Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
M. Vukovi
British and Montenegrin media between 2007 and 2008. The British group of
interviews (30,000 words) consisted of 11 interviews taken from BBC1, BBC
News, BBC World, Sky News, Channel 4 and the British edition of Euronews.
The American group of interviews (33,000 words) consisted of 10 interviews
excerpted from CNN, CBS, ABC and Fox News, and the Montenegrin group of
political interviews (42,000 words) consisted of 8 interviews taken from
RTCG, TV IN and TV Vijesti. We also used an additional corpus at one point,
which consisted of four interviews with George Bush, conducted between
2006 and 2008 on ABC, CBS and BBC.
It was hypothesized that:
a) In spite of all difficulties and its potential deficiencies, an objective
methodology for quantifying adversarialness and evasion may be
established;
b) There exists a link between adversarialness and evasion, i.e., that the
levels of adversarialness directly affect the levels of evasion;
c) The presence of adversarialness and evasion will vary in the three
media cultures studied;
d) Cause and effect relationships between adversarialness and evasion
will be found in all three media cultures studied.
The aims of the paper are then the following:
a) To define how adversarialness and evasion may be quantified;
b) To compare the levels of adversarialness and evasion in the three
groups of interviews, based on the frequencies obtained;
c) To study the relationship between adversarialness and evasion and to
give concrete examples so as to observe patterns.
3. Results and discussion
3.1. Adversarialness
As it can be expected, it is difficult to measure levels of adversarialness in a
political interview. The kind of adversarialness we have in mind here is the
level to which the journalists make it difficult for their interviewees to
answer, i.e., their agressiveness or hostility in questioning. No universally
accepted methodology stands at our disposal and we are of the opinion that it
is quite debatable whether one can be devised to rest solely on quantitative
criteria. Instead, we have decided to focus on the analysis of certain linguistic
features that might indicate adversarialness and to deduce our conclusions on
the basis of several of them.
Surveying the literature, we have come across a number of indicators that are
said to point to adversarialness, and by examining the corpus, we have
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extrapolated a few additional ones. After these methodological steps had been
taken, we made an attempt to catogorise the indicators. Four categories of the
indicators of adversarialness emerged from this research:
1. Question design:
1.1. Tilting the questionlimiting the range of possible answers
1.1.1. Asking yes/no questions
1.1.2. Asking negatively formulated questions
1.1.3. Asking prepared and supplemented questions
1.2. Perspective
1.3. Turn-initial but
2. Interactional demands:
2.1. Multiple questions
3. Interviewees answers:
3.1. Evasion
3.2. Turn-initial well
3.3. Filler I think
4. Interview Management:
4.1. Receipt tokens
4.2. Supplementing answers
4.3. Interruptions
The logic behind the first categoryquestion designis that adversarial
questions limit the range of possible answers. Interviewers can tilt the
question so that the answer takes a certain direction. Typically, these
techniques involve using certain types of grammatical questions, such as yesno questions, which severely limit the range of possible answers, and
especially negatively formulated questions, which tilt the answer towards the
preferred option (Heritage, 2002). Interviewees often have difficulties with
answering yes/no questions, as in example 1, where Boris Johnson starts his
turn using the discourse marker well, typically used when the interviewee is
in an unfavorable situation (Jucker, 1993), followed by two repairs, i.e.,
reformulations (Well I, I . . . ; whether they, they . . . .). These markers suggest
adversarialness in the question. Additionally, the question prefers the
positive answer, which makes it furthermore difficult for the politician to
answer negatively:
(1) (B7) INTERVIEWER: Are you sort of surrounded by a semicircle of
Cameron advisors trying to control you?
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are you doing about the value of the US dollar, which seems to be
falling rather rapidly?
PAULSON: Wolf, you've heard me before, I believe very strongly
that thisthat the strong dollar is in our nation's interests. We
have a strong dollar policy. I make the points repeatedly that
every economy goes through some ups and downs. We're going
through a tough patch right now in our economy.
(CNN, Late Edition, IR: Wolf Blitzer, IE: Henry Paulson,
16.03.2008)
(4) (B2) INTERVIEWER: (Question) Are they brutalised in these camps?
(supplement) There are allegations of raping taking place.
MUGABE: No, no, no, no, no, no. Those are allegations, you are
just looking at the negative. Why don't you look at the aspects
that are promoted that are positive? The youth must be
developed and developed in respect of all skills. They must think
Zimbabwean, feel Zimbabwean and be nationally conscious. That
is what they what they are to be.
