USCA1 Opinion

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
____________________

No. 96-1618
No. 96-1663

LORI-ANN MOLLOY,

Plaintiff, Appellee,

v.

WESLEY BLANCHARD, ETC., ET AL.,

Defendants, Appellants.

____________________

APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND

[Hon. Raymond J. Pettine, U.S. District Judge]

___________________

____________________

Before

Cyr, Circuit Judge,

_____________

Campbell, Senior Circuit Judge,

____________________

and Stahl, Circuit Judge.

_____________

____________________

Kathleen M. Powers, with whom Marc DeSisto and DeSisto Law

__________________
____________
___________
Offices were on brief for appellants.
_______
Ina P. Schiff for appellee.
_____________

____________________

June 10, 1997

____________________

CAMPBELL, Senior Circuit Judge.

____________________

The former Chief

of

Police and the City of Warwick, Rhode Island, appeal from

judgment against them in the district court entered on the

jury's

verdict

Plaintiff

had

in

favor

of

Warwick

alleged, inter alia,

___________

that

police

officer.1

she was

treated

disparately because of her gender and that her constitutional

right

to procedural due process

was violated when the Chief

suspended her without holding a hearing as

law.

required by state

We affirm.

I.

We state the

the verdict.

facts in the light most

favorable to

See Ferragamo v. Chubb Life Ins. Co. of Am., 94

___ _________
__________________________

F.3d 26, 27 n.1 (1st Cir. 1996).

Plaintiff, Lori

Ann Molloy,

a police

officer for

the

City of Warwick, Rhode Island, was suspended by Chief of

Police Wesley

Blanchard, on

resulted from

her ostensible

state

police in

their

June 3,

1994.

suspension

refusal to cooperate

investigation of

involving Robert Sabetta, a

The

a triple

police officer from the

with the

homicide

Town of

Foster, Rhode Island.

Before Molloy joined

the Warwick police department

in 1991, she and Sabetta were in the same class at the police

academy.

After the police academy, Molloy had little contact

____________________

1.

Cf. Molloy v. Blanchard, 907 F. Supp. 46 (D.R.I. 1995)

___ ______
_________

(granting in part and denying in part the defendants' motion

for summary judgment).

-22

with Sabetta until 1993.

In February 1993, Molloy

evening socializing

Sabetta and

police academy

Rhode Island.

Duffy

with

classmate and

spent an

Paula Duffy,

a police officer

another

in Cranston,

During that evening, Sabetta showed Molloy and

his personal

firearm,

a semiautomatic

with a

laser

sight.

Molloy

saw Sabetta

again approximately

two weeks

later.

home to

nearby

Duffy,

with Sabetta

show Molloy her new Jeep.

restaurant

Sabetta complained

force.

in the car,

for pizza

and

The

drove to

three then went to a

beer.

about his suspension for

He commented

Molloy's

During

the meal,

improper use of

that perhaps he should have

killed, or

should kill, the people whose complaints had resulted in

his

suspension.

On April

teenage

13, 1993,

boys and injured a

Sabetta shot and

fourth.

Among

killed three

the victims were

persons who had filed brutality complaints against

injured

victim identified

learned about

her

the murders

midnight to 8:00

Sabetta as

him.

the shooter.

and Sabetta's involvement

a.m. shift on April

14, 1993.

The

Molloy

during

Molloy

told her sergeant about

knowing Sabetta from having attended

the police academy with him.

Later that morning, Duffy contacted Molloy, worried

that

Sabetta

might

come

to

Duffy's

home.

At

Molloy's

suggestion, Duffy arranged to spend the night at the house of

-33

her friend

Suzanne Jardine, also a

Molloy stopped by

the Sabetta

about the

Cranston police officer.

Jardine's home after her duty

matter was

broached, Duffy stated

shootings upset her too much

want to discuss them further.

and that she did not

the Rhode Island state

contacted Molloy in June 1993 to ask her some general

questions

Sabetta

about

Sabetta.

did

Molloy

did

not volunteer

that

had said either he should have killed or should kill

the people who had

nor

that talking

Molloy acceded to her request.

During their investigation,

police

shift. When

she

filed a brutality complaint

mention

knowing

semiautomatic with a laser sight.

that

against him,

Sabetta

owned

The murder weapon had been

Sabetta's service revolver, not a semiautomatic.

