Motion To Dissmiss - Crawford

Case 3:16-cv-00515-SMH-JPM Document 40-1 Filed 06/10/16 Page 1 of 45 PageID #: 910
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
MONROE DIVISION
JUDGE SHARON INGRAM MARCHMAN
Plaintiff
* CIVIL ACTION NO. 16-CV-00515

* JUDGE HICKS
*
* MAGISTRATE PEREZ-MONTES
*
JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
VERSUS
BRIAN E. CRAWFORD; LAWRENCE W.

PETTIETTE, JR.; JAMES D. BUDDY
CALDWELL; JON K. GUICE; JUDGE
CARL V. SHARP; JUDGE FREDERIC C.
AMMAN; JUDGE J. WILSON RAMBO;
JUDGE BENJAMIN JONES; and ALLYSON
CAMPBELL
Defendants
*
******************************************************************************
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION TO DISMISS
Respectfully submitted:
ALLEN & GOOCH
A Law Corporation
/s/ JAMES H. GIBSON
____________________________________
JAMES H. GIBSON 14285
2000 Kaliste Saloom Rd Suite 400
Lafayette, LA 70508
P. O. Box 81129
Lafayette, LA 70598-1129
Direct Dial 337-291-1300
Direct Fax 337-291-1305
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT, BRIAN E.
CRAWFORD
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Table of Contents ..............................................................................................................
ii
Table of Authorities ..........................................................................................................
iv
Introduction ......................................................................................................................
Background Facts and Procedural History .........................................................................
Law and Argument............................................................................................................
19
A. 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss Legal Standard .....................................................
19
1. Plaintiffs Civil Rights Action Does Not Lie Against Crawford, a

Private Attorney ...................................................................................
2. Plaintiffs Allegations Fail to Support Conspiracy Claims Under 1983
4. Plaintiffs Allegations Fail to Support a 1986 Claim ...........................
21
22
28
31
B. The Timeline Disproves that Plaintiff Judge Marchmans Hands Were Clean ..
31
Conclusion ........................................................................................................................
36
Exhibit 1 -
October 23, 2014 Memorandum in Support of Motion to Recuse

Defendant Judge Rambo (Palowsky v. Cork) ..............................................
39
June 12, 2015 Motion to Recuse En Banc and to Appoint Ad Hoc Judge,
(Palowsky v. Cork) .....................................................................................
47
May 31, 2015 Reasons and Judgment (Judge Stephen Winters, in his
capacity as Chief Judge of the 4th Judicial District Court v. Hanna Media,
Inc.) ...........................................................................................................
60
Exhibit 4 -
Petition for Damages (Palowsky v. Campbell) ............................................
64
Exhibit 5 -
First Supplemental, Amended and Restated Petition for Damages,

(Palowsky v. Campbell)..............................................................................
77
Motion to Strike, Request for Sanctions, and Request for Contempt

Citations (Palowsky v. Campbell) ...............................................................
98
Memorandum in Opposition to Allyson Campbells Exceptions of No

Cause of Action, No Right of Action, Prescription, and Vagueness,
(Palowsky v. Campbell)..............................................................................
117
Exhibit 2 Exhibit 3 -
Exhibit 6 Exhibit 7 -
ii
Exhibit 8 -
Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Campbells Motion to Strike,

Request for Sanctions and Request for Contempt Citations (Palowsky v.
Campbell) ..................................................................................................
143
Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Exceptions of No Cause of

Action, No Right of Action, Prescription and Vagueness (Palowsky v.
Campbell) ..................................................................................................
149
Exhibit 10 - Supplemental Motion to Strike and Memorandum in support (Palowsky v.

Campbell) ..................................................................................................
162
Exhibit 11 - Transcript of November 5, 2015 (Palowsky v. Campbell) ...........................
170
Exhibit 12 - Transcript of August 20, 2015 (Palowsky v. Cork) .....................................
197
Exhibit 13 - April 15, 2016 letter from Stephen Street, State Inspector General, to Jerry
Jones, District Attorney ..............................................................................
251
Exhibit 14 - September 5, 2014 Opening of Court Transcript ........................................
253
Exhibit 9 -
iii
Table of Authorities
Federal Statutes
FRCP 12 ...........................................................................................................................
19
42 U.S.C. 1983................................................................................................................ 21, 22, 23,

.............................................................................................................................. 24, 25, 26
42 U.S.C. 1985................................................................................................................ 21, 28,
.............................................................................................................................. 29, 30, 31
42 U.S.C. 1986................................................................................................................ 21, 31
Federal Cases
Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co.
398 U.S. 144, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970) .............................................
23
Arseneaux v. Roberts,
726 F. 2d 1022 (5th Cir. 1982)................................................................................
23
Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1950, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) ................................
20
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,

550 U.S. 544, 127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007) ....................................................................
19
Broussard v. Lafayette City-Parish Consolidated Government,

45 F. Supp. 3d 553 (W.D. La. 2014) ......................................................................
23
Cinel v. Connick,
15 F. 3d 1338 (5th Cir. 1994)..................................................................................
23
Cyrio v. Hunt,
2007 WL 2772222 (E.D. La. 9/19/07)....................................................................
Daigle v. Gulf States Utilities Co.,

794 F. 2d 974 (5th Cir. 1986)..................................................................................
29
Dennis v. Sparks,
449 U.S. 24, 28, 101 S.Ct. 183, 66 L.Ed.2d 185 (1980)..........................................
21
Dennison v. City of New Orleans,

1997 WL361904 (E.D. La. 6/27/97) ...................................................................... 25, 26, 27
iv
Dolenz v. Akin,
1997 WL 21388 (N.D. Tex. 1/14/97) .....................................................................
25
Dudley v. Angel,
209 F. 2d 460 (5th Cir. 2000)..................................................................................
24
Dyess v. Louisiana State University Bd. of Supervisors

2005 WL 2060915 (E.D. La. 8/19/05).................................................................... 25, 26
Filarsky v. Delia,
566 U.S. ____, 132 S.Ct. 1657, 182 L.Ed.2d 662 (2012) ........................................
22
Financial Acquisition Partners LP v. Blackwell,

440 F.3d 278 (5th Cir. 2006)...................................................................................
Garcetti v. Caballos,
547 U.S. 410, 126 S.Ct. 1951, 164 L.Ed.2d 689 (2006)..........................................
24
Glotfelty v. Karas,
512 Fed. Appx. 409 (5th Cir. 2013) ........................................................................
21
Hale v. Harney,
786 F. 2d 688 (5th Cir. 1986)..................................................................................
23
Hamill v. Wright,
870 F. 2d 1032 (5th Cir. 1989)................................................................................
30
Haydell Industries, LLC v. Petrucci,

702 F. Supp. 2d 688 (W.D. La. 2010) ....................................................................
20
Hill v. McClellan,
490 F. 2d 859 (5th Cir. 1974)..................................................................................
21
Horaist v. Doctors Hosp. of Opelousas,

255 F. 3d 261 (W.D. La. 2001) ..............................................................................
30
Johnston v. Harris County Flood Control Dist.,

869 F. 2d 1565 (5th Cir. 1989)................................................................................
23
Kraft Food Ingredients, Corp. v. PCI International Consultants, Inc.,

2008 WL 4001184 (W.D. La. 8/27/08) ..................................................................
20
Marceaux v. Lafayette City-Parish Consolidated Government,

921 F. Supp. 2d 605 (W.D. La. 2013) ....................................................................
28
McKinley v. Harvey Toyota of Bossier City, Inc.,

534 F. Supp. 2d 668 (W.D. La. 2008) ....................................................................
19
Mississippi Womens Medical Clinic v. McMillan,

866 F. 2d 788 (5th Cir. 1989)..................................................................................
31
Montoya v. FedEx Ground Package System, Inc.,

614 F. 3d 145 (5th Cir. 2010)..................................................................................
28
Nelson v. Stratton,
469 F. 2d 1155 (5th Cir. 1972)................................................................................
22
Pete v. Metcalfe,
8 F. 3d 214 (5th Cir. 1993) .....................................................................................
22
Polk County v. Dodson,

454 U.S. 312, 102 S.Ct. 445, 70 L.Ed.2d 509 (1981) .............................................
22
Rodriguez v. Neeley,
169 F. 3d 220 (5th Cir. 1999)..................................................................................
28
Sims v. Jefferson Downs Racing Assn,

778 F. 2d 1068 (5th Cir. 1985)................................................................................
21
Sparks v. Duval County Ranch Co.,

604 F. 2d 976 (5th Cir. 1979)..................................................................................
21
U.S. ex rel. Simmons v. Zibilich,

542 F. 2d 259 (5th Cir. 1976)..................................................................................
22
Village of Willowbrook v. Olech,

