Image Issues and Machinery Presidential

v
CONTENTS
Acknowledgment
1.
The politics of change in a changeless land

Nathan Gilbert Quimpo and Yuko Kasuya
vii
1
2. After populism: Winning the war for bourgeois

democracy in the Philippines
Mark R. Thompson
22
3. The presidency, political parties and predatory

politics in the Philippines
Nathan Gilbert Quimpo
49
4. Partisanship and reform: The making of a presidential campaign

Joel Rocamora
75
5. Democratic consolidation in the Philippines:
Who supports extra-constitutional government change?
Yuko Kasuya
92
6. Image, issues, and machinery: Presidential campaigns

in post-1986 Philippines
Julio C. Teehankee
117
7. Capacity and compromise: COMELEC, NAMFREL

and election fraud
Cleo Calimbahin
160
8. ICT and reform in electoral administration:

An assessment of Philippine electoral modernization
Masataka Kimura
189
114
Image, issues, and machinery: Presidential

campaigns in post-1986 Philippines
Julio C. Teehankee
Abstract
This paper will explore the political terrain leading to the 2010
presidential election. It seeks to understand the nature of presidential
campaigns in post-authoritarian Philippines. Utilizing survey data,
it will trace trends that reflect continuity and change in Filipino
voting behavior. Moreover, it will apply the analytical tools of political
marketing, such as market segmentation and candidate positioning,
in identifying the key elements that contributed to a successful
presidential campaign in the three most recent electoral cycles.
The paper notes that electoral campaigns in the post-authoritarian
period have been waged with competing narratives of reformism,
populism and clientelism. The tradition of Filipino-style reformist
politics has been revived in the issue-based anti-corruption and good
governance campaigns. Meanwhile, continued clientelism and money
politics have manifested themselves in the machine-based campaigns
that have eroded the gains of reformism. The failure of reform
politics to address the problem of poverty, coupled by the ascendancy
of the mass media, has fueled the image-based populist campaigns.
Ultimately, the rise of media and public opinion polling as influential
conduits between national candidates and the electorate underscores
the need to find the right mix and astute use of image, issues and
machinery.
Image, issue, and machinery: Presidential campaigns in post-1986 Philippines
115
Three presidential elections have been held in the Philippines

since the restoration of democratic rule in 1986. The elections
of 1992 and 1998 have demonstrated the efficacy of a smooth and
legitimate transition of power while the experience of 2004 exposed
the corroding effects of a stolen election. The 2010 presidential
election offers an institutional mechanism for addressing the crisis of
legitimation triggered by the presidency of Gloria Macapagal Arroyo.
While the familiar elements of 1992, 1998, and 2004 are evident
in the upcoming 2010 campaign, new factors are coming into play.
Consequently, the outcome of the 2010 presidential election is
crucial for political change since the effects a president has on the
benefits enjoyed by the citizenry go far beyond policies: a president
provides moral and social cues to the country . . . elections integrate
the country and provide the common symbols which inform public
discourse (Popkin, 1991: 3). Ultimately, how a presidential candidate
wages a campaign, gives some cue to how a president will govern
after victory. And in most instances, an effective president is one who
has projected an effective image of himself [or herself]. (Philippine
Center for Investigative Journalism, 2004: 5)
This paper is an exposition on the nature of presidential
campaigns in the post-Marcos political period. It seeks to provide a
historical review of Filipino voting behavior since 1992 and analyze
the trends that reflect continuity and change in Philippine presidential
elections. The paper will identify the key elements that contributed
to a successful presidential campaign in the three most recent
presidential electoral cycles. Moreover, it also aims to provide a brief
backgrounder for the coming 2010 presidential election.
Presidential campaigns in the Philippines
Despite the growth in the literature on Philippine electoral studies
through the years, only a handful of works have focused specifically
on a scholarly analysis of Filipino voting behavior in presidential
elections. Thus far, only three significant studies have been written
116
on this area in the past 40 years: Hirofumi Andos statistical study of

voting patterns in pre-martial law presidential elections published in
1969; Carl Landes geographical and statistical analysis of the 1992
presidential election published in 1996; and more recently, Yuko
Kasuyas groundbreaking work, published in 2009, on the unstable
effects of single-term presidential elections on the post-authoritarian
Filipino party system.1 This paper would like to contribute to the scant
study of Filipino voting behavior by providing a review of presidential
campaigns in the post-authoritarian period from the perspective of
political marketing. It will draw extensively from data culled by Landes
1996 study; the comprehensive survey data compiled by the Social
Weather Stations (SWS) since 1992, and Pulse Asia since 2004.
The marketing of the president
Political marketing offers a more pragmatic framework for thinking
about electoral campaigns that contrasts with the explanatory and
scientific intent of the traditional academic approach to analyzing
political campaigns (Mauser, 1983: 2). The application of marketing
principles in politics allow for the use of standard marketing tools and
strategies, such as polling research, market segmentation, targeting,
positioning, strategy development and implementation. From this
perspective, the voter can be analyzed as a consumer in the political
marketplace using the same models and theories in marketing that are
used to study consumers in the commercial marketplace. And both are
1
Andos study analyzed the pattern of Filipino voting in presidential and senatorial elections from
1946 to 1965. He utilized three main independent variables in explaining partisan voting: party
of the 1992 election with 37 demographic variables of the Philippine census. Similar to Andos
117
dealing in competitive marketplaces and, as such, need to rely on

similar approaches to winning (but each may have several distinct
options) (Newman, 1994: 11).
In political marketing terms, there are two crucial factors in
winning votes in an election (see Figure 1). The first is the push
factor or the organization that will deliver the votes to a particular
candidate. The other is the pull factor or the characteristics that will
attract voters to a candidate. The former is geared towards command
votes, while the latter is aimed at attracting market votes. In applying
these basic marketing principles to political campaigns,
the exchange process centers on a candidate who offers political leadership in
exchange for a vote from the citizen. The product in politics is the campaign
image is created by the use of visual impressions that are communicated by the
Candidate
Pull Factor
Push Factor
Figure 1: Pull and Push Factors in Elections
The increased use of political marketing techniques coincides

with the increasing dominance of media, particularly television,
and the growing influence of political consultants in electoral
campaigns around the world. There is a growing trend towards the
118
hybridization of campaign practices in media-centered democracies,

or a combination of modern media-centered campaign practices
with traditional organization-based mobilization strategies, relying on
networks of supporters and activists (Plasser & Plasser, 2002: 349).
This trend in global political campaigning is also evident in Philippine
electoral politics, which continues to operate according to its own
unique traditional dynamics despite the growing influence of mediadriven campaigns (see Figure 2.)
Command votes, bailiwicks and machineries
In Philippine elections, command votes are blocs of votes that are
gathered and delivered through traditional networks such as political
machines and bailiwicks, usually negotiated through leaders and
gatekeepers.2 Bailiwicks (baluarte) refer to the candidates natural
sphere of influence, commonly determined by his or her ethno-linguistic,
regional or provincial attachments. The ethno-linguistic vote, as
demonstrated in the past two presidential elections, is the most secure
source of votes for a national candidate. Hence, a national candidate
must immediately factor it in his or her electoral calculations.
The standard approach to analyzing Filipino electoral and party politics has been to view power
reciprocal relationship between leader and followers has become contractual in nature. The potency
119
Electorate
Comm and Votes
Bail iwick
Mach ine
Money
Party
Market Votes
Popularity
Gov ernment
Image
Issue
Political machines are specialized organizations set up for the

purpose of mobilizing and influencing voter outcome through the
dispensation of social, economic or material benefits. These benefits
are essentially patronage in the form of jobs, services, favors and
money distributed to voters and supporters. There are essentially
three types of political machines in the Philippines money-based
(organized largely through the use of money), party-based (organized
around local and national political leaders and gatekeepers), and
government-based (organized primarily through access to government
personnel and resources). These three are oftentimes structured on
top of each other.
Market votes, image and issues
Market votes are votes that have to be identified, targeted and
attracted from various segments of the electorate. Similar to the
market, the dominant brand is the most popular one. Hence, market
votes are translated into political support by way of popularity that
is gauged and reflected in regular public opinion surveys. There are
essentially two factors that will draw or repel market votes to a
candidate image and issues. Image is the general perception by the
120
electorate of a particular candidate (whether positive or negative). On

