Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
Before
Torruella, Howard, and Thompson,
Circuit Judges.
He must
Kinsella, 622 F.3d 75, 77 (1st Cir. 2010) (citing United States v.
Bunchan, 580 F.3d 66, 67 (1st Cir. 2009)); United States v.
Mercado, 412 F.3d 243, 245 (1st Cir. 2005).
(a)
A Predator on the Prowl
In 2011 Jones signed up for an account at motherless.com,
an internet pornography site.
white mothers and fathers who have young and would like to see
their daughters get parted by a normal to moderate sized black
pole."
(Emphasis in original.)
added.
A couple days later a postal inspector named Jay Stern
spotted Jones's postings.
time because she is fictitious, though Jones did not know this
then.
theme, he wrote a bit later that he was "a lover of all girls
little.
Want to love."
He suggested that
site's forum called "Very Cute Only," Jones was asked, "what is the
-3-
about his prior sexual contact with very young girls (one as young
as four).
travel
by
bus
from
Pennsylvania
to
Rhode
Jones
Island.
Rendezvousing with Stern and his daughter, the trio would then
check into a hotel, where Jones would perform sex acts on the girl
over the course of several days.
film what Jones did "close up" shots only, the men agreed, "[n]o
face" shots.
With the date for their get-together fast approaching,
Jones asked for and got a chance to talk to Stern's daughter
(played by another officer) over the phone. "I sent you something"
and "[y]ou should have it really, really soon," Jones told her.
What he was referring to was some clothing he had sent her, gifts
intended to make her feel comfortable around him, apparently.
He
also promised Stern that he would bring "something sexy for her to
It read:
The agent,
Jones had booked a room for his meet-up with Stern and Stern's
daughter.
The agent then heard Jones ask the driver to pull over
Twelve child-
Damning
Trying to
explain what brought him to Rhode Island, Jones said that Stern
a man he did not know had "hit me up on my email."
"He's talking
about having sex with his kid," Jones stressed, and "I wanted to
see what he was really about."
talked "about possibly me having sex with his daughter." But Jones
wanted no part of that, and after completing his factfinding
transcript
of
the
his
willingness
to
have
sex
with
girls
five
and
up;
(d) gotten child pornography "left and right" from a guy named
"Eduardo"; (e) emailed Stern more than 10 child-pornography videos;
(f) booked the hotel room; (g) mailed Stern clothes for his
daughter; and (h) downloaded child pornography to the thumb drive
that he had on him "stuff" to show Stern's "kid," he conceded.
As for the other motherless.com posting "look[ing] for white
mothers and fathers who have young and would like to see their
daughters get parted by a normal to moderate sized black pole"
Jones suggested that someone else "could have put that there."
Soon a grand jury indicted Jones, charging him with
crossing a state line with intent to engage in a sex act with a
person under the age of 12 (count 1);5 using the internet a
facility of interstate commerce to persuade a person under 18 to
engage in a sex act for which he could be charged with the criminal
offense of child molestation under Rhode Island law (count 2);6
(count
4);8
possessing
child
pornography
distributed
trial.
(c)
Conviction and Sentence
The parties dueled below over the admissibility of a
certified document showing Jones's 1993 New Jersey conviction for
aggravated sexual assault and endangering the welfare of a child.
The judge had earlier granted the government's in limine motion to
introduce
that
document,
finding
the
evidence
relevant,
not
And the
officer then testified that the victim there was nine years old and
10
11
Anyone
truly intending to have sex with a child would have acted more
slyly, his lawyer told the jury "you don't" give out your "phone
number," for example.
lawyer added.
No one "is
that dumb," defense counsel insisted. And as for the trip to Rhode
Island, all Jones wanted was "to find out what's going on."
The
he imposed life
-9-
with
the
outcome
below,
Jones
contests
the
thinks
that
the
judge
stumbled
in
admitting
and, he reminds us, there was none here; and second, that the
evidence was irrelevant for counts 4-5 and unfairly prejudiced his
defense of counts 1-3, see Fed. R. Evid. 401, 402, and 403.
Because he dbuts his actual-child-victim claim on appeal, we
review it only for plain error a very stiff standard that
requires him to show "error, plainness, prejudice to [him] and the
threat of a miscarriage of justice."
Rosario, 658 F.3d 110, 116 (1st Cir. 2011); see also United States
v. Acosta-Colon, 741 F.3d 179, 192 (1st Cir. 2013); United States
v. Batchu, 724 F.3d 1, 7 n.4 (1st Cir. 2013).