After the Sabetta murder

summer,

the

claiming

police

state

that a

Warwick

officer possessed

prosecution.

on

police

This led

June 2, 1994.

meetings

complained

trial began the following

received

an

police dispatcher

anonymous

and a

information relevant

letter

Cranston

to Sabetta's

the state police to interview

At this

Molloy

interview Molloy revealed her two

with Sabetta, his comments about the people who had

about his

brutality,

and his

ownership of

the

laser sighted semiautomatic.

Not

supplied,

satisfied

the state

with

police

the

information

asked her

to

Molloy

report to

barracks for a third interview the following morning.

-44

had

their

During

this session, Molloy

told the state

police about her

with Duffy

after the

triple homicide.

Molloy for

additional information, but

The police

visit

pressed

Molloy denied having

any.

The state police called

that Molloy

him to

was refusing to

come down to their

Chief Blanchard, told

cooperate with them,

barracks to speak with

him

and asked

her.

The

Chief prepared a letter

state

of suspension and then drove

police barracks with

to the

Deputy Chief Stephen Castiglioni

and Captain Thomas K. Wilson.

After he arrived at

Chief met

conspiring

murders.

with several

with

Duffy

the state police barracks, the

investigators who accused

to withhold

information

Molloy of

about

The Chief then met with Molloy and, without asking

for her side of the story, advised her to cooperate

state

the

police investigation.

state

letter

the

police all

When

she knew,

with the

she insisted she had told

the

Chief handed

her the

of suspension and told her she was suspended with pay

until the state police concluded their investigation into her

alleged conspiracy

with Duffy.

The Chief

also barred

her

from participating

in training activities and

from entering

the police headquarters building.

Molloy remained

weeks.

the

on suspension for nine

and a half

While suspended she received her salary, but she lost

opportunity

to work

extra

-55

shifts,

to participate

in

training

sessions,

and

to

work on

special

activities which

would have provided additional

suspended, Molloy

suffered emotional distress

her

personal

and

occasions during

testifying as

professional

her suspension,

a witness in

made before her suspension

details,

pay.

all

While

and damage to

reputations.

On

several

Molloy was required

while

connection with arrests

she had

to explain in open court

why she

had been suspended.

On

June 9,

1994, approximately

suspension, Molloy, with the

hearing concerning

Island Law

Laws

a week

after her

help of her attorney, requested

her suspension

Enforcement Officers'

pursuant to

the Rhode

Bill of Rights,

R.I. Gen.

42-28.6-13(C) ("the Officers' Bill of Rights").2

The

____________________

2.

Although it has since been amended, see 1995 R.I. Pub.

___

Laws ch. 19,

Gen. Laws

1, at the time of Molloy's suspension, R.I.

42-28.6-13(C) stated:

Emergency suspension may be imposed by the chief or the

highest ranking officer of the law enforcement agency,
when it appears that such action is in the best
interest of the public.

Any emergency suspension of

any law enforcement officer shall consist of the law

enforcement officer being relieved of duty and he or
she shall receive all ordinary pay and benefits as he
or she would have if he or she were not suspended.

Any

law enforcement officer so suspended shall be entitled

to a prompt hearing before a hearing committee upon his
or her request.

The time period for the hearing is not

to exceed fourteen (14) days.

If, after hearing, the

hearing committee does suspend or dismiss the law

enforcement officer, he or she shall not be entitled to
his or her pay and benefits; however, if the
enforcement officer is reinstated by a subsequent
hearing, he or she shall be entitled to be reimbursed
for all salary and benefits that have not been paid.

-66

Chief had met with the City Solicitor, William Smith, the day

before.

did

The Chief testified

Smith had advised

him that he

not need to specify any charges against Molloy or afford

her a hearing

so long as

benefits.3

The Chief

willing to

grant her the

Molloy was receiving full

did not

charge

Molloy, nor

hearing required by

pay and

was he

the Officers'

Bill of Rights.

Molloy filed a mandamus

Superior Court

Chief

under R.I. Gen.

never answered

Molloy's

action in the Rhode Island

Laws

42-28.6-14(2).4

state court

complaint.

The

In

August 1994, the Chief reinstated her, reserving the right to

file disciplinary

charges upon

police investigation.

the completion of

the state

Her reinstatement rendered

her state

court mandamus action moot.

In September 1994, the Attorney

General informed the Chief that no criminal charges

would be

filed against Molloy.

____________________

3.

