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USCA1 Opinion

August 4, 1994

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS


FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
____________

No. 93-2121
THERESA LYONS AND DENNIS LYONS,
Plaintiffs, Appellants,
v.
NATIONAL CAR RENTAL SYSTEMS, INC.
(OF DELAWARE),
Defendant, Appellee.
____________
ERRATA SHEET
The opinion of
amended as follows:
Amend

this

court issued

the cover sheet as follows:

on

July 27,

1994,

is

"Kathleen E. Cross, with


_________________
whom Brenda M. Cotter, Gerald P. Tishler, and Brown, Rudnick,
_________________ __________________
________________
Freed & Gesmer, P.C. were on brief for appellee."
____________________

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS


UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
____________________
No. 93-2121
THERESA LYONS AND DENNIS LYONS,
Plaintiffs, Appellants,
v.
NATIONAL CAR RENTAL SYSTEMS, INC.
(OF DELAWARE),
Defendant, Appellee.
____________________
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

[Hon. William G. Young, U.S. District Judge]


___________________
[Hon. Donald E. Walter, U.S. District Judge]
___________________
____________________
Before
Breyer,* Chief Judge,
___________
Bownes, Senior Circuit Judge,
____________________
and Stahl, Circuit Judge.
_____________
____________________

Matthew Cobb, with whom the Law Firm of Matthew Cobb was on br
____________
_________________________
for appellants.
Kathleen E. Cross, with whom Brenda M. Cotter, Gerald P. Tishl
_________________
_________________ _______________
and Brown, Rudnick, Freed & Gesmer, P.C. were on brief for appellee
____________________________________
____________________
July 27, 1994
____________________

____________________
*Chief Judge Stephen Breyer heard oral argument in this matter but
not participate in the drafting or the issuance of the pane
opinion.
The remaining two panelists therefore issue this opin
pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
46(d).

BOWNES, Senior Circuit Judge.

Plaintiff-appellant,

BOWNES, Senior Circuit Judge.


____________________
Theresa

Lyons (Lyons), appeals from the entry of judgment as

a matter of law in

favor of defendant-appellee, National Car

Rental Systems, Inc. (National), on her claims of slander and


violating
filed a

the Massachusetts
nine count complaint

National after
pretrial
taken

Civil

from the

three counts,

in the district

her termination.

on a motion for

court against

summary judgment.1

No appeal was

dismissal.

which included a count

After

had

were dismissed

summary judgment

bifurcated.

Lyons

Six counts

for loss of consortium, were tried


was

Rights Act.

The remaining

by plaintiff's husband

before a jury.

plaintiff rested

The trial

on her

liability

counts, defendant moved for judgment as a matter of law under


Fed.

R. Civ.

P. 50.

After

briefing and

argument by

the

parties, the court entered judgment for defendant as a matter


of law.
Plaintiff filed a timely appeal which included
loss of consortium count.
either

or

submitted

both of
to

the

the jury.

The issues on appeal


liability counts
Our

standard

the

are whether

should

have been

of review

has been

stated as follows:
A reviewing court
applies the
same
standard that governed adjudication of
____________________
1. The counts dismissed on motion for summary judgment were
breach of contract, libel, invasion of privacy, intentional
infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction of
emotional distress, and false imprisonment.

-22

the
Rule
50
motion
below:
we
"scrutiniz[e]
the
proof
and
the
inferences
reasonably
to
be
drawn
therefrom in the light most hospitable to
the nonmovant," refraining entirely from
"differential
factfinding."
In
the
process,
we
may "not
consider the
credibility
of
witnesses,
resolve
conflicts in testimony, or evaluate the
weight of the evidence."
Cook
____

v. Rhode Island Dep't of Mental Health, 10 F.3d 17, 21


____________________________________

(1st Cir. 1993) (citations omitted).


THE FACTS
THE FACTS
_________
In accord with the standard of review, we state the
facts

in the light most

favorable to the

plaintiff.

Lyons

worked for National at Logan International Airport in Boston,


Massachusetts.

She began

rental representative,

working for National in 1983

became a customer

1985, and was promoted to regional

as a

service manager in

training manager in 1989.

Lyons' immediate supervisor was Ellen Justiniano.