(Sky News, freestanding interview, IR: Stuart Ramsey, IE: Robert
Mugabe, 24.05.2004)
In example 3, by providing a preparatory statement that suggests grim
economic circumstances, Wolf Blitzer makes it virtually impossible for
Paulson to paint a rosy picture of the US economy. In addition, in the
formulation of the question, the interviewer suggests that the Treasury
Secretary Paulson is doing nothing to improve the circumstances. In return,
the answer provided by the politician is vague and uses the plural perspective
(the first person plural pronoun we is the subject, which mitigates some
responsibility for the individual).
A similar mechanism underlies example 4, featuring a supplemented
question. In the literature, this marker has not been mentioned, however, we
think that it might also be used as an indicator of adversarialness. Let us see
how this works in the example mentionedthe yes/no question which starts
the turn limits the range of possible answers to either yes or no. However,
the supplement that follows tilts it further towards the positive answer, even
though it is softened by the phrase there are allegations. The interviewer is
basically leading the politician to give a positive answer. Such questions seem
to be quite resonant in the ears of the audience, which is why the politician
chooses to give a definite negative answer, repeating no six times.
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RUBIN: We are in a state of war with the Shiite militias and alQaeda we are in a state of war. Iran has policies that we object
to and we reject.
INTERVIEWER: But there . . . .
RUBIN: And we should confront.
INTERVIEWER: But they are contributing to the deaths of
Americans, if you listen to the American military in Iraq, by
supporting some of the rogue militias. Shouldn't that make them
enemies?
(Fox News, The Journal Editorial Report, IR: Paul Gigot, IE: James
Rubin, 31.05.2008)
This was found to be the case throughout our corpus, regardless of the group
of interviews. In most cases, it could be implied that the journalist was
somehow contesting what the politician was sayingin ex. 9, but is paired up
with an ironic analogy, suggesting that Beckett is deliberately belittling the
severity and the scope of the situation; in ex. 10, the journalist contradicts the
interviewee directly several times but the interviewee insists, which results
in a harsh fight for the floor and the right to speak.
Also, by imposing higher interactional demands on politicians (the second
category), for example through asking a series of questions within the same
turn (11), the difficulty of the question rises and so does the likelihood of its
being more adversarial (Clayman & Heritage, 2002). The more complex the
questioning, the more difficult it is for the politician to answer:
(11) (A2) INTERVIEWER: (preparatory-statement) I was in Tehran last
week with Scott Pelley interviewing Ahmadinejad. (question 1)
How much of a time deadline do you face? (question 2) Do you
have to resolve this diplomatically or with sanctions before
President Bush's term is up? (question 3) And if you don't, then
does that mean that the President would use force? (question 4)
Is he determined to resolve this on his watch?
RICE: (answer 4) Well, we are determined to do everything that
we can to prevent Iran from getting these technologies because
let me be very clearthe issue is having the engineering knowhow to be able to string together the running of centrifuges long
enough to enrich to the material to the level at which it's nuclear
weapons grade. That's really what we're talking about. We're not
talking about a kind of mature program of the kind that the North
Koreans have.
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10
The dual nature of this pragmatic marker (deliberative and tentative) has also
been confirmed by Holmes (1990) and Krkkinen (2003).
11
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INTERVJUISTA: 2009.
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B
58.2
34.8
9.77
25.23
6.7
7.1
13.56
5.67
0.63
0
37.85
A
49.47
30.2
5.24
16.39
5.24
10.4
17.7
1.31
1.96
0.32
10.72
M
43.91
21.62
2.53
31.70
2.17
19.93
12.13
2.71
9.42
5.07
59.77
American
British Corpus Corpus
50%
55.3%
Montenegrin
Corpus
51%
Comparing the results, we arrive at a conclusion that there was most evasion
in the American group of interviews. However, the rates are similar and,
when compared to the rate of 46% from Bulls study (2003), somewhat
higher in our interviews.
The drawback to this evasion assessing model is in its simplicity, as
politicians are rarely asked simple questions in media interviews, so to
expect a yes/no reply can sometimes be unreasonable (Beard, 2000, p. 112).
2
In this section, the paper draws on the results obtained within a wider research of
political interviews, some of which were presented in Vukovi, 2011.
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70.6%
63.5%
33.3%
42.3%
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Nevertheless, the data also point to the fact that such an hypothesis must be
supplemented. Namely, different levels of adversarialness in the three groups
of interviews all resulted in similar evasion rates. In particular, the
Montenegrin group of interviews had a significantly lower degree of
adversarialness, whereas evasion featured a high total of 51%. Such a result
may not be explained by a level of adversarialness and clearly other factors
have to be accounted for.
A new hypothesis is that politicians evade not only because their interviewers
are hostile but also in cases when their interviewers are too lenient. Clayman
(2001, p. 440) concluded his Answers and Evasion paper by stating that:
alternatively, increasingly adversarial questioning could have precisely
the opposite effect: insofar as adversarialness includes a greater
propensity to ask follow-up questions that pursue evasive responses, it
could encourage interviewees to adhere more closely to the question
agenda.