In contrast, Smith testified he told the Chief to put

Molloy on "administrative leave status" and specifically

advised him not to suspend Molloy under the emergency

suspension provision of the Officers' Bill of Rights, R.I.

Gen. Laws

42-28.6-13(C), because that provision did not

apply to Molloy's case.

4.

R.I. Gen. Laws

42-28.6-14(2) states:

Any law enforcement officer who is denied any right

afforded by this subtitle may apply, either
individually or through his or her certified or
recognized employee organization, to the superior court
where he or she resides or is regularly employed for
any order directing the law enforcement agency to show
cause why the right should not be afforded.

-77

On September 30, 1994, Molloy filed an eight-count5

complaint against

the City of Warwick,

Board of Public Safety,

U.S.C.

1983,6 Molloy

and Mayor Lincoln Chafee.

the Civil

of 1964, 42

Molloy claimed disparate treatment

disparate

impact

because

negative impact on her

alleged

discrimination

of

the

infliction of emotional distress.

and

Under Title VII of

U.S.C.

2000e et seq.,
________

because of her gender and

policies

as a woman.

and

of her

protection, free speech,

and procedural due process.

Rights Act

Under 42

alleged she had been deprived

constitutional rights to equal

substantive

the Chief, Warwick's

having a

Under

negligent

disparate

state law, Molloy

or

intentional

Before

grounds

of

substantive

Mayor

trial, the

qualified

immunity,

and procedural

Chafee and

district

her claim

violation against the Chief.

due

court

dismissed,

Molloy's

claims

process violations

for a

substantive

on

for

against

due process

The trial then proceeded.

At

____________________

5.

The complaint actually states nine counts, though two are

labeled "VIII."

However, the first two counts are apparently

identical.

6.

42 U.S.C.

1983 states, in relevant part:

Every person who, under color of any statute,

ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State
or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof
to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall
be liable to the party injured in an action at law,
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.

-88

the

close of all the evidence, the court granted judgment as

matter of law for all the defendants on Molloy's disparate

impact and

First Amendment claims.

The court

judgment as a matter of law for Molloy on her

process claim,

also granted

procedural due

submitting her gender discrimination claim to

the

jury.

The jury was also instructed to ascertain damages

on both claims.7

The

jury

determined

that

Molloy

discriminated against on the basis of her gender.

had

been

It awarded

her $23,000 in damages on the discrimination claim as well as

for violation of

the

court.

The

verdict motions

procedural due process as earlier

district

court

for judgment as a

trial, and to alter judgment.

found by

denied Defendants'

matter of law,

post-

for a new

Defendants appealed.

II.

We

district

matter of

the

turn first to

court committed

Defendants' contention

error

in granting

that the

judgment as

law against Defendants and in Plaintiff's favor on

procedural due process claim.

This is a close question.

Given, however, our affirmance,

for

Plaintiff

discrimination,

however resolved,

on

her

there is

infra, of the jury's verdict

_____

Title

VII

no practical

the outcome

claim

for

gender

need to

address it;

would not affect

the damages

____________________

7.

The remaining claims appear to have been dropped and, in

any event, are not at issue in this appeal.

-99

awarded to Plaintiff.

award

for both

The

claims, and

entitled to have prevailed

award

jury provided

stands, with

so long

one or

same conduct underlay both:

while

depriving

Officers' Bill

her

of

instance of her lost

suspended

(for

emotional

distress

suspension.

as Plaintiff

on either of the two

no alteration in

regardless of whether

a single

of

is found

claims, the

the amount

both claims are

damages

of damages

upheld.

the Chief's suspension of Molloy

the

Rights.

hearing

Her damages

called

for

by

consisted in

opportunity to earn extra income

special

details,

and loss

The special

The

of

overtime,

reputation

etc.)

each

while

and her

caused by

verdict form handed to the

the

her

jury by

the court instructed

the jury

damages

found (as

even if

liability

and

theories.8

We

judgment,

which

underlying

it

causation

legal

also note

we

the

under

of

it

Molloy's

district

infra, does
_____

but

single amount

jury reported

both

that the

affirm,

theories

to award a

did)

legal

court's final

not

only states

of

mention

finding

the

of

liability and the amount of damages.

Because the jury's damages

under either or both liability

there was

award would be the same

theories, and because we find

sufficient evidence to support

the jury's finding

____________________

8.

Although liability under Molloy's procedural due process

claim had been directed by the court, the causation

determination under that theory was left to the jury, as were

damages.

