USCA1 Opinion

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
____________________

No. 96-2309

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Appellee,

v.

JOSE V. ANDRADE, JR.,

Defendant, Appellant.

____________________

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

[Hon. Reginald C. Lindsay, U.S. District Judge]

___________________

____________________

Before

Boudin, Circuit Judge,

_____________

Coffin, Senior Circuit Judge,

____________________

and Dowd,* Senior District Judge.

_____________________

____________________

Miriam Conrad, Federal Defender Office, for appellant.

_____________
James F. Lang,
_______________

Assistant

Donald K. Stern, United

_______________

United

States

Attorney,

States Attorney, was on brief

States.

____________________

with

for the Uni

February 3, 1998
____________________

____________________

*Of the Northern District of Ohio, sitting by designation.

BOUDIN,

Circuit Judge.
_____________

Jose V. Andrade,

Jr., appeals

from

his conviction

for

conspiracy

license in the business of

371,

922(a)(1)(A)

without

922(a)(3).

appeal

The

engage

without

dealing in firearms, 18 U.S.C.

(1994),

license

to

into

and

his

for

state

facts pertaining

are largely undisputed.

transporting

of

residence,

to the

As

firearms

issues

id.
___

raised on

the sufficiency

of the

evidence is not an issue, we abbreviate the facts.

Andrade,

native of

Boston,

attended

Jackson State

University in Jackson, Mississippi, during 1993 and 1994.

the

time, the authorities

suspected Andrade of

illegally from Mississippi to Massachusetts.

1994,

Andrade--then in

arrested

and questioned

Boston

in

for Christmas

At

moving guns

On December 16,

vacation--was

circumstances described

below.

His family apartment

and two others occupied by cousins were

searched on the same day based on search warrants or consent.

Andrade was

released the

same day,

questioned

at home

on

December 19, and rearrested in March 1995.

On April 26,

1995, Andrade was indicted

for conspiracy

to engage in gun dealings, together with Christopher Todd and

Terrance Smith,

who were alleged to have

Andrade in Mississippi; as residents,

purchased guns for

it was easier for them

to purchase guns than for Andrade to do so.

the

grand

jury

issued

superseding

In January 1996,

indictment

against

Andrade, adding the second count (transporting firearms

-2-2-

into

Massachusetts).

By

that time,

Todd

had pled

guilty, and

charges against Smith had been dismissed.

On

May 8,

1996, the district

refusing to suppress statements that

authorities on

December 16 and

court issued

a decision

Andrade had made to the

December 19 and

refusing to

suppress the results of the

searches of December 16.

United
______

States
______

Supp.

1996).

v. Andrade,
_______

925 F.

71, 81

(D. Mass.

Andrade

was tried

lasting about two

before

weeks.

jury in

The most

May

1996, the

trial

damaging testimony

was

given by Todd and Smith.

Both men gave detailed accounts of Andrade's requests to

them in 1993 and 1994 to buy handguns and his statements that

he planned to

each

take them to Boston

described multiple

to sell.

occasions

on

Todd

and Smith

which, in

Andrade's

company, they purchased handguns for Andrade in different gun

shops and pawnshops, Andrade selecting the weapons and taking

them afterwards from Todd or Smith.

Certain of the guns were

later recovered by the police in Boston.

Two

pawnshop

identified Andrade as

employees,

from

different

pawnshops,

an individual who accompanied

Todd on

specific occasions.

and friend,

Michael

admitted saying

that he was bringing guns

and that Spinola

Spinola

Spinola, Andrade's first cousin

that Andrade

Spinola

from Mississippi to Boston to sell

had seen some of the

had given detailed

had told

weapons; but although

testimony to this

-3-3-

effect to the

grand jury, at trial he described much of it as lies.

is also testimony

that

in

from a former friend of

December

1994

after

the

There

Andrade, who said

search

warrants

were

executed, Andrade had asked the friend whether he would store

a suitcase of guns for Andrade.

Andrade

Although

sought

he

did

not

to

impeach

testify

government

himself,

witnesses.

Andrade

offered

testimony of Manuel Correia, who had been his roommate at the

University in Mississippi.

Correia said that he

from Jackson to Boston with

Andrade three times, had seen or

helped

Andrade pack,

Andrade's own

from

the

and had

statements, and

apartment

searches,

never seen

some of

were

had driven

any guns

around.

the evidence

introduced

seized

by

the

government.

