Beruflich Dokumente
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Deep operation also known as Soviet Deep Battle (Russian: , glubokaya operatsiya) was
a tenet that emphasized destroying, suppressing or disorganizing enemy forces not only at the line of contact,
but throughout the depth of the battlefield. It was a military theory developed by the Soviet Union for its armed
forces during the 1920s and 1930s by a number of influential military writers, such as Vladimir Triandafillov
and Mikhail Tukhachevsky who endeavoured to create a military strategy with its own specialised operational
art and tactics. The concept of deep operations was a national strategy, tailored to the economic, cultural and
geopolitical position of the Soviet Union. In the aftermath of several failures or defeats in the Russo-Japanese
War, First World War and PolishSoviet War, the Soviet High Command (Stavka) focused on developing new
methods for the conduct of war. This new approach considered military strategy and tactics, but also introduced
a new intermediate level of military art: operations. The Soviet Union was the first country to officially
distinguish the third level of military thinking which occupied the position between strategy and tactics.
Using these templates, the Soviets developed the concept of deep battle and by 1936 it had become part of the
Red Army Field Regulations. Deep operations had two phases; the tactical deep battle, followed by the
exploitation of tactical success, known as the conduct of deep battle operations. Deep battle envisaged the
breaking of the enemy's forward defences, or tactical zones, for fresh uncommitted mobile operational reserves
to exploit by breaking into the strategic depth of an enemy front. The goal of a deep operation was to inflict a
decisive strategic defeat on the enemy and render the defence of their front more difficult, impossibleor,
indeed, irrelevant. Unlike most other doctrines, deep battle stressed combined arms cooperation at all levels:
strategic, operational, and tactical.
Contents
1 History
1.1 Before deep battle
1.2 Roots of deep battle
2 Principles
2.1 Doctrine
2.2 Tukhachevsky legacy
2.3 Isserson; the factor of depth
2.4 Tactical deep battle
2.5 Deep operation
2.6 Varfolomeev and the composition of deep operations
2.7 Deep operations engagement
2.8 Logistics
3 Intended outcomes; differences with other methodologies
4 The impact of the purges
5 Deep operations during World War II
5.1 Moscow counter offensive
5.2 Rzhev-Vyazma offensive
5.3 Operation Uranus and Third Kharkov
5.4 Kursk
5.5 Other campaigns
6 Cold War
6.1 Central Europe
6.2 Asia
7 Major proponents
8 See also
9 References
9.1 Citations
9.2 Bibliography
10 External links
History
Before deep battle
Russian military thinking had changed little over the course of three centuries prior to the 1920s. The Russian
Empire had kept pace with its enemies and allies and performed well in its major conflicts in the run-up to the
19th century. However, despite some notable victories in the Napoleonic Wars and Russo-Turkish Wars, its
defeats in the Crimean War, Russo-Japanese War and First World War, together with a series of defeats at the
hands of Poland in the PolishSoviet War (19191921), highlighted the inferiority of Russian methodology in
organisation and training.[1]
After the Russian Revolution, the new Bolshevik regime sought to create an entirely new military system that
reflected the Bolshevik revolutionary spirit. The new Red Army combined the old and new methods. It still
relied on the country's enormous manpower reserves; however, the Soviet program to develop heavy industry,
which began in 1929, also raised the technical standards of Soviet arms industries to the level of other European
nations. Once this had been achieved, the Soviets turned their attention to solving the problem of military
operational mobility.[2]
Primary advocates of this development included Alexander Andreyevich Svechin, Mikhail Frunze, and
Tukhachevsky. They promoted the development of military scientific societies and they identified groups of
talented officers. Many of these officers entered the Soviet Military Academy during Tukhachevsky's tenure as
its commandant in 19211922. Others came later, including particularly Nikolai Efimovich Varfolomeev and
Vladimir Triandafillov, who made significant contributions to the use of technology in deep offensive
operations.[3]
Mikhail Frunze
that a strategy of decisive destruction of the enemy forces was needed. The latter
opinion was motivated in part by the condition of the Soviet Union's economy: the
country was still not industrialized and thus was economically too weak to fight a
long war of attrition.[6] By 1928 Tukhachevsky's ideas had changed: he considered
that, given the nature and lessons of the First World War, the next major war
would almost certainly be one of attrition. He determined, however, that the vast
size of the Soviet Union ensured that some mobility was still possible. Svechin
accepted this and allowed for the first offensives to be fast and fluid; but
ultimately he decided that it would come down to a war of position and attrition.