-1010

of

gender

discrimination,

determination as

granting

to

judgment to

constitutional

claim

whether

infra,
_____

or

Plaintiff as

of

not

we

need

make

no

the

court

erred

in

a matter

violation

of

of law

on her

procedural

due

process.9

Cf. Gulf Oil Co.

___ _____________

(1981)

("[P]rior to

federal

courts must

v. Bernard,
_______

reaching any

452

U.S. 89,

99

constitutional questions,

consider nonconstitutional

grounds for

decision.").

Our analysis has the effect of mooting the district

court's holding as

ruling without

to the

legal

effect.

Morton Int'l, Inc., 508

___________________

that

in

patent

asserting

a court

the

Cf.
___

claim, leaving

Cardinal Chem. Co.

___________________

U.S. 83, 93-95

infringement

infringement prevents

defense

due process

cases,

validity issue becomes "immaterial

v.

(1993) (recognizing

finding

from reaching

patent's

that

invalidity

of

non-

an affirmative

because

the

to the disposition of the

case," and that any determination of the patent's validity by

the

district court in such a case should be vacated) (citing

Electrical Fittings Corp. v. Thomas & Betts Co., 307 U.S. 241
_________________________
__________________

(1939)).

____________________

9.

For the same reasons, we also do not reach the City's

claim that it is not liable for the Chief's actions under

1983.

The City does not contest respondeat superior

liability under Title VII.

See Randle v. City of Aurora, 69

___ ______
______________

F.3d 441, 450 (10th Cir. 1995); Hamilton v. Rodgers, 791 F.2d
________
_______
439, 444 (5th Cir. 1986); Scott v. City of Topeka Police &
_____
_______________________
Fire Civil Serv. Comm'n, 739 F.Supp. 1434, 1438 (D. Kan.
_______________________
1990).

-1111

III.

We

turn next to

was insufficient

Defendants' assertion

evidence to

support the jury's

Plaintiff's favor on the sex discrimination claim.

makes it unlawful

Title VII

individual, or otherwise to discriminate

any individual

terms, conditions, or

such individual's

verdict in

for an employer "to fail or refuse to hire

or to discharge any

against

that there

with

respect

privileges of

race,

to his

compensation,

employment, because

color, religion,

sex, or

of

national

origin."

42 U.S.C.

In

often

2000e-2(a)(1).

a Title VII disparate treatment case, if, as is

true, see Smith v. Stratus Computer, Inc., 40 F.3d 11,

___ _____
______________________

15 (1st Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1958 (1995), the
____________

plaintiff has

"the

no direct proof of

plaintiff

must

make

out

deliberate discrimination,

prima

facie

case

of

discrimination, the employer must then come forward with some

non-discriminatory justification, and

is given the opportunity

the plaintiff

to convince the trier of

finally

fact that

the justification was pretextual and that the real reason was

discriminatory."

Cuello-Suarez v.
_____________

Puerto Rico Elec. Power

________________________

Auth., 988 F.2d 275, 278 (1st Cir. 1993).

_____

For

the

prima

facie

case,

disparate

plaintiff must "identify and relate specific

persons

situated similarly

treated differently."

'in

impact

instances where

all relevant

aspects' were

Dartmouth Review v. Dartmouth College,

________________
_________________

-1212

889

F.2d 13, 19 (1st

Cir. 1989) (quoting

Smith v. Monsanto

_____

Chem. Co., 770 F.2d

_________

475

U.S. 1050

(1986)).

person, looking

them

roughly

situated."

"The

objectively at

equivalent

Id.
___

necessary,

719, 723 (8th Cir. 1985),

"Exact

and

test

the

the

defendants

protagonists

establish a prima facie

prudent

that

think

similarly

neither likely

be fair congeners.

contend

incidents, would

words, apples should be compared to apples."

The

cert. denied,
____________

is whether

correlation is

but the cases must

________

nor

In other

Id.
___

Molloy

failed

to

case by establishing that "similarly

situated" males received more lenient treatment in respect to

suspension.

At

We disagree.

trial,

the

Chief himself

testified

that

in

approximately

police

dozen

he

cases

officers who were male,10 the

officers the rights

as

discipline

in a

Chief had afforded the

created by the Officers' Bill of Rights,

conspicuously

Moreover,

involving Warwick

would

number of

not

do

these cases

for Molloy,

he kept

woman.

officers on

active duty after learning that they were suspected of highly

questionable behavior.