The jury

next day

retired to

deliberate on May

it asked the court

29, 1996.

to answer a question

The

about the

substantive count (transporting guns into Massachusetts); the

question and

court's reply

discussed below.

On May

are at issue

on appeal

and are

31, Andrade was convicted

on both

counts and later sentenced to 46 months in prison.

Andrade's

court

first claim

of error

admitted statements that

December

is

Andrade had made

16 interrogation at the police

arrest, Andrade

substation and

was taken to

handcuffed

that the

station.

an office in a

to a

-4-4-

chair.

district

during his

After his

Roxbury police

There,

Bureau

of

Alcohol,

Tobacco and

Andrade the

Firearms

agent

Miranda warnings,
_______

U.S. 436, 478-79

rights; Andrade

Daniel Campbell

see Miranda
___ _______

(1966), and asked him if

said that he

did.

v. Arizona,
_______

read

384

he understood his

A state

police officer,

Francis Matthews, was also present.

Campbell told

Andrade that

he was under

investigation

for

gun shipments, and

that the police

for two premises connected

with Andrade.

had search warrants

Andrade said

that

he had bought guns in Mississippi but that he was a collector

and not a dealer.

where

he had

search warrants

Andrade also identified a third apartment

stayed.

Campbell

and obtained

then went

to execute

permission from

the owner

the

to

search the third apartment.

After Campbell

Andrade

left, an

INS agent

about his immigration

Matthews told

the agent to

then entered and, hearing

status.

leave.

sought to

Andrade

A Boston

question

refused, so

police officer

Andrade tell Matthews that he

was

not a firearms dealer, accused Andrade of lying; there was an

angry

leave.

reply from Andrade, and Matthews told the detective to

After some further discussion between them, Matthews

said to Andrade

he didn't

that he would not keep

want to

talk, and Matthews

bothering Andrade if

then spent

about two

hours on paperwork while Andrade slept in the chair.

At some

suggested

to

point

during the

Andrade's

sister

-5-5-

searches, police

that

she

apparently

talk to

him

by

telephone;

talk

to

she did so,

the

substation,

police.

Andrade

Campbell woke him

had

crying and pleading

When

Campbell

been held

for

and asked him if he

that had been read to him earlier.

At this point, Campbell said

with Andrade to

returned

about

to

the

four hours.

remembered the rights

Andrade said that he did.

that he knew that Todd and

Smith had purchased guns for Andrade in Mississippi.

Andrade

replied that he knew Todd and Smith and was present when they

purchased

guns.

Andrade admitted that he obtained guns from

Todd and Smith but said that he

to three

had sold them in Mississippi

men from Houston, although he

also admitted having

given a couple of guns to two men in Boston.

Andrade was

released after

offering to

cooperate with

the police in retrieving weapons that the police thought were

still at large in Boston.

and a

Boston Police

Seeking this cooperation, Campbell

detective visited

December 19, where Andrade

would

soon be

Andrade

said that three men

arriving in

Boston

Andrade offered to introduce the

at home

on

from Houston

with weapons

men to Campbell.

and drugs.

Andrade's

statements on both days were offered in evidence at trial.

In

this

statements

by

court,

Andrade

does

he made were involuntary.

repeated questioning police failed

remain silent

under the

not

claim

that

the

Instead, he says that

to honor his right to

Miranda doctrine,
_______

see Michigan
___ ________

v.

-6-6-

Mosley, 423
______

U.S.

96, 104

(1975),

and that

when

resumed questioning after completing the apartment

Campbell

searches,

there was no adequate waiver when Andrade made the statements

in

the

second

interrogation.

The

district

court

held

otherwise, and we agree.

Miranda
_______

requires

that

the police

warn

suspect in

custody

of his

silent.

If

right to

counsel

the police have failed to give

obtain a waiver of rights, the

if

and his

otherwise voluntary.

wants to consult

remain silent,

But

remain

the warnings and

statements are excluded, even

Where the suspect

asserts that he

with counsel, questioning must

counsel is provided.

484-85 (1981).

right to

See Edwards v. Arizona,

___ _______
_______

when a defendant

Mosley makes clear

______

cease until

451 U.S. 477,

invokes his

that the

right to

police are

not

automatically forbidden from later resuming interrogation.