This would require a strong economy and a loyal and politically indoctrinated
population in order to outlast the enemy.[5]
The doctrine pursued by the Soviets was offensively oriented. Tukhachevsky's
neglect of defense pushed the Red Army toward the decisive battle and cult of the
offensive mentality, which along with other events, caused enormous problems in
1941.[7]
Mikhail Tukhachevsky
Unlike Tukhachevsky, Svechin determined the next war could only be won by attrition, not by a single or
several decisive battles. Svechin also argued that a theory of alternating defensive and offensive action was
needed. Within this framework, Svechin also recognised the theoretical distinction of operational art that lay
between tactics and strategy. In his opinion the role of the operation was to group and direct tactical battles
toward a series of simultaneous operational objectives along a wide frontage, either directly or indirectly, in
order to achieve the stavka's ultimate strategic target(s).[7] This became the blueprint for Soviet deep battle.
In 1929 Vladimir Triandafillov and Tukhachevsky formed a partnership to create a coherent system of
principles from the concept formed by Svechin. Tukhachevsky was to elaborate the principles of the tactical
and operational phases of deep battle.[8] In response to his efforts and in acceptance of the methodology, the
Red Army produced the Provisional Instructions for Organizing the Deep Battle manual in 1933. This was the
first time that "deep battle" was mentioned in official Red Army literature.[9]
Principles
Doctrine
Deep battle encompassed manoeuvre by multiple Soviet Army front-size formations simultaneously. It was not
meant to deliver a victory in a single operation; instead, multiple operations, which might be conducted in
parallel or successively, would induce a catastrophic failure in the enemy's defensive system.
Each operation served to divert enemy attention and keep the defender guessing about where the main effort,
and main objective, lay. In doing so, it prevented the enemy from dispatching powerful mobile reserves to this
area. The Army could then overrun vast regions before the defender could recover. The diversion operations
also frustrated an opponent trying to conduct an elastic defence. The supporting operations had significant
strategic objectives themselves and supporting units were to continue their offensive actions until they were
unable to progress any further. However, they were still subordinated to the main/decisive strategic objective
determined by the Stavka.[10]
Each of the operations along the front would have secondary strategic goals, and one of those operations would
usually be aimed towards the primary objective.
The strategic objective, or mission, was to secure the primary strategic target. The primary target usually
consisted of a geographical objective and the destruction of a proportion of the enemy armed forces. Usually
the strategic missions of each operation were carried out by a Soviet front. The front itself usually had several
shock armies attached to it, which were to converge on the target and encircle or assault it. The means of
securing it was the job of the division and its tactical components, which Soviet deep battle termed the tactical
mission.
Terminology, force allocation and mission table.[11]
Mission
Territory
Actions
Force allocation
Strategic aim
Theatre of operations
Strategic operation
Strategic mission
Strategic direction
Front operation
Battlefield
Battle
The concept of deep battle was not just offensive. The theory took into account all forms of warfare, and
decided both the offensive and defensive should be studied and incorporated into deep battle. The defensive
phase of deep battle involved identifying crucial strategic targets and securing them against attack from all
directions. As with the offensive methods of deep battle, the target area would be identified and dissected into
operational and tactical zones. In defence, the tactical zones, forward of the objective would be fortified with
artillery and infantry forces. The outer and forward most defences would be heavily mined making a very
strong static defence position. The tactical zones would have several defence lines, one after the other, usually
12 kilometres from the main objective. In the zone some 13 kilometres from the main objective, shock forces,
which contained the bulk of the Soviet combat formations, would be positioned.[12]
The goal of the defence in depth concept was to blunt the elite enemy forces, which would be first to breach the
Soviet lines, several times, causing them to exhaust themselves. Once the enemy had become bogged down in
Soviet defences, the operational reserves came into play. Being positioned behind the tactical zones, the fresh
mobile forces consisting of mechanized infantry, foot infantry, armored forces, and powerful tactical air support
would engage the worn down enemy in a counter-offensive, either destroying it by attacking its flank, or driving
it out of the Soviet tactical zone and into enemy held territory as far as possible.[12]
Tukhachevsky legacy
There are three standard doctrine about military to understand Deep Battle, as adopted by US Army and US
Marine Corps:
1. Tactic
The lower level is tactic, an aspect of individual skill and corps size.