the other hand, issues are the major concerns of the electorate that they
hope the candidates will address when elected into public office.
Candidates usually attempt to address these concerns through their
campaign message and platform. Again, similar to market competition,
candidates have to distinguish themselves from others by projecting
an ideal image and articulating the proper issue or issues in the hope
of gaining popularity in the surveys. Competition among candidates
to capture large chunks of the market vote is usually waged through
the mass media both print and broadcast. Moreover, politics is no
longer just addition. In the age of mass media, politics is image-making.
Amplified by television and advertising, a politicians image in the
publics collective mind is greater than the sum of his actual attributes,
assets and accomplishment (Philippine Center for Investigative
Journalism, 2004: 5). Candidate images are cognitive representations
and, to a considerable extent, peoples image of things [that] rules the
way they behave, regardless of how close to reality their images are
(Laylo & Dayag-Laylo, 1999: 3).
The Institute for Political and Economic Reforms (IPER) conducted
two psychographic studies that profiled the voting behavior of the
Filipino electorate in 1995 and 2003. In 1995, the top four factors
for voters choice were: 1) popularity, 2) endorsement of traditional
network and organization, 3) characteristics that can be of benefit to
the voter, and 4) party program. By 2003, the ranking of the factors had
significantly changed into: 1) the benefit factor, 2) political machinery, 3)
popularity, and 4) endorsement of traditional network and organization
(cited in Co et al., 2005).
The decision to mobilize either command or market votes relies
largely on a myriad of factors that include political opportunity,
personal attributes and/or resources available to individual candidates
or political parties. The identification of image, issues and machinery
in this paper refers to the predominant electoral strategy waged by a
presidential campaign. Of course, these categories are not absolute
121
and may actually overlap into mixed strategies in actual presidential

campaigns.
Ascendancy of media
Given the physical, financial and logistical impossibility of
personally facing the electorate in a national campaign, media has
emerged as the most efficient and cost-effective way of communicating
with the public. Broadcast media (radio and television) has emerged as
the primary source of news and information for the public. Broadcast
media, with an audience reach in the millions, has supplanted print
media, which is circulated in the hundreds of thousands. However,
while broadcast media has the most audience reach, it tends to
have less substance since everything is reduced into a two- or threesentence sound byte. On the other hand, print media offers much
space for elaborate explanations (Carandang, 2004).
Within broadcast media, television has replaced radio as the
source of information for the masses. This trend has been manifested
since the late 1980s when television sets were sold by the hundreds
of thousands. Programming and language shifted from English to
Tagalog to reach the mass audience. By 1995, some 57 percent of
households nationwide had TV sets. This figure has risen to 85 percent,
as of 2001 (Coronel, 2003). In 2001, a 13-year old law banning political
advertising was lifted, thus opening the floodgates of media-related
expenditures for political campaigns. The 2004 elections marked the
first time that presidential candidates spent more than half of their
total campaign expenses on advertising (Gloria et al., 2004: 30) (see
Table 1).
122
Table 1: Commercial and Political Ads from January to May 2004

(in million pesos)
TV
Radio
Print
Total
Nonpolitical Ads
2,216.25
2,016.55
598.17
4,830.97
Political Ads
1,405.67
530.07
53.66
1,989.40
Source: Gloria et al., 2004
The media has eroded the vote-delivery potential of the political

machinery. Traditionally, a well-oiled machinery was relied upon to
deliver 75 percent of a candidates vote. The other 25 percent was
delivered by provincial sorties, posters and propaganda materials.
Presently, this equation has been altered with media accounting for
approximately more than 50 percent of a candidates votes. Hence,
the communications group composed of image strategists, pollsters,
advertising specialists and media relations experts have become an
integral and important component of any presidential campaign (Gloria
et al., 2004). The advantage of the incumbent is reflected by the budget
that is made available for media advertisement. In 2004, government
spent a total of P6.1 billion on advertisements for a period of five months
prior to the elections (see Table 2).
Table 2: Government Ads in 2004 (January to May)

Government Ads
P1.4 billion
Social Concern Ads
P2.8 billion
Political Ads
P1.9 billion
123
The 1992 presidential election

The 1992 election was the first democratic election for the
presidency since 1969. It was also the first to be held after the 1986
transition from authoritarianism to democracy. There were seven
contenders: Fidel Ramos, Miriam Defensor Santiago, Eduardo
Cojuangco, Ramon Mitra, Imelda Marcos, Jovito Salonga and Salvador
Laurel. Of these seven, only four were considered serious contenders.
Former Defense Secretary Fidel Ramos won with 23.6 percent of
the national vote (see Table 3). Former Agrarian Reform Secretary
Miriam Defensor Santiago placed second with 19.7 percent, close
Marcos associate Eduardo Cojuangco placed third with 18.2 percent,
and House Speaker Ramon Mitra placed fourth with 15 percent of the
presidential vote.
Table 3: Results of 1992 Election
Candidate
Party
Votes
5,342,521
23.6
Fidel V. Ramos
Lakas NUCD
Miriam Defensor
Santiago
Peoples Reform Party
4,468,173
19.7
Eduardo Cojuangco
Nationalist Peoples
Coalition
4,116,376
18.2
Ramon Mitra
Laban ng Demokratikong
Pilipino
3,316,661
14.6
Imelda Romualdez
Marcos
Kilusang Bagong Lipunan
2,338,294
10.3
Jovito Salonga
Liberal Party
2,302,124
10.2
Salvador H. Laurel
Nacionalista Party
770,046
3.4
Source: Commission on Elections, 1992
124
Reformism and issue-based campaigns

Ramos consistently topped the Social Weather Stations (SWS)
surveys from July 1991 to early February 1992 (see Table 4). His closest
rival, Miriam Defensor Santiago, only caught up with him in April 1992,
but her lead was not statistically significant. Ramos support was evenly
distributed by age, class, education and location (Mangahas, 1994). He
also capitalized on his role in the 1986 People Power revolution and
his staunch defense of the Aquino administration from seven coup
attempts. Consistent with this image, he encapsulated his campaign
message into the slogan peoples empowerment.
Table 4: SWS National Surveys: July 1991 April 1992
July 1991
1
2
3-4
Ramos
Salonga
Estrada
&
Santiago
5
Laurel
6-7
Mitra &
Pimentel
8 Cojuangco
November 1991
1
2-3
4
5
6
7-8
Ramos
Estrada &
Santiago
Salonga
Mitra
Laurel
Fernan &
Cojuangco
February 1992
1
2
3-4
5
6
7
8
Ramos
Santiago
Mitra &
Estrada
Cojuangco
Marcos
Salonga
Laurel
Undecided 17%
April 1992
1-2 Santiago &
Ramos
3 Cojuangco
4-6
Mitra &
Salonga
7
Laurel
Undecided
26%
Note: SWS utilized several survey techniques, hence only the rankings can be
compared.
Source: Posadas & Sandoval, 1992
Santiago waged a single-issue campaign against corruption and

captured the support of the youth through her unusual image. She
also won the support of the middle class, educated and urban voters
(Mangahas, 1994). Her image was the antithesis of Cory Aquinos. While
Cory was pensive, dignified and passive, Miriam was shrill, acerbic and
aggressive. This image, however, was used by her opponents to portray
her as unstable and possibly disturbed.
125
Notwithstanding his national prominence as House Speaker, Mitra

did not rate well in the SWS surveys. He ranked between 6th to 7th in
July 1991, 5th place in November 1991, between 3rd and 4th in February
1992, and between 4th and 6th in April 1992. Ironically, his main power
base the speakership of the lower house was also his greatest
liability. The position reinforced his image as a traditional politician
or trapo. The public had an adverse perception of the House of
Representatives because of a number of scandals that involved its
members. The Speaker himself was implicated in the misuse of the
House printing facilities to support his presidential campaign (Lande,
1996).
Businessman Eduardo Cojuangco languished at the tail end
of the surveys but managed to rise from 8th place in July 1991 to
between 7th and 8th place in November 1991, to 5th place in February
1992, and finally landing oin 3rd place in April 1992. While his image
handlers highlighted his alleged business acumen, he was hounded
by his close association with the ousted dictator and his role in the
controversial coconut levy imposed on coconut farmers by the Marcos
administration. With such an image, his over-all negatives outweighed
his positives.
Rise of the machines
Speaker Ramon Mitra Jr. had the most organized party machinery
the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP). On the eve of the 1992
elections, the LDP boasted that it had the support of 150 out of 200
congressmen, 50 out of 73 governors, 35 out of 60 city mayors, 1,100
out of 1,532 municipal mayors and 70 percent of barangay officials
(De Castro, 1992). In addition, Mitra was publicly endorsed by the
influential Roman Catholic Archbishop, Jaime Cardinal Sin.
On the other hand, Eduardo Cojuangco attempted to replicate
the national pyramidical political machinery of Ferdinand Marcos
by designating a loyal deputy (postes) in every geographical region.
In addition, he utilized his vast financial resources to set up his
126
party machinery. However, he was outspent by Ramos at the tail end