This action arose from

events that occurred during

a training conference held by National at its headquarters in

Minneapolis,
Lyons

Minnesota, during

attended

counterparts.

the

the week

conference

along

of April
with

looked

Lyons was
at

her

confused."
is new?"

regional

During the conference, Lyons encountered

problems with her supervisor, Justiniano.


arrived

her

8, 1991.

in the

keys

and

The

first day she

elevator with Justiniano.


remarked,

"I

am

some

Lyons

little

bit

Whereupon Justiniano

responded, "Well, what else

She was told during one

session by Justiniano that

-33

she was

embarrassing her by

nodding off and to

go into the

bathroom and put on some make-up.

During one of the training

sessions Justiniano slipped her a

note which read, "Terry, I

just

put you through training.

Why are you embarrassing me?

Why aren't you answering any questions?"


On

Friday,

April

12,

the

last

day

of

the

conference, Justiniano pulled her aside and told her that the
company was
Boston and
like to

investigating
Bryan Viau,

a car

theft from

National's chief of

speak to Lyons to

get some input.

its office

in

security, would
Lyons agreed to

meet with Viau at his office at ten o'clock.


After greeting Lyons in
her into a very small room.
of tissues

on it, which

of

caught her

opposite sex.
her

policy

when

relationship

at the

She was there because

questioning

employees

of

the

Viau started the interview by asking Lyons how

week had been going.

She told Viau

eye, and chairs

a box

One of the chairs was already

by a woman, Trudie Levesque.

National's

escorted

It had a round table with

table two or three feet apart.


occupied

his office, Viau

She

that she had a

responded by starting to cry.


bad week, that

with her boss, and

she had a

bad

that her boss

had not been

Viau to please tell

her what was

very nice to her.


Lyons then asked
going on.

Viau pointed to a folder and said,

evidence that you were

"I have strong

involved in a company theft."

Lyons

-44

became hysterical and


the evidence.

asked several times

if she could

Viau refused to show her the evidence.

see
Lyons

then said, "Why would

I be crying so hard if I was guilty of

doing something like that?"


was people like her who

Viau responded by saying that it

cry a lot that are the

guilty ones.

He also said that it was people like her who know the ins and
outs

of the company that do things

such as that.

Viau also

told her that she had the face of a good liar. Viau continued
to say,

"Terry, you know, you

people like

you.

prosecuted.
left the

If you

You will lose

room. When he

know the ins and

don't

your job."

Just
trial

we have

the evidence we

come forward,"

ended the interview.

During

stepson as the possible


of stealing

cars.

At some

will

be

point Viau
him what was

will prosecute

you.

Viau also told her that if a


he would

let her

know. This

the interview, Lyons named

thief because he had a

She did

It's

He said, "You go back to your

go back and do your job."


"was to

you

came back, Lyons asked

going to happen at this point.


job, and when

speak now,

outs.

this in an attempt

her

prior record
to help Viau

identify the real thief.


On
asked to leave

cross-examination

Lyons

the interrogation room.

Viau never touched her

said that

she

She testified

or threatened to touch her,

never
that

and that

although Viau raised his voice during the interview, he never


shouted.

Based on

facts that were represented to

-55

have been

known by National, Lyons agreed that

National had some basis

for questioning her.

She further testified on cross that she

had

to say

the opportunity

anything she

wanted about

the

theft.
When
for her trip

Lyons got into the


home, she

van to go

was still visibly

to the airport

very much

upset.

When asked by some of her colleagues what was wrong, she told
them that she had
home, Lyons
and

been accused of car theft.

told members of

accusation of

car

After arriving

her family about

theft.

She

the interview

went back

to

work in

National's Boston office.


Viau's questioning of Lyons was prompted by a prior
investigation
theft

which disclosed

was an inside job

Lyons.

evidence suggesting

involving someone with

the name of

The stolen car was ultimately found in the possession

of a Barbara

Lyons.

The only link between Barbara Lyons and

the plaintiff

was that, unknown to

was

relationship with

having a

Patrick

that the

Dello

Iacono, who

was

plaintiff, Barbara Lyons

plaintiff's brother-in-law,
a sergeant

on

the Everett

Police department.

Viau decided to interview plaintiff after

consultation

her

Justiniano.

with

supervisors,

Foley,

Ceruolo,

and

THE SLANDER COUNT


THE SLANDER COUNT
_________________
Because this is a diversity case, Massachusetts law
applies.

