USCA1 Opinion

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

_________________________

No. 96-1152

VALENTINO T. COLASANTO, TRUSTEE OF THE

ROBERT M. COLASANTO REVOCABLE TRUST,

Plaintiff, Appellant,

v.

LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY OF NORTH AMERICA,

Defendant, Appellee,

v.

STEPHEN A. FARLEY,

Third-Party Defendant, Appellee.

_________________________

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND

[Hon. Ernest C. Torres, U.S. District Judge]

___________________
_________________________

Before

Selya, Circuit Judge,

_____________

Campbell, Senior Circuit Judge,

____________________

and Boyle,* Senior District Judge.

_____________________

_________________________

Katherine A. Merolla, with whom Amedeo C. Merolla and Pucci,

____________________
_________________
______
Goldin & Merolla were on brief, for appellant.

________________
William B. VanLonkhuyzen, with
_________________________

whom Norman S. Zalkind and

__________________

Zalkind, Rodriguez, Lunt & Duncan were

___________________________________

on brief,

for appellee

Stephen A. Farley.
_________________________

November 15, 1996

________________________

_________________
*Of the District of Rhode Island, sitting by designation.

SELYA, Circuit
SELYA, Circuit

Judge.
Judge.

This appeal

summons our review

______________

of a jury verdict that awarded certain life insurance proceeds to

the

decedent's quondam companion rather than

Upon close perscrutation

to a family trust.

of the record, the parties' briefs, and

the applicable law, we discern no error.

I.
I.

BACKGROUND
BACKGROUND

We

start with a neutral account of the facts that were

before the jury.

The

mark as a successful

business executive.

Colasanto met Stephen

the

two men

A. Farley.

began cohabiting

lived initially in

home that Colasanto

founded a

decedent, Robert M.

a rented

Colasanto, made

In September

Diego, California.

dwelling and later

purchased.

of 1982,

A relationship developed

in San

in a

his

and

They

luxurious

During this time frame Colasanto

health-care organization, Community Care Network, Inc.

(CCN),

which became

fruits of his

good fortune including,

interest under a

issued by

hugely successful.

group life

Colasanto

enjoyed the

inter alia, a
_____ ____

beneficial

insurance policy owned

Life Insurance Company

of North America

by CCN

and

(LINA) which

afforded him a $140,000 death benefit.

Colasanto's

diagnosed

Yearning

world

changed in

him as HIV-positive.

for his

Massachusetts.

native

New

1989

when a

physician

By 1992, he had contracted AIDS.

England,

Colasanto and Farley

he

bought

home

in

took up residence there

in

the spring of 1993.

As

Colasanto's

relationship with

Farley.

health

The

deteriorated,

two

men

began

so,

too,

discussing

his

property

settlement

in mid-1993.

Despite

the assistance

retained

counsel, they were unable to agree on terms.

to Farley, however, the parties reached an informal

or about December 3,

1993.

Under that accord,

of

According

agreement on

Colasanto was to

transfer ownership of five life insurance policies (including the

LINA group life policy) to Farley.

On December 10, Colasanto completed and executed a form

entitled "Application

Insurance"

for Conversion

(the conversion

of Group or

application) with

the intention

converting his

coverage under the group policy

policy.

10(c)

Line

inscription

lines.

appear:

On

"Pay

conversion

Death Benefit

Underneath

the

to,"

first blank

to an individual

application bears

followed

line

of

by three

these

the

blank

instructions

"Print Full Name of Beneficiary and State Relationship."

the left-hand side of

Farley."

this line Colasanto

He left a blank space

the right-hand side he

lines Colasanto

See

of the

Employee Life

enclosed letter."

in the middle of the line and on

typed "Executor."1

added "Issue

The

typed "Stephen A.

policy with

On the

following two

Mr. Farley

letter, signed by

as owner.

Colasanto, bore a

caption indicating that it was being transmitted "RE:

CONVERSION

OF GROUP COVERAGE TO INDIVIDUAL COVERAGE

OF INDIVIDUAL POLICY

WHICH IS ISSUED."

made explicit reference to

SPECIFICATION OF OWNER

The body of the

letter

the conversion application and stated

____________________

1The parties

agree that

on December 10,

will nominated Farley as his executor.

before he
not

died.