of the campaign. Some of the postes, particularly in Northwestern,
Northeastern and Central Luzon, were effective in delivering the bulk
of Cojuangcos votes (Lande, 1996). Iglesia ni Cristo (INC) Bishop
Erao Manalo endorsed his candidacy.3 Except for his home province
of Tarlac, Cojuangco did not benefit much from Tagalog-speaking
provinces. He, however, drew much support from the Ilocano-speaking
provinces, given his close association with former President Marcos.
His combined support from Ilocano and Tagalog provinces was greater,
on the average, than the support he received in provinces dominated by
other language groups (Lande, 1996) (see Appendix 1).
Unlike the other presidential candidates, Mitra did not have a large
linguistic-regional base of his own; he got his strongest support from
the thinly-populated island and frontier provinces (Siquijor, Camiguin,
Sulu, Tawi-Tawi and Romblon) that resemble his native Palawan, and
the thinly-populated highlands (Cordillera region) where he grew up
(Lande, 1996). He got additional votes from the populous Cebuanospeaking Central Visayan provinces, the home of his vice-presidential
running-mate former Chief Justice Marcelo Fernan. This advantage,
however, was limited because of the equally strong support given by the
region to Ramos vice presidentvice-presidential running-mate, Cebu
Governor Lito Osmea (Lande, 1996).
Ramos, a non-politician, entered and lost the Laban ng
Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) primaries to Mitra. He then organized
his own political party, the Lakas NUCD, and won the endorsement of
President Aquino. This endorsement translated to access to government
resources through the extra-legal pre-election release of between P600
million to P1.5 billion National Aid to Local Government Units (NALGU)
funds to localities whose leaders campaigned for Ramos (Lande, 1996).
In addition, the LDP charged that portions of an estimated P100 million
3
127
fund for the Rebel Returnee Program were distributed to local officials
supportive of the Ramos campaign (Balgos, 1998).
Ramos, a protestant and only the second non-Catholic to seek
the presidency, secured the endorsement of two tightly-knit religious
organizations the El Shaddai of Brother Mike Velarde and Jesus is
Lord of Brother Eddie Villanueva. In terms of regional strength, he
got the bulk of his support from the countrys most heavily populated
regions: Central Luzon and the Cebuano-speaking areas of the Visayas
and Mindanao. In addition, he was exceptionally strong in two
provinces with very large populations, Pangasinan and Cebu (Lande,
1996) (see Appendix 1).
Santiago did not have a political machinery to support her
candidacy. Her Peoples Reform Party had no congressional or local
candidates and it had only a partial senatorial slate, which included
five retired generals. It was only in the latter part of the campaign
that she was able to convince Ramon Magsaysay Jr. to be her vicepresidential running-mate. What she lacked in traditional political
machinery, she made up for with a non-traditional campaign powered
largely by unpaid volunteers, made up of students and civic leaders
(Lande, 1996).
Santiago won in two of the countrys most densely populated
regions: the National Capital Region and its surrounding semiurban provinces, and Western Visayas, particularly vote-rich Negros
Occidental and Iloilo (Lande, 1996). While she topped most media and
campus surveys, the SWS surveys from July 1991 to early February
1992 had her running second to Ramos. By April 1992, she was able
to overtake Ramos, but her lead was not statistically significant
(Mangahas, 1994).
Keys to success
In 1992, Ramos consistently topped the surveys, articulated the
proper issue (peoples empowerment) consistent with his image
as one of the EDSA heroes, and had government resources at his
128
disposal to by-pass the traditional party machinery. The phenomenal

performance of Santiago revealed the potential of cultivating the right
image and articulating hot-button issues in attracting the market votes.
However, her campaign suffered from a lack of machinery to protect
her votes.
The tight competition between Ramos and Santiago served to
highlight the important role of ethno-linguistic bailiwicks in a close
election. Nearly ten percent of Ramoss total tally came from his native
Pangasinan, while the bulk of Santiagos votes came from the Ilonggospeaking provinces. Hence, in a close election, the margin could be
swung according to regional and linguistic bases (Coronel, 2003) (see
Appendix 1).
An issue-focused campaign without the corresponding positive
image and credible machinery can also prove to be disastrous. Jovito
Salonga articulated nationalist and progressive issues and was favored
by a segment of the educated middle class but he suffered from an
image problem due to his age. Both Mitra and Cojuangco relied on their
respective machineries to deliver command votes: Mitras machine was
largely party-based, while Cojuangcos was money-based. The two,
however, suffered from extremely negative images: Cojuangco as the
Marcos crony, and Mitra the trapo.
Command Votes
Mo ney
Party
Market V otes
Gover nment
Im age
Ramos
Issue s
Santiago
Mitra
Salonga
Cojuangco
Figure 3: 1992 Candidate Positioning
129

The second presidential election saw an unprecedented number
of presidential candidates in Philippine political history (see Table 5).
The eleven candidates who competed for the presidency included:
Speaker Jose de Venecia Jr., Vice-President Joseph Estrada, Senator
Raul Roco, former Cebu Governor Lito Osmea, Manila Mayor Alfredo
Lim, Defense Secretary Renato de Villa, Senator Miriam Defensor
Santiago, Senator Juan Ponce Enrile, Santiago Dumlao and Manuel
Morato. Out of this number, there was one frontrunner and three
serious challengers.
Table 5: Results of 1998 Election
Presidential Candidate
Party
Votes
10,722,295
39.9
Lakas NUCDUMDP
4,268,483
15.9
Raul S. Roco
Aksyon
Demokratiko
3,720,212
13.8
Emilio R. Osmea
PROMDI
3,347,631
12.4
Alfredo S. Lim
LP
2,344,362
8.7
Renato S. de Villa
Reporma-LM
1,308,352
4.9
Miriam Defensor Santiago
PRP
797,206
3.0
Juan Ponce Enrile
Independent
343,139
1.3
Santiago F. Dumlao
KPP
32,212
0.1
Manuel L. Morato
Partido ng
Bansang
Marangal
18,644
0.1
Joseph E. Estrada
LAMMP
Jose C. de Venecia Jr.
Vice-President Joseph Estrada won the presidency with 39.9

percent of the vote. House Speaker Jose de Venecia placed second
130
with 15.9 percent ; Senator Raul Roco was on third place with 13.8
percent ; and Emilio Lito Osmea placed fourth with 11 percent of
the national vote.
Populist onslaught
Estradas popularity was formidable; his support from the masa
was solid. His popularity compensated for the relative handicap of
his LAMMP coalition vis--vis the administration Lakas party. Estrada
dominated the SWS surveys throughout the campaign period. From
January to May 1998, he did not relinquish the top position in the
opinion polls (see Table 6). Although rejected by a small but significant
ABC or middle-to-upper classes, Estrada nevertheless won as a result
of mass support from the D and E classes the so-called masa vote.
The 1998 election was the first time that the masa came out solidly
behind a single candidate. Estrada captured 38 percent of the class D
and 48 percent of the class E votes (Mangahas, 1998).
The Estrada campaign will be remembered for one of the most
successful campaign slogans in the history of Philippine presidential
campaigns Erap para sa mahirap (Erap for the poor). The slogan did
not only capture the core message and issue of the Estrada campaign,
it was also in synch with his image as an idol of the masses. He won
the endorsement of the Iglesia ni Cristo, and SWS exit polls indicated
that 81 percent of INC members voted solidly for him. Estada was
also endorsed by El Shaddai; however, only 39 percent of its members
actually voted for him (Mangahas, 1998) (see Appendix 4).
Estrada was subjected to a barrage of negative attacks revolving
around his character and competence. His opponents raised the issue
of morality, particularly regarding his mistresses, his drinking sprees
and gambling habit. His lack of advanced education was also used to
cast doubt on his competence. While these allegations had some basis
in fact, his popularity did not wane. His media strategists even used the
Erap jokes that were circulating to further endear him to the masses.
131
Table 6: SWS National Surveys: January 1998-May 1998

Sep
96
Dec
96
Apr
97
Sep
97
Jan
98
Feb
98
Mar
98
Apr
98
May
98
19
17
23
19
28
28
28
30
33
De Venecia
11
12
14
12
15
Roco
10
11
10
11
Osmea
17
13
13
11
Lim
14
14
14
13
10
De Villa
0.5
Arroyo
14
17
22
19
Enrile
0.9
Santiago
18
14
13
13
Marcos
0.3
Dumlao
0.1
0.4
0.3
0.3
Morato
0.6
0.9
0.2
0.2
Undecided
14
10
Estrada
Source: Mangahas, 1998
De Venecia struggled to catch up with Estradas popularity but he

only placed fourth in January and February; tied for second place with
Alfredo Lim in March; fell to third place in April, and regained second
place in May. On the eve of the elections, he was behind Estrada by 18
percentage points, or roughly 4.5 million votes. Like Mitra in 1992, de
Venecia suffered from a negative trapo image reinforced by his role
as House Speaker.
Roco was popular among women voters and the youth, but he
was eventually outdone by Estrada, even among these sectors. Hence,
socioeconomic class, age and gender did not matter much in the 1998
132
elections (Mangahas, 1998) (see Appendix 5). Brilliant and articulate,

