Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
3d 664
In late December 2001, the Mosbruckers moved under Rule 60(b)(3), (5), and
(6) to set aside the sale, contending the government had not met procedural
requirements or given them notice at various points during the foreclosure
process. The court denied relief on timeliness and other grounds. We affirm the
denial of relief.
The Mosbruckers did not appeal from the order confirming the foreclosure sale,
nor did they file their Rule 60(b) motion within the time to appeal, and all of the
arguments in support of their Rule 60(b) motion could have been raised in a
timely appeal. Because a Rule 60(b) motion may not substitute for a timely
appeal, we find no abuse of discretion in the district court's denial of relief. See
Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Hope Elec. Corp., 293 F.3d 409, 415 (8th
Cir.2002) (standard of review); Chester v. St. Louis Hous. Auth., 820 F.2d 259,
260 (8th Cir.1987) (per curiam) (Rule 60(b) provides for relief only under
exceptional circumstances and is not intended to substitute for a timely appeal;
thus, if the alleged error could have been corrected by appeal, a motion must be
made within the time for appeal).
Motion to Amend Judgment
In June 2002, the government moved under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
60(a) and 60(b) to correct an error in the March 1997 judgment granting the
government summary judgment. Specifically, the government learned in
January 2002 that its original complaint-as well as the subsequent pleadings,
the district court's judgment, and the marshal's deed-incorrectly indicated that a
thirty-acre portion of the subject property had been partially released, when
actually the thirty acres were simply subject to an electric utility easement to
which the government had subordinated its mortgage. The court granted the
government's order and entered an amended judgment reflecting that the thirty
acres were subject to an easement, not a partial release. On appeal, the
Mosbruckers argue the government should be held to the language of the deed,
because the legal description in the government's complaint was incorrect, the
request was untimely, and correcting the error in the legal description would
result in the Mosbruckers losing an additional thirty acres of land.2
The Mosbruckers also appeal from the district court's grant of the government's
The Mosbruckers also appeal from the district court's grant of the government's
eviction petition, arguing (1) the court lacked jurisdiction to evict the
Mosbruckers from the thirty-acre easement property, (2) the government
fraudulently attempted to evict the Mosbruckers from that property, and (3) the
Mosbruckers did not receive due process. Based on our prior discussion, we
conclude the court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1345 to order the
Mosbruckers' eviction, no fraud was committed by the government, and the
Mosbruckers received notice and an opportunity to be heard. See Duncan v.
Dep't of Labor, 313 F.3d 445, 447 (8th Cir.2002) (per curiam) (due process).
Summary Judgment
Finally, the Mosbruckers appeal from the district court's grant of summary
judgment to the government in the Mosbruckers' August 2001 action to set
aside the district court's March 1997 summary judgment order. We affirm
because the action is barred by res judicata, see Oglala Sioux Tribe v.
Homestake Mining Co., 722 F.2d 1407, 1411 (8th Cir.1983); United States v.
Mosbrucker, No. 97-2829, 2000 WL 1532993 (8th Cir. October 17, 2000) (per
curiam), and because the matters raised should have been timely appealed in
1997, see Chester, 820 F.2d at 260.
Conclusion
Notes:
1
The Honorable Patrick A. Conmy, United States District Judge for the District
of North Dakota
The Mosbruckers raise numerous other arguments for the first time on appeal.
We decline to address themSee Schaller Tel. Co. v. Golden Sky Sys., Inc., 298
F.3d 736, 741 (8th Cir.2002) (declining to consider argument first raised on
appeal).