Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
Before
Thompson, Baldock,* and Lipez,
Circuit Judges.
on
multiple
criminal
charges
related
to
their
pleas, and some others who testified against them in the hope of
lessening their own punishments, Ayala and Cruz hunkered down and
stood trial together.
a life sentence.
The two brothers now argue they should be acquitted
because the evidence introduced at trial was not sufficient to
support the jury verdicts.
-3-
sentence.
BACKGROUND
We set forth the basic facts in the light most favorable
to the verdict, United States v. Rios-Ortiz, 708 F.3d 310, 312 (1st
Cir. 2013), reserving additional details for our discussion of the
specific issues raised in this appeal.
When it drew
It further
put
up
drug
money
to
pay
for
extravagant
annual
Ayala
As befitting his position as the first listed defendant,
the government set out to prove that Ayala was the kingpin of the
entire DTO.
of
drug
crimes,
including
conspiracy
with
intent
to
-5-
After a
lengthy trial, the jury convicted Ayala on the first nine counts.
Ayala does not contest the jury's acceptance of the vast majority
of the facts testified to at trial.
named Steven, but when Steven died in 1995 Ayala took over the DTO
himself and became the "boss" or "leader of the drug point owners"
at Barbosa.
to Ayala for the privilege of selling drugs there. Only people who
Ayala knew or who had positions of responsibility within the DTO
were allowed to sell drugs.
Witnesses testified that drug sales occurred at Barbosa
twenty-four seven.
Ayala paid for, were intended to keep the drug sellers from being
identified or apprehended by the police.
A DEA
Police
testimony
further
Ayala
those
drugs
to
sellers
in
New
York
and
other
mainland
When
in varied, but was between 120 and 300 kilos per trip.
Trips were
made two or three times each week, and the witness testified that
in one month "about 5,000 kilos had been sent" to the mainland.
2.
Cruz
The Indictment identified Cruz's role in the DTO as that
intent
to
distribute
controlled
substances,
along
with
-9-
In this capacity,
"shifts"
to
the
sellers,
informed
drug
sellers
of
further
indicated
that
Cruz
acted
as
an
Baez
new
trial.
In
seeking
to
reverse
their
convictions,
the
-11-
Finally,
In its view
the convictions should stand because the evidence at trial-including witness testimony, videotape, and seized drugs--more than
suffices to allow a reasonable jury to return guilty verdicts. The
government then urges us not to grant new trials because the trial
judge did not exceed his authority in questioning witnesses and
commenting on the evidence.
that even if the trial judge erred in his trial participation, the
appellants still are not entitled to a new trial because any such
error was harmless.
government
states
it
is
procedurally
and
substantively
-12-
I.
laundering.
First,
he
argues
the
government
did
not
did not have enough evidence to find that he was involved in any of
the financial transactions alleged in Counts VII through IX.
Although
Ayala
argues
that
his
sufficiency
of
the
United States
-13-
We
a.
drugs to sellers who were selling inside Barbosa; (2) the sellers
in turn sold those drugs inside Barbosa; (3) the sellers kept those
drugs in apartments and in vehicles; and (4) Ayala charged rent to
the sellers.
Thus, he urges us to
overturn his convictions on the grounds that the evidence did not
Ayala
controlled
the
DTO
and,
therefore,
actually
or
In support of this
argue that the evidence showed Ayala controlled the specific manner
of distribution within Barbosa itself.9
21 U.S.C. 860 makes it illegal for an individual to
"distribut[e],
possess[]
with
intent
to
distribute,
or
Here, Ayala does not contest that the drugs are "controlled
substances" or that Barbosa constitutes a "housing facility owned
by a public housing authority."
centered on his contention that once the drugs left his physical
custody, he no longer possessed them or controlled the particulars
of their ultimate distribution and, therefore, is not guilty of
possession with intent to distribute at Barbosa in violation of 21
U.S.C. 860.
"In order to prove possession with intent to distribute,
the
government
must
show
that
the
defendants
knowingly
and
Id.
687 F.3d 13, 18 (1st Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Having carefully reviewed the record, we conclude that the evidence
at trial proved Ayala, through his control of the DTO, retained
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at
trial
operations there.
proved
Ayala
controlled
all
Indeed, the
of
the
DTO's
Moreover, the
-17-
year at Barbosa.
exercised dominion and control over the drugs even after they left
his physical possession, through his control over his underlings in
the
DTO.