Farley was

appointed executor

of

1993, Colasanto's

Colasanto made a new will

not named as executor

Colasanto's estate

demise.

then and was

upon Colasanto's

in relevant part:

Please

note that

I am

requesting that

the individual policy be issued such that the

owner is as follows:
Stephen A. Farley
10448 Russel Road
La Mesa, CA 91941 D.O.B. 2-21-49

Mr. Farley is currently

of the group coverage.

the beneficiary

If he needs to

out another beneficiary form, please

to him since

that will be

fill

send it

his right as

the

policy owner.

The premium statement(s) should

be sent

to Mr. Farley at the above address.

Colasanto

letter

to LINA.

transmitted

the conversion

application and

He sent forms

and letters to

four other life

insurers on the same date.

transfer ownership of the

the

Each letter instructed the carrier to

affected policy to Farley.

five instances Colasanto

In each of

contemporaneously furnished Farley

with signed

form,

the

request

copies of

the conversion application

cover letter,

in Colasanto's

and

a certified

mail

handwriting asking

or assignment

return receipt

that the

receipt be

forwarded to Farley.2

Farley

returned

to California

on

December

22.

On

January 19, 1994, Colasanto sent a premium payment to LINA on the

policy

in question and accompanied it

with a letter reiterating

"that the individual policy should be issued to Stephen A. Farley

as owner."

change

Colasanto added:

owner,

then

"If a separate form is required to

please

send

the

form.

Future

premium

____________________

2Upon

Colasanto's death,

proceeds of the

other four

Farley

apparently collected

policies without incident.

event, none of those policies are implicated here.

In

the

any

statements should be sent to Mr. Farley as owner."

individual policy to Colasanto in

letter admonishing

as owner, he should

LINA.

LINA sent the

early February together with a

that if Colasanto wished

to designate Farley

execute an assignment form and

return it to

Despite the fact that LINA enclosed a blank form with this

letter, Colasanto never signed it.

Later that month, Farley

returned to Massachusetts.

reconciliation ensued.3

Colasanto

repaired to

California with

Farley, only to return to

Massachusetts alone following a bitter

quarrel

on

that

took place

Colasanto

executed

purported

to

Colasanto,

Revocable

March

7, 1994.

change-of-beneficiary

designate

one

of

his

The next

form

brothers,

month

in which

he

Valentino

T.

in his capacity as Trustee of the Robert M. Colasanto

Trust,

as

the

beneficiary

of

the

LINA

policy.

Colasanto died on June 17, 1994.

Both Farley and

the Trustee laid

proceeds.

The Trustee won the

filed suit

against LINA

removed the case

in a

to federal

claim to the

policy

race to the courthouse steps and

Rhode Island state

district court, 28

court.

U.S.C.

LINA

1441,

citing the existence of original jurisdiction arising out of both

diversity

and

impleaded

Farley, and

($140,000)

interpleader, see
___

into

the

28

U.S.C.

deposited the

registry

of

1332(a),

face value

the

district

of

1335,

the policy

court.

See
___

____________________

3During
subject

this

policy

disagree about

and

period Farley
the blank

took

possession

assignment

how this occurred.

form.

The appellant

of both
The

the

parties

contends that

Farley filched the papers; Farley claims that Colasanto gave them
to him.

generally
_________

Fed.

R.

Civ.

P.

22

(discussing

the

fray left

mechanics

of

interpleader actions).

LINA's

departure from

Trustee locked in mortal combat.

the case

was tried and the

favor.

The

district

Farley and

the

After considerable skirmishing,

jury returned a verdict

court thereafter

denied

in Farley's

the

Trustee's

motions under Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b) (judgment as a matter of law)

and Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(a) (new trial).

The Trustee

position.

We have

presses several

considered them

opinion only those contentions that

This appeal followed.

points in support

all,

OWNERSHIP OF THE POLICY

OWNERSHIP OF THE POLICY

in this

have arguable merit and that

are necessary to a resolution of this appeal.

II.
II.

but address

of his

The appellant's

juror could conclude that

subject policy to

have granted

flagship claim

is that no

reasonable

Colasanto transferred ownership of the

Farley, and the

lower court therefore

the motion for judgment

as a matter of

should

law.4

The

standard

of review referable to a trial court's refusal to order

judgment

as a

appeals

matter of

undertakes

plenary

Cranston, 37 F.3d 731,

________

evidence

law is

set in cement.

review,

see
___

the light most favorable to

court of

v.