2. Strategy
The highest level, an aspect of theater operation and the leadership of organization of a government.
3. Operational
Operational is the bridge between tactic and strategy.
According to Col McPadden (US Army) the most precious legacy of Tukhachevsky are his concepts about all
operations theory including the "operational art". Mikhail Tukhachevsky is the first who made operational as a
systematic concept. According to Col. McPadden the main skill of military commander is dependent on
Tukhachevsky's Theory, which is the ability to integrate tactic and strategy. The meaning is, the capability of
commander on "the use of military forces to achieve strategic goals through the design, organization, integration
and conduct of theater strategies, campaigns, major operations and battles".[13]
defence lines. If this failed, and the enemy succeeded in sweeping aside the holding forces and breaching the
several main defence lines, mobile operational reserves, including tanks and assault aviation, would be
committed. These forces would be allocated to holding and shock groups alike, and were often positioned
behind the main defences to engage the battle worn enemy thrust.[17]
The forces used to carry out the tactical assignments varied from 1933 to 1943. The number of shock armies,
rifle corps, and divisions (mechanized and infantry) given to a strategic front constantly changed. By 1943, the
year the Red Army began to practice deep battle properly, the order of battle for each tactical unit under the
command of a front were:
Rifle army
3 rifle corps
712 rifle divisions
4 artillery regiments
One field artillery regiment
One anti-tank gun regiment
anti-aircraft artillery regiment
One mortar regiment
One signal regiment
One communication battalion
One telegraph company
One aviation communication troop
Stavka operational forces
12 artillery divisions
3 artillery regiments
3 tank destroyer regiments
34 tank or self-propelled gun brigades
10 separate tank or self-propelled gun regiments
2 anti-aircraft divisions
12 mechanized corps
These forces numbered some 80,000130,000 men, 1,5002,000 guns and mortars, 48-497 rocket launchers,
and 30-226 self-propelled guns.[18]
Rifle corps
3 Rifle divisions
One artillery regiment
One signals battalion
One sapper battalion
Rifle division
3 Rifle regiments
One artillery regiment
One anti-tank battalion
One sapper battalion
One signal company
One reconnaissance company
The division numbered some 9,380 men (10,670 in a guards rifle division), 44 field guns, 160 mortars and 48
anti-tank guns.[18]
Deep operation
Soviet analysts recognised that it was not enough to break through the enemy tactical zone. Although it is the
first step and crucial, tactical deep battle offered no solution about how a force could sustain an advance
beyond it and into the operational and strategic depths of an enemy front. The success of tactical action
counted for little in an operational defensive zone which extended dozens of kilometres and where the enemy
held large reserves. Such enemy concentrations could prevent the exploitation of a tactical breakthrough and
threaten the operational advance.[19]
This was demonstrated during the First World War, when
initial breakthroughs were rendered useless owing to
exhaustion during the tactical effort, limited mobility, and a
slow paced advance and enemy reinforcements. The
attacker was further unable to influence the fighting beyond
the immediate battlefield, due to the limited range, speed
and reliability in existing weapons. The attacker was often
unable to exploit tactical success in even the most
favourable circumstances as his infantry could not push
into the breach rapidly enough. Enemy reinforcements
could then seal off the break in their lines.[19]
The concept was termed "deep operations" (glubokaya operatsiya). It emerged in 1936 and placed within the
context of deep battle in the 1936 Field Regulations. The deep operation was geared toward operations at the
Army and or Front level and was larger, in terms of the forces engaged, than deep battle's tactical component,
which used units not larger than corps size.[19]
The forces used in the operational phase were much larger. The Red Army proposed to use the efforts of air
forces, airborne forces and ground forces to launch a "simultaneous blow throughout the entire depth of the
enemy's operational defense" in order to delay his strongest forces positioned in the area of operations by
defeating them in detail; to surround and destroy those units at the front (the tactical zone, by occupying the
operational depth to its rear); and to continue the offensive into the defender's operational and strategic
