Karl Kautsky

The Lessons of the October Experiment

THE DESPOTISM of the Bolshevik party in Russia appears to be stronger and less o
pen to attack than ever. Yet already it shows signs of impending collapse. That
has been proved very recently by the Trotsky case. It may seem at first sight as
if its swift and easy settlement has strengthened the dictatorial regime to the
greatest degree, and has shown that no opposition to this regime is now possibl
e. But it is precisely the ease with which the opposition was suppressed that ha
s demonstrated how deep the inner decay of Bolshevism already is. For this was n
ot an external opposition that faced the present masters of Russia, but one from
within their own ranks, the opposition of a man who together with Lenin created
the dictatorship and justified it both practically and theoretically, while the
majority of Russia's present ruling elite initially adopted a hesitant and vaci
llating attitude towards it
and for very good reasons.
This position taken by Zinoviev and company was demonstrated clearly by Trotsky'
s recent writings Lenin and 1917 [On Lenin and Lessons of October], and even mor
e clearly by the fact that they do not know how to answer his criticisms except
by silencing the critic.
But something else is demonstrated by both of these writings and particularly by
the latter: how even the best minds of Bolshevism have declined intellectually.
Trotsky speaks with contempt about the "parliamentary cretinism" of social democ
racy, by which he understands any interest in parliamentary proceedings and any
involvement in such matters. Engels, who introduced the expression, understood s
omething different by it: the limited mentality of some parliamentarians who bel
ieve "that the whole world, its history and future, are governed and determined
by a majority of votes in that particular representative body which has the hono
ur to count them among its members". (Revolution and Counter-Revolution in Germa
ny, pp.107-8. Published under Marx's name, but written for the most part by Enge
ls.)[1]
But such an overestimation of one's own sphere of activity is not found only amo
ng members of parliament. In every field of human action the same conceit can be
observed among limited minds.
At the same time that Trotsky engaged in the struggle for power and then came to
power, he also succumbed to cretinism (in the sense defined here). But not to t
he parliamentary variety. His is of another type: it is military cretinism. Trot
sky believes that all the problems of our time can be solved by means of militar
y force. Eventually he even wanted to revive the faltering production of Soviet
Russia by recklessly militarising it. And yet it was faltering precisely because
an excess of the militaristic spirit already prevailed within the state adminis
tration and statified industry. Trotsky then also failed miserably with his mili
tarisation of labour.
He is no wiser for this. He still believes that anything can be achieved with mi
litary force. In his recent book he wants to draw the "lessons of the revolution
", but as far as he is concerned no economic or social factors are worthy of con
sideration here, only the military factor. At one point he even talks in all ser
iousness about compiling a "manual of civil war" (p.68 of the German edition, pu
blished by E. Laub, Berlin).[2]
Elsewhere he says: "That is why we require an approach entirely different from t
he prevailing one to the questions of civil war in general and of armed insurrec
tion in particular. Following Lenin, all of us keep repeating time and again Mar
x s words that insurrection is an art. But this idea is transformed into a hollow