City of
________

Gibson
______

735 (1st Cir. 1994), and

and the inferences reasonably

The

"examine[s] the

to be drawn therefrom in

the nonmovant," Wagenmann v.

_________

Adams,
_____

____________________

4Transfer

of

ownership

Colasanto remained the

then his

is

owner of

critical

the policy on

execution and delivery of

datum

since,

April 21,

if

1994,

a change-of-beneficiary form

on that date would

have been effective, and the

policy proceeds

would be payable to the successor beneficiary (the Trustee).

829 F.2d 196, 200

not

consider

testimony,

or

(1st Cir. 1987).

credibility

evaluate

Overriding a jury verdict

In so doing the court

of witnesses,

the

weight

of

resolve

the

conflicts

evidence."

is warranted only if the

"may

in

Id.
___

evidence "is

so one-sided that the movant is plainly entitled to judgment, for

reasonable minds could not differ as to the outcome."

Gibson, 37
______

F.3d at 735.

A
A

The gist

although taking

of the Trustee's argument

an initial

step

to transfer

policy to Farley, never effectuated

terms of the policy.

Colasanto

Thus, no

substantially

is that Colasanto,

ownership of

that change according to the

reasonable jury could find

complied

the

with

the

explicit

that

policy

requirements necessary to anoint Farley as the owner.

This argument misses the mark.

It is predicated on the

common law doctrine of substantial compliance.

that

the

controversy,

substantive

law

and, according to

of

The parties agree

Massachusetts

governs

this

the appellant, the Massachusetts

cases suggest that,

transfers

if a

policy specifies the

manner in

are to be made, the failure of literal compliance with

the policy requirements will

everything

that he

could do

be excused only if the

to comply

with

insured did

those provisions.

See, e.g., Acacia Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Feinberg, 318 Mass.
___ ____ _________________________
________

250,

61

which

N.E.2d 122,

124 (1945)

(stating

that "it

is

246,

of the

essence of substantial compliance that the insured must have done

all

in his

power

to

effect

the

change,

leaving

only

some

ministerial

act

on

the

part

consummate it"); Resnek v.

______

of

the

insurer

necessary

Mutual Life Ins. Co., 286

____________________

to

Mass. 305,

309, 190 N.E. 603, 604-05 (1934) (similar).

Building

on

this

base,

the appellant

provision in the LINA policy that states:

or

beneficiary]

satisfactory

to

must

us

be

and

requested

sent to

our

Because this condition could have been,

all, the carrier sent

that there

to

"Changes [of ownership

in

writing

on

Administrative

form

Office."

but was not, met

after

Colasanto a blank assignment form,

and he

easily could have completed it and mailed it back

insists

points

was no

substantial compliance,

the appellant

and, hence,

that

at

the attempted change of ownership was ineffectual.

309-10 (indicating that if the insured

he has

is put on notice that

not done all in his power to comply with the requirements

for changing a beneficiary,

improperly

completed

Even though

as by the insurer's rejection

form, and

suggested remedial action,

the insured

wrote a

take the

owner on

designation in

subsequent epistle

of an

compliance).

designated Farley as

application, reaffirmed that

letter, and

does not

there is no substantial

Colasanto explicitly

the conversion

cover

See id.
___ ___

the

reiterating that

Farley owned the policy,

the appellant asseverates that Farley's

claim of ownership fails

because Colasanto never transmitted the

assignment form to LINA.

The appellant then tries to hoist

this

asseveration by its bootstraps, noting that LINA never recognized

a transfer of

policy ownership

to Farley,

instead sending

policy to Colasanto and accepting the change-of-beneficiary

the

form

that he subsequently submitted.

There

are

appellant's thesis.

two visible

flaws

in

the fabric

of

the

In the first place, we do not think that the

doctrine of substantial compliance

applies to this case.

It is

generally

held

in

Massachusetts

insurance policy which stipulate

assignment

are for

benefit of others.