528 U.S. 562, 120 S.Ct. 1073, 145 L.Ed.2d 1060 (2000) ........................................
24
Villanueva v. McInnis,
723 F. 2d 414 (5th Cir. 1984)..................................................................................
23
West v. Atkins,
487 U.S. 42, 108 S.Ct. 2250, 101 L.Ed.2d 40 (1988) .............................................
22
Williams v. Bramer,
180 F. 3d 699 (5th Cir. 1999)..................................................................................
24
vi
State Statutes
Rule XXIII, Louisiana Supreme Court Rules .....................................................................
24
State Cases
Gulf States Land and Development, Inc. v. Ouachita National Bank in Monroe,
29,134 (La. Ct. App. 2 Cir. 4/4/97), 705 So. 2d 189 ...............................................
In Re Curry,
2008-2557 (La. 7/1/09), 16 So. 3d 1139.................................................................
vii
INTRODUCTION
Defendant attorney Brian Crawford submits this memorandum in support of his Motion
to Dismiss pursuant to FRCP 12(b)(6). Plaintiff Judge Marchmans core complaint against
Crawford focuses on filings made by Crawford and his co-counsel in his representation of
Defendant Allyson Campbell, in which it was urged that Plaintiff Judge Marchman illegally
disclosed Campbells confidential personnel records. Plaintiff Judge Marchman further alleges,
without specificity, that Crawford conspired with the other defendants to deprive her of her civil
rights. However, Plaintiff Judge Marchman has failed to state a claim against Crawford because:
The indisputable facts establish that Plaintiff Judge Marchman did illegally disclose
Campbells confidential personnel records,
Crawford is a private actor, thus no cause of action lies against him under 1983,
the Complaint fails to allege facts supporting a conspiracy with state actors pursuant to
1985, and
without adequate allegations of a conspiracy under 1985, Plaintiff Judge Marchmans
1986 claim fails as well.
Furthermore, because those ultimately responsible for outing Plaintiff Judge Marchmans
violation of Judge Ad Hoc Anne Simons order, as truthfully reported by the complained of
pleadings at issue, are her own attorneysnot Crawford--the Motion to Dismiss should be
granted.
BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
From the proliferation of litigation surrounding her unremarkable duties as law clerk for
the Fourth Judicial District Court,1 it is evident that someone has it out for Allyson Campbell and
This is the fourth suit in which Defendant Campbells work habits and off-duty activities along with attacks on her
character and integrity and that of the Fourth Judicial District Court bench take center stage. See Palowsky v. Cork,
will move heaven, earth, state and federal courts to exact their pound of flesh from her or her
attorneys. What is unclear from a review of plaintiffs multiple complaints however, is the
identity(ies) of the villain(s) of this piece out of the recurring cast of characters. To aid in
placing this suit in the larger context, the following recitation traces the intertwined background
facts and litigation culminating in this suit.
Stanley Palowsky, Jr. was a client of Plaintiff Judge Marchmans before she was elected
to the bench in 2000.2 Similarly, attorneys Joe Ward and Sedric Banks also have represented
Mr. Palowsky, his family and his businesses for many years. Messrs. Ward and Banks represent
Plaintiff Judge Marchman in the matter at bar.
Defendant Allyson Campbell has been a law clerk with the Fourth Judicial District Court
for approximately 14 years. Her supervising judges have included now Justice Marcus Clark now Second Circuit Court of Appeal Judge D. Milton Moore, III and Defendant Judges Amman,
Sharp and Rambo.
Plaintiff Judge Marchman has never directly or indirectly supervised
Campbell. Despite that fact, as far back as 2010, Plaintiff Judge Marchman began to complain to
the other judges about Defendant Campbells work habits and attendance.3 Over the next few
years, Defendant Campbells confidential employment file was populated with complaints about
Defendant Campbells work habits or attendance, and the investigation and resolution of those
complaints.
However, Plaintiff Judge Marchmans efforts, as extensively detailed in her
Complaint, consistently failed to bear fruit in the form of Defendant Campbells termination.
Docket No. 13-2059, 4th Judicial District Court; Judge Stephen Winters, in his capacity as Chief Judge of the 4th
Judicial District Court, Docket No. 15-0770, 4th Judicial District Court; and Palowsky v. Campbell, Docket No. 152179, 4th Judicial District Court.
2
See Gulf States Land and Development, Inc. v. Ouachita National Bank in Monroe, 29,134 (La. Ct. App. 2 Cir.
4/4/97), 705 So. 2d 189, and In Re Curry, 2008-2557 (La. 7/1/09), 16 So. 3d 1139.
3
Complaint at 18.
In July 2013, Stanley Palowsky, III, Mr. Palowskys son, filed a lawsuit in the Fourth
Judicial District Court captioned Palowsky v. Cork.4
Mr. Palowsky, III, alleged various
misdeeds by the co-owner of an environmental clean-up entity in which Mr. Palowsky, III, and
his partner, Mr. Cork, were the sole corporate shareholders. Messrs. Ward and Banks represent
Mr. Palowsky, III and his company. 5 Thomas Hayes III and his firm represent the defendants.
Initially, Mr. Palowsky, IIIs case was assigned to Defendant Judge Rambo. Over the
course of the litigation, Mr. Palowsky, III sought the recusal of Judge Rambo, then his successor,
Defendant Judge Sharp, and, ultimately, the entire Fourth Judicial District Court.
This
necessitated the appointment of Judge Ad Hoc Dee Hawthorne to hear Mr. Palowsky, IIIs case. 6
In October 2014 via recusal motion, Mr. Palowsky, III attacked Judge Rambos fairness and
impartiality, accusing him of causing undue delays, showing bias and prejudice against Messrs.
Ward and Banks while showing clear favoritism to opposing counsel, Mr. Hayes, as well as
improperly supervising his law clerk, Campbell. 7 After seeking recusal of the entire Fourth
Judicial District Court, Mr. Palowsky, III also sought to add Mr. Hayes and his firm as
defendants in his suit, alleging fraud, conspiracy, racketeering and/or unprofessional conduct.8
Docket No. 13-2059, 4th Judicial District Court.

The case remains pending.
6
Exhibit 1, October 23, 2014 Memorandum in Support of Motion to Recuse Defendant Judge Rambo, and Exhibit
2, June 12, 2015 Motion to Recuse En Banc and to Appoint Ad Hoc Judge, filed on behalf of Mr. Palowsky, III, by
Messrs. Ward and Banks in Palowsky v. Cork, Docket No. 13-2059, 4th Judicial District Court. A court may
consider matters of public record when considering a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to FRCP 12(b). Financial
Acquisition Partners LP v. Blackwell, 440 F.3d 278, 286 (5th Cir. 2006). See also Cyrio v. Hunt, 2007 WL 2772222
(E.D. La. 9/19/07) at *4 (although generally limited to the allegations on the face of the complaint, the court may
also take into account matters of public record, orders, items appearing in the record of the case and exhibits
attached to the complaint in resolving a FRCP 12(b) motion).
7
Exhibit 1. Evidently, Mr. Palowsky, III was bothered that Campbell wrote fluff society pieces for the Monroe
NewsStar that complimented Mr. Hayes on having the IT factor and being one of the best dressed gents in town.
Id. at item 49. Plaintiff Judge Marchman also references Campbells newspaper articles in the Complaint at 35,
41.
8
This spawned yet another suit, Palowsky v. Hayes, Docket No. 2014-2412, 4th Judicial District Court.
5
While Mr. Palowsky, IIIs case was pending, Johnny Gunter, a reporter for The Ouachita
Citizen, sent five public records requests to Chief Judge Stephen Winters of the Fourth Judicial
District Court in February and March 2015.9 Mr. Gunter sought specific information contained
in Campbells personnel records.10 Judge Winters responded to the requests by producing only
those documents believed to be subject to production in accordance with advice of his counsel-Jon Guice, yet another defendant in this case. 11 Judge Winters did not produce to the reporter
commendations, evaluations or other documents addressing Campbells job performance, citing
Campbells right to privacy. 12 After Mr. Gunter lodged a criminal complaint, Judge Winters
filed a declaratory judgment action seeking judicial determination after in camera inspection as
to whether the withheld documents were subject to production. Campbell intervened in that
action.
By Judgment of May 31, 2015, Judge Ad Hoc Anne Simon, after her in camera
inspection, issued a ruling regarding the propriety of withholding certain of Campbells records
from production.13 Judge Simons Reasons and Judgment explained that Judge Winters must not
produce documents responsive to four detailed requests by Mr. Gunter:
1. Reports of any disciplinary action or reprimands taken against any employee(s) who
received pay or leave time for which they were not entitled,
2. Any document showing the reason(s) Campbell was not at work during the month of
May 2014,
3. Campbells timesheets, any written correspondence, reprimands, accommodations,
job descriptions, salary and attendance records.
Complaint at 47.
Exhibit 3, Reasons and Judgment dated May 31, 2015 issued by Judge Anne Simon in Judge Stephen Winters, in
his capacity as Chief Judge of the 4th Judicial District Court, Docket No. 15-0770, 4th Judicial District Court.
11
Judge Winters is not a defendant in this action.
12
Exhibit 3.
13
Id.
10
4. Any sworn/unsworn document filed by Monroe attorney Cody Rials at the request of
Fourth Judicial District Court Judge Wendell Manning concerning missing files or the
destruction of court records by Campbell.14
Scrutiny of these categories reveal that Mr. Gunter demonstrated the uncanny and accurate
ability to intuit the contents of Campbells confidential personnel file now referenced by Plaintiff
Judge Marchman in her Complaint. Equally interestingly, some of the confidential information
from Campbells personnel file had already been cited by Messrs. Ward and Banks in the
October 2014 Motion to Recuse Judge Rambo filed on Mr. Palowsky, IIIs behalf. One must
inquire who was the source of these early personnel disclosures.
For example, Plaintiff Judge Marchmans current Complaint relates an April 24, 2014
meeting of the Fourth Judicial District judges, a confidential proceeding, in which actions were
taken to remove Campbell as senior law clerk, terminate her stipend and suspend her for the
month of May without pay.15 Ostensibly, this confidential meeting and its equally confidential
outcome would have been documented in Campbells personnel file. Mr. Gunters request
sought any document showing the reason(s) Allyson Campbell was not at work during the
month of May 2014.
Plaintiff Judge Marchmans Complaint also describes a newspaper piece by Campbell
published on August 10, 2014 that allegedly caused attorney Cody Rials to make a confidential
complaint about Campbell the following day. 16 The complaint was passed on to Plaintiff Judge
Marchmanchair of the personnel committee--who alleges that she turned it over to the chief
judge who ordered Mr. Rials to reduce his complaint to writing.17 The Motion to Recuse in
14
Exhibit 3 at p. 2. Judge Simon also concluded that her review in camera did not support the swirling
allegations/rumors of Campbells misconduct.
15
Complaint at 31.
16
Id. at 36.
17
Id.
Palowsky v. Cork filed in October 2014 clearly references the confidential complaint as Mr.
Palowsky, IIIs counsel admits to questioning the Judicial Administrator about it within 48 hours
of the complaint being made:
20. On August 13, 2014, the Judicial Administrator confirmed in an in-person
meeting with AESIs counsel that complaints had been made against Judge
Rambos law clerk in another case. The Judicial Administrator was then
advised of missing court filings, as well as undue delays in rulings.18
Plaintiff Judge Marchmans Complaint clarifies that Mr. Banks asked the Judicial Administrator
on August 13, 2014 about the actions of Campbell in the 2012 Rials complaint, pinpointing
Mr. Banks knowledge of the incident and Mr. Rials name within days of it being reported to
Judge Marchman. 19 Similarly in his requests, Mr. Gunter sought any document filed by Monroe
attorney Cody Rials at the request of Fourth Judicial District Court Judge Wendell Manning
concerning missing files or the destruction of court records by Campbell. 20
Plaintiff Judge Marchman also alleges that an en banc meeting of the judges took place
on September 12, 2014 (a month before Mr. Palowsky, III filed Exhibit 1), at which time a
reprimand letter directed to Campbell was discussed regarding numerous missing applications
for post-conviction relief found in Campbells office during the May suspension.21 There was
also dialogue about complaints by two local attorneys that Campbell had shredded or withheld
their documents from the judge who should have received them. 22 However, Messrs. Ward and
Banks could not independently learned or known about the missing post-conviction relief
applications discussed in a confidential meeting of the judges the month before, and yet the
Motion to Recuse Defendant Judge Rambo states:
18
Exhibit 1.
Complaint at 38.
20
Exhibit 3.
21
Complaint at 41.
22
Id.
19
17. Meanwhile, information surfaced regarding Judge Rambos law clerk