Roco initially projected himself as an incarnation of Ninoy Aquino. He
was adept at discussing and debating policy issues, but was oftentimes
perceived as flowery in delivery and too esoteric for the layperson.
In terms of popularity, as reflected in the SWS surveys, Osmea
consistently placed a far second to Estrada in the early part of the
campaign period. He fared well in the surveys with strong name
recognition his family has been active in local and national politics
since the American colonial period. His grandfather, Sergio Sr., had
been a president of the Republic; his uncle, Sergio Jr., had been a
senator and a presidential candidate; his estranged brother, Sonny,
was a long-time senator; his cousin, Sergio III, was also a senator;
and another cousin, Tomas, was mayor of Cebu. On top of his strong
regional backing and wide name recognition, Osmea ran a single-issue
campaign that resonated with the electorate. His advocacy of greater
decentralization for local government units was a popular issue in the
Visayas and Mindanao where the electorate have strong animosity
against the dominant centralism of Imperial Manila (see Appendix
2).
Splintering the reformist votes
Estradas machinery was provided largely by the Laban ng
Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP), which coalesced with the Nationalist
Peoples Coalition (NPC), and his own party Partido ng Masang
Pilipino (PMP). The coalition Laban ng Makabayang Masang Pilipino
(LAMMP) served to supplement his popularity with the electorate.
Estradas bailiwick was concentrated in the Tagalog-speaking provinces
of Laguna, Cavite, Rizal, Quezon and Bulacan. Regionally, he was strong
in Regions 1 and 2 (Ilocos and Cagayan Valley), Region 3 (Central Luzon),
Region 4 (Southern Tagalog), Region 8 (Eastern Visayas), Regions 9 and
12 (Western and Central Mindanao), Region 10 (Northern Mindanao) and
Region 11 (Southern Mindanao) (Laquian, 1998). In spite of the fact that
he came from San Juan, a small municipality in Metro Manila, Estrada
133
enjoyed wide margins throughout the country. He even encroached

on the regional bailiwicks of his rivals (Coronel, 2003).
De Venecia had the advantage of money and machinery built around
the administration party, Lakas NUCD-UMDP, whose membership
included majority of the congressmen, governors, mayors and local
officials in the country. He also won the endorsement of President
Ramos after a grueling competition with Defense Secretary Renato de
Villa in the Lakas primaries. Soon after, he was endorsed by the Jesus
is Lord of Brother Eddie Villanueva and the Jesus Miracle Crusade of
Brother Wilde Almeda (see Appendix 3). The main base of support for
de Venecia was his home province vote-rich Pangasinan. He was
also particularly strong in Northern Luzon (see Appendix 2).
Roco placed third despite a lack of money and machinery. Like
Santiago in 1992, he ran an alternative grassroots campaign anchored
on the miniscule party he founded Aksyon Demokratiko. Aside from
an unknown vice-presidential candidate, Inday Santiago, his party did
not field a national or local slate of candidates. Rocos votes came
primarily from his bailiwick the Bicol Region. He also performed
strongly in the National Capital Region (see Appendix 2). Roco
dominated the votes among the ABC classes but fared poorly among
the D and E (see Appendix 4).
Osmea ran for president under his own provincial-based party
the Probinsya Muna Development Initiative (PROMDI). He got the
most number of votes in Cebu, where he had served as governor. He
also did well in the nearby Cebuano-speaking areas in the Visayas
and Mindanao where he repeated his strong performance in 1992 as
a vice-presidential candidate. His campaign reflected the continued
potency of ethno-linguistic ties as the most dependable source of
command votes in a national election.
Keys to success
In 1998, Estradas popularity as an actor was reinforced by his
core message (Erap para sa Mahirap), his single-issue campaign,
134
which was consistent with his image, and his machinery that was largely
provided by the LDP and NPC. He managed to secure his frontrunner
position throughout the campaign, which projected invincibility and
resulted in a bandwagon effect. De Venecia had the advantage of
having a well-financed party machinery in the form of the monolithic
administration party Lakas NUCD-UMDP, and the endorsement of
President Ramos which translated into access to government resources.
However, like Mitra in 1992, he was very unpopular and suffered from a
negative trapo image.
Command Votes
Mo ney
Gover nment
De Venecia
Market V otes
Party
Im age
Issues
Estrada
Roco
Osme a
Lim
De Villa
Figure 4: 1998 Candidate Positioning
Roco ran a strong alternative grassroots campaign and captured a

portion of the market votes, particularly among the middle class, youth
and women. But as in the Miriam phenomenon in 1992, his lack of
machinery weighed down his chances of winning the election. Osmeas
campaign revealed the continuing potency of ethno-linguistic ties as
the most dependable source of command votes in a national election.
This was also evident in the strong support from regional bailiwicks
received by de Venecia from Pangasinan and Roco from Bicol. However,
Estradas encroachment in his rivals bailiwicks revealed that class
135
loyalties could overcome regional and linguistic ones (Coronel, 2003:

10).
In 2004, after a tumultuous three-and-a-half years of completing
the unfinished term of ousted President Joseph Estrada, President
Gloria Macapagal Arroyo sought her own electoral mandate.
Notwithstanding her earlier promise not to seek election, she was
determined to win a full six-year term. Her candidacy served as
a referendum on her administrations achievements and failures.
There were six candidates for the 2004 presidential elections, namely
President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, film legend Fernando Poe Jr.,
former Education Secretary Raul Roco, Senator Panfilo Lacson,
Brother Eddie Villanueva and Eddie Gil. Of the six candidates,
two were serious frontrunners, three were spoilers, and one was a
nuisance candidate. The incumbent won by a margin of 3.4 percent of
the total votes cast or an equivalent of 1,123,576 votes (see Table 7).
Table 7: Results of the 2004 Presidential Election
Candidate
Party
Votes
12,905,808
39.9
11,782,232
36.5
Independent
3,510,762
10.9
Raul Roco
Alyansa ng Pag-asa
2,082,762
6.4
Eduardo Villanueva
Bangon
1,988,218
6.2
32,269,782
100
Gloria Macapagal Arroyo
K4
Fernando Poe Jr.
KNP
Panfilo Lacson
Total
Power of the incumbent

The last time that an incumbent president was re-elected in the
Philippines was in 1969 when Ferdinand Marcos defeated Sergio
136
Osmea Jr. It would also be the last democratically-held presidential

election in the Third Philippine Republic. Marcoss attempt to force
an electoral mandate in the 1986 snap presidential election unleashed
the first people power uprising. The 2004 election was only the third
time in Philippine political history that a former vice-president who
completed an unfinished term of a predecessor, sought a full mandate
as president. The first time was the controversial victory of Elpidio
Quirino in the 1949 presidential election that nearly resulted in an
uprising by disgruntled followers of defeated candidate Jose P. Laurel
Sr. In 1953, Quirinos blatant attempt at re-election was thwarted by
a reformist-populist candidate, Ramon Magsaysay (Hedman & Sidel,
2000).
Since she assumed office after EDSA 2, President Arroyo has
suffered from an image problem that did not disappear after several
image makeovers. Consequently, she campaigned against herself on
issues like the vows she broke, the promises she has yet to fulfill, her
flip-flops that need more explaining, and her husband that many say has
been her heaviest political baggage (Paez, 2004: 26).
The President relied on three parallel machineries to carry her to
victory. The first was the government bureaucracy, an advantage of
incumbency. The second was her party machinery composed of the
ruling Lakas-Christian Muslim Democrats (Lakas-CMD), in coalition
with the Liberal Party, a faction of the Nationalist Peoples Coalition and
the miniscule Peoples Reform Party. The third was a network of parallel
support groups organized under the control of the First Gentleman Jose
Miguel Arroyo, the presidents brother Diosdado Macapagal Jr., and the
seasoned political operator Ronaldo Puno.
Lakas stalwarts and strategists had learned the lessons of the failed
1998 bid of Speaker de Venecia. Despite the advantage of governmentbased and party-based machineries, great efforts were made to
organize parallel campaign organizations, in case the party machinery
failed again. In addition, the President was a hardworking and driven
campaigner. She was a veteran of three grueling national elections:
137
two for the senate and one for vice president. She got the highest
number of votes on her second run for the senate in 1995, and when
she won the vice presidency in 1998. Aside from Pampanga, she also
counted Bacolod, Negros Occidental (her husbands province) and
Iligan, Lanao del Norte (her mothers province) as her bailiwicks. In
successive SWS surveys, she consistently scored high in the Visayas,
where she outranked Fernando Poe Jr. She eventually consolidated
her ethno-linguistic base (i.e. Cebuano and Ilonggo) in the Visayas
and Mindanao to counter Poes dominance in Luzon (see Appendix
6).
In terms of presidential preference, Arroyo consistently trailed
behind other candidates. Before her October 2003 announcement
that she would seek election, she consistently trailed behind Senators
Noli de Castro and Raul Roco, except in June of the same year when
she placed first with 20 percentage points in the SWS survey. Her
numbers did not pick up after her October announcement. It was only
in January 2004 that she overtook Roco with 27 percentage points,
and placed second to Fernando Poe Jr. She benefited largely from
the decision of survey frontrunner Noli de Castro to withdraw and
become her vice-presidential candidate. By February 2004, she had
become competitive, rising two percentage points and narrowing her
margin with Poe in the SWS survey (see Table 8).
138
Table 8: SWS National Surveys: August 2003 May 2004