54, 27 N.E.2d

the

that

benefit of

the

insurer, not

722, 723-24

(1940); Goldman v.
_______

combatant, and the

an

for

the

dispute over

assignor and the

claiming

under them),

assignor is

the

mechanically on the formalities built

Moses, 287
_____

Mass.

When, as now, the insurer is

is limited to the

See
___

of

See Abbruzise v. Sposata, 306 Mass. 151, 153___ _________

_______

transfer

the transfer.

provisions

what formalities must attend an

393, 397, 191 N.E. 873, 874 (1934).

no longer a

the

the validity of

assignee (or those

precluded from

into the policy to

Abbruzise, 306 Mass. at 153-54;

_________

relying

defeat

Goldman, 287
_______

Mass. at 397; Herman v. Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co., 218 Mass.
______
______________________________

181, 185, 105 N.E. 450, 451 (1914); Merrill v. New Eng. Mut. Life

_______

Ins. Co., 103

_________

Mass.

245,

252 (1869).

__________________

In other

words,

the

assignment, though not in compliance with the policy, nonetheless

may be binding

as between the

the evidence of the act and

assignor and assignee as

long as

the intent is sufficient to

confirm

the assignment's validity.

The second flaw in the appellant's thesis is that, even

if the substantial compliance

doctrine retains some relevance in

a contest over life insurance proceeds between parties other than

the insurer,

an argument

premised on substantial

compliance in

this

case

overlooks

regulates

the form

literally
_________

with those

the

of an

obvious.

If

assignment and

terms,

an

insurance

the insured

the assignment

is valid,

policy

complies

and the

question of substantial compliance is immaterial.

Here,

changing

"your")

the policy provides

the ownership.

is

the

application or
___________

Insured

not one, but

It stipulates:

two, means of

"The Owner

("you,"

unless otherwise designated in the

______________________________________

unless changed

as provided under

the Change

of

Ownership or Beneficiary provision [i.e., by use of an assignment

form]."

(Emphasis

reiterates

insured

supplied).

this duality:

unless another

later becomes the

supplied).

"The Owner

person

Owner as

jacket

of

("you,"

the

policy

"your") is

the

is named in the application or

_____________________________

allowed by the

policy."

(Emphasis

Thus, while Colasanto could have effected the desired

change of ownership by

instructed,

returning the assignment form to

we see no reason why he

in the application.
___________________

given the

The

LINA as

could not also have done so

Since the policy appears explicitly to have

policyholder that option,

we think that

a reasonable

jury could have decided the point on the basis that Colasanto had

chosen this manner

of switching the policy's

ownership and that

the resultant designation was valid and binding.

A group policy

and an individual

policy that is

spun

off from it ordinarily are

of

insurance.

F.2d 889, 891

See Binkley
___ _______

(10th Cir.),

deemed a single, continuing

contract

v. Manufacturers Life Ins. Co., 471

____________________________

cert. denied, 414

_____ ______

Brindis v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 29 Mass. App.

_______
_____________________

U.S. 877

(1973);

Ct. 368, 369-70,

10

560

N.E.2d

722,

723

(1990).

Until

Colasanto

retired, his

employer

owned the group policy.

(and, hence,

no individual owner) until

right of conversion.

application

and

In all

in any event,

maintains, however,

dictate ownership

within the purview

we hesitate

it cannot be heard

Colasanto exercised his

probability, then, the

is an application

policy language

here, and

There was no individual policy

the appellant concedes

that the

of the quoted

only because LINA is

on the topic in

not a party

this proceeding

that it is

application could

because there

conversion

was no line

such.

not be

or place on

He

used to

it to

spell out the nature of the change.

We reject

this argument.

An

insurance company cannot

confer a prerogative upon the insured in the policy covenants and

then surreptitiously take it away by omitting any reference to it

on

the forms that the company prints to implement the covenants.

Here, the policy told Colasanto that he could designate the owner

of

converted

application, and

policy

he did

by

naming

so.

that

At the very

individual

least, a

in

the

reasonable

jury, faced with this concatenation of circumstances, had a right

to

conclude

that

the

policy

allowed

Colasanto

conversion application as a vehicle to bring about

arrangement that he preferred.

ownership contained

in the

to

use

the

the ownership

On that basis, the designation of

application complied

literally with

the terms of the policy.

B
B

The appellant

advances a second

11

theory that

involves

substantial compliance.