We

agree

with

the

district

court

that

the

-66

statement, "National has strong


a car

theft," was slanderous.

and Hartford R.R. Co.,


_______________________
(accusations of

evidence you are involved in


Galvin v. New York, New Haven
______
___________________

168 N.E.2d

crime actionable

262,

without

294 (Mass.
proof of

1960)
special

damage); Bander v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 47 N.E.2d 595,


______
__________________________
598 (Mass. 1943) (same).
The district

court held that the

other statements

made during the interview were not slanderous:


face
are

of a good

liar"; "It's people like

the guilty ones"; "It's

ins and

outs of the

[you] who cry that

people like [you]

company that

"You have the

who know the

do things such

as that";

"Terry, you know, you know the ins and outs. It's people like

you"; and "If you don't speak now, you will be prosecuted."
We do
been

excised

statements

from the

made

accusation.
made

not think that these

by

at different

accusation of

Viau

This is

were

not a

times

plaintiff of car theft,


liar.

employee

of

Part of
National,

be prosecuted.

theft.

and

parcel

different

one interview.

had the

contexts.

that

The

said she

was that

knowledge

of

to commit the theft.

if she did not confess to

of

National accused

the theft accusation


she

All the

statements are

and because she denied it,

practice and the opportunity


was told that

part

car

situation where

and in

statements were made during

was a

statements should have

as an
company

She also

the theft she would

The statements, taken as a whole, constituted

-77

a single accusation that

Lyons had stolen a company

car and

an attempt by National to have her confess to the accusation.


Defendant

argues that

because

plaintiff did

not

specifically object to the district court rulings finding the

statements not slanderous during the Rule 50 hearings, she is


precluded from raising the issue here.
this contention.

The

There is no merit to

plaintiff argued that

were slanderous during the Rule 50 hearing.


95-97.
appellate

And

she also

brief.

argues

to

Plaintiff's

sufficient to preserve

made during

a Rule

Tr., 2d day, pp.

the same
Brief

the issue

effect

at

13.

for review.

requirement that specific objections


be

the statements

in

her

This

was

There is

no

to the court's

rulings

It suffices

that the

50 hearing.

plaintiff raise the issues so that the court understands what


they are.

This was clearly done here.

specific objections
or to the court's

be made to the

The

requirement that

introduction of evidence

final charge to the jury do

not, contrary

to defendant's suggestion, apply to a Rule 50 hearing.


Although

defendant

publication on appeal, the

has

not

argued

publication requirement for a

Massachusetts law

of

district court did express doubts

about publication during the Rule 50 hearing.


that the

lack

was met here.

We simply note

slander action under

Brauer v.
______

Globe Newspaper
_______________

Co., 217 N.E.2d 736, 739 (Mass. 1966):


___
There is no requirement in an action of
libel "that the defamatory matter be
-88

communicated
to
a
large
or
even
substantial group of persons.
It is
enough that it is communicated to a
single individual other than the one
defamed."
Restatement:
Torts,
577.
See Bigelow v. Sprague, 140 Mass. 425,
___ _______
_______
426-427, 5 N.E. 144; Rumney v. Worthley,
______
________
186 Mass. 144, 71 N.E. 316; Bander v.
______
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 313 Mass.
_____________________________
337, 349, 47 N.E.2d 595; Prosser, Torts
(3d ed.)
108.
In Bander v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 47 N.E.2d
______
___________________________
at

601,

the court

liability

held that

for defamation"

corporation

to

person in the

there

was no

communicated

another agent.

The

"immunity from

by one

agent of

presence of

the third

interrogation room was sufficient to

meet the

publication requirement.
We now
privilege

turn to

and malice.

the related issues

of conditional

We agree with the district court that

the facts giving rise to a conditional privilege


were

proven

during plaintiff's

by National

case-in-chief.

National's

prior investigation had disclosed that

a person by the

of Lyons was probably

car theft.

the

interrogation

of

involved in the
plaintiff,

suspecting that the theft

Viau

had

was an inside job.

Prior

grounds

name
to
for

And plaintiff

herself stated that

National had some basis

to question her

about the car theft.