Dec May - Jun
02 Jun 03 03
Aug
03
Sep
03
Nov
03
Jan
04
Jan
- Feb
04
Feb
04
Mar
04
Mar
04
Apr
04
May
04
Arroyo
13
15
20
16
17
17
26.5
28.7
31.8
32.9
31.4
35.3
37
Poe
21
16
15
12
14
25
36.3 37.5
30.5
34.9 32.0
30.8
30
Roco
24
19
19
18
20
18
19.2
17.4
17.9
13.1
15.0
8.4
Lacson
12
11
11
10
10
11.5
8.4
11.4
11.5
11.2
10.6
11
De Castro
19
22
18
20
28
24
Villanueva
1.0
1.7
1.8
2.4
2.8
4.0
Gil
0.1
0.2
0.03
0.5
0.05
0.3
Others
12
10
15
15
Undecided
5.4
6.1
6.6
4.6
7.6
10.9
12
Source: Social Weather Stations, 2004
She managed a statistical tie with Poe in the Pulse Asia and SWS
surveys in that period of time. Compared with Poe, Arroyo gradually
consolidated her hold on the ABC class and made inroads in the D class
(see Table 9 and Appendix 8).
139
Table 9: Pulse Asia Voter Preference by Socioeconomic Class, in Percent

Candidate/
Sector
Nov 03
(1,200)
Jan 04
(1,800)
Feb 04
(1,800)
Mar 04
(4,800)
Apr 04
(1,800)
Arroyo, G.M.
ABC
D
E
21
27
32
28
36
30
33
33
29
32
34
32
33
39
35
Poe, F. Jr.
ABC
D
E
15
27
32
25
33
43
23
30
39
22
27
41
18
28
41
Lacson, P.
ABC
D
E
17
12
10
14
8
8
14
11
10
13
11
6
19
12
7
Roco, R
ABC
D
E
41
32
24
25
20
16
17
17
13
19
13
10
12
7
5
4
1
1
2
1
2
4
4
3
7
6
2
6
2
2
5
3
3
11
8
7
6
12
8
1
7
8
Villanueva,
E.
ABC
D
E
Undecided/
None/NR
ABC
D
E
Populism falters
After 282 movies and 48 years as the undisputed box-office king
of Philippine cinema, Fernando Poe Jr. (popularly known as FPJ)
performed the greatest role of his life by running for the presidency
and following in the footsteps of his best friend, Joseph Estrada.
His candidacy was borne out of the efforts of several sectoral and
140
volunteer groups that urged him to run. His main political vehicle was
the hastily-formed coalition the Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino
(KNP) composed of the LDP, Partido Demokratikong Pilipino-Lakas
ng Bayan (PDP-Laban), and the Pwersa ng Masang Pilipino (PMP).
FPJs electoral strength was both regional and class-based. In
Luzon, FPJ relied on his home province of Pangasinan as his major
bailiwick. He was also particularly strong in Mindanao where he had
a strong following among the Muslim communities. His campaign
hoped to capture the class D and E votes that delivered the presidency
to Estrada in 1998. FPJs survey numbers surged initially despite his
late declaration to run for the presidency. However, a series of negative
news stories about him, including a disqualification case filed at the
Supreme Court, succeeded in halting his upward momentum. Moreover,
FPJs refusal to articulate his platform or participate in debates fatally
impaired his candidacy. His public appearances were limited to smiling,
waving and saluting to the crowd, and his speeches were limited to oneliners, which were often taken from his movies.
Despite the huge number of fans who attended his campaign
sorties, the failure of FPJ to mount an insurmountable lead in the
presidential surveys prevented most local politicians from endorsing
his candidacy and discouraged political financiers from infusing funds
into his campaign. In the end, he lost his hold on his core demographic
base the class D and E votes. Ironically, he captured the youth vote,
but majority of the older voters supported Arroyo (see Appendix 9).
His campaign was also saddled by internal bickering among the
parties and organizations within the opposition coalition. His failure
to unite with recalcitrant opposition candidate Panfilo Lacson further
weakened the political opposition, weighed down his campaign
message of national unity and resulted in the withdrawal of support
of the influential Iglesia ni Cristo. In the end, the opposition failed to
provide the political vehicle for the charismatic Poe.
Unlike President Estradas Laban ng Makabayang Masang Pilipino
(LAMMP) coalition in 1998, which managed to assemble the requisite
141
political machinery to convert popularity into votes and have them

counted, the KNP, Poes coalition in 2004, fielded only 26 candidates
out of 211 seats (12 percent) for the House of Representatives
and eight candidates for 76 (10 percent) provincial governor seats
(Doronila, 2004).
Keys to Success
Despite serious charges raised by the opposition regarding
the conduct and outcome of the 2004 presidential election, Gloria
Macapagal Arroyo managed to claim a new mandate and was
proclaimed victorious by Congress. On March 29, 2005, the Supreme
Court, sitting as the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET), dismissed
the election protest filed by defeated opposition candidate Fernando
Poe Jr. on the ground that no real party in interest has come forward
within the period allowed by law, to intervene in this case or be
substituted for the deceased protestant (Clapano, 2005). Poe had
died from a stroke on December 14, 2004, with the resolution of his
election protest still pending. The PET dismissed the request of his
widow, Susan Roces, to substitute for her deceased husband since
the rules allowed only the registered candidates who obtained the
second and third highest votes for the presidency to file an election
protest.
The victory of President Arroyo and her running mate, Senator
Noli de Castro, was the first time a presidential and vice-presidential
ticket was not split in the three elections since 1992. The immensely
popular former television newscaster and senator, Noli de Castro,
defeated equally popular fellow newscaster and senator, Loren
Legarda. De Castro, whose name was earlier floated as a presidential
contender, contributed much to the victory of Arroyo in terms of vote
transferability, as the administrations internal survey indicated that
an estimated 70 percent of those who would vote for de Castro would
also vote for Arroyo. The inclusion of de Castro in the presidents
ticket also allowed Arroyo to communicate with the poor, who
142
comprised the bulk of the electorate and the natural constituency of

Poe (Bergonia, 2004; Gloria et al., 2004).
Command Votes
Market Votes
Arroyo
Poe
Lacson
Roco
Arroyos victory was also the first time in Philippine history that
a presidential candidate won the election by winning the southern
islands of Visayas and Mindanao but losing in the traditional locus of
political power the northern island of Luzon. Despite the fact that
Luzon was Arroyos natural bailiwick, majority of its voters indicated
their preference for Poe in successive surveys conducted by SWS and
Pulse Asia prior to the election. Given her political weakness in Luzon,
she relied on the political clans and bosses in the Visayas and Mindanao
to deliver the votes for her (De Castro, 2004). The administration also
succeeded in getting the support of seven out of ten governors in voterich provinces (Go, 2004).
The Presidents candidacy was reinforced by the religious command
votes that were delivered by the Iglesia ni Cristo and El Shaddai (see
Appendix 7). According to estimates, each religious group can deliver
between two to four million votes. In 1998, Erap Estrada got the
endorsement of the Iglesia ni Cristo and El Shaddai. The 1998 SWS
exit polls indicated that 81 percent of INC members voted solidly for
143
Estrada. The El Shaddai also endorsed Estrada, but only 39 percent

of its members actually voted for him (Mangahas, 1998).
The 2010 Presidential Election
The allegation of massive fraud committed by the administration
during the 2004 election was reinforced in June 2005 with the sudden
and mysterious release of wire-tapped conversations between
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Commissioner Virgilio
Garcillano and various personalities led by President Arroyo. The
taped conversations, which allegedly took place from May 17 to June
18, 2004, exposed the cabal of political operators who tampered
with votes upon orders of Garcillano. While the President admitted
to being one of the voices in the taped conversations, she denied
any wrongdoing. Nonetheless, she profusely apologized for the
impropriety of her lapse in judgment.
The 2010 presidential election will serve as a referendum on
the nine-year rule of Gloria Macapagal Arroyo. It will also be an
opportunity to repair the political institutions damaged by the
legitimation crisis that emerged from the 2004 election. Contested
elections have the effect of weakening legitimacy since they diminish
the belief in democratic procedures as a source of political authority.
Given the impending end of Arroyos term of office, and her failure
to extend it by constitutional revision, several political personalities
have projected themselves to be her possible successor in the next
round of presidential elections.
Air and ground war
Fresh from getting the highest number of votes in the 2007
senatorial elections, Loren Legarda topped the first survey on possible
presidential candidates for 2010 conducted that year. Succeeding
surveys showed Vice-President de Castro as the most preferred
choice to succeed President Arroyo. Between September 2007 and
June 2009, however, preparations for the 2010 electoral campaign
144
shifted to the mobilization of party-based local machineries (ground