56(d),5 the

He

asserts that, under Fed. R.

district court's

for summary judgment

order denying his

precluded presentation

compliance issue at trial.

pretrial motion

of the

substantial

The court's order stated:

Although there does not appear to be any

_____________________________________________
dispute that Robert M. Colasanto failed to
_____________________________________________
execute and deliver the documents necessary
_____________________________________________
to transfer ownership of the
policy in
_____________________________________________
question
to Stephen Farley,
______________________________

there

Civ. P.

is

genuine

issue

of

fact

regarding

Robert Colasanto ever agreed to

Farley
owner

an

irrevocable

of such

consideration

policy
was

whether

make Stephen

beneficiary
and whether

given

for

and/or
adequate

any

such

agreement.

(Emphasis supplied).

The

establishing

appellant interprets

as

matter

substantially complied

with

of

the underscored

law

that

language as

Colasanto

the requirements

for

____________________

5The rule provides in pertinent part:

rendered upon
relief asked
court

this rule judgment is not

the whole case or

and a

trial is

at

the

hearing

examining

the

pleadings

of

for all the

necessary, the
the

and

motion,
the

not

transferring

ownership of the policy to Farley.

If on motion under

had

by

evidence

before it and by interrogating counsel, shall

if practicable ascertain what

exist

without

substantial

material facts
controversy

what material facts are actually and

faith
an

controverted.

order specifying

without substantial
directing

such

action as

are just.

and

in good

It shall thereupon make

the

facts that

controversy

further

. .

appear
.

and

proceedings in

the

Upon the trial

of the

action the facts so specified shall be deemed

established, and the trial shall be conducted
accordingly.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d).

12

The

grounds.

appellant's

We

mention

contention is

two

substantial

compliance

is

challenging

Farley's status

of

vulnerable

them.

red

First,

herring,

and the

the

Rule

56(d)

approach

stultification by tactical semantics.

Although the

is

substantial controversy, the rule

arrives."

on all

10A Charles

aspects of

is

not

in

the final

more

than

(and set to

noting that Rule

that are without

adjudication

LINA

We explain briefly.

appellant is correct in

to retain

of

little

court to specify

the court

issue

See supra Part II(A).

___ _____

56(d) empowers a

"permits

the

case turns,

analysis, on Colasanto's discerned intent.

Second,

as

on several

full power

the case

one side)

facts

nevertheless

to make

one complete

when the

proper time

Alan Wright et al., Federal

Practice and

Procedure

2737 (2d

ed. 1983).

Here,

it is

suggest that the court relinquished this power.

underscored language simply acknowledges

as to whether the

LINA.

the lack of any dispute

assignment form was executed and

delivered to

the compliance question as a matter of law would require

both to torture the

manifest intention.

III.
III.

Fairly read, the

To say, as the appellant would have it, that the statement

decides

us

disingenuous to

district court's words

and overlook its

We refuse to do so.

THE BENEFICIARY DESIGNATION

THE BENEFICIARY DESIGNATION

The

appellant's fallback

position

is

that, even

if

Colasanto transferred ownership of the policy to Farley, it still

must

is

be found as a matter of

law that Farley, as an individual,

not entitled to the policy proceeds.

This reasoning rests on

13

line 10(c) of the conversion application, which solicits the full

name of the beneficiary and the beneficiary's relationship to the

insured.

In response

Executor."

"executor"

The

in

beneficiary and,

Colasanto typed:

appellant posits

this

context

"Stephen Farley

that

designates

the

use

of the

fiduciary

therefore, Colasanto's executor

as

word

the

not Farley

is entitled to the avails of the policy.

The principal

is

authority on which the

appellant relies

Faircloth v. Northwestern Nat'l Life Ins. Co.,

_________
_________________________________

815 (S.D. Ohio 1992).

799 F. Supp.

In Faircloth, the insured wrote "Faircloth

_________

James H. Administrator" on the line in the application that asked

for the name of the beneficiary.

law that the policy

administered for

individual.

stand

for

The court ruled

as a matter of

proceeds went to the named beneficiary to be

the benefit of the estate, and not to him as an

See id. at
___ ___

817.

the proposition

The

appellant reads Faircloth to

_________

that whenever

a fiduciary

label is

found in close proximity to a beneficiary's name, the beneficiary

designation must be construed as running to the actual fiduciary,

not

to the

individual

named.