depth.[20]
The central composition of the deep operation was the shock army, acting either in cooperation with each other
or independently as part of a strategic front operation. Several shock armies would be subordinated to a
strategic front. Triandafilov created this layout of force allocation for deep operations in his Character of
Operations of Modern Armies, which retained its utility throughout the 1930s. Triandafilov assigned the shock
army some 1218 rifle divisions, in four to five corps. These units were supplemented with 1620 artillery
regiments and 812 tank battalions. By the time of his death in 1931, Triandafilov had submitted various
strength proposals which included the assignment of aviation units to the front unit. This consisted of two or
three aviation brigades of bomber aircraft and six to eight squadrons of fighter aircraft.[20]
Triandafilov's successor, Nikolai Efimovich Varfolomeev, was less concerned with developing the quantitative
indices of deep battle, but rather the mechanics of the shock army's mission. Varfolomeev termed this as
"launching an uninterrupted, deep and shattering blow" along the main axis of advance. Varfolomeev believed
the shock army needed both firepower and mobility to destroy both enemy
tactical defences, operational reserves and seize geographical targets or
positions in harmony with other operationally independent, but strategically
collaborative, offensives.[21]
Vladimir Triandafillov
Logistics
The development of Soviet operational logisticsthat complex of rear service roles, missions, procedures, and
resources intended to sustain military operations by army and front groupingsclearly occupied a prominent
place within overall Soviet efforts to formulate or adapt warfighting approaches to new conditions. As Soviet
military theorists and planners have long emphasised, logistic theory and practice are shaped by the same
historical and technological developments that influence Soviet warfighting approaches at every level. In turn,
they play a major role in defining directions and parameters for Soviet methods.
Soviet theory recognised the need for logistic theory and practice that were consistent with other components
of strategy, operational art, and tactics. Despite the many changes in the political, economic, and military
environment and the quickening pace of technological change, logistical doctrine was an important feature of
Soviet thinking.
The abandonment of deep operations had a huge impact on Soviet military capability. Entering the Second
World War after the German invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941, the Soviets struggled to relearn it. The
surprise German invasion (Operation Barbarossa) subjected the Red Army to six months of disasters. The Red
Army was shattered during the first two months. Thereafter it faced the task of surviving, then reviving and
maturing into an instrument that could compete with the Wehrmacht and achieve victory.
Soviet military analysts and historians divide the war into three periods. The Red Army was primarily on the
strategic defensive during the first period of war (22 June 1941 19 November 1942). By late 1942 the Soviets
had recovered sufficiently to put their concept into practice. The second period of war (19 November 1942 31
December 1943), which commenced with the Soviet strategic counteroffensive at Stalingrad, was a transitional
period marked by alternating attempts by both sides to secure strategic advantage. After that deep battle was
used to devastating effect, allowing the Red Army to destroy hundreds of Axis divisions. After the Battle of
Kursk the Soviets had firmly secured the strategic initiative and advanced beyond the Dnepr River. The Red
Army maintained the strategic initiative during the third and final period of war (19441945) and ultimately
played a central role in the Allied victory in Europe.[35]
Rzhev-Vyazma offensive
Deep battle plan
The Stavka correctly judged that these operations had failed because of the Red Army's lack of large, coherent,
mechanized, and armored formations capable of performing sustained operational maneuver. To remedy the
problem, in April 1942 the Soviets fielded new tank corps consisting of three tank brigades and one motorized
rifle brigade and totaling 168 tanks each. The Stavka placed these corps at the disposal of army and front
commanders for use as mobile groups operating in tandem with older cavalry corps, which by now had also
received a new complement of armour. The Stavka employed these new tank corps in an offensive role for the
first time in early 1942.