Andrade's

initial

statements

voluntarily made after full warnings.

of the INS agent and

to

them but

were

to

Campbell

were

Andrade's later rebuff

police detective were refusals to speak

not couched

as a

refusal

to talk

with

anyone.

When Matthews ended

that Andrade

no longer

neither

Andrade

did

his own questioning, it appears

wanted

rule out

to talk

the

with Matthews,

possibility

but

of talking

later.

We

see nothing wrong with Campbell's decision to resume

questioning

of Andrade

after the

-7-7-

searches.

reasonable

interval

separated

the

two

periods

of

questioning,

see
___

Mosley, 423 U.S. at 106, and there was no repeated attempt to

______

reverse

a refusal

circumstances

Barone, 968
______

resisted

to

were

talk

quite

F.2d 1378 (1st

questioning,

was

through

undue pressure.

different

in

United States
______________

Cir. 1992), where

held

for

The

over

v.

the defendant

24

hours,

was

interrogated four times before he began to discuss the crime,

and was twice intimidated by suggestions that he "would be in

substantial

[physical]

without cooperating."

danger

if

he

returned

to

Boston

Id. at 1385; see also id. at 1386.

___
________ ___

Whether Andrade's later statements reflected a waiver of

his right to remain silent is a closer issue.

that the Supreme

Court has said, almost in

The problem is

the same breath,

that "mere silence is not enough" for a waiver, but that this

"does not mean

understanding

indicating

that the defendant's silence, coupled with an

of

his

rights

waiver, may never

and

be decided on the facts.

course

conduct

that the

North Carolina v. Butler,

______________
______

The waiver issue, it appears, must

See id. at 374-75.

_______

Here, we have no reason

to doubt that Andrade knew that

he had a right to remain silent; at the outset of

round, Campbell

of

support a conclusion

defendant has waived his rights."

441 U.S. 369, 373 (1979).

reminded him

of the

Andrade confirmed that he remembered.

the second

earlier warnings,

and

As for the intervening

events,

Matthews'

dismissal

of the

INS

agent

and police

-8-8-

detective, when Andrade demurred, fairly conveyed the message

that Andrade

whom

he

was in

would

charge of the

speak.

By ending

decision whether

the

initial

and to

round

of

questioning, Matthews himself reinforced this message.

Andrade's

confessions

subsequent admissions

wrested from

to

a reluctant

statements were partly consistent

Campbell were

detainee.

not

Andrade's

with Andrade's cover story

(selling the weapons to three men from Houston) and partly an

attempt to explain

in

Boston.

away the presence of some

In short,

Andrade

choosing not to remain silent.

________

have

helped

the

had a

of the weapons

rational reason

for

While a written waiver would

government,

it

is

not

mechanical

requirement.1

Andrade's

instructions

firearms

next

on

without

requirement.

the

18 U.S.C.

claim

is

that

first

count--conspiracy

license--set

the

too

trial

low

to

court's

deal

in

scienter

924(a)(1)(D) provides that a number

of weapons offenses, including the offense of dealing without

a license, require

undertaken.

that the proscribed conduct

Andrade's counsel

asked the court

be willfully

to instruct

the jury that this in turn required proof beyond a reasonable

doubt

that "the

defendant

knew

that Section

922(a)(1)(A)

____________________

1Compare United States v. Christian, 571 F.2d 64, 66, 69

_______ _____________
_________
(1st Cir. 1978)

(no waiver where a defendant's

an FBI waiver form showed

signature on

that he had admitted being advised

of his rights, but conspicuously omitted his signature on the

line provided for a waiver of those rights).

-9-9-

requires

one

who engages

firearms to obtain

in

the

business

a dealer's license from

of dealing

in

the Secretary of

the Treasury."

The

district court

Instead, it

told the

intentionally commits

refused

jury that one

illegality had

But it

this instruction.

acts willfully

when he

acts proscribed by law "with knowledge

that his conduct is unlawful."

of

to give

to be

The court said that knowledge

proved beyond a

also instructed that

reasonable doubt.

the government did not

have to

prove that the defendant knew of the specific statute that he

was charged

with violating

or that

he intended

to violate

that particular statute.