Scott Hornoff, for example, was the primary suspect

in the state

woman

police investigation

named Victoria Cushman.

of the 1989

murder of

Although the Chief knew as of

____________________

10.

The Chief also briefly referred to a situation involving

a woman officer, but she was not identified, and the details
of her case remain unclear.

-1313

October

1991 that Hornoff was

suspend him

as he later did

active duty

working at an

the main suspect,

Molloy but instead

administrative job.

he did not

kept him on

Hornoff was

not suspended until he was eventually indicted for murder

grand jury in December

that

Hornoff's rights

1994.

under the

It

by

was conceded, moreover,

Law Enforcement

Officers'

Bill of Rights were recognized.

Joseph Duquette, a senior Warwick police officer at

the

time of

the

Cushman case,

police investigation of Hornoff.

memorandum in

which he

Major Crimes

with anyone

Unit not

explicit

any

way

to discuss the

his

of the

of

state

Warwick

Cushman investigation

general's office unless

place pursuant to a subpoena

permission

for

with the

1993, Duquette issued a

ordered the members

Castiglioni or Chief Blanchard.

in

In

from the state attorney

such a discussion took

the

interfered

Duquette,

or with

then-Commander

Duquette was not disciplined

interference

with the

state

police

investigation until August of 1995, after Chief Blanchard had

been replaced by

the

Chief

was

Chief DeFeo.

unaware

of

While Appellants argue

Duquette's

activity,

we

that

find

sufficient evidence in

the record from which

the jury could

have properly inferred knowledge.

We

sufficient

conclude

for

the

that

jury

to

-1414

Molloy

have

presented

found

that

evidence

she

had

established her prima

facie case

that "similarly

situated"

males had received dissimilar treatment.

The

conduct of

defendants go

on to

the disciplined

male

argue that

officers was

even if

the

sufficiently

similar in material respects to Molloy's to establish a prima

facie case,

support

the weight of

a finding

defendants]

was

discriminatory."

"that the

had

that

the

by the

real reason

was

Cuello-Suarez, 988 F.2d at 278.

_____________

with

the

Duquette's in

committed similar

Molloy was

insufficient to

justification [offered

pretextual and

Presented

Hornoff's and

the evidence was

accused of

or

were

evidence

of

cases

which male police

more severe

either not

such

as

officers who

offenses than

those

disciplined or,

if

disciplined,

were

first

afforded their

rights

under

the

Officers' Bill of Rights, the jury was entitled to infer that

the

Chief's

proffered

treatment of Molloy

explanation

to cooperate

that the

granting of rights was

with them

and the

the

same

reasonable jury

to conclude

her

proving

of

against Molloy

VII.

See Udo
___ ___

harsh

Tomes, 54
_____

ostensible advice

was a pretext.

evidence

also

that the plaintiff

that the

because of her

v.

more

unnecessary where, although

suspended, she was still being paid

burden

his

the state police's advice that she was

refusing

Essentially

for

Chief

had

allowed

had carried

discriminated

gender in violation

F.3d

9, 13

(1st

of Title

Cir. 1995)

-1515

(holding

that a plaintiff may

rely on the

prove both pretext and discrimination).

without being

offered the

situated male

officers.

the

Chief for his refusal

same evidence to

Molloy was suspended

same rights granted

to similarly

Moreover, the reasons

supplied by

to provide Molloy

with a hearing

were so flimsy as to permit a finding of mendacity:

The factfinder's disbelief of the reasons

put

forward

by

the

defendant

(particularly if disbelief is accompanied

by

suspicion

together with

of

mendacity)

the elements of

facie case, suffice

discrimination.

to show

Thus,

may,

the prima
intentional

rejection of

the

defendant's proffered reasons will permit

______
the trier of
fact

fact to infer

the ultimate

of intentional discrimination . . .

St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v.

______________________

Hicks, 509 U.S.

_____

502, 511

(1993).

See also Woods v. Friction Materials, Inc., 30 F.3d 255, 260________ _____
________________________

61 n.3 (1st Cir. 1994); LeBlanc v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 6 F.3d
_______
__________________

836, 843 (1st Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1018 (1994).
____________

The

Chief

was

experienced

Officers' Bill of Rights,

in matters

arising

yet he refused to grant

under

the

Plaintiff

her rights even after, with the assistance of an attorney and

a union

Chief

representative, she

said that

because

required.

he had

had requested a

refused to

the City

Solicitor

had

Yet

the statutory

grant Molloy

told

him no

language seems

that a hearing was required in this case.