A high level of adversarialness would make politicians less evasive, and a low
level of adversarialness could trigger more evasion, having in mind that
sanctions for such behaviour are not expected.
The best example to illustrate the case may be found in the Montenegrin
group of interviews. It is the aforementioned interview with the Prime
Minister of Montenegro, broadcast by the National Montenegrin Broadcasting
Company. The interviewer seemed to employ a lenient approach to
questioning and the interviewee seemed to take advantage of it by evading to
a high degree:
(17) (C 2) INTERVJUISTA:- Da, da li ipak u sluaju Crne Gore ima odreenih
prepreka na tom putu?
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that, for example, the American culture favored directness and precision,
whereas some others favored the opposite (e.g., Japanese).
In all the three groups, the levels of evasion were not uniform in all
interviews. Although the mean final results were similar, the level of evasion
varied from interview to interview (as in Table 4). Additionally, we take into
account the fact that these percentages could differ for the same politician
from interview to interview (Table 3). Therefore, according to the results of
this study, culture does not seem to be a major generator of evasion in
political interviews for these three media cultures.
At this point, however, we must add that we do believe that there is a
connection between culture and evasion, but we assume it plays a minor part
in this context. The existence of this connection could only be proven using a
much larger corpus and more detailed analyses.
4. Conclusion
Overall, the conclusion is that the level of evasion in broadcast political
interviews is context-specific and depends on the questioning style employed
by the interviewer in terms of adversarialness or leniency as well as the
degree thereof, and that evasive behaviour seems to follow culture-specific
patterns.
It proved more difficult to measure the level of adversarialness in comparison
to evasion. For measuring adversarialness, we came up with a list of potential
linguistic indicators and later measured their frequency compared to the
number of turns in which they occur. The results in the three groups of
interviews varied significantly, as it was expected in our hypothesis,
suggesting that adversarialness is differently expressed in different media
cultures. Overall, one could deduce where there was more adversarialness in
the Ango-Saxon media, but the results, despite all efforts to have objective
data, were far from conclusive, as it turned out that various types or styles
of adversarialness existed in the three cultures.
On the other hand, a much simpler method was used for assessing evasion
that of observing only the replies to yes/no questions. Evasion turned out to
be more or less at the same level in the three groups of interviews, despite the
different adversarialness levels.
Both high and low levels of adversarialness result in more evasive action. On
the one hand, in interviews with hostile questioning, politicians find
themselves in conflictual situations where avoiding certain issues or avoiding
giving direct answers might be beneficial to their case; on the other hand,
when given the chance and when not facing a backlash from the interviewer
in the case of more lenient questioning, politicians will go off topic and take
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the opportunity to deliver pre-packed politics and thus score political points.
Therefore, politicians evade because they have to (in case of high level of
adversarialness in questioning) and because they can (in case of low level of
adversarialness in questioning). The cause and effect relationship between
adversarialness and evasion was confirmed on several subgroups of
interviews. The levels of evasion varied with the same politician, in the same
way the level of adversarialness varied with the same interviewer. This leads
us to believe that the levels of the two were a result of an interplay mentioned
abovethe more the journalist was aggressive, the more the politician
evaded. But it did not go for the other way roundactually, the less journalist
was aggressive, the more the politician evaded. The conclusion is that most
politicians will evade when given the chance (with slack interviewers), and
they will do the same when forced by hostile questioning (with tough
interviewers). It seems that, for a constructive and informative interview, the
interviewer is the one who needs to strike up the right balance, as little
appears to be depending on the politician himself/herself.
The Author
Milica Vukovi (Email: vmilica@ac.me) has been a researcher at the Institute
of Foreign Languages, University of Montenegro, since 2006. As a member of
the Institutes staff, she also teaches English Grammar for interpreters and
English for Science. Dr Vukovi acquired her MPhil and PhD degrees in
linguistics at the Faculty of Philosophy in Niki, Montenegro. The scope of
her interests covers discourse analysis, in general, and political discourse
analysis, in particular.
References
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campaign speeches. In I. Mushin & M. Laughren (Eds.), Selected papers
from the 2006 annual meeting of the Australian Linguistic Society, (pp.
113). Brisbane: University of Queensland.
Bavelas, J., Black, A., Bryson, L., & Mullett, J. (1988). Political equivocation: A
situation explanation. Journal of Language and Social Psychology, 7(2),
137-145.
Beard, A. (2000). The Language of politics. London: Routeledge.
Bhatia, V. (1993). Analysing genre: Language use in professional settings.
London: Longman.
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