If case law from

issue appears

ways,

easy.

other circuits is put to one side, the

The

term "willful" is used

in various

but the standard definitions normally emphasize that a

defendant

acted

unlawful,"

"with

knowledge

1 L. Sand,

that

[his]

J. Siffert, W. Loughlin

Modern Federal Jury Instructions

_________________________________

3A.01, at

conduct

is

& S. Reiss,

3A-18 (1997).

Willfulness is often required where a statute outlaws conduct

commonly

thought

willfulness

to

be

requirement

lawful.

reverses

ignorance of the law is no defense.

may be needed is a different matter.

In

the

some

measure,

the

usual

rubric

that

Just how much ignorance

Nothing in the traditional

in

its

underlying

purpose,

willfulness instruction, nor

requires

that

the

defendant

-10-10-

possess specific

knowledge of

makes his conduct unlawful.

the statutory

provision that

To impose such a requirement of

detailed knowledge

judges could

of the

firearms statutes

pretend) would make

dealer laws

very difficult.

beyond what is needed to

(to which

an enforcement of

And the requirement

few

the gun

goes well

screen out an innocent who honestly

thought that his conduct was lawful.

Our

view

accords

with

the

purpose

adopting the willfulness requirement in

Protection

Act

of 1986,

Congress's concern

conduct

be

was that,

L.

in

the Firearms Owners'

99-308,

because of

Congress

100 Stat.

the nature

449.

of the

and technicality of the statute, some offenses might

committed

conduct

Pub.

of

by

individuals who

had been

made criminal.2

Congress was

were

unaware

that their

Nothing indicates

concerned with protecting individuals

that

who knew

that their conduct was unlawful but might not be able to cite

chapter and verse as to which precise provision made it so.

The proponents

extent that we

of the willfulness

requirement, to

can discover their comments, said

suggest that the term was

the

nothing to

intended to go beyond its ordinary

____________________

2The willfulness requirement applies

and

not

others, and

the

dividing

to some gun crimes

line is

crudely

drawn

between actions that anyone might expect to be unlawful, see,

____
e.g.,
____

18

U.S.C.

assault weapon
appear

922(v),

crimes), and

actions that

unlawful, see, e.g.,

__________

(shipping

a firearm in

924(a)(1)(B)

id.
___

-11-11-

might not

922(e),

interstate commerce

notice to the common carrier).

(semiautomatic
always

924(a)(1)(D)

without written

meaning, that is,

awareness that one's conduct

is unlawful.

The only suggestions that the statute might require knowledge

of

the "details"

amendment; given

normally get

of

the

law came

the incentive to

little

weight.

from

opponents of

exaggerate, such

NLRB v.
____

the

remarks

Fruit & Vegetable

___________________

Packers & Warehousemen, Local 760, 377 U.S. 58, 66 (1964).3

_________________________________

The

Second

Circuit

government need only prove

has

squarely

ruled

that

the

that the defendant knew that

his

conduct was illegal.

76-77,

United States v. Collins, 957 F.2d 72,

______________
_______

cert. denied,
____________

504 U.S.

944

(1992).

Accord United
______ ______

States v.
______

Allah, 130 F.3d

_____

33, 38-41 (2d Cir.

1997); United
______

States v.
______

Bryan, 122 F.3d

_____

90, 91 (2d Cir.),

cert. granted,
_____________

118 S.

Ct. 622

(1997).

The

Seventh Circuit's

decision in

United States v. Obiechie, 38 F.3d 309 (1994), largely points

_____________
________

toward

although

standard

one

of

sentence

general

suggests

knowledge

that

licensing requirement may be required.

of

illegality,

knowledge

of

the

See id. at 316.

_______

Several other circuits--including the Third and Eighth--

say

generally that the defendant must have "knowledge of the

____________________

3Compare 132 Cong.

_______
Hughes)

(opponent's

Rec. 6876 (1986) (statement

comments

require the defendant to know

that

the

[I]t would be a

with
____

(statement of Rep.

comment that the

in favor of

new statute

prosecutor's nightmare"),
Boehlert) (supporter's

statute rejected mere knowledge

"some sort of criminal intent").

and extensive legislative

would

"what the law is, every detail

of the law. . . .
id. at 6861
___

of Rep.