___

42-28.6-13(C) ("Any

The

a hearing

hearing

was

utterly clear

See R.I. Gen. Laws

___

law enforcement officer

-1616

hearing.

so suspended

shall

be

entitled

committee upon his

refusal was

prompt

male officers.

evidence

hearing

or her request.").

in marked contrast

these rights to

sufficient

to a

from

which

before a

The

Chief's outright

to his regular

We hold that

to

hearing

infer

allowance of

the jury

had

discriminatory

intent.

IV.

The

persuasive.

defendants'

First, they

remaining

contentions

are

argue that the district court

not

made

certain errors in admitting evidence at trial.

Our review of

the

if any,

record

satisfies us

that

such

errors,

were

harmless.

See Lataille v. Ponte,

___ ________
_____

754 F.2d 33, 37 (1st Cir.

1985) ("Our standard for determining whether the admission of

such evidence is harmless

error is whether we can

fair assurance . . . that the judgment

swayed

by the

error

was not substantially

. . . .'") (quoting

Pisari, 636 F.2d 855, 859 (1st Cir.

______

say 'with

United States
_____________

v.

1981) (quoting Kotteakos

_________

v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 765 (1946))).

_____________

Defendants

evidence to

allow

damages, pointing

protest

that

a reasonable

out that Molloy

there

jury

was

insufficient

to award

$23,000

could not have

lost more

than $5,000 in overtime, training, detail work and the

They acknowledge that the

jury may have granted all

in

like.

or some

of the remaining damages to compensate for Molloy's emotional

distress, but

insist that

since there were

other potential

-1717

causes

of

Molloy's

interrogation

and

distress,

her

worries

such

as

about

the

state

possible

police

criminal

prosecution, expert testimony was essential to establish what

portion

of her distress came from her suspension.

Andrade v. Jamestown Hous. Auth.,

_______
_____________________

Cir.

1996), as

holding that

possible cause

of a

testimony

required

is

82 F.3d 1179, 1187-88 (1st

where there

is more

plaintiff's emotional

to

They cite

establish

than one

distress, expert

that

it

defendant's conduct that caused the plaintiff's

was

the

symptoms and

not some other factor.

The defendants misstate our holding in Andrade.

_______

that case,

problems,

the plaintiff had

headaches, and

testimony was

irritated

sleeplessness

diarrhea.

required for the

bowels,

a previous history

We

of stomach

held that

plaintiff to prove

diarrhea,

she experienced were

tension

medical

that the

headaches

the result

In

and

of emotional

distress

caused

by

the

defendant

and

not

continuation of her previous medical problems.

we

sought

evaluating

without

"[W]e

to

avoid

the effect

the aid

are not

putting

of

of expert

juries

in

the

merely

In that case,

position

preexisting medical

medical testimony.

establishing a

bright-line rule

of

condition

We

stated,

that expert

testimony is always necessary to prove the causation prong of

[intentional infliction

very well be

of emotional distress].

There

may

situations where causation is within the common

-1818

knowledge and experience

of the layperson

. . . ."

Id.
___

at

1188 n.5.

This is such a

Molloy's

asserted

sleeplessness

The

sole

producing

case.

anxiety,

derived from a

issue

was

There is no

the

nervousness,

contention that

nausea

and

preexisting medical condition.

role

those symptoms and the

of

Defendants' conduct

in

placing of a fair monetary

valuation on them relative to the circumstances of this case.

The jury

heard and

could evaluate her

testimony describing

what

effect

other events.

This

is the

the suspension

had upon

her as

compared with

It is unclear how an expert could have helped.

kind

of determination

typically entrusted

to

juries.

Besides emotional distress,

that

Molloy also

the defendants' actions caused her

her personal

received

to suffer damage to

and professional reputations.

her suspension, related as it was to

substantial publicity.

testified

She stated that

Sabetta's murder trial,

Also, during her suspension

Molloy testified as a witness at several trials in connection

with arrests she had

had

to admit in open

was

obliged

suspension.

made previously.

court that she

to describe

The

At these

was then suspended and

the circumstances

jury was entitled to

trials, she

surrounding her

compensate Molloy for

these additional elements of damage.

The judgment is affirmed.

________________________

-1919

Costs to appellee.
_________________