During this time, The Germans launched Operation Kremlin, a deception campaign to mislead the Stavka, that
the main German attack in the summer would be aimed at Moscow. The Stavka were convinced that the
offensive would involve Army Group South as a southern pincer against the Central Front protecting Moscow.
To preempt the German assault, the Red Army launched two offensive operations, the Rzhev-Vyazma strategic
offensive operation against Army Group Centre, and the Kharkov offensive operation (known officially as the
Barvenkovo-Lozovaia offensive)[36] against Army Group South. Both were directly linked as a spoiling
offensives to break up and exhaust German formations before they could launch Operation Blue.[37] The
Kharkov operation was designed to attack the northern flank of German forces around Kharkov, to seize
bridgeheads across the Donets River north east of the city. A southern attack would be made from bridgeheads
seized by the winter-counter offensive in 1941. The operation was to encircle the Fourth Panzer Army and
German Sixth Army as they advanced towards the Dnepr river.[38] The operation led to the Second Battle of
Kharkov.
The battlefield plan involved the Soviet South Western Front. The South Western Front was to attack out of
bridgeheads across the Northern Donets River north and south of Kharkov. The Soviets intended to exploit with
a cavalry corps (the 3rd Guards) in the north and two secretly formed and redeployed tank corps (the 21st and
23d) and a cavalry corps (the 6th) in the south. Ultimately the two mobile groups were to link up west of
Kharkov and entrap the German Sixth Army. Once this was achieved, a sustained offensive into the Ukraine
would enable the recovery of industrial regions.
Outcome
In fact, primarily due to Stalin overriding his subordinates' suggestions, the Stavka fell for the German ruse.
Instead of attacking the southern pincer of the suspected Moscow operation, they ran into heavy concentrations
of German forces that were to strike southward to the Soviet oilfields in the Caucasus, the actual aim of
Operation Blue.
Although the offensive surprised the Wehrmacht, the Soviets mishandled their mobile forces. Soviet infantry
penetrated German defences to the consternation of the German commanders, but the Soviets procrastinated
and failed to commit the two tank corps for six days. The corps finally went into action on 17 May
simultaneously with a massive surprise attack by First Panzer Army against the southern flank of the Soviet
salient. Over the next two days, the two tank corps disengaged, retraced their path, and engaged the new threat.
But it was too late. The German counterattack encircled and destroyed the better part of three Soviet armies,
the two tank corps and two cavalry corps, totaling more than 250,000 men.[39]
The Kharkov debacle demonstrated to Stalin and Soviet planners that they not only had to create larger
armoured units, but they also had to learn to employ them properly.
Kursk
Deep battle plan
The battle of Kursk combined both the defensive and offensive side of deep battle. The nature of Soviet
operations in the summer, 1943 was to gain the initiative and to hold it indefinitely. This meant achieving
permanent superiority in the balance of forces, in operational procedure and maintaining initiative on the
battlefield.[40]
The Soviet plan for the defence of the city Kursk involved all three levels of warfare coherently fused together.
Soviet strategy, the top end of military art, was concerned with gaining the strategic initiative which would then
allow the Red Army to stage further military operations to liberate Soviet territory lost in 1941 and 1942. To do
this, the Stavka decided to achieve the goal through defensive means. The bulge in the front line around Kursk
made it an obvious and tempting target to the Wehrmacht. Allowing the Germans to strike first at the target area
allowed the Red Army the opportunity to wear down German Army formations against pre-prepared positions,
thereby shaping the force in field ratio heavily against the enemy. Once the initiative had been achieved and the
enemy had been worn down, strategic reserves would be committed to finish off the remaining enemy force.