Accordingly,
the
evidence
at
trial
proved
Ayala
Garcia-Carrasquillo, 483
10
to
testimony
from
cooperating
witnesses
regarding
the
For example,
-19-
We are
-20-
seized.11
296, 335 (2d Cir. 2006), Ayala argues the government was required
to show that he, as the principal, personally initiated, concluded,
or participated in each transaction. The government's response is,
essentially, that the evidence at trial allowed the jury to
conclude that Ayala was the boss or leader of the entire DTO, that
Ayala imposed a structure on the drug sellers to collect money
11
See 18 U.S.C.
18 U.S.C. 1956(h).
12
To convict an
convict
Ayala
of
conspiracy
to
commit
money
13
tacit or express.
(1st Cir. 1996).
defendant
voluntarily
objective."
Id.
participated
to
promote
criminal
need not have been familiar with all the details of the conspiracy
or with the identities of all other conspirators" in order to be
guilty of the conspiracy offense.
Count
VII
alleged
Id.
that
Ayala
was
part
of
money
from
2004
through
2008.
The
government
introduced
evidence at trial showing not only that Ayala was the unquestioned
"boss" of Barbosa, but that he himself put in place a procedure to
fund the Christmas parties by requiring sellers to contribute drug
proceeds throughout the year.
105, 116 (1st Cir. 2002) ("Purchasing large items with drug money
-24-
usually,
Hall, 434 F.3d 42, 52 (1st Cir. 2006) (citing United States v.
Misher, 99 F.3d 664, 668-69 (5th Cir. 1996) (recognizing that using
small bills "made it more difficult for anyone to trace the . . .
payment" and allows the jury to conclude that a purpose of the
transaction is to conceal the source of the funds)).
Under these circumstances, the jury had enough evidence
to conclude, at a bare minimum, that Ayala knowingly participated
in a conspiracy to conduct financial transactions using drug money
with the intent either to promote the DTO's continued success (by
maintaining good relations with Barbosa's residents) or to conceal
the nature and source of the proceeds used to fund those parties.
More than that though, because there was evidence that Ayala
established procedures to fund these parties, the jury would also
have been warranted in convicting him on a theory of his direct
participation in money laundering.
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of various vehicles.
car, trailer, and truck, while Count IX was predicated upon the
purchase of various luxury cars that Ayala used as daily-drivers.
Once again, ample evidence at trial supported his convictions on
both counts.
Beginning with the race vehicles, testimony at trial
indicated that Ayala had been involved in the purchases of a
$144,000 race car named Major League, a $45,000 trailer, and a
$70,000 truck to haul the race car and trailer.
evidence that the truck and the trailer were registered to Humberto
Cruz-Ortiz, a drug seller in Ayala's DTO.
This
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without anyone knowing they were his by having someone else fill
out the paperwork for the purchase and subsequent registration.
Ayala, though not the registered owner, made the monthly payments
on these vehicles, and the "straw purchaser" received payment for
his participation in filling out the paperwork.
Accordingly,
just as there was evidence showing that Ayala had created a system
for laundering money through annual Christmas parties, there was
evidence that he masterminded a similar scheme for the purchase of
his daily-drivers.
Cruz,
-27-
conducted
any
financial
transactions
related
to
or
was
Id.
We have already
-28-
Notably, he admits
He goes on to
authority, that his membership in the drug conspiracy "did not have
the effect of converting him into a co-conspirator of the money
laundering conspiracy," and that any "potential inference that he
may have known that the Barbosa Christmas parties were being paid
with drug profits of [Ayala] was insufficient to establish he
intended to be a participant or member of the money laundering
conspiracy." In sum, he claims that a conviction requires proof of
his intent to specifically join in the money laundering conspiracy.
The
government
argues
the
evidence
showed
Cruz
was
trial showed that Cruz began working for his brother's DTO no later
than 2003, and that he took on multiple roles, including those of
administrator, runner, and occasional drug seller.
According to
oversight
of
the
drug
-29-
point's
daily
operations--
"circumstantially
showed
Cruz's
participation
in
the
money
laundering conspiracy."
After careful consideration of the evidence adduced at
trial, we conclude the evidence sufficed to allow the jury to
conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Cruz was a member of the
money laundering conspiracy.
14
in
drug
conspiracy
knew
that
certain
air
the
year
by
having
members
of
the
organization--
then picked up from Barbosa and set aside to pay for the annual
party.
In fact, the
evidence supported a finding that he was in charge of the day-today operations of the Barbosa drug points.