withholding and shredding court documents and causing delay in domestic
litigation. Still, other information surfaced about Judge Rambos law clerk
delaying scores of writ applications and had, actually, used such court records
as an end table in her office. After this information was brought to plaintiffs
attention, he became suspicious of the multiple delays in his case, particularly
after the Clerk of Court advised that Judge Rambos office did pick up the
sealed documents the same day the sealed documents were filed, March 14,
2014.23
Messrs. Ward and Banks did not identify in the motion the source of the other information that
surfaced regarding Campbell.
The foregoing filing demonstrates that Messrs. Ward and
Banks, and Mr. Gunter, all had knowledge about the confidential contents of Campbells
personnel file long before Judge Simon ever ruled.
Judge Simon heard oral arguments on May 19, 2015 and thereafter conducted an in
camera inspection of the documents responsive to Mr. Gunters requests, but withheld as
private.24
Plaintiff Judge Marchmans Complaint insinuates that the other judges withheld
documents from Judge Simons review by alleging that in meetings with the judges she
repeatedly requested that they produce all documents to Judge Simon. 25 However, her
Complaint is silent as to what was or was not provided to Judge Simon. In contrast, Judge
Simons written ruling clearly recites that she reviewed the withheld documents responsive to the
four categories: disciplinary action or reprimand for payroll fraud, documentation indicating
why Campbell was suspended in May 2014, her timesheets, attendance records, salary, and
disciplinary history and the Rials complaint. 26 It cannot be disputed that had a respected and
meticulous jurist like Judge Simon believed documents responsive to those requests were being
withheld from her, she certainly would have investigated and made a record of same.
23
Exhibit 1.
Id. at p. 3.
25
Complaint at 52-54.
26
Exhibit 3.
24
Ultimately, Judge Simon ruled that Campbells expectation of privacy in the withheld
documents precluded their production. None of the parties sought appellate review rendering
Judge Simons judgment of May 31, 2015 final. Thus, the private contents of Campbells
personnel file were to remain private. They did not.
On July 22, 2015, less than two months after Judge Simons ruling, Mr. Palowsky, III,
filed a Petition for Damages against Campbell, accusing her of criminal conduct in maliciously
spoliating, concealing, removing, destroying, shredding, withholding and improperly handling
court documents in the Palowsky v. Cork litigation.27 Once again, Messrs. Ward and Banks
represented Mr. Palowsky, III in his lawsuit. The factual allegations supporting these causes of
action consisted of scandalous, immaterial, impertinent, and insulting commentary on and
disparagement of Campbells character, along with reference to and quotations from the society
column Campbell wrote for the Monroe NewsStar. Much of the Petition also related detailed
information that Palowsky learned about investigations into complaints about Campbells
workconfidential complaints and confidential internal investigations which Judge Simon
had ordered to remain confidential.28
Not content with the vilification of Campbell, nine days later Mr. Palowsky, III, through
his counsel, Messrs. Ward and Banks, filed a First Supplemental, Amended and Restated Petition
for Damages.29 Mr. Palowsky, IIIs July 31, 2015 supplemental pleading added Judges Sharp,
Jones, Amman and Rambo, and Judge Winters as defendants.
27
Mr. Palowsky, III, through
Exhibit 4, Petition for Damages, Palowsky v. Campbell, Docket No. 15-2179, 4th Judicial District Court.
Exhibit 4 at 11(c), 16, 18, 32, 33, 36, 37. Interestingly, Plaintiff Judge Marchman goes into detail in the
Complaint about what she reports transpired at meetings of the judges discussing personnel matters, results of
investigations, and other events. Although she takes pains to point out that she voluntarily recused herself in June
2014 from personnel committee matters involving Campbell after learning that Campbell was actively seeking
someone to oppose her in the upcoming fall election, curiously her further allegations show that she admittedly
immersed herself in all matters concerning Campbell thereafter. Complaint at 33, 36, 41, 49, 50, 52, 53, and 54.
29
Exhibit 5, First Supplemental, Amended and Restated Petition for Damages, Palowsky v. Campbell, Docket No.
15-2179, 4th Judicial District Court.
28
Messrs. Ward and Banks, accused the judges and Campbell of conspiring to inflict intentional
torts upon and violate Mr. Palowskys constitutional rights. 30 Mr. Palowsky, III further alleged
the judges of being complicit in Defendant Campbells felonious document destruction and
payroll fraud, and scheming and conspiring with her to conceal the fraud from the taxpaying public.31 However, once stripped of its defamatory window-dressing, Mr. Palowsky,
IIIs core complaint was that Campbell and the Fourth Judicial District Court judges had
allegedly, and for some unfathomable motives, actively assisted his opponent in Palowsky v.
Cork.32
Defendant Larry Pettiette, a Special Assistant Attorney General, was appointed by
Defendant Buddy Caldwell, Louisiana Attorney General, to represent Campbell in the suit by
Mr. Palowsky, III. Campbell retained Crawford, her private attorney, as co-counsel. On August
10, 2015, Crawford filed Exceptions of Vagueness, No Right of Action and Prescription, and
Motion to Strike, Request for Sanctions, and Request for Contempt Citations on behalf of
Campbell.33 Crawford sought to strike 52 of the 88 paragraphs of the supplemental petition as
irrelevant, insulting, and immaterial to Mr. Palowsky, IIIs claims. Crawford also filed an
Exception of No Cause of Action in September 2015. In response, on October 28, 2015, Messrs.
Ward and Banks filed on behalf of Mr. Palowsky, III, a memorandum in opposition to
Campbells exceptions and motion to strike.34
30
Exhibit 5.
Id. at 15, 16, 17, 26.
32
Id. at 45, 46, 49, 50, 51.
33
Exhibit 6, Motion to Strike, Request for Sanctions, and Request for Contempt Citations, Palowsky v. Campbell,
Docket No. 15-2179, 4th Judicial District Court. Defendant Jon Guice followed suit with exceptions and a similar
motion to strike and for contempt sanctions on behalf of the judges.
34
Exhibit 7, Memorandum in Opposition to Allyson Campbells Exceptions of No Cause of Action, No Right of
Action, Prescription, and Vagueness, Palowsky v. Campbell, Docket No. 15-2179, 4th Judicial District Court.
31
In an effort to lend credence his defective and immaterial pleadings, to avoid them being
stricken and potentially avert sanctions, Mr. Palowsky, III made an important and surprising
admission in his opposition memorandum: Palowsky reasonably believes that Judge Sharon
I. Marchman of this Court will testify as follows.35 What follows is a chronological history
of the contents of the confidential complaints, internal investigations and outcomes in
Campbells personnel file among other confidential discussions between the judges regarding
Campbells employment, and accusations of payroll fraud and document destruction by
Campbell allegedly covered up by the Fourth Judicial District judges.36
Mr. Palowsky, III
through Messrs. Ward and Banks--represented:

[that Plaintiff Judge Marchman would testify under oath that]As far back as 2010,
Defendant Campbell had a problem with being absent from work. When another law
clerk reported Campbells attendance issue to her, Judge Marchman discussed this with
Defendant Judges Rambo and Amman, for whom Campbell worked at the time.
Palowsky believes that Judge Marchman will testify that Judges Rambo and Amman said
they had no complaints about Campbells work, and they said they could find her when
they needed her, so Judge Marchman had to remind them that the Courts policy was that
employees were only allowed to work from the courthouse, not from home or any other
location.37
[Regarding the Rials complaint] Palowsky believes that Judge Marchman will testify
that she certainly was not made aware of this issue at that time even though she was head
of the personnel committee.38
Palowsky believes that Judge Marchman will testify that subsequently, there were
several meetings of the judges to address the subject of payroll fraud. It was understood
at that time that an employees not being at work when reported was payroll fraud.39
Palowsky reasonably believes that Judge Marchman and Ms. Hartt will testify that on
April 15, 2014, there was a review of Defendant Campbells hours from January 14 to
March 31. As Judge Marchman and Ms. Hartt will likely testify, said review showed that
35
Essentially, Mr. Palowsky, III and his attorneys were telling the Court that the information could stay in and they
were not culpable for its inclusion since a judge would testify to it. Exhibit 7 at p. 3.
36
Id.
37
Id. Compare with Complaint at 18.
38
Id. at p. 4. Compare with Complaint at 22.
39
10
on seven different days, Defendant Campbell reported that she worked seven hours even
though her key fob did not show that she entered the courthouse on any of those days.
On most of those days, she had excuses for being late, such as her flight from New York
was late or she had tennis matches that morning, but then she apparently would not come
to work (as evidenced by the lack of key fob activity) and would still report that she
worked seven hours.40
Additionally, Palowsky reasonably believes that Judge Marchman will testify that
Defendant Judges Rambo and Amman had been approving her false timesheets for
payment.41
Palowsky reasonably believes that Judge Marchman and Ms. Hartt will testify that the
Court never reported any payroll fraud to the legislative auditor or the district attorney. 42
Palowsky reasonably believes that Judge Marchman will testify that also on April 15,
2014, the judges had an en banc meeting and approved new measures to be implemented
to prevent payroll fraud. The judges agreed en banc to remove Campbell from the
position of senior law clerk, to terminate her stipend, and to suspend her for one month
without pay.43
Beginning on April 28, all law clerks were required to sign in and out each time they
entered or left the building. Notably, within one day of the new rules implementation,
Campbell refused to comply and falsified her sign-in sheet, and Palowsky believes that
Judge Marchman will testify to same.44
Palowsky reasonably believes that Judge Marchman will testify that while Campbell
was serving her suspension during May, 47 files (later determined to be 52) which
required Defendant Campbells attention were found underneath her desk. Palowsky
reasonably believes these files were PCRs, or post-conviction relief applications, which
had been given to her by Defendant Judge Sharp to address. The oldest PCR was dated
November 2, 2011. When questioned as to why they were sitting in her office, Campbell
had no explanation. Palowsky believes that Judge Marchman will testify that it was
discovered later that Defendant Campbell had given the employee who found the 52
applications a $200 gift card.45
Palowsky believes that Judge Marchman will testify that on June 17, 2014, she notified
Judge Wendell Manning that although she had planned to recommend that Defendant
Campbell be terminated, instead she was going to recuse herself from the pending
40
Exhibit 7 at p. 5. Compare with Complaint at 25.