If

Faircloth stands
_________

for

this

proposition

basic

a matter on which we take no view

tenets of

Massachusetts contract

it contradicts

interpretation,

and we

must therefore disregard it.

Massachusetts law holds that, if an ambiguity exists in

contract documents, its

on

the parties'

intent.

ultimate resolution almost always

See Smart
___ _____

turns

v. Gillette Co. Long-Term

_______________________

Disability Plan, 70 F.3d 173, 178 (1st Cir. 1995); Massachusetts

________________
_____________

14

Mun. Wholesale Elec. Co.

________________________

577

the

N.E.2d 283, 288 (1991).

contracting parties

factfinder

from

v. Town of Danvers, 411 Mass. 39,

________________

is

45,

In such a situation, the intent of

a matter

from the circumstances

to

be discerned

by

the

surrounding the ambiguity and

such reasonable inferences as may be available.

See Smart,
___ _____

70 F.3d at 178.

These rules

way

as they apply in

apply to

insurance documents in

other contractual settings.

the same

See Falmouth
___ ________

Nat'l Bank v. Ticor Tile Ins. Co., 920 F.2d 1058, 1061 (1st Cir.
__________
____________________

1990) (applying Massachusetts law).

Massachusetts cases indicate that,

For instance, two analogous

when the insured, called upon

by

the

insurer

relationship,

"wife,"

insured

it

is up

by

using

to the

the

beneficiary

a descriptive

factfinder

particular

by

term

to determine

person

name

named,

such

and

as

whether the

or,

in

the

a person fitting the description on the date of the

insured's death.

Co., 321
___

designate

complies

meant

alternative,

to

See,
___

Mass. 507,

e.g., Strachan v.
____ ________

509, 73

Prudential Life Ins.

_____________________

N.E.2d 840, 843

(1947); Brogi
_____

v.

Brogi, 211 Mass. 512, 514, 98 N.E. 573, 573 (1912).6

_____

Of

course,

it

can

be argued

that

the

"executor" is more "legalistic" than the term "wife,"

different treatment.

be

appellation

and merits

We agree that the beneficiary's burden may

heavier when a fiduciary

designation is in

play, but, here,

____________________

6Interestingly,

both
take,

cases

individual

should

though

married to

the insured at the

determined
neither of

that
them

time of the latter's

the
was

named

legally

death.

See
___

Strachan, 321 Mass. at 511; Brogi, 211 Mass. at 514.

________
_____

15

the end result is the same.

In

general,

courts construe

beneficiary designations

made in connection with insurance policies according to the rules

applicable

to the construction of wills.

Cyclopedia of Insurance Law

28:7

See 5 George J. Couch,

___

(2d ed. 1984).

rule in the interpretation of a will is the

"The cardinal

ascertainment of the

testator's intent from an examination of the language employed by

him construed in

the light of the circumstances known

the time he executed

must

be given

effect

Magill v. Magill,
______
______

Thus,

the will, and his intent,

unless contrary

317 Mass. 89, 92,

testamentary

gift

will

to

to him at

when determined,

some rule

of

56 N.E.2d 892, 894

vest

in

law."

(1944).

beneficiary

qua
___

fiduciary absent

a plain manifestation of

the testator's intent

to

different

Slavik v.
______

accomplish a

Slavik, 46
______

Ark. App.

result.

74, 76,

880

See
___

S.W.2d 524,

Estate of
__________

526 (1994)

(en

banc); Baker
_____

(1952).

change

state

v. Wright,
______

However,

697, 703,

merely inserting

of beneficiary

the

257 Ala.

form

relationship

presents presumptively

the

the

825, 830

word "executor"

that requests

between

60 So.2d

in

the policyholder

beneficiary

a materially weaker case

and

to

himself

for holding the

gift to be taken in a fiduciary capacity than leaving property by

will to

a donee who

dispositive clause.

is a fiduciary and

is so described

See Slavik, 46 Ark. App. at 76.

___ ______

in the

In sum, the

naked fact

that the beneficiary's relationship to the insured is

designated

in

the

policy

documents

by a

legal

term

(e.g.,

"executor") does not compel a finding of a fiduciary disposition;

16

the

matter still

comes down

to a

question of

the declarant's

intent.