war) and the early saturation of radio and television with expensive
political advertisements (air war). Two potential candidates strongly
competed in this regard: Senators Manuel Mar Roxas II and Manuel
Manny Villar Jr. The former is the grandson of the late president and
Liberal Party (LP) founder Manuel Roxas; while the latter is the steward
of the resurgent Nacionalista Party (NP). Aside from leading the two
oldest parties in the Philippines, both are among the richest legislators
in Congress. Roxas is a scion of the Araneta clan owners of the Araneta
Commercial Center in Cubao; while Villar is a self-made billionaire who
made his money developing mass housing projects (Lopez, 2007).
According to Nielsen Media Research, in the first three months of
2009, three possible candidates had already spent a total of P230 million in
televised advocacy ads. The three are Roxas (P140 million), Villar (P80
million), and Legarda (P10 million). The cost of air time at peak viewing
hours on the two major television networks (GMA 7 and ABS-CBN 2)
can be as much as P475,000 per 30 seconds. (Sisante et al., 2009). By the
second quarter of 2009, Villar had overtaken Roxas in ad placements.
According to Nielsen, Villar logged a total of 603 minutes or 10.5 hours
of television advertisements in the first half of 2009 accounting for 45
percent of the total 1,345 minutes of infomercials during the period.
He was followed by Roxas with 444 minutes of airtime; Makati Mayor
Jejomar Binay with 166 minutes, Defense Secretary Gilbert Teodoro
with 70 minutes, evangelist Eddie Villanueva with 33 minutes and Sen.
Panfilo Lacson with 30 minutes (Daily Tribune, 2009).
The barrage of television advertisements pushed Villars survey
ranking. In May, he reached a statistical tie with de Castro, the
consistent survey leader , and by June 2009, had taken the lead in the
SWS survey. Even as he competed tightly with Villar in media spending,
Roxas failed to obtain the same push in his survey rankings. On the
other hand, Legardas survey numbers plummeted after her political
advertisements stopped airing on the major television networks. VicePresident de Castro managed to compete in media exposure through
145
his government-sponsored infomercials promoting housing loans.

However, his later actions indicated his disinterest in either pursuing
the presidency or running for re-election as vice-president. His noncommitment paved the way for the selection of the relatively unknown
Gilbert Teodoro as the standard bearer of the recently merged LakasCMD and Kabalikat ng Malayang Pilipino (Kampi) (see Table 10).
Table 10: SWS National Surveys: September 2007 June 2009
Sep
07
Dec
07
Mar
08
60
De Castro
25
30
35
31
29
31
27
21
19
Villar
18
27
17
25
28
27
26
29
33
37
Estrada
14
11
13
11
13
13
25
18
Legarda
44
23
30
26
26
28
25
14
15
20
16
13
13
10
15
18
20
12
Escudero
13
15
19
14
16
19
23
15
20
15
Lacson
18
13
12
16
17
14
14
12
Villanueva
0.5
0.4
0.04
0.1
0.2
0.4
0.04
0.7
0.8
Binay
0.3
0.4
0.2
0.3
Fernando
0.2
0.1
0.2
0.2
0.8
15.6
14.7
9.3
8.2
10.5
4.74
10.1
5.7
0.5
12
12
11
15
13
20
18
12
Aquino
Roxas
Teodoro
Others
Dont Know
None
Jun
08
Sep
08
Dec
08
Feb
09
May
09
Jun
09
Sep
09
146
Revival of reformism
At the outset, it became apparent that the 2010 electoral battle was
going to be waged in terms of an expensive media war and a pitched
battle for the mobilization of local political machineries. However, the
massive outpouring of national grief over the death of former President
and democracy icon Corazon C. Aquino on August 1, 2009 reawakened
a sense of collective nostalgia for the democratic struggle against
the Marcos dictatorship. Similar to the events of 1983 after Senator
Benigno Ninoy Aquino Jr. was assassinated, thousands representing
a cross-section of Philippine society from street vendors to middleaged professionals and their children literally lined up in the streets of
Manila to pay their last respects to the former president. The tremendous
national grief, coupled with deep frustration over the scandal-ridden
Arroyo administration, rekindled the flames of reformist aspirations.
Suddenly, national attention shifted to Aquinos son, Senator
Benigno Noynoy Aquino III, as the bearer of the reformist struggle.
In a repeat of his mothers path to the presidency, several individuals
and private organizations launched a signature drive urging the young
Aquino to consider running for president under the Liberal Party in 2010.
Recognizing the signs of the times, Mar Roxas graciously withdrew
his presidential candidacy in favor of Aquino. His act similar to the
withdrawal of Salvador Doy Laurel in favor of Cory Aquino further
reinforced the historical parallelisms with the 1986 campaign for the
snap presidential election. A special SWS survey covering the voterich Lingayen-Lucena corridor was commissioned in September 2009
to test the potentials of a Noynoy candidacy. The poll was taken a day
after Roxas withdrawal but weeks before Aquinos declaration that he
would seek the presidency (see Table 11).
147
Table 11: SWS Survey on Presidential Preferences for 2010 Election:

Lingayen-Lucena Corridor (September 2009)
Pangasinan
Region
III
Region
IV-A
Total
NCR
Benigno Simeon Aquino III
50
50
48
49
51
Manuel Villar Jr.
14
14
22
15
12
Joseph Estrada
13
15
14
13
Francis Escudero
12
14
10
12
Noli De Castro
14
Dont Know
None
According to Mahar Mangahas (2009: 15), the Lingayen-Lucena

corridor extending from Metro Manila to the north into Central Luzon
and up to Pangasinan, and to the south into Southern Tagalog provinces
on Luzon island, is where presidential races have traditionally been
won, with the notable exception of the 2004 election. In the LingayanLucena corridor, which accounts for nearly 40 percent of the national
vote. the special survey had Noynoy scoring a phenomenal 50 percent
over his closest rivals.
The question of whether the Noynoy phenomenon was limited
to Manila and Luzon was answered by the result of the 3rd Quarter
regular SWS survey (see Table 9) taken from September 18 to 21,
2009, in which Aquino was named by an astounding 60 percent of
respondents as their choice for president. Despite his being off the
political radar in the nine polls since 2007, Noynoys ranking took
off from virtually zero to 60 percent (Mangahas, 2009).4 Aquinos
4
in sinu-sino
148
frontrunner status was further reinforced by the result of the Pulse

Asia survey conducted from October 22 to 30, 2009, where he scored
44 percent nationwide, a 25 percent margin over second placer Manny
Villar (see Table 12).
Table 12: Pulse Asia First Choice Presidential Preference for 2010 Election
(October 22-30, 2009)
Location
Class
RP
NCR
Bal
Luz
Vis
Min
ABC
Aquino, Benigno Noynoy III
44
47
41
53
41
51
44
44
Villar, Manuel Jr.
19
11
19
24
19
13
20
18
Escudero, Francis
13
17
16
12
15
10
Estrada, Joseph
11
11
21
17
De Castro, Noli
Teodoro, Gilbert
Fernando, Bayani
Villanueva, Eduardo
Others
None/Refused/Undecided
Source: Pulse Asia, 2009
Keys to Success
Some political analysts and opinion columnists have described the
surge in the surveys of Noynoy Aquino as a game changer. With the
rise in his numbers in the surveys, it is apparent that the core reformist
issues such as transparency, accountability and good governance have
gained ground as the central issues of the 2010 election. As political
analyst Amando Doronila (2009) observed, the survey results reflect the
deep and broad resonance of the issue of clean and honest governance
149
that highlights Aquinos campaign theme. The groundswell of support

for Aquino following the death of his mother, President Cory Aquino,
flows from the public service record of his mother and his father,
the martyred former Sen. Benigno Aquino, whose honesty and
transparency appear to have been accepted by the Filipino public.
The entry of Aquino has definitely shifted the momentum of the
campaign from the initial focus on ground and air wars, to a revival
of the issue-based, middle-class-backed reformist crusade reminiscent
of the campaigns of Ramon Magsaysay in 1953 and Corazon Aquino
in 1986. Both reformist campaigns faced critical elections that
provided unique opportunities for transformist mobilization to ease,
if not resolve the deep-rooted system contradictions which had
crystallized into full blown political crises (Hedman & Sidel, 2000:
20). In the same light, the imperatives of addressing the legitimation
crisis of the Arroyo administration have galvanized reform-oriented
individuals and civil society organizations around the candidacy of
Noynoy Aquino. In effect, the aspirations for change and hope
and a rejection of politics as usual are fuelling the groundswell of
support for Aquino across class, age and region. The main challenge
for the Aquino campaign is to sustain this support into vote-generating
and vote-protecting machineries that will assure him of victory in
2010.
As of this writing, there are four serious contenders for the
presidency: Aquino, Villar, Estrada and Teodoro. This number is
expected to narrow down by the start of the official campaign period
on February 9, 2010. Each candidate is capitalizing on his perceived
strengths in positioning against the others (see Figure 6). In terms of
market votes, Aquinos closest competitor is Erap Estrada. The former
president, the most media-savvy among the potential candidates, still
attracts a core of solid supporters, but his numbers have dwindled
from his phenomenal rankings in 1998. No doubt, his image has been
greatly affected by his ouster from the presidency, his conviction for
plunder, and more recently, his alleged complicity in a celebrated
150
murder that happened during his controversial administration. He