42
43
Id. Compare with Complaint at 29, 31.
44
Id. Compare with Complaint at 30, although someone undoubtedly has their date wrong. Furthermore, the very
next paragraph discusses the warning and reprimand referenced at 32.
45
Id. at pp. 6-7. Compare with Complaint at 32.
41
11
personnel matters involving Campbell since she had heard that Campbell was actively
seeking someone to oppose her in the next election.46
[Regarding the outcome of the personnel matter that she had just recused herself from]
Palowsky believes that Judge Marchman will testify that thereafter, on July 8, 2014,
Judge Jones discussed the issues of the 52 PCR applications and the related gift card at a
personnel committee meeting, but no remedial action was taken against Campbell.47
Palowsky believes that Judge Marchman will testify that to her knowledge, until August
11, 2014, the only judges who knew about Rials complaint were Judges Sharp and
Rambo.48
[Regarding Mr. Banks complaint about Campbell in the Palowsky v. Cork matter]
Palowsky believes that Judge Marchman will testify that Defendant Judge Rambo
discussed this matter during a judges meeting, and he had no concerns with Campbells
work on Palowskys case.49
Palowsky believes that Judge Marchman and Ms. Hartt will further testify that Ms. Hartt
was directed [by Judge Rambo] to write to Mr. Banks, which she did on September 11,
and tell him that the reason some pleadings did not make their way to Judge Rambo was
because of a new filing system and that she understood a ruling had been made.50
Palowsky believes that Judge Marchman will testify that on September 12, 2014, there
was an en banc meeting which she did not attend but which was recorded. Judge
Marchman will testify that she listened to the recording, and during the meeting, Judge
Jones discussed putting a letter in Campbells file about the missing records which were
discovered in her office during her suspension. There was also a discussion of
complaints by two local attorneys that Campbell had shredded or withheld their
documents from the judge who should have received them. It was discussed that in one
case, the Clerks filing procedure was to blame. It was also discussed that no further
action would be taken against Campbell besides placing a reprimand letter about the 52
PCR applications in her file. It was noted that Judge Marchman would vote by proxy to
terminate Campbell. Judge Jones also recommended that Campbell be counseled about
the content of articles in The News-Star each week.51
46
Exhibit 7 at p. 7. Compare with Complaint at 33.

Id. Compare with Complaint at 34. Again, it is stunning that a District Judge would be honorable enough to
recognize her inability to be unbiased and impartial in matters concerning Ms. Campbell and yet immediately launch
into activity designed to cause her termination and criminal prosecution.
48
Id. at p. 8. Compare with Complaint at 19-22.
49
Id. Compare with Complaint at 36, 38, 39 which highlight Mr. Banks asking about the Rials complaint within
days of Plaintiff Judge Marchman learning of it.
50
Id. Compare with Complaint at 40. While Mr. Banks undoubtedly knew about the letter he received, he could
not have known of the discussions held in the judges meeting after lodging his complaint.
51
Id. at pp. 8-9. Compare with Complaint at 41.
47
12
Palowsky reasonably believes the evidence will show that on November 3, 2014,
Defendant Campbell emailed Judge Sharp and asked him to state that the 2012
allegations of Cody Rials against her were unfounded. Judge Sharp responded that he
was the only member of the Court who looked into the allegations, and he found that no
misconduct was indicated, which contradicts his November 28, 2012 letter to Mr. Rials
in which he stated that Rials concern was reasonable. Regardless, Judge Sharps
response was apparently not good enough because a few minutes later, he supplemented
his earlier email and said that she never shredded anything.52
Palowsky believes that Judge Marchman will testify that on December 30, 2014, there
was a specially-called judges meeting in which it was debated how to respond to the
legislative auditors findings that some employees had been paid for time that had not
been worked.53
Palowsky believes that Judge Marchman will testify that on March 13, 2015, there was a
meeting of the judges in which she moved to terminate Campbell, but no one seconded
the motion.54
Judge Marchman will also testify that Judge Jones advised that just prior to the meeting,
Campbell had given him a folder containing a few documents, and it was decided that
Campbells March 12, 2015 letter to Defendant Judge Jones should not go in her
personnel file, but two other documents, which included the November 3, 2014
emails between Campbell and Judge Sharp, should. (Emphasis added).55
Palowsky believes that Judge Marchman will testify that on March 23, 2015, she wrote
to Defendant Judge Winters about the documents which Campbell handed to Judge Jones
prior to the March 13 meeting and which she wanted placed in her personnel file.56
Thus, in order to substantiate the baseless allegations in Mr. Palowsky, IIIs supplemental
petition, counsel represented to the Court that Plaintiff Judge Marchman would testify to, among
other confidential, yet immaterial, information discussed by the Fourth Judicial District Court
judges, the alleged payroll fraud and investigation outcome, Campbells May 2014 suspension,
52
Exhibit 7 at p. 9. Compare with at 44. This certainly begs the question of how Messrs. Ward and Banks could
have known of the email exchange between Campbell and Judge Sharp if they were not copied with the
correspondence.
53
54
55
Id. at pp. 10-11. Compare with Complaint at 50. Amazingly, Messrs. Ward and Banks are representing what
Judge Marchman would have testified to specific to the contents of Campbells personnel file!
56
13
Campbells attendance and disciplinary history and the Rials complaintall of which Judge
Simon held to be confidential in her May 2015 ruling.
Accordingly, by November 2, 2015 Supplemental Memoranda in Support of Campbells
Motion to Strike, Request for Sanctions and Request for Contempt Citations, Exceptions of No
Cause of Action, No Right of Action, Prescription and Vagueness, and Supplemental Motion to
Strike, Crawford simply concluded what her own attorneys had confirmed: that Plaintiff Judge
Marchman illegally divulged Campbells private personnel information in contravention of
Judge Simons ruling, which Mr. Palowsky, III through his attorneys (now Plaintiff Judge
Marchmans attorneys) Messrs. Ward and Banks, inserted into his July 2015 Petitions in
Palowsky v. Campbell.57 Furthermore, in oral argument on Campbells Motion to Strike, Mr.
Ward confirmed in open court that with regard to the allegations sought to be stricken from the
pleadings:
Ive actually had a judge inside the court confirm things to me or I wouldnt have
put them down to start with.58
Incredibly, Plaintiff Judge Marchman now contradicts 1) the assertions of Mr. Palowsky, III and
his attorneys (her attorneys) that she would testify to the privileged information populating his
July 2015 Petition and Supplemental Petition, and 2) Mr. Wards admission that the privileged
information sought to be stricken from the July 2015 Petition and Supplemental Petition by
Crawford on Campbells behalf came from a judge inside the court.
57
Exhibit 8, Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Campbells Motion to Strike, Request for Sanctions and
Request for Contempt Citations; Exhibit 9, Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Exceptions of No Cause of
Action, No Right of Action, Prescription and Vagueness; and Exhibit 10, Supplemental Motion to Strike and
Memorandum in support, Palowsky v. Campbell, Docket No. 15-2179, 4th Judicial District Court. As will be
discussed more fully herein, the fact that Messrs. Ward and Banks, not Crawford, outed Plaintiff Judge Marchman
as the source of the leaked confidential information disproves Plaintiff Judge Marchmans core claim against
Crawford.
58
Exhibit 11, transcript of November 5, 2015 at p. 8, lines 10-12, Palowsky v. Campbell, Docket No. 15-2179, 4th
Judicial District Court.
14
Instead, in an abrupt about-face, Plaintiff Judge Marchmans Complaint states that her
only disclosure was in response to a valid subpoena duces tecum of August 17, 2015 issued at
Mr. Palowsky, IIIs request in Palowsky v. Cork seeking documents regarding the investigation
of Campbell. 59 However, her assertion is belied by the clear timeline established by the filings in
Palowsky v. Campbell. She had not been served with the August 2015 subpoena duces
tecum, which she now claims allowed her disclosure, when Messrs. Ward and Banks filed
the July 2015 Petition and Supplemental Petition airing the contents of Campbells
privilege personnel filewhich they contend came from her! Citing an August 20, 2015
hearing on Mr. Palowsky, IIIs Motion to Recuse the entirety of the Fourth Judicial District
Court bench in Palowsky v. Cork, Plaintiff Judge Marchman asserts that Defendant Judge Sharp
instructed her to comply with the subpoena duces tecum. She states:
. . . Judge Sharp stated as follows: Comply with the subpoena if you wish. Give
it to the litigants. Judge Marchman then questioned the directive to give her
documents to the litigants, and Judge Sharp told her to give the documents to
counsel for Palowsky and told the attorney to do with it what you will.60
From that, she concludes that her disclosure was pursuant to a valid subpoena duces tecum.61
However, Plaintiff Judge Marchman intentionally fails to identify in the Complaint exactly what
documents were to be provided to counsel for Palowsky. The transcript of the hearing of
August 20, 2015 is quite clear on that topic.
Declining to rule on Mr. Palowsky, IIIs Motion to Recuse, Defendant Judge Sharp
stayed Palowsky v. Cork pending a resolution of Palowsky v. Campbell.62 Once he ruled,
Plaintiff Judge Marchman made an appearance before the Court and asked to file documents into
59
Complaint at 63, 67.

Id. at 67.
61
Id. at 84, Defendant Judge Sharp ordered her to produce the documents at issue.
62
Exhibit 12, transcript of August 20, 2015 at p. 49, lines 7-10, Palowsky v. Cork, Docket No. 13-2059, 4th Judicial
District Court.
60
15
the record discharging [her] responsibility to the subpoena and subpoena duces tecum. 63 What
followed was an argument between Defendant Judge Sharp and Plaintiff Judge Marchman
regarding whether the Motion to Quash subpoenas and subpoenas duces tecum for investigation
of Campbell issued by Mr. Palowsky, III to the Fourth Judicial District Court judges for the
August 20, 2015 hearing previously filed by Jon Guice (another defendant herein) and granted
by Defendant Judge Sharp applied to Plaintiff Judge Marchman.64
Reaching its denouement,
this exchange occurred:

BY THE COURT:
You misinterpret or either misremember what I said. But, one moment, is
that, is that the subpoena return that you hold in your hand?
BY JUDGE MARCHMAN:
These two documents are what I just identified. My correspondence to
Julie Cunningham and her reply to me that she was instructed not to produce any
documents. So thats my return. I would simply file that in the record.
BY THE COURT:
One moment. Comply with the subpoena request if you wish. Give it to
the litigants.
BY JUDGE MARCHMAN:
Im sorry, give it to the litigants?
BY THE COURT:
Im not sure, Im not sure Im going to allow you to file anything into the
record. If you wish to, if you wish you can supply the subpoena returns if you
want to. Give it to Mr. Ward. Mr. Ward, do with it what you will. All right,
were adjourned.65
63
Exhibit 12 at p. 49, lines 24-32.