The success of this strategy would allow the Red Army to pursue its enemy into the economically rich area of
Ukraine and recover the industrial areas, such as Kiev, which had been lost in 1941. Moreover, Soviet
strategists recognised that Ukraine offered the best route through which to reach Germany's allies, such as
Romania, with its oilfields, vital to Axis military operations. The elimination of these allies or a successful
advance to their borders would deny Germany military resources, or at least destabilise the Axis block in the
Balkans.
The operational method revolved around outmanoeuvring their opponents. The nature of the bulge meant the
Red Army could build strong fortifications in depth along the German axis of advance. Two rifle divisions
defended the first belt, and one defended the second. A first belt division would only defend an area of 815
kilometres wide and 56 kilometres in depth.[41] Successive defence belts would slow German forces down and
force them to conduct slow and attritional battles to break through into the operational depths. Slowing the
operational tempo of the enemy would also allow the Soviet intelligence analysts to keep track of German
formations and their direction of advance, enabling Soviet reserve formations to be accurately positioned to
prevent German spearheads breaking through each of the three main defence belts. Intelligence would also help
when initiating their own offensives (Operation Kutuzov and Operation Polkovodets Rumyantsev) once the
Germans had been bogged down in Soviet defences. The overwhelming contingent of Soviet armour and
mechanised divisions were given to the operational reserves for this purpose.[42]
The tactical level relied heavily on fortified and static defences made up of infantry and artillery. Anti-tank guns
were mounted throughout the entire depth of the defences. Few tanks were committed to the tactical zones and
the nature of the defences would have robbed them of mobility. Instead, only a small number of tanks and
self-propelled artillery were used to give the defences some mobility. They were distributed in penny packets to
enable localised counterattacks.[43] Such tactics slowed the Germans, forcing them to expend strength and
munitions on combating the Soviet forward zones. The Soviets had counted on the Germans being stopped
within the tactical zones. To ensure that this occurred, they distributed large numbers of anti-AFV and
anti-personnel mines to the defences.
Outcome
The Germans began their offensive, as predicted, on 5 July 1943, under the codename Operation Citadel. The
Soviets succeeded in limiting them to a slow advance. In the north, the German 9th Army advanced south from
Orel. The Germans failed to breach the main defence lines, stalling at the third belt. The German armies had
been forced to commit their mobile reserves to the breakthrough. This allowed the Soviets to conduct the
operational and offensive phase of their plan; Operation Kutuzov. Striking the 2nd Panzer Army, the Soviet's
fresh operational forces, heavily mechanized, threatened to cut off the German 9th Army. Had they succeeded,
nothing would have stood between the Red Army and the strategic depth of German Army Group Centre's
front. However the Germans were able to stem the advance by committing their mobile reserves and organize a
withdrawal. Still, the two German armies had been worn down, and the Soviet forces in the north had won the
strategic initiative.
In the south, the Soviet plan did not work as effectively and the contingency plan had to be put into effect. The
German formations succeeded in penetrating all three Soviet defence belts. This denied the Soviets the
opportunity to pin them down in the tactical defence belts and release their operational reserves to engage the
enemy on favourable terms. Instead, operational forces for Operation Polkovodets Rumyantsev that were
intended for the southern counteroffensive, were ordered to at and near Prokhorovka. This led to the Battle of
Prokhorovka. While the tactical deployment and operational plan had not worked as flawlessly as it had in the
north, the strategic initiative had still been won.
Other campaigns
Other campaigns that exemplify the application of the Deep operation doctrine include:
Battle of the Dnieper
DnieperCarpathian Offensive
Operation Bagration
VistulaOder Offensive
Cold War
Central Europe
The Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies used their massive superiority in numbers and the idea of Deep
Battle to intimidate NATO over the Inner German Border. Some Western observers predicted that the Warsaw
Pact could use a mixture of speed and surprise to overrun Western Europe in around 48 hours. While massive
air strikes using enormous amounts of aircraft would devastate NATO infrastructure and reinforcements, VDV
(airborne units), Spetsnaz ("special purpose troops") and naval infantry would clear the way for the torrent of
tank and motor-rifle divisions that would soon cross the border. The forward units of these tank and motor rifle
divisions would be given the task, rather unusually, of avoiding engagements with the enemy and simply to
advancing as far and as fast as possible, therefore enabling a victory before any replacement aircraft and
REFORGER units came to Europe from America.