Applying the principles

descry

no

Colasanto's

creates an

on

the

error

It

is

plain

as

these cases,

pikestaff

we

that

use of the word "executor" in response to line 10(c)

ambiguity.

completed

relationship

here.

gleaned from

Given the suggestive spacing that appears

form

to Colasanto

and

the delicate

nature

of

Farley's

a relationship that, in a homophobic

society, he might wish to describe with some tact

can

plausibly be

construed

descriptive sense.

used the word

but

To

as

using

the

this possibility means no more than

context, is ambiguous.

892

F.2d

usually

1076,

Cir.

ambiguous .

purely

that Colasanto

that the word, taken in

1989)

. .

in

of the beneficiary

See Fashion House, Inc.

___ ___________________

1083 (1st

considered

word

be sure, it can be argued

to indicate the legal status

the response

v. K mart Corp.,
____________

("Contract

where the

language is

phraseology can

support reasonable difference of opinion as to the meaning of the

words

employed

ambiguities must

it

follows

that

and

obligations

undertaken.").

be resolved according to

the

question to the jury.

district court

Because

such

the insured's intent,

properly

submitted

this

Taking the next step, the jury's finding that Colasanto

intended the term "executor" to describe Farley as an individual,

not

as

as a fiduciary, is amply supported.

the

completed

executor of

the

Colasanto's

conversion

Since Farley was named

estate at

application,

the

the

time Colasanto

description

was

17

accurate.

Here, moreover,

Colasanto originally had named Farley

as the beneficiary of the

as

the appellant

"companion"

Colasanto

not of

might

group life policy.

suggests,

have

that a

described

more fittingly, that

appellate review

and

Colasanto's word choice with

phrases may have

term

While it

such as

Farley's

is true,

"friend"

relationship

of jury arguments,

the jury had

a right

to assess

been painful to contemplate because

charged

a ten-year

Finally, it is telling (or so the

jurors could have thought) that Colasanto never once referred

Farley

as a

fiduciary or

to

is the stuff

knowledge that emotionally

relationship was on the rocks.

or

in a

fiduciary status

to

in subsequent

correspondence or conversations anent the policy.

We need not paint the lily.

rational jury could have inferred

word

"executor"

was

meant

only

On this scumbled record, a

as this jury did

to

describe

the

that the

particular

individual whom the insured

of the

policy, and not

intended to name as

to portend a

the beneficiary

disposition to

Farley qua
___

fiduciary.

IV.
IV.

THE MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL

THE MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL

The appellant

tells us that

denying his motion for a new

trial.

the trial court

Appellate review of

refusing new trials is tightly circumscribed.

not disturb such a

jury's

verdict.

ruling if a

outcome

orders

We ordinarily will

reasonable basis exists for

See Wagenmann,
___ _________

another way, we will

erred in

at 200-01.

Phrased

not intervene unless we ascertain

that the

is "against the clear

829 F.2d

the

weight of the

18

evidence such that

upholding the

verdict will result in a

Putnam Resources v. Pateman,

________________
_______

miscarriage of justice."

958 F.2d 448, 459 (1st

Cir. 1992).

This is not such a case.

We need not tarry.

largely

on the two issues

ownership and the identity

The motion for a

new trial hinged

previously discussed

of the beneficiary.

the change of

We

have already

explained that the jury had enough evidence on these questions to

support a

III.

verdict in Farley's

We add here only that,

favor.

See supra Parts

___ _____

II(A) &

on both issues, the totality of the

evidence does not suggest either that justice miscarried or

the

trial

court's

constituted an

court did not

refusal

to

overturn

abuse of discretion.

err in

the

verdict

Consequently, the district

denying the appellant's

under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(a).

jury's

that

new trial

motion

See Sanchez v. Puerto Rico Oil Co.,

___ _______
___________________

37 F.3d 712, 717 (1st Cir. 1994).

V.
V.

THE EVIDENTIARY QUESTION

THE EVIDENTIARY QUESTION

The appellant contends

that the trial court

blundered

in refusing to admit into evidence portions of letters written by

Colasanto

to Farley

respectively.

on

March

17,

1994

and

April

1,

1994,

As a starting point, the appellant claims that the

proffered statements were admissible

under Fed. R. Evid. 803(3).