From this evidence, the jury could have concluded, beyond
a reasonable doubt, that Cruz directly participated in the money
laundering scheme by either contributing money to it directly
during the times he worked as a runner or seller, and/or by
overseeing the collection of funds from other members as part of
his control of daily operations at Barbosa or as a fill-in boss
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getting
to
the
substance
of
the
appellants'
because the claimed errors are "of equal application to [Cruz] and
warrant[] the granting of a new trial due to the district court
openly assisting the government during trial."
The government,
15
Fed. R.
United States v. David, 940 F.2d 722, 737 (1st Cir. 1991).
Here,
Cruz
and
Ayala
were
tried
together,
and
the
Ayala claims he is
against
both
appellants),
took
on
the
role
of
an
His
Given the
trial along with his brother, if Ayala were to show that the judge
deprived him of a fair trial, it would arguably follow that his
comments and questions deprived Cruz of a fair trial as well.
-33-
See United
While Cruz's
Their objection
centers around the trial judge letting the jury know that certain
individuals referred to in trial testimony had been named in the
Indictment, even though neither the witness nor prosecutor tied
that individual by name to the Indictment. The appellants point to
twenty-three separate comments made by the trial judge during four
days of trial from March 29 through April 4.
-34-
The
16
overwhelming anyways.
On a different
date, the judge asked a witness about the source of certain monthly
payments she had been receiving. Finally, and on yet another date,
the trial judge asked a witness about how certain drugs were
"branded" by their packaging.
The remaining nineteen occasions, however, involved the
judge's questioning of a witness and identification of other
individuals named on the Indictment.
a similar format.
resuming
his
questioning
of
Miguel
Antonio
Montes
At the outset of
Up
-36-
Q.
A.
When he was arrested in the indictment
with Angelo [Ayala].
The Court:
You say your brother's name is
Miguel Angel Montes Nieves?
The Witness:
The Court:
"Ito."
The Witness:
The Court:
Yes.
Yes.
17
The purpose of
get the heroin drug points and make it one ten-dollar heroin drug
point and one three-dollar heroin drug point."
testified
that
the
following
understandings
Montes Nieves
came
out
meeting:
Q.
Yes.
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"Checo" is Jose
of
the
The Court:
No. 11 in the indictment.18
"Raymond" is Ramon Rosario Oquendo?"
The Witness:
The Court:
The Witness:
The Court:
Yes.19
Yes.
All right.
The Witness:
Los Olivo.
The Court:
The
prosecutor
then
The Witness:
The Court:
The Witness:
The Court:
I know
No.
All right.
resumed
Go ahead.
the
examination,
again
with
no
18
22
If the witness
such
exchange,
defense
counsel
expressed
some
involved the testimony of Jose Arce Baez, a drug seller in the DTO.
Baez stated on direct examination that he had "exchanged the empty
bag [of drugs] for a full one, from 'Martillo.'"
The prosecutor
-40-
Baez
"Martillo" was named in the Indictment even though the witness who
mentioned him did not know "Martillo's" full name, the trial judge,
according to counsel, added to the evidence against the appellants.
In response, the trial judge stated that his comments
were made in order to let the jury know when a witness was
referring to one of "the defendants that are in the indictment."
He then noted that when he read the Indictment to the jury before
23
The trial
Instead, he asked
the judge to instruct the jury that "only Mr. Ayala" was on trial,
not anyone else named on the Indictment.24
The
the case," the trial judge refused to give any other instruction.
Thus, although not stated explicitly on the record, by the end of
the colloquy the trial judge had quite obviously refused to declare
a mistrial.
24
The trial judge pointed out that Cruz was being tried too.
-42-
c.
Standard of Review
A trial judge's denial of a motion for a mistrial is
questioning
of
various
witnesses
and
his
occasional
comments informing the jury that certain individuals had been named
on the Indictment along with Ayala and Cruz.25
(1st Cir. 1997); Walsh v. United States, 371 F.2d 436, 437-38 (1st
Cir. 1967).26
25
United States v. Polito, 856 F.2d 414, 418 (1st Cir. 1998) (noting
that, when a defendant claims he has been prejudiced through a
trial judge's interventions at trial, "[c]harges of partiality
should be judged not on an isolated comment or two, but on the
record as a whole").
d. Analysis
"It cannot be gainsaid that [a] fair trial in a fair
tribunal is a basic requirement of due process.
Accordingly, a
Deary v.
City of Gloucester, 9 F.3d 191, 194 (1st Cir. 1993); see also
Aggarwal v. Ponce School of Medicine, 837 F.2d 17, 22 (1st Cir.
1988).
United States v.