Id. at pp. 50-51.
65
Id. at p. 51.
64
16
This colloquy indicates that the entirety of Plaintiff Judge Marchmans subpoena return was two
pages:
her letter to Cunningham asking her to produce Campbells investigation file and
Cunninghams response that she would not. Even ignoring the temporal disconnect, this cannot
be the basis of Plaintiff Judge Marchmans assertion that her divulgence of Campbells
confidential information was pursuant to a valid subpoena. 66
Moving on to the proceedings in Palowsky v. Campbell, ultimately Judge Barbera
ordered stricken 49 paragraphs from Mr. Palowsky, IIIs pleadings and parts of an additional
paragraph as prejudicial and immaterial to Mr. Palowsky, IIIs claims. 67 He deferred ruling on
contempt and sanctions urged by Campbell against Mr. Palowsky, III and his counsel, pending
Mr. Palowsky, IIIs appeal. 68 He also sustained the exceptions of no cause of action based on
judicial immunity, dismissing the suits against Campbell and the judges. 69 The case is currently
on appeal with the Second Circuit Court of Appeal.
The foregoing history provides the sordid backdrop for Plaintiff Judge Marchmans
Complaint against Judges Sharp, Amman, Rambo and Jones70, Guiceas the judges counsel,
66
Nor can there be any confusion about whether Defendant Judge Sharp quashed the subpoenas and subpoenas
duces tecum to Plaintiff Judge Marchman and the rest of the 4th JDC bench. Plaintiff Judge Marchman related a
conversation with Defendant Judge Sharp that she took to mean that Defendant Judge Sharps order quashing the
subpoenas and subpoenas duces tecum did not apply to her. Exhibit 12 at pp. 50-51. Defendant Judge Sharp
corrected her, indicating that her memory was faulty. Id. at p. 51. He also rebuffed Mr. Wards attempts to have
Defendant Judge Sharp interpret the order on the motion to quash for Mr. Ward, instructing him twice, Read the
order. Id.
67
Exhibit 11 at p. 11.
68
Id. at p. 4.
69
Id. at pp. 16, 20.
70
It should be noted that Plaintiff Judge Marchmans pointed allegations against Judge Jones, in particular, of
conspiracy to hide payroll fraud and document destruction stand in sharp contrast to her effusive praise of Judge
Jones recorded at the formal court opening ceremony for the Fourth Judicial District Court in September 2014.
Exhibit 14. Plaintiff Judge Marchmans Complaint identifies Judge Jones as the investigating authority in July
2014 for the issues of the 52 PCR applications and the related gift card for which no remedial action was taken
against Campbell. Complaint at 33, 34. Plaintiff Judge Marchman further points out that in the following
month, August 2014, Judge Jones purportedly ignored an eyewitness to Campbells alleged confession to document
destruction and closed that investigation without taking any action against Campbell. Complaint at 37. Despite her
knowledge of Judge Jones alleged participation in the cover up made subject of this suit, she described Judge
17
Crawford, Pettiette and Caldwellas Campbells counsel, and Campbell, and Crawfords
resulting Motion to Dismiss. However, conspicuously absent from Plaintiff Judge Marchmans
Complaint is any direct proof of her defamatory accusations that Campbell committed payroll
fraud and destroyed documents and the Fourth Judicial District Court conspired to cover it up.
On the contrary, in the early fall of 2015 the Attorney General commenced an, delegated to the
State Inspector General and Louisiana State Police, into whether Campbell had destroyed
and/or concealed records related to specific court cases and committed payroll fraud by receiving
pay for services not rendered while employed as a Fourth Judicial District Court law clerk.71
After a lengthy investigation, on April 15, 2016, the State Inspector General concluded that the
facts failed to provide sufficient cause to support the arrest of Campbell. 72 This suit was filed
four days later on April 19, 2016.
Importantly, despite the fact that one of the central themes of Plaintiff Judge Marchmans
Complaint is that Campbell committed payroll fraud and destroyed documents and the judges
and attorney defendants conspired to hide this, she has never brought to this Courts attention
that Campbell has been officially cleared of wrongdoing. Certainly, if Campbell did not do the
nefarious acts alleged by Plaintiff Judge Marchman then the other defendants could not have
conspired to hide the non-existent nefarious acts. Plaintiff Judge Marchman filed an amended
complaint on May 13, 2016 in response to a motion to dismiss filed by Larry Pettiette to clarify
Jones as our brother, our mentor, our leader, trusted friend in September 2014. Exhibit 14 at p. 2. She
further commented, Just this morning he leaned up to me and said I got your back. And that he always has. And
for that we are so very grateful. Id. Plaintiff Judge Marchman also stressed that knowing Judge Jones concern for
the public fisc that no public money was spent on the portrait of Judge Jones commissioned by the Fourth Judicial
District Court judiciary that was donate to the Louisiana Supreme Court Historical Society. Id. at p. 3. This hardly
sounds like the jurist with whom Plaintiff Judge Marchman was privileged to serve on the bench, for whom she
expressed the utmost respect, true affection and admiration. Id. at p. 2.
71
Exhibit 13, April 15, 2016 letter from Stephen Street, State Inspector General, to Jerry Jones, District Attorney.
This can be contrasted with Plaintiff Judge Marchmans allegation that the Attorney General never properly
conducted an investigation into Campbell. Complaint at 17.
72
Id.
18
her damages, the capacity in which the defendants were being sued, and to add a 1986 claim
but again, not a word about the investigation that cleared Campbell.
With the backdrop set, as will be discussed below, Plaintiff Judge Marchmans
Complaint is unsupported on both factual and legal grounds and Crawfords Motion to Dismiss
should be granted, dismissing with prejudice the entirety of Plaintiff Judge Marchmans claims
against Crawford.
LAW AND ARGUMENT
A. 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss Legal Standard
The standard for passing on motions to dismiss has been recently revised by the Supreme
Court.73 This Court has distilled the standard as follows:
In order to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the plaintiff must plead
enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.
In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litigation, 495 F. 3d 191, 205 (5th Cir. 2007), citing
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1974, 167 L.Ed.2d 929
(2007). Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the
speculative level, on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are
true (even if doubtful in fact). Id. Yet, if the allegations set forth in the
complaint, even if true, could not raise a claim of entitlement to relief, the court
will expose the basic deficiency at the point of minimum expenditure of time and
money by the parties and the court. Cuvillier v. Taylor, 503 F.3d 397, 401 (5th
Cir.2007).74
This Court has also instructed:
The plaintiff's complaint is to be construed in a light most favorable to the
plaintiff, and the allegations contained therein are to be taken as true.
Oppenheimer v. Prudential Securities, Inc., 94 F.3d 189, 194 (5th Cir.1996). At
the same time, a plaintiff must plead specific facts, not mere conclusional
allegations, to avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim. Kane Enterprises v.
MacGregor (USA), Inc., 322 F.3d 371, 374 (5th Cir.2003). We will thus not
73
74
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1974 (2007).
McKinley v. Harvey Toyota of Bossier City, Inc., 534 F. Supp. 2d 668, 670 (W.D. La. 2008).
19
accept as true conclusory allegations or unwarranted deductions of fact. Id.

(internal quotations omitted).75
As this Court recently pointed out:
While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need
detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds of his
entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do [.] Bell
Atlantic, 127 S.Ct. at 1964-65 (citations, quotation marks, and brackets
omitted)(emphasis added). See also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, --- U.S. ----, 129 S.Ct.
1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009).76
This case presents a surfeit of detailed factual allegations having nothing to do with the
plaintiffs causes of action. Drilling down to Plaintiff Judge Marchmans factual allegations
relative to her claims against Crawford reveals the lack of any valid claim for relief as pleaded.
Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief is a context-specific
task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.77
While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by
factual allegations.78 Where a complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a
defendants liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement
to relief.79 When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity
and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.80 As to Crawford,
Plaintiff Judge Marchmans Complaint does not establish an entitlement to relief under 1983,
1985, or 1986, because Crawford was not a state actor and the Complaint fails to sufficiently
plead facts supporting a conspiracy with state actors or otherwise. Moreover, the facts establish
75
Kraft Food Ingredients, Corp. v. PCI International Consultants, Inc., 2008 WL 4001184 (W.D. La. 8/27/08) at
*2.
76
Haydell Industries, LLC v. Petrucci, 702 F. Supp. 2d 688, 695-696 (W.D. La. 2010).
77
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1950, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009).
78
Id.
79
Internal quotes and citation omitted. Id.
80
Haydell Industries, LLC v. Petrucci, 702 F. Supp. 2d 688, 695-696 (W.D. La. 2010).
20
that Plaintiff Judge Marchman did improperly and illegally disclose Campbells confidential
personnel information, gutting her core complaint against Crawford.
1. Plaintiffs Civil Rights Action Does Not Lie Against Crawford, a Private
Attorney
Plaintiff Judge Marchman has not stated a claim for relief under 1983 against Crawford,
a private retained attorney whose complained-of actions occurred in his representation of
Campbell. A claim under 1983 requires conduct by a person under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom or usage of any State or Territory law depriving another of any
right, privilege or immunity guaranteed by the Constitution and laws of the U.S. 81 The Fifth
Circuit explained:
Where a plaintiff brings a 1983 action against a state official, the requirement to
show that the defendant acted under color of state law is satisfied by
demonstrating state action under the Fourteenth Amendment. Lugar v.
Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 929, 102 S.Ct. 2744, 73 L.Ed.2d 482 (1982).82
However, a private party does not act under color of law by using the civil or criminal court
systems for redress of grievances. 83 Furthermore, the Fifth Circuit has held that private attorneys
do not transform themselves into state actors merely by relying on Louisianas legal system to
effect their clients representation.84 [T]o hold otherwise would lead to the absurd conclusion
that every person who seeks redress through the legal system acts under color of state law.85
Thus, neither a private retained nor a court-appointed attorney performing their typical functions
81
42 U.S.C. 1983.
Glotfelty v. Karas, 512 Fed. Appx. 409, 413 (5th Cir. 2013).
83
512 Fed. Appx. at 414, citing Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 28, 101 S.Ct. 183, 66 L.Ed.2d 185 (1980), and Sims
v. Jefferson Downs Racing Assn, 778 F. 2d 1068, 1078-1079 (5th Cir. 1985).
84
512 Fed. Appx. at 414. See also Hill v. McClellan, 490 F. 2d 859, 860 (5th Cir. 1974)(private attorney
representing a client in a civil proceeding does not act under color of state law), overruled on other grounds, Sparks
v. Duval County Ranch Co., 604 F. 2d 976, 983 (5th Cir. 1979).
85
Id.
82
21
act under color of law.86 On the contrary, they serve their client--not the state--by virtue of the
attorney-client relationship.87
The Complaint concludes that Crawford was at all pertinent times acting under color
of law as a representative and attorney for Campbell. 88 However, the Complaint is devoid of
material facts that support the notion that Crawfords defense of Campbell required him to
exercise power possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because Crawford was
clothed with the authority of state law.89 Moreover, Crawford is not a state actor by association
merely by serving as co-counsel for Campbell with the Louisiana Attorney Generals office.
Crawford served Campbell, not the state, under the attorney-client relationship. Thus, Plaintiff
Judge Marchmans conclusion that Crawford acted under color of law in his representation of
Campbell does not make it so, nor does that conclusion devoid of reference to material facts
suffice to transform Crawford into a state actor. Because Crawford did not act under color of
law as a private retained attorney, he cannot be liable under 1983. Accordingly, Plaintiff Judge
Marchman has failed to set forth a plausible claim for relief and Crawfords motion should be
granted.
Plaintiff Judge Marchman fails to allege facts supporting her conspiracy claims under the
First and Fourteenth Amendments. A private actor can be found liable under 1983 if the private
86
Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 102 S.Ct. 445, 70 L.Ed.2d 509 (1981); Pete v. Metcalfe, 8 F. 3d 214, 217
(5th Cir. 1993); Nelson v. Stratton, 469 F. 2d 1155 (5th Cir. 1972).
87
Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 102 S.Ct. 445, 70 L.Ed.2d 509 (1981); U.S. ex rel. Simmons v. Zibilich, 542
F. 2d 259, 261 (5th Cir. 1976).
88
Complaint at 5(B). Alternatively, as raised by Defendants Caldwell and Pettiette, assuming Crawford was
indeed acting under color of law in his representation of Campbell as alleged by the plaintiff, then he would be
immunized from liability in his official capacity. Filarsky v. Delia, 566 U.S. ____, 132 S.Ct. 1657, 182 L.Ed.2d 662
(2012) (a private attorney temporarily retained by the city to carry out its work is entitled to seek qualified immunity
from suit under 1983).
89
512 Fed. Appx. at 413, citing West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 49, 108 S.Ct. 2250, 101 L.Ed.2d 40 (1988).
22
actor was a willful participant in joint activity with the state or its agents.90 Thus, a private
person like Crawford can be considered a state actor under 1983 if the private person was
engaged in a conspiracy with one or more parties acting under color of state law.91 To support
conspiracy claims, the Fifth Circuit requires that the complainant set forth facts supporting 1) an
agreement between the private and public defendants to commit an illegal act, and 2) an actual
deprivation of constitutional rights.92 Mere conclusory allegations of conspiracy cannot, absent
reference to material facts, survive a motion to dismiss.93
The Fifth Circuit consistently
requires specific facts rather than generic conclusions in 1983 cases.94
Plaintiff Judge
Marchmans conspiracy allegations fail in this regard, nor do they support curtailment of her
constitutional rights.
Taking the second criterion first, Plaintiff Judge Marchmans factual allegations do not
support an actual deprivation of constitutional rights.
[A]n underlying constitutional or
statutory violation is a predicate to any theory of liability under 1983.95 Plaintiff Judge
Marchman has not set forth a First Amendment retaliation claim or Fourteenth Amendment
equal protection claim.
Her speech concerning Campbell and resulting in the alleged
retaliation96 was made pursuant to her official duties as an elected Fourth Judicial District Court
judge and chair of the personnel committee.
90
[W]hen public employees make statements
Cinel v. Connick, 15 F. 3d 1338, 1343 (5th Cir. 1994).

Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co. 398 U.S. 144, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970).
92
15 F.3d at 1343, citing Arsenaux v. Roberts, 726 F. 2d 1022, 1024 (5th Cir. 1982), and Villanueva v. McInnis, 723
F. 2d 414, 418 (5th Cir. 1984).
93
Arsenaux v. Roberts, 726 F. 2d 1022, 1024 (5th Cir. 1982).
94
Hale v. Harney, 786 F. 2d 688, 690 (5th Cir. 1986).
95
Broussard v. Lafayette City-Parish Consolidated Government, 45 F. Supp. 3d 553, 565-66 (W.D. La. 2014), citing
Johnston v. Harris County Flood Control Dist., 869 F. 2d 1565, 1573 (5th Cir. 1989).
96
What the retaliation allegedly spearheaded by Campbell and the judges consisted of is unstated from her
pleadings. Plaintiff Judge Marchman remains an elected judge with the Fourth Judicial District Court. Simply
contending that certain persons in the Judges office and the courthouse are no longer friendly to her does not rise to
the level of retaliation.
91
23
pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment
purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their communications from employer
discipline.97 Moreover, Crawford is not her employer and she has not alleged that she was
subject to discipline as a result of her speaking out about Campbell with the other defendant
judges. Thus, Plaintiff Judge Marchman fails to set forth a First Amendment claim under 1983.
Similarly, Plaintiff Judge Marchmans allegations also fail to make out an equal
protection claim. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that
persons similarly situated be treated to the same way. 98 Generally, an equal protection claim
involves establishing selective treatment of the plaintiff among other similarly situated, and that
selective treatment was based on impermissible considerations of race, religion, intent to restrict
or punish exercise of constitutional rights, or malicious intent to injure. 99
Plaintiff Judge
Marchman alleges that she was singled out for unfavorable treatment without adequate
justification, but fails to allege membership in a suspect class.100 Thus, she appears to allege an
equal protection violation under the class of one theory. 101
However, no facts in her
Complaint articulate intentional treatment disparate from others similarly situated without a
rational basis for the difference in treatment.102 Nowhere does her Complaint state that other
judges or duly-elected officials in the Fourth Judicial District Court also tried to expose
Campbells purported history of document destruction and payroll fraud with resulting different
97
Garcetti v. Caballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421, 126 S.Ct. 1951, 164 L.Ed.2d 689 (2006).
45 F. Supp. 3d at 568, citing Dudley v. Angel, 209 F. 2d 460, 463 (5th Cir. 2000).
99
Williams v. Bramer, 180 F. 3d 699, 705 (5th Cir. 1999).
100
Complaint at 101. Furthermore, the unfavorable treatment of which she complains consists of disagreements
and perceived slights by her colleagues which, while personally distasteful, if true, does not rise to the level of civil
rights violations. Moreover, the personal and personnel disputes aired in this proceeding and others should have
been resolved in an internal employment setting, or even in a confidential proceeding with the Louisiana Judiciary
Commission and Louisiana Supreme Court rather than this federal forum. See Rule XXIII, Louisiana Supreme
Court Rules.
101
Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 120 S.Ct. 1073, 145 L.Ed.2d 1060 (2000).
102
528 U.S. at 564.
98
24
treatment. Thus, Plaintiff Judge Marchman fails to set forth an equal protection claim under
1983.
Furthermore, regarding the alleged conspiracy, nothing in the Complaint articulates the
foundation for the alleged conspiracy between Crawford and the purported co-conspirators. A
civil conspiracy pursuant to 1983 is an agreement between private and public actors to violate a
plaintiffs constitutional rights.103 Concerted action between state and private actors, without
allegations which suggest an agreement regarding the challenged state action, is not enough to
overcome a 12(b)(6) motion.104 Thus, in Dolenz v. Akin, the Northern District of Texas found
that plaintiffs conclusory allegations that the defendant judge, opposing party and her attorney
reached an agreement, had a meeting of the minds, or participated in an action in
conspiracy to have the plaintiff incarcerated for contempt were inadequate to state a claim for
relief for a conspiracy under 1983.105 The sum total of plaintiffs factual allegations supporting
the purported conspiracy were that the defendants had ex parte communications and the
defendant judges actions favored the opposing party and her attorney. 106 Without more,
plaintiff failed to state a plausible claim for relief under 1983, and defendants motion to
dismiss was granted. Nowhere in Plaintiff Judge Marchmans Complaint does she even remotely
articulate how, when, why, where or even who conspired to act (or even had a motive to act).
Similarly in Dyess v. Louisiana State University Bd. of Supervisors, the Eastern District
granted the defendant attorneys motion to dismiss the plaintiffs 1983 claims under FRCP
12(b)(6).107 The defendant attorneys subpoenaed and received plaintiff Dyess medical school
103
Cinel, 15 F. 3d at 1343.
Dennison v. City of New Orleans, 1997 WL361904 (E.D. La. 6/27/97) at *3.
105
1997 WL 21388 (N.D. Tex. 1/14/97) at *5.
106
Id. at *5.
107
2005 WL 2060915 (E.D. La. 8/19/05).
104
25
records from LSU without notifying the plaintiff or obtaining his consent. Thereafter, Dyess
records were used to impeach him while serving as an expert witness in litigation defended by
the defendant attorneys. Dyess sued the attorneys and LSU under 1983 alleging violations of
his constitutional rights of due process and freedom from unlawful seizure. The Eastern District
held that a private attorney issuing a subpoena does not become a state actor under 1983.108
Furthermore, in the absence of factual allegations that the defendant attorneys and LSU reached
an agreement to commit an illegal act or facts from which their collusion could be inferred,
Dyess failed to state a claim against the attorneys under 1983.109
The Eastern District reached the same conclusion in Dennison v. City of New Orleans.110
The plaintiff, Dennison, a bar patron, sued the bartender (Hand) and owner of the bar
(Monaghan) for conspiring with NOPD to commit false arrest, battery and imprisonment under
1983. Dennison alleged that Hand acted in concert with NOPD. However, nothing in the
complaint set forth that Hand/Monaghan were capable of and exercised influence and control
over the police officers official functions, or compelled, directed, or entered into an agreement
or understanding with the officers to deprive Dennison of his constitutional rights.111 In granting
Hand/Monaghans motion to dismiss, the Court reasoned:
To summarize, Dennison has failed in this instance to allege facts which suggest
that defendants Hand and/or Monaghan, both private actors, conspired with the
defendant officers of the NOPD to deprive plaintiff of his constitutional rights.
Dennison has not alleged that Hand and Monaghan played any role in suggesting
to the investigating officers the unlawful manner in which they allegedly
performed their function as law enforcement officers. Dennison has failed to
allege that the private defendants had a common understanding or meeting of the
minds with any state actors regarding the deprivation of his constitutional rights.
Instead, Dennisons complaint merely asserts that Hand acted in concert with
108
2005 WL 2060915 at *3.

Id. at *4.
110
1997 WL361904 (E.D. La. 6/27/97).
111
Id. at *3.
109
26
the investigating NOPD officers. More conclusory allegations of this nature will
not suffice. Accordingly, Dennison has failed to state a claim for relief under 42
U.S.C. 1983 against Hand and Monaghan.112
The same result should obtain in this case.
The facts set forth in Plaintiff Judge Marchmans Complaint concerning Crawfords
involvement in the alleged conspiracy are sparse, wholly speculative, and inadequate. Instead,
unfounded conclusions populate the limited references to Crawford, which appear in only 11 of
the 117 paragraphs of the Complaint. Plaintiff Judge Marchman contends:
Crawford conspired with Campbell, Pettiette, and Caldwell and assisted in Campbells
retaliation against Plaintiff Judge Marchman. 113
Crawford submitted the pleadings in which she [Plaintiff Judge Marchman] was accused
of committing wrongful and illegal acts which accusation lacked merit. 114
Crawford acted in concert with Defendant Judges Sharp, Amman, Rambo and Jones, the
Defendant Judges attorney, Guice, the State Attorney General Caldwell and Special
Assistant Pettiette, appointed to represent Campbell, to turn Plaintiff Judge Marchman
into a virtual pariah at the courthouse, and singled her out for disparate treatment.115
Plaintiff Judge Marchman does not allege facts supporting Crawfords motive, intent, knowledge
or involvement in assisting in a retaliation of unspecified nature. [A] plaintiff must show
that the defendants agreed to commit an act by identifying the illegal objective of the agreement
112
1997 WL361904 at *3.