Massachusetts courts have recognized that
a person may
possess a
conditional
privilege to publish defamatory material
if
the
publication
is
reasonably
necessary
to
the
protection
or

-99

furtherance
interest.
Bratt
_____

of

legitimate

business

v. Int'l Business Machines Corp., 467 N.E.2d 126, 131


______________________________

(Mass.

1984); see also McCone


___ ____ ______

v. New England Tel. and Tel.


__________________________

Co., 471 N.E.2d 47, 51 (Mass. 1984).


___
The
conditional
law and

basic

issue

is

whether

privilege by abusing it.

the facts

this was

a jury question.

508 N.E.2d

72

(Mass.

Judicial

reiterated

the

test

privilege:

lost

its

We rule that under the

Polaroid Corp.,
_______________
Court

National

In

1987), the
for

abuse

Foley v.
_____
Supreme
of

the

[w]hen as here, executives of a corporate


employer make statements that defame an
employee, and the information disclosed
by those statements is reasonably related
to the employer's legitimate business
interests, the employee has the burden to
prove that the statements
were made
recklessly, that is, that
they were
unnecessary, unreasonable, or excessively
published. Of course, a statement made
with knowledge of its falsity or with
reckless disregard for the truth would be
reckless within the meaning of the rule.
Id. at 79-80 (citations omitted).
___
A finding of recklessness is necessary
a

conditional privilege.

court pointed out


prerequisite
Galvin, 168
______
explain

that

In

that proof

to the
N.E.2d

loss

of "actual malice"

of the

at 266).

Massachusetts

"malice in fact"

Bratt, 467 N.E.2d


_____

privilege.

The court
law

as the standard.

-1010

favored
Id.
___

then

to overcome
at 131, the
was not
Id.
___

(citing

went on

to

"recklessness" or
It defined one type

of

"malice in fact" as

act

without lawful

"'the willful doing

excuse.'"

Id.,
___

of an injurious

n.9 (quoting

Grew, 107 N.E. 620, 621 (Mass. 1915)).


____

Doane v.
_____

The court concluded,

that loss of a defendant's conditional


privilege in a defamation action through
"unnecessary, unreasonable or excessive
publication" requires
proof that the
defendant acted recklessly.
Id. at 132.
___
We

think

that

factfinder

could

reasonably

conclude that the statements made during the interrogation of


plaintiff were reckless.
Viau:
company

Plaintiff was told at the outset by

"I have strong evidence


theft."

accusation;

Viau

pointed

this implied

But the evidence was not


request to

see it.

that plaintiff had


that National had
suspicion.
because
to

that you were involved


to

that it

folder

during

contained such

in a
the

evidence.

disclosed to plaintiff, despite her

In fact,

there was no "strong evidence"

been involved
at that

in a company

time was, at

Plaintiff was then

theft.

best, a

called a liar

All

reasonable

and told that

of her position in the company she had the knowledge

commit

the

theft.

She

was

then

threatened

with

prosecution and loss of her job if she did not confess to the
theft.

These statements considered as a whole could be found

to be "reckless" under Massachusetts law.


We

also

think

legitimately be found.

that

"malice

in

fact"

First, there was evidence

could

from which

-1111

jury

could find

Justiniano,

either

that

plaintiff's

disliked

displeased with her conduct

immediate supervisor,

plaintiff

personally

at the meeting.

But

significance was the conduct of the interrogation.


it was not an interrogation
and

but an inquisition.

or

was

of telling
In

fact,

Accusations

threats were made; there was no attempt to determine the

facts objectively.
conducted

The manner in which the interrogation was

fairly reeked

of malice.

It could

reasonably be

found that the accusations and threats made to plaintiff were


"the

willful

excuse."

doing

Because

is

an

injurious

act

without

lawful

Bratt, 467 N.E.2d at 131, n.9.


_____
The judgment

count

of

reversed.

of the district court


The

determination was

on the slander
for

the jury.

the loss of consortium count rises or falls with the

slander count, it also remains viable.


THE MCRA COUNT
THE MCRA COUNT
______________
Plaintiff's next argument on appeal arises from the

district court's granting


as

a matter

of law

[MCRA] claim.
employee

on her

violated

in an

for judgment

Massachusetts Civil

Plaintiff claimed that

Viau,

intimidation

of National's motion

the

MCRA

National, through its


by

attempt to cause

Rights Act

using

her to

threats

relinquish her

Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.


Gen. Laws ch.