The scattered

history is recounted in

The Firearms Owners' Protection Act:

of conduct

D. Hardy,

A Historical and Legal

Perspective, 17 Cumb. L. Rev. 585, 604-07, 645-53 (1987).

_____________

-12-12-

law," e.g.,
____

United States
_____________

Cir. 1995)

("the defendant

that his

F.2d

intentional

767

(8th

Cir.

violation of

could

Second Circuit.

in

must have

F.3d 126,

acted with

conduct was unlawful"); United States

_____________

764,

language

v. Hayden, 64
______

be read

1991)

know legal

either

And the matter is

purporting to disagree

("`willful'

duty").

to support

130 (3d

knowledge

v. Hern, 926
____

means

But

Andrade

an

this

or the

further confused because,

with the Second

Circuit, several

such decisions misunderstand its position.4

Admittedly,

two

other

circuits

requires proof that the defendant

say

that

conviction

was aware of the licensing

requirement

itself,

persuasive.

at *4

decisions

we

See United States

___ _____________

(5th Cir.

Corcino,
_______

but

85

549,

553-54

Rodriguez,
_________

not

find

these

cases

v. Rodriguez, 1997 WL 797506,

_________

Dec. 31, 1997);

F.3d

like

do

United States
_____________

(11th

Cir.

purporting to

v. Sanchez________

1996).

require

Even

specific

awareness of the statute, dilute the requirement by inferring

specific

knowledge

from

circumstantial

evidence.

See
___

Rodriguez, 1997 WL 797506, at *4.

_________

Such

evidence

defendant knew that

is likely

to

his conduct was

be

good proof

that

unlawful but very

the

thin

____________________

4The

Third Circuit, for example, ascribes to the Second

Circuit the view that the government need prove only that the

defendant
n.6.

The

expressed
evidence

knew what he
Second

was doing.

Circuit

this view.

has,

See
___

Hayden, 64
______
to

our

Collins, 957
_______

"demonstrate[d] that

Collins

F.3d at 130

knowledge,
F.2d

at 77

understood that

never
(the
his

firearms sales violated the law").

-13-13-

evidence that

the defendant

See Rodriguez, 1997

___ _________

knew what statute

WL 797506, at *6

made it

so.

("counter-surveillance

operations," "unease about the sale," and "experience at `The

Bunker'

and with firearms" gave defendant a "background from

which she should have been familiar with the firearms laws").

See also Obiechie, 38 F.3d at 316 ("An inference of knowledge

________ ________

could be

`gift' as

drawn

from the

fact that

his reason for purchasing

[defendant] had

listed

the [guns] . .

. after

having indicated that the first two purchases were for retail

sale.").

Since juries are

being allowed to convict

basis of such evidence, nothing

jury with

language suggesting

on the

is gained by instructing the

that the

standard is

higher

than it actually is.

Nor

is Andrade's position

Ratzlaf v. United States, 510

_______
_____________

supported, as he

U.S. 135 (1994).

claims, by

Ratzlaf held
_______

that a currency structuring violation

required "knowledge of

illegality [as]

willfulness, Bates
_____

United States,
_____________

what

an element"

v.

118 S. Ct. 285, 290 n.6 (1997), which is just

the district

knowledge of

to show

court told

the jury

a specific statute

here.

In Ratzlaf,
_______

(or something close

to it)

was also required--not because of the willfulness requirement

____

but because the statute itself required a "purpose of evading

the reporting requirements"

U.S.C.

5324.

of 31 U.S.C.

This additional wrinkle is

present case.

-14-14-

5313(a).

See 31
___

not part of

the

In

short, after surveying

ground

in joining

enough

that the

unlawful.

the Second

defendant

Circuit position

aware

Such knowledge, needless

circumstances.

In

our

smuggling activity, his

station,

be

the cases, we

and

other

case, the

that his

feel on solid

that it

is

conduct

is

to say, depends upon the

scale

of Andrade's

gun

denials of gun dealing in the police

evidence

that he

sought

to

hide the

weapons are powerful

indications of his awareness.

himself makes no claim

that the evidence is

Andrade

insufficient on

this score if the district court's instruction is upheld.

The remaining claim of error

address

concerns

a supplemental

district court in answer

second

that we think necessary to

instruction

to a question from

given by

the jury.

The

count charged Andrade with the substantive offense of

transporting

firearms

without

the

a license

residence.