-10-
He did, however,
We
Moving on, we
See Martnez v.
Importantly, this
Fed. R. Evid.
414(d)(1).
Given
560 U.S. 258, 262 (2010); see also Cheshire Med. Center v. W.R.
Grace & Co., 49 F.3d 26, 31 (1st Cir. 1995) (finding no plain error
where (among other things) "no decision cited to us, and none of
which we are aware," showed the obviousness of the supposed error).
Things might be different if Rule 414's language clearly
supported Jones's position.
Rodriguez, 480 F.3d 62, 70 (1st Cir. 2007). Unfortunately for him,
it does not.
Pouncing on the Rule's opening clause "In a criminal
case in which a defendant is accused of child molestation" Jones
argues that "child" there must mean a real child.
See, e.g.,
with
pornography).
the
transportation
Essentially,
and
and
distribution
helpfully,
he
of
child
concedes
the
436, 444 (5th Cir. 1976) (stressing that the court was "aware of no
rule of law declaring that in order to be admissible on one count
of an indictment, evidence must be relevant on all counts").
All
things
his
considered,
we
cannot
say
that
the
judge
abused
Rule 403
(for those not in the know) lets a judge exclude relevant evidence
if
"its
probative
value
is
substantially
outweighed"
by
its
committee's note.
Jones complains first that evidence of his New Jersey
conviction merely encouraged the jury to infer that he had a
propensity to act like a "child molester," something that he
believes is at odds with Rules 404(b) and 403.
Not true.
Yes,
evidence offered under Rule 414 must still pass muster under Rule
403.
problem, judges must be ever mindful that Rule 414 removes Rule
404(b)'s blanket ban on propensity inferences in child-molestation
cases. See id. at 60.12 And because Rule 414 flags this propensity
12
See id.
The
Think of a jury
See id.
But
the
elements
"indictment."
of
the
offense"
involved
in
the
current
13
for any act, conduct, or offense that was not charged in the
indictment."
why the judge's comments were not enough to neutralize any risk of
unfair prejudice, for example.
And so we press
on.
(b)
The 2260A Conviction
Jones grouses that his count-6 conviction (committing a
particular
felony
crime
involving
minor
while
required
to
But if instead it is
when
dealing
with
an
unpreserved
sufficiency-of-the-
and
omitted)).
gross
injustice
for
reversal"
(internal
quotations
But the Eleventh Circuit has, the government is quick to point out,
14
And so,
from the fact that chapter 110 uses the phrase "actual minor" three
times, in 18 U.S.C. 2252A(a)(3)(B)(ii), (c)(2), and (e), but not
in 2260A showing, Slaughter said, that Congress knows how to
add the "actual minor" language when it wants to.
1215-16.
Id. at 1216.
Id.
15
of important things:
(and
or
we
express
instructions
are
no
opinion,
one
way
the
law
our
case
for
the
because
other),
they
these
are
not
v. D'Amico, 496 F.3d 95, 102 n.6 (1st Cir. 2007), vacated on other
grounds, 552 U.S. 1173 (2008).
16
Still hoping against hope, Jones also suggests that two of his
three 2260A predicate convictions specifically, his convictions
under 2422 and 2423 constitute a double-jeopardy violation.
But he discusses the issue only in his reply brief and so has
waived the argument.
summarize
succinctly,
because
Jones's
preferred
Obviously
nothing said here whispers even the faintest hint of how we might
someday rule on the merits of the actual-child question.
See
holding
did
not
constitute
"ruling
on
the
merits"
Commendably, the
concluded
that
Jones's
1993
New
The judge at
Jersey
conviction
Looking at the
-21-
sexual
assault
if
he
commits
an
act
of
sexual
A.2d 416, 424 (N.J. 2006) (explaining how 2C14-2a(1) lacks that
intent element).
Unlike
And
lists
nine
crimes
that
qualify
as
Section
federal
sex
-22-
not
share
the
same
intent
element.
Ultimately,
then,
21, 33-34 (1st Cir. 2013) (concluding that our vacating sentences
on certain counts affected the judge's "sentencing architecture,"
requiring a complete resentencing on all counts).
Jones agrees.
That suggestion makes sense, but only for counts 1-5 after all,
2260A (the statute underlying his conviction on count 6) obliges
the
judge
to
apply
10-year
mandatory
sentence,
to
run
See id.
Naturally, we
-23-
FINAL WORDS
The short of this longish opinion is that we affirm
Jones's convictions but vacate his sentences on counts 1-5 and
remand for a resentencing consistent with this decision.
So Ordered.
-24-