-45-
of
advocacy
when
he
informed
witnesses
that
certain
As
discussed above, the record shows that throughout the trial when a
witness confirmed a particular individual had been indicted along
with Cruz and Ayala, the trial judge stated what number defendant
the individual was on the Indictment.
27
F.2d 148, 159 (1st Cir. 1989) (applying harmless error analysis
where the judge erred by "adding to the evidence").28
After
in
their
setting.'")
(quoting
United
States
v.
militates
against
finding
of
reversible
error.
This
is
the
nineteen
occasions
on
which
the
judge
29
judge reminded the jurors of the respective roles of the judge and
jury: "It is your duty to find the facts from all the evidence
admitted in this case. . . . The determination of the law is my
duty as the presiding Judge in this court."
the jury it "must not read into these instructions or into anything
I may have said or done, any suggestion by me as to what the [sic]
verdict you should return." The judge also addressed the fact that
some witnesses had pleaded guilty in connection with their own
roles in the DTO:
30
I
Do
That is entirely
or
comments
can
be
satisfactorily
dispelled
by
Ferrer, 736 F.3d 573, 587 (1st Cir. 2013) (quoting United States v.
Sepulveda, 15 F.3d 1161, 1184 (1st Cir. 1993)).
This is so even
Gentles, 619
was "amply admonished" during trial that the judge's comments were
not evidence and that the members of the jury are the only finders
of fact.
-50-
In fact,
great detail about the types and amounts of drugs brought into
Puerto Rico and distributed at Barbosa, as well as exactly how
large quantities of drugs were shipped from Puerto Rico to the
mainland. Other members of the DTO described the particulars as to
how drugs were sold at Barbosa, the measures taken to protect the
DTO's sellers from arrest, and the procedures Ayala and Cruz
implemented and enforced to minimize unwanted attention from the
police and to warn drug sellers when police officers came into
Barbosa.
There
was
significant
-51-
amount
of
testimony
and
documentary
evidence
regarding
Ayala's
and
Cruz's
efforts
to
We are satisfied
Accordingly,
31
the
judge's
questions
and
comments
likely
made
the
for
the
prosecutor,
especially
with
respect
to
the
well-prepared,
competent,
and
more
than
capable
of
examining
the only type of review available for the claim in that case.
Santana-Prez, 619 F.3d at 124-25. In Ofray-Campos we concluded
the claim of "judicial bias [was] without merit." Ofray-Campos,
534 F.3d at 34.
And even if this particular judge had been
reversed in either of those two prior cases it would have no impact
whatsoever upon our review of this appeal and the outcome here, as
we must resolve this appeal on its own merits. Ayala's invocation
here of our supposed "supervisory power" over the district courts
borders on frivolous.
-53-
the trial judge to have read the complete Indictment (including all
nicknames and/or aliases) at jury selection, to have remained
silent and allowed the prosecutor to bring out whatever additional
identifying information that he felt was necessary to his case, or
to have provided the jury with a copy of the Indictment during
trial so that the jury members could follow along and make the
identifications themselves.
Before moving on, we take advantage of this opportunity
to remind trial judges in this Circuit that when they do choose to
exercise their power to actively involve themselves at trial, they
must remain constantly vigilant to ensure they do not infringe upon
the province of the jury by commenting or appearing to comment
(positively or negatively) on a witness's credibility.
Similarly,
See Starr
v. United States, 153 U.S. 614, 626 (1894) ("It is obvious that
under any system of jury trials the influence of the trial judge on
the jury is necessarily and properly of great weight, and that his
lightest word or intimation is received with deference, and may
prove controlling."); see also Glasser, 315 U.S. at 82 (A trial
judge bears "the responsibility of striving for that atmosphere of
-54-
the
judge
applied
the
Sentencing
At
Guidelines
crime
occurred
reasonably
in
foreseeable
a
to
"protected
Cruz
that
location,"
weapons
that
"were
it
was
possessed,
carried and used by" members of the DTO, and because Cruz was an
organizer
of
criminal
activity
that
involved
five
or
more
-55-
life sentence as Ayala because Ayala was the leader while he was
merely a "third tier administrator."
He
The
sentencing
procedures
and
that
the
sentence
is
not
and
conspiracy.
a.
is
appropriate
to
Cruz's
role
in
the
drug
Standard of Review
The Supreme Court has clearly delineated the nature and
review
of
sentencing
decisions
is
limited
to
32
first
the
determine
reasonable
and
reasonable.'"
whether
then
sentence
determine
imposed
whether
it
is
is
procedurally
substantively
2012) (quoting United States v. Clogston, 662 F.3d 588, 590 (1st
Cir. 2011)).
take
up
consideration
of
the
procedural
and
Procedural Reasonableness
When we review a sentence's procedural reasonableness, we
-57-
"We review
calls
for
abuse
of
discretion
simpliciter."