also faces the possibility of disqualification, given the constitutional
provision on term limits that bans the president from seeking any
reelection.
In terms of command votes, Manny Villar has mobilized his vast
fortune to finance the revitalization of the moribund Nacionalista Party.
Since 2001, the billionaire legislator has been rebuilding the NP to serve
as his vehicle for the presidency. Using the network he has built as
former House Speaker and Senate President, Villar has either directly
raided other parties or quietly secured the support of local and national
politicians. He has invested large amounts in political advertising, which
has translated into positive survey ratings. Despite efforts by his critics
to implicate him in corruption scandals and portray him as a trapo, he is
among the best-prepared candidates to take the reins of the presidency,
given his professional and political experience. With his rags-to-riches
story, he offers a compelling narrative to the Filipino electorate that can
rival the masa appeal of Erap.
Equally prepared to succeed the presidency is Defense Secretary
Gilbert Gibo Teodoro. A bar topnotcher, three-term congressman,
and known protg of his uncle Danding Cojuangco, Teodoro shifted
allegiance from the NPC to Lakas-CMD to contest the presidential
nomination of the ruling coalition. He won the nomination almost by
default, after frontrunner Noli de Castro refused to participate in the
primaries. However, Teodoro is a virtual unknown with survey rankings
hovering between 0.8 to 4 percent in the SWS surveys. He is also saddled
with the unenviable task of defending the largely unpopular Arroyo
administration. Adding to his troubles is his less-than-impressive
performance as Chairman of the National Disaster Coordinating Council
(NDCC) during the two recent typhoons that hit Manila and Northern
Luzon which caused massive floods and losses to lives and property.
What Teodoro lacks in terms of popularity, he hopes to make up for
in terms of the almost monolithic machinery of the ruling coalition. The
merged administration parties Lakas-Kampi-CMD claim the support
151
of about 70 percent of governors, congressmen and mayors across the

country (Burgonio & Salaverra, 2009). Out of 219 congressional seats,
Lakas-Kampi-CMD have 146 representatives, or about 66.7 percent
representation. In the gubernatorial race, they have 58 candidates out
of 80 slots, or 72.5 percent of the total available posts. For the city and
municipal mayoral positions, they have 85 out of 120, and 1,112 out of
1,507 positions, respectively (Joven, 2009).
Command Votes
Market Votes
Estrada
Competing narratives of reformism, clientelism and populism

Thus far, electoral campaigns in post-authoritarian Philippines
have been waged with competing narratives of reformism, populism
and clientelism. Thompson (2009), in his contribution to this volume,
argues that these three are but forms of elite politics. The tradition
of Filipino-style reformist politics, which can be traced to the
presidential campaigns of Ramon Magsaysay in 1953 and Corazon
Aquino in 1986, has been revived in the issue-based anti-corruption
and good governance campaigns of Miriam Defensor Santiago in 1992
and Raul Roco in 1998 and 2004. The same reformist aspirations have
been rekindled to fuel the surging campaign of Noynoy Aquino.
However, the failure of reform politics to address the problem
of poverty, coupled with the ascendancy of mass media, fueled the
image-based populist campaigns of Joseph Estrada in 1998 and
152
Fernando Poe Jr. in 2004. Meanwhile, continued clientelism and money

politics manifested itself in the machine-based campaigns of Ramon
Mitra in 1992 and Jose de Venecia in 1998. Gloria Macapagal Arroyos
successful revitalization of clientelism in 2004 managed to undercut the
threat of a populist restoration (Thompson 2009). But in so doing, she
also triggered a legitimation crisis that nearly toppled her administration
and damaged fundamental institutions.
The last three elections in the post-1986 period were not a
severance from the past but a continuation with some surprising
twists (Coronel, 2003: 11).
A formidable political machinery is not enough to guarantee success
in presidential elections, as experienced by Mitra and de Venecia. The
experiences of Santiago and Roco demonstrate that image and issues
are also not enough to win presidential elections; a candidate needs
the corresponding political machinery to get and protect his votes.
Successful presidential campaigns are characterized by the right mix
and astute use of popularity and machinery.
It has been observed that the Filipino electorate has shifted from
feudal to mass politics. The successive electoral exercises since 1992
have pointed to the rising inadequacies of relying on strong provincial
bailiwicks in winning national office. The so-called command votes
must now be supplemented by market votes. Like the mass market, the
electorate must be segmented and targeted. Thus, national candidates
(e.g., presidents and senators) must be packaged to target defined
niches in a highly segmented electorate (Magno, 1992). Ultimately,
media and public opinion polling have emerged as a primary and most
influential conduit between national candidates and the electorate.
These trends will continue to shape and define electoral campaigns in
the Philippines.
153
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Spin & sell: How political
ads shaped the 2004 elections
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The Manila Chronicle
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Social Weather Bulletin.

Global political campaigning: A worldwide analysis of
campaign professionals and their practices
Ulat ng Bayan
from http://www.sws.org.ph/.
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gain while de Castro drops. Retrieved from http://www.sws.org.ph/
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Electoral politics in Southeast and East Asia

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157
Appendix 1: 1992 Presidential Candidates and Census

Variables: Percentage of Variance in Votes Accounted
for by Census Variables
F.
Ramos
M.
Santiago
E.
Cojuangco
Cebuano
4.97
-4.49
Tagalog
-1.20
-1.46
0.97
Ilocano
-0.01
-4.33
8.09
Hiligaynon
1.17
1.15
-0.15
Bicolano
0.00
-0.52
Samar-Leyte
-3.20
-3.15
Pangasinan
14.19
0.91
R.
Mitra
I.
Marcos
J.
Salonga
S.
Laurel
3.84
2.54
-0.32
0.43
2.29
0.51
20.06
-1.97
8.51
1.18
1.21
-1.91
4.62
0.44
-0.43
-0.02
0.16
0.01
0.45
0.03
-2.02
-0.07
9.72
10.44
0.38
0.01
0.63
-0.15
-2.76
-0.48
-1.05
2.24
-0.01
-0.85
-2.21
1.34
-0.03
Language
Major
Language
-0.24
0.45
Religion
Protestant
5.06
0.61
-1.74
0.06
-2.41
0.44
-9.43
Aglipayan
-0.90
0.39
-0.15
-2.19
1.66
-1.58
0.94
Iglesia ni
Cristo
0.12
0.00
1.46
0.00
-4.79
-0.31
-0.60
Muslim
0.62
0.14
0.00
0.42
-3.52
0.36
-3.75
Other
Religion
-0.99
0.62
-0.27
1.61
-3.06
-0.01
0.01
0.75
Crops
Rice
-3.73
1.72
0.41
-0.75
0.14
0.12
Corn
Sugar
-5.13
0.12
0.90
0.05
-0.39
-0.75
2.95
-3.25
-0.02
0.01
0.02
-0.99
-0.63
17.14
Tobacco
-0.29
1.02
-0.55
-0.05
-0.41
-1.42
-1.03
Perm. Crops
-0.31
0.54
-0.52
-0.86
-0.34
0.07
8.42
Information
College
-0.46
2.99
-2.15
-2.77
-0.02
0.02
10.82
Grade School
-1.38
-0.92
-0.28
0.98
1.04
2.50
0.72
No School
0.00
-1.58
-0.74
0.00
4.44
0.33
4.89
Radio
0.00
-0.68
0.00
4.78
0.01
-5.10
0.34
Source: Land 1996
158
Appendix 2: Presidential Votes by Language Based

on Social Weather Stations 1998 Exit Polls
Total
RP
Tagalog
Cebuano
Ilonggo
(100%)
Estrada
Ilocano
Bicol
(34%)
(25%)
(8%)
(8%)
(5%)
Kapampangan
(2%)
38.8%
41.7%
31.1%
43.6%
49.6%
9.9%
44.7%
De
Venecia
16.2
10.8
15.4
12.5
24.7
7.2
12.1
14.3
Roco
13.4
19.1
3.6
3.0
5.4
80.0
22.2
Osmea
12.1
1.5
38.8
9.0
0.4
0.0
0.0
Lim
9.1
13.8
6.6
9.1
4.1
1.0
De Villa
4.7
10.6
2.2
2.3
1.0
1.4
Santiago
3.1
1.8
0.4
19.2
0.6
Enrile
1.4
0.5
0.1
0.2
11.0
Marcos
0.9
0.0
1.7
1.1
Dumlao
0.2
0.1
0.1
Morato
0.04
0.1
0.1
Other
Mindanao
Waray
Pangsinense
Chavacano
Other
Luzon
Other
Visayan
(3%)
(2%)
(1%)
(2%)
(4%)
6.1%
7.9%
52.4%
38.9%
37.3%
52.7%
90.6
5.3
26.8
11.1
27.4
0.6
1.5
5.3
15.7
4.9
1.9
6.3
0.0
8.3
0.0
15.3
8.7
19.3
11.4
0.0
26.7
3.4
8.8
3.8
0.8
0.7
0.0
1.9
1.2
1.8
2.1
0.0
0.8
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
19.2
0.4
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
12.7
0.0
0.8
.1
0.5
0.2
0.7
0.0
0.0
0.3
0.5
1.5
0.0
0.2
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.9
1.1
0.8
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
(5%)
Appendix 3: Presidential Votes by Religion Based on Social