Complaint at 16. This allegation raises yet another obstacle to Plaintiff Judge Marchmans cause of action:
how attorneys defending the same party can conspire under the statute when they all serve the interests of the same
person, Campbell.
114
Complaint at 16, 71-77, 82.
115
Id. at 82.
113
27
supported with facts rather than conclusory allegations. 116 However, apart from conclusions,
Plaintiff Judge Marchman fails to set forth any facts showing any understanding or agreement
among the alleged conspiratorsincluding Crawford--for the purpose of violating her First and
Fourteenth Amendment rights. Instead, Plaintiff Judge Marchman simply points to Crawfords
representation of Campbell and his actions in making filings in Campbells defense. These facts
are insufficient to state a conspiracy claim under 1983. Therefore, Crawfords Motion to
Dismiss should be granted.
Plaintiff Judge Marchmans claims under 1985 also lack adequate substance to
withstand FRCP 12(b)(6) scrutiny.
This Court has succinctly summarized the various
conspiracies recognized under 1985:

Part of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. 1985 creates a private civil
remedy for three prohibited forms of conspiracy to interfere with civil rights.
Subsection (1) prohibits conspiracies to prevent federal officers from performing
the duties of their offices by force, intimidation, or threat; Subsection (3)
prohibits conspiracies to depriv[e] ... any person or class of persons the equal
protection of the laws and those aimed at preventing a person from lawfully
voting; and Subsection (2) concerns conspiracies directed at the right of
participation in federal judicial proceedings. (Footnote omitted).117
Plaintiff Judge Marchman does not identify the subsection applicable to her claims. However,
1985(1) protects federal officers and neither Plaintiff Judge Marchman nor any of the other
defendants are alleged to be federal officers. Thus, Plaintiff Judge Marchman has not stated a
valid claim against Crawford under 1985(1).
116
Marceaux v. Lafayette City-Parish Consolidated Government, 921 F. Supp. 2d 605, fn. 99 (W.D. La. 2013),
citing Rodriguez v. Neeley, 169 F. 3d 220, 222 (5th Cir. 1999).
117
921 F. Supp. 2d at 642, citing Montoya v. FedEx Ground Package System, Inc., 614 F. 3d 145, 149 (5th Cir.
2010).
28
Plaintiff Judge Marchman also fails to state a claim under 1985(2). That subsection first
addresses conspiracies focused on obstructing justice, or intimidating a party or witness to a
federal court proceeding:
(2) If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire to deter, by force,
intimidation, or threat, any party or witness in any court of the United States from
attending such court, or from testifying to any matter pending therein, freely fully,
and truthfully, or to injure such party or witness in his person or property on
account of his having so attended or testified, or to influence the verdict,
presentment, or indictment of any grand or petit juror in any such court, or to
injure such juror in his person or property on account of any verdict, presentment,
or indictment lawfully assented to by him or of his being or having been such
juror; . . . 118
Because no federal proceedings are implicated in Plaintiff Judge Marchmans pleadings, this
portion of 1985(2) does not apply. The remainder of that subsection is likewise inapplicable:
or if two or more persons conspire for the purpose of impeding, hindering,
obstructing, or defeating, in any manner, the due course of justice in any State or
Territory, with intent to deny to any citizen the equal protection of the laws, or to
injure him or his property for lawfully enforcing, or attempting to enforce, the
right of any person, or class of persons, to the equal protection of the laws; . . . 119
The state court proceeding portion of the statute requires a showing of racial or other class-based
animus.120 Plaintiff Judge Marchman has not alleged that the defendants were motivated by
racial or other discriminatory animus. Thus, Plaintiff Judge Marchman has failed to allege facts
sufficient to state a claim against Crawford under the entirety of 1985(2).
Plaintiff Judge Marchman likewise fails to state a claim under 1985(3) in light of the
lack of any allegations of any racial or class-based animus behind the alleged conspiracy. That
subsection provides:
(3) If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire or go in disguise on
118
42 U.S.C. 1985(2).
Id.
120
Daigle v. Gulf States Utilities Co., 794 F. 2d 974, 979 (5th Cir. 1986).
119
29
the highway or on the premises of another, for the purpose of depriving, either
directly or indirectly, a person or class of persons of the equal protection of the
laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws; or for the purpose of
preventing or hindering the constituted authorities of any State or Territory from
giving or securing to all persons within such State or Territory the equal
protection of the laws; or if two or more persons conspire to prevent by force,
intimidation, or threat, any citizen who is lawfully entitled to vote, from giving his
support or advocacy in a legal manner, toward or in favor of the election of any
lawfully qualified person as an elector for President or Vice President, or as a
Member of Congress of the United States; or to injure any citizen in person or
property on account of such support or advocacy; . . .121
The law in this Circuit is well settled that to state a cognizable claim under 1985(3), Plaintiff
Judge Marchman must allege that 1) a racial or class-based discriminatory animus lay behind the
conspiracy and 2) the conspiracy aimed to violate rights protected against private
infringement.122 Being the sole proponent of the belief that Campbell committed payroll fraud
and destroyed documents does not equate to a class for purposes of discriminatory animus.
Furthermore, the factual allegations in the pleadings do not articulate a conspiracy motivated by
race, inherited or other immutable characteristics, political belief or association.123
Thus,
Plaintiff Judge Marchman has failed to allege facts sufficient to state a claim against Crawford
under 1985(3).
Moreover, for the reasons set forth in Section C, the pleadings do not set forth a
conspiracy in that Plaintiff Judge Marchman concludes the existence of a conspiracy but does not
allege facts supporting an agreement among the defendants to act to in a manner supporting an
illegal objective. For these reasons, she has failed to state a claim for relief against Crawford
under 1985 and the Motion to Dismiss should be granted.
4. Plaintiffs Allegations Fail to Support a 1986 Claim
121
42 U.S.C. 1985(3).
Horaist v. Doctors Hosp. of Opelousas, 255 F. 3d 261, 270 (W.D. La. 2001).
123
Hamill v. Wright, 870 F. 2d 1032, 1037-38 (5th Cir. 1989).
122
30
On May 13, 2016, Plaintiff Judge Marchman filed a Supplemental, Amended and
Restated Complaint which added, among other allegations, 1986 claims that all defendants had
knowledge of the conspiracies against Judge Marchman and had the power to stop or prevent
same, but they refused or neglected to do so.124 Under 1986, a defendant can be held liable for
neglecting to prevent a conspiracy. However, a valid 1985 claim is condition precedent to
maintaining a 1986 claim. 125
Since Plaintiff Judge Marchman fails to set forth a valid
conspiracy claim under 1985, her allegation that Crawford is liable under 1986 for failure to
prevent the conspiracy also fails. Thus, the Motion to Dismiss should be granted.
B. The Timeline Disproves that Plaintiff Judge Marchmans Hands Were Clean
in Her Improper Disclosures
Plaintiff Judge Marchmans allegations that Crawford and Campbell made baseless
accusations about her to the Court in Palowsky v. Campbell contradict her own attorneys
admissions. Therefore, to prove that she did not disclose Campbells confidential personnel
information until allegedly ordered to do so on August 20, 2015, she must show that Messrs.
Ward and Banks lied when they identified her, both in court and in pleadings, as the source of
the information in Mr. Palowsky, IIIs July 2015 pleadings.
The only other reasonable
conclusions are that Plaintiff Judge Marchman has misrepresented the facts to this Court in her
Complaint or that she and her attorneys have misrepresented the facts.
As discussed in detail above, after a local reporter sought via public records request
personnel information targeting Campbell which the Fourth Judicial District Court refused to
provide, Judge Simon determined that Campbells expectation of privacy in the withheld
124
125
Doc. 22, Supplemental, Amended and Restated Complaint at 17, 103-105, 112-113.
Mississippi Womens Medical Clinic v. McMillan, 866 F. 2d 788, 795 (5th Cir. 1989).
31
documents precluded their production.126 Accordingly, Judge Simons May 2015 ruling deemed
Campbells disciplinary history confidential and private.
In July 2015, Messrs. Ward and Banks on behalf of Mr. Palowsky, III, filed suit against
Campbell and Judges Sharp, Jones, Amman, Rambo, and Winters.127 In addition to scandalous,
immaterial, impertinent, and insulting commentary on and disparagement of Campbells
character, Mr. Palowsky, IIIs pleadings detailed allegations of Campbells History of
Destruction, Mishandling and/or Concealment of Documents and Defendant Judges Complicit
Cover-Up of Same.128 The pleadings alleged that Palowsky learned that Campbell had been
investigated in 2012 and again in 2014 and the specifics of that confidential judges inquiry, that
Campbell did not electronically enter the time she spent at work until after May 2014, a month
she unexpectedly had off without pay, and Campbells alleged responsibility for 52 missing
writ applications. 129 Mr. Palowsky, III further alleged the judges of being complicit in
Campbells felonious document destruction and payroll fraud, and scheming and
conspiring with her to conceal the fraud from the tax-paying public. 130 Messrs. Ward and
Banks also peppered the pleadings with impertinent and out of context quotations from
Campbells society column written for the Monroe NewsStar.131
126
Exhibit 3.
Exhibit 4.
128
Exhibit 4 starting at 27. In Mr. Palowsky, IIIs original Petition, this section was entitled, Campbells History
of Intentionally Mishandling and Misplacing Pleadings Without Any Reprisal From Her Supervising Judges. See
Exhibit 3 starting at 22.
129
Exhibit 4 at 13, 28, 29, 30, 36, 39, 42, and 52.
130
Id. at 15, 16, 17, 26.
131
Exhibit 4 at 32, 52, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, and 69. It is interesting to note that Campbell did not know, nor was
she in any way acquainted with Mr. Palowsky, Jr., Mr. Palowsky, III, Messrs. Ward or Banks prior to the institution
of the state court pleadings.
127
32
In response, on August 10, 2015, Crawford filed exceptions, moved to strike 49 of the 88
paragraphs as immaterial, insulting and scandalous.132 Campbells filings were met with an
October 28, 2015 opposition memorandum filed by Messrs. Ward and Banks on behalf of Mr.
Palowsky, III. Over approximately ten pages, the opposition memorandum set forth details
provided to Messrs. Ward, Banks and Palowsky, III by Plaintiff Judge Marchman of what
Plaintiff Judge Marchman would testify if allowed to testify on Mr. Palowsky, IIIs
behalf.133 The majority of Plaintiff Judge Marchmans testimony, according to Messrs. Ward,
Banks and Palowsky, III, related to the contents of Campbells private personnel file, including
disciplinary history, and private discussions between the judges about personnel decisions
involving Campbell. A sampling of the extensive confidential facts to which Plaintiff Judge
Marchman would testify includes:
That Campbell was reported for attendance issues by another law clerk and the resulting
conversations between the judges;134
That information about another complaint made about Campbell was not shared with
Plaintiff Judge Marchman despite the fact that she was chair of the personnel
committee;135
That the judges met on several occasions to discuss payroll fraud; 136
That Plaintiff Judge Marchman had reviewed time sheets and key fob reports for
Campbell and what she believed her review revealed;137
That the judges met in April 2014, discussed new procedures, and disciplinary action
taken regarding Campbell;138
132
Exhibit 6.
Exhibit 7 at pp. 3-12.
134
Id. at p. 3. Note the similarity in the language to Plaintiff Judge Marchmans Complaint at 18.
135
Id. at p. 4. See Complaint at 22.
136
137
Id. at pp. 5-6. See Complaint at 25, 28.
138
Id. at 6. See Complaint at 29, 30, 31.
133
33
That an investigation took place regarding missing post-conviction relief applications,

discussion among the judges regarding same and the outcome;139
Her discussion with Judge Manning regarding wanting Campbell fired and recusing
herself from pending personnel matters involving Campbell; 140
Discussions during a judges meeting regarding Mr. Palowsky, IIIs allegations against
Campbell in Palowsky v. Cork and outcome;141
That discussions were had regarding complaints about Campbell during a September 10,
2014 judges meeting, and the outcome of same;142
The contents of emails between Campbell and Defendant Judge Sharp in November 2014
concerning a complaint about Campbell;143
Discussions at a specially-called judges meeting in December 2014;144
That at a meeting of the judges in March 2015, Plaintiff Judge Marchman moved to
terminate Campbell, but no one seconded the motion;145 and
Decisions made by the judges at the March 2015 judges meeting about what
documents would be included in Campbells personnel file.146
Thus, as of October 28, 2015, Messrs. Ward, Banks and Palowsky, III had identified Plaintiff
Judge Marchman as the person from whom they obtained the information set forth in the July
2015 pleadings.
It cannot be disputed that the information to which Judge Marchman would testify
included extensive information disclosed from the private and confidential personnel records of
139
Exhibit 7at pp. 6-7. See Complaint at 32, 34.