Id.
(citations omitted).
Cruz's procedural challenge is limited in that he does
not contest the district judge's determination that the Guidelines
recommended a life sentence based on the crimes of conviction and
enhancements, nor does Cruz assert that his sentence was based upon
clearly erroneous findings of fact or that the district judge
failed to adequately explain the life sentence.
Instead, Cruz
the
level
of
procedural
error
resentencing."
-58-
warranting
remand
for
pronouncing
sentence
Guidelines as "advisory."
he
explicitly
referred
to
the
more
significant
procedural
argument
is
his
need
to
avoid
unwarranted
sentence
disparities
among
33
his
sentence
against
those
of
other
codefendants
as
not
disparities
further
urges
us
within
to
find
one
specific
that
because
case.
The
the
other
their roles in the DTO, they are not in a similar position to Cruz,
and it is not appropriate to compare their sentences to Cruz's.
Here, the district judge stated he considered all of the
factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) in crafting Cruz's
sentence.
our finding that the judge weighed each of those factors and,
therefore, that the sentence is procedurally reasonable.
See
and
considered
whether
Cruz's
life
sentence
was
be
commensurate
with
theirs.
Noting
that
the
other
-61-
Cruz,
Guidelines
to
an
individual
before
it
and
should
552
Id. at 49-50.
34
Of equal
does
not
change
the
deferential
abuse-of-discretion
disparities
are
conspicuous
and
threaten
to
undermine
among
defendants
nationally."
-63-
United
States
v.
McDonough,
727
F.3d
143,
165
(1st
Cir.
2013).35
Thus,
the
Substantive Reasonableness
Having found no procedural error, we move on to Cruz's
sentence,
we
review
sentences
for
substantive
35
United States v.
United
sentence
as
substantively
unreasonable
is
burdensome task in any case, and one that is even more burdensome
where, as here, the challenged sentence is within a properly
calculated [Guidelines Sentencing Range].").
Cruz faces a high hurdle and, as it turns out, one he is
unable to surmount.
-65-
these
he
arguments
is
Cruz's
contention
that
should
not
be
his brother, but ostensibly not by him, and bluntly asserts that in
light of their differing conduct, he "did not deserve the same life
sentence" as his brother.
In Cruz's view, he received a life sentence only because
the district judge employed a "strict application of the guidelines
as reprisal for [Cruz] having gone to trial."
He contends that
government
points
out
that
the
district
judge
-66-
judge's
discretionary
decision
in
United
Further, "when a
a
particular
case
reasonableness.
Throughout his brief, Cruz maintains his sentence should
be less lengthy than Ayala's because Ayala was "more culpable" in
the drug conspiracy.
-67-
who received lesser sentences had entered guilty pleas whereas Cruz
stood trial, the district judge was not required to conform Cruz's
sentence to theirs because those individuals were not similarly
situated to him.
45-46
(1st
Cir.
2009)
(affirming
life
sentence
where
the
potential,"
and
justified
below-Guidelines
-68-
Indeed,
point
in
his
favor,
it
could
also
have
concluded
his
-69-
United States v.
Coln-Rodrguez, 696 F.3d 102, 108 (1st Cir. 2012). Moreover, Cruz
has wholly failed to come forward with any mitigating reasons,
never mind "fairly powerful ones," and we are not persuaded that
the district judge unreasonably balanced the factors that went into
crafting Cruz's sentence.
failed
to
reasonableness.
overcome
the
sentence's
presumption
of
The
unknowable.
human
toll
exacted
by
its
illicit
activity
is
-70-
prospect of paying the full, heavy price for their crimes, many of
these individuals elected to plead guilty in the hope of receiving
leniency.
Not so Ayala and his brother Cruz.
Much as Tennyson's
Balin and Balan36 together sat upon their horses and tested their
might against all-comers, these two brothers stood their ground
against the full force of the evidence marshaled by the federal
government and the testimony of their own partners in crime.
In
the end, however, Cruz and Ayala fared little better than did Balin
and Balan, who perished in each other's arms.
The mountains of
DTO's
kingpin,
and
that
his
brother
Cruz
was
trusted
life in prison.
While the brothers struggle mightily in this appeal to
get out from under their shared doom, after careful consideration
we conclude there is no merit to any of the grounds raised on
appeal.
in all respects.
36