Weather Stations 1998 Exit Polls
Total
RP
Catholic
Iglesia
ni
Cristo
A g l i payan
Other
Christian
Muslim
Charismatic Group
Other
Jesus
is
Lord
(1%)
Jesus
Miracle
Crusade
(0.3%)
Other
Groups
(8%)
(100%)
(82%)
(3%)
(2%)
(6%)
(4%)
(3%)
El
Shaddai
(3%)
Estrada
38.8%
37.0%
81.4%
34.7%
29.0%
63.2%
34.7%
39.2%
51.9%
43.2%
33.0%
De
Venecia
16.2
14.9
6.4
27.6
26.4
24.7
23.2
11.0
23.4
13.1
15.6
Roco
13.4
14.7
3.4
5.1
11.0
2.3
11.7
20.9
10.0
0.0
14.2
Osmea
12.1
12.5
2.1
9.3
16.1
1.9
11.5
4.6
6.5
38.0
13.3
Lim
9.1
9.8
3.3
8.2
7.0
3.7
8.2
11.4
8.2
5.6
14.6
De Villa
4.7
5.2
1.7
0.0
3.6
2.4
3.4
10.6
0.0
0.0
4.7
Santiago
3.1
3.2
0.0
8.5
2.9
0.0
2.8
2.4
0.0
0.0
3.0
Enrile
1.4
1.1
3.6
1.6
0.0
2.2
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.6
Marcos
0.9
0.8
0.6
2.9
1.8
0.5
2.3
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.8
Dumlao
0.2
0.2
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.3
Morato
0.04
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
159
Appendix 4: Presidential Votes by Socio-Economic Class

and Educational Attainment Based on Social Weather Stations
1998 Exit Polls
Socio-Economic Class
Total
RP
Educational Attainment
ABC
(100%)
(9%)
(21%)
(20%)
Elementary
Graduate
(35%)
High School
Graduate
(41%)
Some
College
(10%)
College
Graduate
(13%)
Estrada
38.8%
23.0%
38.2%
47.6%
44.6%
41.6%
30.8%
21.4%
De Venecia
16.2
12.3
1.3
17.7
17.0
16.4
14.8
14.9
Roco
13.4
26.1
13.2
8.5
8.9
12.0
21.0
24.1
Osmea
12.1
5.7
12.4
13.7
14.0
11.1
10.4
11.8
Lim
9.1
20.1
8.8
5.6
6.1
7.9
12.5
18.2
De Villa
4.7
9.6
4.7
2.5
3.5
5.3
6.7
4.3
Santiago
3.1
1.4
3.7
1.7
2.9
3.2
2.6
3.0
Enrile
1.4
0.8
1.5
1.2
1.7
1.4
0.7
1.2
Marcos
0.9
0.7
0.9
1.2
1.1
1.0
0.4
0.5
Dumlao
0.2
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.3
0.1
0.3
0.2
Morato
0.04
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.3
Appendix 5: Presidential Votes by Gender and Age Attainment Based

Total
RP
(100%)
Gender
Male
(46%)
Female
(54%)
Age
18-24
(16%)
25-34
(29%)
35-44
(25%)
45+
(30%)
Estrada
38.8%
40
38
39
40
39
38
De Venecia
16.2
16
16
16
17
16
16
Roco
13.4
13
14
17
14
12
12
Osmea
12.1
12
12
11
12
13
13
Lim
9.1
10
10
10
De Villa
4.7
Santiago
3.1
Enrile
1.4
Marcos
0.9
0.7
0.7
0.6
Dumlao
0.2
0.3
0.1
0.3
0.04
0.2
0.3
Morato
0.04
0.05
0.03
0.2
0.1
160
Appendix 6: Presidential Votes by Language Based

Total
RP
(100%)
Tagalog
Cebuana
Ilocano
Ilonggo
Bicol
Others
(34%)
(25%)
(8%)
(8%)
(4%)
(19%)
Arroyo
41%
25%
61%
32%
54%
25%
47%
Poe
32
38
24
36
22
20
35
Lacson
15
11
Roco
Villanueva
No Answer
14
10
Appendix 7: Presidential Votes by Religion Based

Total
RP
Catholic Iglesia Other Muslim Others

ni
Christian
Cristo
Charismatic Group
None
(100%)
(80%)
(3%)
(6%)
(4%)
(7%)
(0.7%)
Couples
for
Christ
(4%)
Arroyo
41%
41
74
29
47
41
34
54
23
24
13
46
Poe
32
32
10
30
44
29
33
22
53
23
63
22
Lacson
10
10
16
Roco
Villanueva
25
10
44
No Answer
15
10
10
24
El
Shaddai
Jesus is
Lord
Other
Groups
(0.7%)
Jesus
Miracle
Crusade
(0.1)
(1.3%)
(5%)
161
Appendix 8: Presidential Votes by Socio-Economic Class

and Educational Attainment Based
Total
RP
Socio-Economic Class
Educational Attainment
ABC
None
Elementary
Graduate
(20%)
Elementary
Grduate
High
School
Some
College
College
Graduate
(100%)
(19%)
(33%)
(16%)
(11%)
Arroyo
41%
42
40
43
47
41
39
38
42
Poe
32
20
32
35
33
39
36
25
16
Lacson
11
10
16
12
Roco
Villanueva
12
11
No Answer
11
Appendix 9: Presidential Votes by Gender and Age Attainment Based

Gender
Total
RP
Age
(100%)
Male
(45%)
Female
(55%)
18-24
(14%)
25-34
(25%)
35-44
(25%)
45-54
(17%)
55 & up
(19%)
Arroyo
41%
41
41
33
38
44
44
45
Poe
32
30
33
38
33
30
31
28
Lacson
11
11
10
Roco
Villanueva
No Answer
10
12

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v

The politics of change in a changeless land

2. After populism: Winning the war for bourgeois

3. The presidency, political parties and predatory

4. Partisanship and reform: The making of a presidential campaign

6. Image, issues, and machinery: Presidential campaigns

7. Capacity and compromise: COMELEC, NAMFREL

8. ICT and reform in electoral administration:

Image, issues, and machinery: Presidential

Image, issue, and machinery: Presidential campaigns in post-1986 Philippines

Three presidential elections have been held in the Philippines

on this area in the past 40 years: Hirofumi Andos statistical study of

Image, issue, and machinery: Presidential campaigns in post-1986 Philippines

dealing in competitive marketplaces and, as such, need to rely on

Figure 1: Pull and Push Factors in Elections

The increased use of political marketing techniques coincides

hybridization of campaign practices in media-centered democracies,

Image, issue, and machinery: Presidential campaigns in post-1986 Philippines

Comm and Votes

Political machines are specialized organizations set up for the

electorate of a particular candidate (whether positive or negative). On

Image, issue, and machinery: Presidential campaigns in post-1986 Philippines

and may actually overlap into mixed strategies in actual presidential

Table 1: Commercial and Political Ads from January to May 2004

Source: Gloria et al., 2004

The media has eroded the vote-delivery potential of the political

Table 2: Government Ads in 2004 (January to May)

Social Concern Ads

Source: Gloria et al., 2004

Image, issue, and machinery: Presidential campaigns in post-1986 Philippines

The 1992 presidential election

Peoples Reform Party

Kilusang Bagong Lipunan

Source: Commission on Elections, 1992

Reformism and issue-based campaigns

Santiago waged a single-issue campaign against corruption and

Image, issue, and machinery: Presidential campaigns in post-1986 Philippines

Notwithstanding his national prominence as House Speaker, Mitra

party machinery. However, he was outspent by Ramos at the tail end

Image, issue, and machinery: Presidential campaigns in post-1986 Philippines

disposal to by-pass the traditional party machinery. The phenomenal

Figure 3: 1992 Candidate Positioning

Image, issue, and machinery: Presidential campaigns in post-1986 Philippines

The 1998 presidential election

Miriam Defensor Santiago

Juan Ponce Enrile

Jose C. de Venecia Jr.

Source: Commission on Elections, 1998

Vice-President Joseph Estrada won the presidency with 39.9

Image, issue, and machinery: Presidential campaigns in post-1986 Philippines

Table 6: SWS National Surveys: January 1998-May 1998

Source: Mangahas, 1998

De Venecia struggled to catch up with Estradas popularity but he

elections (Mangahas, 1998) (see Appendix 5). Brilliant and articulate,

Image, issue, and machinery: Presidential campaigns in post-1986 Philippines

enjoyed wide margins throughout the country. He even encroached

Figure 4: 1998 Candidate Positioning

Roco ran a strong alternative grassroots campaign and captured a

Image, issue, and machinery: Presidential campaigns in post-1986 Philippines

loyalties could overcome regional and linguistic ones (Coronel, 2003:

Gloria Macapagal Arroyo

Fernando Poe Jr.

Power of the incumbent