12

11I.

No claim

and

See Mass.
___

was asserted against Viau

individually.

-1212

The MCRA states, in pertinent part:


Any person whose exercise or enjoyment of
rights secured by the constitution or
laws of the United States . . . has been
interfered with, or attempted
to be
interfered
with
[by any
person or
persons, whether or not acting under
color of law, by threats, intimidation or
coercion,] may institute and prosecute in
his own name and on his own behalf a
civil action for . . . money damages. . .
.
Id.
___

11H,

11I.

The

district court

granted

National's

motion, finding

first that the MCRA did not recognize claims

based on the doctrine of respondeat superior, and second that


plaintiff presented not a "scintilla" of evidence that Viau's
actions

were

taken

pursuant

established by National.
the first finding.
plaintiff

to

any

policy

or

custom

Plaintiff challenges on appeal only

Assuming,

without

deciding,

that

would have had an actionable MCRA claim if she had

named Viau as a defendant, we turn to the respondeat superior


issue.
The
vicariously

liable

employee has
court.

question of

1131 n.14

under the

not been

See, e.g.,
___ ____

whether an
MCRA for

addressed by any

Rodriques v.
_________

employer may
the actions

of its

Massachusetts state

Furtado, 575
_______

(Mass. 1991) (expressly declining

with respect to municipal

be held

N.E.2d 1124,

to decide issue

employer); cf., e.g., O'Connell v.


___ ____ _________

Chasdi, 511 N.E.2d 349, 354 (Mass. 1987) (remanding for trial
______
MCRA

claim asserted

against

private employer

-1313

for acts

of

employer's

agent,

without

respondeat superior).
to

answer this

Worcester, 924
_________

questioning

Similarly,

question.

See,
___

applicability

we have never had occasion


e.g.,
____

F.2d 364, 370 n.7 (1st

Dean
____

v.

City of
________

Cir. 1991) (declining

to comment on issue with respect to municipal employer).


only

courts that

have addressed

of

the issue

The

have determined

that claims under the MCRA cannot be based on the doctrine of


respondeat superior.
480, 484

E.g., Broderick v. Roache, 803 F. Supp.


____ _________
______

(D. Mass. 1992) (municipal employer); Jones v. City


_____
____

of Boston, 738
_________

F. Supp.

604, 606 (D.

Mass. 1990)

(private

employer).
"Absent

controlling

federal court sitting


issue

to

the

state's

prediction, `when

Because we

court

in diversity may
highest

court,

Vanhaaren v.
_________

precedent,

certify a state

the [route] [the] state

is reasonably clear.'"
Ins. Co., 989 F.2d
________

state

or

undertake

a
law
its

courts would take

State Farm Mut. Auto.


______________________

1, 3 (1st Cir. 1993)

(citation omitted).

find sufficient guidance on this issue, we follow

the latter course.


The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
clearly described the scope of the MCRA:
The Legislature enacted [the MCRA] to
provide a State remedy for deprivations
of civil rights.
The statute extended

[SJC] has

beyond
the
limits
of its
Federal
counterpart
by incorporating
private
action within its bounds.
We conclude
___________
that the Legislature intended to provide
_________________________________________
a remedy under [the MCRA], coextensive
_________________________________________
-1414

with 42 U.S.C.
1983, except that the
______________________
Federal statute requires State action
whereas its State counterpart does not.
Batchelder
__________

v. Allied Stores Corp., 473


_____________________

(Mass. 1985) (emphasis added).


actions, the

Legislature did

constitutional tort,'"

N.E.2d 1128,

"[B]y reaching private party


not intend

and thus

to create

limited the MCRA

`a vast
remedy to

cases involving threats, intimidation, or coercion.


Northeastern Univ., 532 N.E.2d
__________________

1131

Bally v.
_____

49, 52 (Mass. 1989) (citation

omitted).
Rulings in
used to
U.S.C.

determine
1983

also

1983
whether

cases predating the MCRA


doctrines

apply under

applicable

the MCRA.

See

may be

under

42

Duarte v.

___
Healy, 537
_____
the

N.E.2d 1230, 1232 (Mass. 1989)

Legislature was

immunity] when
Rights

aware of

it chose

Act after

this case

to pattern the

1983.").