We do not agree.

Evidence

Rule

prohibition statements that

state of mind."

sweeping

803(3)

removes

from

of

hearsay

exhibit a declarant's "then-existing

But, this exception is not to

endorsement

the

all

be construed as a

state-of-mind evidence.

19

To

be

admissible

under

things, must

this

exception, a

declaration,

to have been the

W. Strong, McCormick

on Evidence

rulings

solely

274 (4th

excluding

for abuse of discretion.

ed. 1992).

come within

fact-sensitive, the trial

position to resolve

admitting or

material time."

whether particular statements

the state-of-mind exception are

in the best

is reasonably likely

same condition existing at the

Because disputes over

is

other

"mirror a state of mind, which, in light of all the

circumstances, including proximity in time,

2 John

among

them.

evidence,

As is

court

true of other

appellate review

is

See, e.g., Blinzler v. Marriott

___ ____ ________
________

Int'l., Inc., 81 F.3d 1148, 1158 (1st Cir. 1996).

____________

Here,

statements reflect

the

appellant

argues

Colasanto's intent,

that

the

as early as

proffered

February of

1994,

not to transfer the

converted policy to

Farley, and that

they therefore rebut Farley's claim that Colasanto had a donative

intent.

ground

The

district court excluded

the correspondence on

the

that it did not relate to Colasanto's intent in February,

but only to his intent at or about the time he wrote the letters.

We detect no misuse of the court's wide discretion.

On Farley's

version of

the case, Colasanto

evinced a

donative intent vis- -vis the LINA policy in December of 1993, in

January 1994, and again in early February

the last of

these incidents and the first

bore a date of March 17,

time

companions

purposes,

of that year.

ensued.

eradicated any

Between

of the letters (which

1994), a bitter fight between the long-

That imbroglio,

vestige

of an

for

all

practical

amicable relationship.

20

Although

the

animosity

subsequent

toward

Farley

letters

on

significant

intervening events

breakup

could

reasonably

clearly

March

17

and

the quarrel

be

thought

contemporaneity required by Evidence Rule

unable to find that

reflect

thereafter,

and the

to

803(3).

the district court abused its

excluding the proffered state-of-mind evidence.

Colasanto's

the

ensuing

disrupt

the

Thus, we

are

discretion by

In

argues, in

Fed.

R.

a last-ditch effort to stem the tide, the appellant

the alternative, that

Evid.

804(b)(5).

That

introduction

of hearsay evidence,

long

declarant

as the

"circumstantial

the evidence was

catchall

not otherwise

is unavailable,

guarantees

permits

of trustworthiness,"

and

possesses

the trial

to prove a material

probative on the point than

other available

evidence, and (iii) the interests of justice will be served.

Fed.

R. Evid.

Lespier, 918
_______

804(b)(5); see
___

F.2d 313,

determinations under

also
____

316 (1st

United States
_____________

Cir. 1990).

Evidence Rule 804(b)(5)

the

admissible, as

the evidence

court finds that the evidence (i) is offered

facet, (ii) is more

rule

proper under

See
___

v. Panzardi_________

A trial

court's

are reviewed under

an abuse of discretion standard.

See Cook v. United States, 904

___ ____
______________

F.2d 107, 111 (1st Cir. 1990).

The preconditions for deployment

formidable,

instance.

and

For

the

appellant

example,

the

cannot

district

of Rule 804(b)(5) are

satisfy

court

them

found

in

this

that

the

statements lacked satisfactory assurances of trustworthiness.

light

of

the

disputatious

course

21

of

events

that

had

In

been

unfolding for months, leading to the retention of counsel by both

Farley

and Colasanto

and

California, we cannot fault

the statements were

then to

the

acrimonious quarrel

in

the district court's conclusion that

suspect because litigation

was in the

wind

that appears,

the

when they were made.7

VI.
VI.

CONCLUSION
CONCLUSION

We need go

no further.

For aught

case was fairly tried and the lower court appropriately permitted

the jury's verdict to stand.

Affirmed.
Affirmed.
________

____________________

7To emphasize the

point, we

note that the

April 1

letter

shows on its face that Colasanto contemporaneously sent a copy to

his attorney.

22