Following

deliberation,

the jury submitted

charge

into

and

state of

period

a written question

The jury requests a description of clarification of

the term

"transport" as it

the Jury instructions, i.e.:

is used in Page
Does defendant

personally transport or deliver guns?

of

to the

court as follows:

to

the

22 of
have

Is (sic)

acceptance of said guns in Massachusetts constitute

transportation,

especially

in

the

phrase

"to

transport into" or "receive"?

After consulting with

told

case,

the jury

that, given

it would not

the parties,

the district

the government's

be enough for the

-15-15-

theory

court

of the

jury to conclude that

the

defendant

"merely

Massachusetts."5

be

guilty if

or

accepted

guns

in

However, the court said that Andrade would

he had

associate" to bring

counsel, in

received

turn,

caused

"an agent,

employee or

the guns into Massachusetts.

objected

to

this

further

other

Andrade's

supplemental

instruction.

The

supplemental charge was legally correct.

law one is

liable as a principal if

At common

one deliberately causes

or procuring another to perform a criminal act, 2 W.R. LaFave

& A.W. Scott, Jr., Substantive Criminal Law

_________________________

6.6(a), at 126

(1986),

and the

forward by

U.S.C.

2(b).

principle has

been carried

Unlike aiding and abetting

2(a), there is no requirement

18

liability, id.
___

that the intermediary be shown

to

be criminally

offense but

without

liable.

a general

any need for

Section 2(b)

principle of

reference in

is not

a separate

liability that

applies

the indictment.

United
______

States v. Sabatino, 943 F.2d 94, 99-100 (1st Cir. 1991).

______
________

Andrade

closing

says

that

arguments

delivering

violated

Fed.

the

R.

instruction

Crim.

P.

30,

after

which

requires that the court rule on requested instructions "prior

to their arguments

to the

jury."

By its terms

and, as

____________________

5In

his

original

already told the

instructions,

the

jury--consistent with the

trial

judge had

indictment--that

the charge against Andrade had as a necessary element that he

had

transported

earlier the
statute

the

judge had

guns

into

Massachusetts.

quoted the statute

makes transportation or
__

in full,

receipt criminal,

However,
and the
if other

conditions are met--which may explain the jury's question.

-16-16-

matter

of

necessity, Rule

instructions

requested by

30

refers

counsel "[a]t

only

the

to rulings

on

close of

the

evidence or at such earlier time" as the court directs.

R. Crim.

procedure

retired.

P. 30.

The

rule

for supplemental

See

simply does

not prescribe

instructions after the

United States v. Fontenot, 14

Fed.

the

jury has

F.3d 1364, 1368

___

_____________

________

(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 966 (1994).

____________

The defense now

allowed to address

says that at least it

the jury on

should have been

this "new theory,"

pointing

out to it that there was no specific evidence that anyone had

transported the guns at Andrade's direction.

refusal

to permit

further

argument

made

supplemental instruction could amount to

We agree that a

necessary

error.

by

But here it

is enough to say that no such request to make further closing

argument

after the supplemental instruction was made in this

case.

Further, the notion

counsel pointed out to the

of prejudice is fanciful.

Defense

jury in her original closing that

there was no direct evidence showing Andrade's transportation

of the guns

the jury that

asked

to Massachusetts.

there was no direct evidence

an "agent, employee

the guns for

It had to be equally clear to

him.

that Andrade had

or other associate"

to transport

To spell out the obvious would have added

nothing.

-17-17-

At the same

to

conclude

that

time, there was enough evidence

somehow
_______

Andrade

had

for a jury

managed

to

get

Mississippi guns to Boston; among much else, Andrade had told

Todd and Smith that he planned to do so, and some of the guns

had

in fact

been recovered

here.

The

government had

obligation to prove the means of transportation.

the supplemental instruction

no

In context,

did little more than

make this

clear to the jury, and properly so.

There is no

attack on the

need to address

in detail Andrade's

trial judge's instructions; taken as

final

a whole,

we do not believe the charge tended to mislead or confuse the

jury.

Although Andrade's

arguments have not

prevailed, we

think it

fair to note

that several of them

and that

Andrade has been

represented on

singular skill and ingenuity.

Affirmed.
________

are substantial

this appeal

with

-18-18-