("We presume that


law [on

qualified

Massachusetts Civil

Accordingly, we

construing the federal Civil Rights

______

look to cases

Act for guidance in

the

New York Dep't of Soc. Servs.,


_______________________________

436

present action.
In Monell v.
______
U.S. 658

(1978), the Supreme Court

governments

may

be

liable

considered whether local

under

unconstitutional conduct of their

1983

employees.

for

the

The Court held

that claims against municipalities cannot rest on a theory of


respondeat
the employee

superior, but may proceed if


acted in accordance with

there is proof that


the employer's policy

-1515

or custom.
stated

that

Id. at
___

694.

Congress's

In

a concurrence,

intent,

as

Justice Powell

expressed

in

the

legislative

history of

limiting "the
rejection of

can best

statutory ambit to actual


respondeat superior
__________ ________

vicarious liability."
Plaintiff
respondeat

1983,

as

wrongdoers, i.e., a
____

or any other

principle of

Id. at 707 (Powell, J. concurring).


___
argues

superior cannot

Monell concerns
______

be understood

that

Monell's
______

be grafted

only municipalities,

invoked against private parties.

We

rejection

on the

MCRA because

while the MCRA


disagree.

of

may be

Although the

holding in Monell is framed so that it expressly applies only


______
to local governments, the decision
language

and

legislative

principles--such
applicable only

as

is based generally on the

history

sovereign

to governmental

of

or

1983,

qualified

entities.

See
___

not

on

immunity-Monell, 436
______

U.S. at 690-94.
It is
of

true that one aspect

the legislative

private corporations:
making municipalities
Congress

lacked the

local governments.

history of
certain

of Monell's discussion
______

1983

has no

members of Congress

vicariously liable on the


power

relevance to

to impose

Id. at 679-83, 693.


___

opposed

ground that

"positive" duties
We

on

do not believe,

however, that this aspect of the Court's reasoning undermines


our conclusion.

The remainder of Monell focusses


______

on matters

pertinent to

all employers,

public or

private.

The

Court

to

make

-1616

stated,

for

example,

municipalities

that

vicariously

Congress
liable

declined

under

1983,

despite

arguments that vicarious liability would reduce the incidence


of

unconstitutional

injuries throughout
justifications

acts

and

would

spread

the community.

Id.
___

equally

applicable

are

the

cost

at 693-94.
to

of

These
private

corporations.
The
1979,

Massachusetts legislature enacted

one year

after Monell
______

was decided.

legislature was aware of Monell.


______
The

language of

legislature

the MCRA

intended

to

the MCRA in

Presumably, the

Duarte, 537 N.E.2d at 1232.


______

contains
expand

no indication
the

scope

that the

of

employer

liability under the MCRA beyond that available under


Compare Mass. Gen. Laws
_______
or

persons,

whether

ch. 12,
or

not

11H ("Whenever
acting

under

1983.

any person

color of

law,

interfere
42

by threats, intimidation or

U.S.C.

1983 ("Every

subjects, or

coercion . . .") with


____

person who, under

causes to be

subjected, any [other

the deprivation of any rights . . .").


that

the

state

embracing the

legislature

knew

person] to

Moreover, it is clear
how

to

pass

doctrine of respondeat superior.

Gen. Laws ch. 151B


For

color [of law],

statutes

E.g., Mass.
____

3(1) ("It shall be an unlawful practice:

an employer, by himself or his agent" to discriminate on

the basis of race, religion, ethnicity, sex, or age); id. ch.


___
258,

("Public employers

shall be liable

for injury

or

-1717

loss of
act

property . .

or omission of

the scope
1978).

of his

negligent or wrongful

any public employee


office or

Finally, the

legislative

. caused by the

history

employment .

while acting within


. .

.") (enacted

parties have not cited anything


of

the

MCRA

indicating

that

in the
the

legislature intended to make employers vicariously liable for

the

acts

claims

of their

employees.

Accordingly,

against employers under

we

the MCRA cannot

hold that
rest on the

doctrine of respondeat superior.


SUMMARY
SUMMARY
_______
We reverse
slander

the district

claim and on the

court's

judgment on

loss of consortium

the

claim based on

the slander issue and remand for a new trial on those claims.
As

to

the MCRA

claim,

the

district court's

judgment

affirmed.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part. No costs.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part. No costs.
______________________________________________

-1818

is

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