Asia
Ever since the 1960s when the Sino-Soviet alliance came to an abrupt end, the Soviet High Command
considered invading China by deep battle offensive operations, envisaging a rapid drive deep towards the
latter's main industrial centers before they could have a chance to mount a credible defense or even stage a
counterattack. However, the extremely vast numbers of the Chinese Army and their knowledge of the terrain,
coupled with their then-recent possession of nuclear weapons, made such a drive the Soviets are to execute
extremely unlikely. Although both sides nearly went to war in three separate occasions in 1968, 1969 and 1979
respectively, the Soviets are rather hesitant to go to war and invade China, thanks to the fact that both possess
huge armed forces and nuclear weapons at their disposal.
Major proponents
Mikhail Tukhachevsky
Georgii Isserson
Nikolai Efimovich Varfolomeev
Vladimir Triandafillov
Georgi Zhukov
See also
Operational art
Tank Corps (Soviet)
Mechanized Corps (Soviet)
Blitzkrieg
References
Citations
1. Harrison 2001, p. 4.
2. Harrison 2001, pp.
45.
3. Cody and Krauz
2006, p. 229.
4. Harrison 2001, p.
123.
5. Harrison 2001, p.
126.
6. Harrison 2001, pp.
129131.
7. Harrison 2001, p.
140.
8. Harrison 2001, pp.
187194.
9. Harrison 2001, p.
187.
10. Watt 2008, p.
673674.
11. Glantz 1991a, p. 40.
12. Harrison 2001, p.
193.
Bibliography
Glantz, David M., Col (rtd.) Soviet Military Operational Art: In Pursuit of Deep Battle, Frank Cass,
London, 1991a. ISBN 0-7146-4077-8.
Glantz, David M. (1991b). The Soviet Conduct of Tactical Maneuver: Spearhead of the Offensive (1.
publ. ed.). London u.a.: Cass. ISBN 0-7146-3373-9.
Habeck, Mary. Storm of Steel: The Development of Armor Doctrine in Germany and the Soviet Union,
19191939. Cornell University Press, 2003. ISBN 0-8014-4074-2
Harrison, Richard W. The Russian Way of War: Operational Art 19041940. Lawrence, Kan.: University
Press of Kansas, 2001. ISBN 0-7006-1074-X
Krause, Michael and Phillips, Cody.Historical Perspectives of Operational Art. Cente of Military
History, United States Army. 2006. ISBN 978-0-16-072564-7
Naveh, Shimon (1997). In Pursuit of Military Excellence; The Evolution of Operational Theory.
London: Francass. ISBN 0-7146-4727-6.
Simpkin, Richard. Deep Battle: The Brainchild of Marshal Tukhachevsky. London; Washington:
Brassey's Defence, 1987. ISBN 0-08-031193-8.
Watt, Robert. Feeling the Full Force of a Four Point Offensive: Re-Interpreting The Red Army's 1944
Belorussian and L'vov-Przemyl Operations. The Journal of Slavic Military Studies. Routledge Taylor &
Francis Group. ISSN 1351-8046
External links
The Evolution of Operational Art by Georgii Isseson, 1936 (http://usacac.army.mil/Cac2/cgsc
/carl/download/csipubs/OperationalArt.pdf) PDF, available on United States Army Combined Arms
Center's website
"Georgii Isserson: Architect of Soviet Victory in World War II": Video (https://www.youtube.com
/watch?v=56N9iPjQDIU) on YouTube, a lecture by Dr. Richard Harrison, via the official channel of the
U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center
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