141
Id. at p. 8. See Complaint at 19-22, 36, 38, 39, 40. While Mr. Banks undoubtedly knew about the letter he
received, he could not have known of the discussions held in the judges meeting after lodging his complaint.
142
Id. at pp. 8-9. See Complaint at 41.
143
Id. at p. 9. See Complaint at 44. How could Messrs. Ward and Banks have known of the email exchange
between Campbell and Judge Sharp if they were not copied with the correspondence?
144
145
Id. See Complaint at 49.
146
Id. at pp. 10-11, reporting that Plaintiff Judge Marchman would testify that it was decided that Campbells
March 12, 2015 letter to Defendant Judge Jones should not go in her personnel file, but two other documents, which
included the November 3, 2014 emails between Campbell and Judge Sharp, should. See Plaintiff Judge
Marchmans Complaint at 50.
140
34
Campbell as well as the private activity of the court. Moreover, on November 5, 2015, at the
hearing on Campbells Motion to Strike, Mr. Ward confirmed that the factual support for Mr.
Palowsky, IIIs July 2015 pleadings came from a judge inside the court.
Plaintiff Judge
Marchman was the only judge he identified that would testify extensively to the private
information in Campbells personnel file; private information that Judge Simon had ruled in May
2015 was to remain confidential. Therefore, Crawford and Campbell were entirely correct in
stating that Plaintiff Judge Marchman illegally and improperly disclosed sensitive and privileged
material to private litigants in a civil matter over which she was not presiding in violation of a
final judgment of Judge Simon.
Thus, Plaintiff Judge Marchmans core complaint against
Crawford is meritless.
For the sake of completion, Crawford proves that the other representations cited by
Plaintiff Judge Marchman at paragraphs 71, 72 and 75 are likewise accurate and supported.
First, Crawford challenges Plaintiff Judge Marchman to deny her long-standing acquaintance,
close friendship and representation of Mr. Palowsky and his family. 147
Second, as for the existence of a personal vendetta, 148 the definition supports the facts in
this case.
Vendetta is defined as any prolonged and bitter feud, rivalry, contention or the
like.149 Messrs. Ward, Banks and Palowsky, IIIs representations to the Fourth Judicial District
Court as to what Plaintiff Judge Marchman would have testified to as well as the Complaint in
this matter demonstrate prolonged disagreements between Plaintiff Judge Marchman and her
colleagues about Campbells personnel matters and other internal court issues and with
147
Complaint at 71.
Id. at 71, 72.
149
See http://www.dictionary.com/browse/vendetta?s=t
148
35
Campbell.150
Despite pointing out that she voluntarily recused herself in June 2014 from
personnel committee matters involving Campbell after learning that Campbell was actively
seeking someone to oppose her in the upcoming fall election, her further allegations show that
she admittedly later immersed herself in all matters concerning Campbell. 151 Plaintiff Judge
Marchmans actions against the employment interests of a law clerk after formally
acknowledging that she could no longer act in an unbiased and impartial fashion demonstrates
the very existence of the vendetta she denies. For these reasons, Plaintiff Judge Marchman
cannot prove the falseness of the content of Crawfords memoranda, the central contention
against him in this lawsuit.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff Judge Marchman has failed to state a claim against Crawford under 1983
because Crawford was a privately retained attorney and not a state actor.
Plaintiff Judge
Marchman also fails to state claim for conspiracy with state actors under 1983 or under 1985
insofar as no facts support an agreement among the defendants to deprive the plaintiff of her
constitutional rights, nor do the facts articulate an actual deprivation of rights. Additionally,
without adequate allegations of a conspiracy under 1985, Plaintiff Judge Marchmans 1986
claim fails as well.
Finally, the crux of Plaintiff Judge Marchmans claim against Crawford lies in the
representations made in filings during his representation of Campbell. As to his purportedly
false statement that Plaintiff Judge Marchman illegally disclosed Campbells confidential
personnel information in violation of Judge Simons ruling, not only did she do that, but her own
150
151
Exhibit 7 and Complaint at 75.

Complaint at 33, 36, 41, 49, 50, 52, 53, and 54.
36
attorneys identified her as the source of the divulged information. Regarding her vendetta, what
possible other explanation can there be for continuing to accuse Campbell, the Fourth Judicial
District judges, and Campbells attorneys of conspiring to hide payroll fraud and document
destruction, when an investigation by the Louisiana Inspector General and State Police found no
proof of that conduct?
For these reasons, Crawford respectfully submits that his Motion to Dismiss should be
granted, dismissing Plaintiffs claims against him with prejudice.
Respectfully submitted:
ALLEN & GOOCH
A Law Corporation
/s/ James H. Gibson
____________________________________
JAMES H. GIBSON 14285
2000 Kaliste Saloom Rd Suite 400
Lafayette, LA 70508
P. O. Box 81129
Lafayette, LA 70598-1129
Direct Dial 337-291-1300
Direct Fax 337-291-1305
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT, BRIAN E.
CRAWFORD
37
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing Memorandum in Support of Motion to
Dismiss was filed electronically with the Clerk of Court using the CM/ECF system. Notice of
this filing will be sent to all counsel of record by operation of the Courts electronic filing
system.
Lafayette, Louisiana, this 9TH day of June, 2016.
/s/ James H. Gibson

__________________________________
JAMES H. GIBSON
38

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Case 3:16-cv-00515-SMH-JPM Document 40-1 Filed 06/10/16 Page 1 of 45 PageID #: 910

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

* CIVIL ACTION NO. 16-CV-00515

BRIAN E. CRAWFORD; LAWRENCE W.

Case 3:16-cv-00515-SMH-JPM Document 40-1 Filed 06/10/16 Page 2 of 45 PageID #: 911

Table of Authorities ..........................................................................................................

Background Facts and Procedural History .........................................................................

Law and Argument............................................................................................................

A. 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss Legal Standard .....................................................

1. Plaintiffs Civil Rights Action Does Not Lie Against Crawford, a

October 23, 2014 Memorandum in Support of Motion to Recuse

Petition for Damages (Palowsky v. Campbell) ............................................

First Supplemental, Amended and Restated Petition for Damages,

Motion to Strike, Request for Sanctions, and Request for Contempt

Memorandum in Opposition to Allyson Campbells Exceptions of No

Case 3:16-cv-00515-SMH-JPM Document 40-1 Filed 06/10/16 Page 3 of 45 PageID #: 912

Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Campbells Motion to Strike,

Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Exceptions of No Cause of

Exhibit 10 - Supplemental Motion to Strike and Memorandum in support (Palowsky v.

Exhibit 11 - Transcript of November 5, 2015 (Palowsky v. Campbell) ...........................

Exhibit 12 - Transcript of August 20, 2015 (Palowsky v. Cork) .....................................

Exhibit 14 - September 5, 2014 Opening of Court Transcript ........................................

Case 3:16-cv-00515-SMH-JPM Document 40-1 Filed 06/10/16 Page 4 of 45 PageID #: 913

42 U.S.C. 1983................................................................................................................ 21, 22, 23,

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,

Broussard v. Lafayette City-Parish Consolidated Government,

Daigle v. Gulf States Utilities Co.,

Dennison v. City of New Orleans,

Case 3:16-cv-00515-SMH-JPM Document 40-1 Filed 06/10/16 Page 5 of 45 PageID #: 914

Dyess v. Louisiana State University Bd. of Supervisors

Financial Acquisition Partners LP v. Blackwell,

Haydell Industries, LLC v. Petrucci,

Horaist v. Doctors Hosp. of Opelousas,

Johnston v. Harris County Flood Control Dist.,

Kraft Food Ingredients, Corp. v. PCI International Consultants, Inc.,

Marceaux v. Lafayette City-Parish Consolidated Government,

Case 3:16-cv-00515-SMH-JPM Document 40-1 Filed 06/10/16 Page 6 of 45 PageID #: 915

McKinley v. Harvey Toyota of Bossier City, Inc.,

Mississippi Womens Medical Clinic v. McMillan,

Montoya v. FedEx Ground Package System, Inc.,

Polk County v. Dodson,

Sims v. Jefferson Downs Racing Assn,

Sparks v. Duval County Ranch Co.,

U.S. ex rel. Simmons v. Zibilich,

Village of Willowbrook v. Olech,

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Case 3:16-cv-00515-SMH-JPM Document 40-1 Filed 06/10/16 Page 9 of 45 PageID #: 918

Plaintiff Judge Marchman has never directly or indirectly supervised

However, Plaintiff Judge Marchmans efforts, as extensively detailed in her

Case 3:16-cv-00515-SMH-JPM Document 40-1 Filed 06/10/16 Page 10 of 45 PageID #: 919

Mr. Palowsky, III, alleged various

Docket No. 13-2059, 4th Judicial District Court.

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Case 3:16-cv-00515-SMH-JPM Document 40-1 Filed 06/10/16 Page 14 of 45 PageID #: 923

17. Meanwhile, information surfaced regarding Judge Rambos law clerk

The foregoing filing demonstrates that Messrs. Ward and

Case 3:16-cv-00515-SMH-JPM Document 40-1 Filed 06/10/16 Page 15 of 45 PageID #: 924

Mr. Palowsky, III, through

Case 3:16-cv-00515-SMH-JPM Document 40-1 Filed 06/10/16 Page 16 of 45 PageID #: 925