phrase, to the extent that Marx s formula is not supplemented with a study of the
fundamental elements of the art of civil war, on the basis of the vast accumulat
ed experience of recent years" (p.75).[3]
It is true that Engels (not Marx, in the already quoted book on revolution and c
ounter-revolution in Germany, p.117) says: "... insurrection is an art quite as
much as war or any other, and subject to certain rules of proceeding."[4] But th
ese rules appear to Engels to be very simple. He is not thinking here of drawing
up an official manual for the revolution. These rules, for Engels, comprise onl
y two: "Firstly, never play with insurrection unless you are fully prepared to f
ace the consequences of your play."[5] This paragraph from the official manual o
f revolution should be urgently taken to heart by every member of the Communist
International.
And Engels also says: "Secondly, once the insurrection has begun, act with the g
reatest determination and seize the offensive."[6] That is today still an indisp
utable principle which, however, naturally applies only so long as "the insurrec
tion has begun". But in his book Trotsky does not deal with that at all. For him
the "art of insurrection" is, rather, the art of calling an insurrection into b
eing. Engels, again, does not deal with this at all. He discusses the question o
f how one should proceed in the insurrection, in connection with the German upri
sings of 1849, which arose entirely spontaneously, out of a situation where the
Imperial Constitution and the National Assembly were threatened by reaction, and
thus, as Trotsky would say, out of "parliamentary cretinism". All the defenders
of the National Assembly acted together at that moment, and Engels joined in th
e insurrection of the petty bourgeoisie in Baden and thus became, to employ Bols
hevik phraseology, a "lackey of the bourgeoisie".
By contrast, not only does Trotsky examine the art of staging an insurrection, b
ut it is also an insurrection of a very particular type whose arts he develops;
not an insurrection against the counter-revolution, in which all defenders of th
e revolution work together, but an insurrection against other revolutionaries, w
ho have to be defeated if they will not allow themselves to be commanded by Leni
n and Trotsky.
Engels would have rejected participation in such an insurrection with indignatio
n and Marx no less so. After all, they said in the Communist Manifesto: "The Com
munists do not form a separate party opposed to other working class parties."[7]
They were the strongest opponents of sectarianism within the great workers' par
ty which was their objective. They saw in sectarianism a sign of the immaturity
of the workers' movement.
Not only have Lenin and Trotsky adopted this sign of the immaturity of the movem
ent as their most important principle and made Bolshevism the most intolerant of
all sects, but they have gone further than even the most immature of socialist
sects have ever gone before: they have propagandised for and carried out the arm
ed insurrection of their sect against other workers' parties
as Trotsky shows, i
nitially in opposition to a substantial section of their own supporters, who rig
htly held doubts about such a type of civil war, at least so long as they had no
t themselves tasted the attractions of power. Whoever practises the art of this
insurrection may in no way appeal to Engels or Marx. Such an uprising could neve
r emerge out of the spontaneous action of the masses, and, as Trotsky himself sh
ows, an essential condition for its success was the deception of the masses rega
rding the aim of the action and the lulling of other socialists, with whom a par
t of the Bolsheviks engaged in friendly negotiations while at the same time the
other part brought up machine guns against them. Trotsky takes it upon himself t
o sneer at the Mensheviks because they trusted in the honesty of the Bolsheviks.
[8]
What took place in October 1917 in St Petersburg was precisely not a spontaneous

uprising of the masses, like that in February of the same year, but a coup d'tat
, which Lenin and Trotsky themselves staged, entirely in the old Russian manner.
It is the art of such coup d'tats that Trotsky is thinking of, and he understand
s them better than anyone else. His success does not prove that this is the way
to socialism which the proletariat has to follow everywhere, but only that in ma
ny things Russia is still no further advanced than it was under Catherine II.
It is evidence of Trotsky's military cretinism that he imagines that you need on
ly to know the manual for such insurrections to be able to produce them as you l
ike, anywhere and at any time. If the world revolution has still not happened, t
his is evidently due to the fact that the manual is not ready yet.
He does not see that the success of the coup d'tat in 1917 was due to conditions
of a quite specific type which existed only in Russia at that time and which do
not exist today in any country in the world, least of all in the capitalist worl
d. It shows an incredible narrowness of vision to think that any lessons for the
international proletariat can be gained from the arts of the October putsch of
1917.
Up to today, it still has not registered in Trotsky's consciousness what the rea
l lessons to be drawn from this coup are. He thinks: "... for the study of the l
aws and methods of proletarian revolution there is, up to the present time, no m
ore important and profound a source than our October experience" (p.14).[9] Howe
ver, for him the proletarian revolution is identical with the "armed seizure of
power".
Seizure of power by whom? By the proletariat? Trotsky himself holds that the Rus
sian proletariat is incapable of maintaining state power. He speaks only of the
"organisation of the proletarian vanguard" for the armed insurrection. By that h
e means the Communist Party. But this was itself split in October, as Trotsky sh
ows. At that time, apart from Lenin and Trotsky, almost all the leaders of Bolsh
evism harboured doubts about the insurrection. So in the end the "proletarian re
volution" is reduced to the seizure of power by the commanders of the vanguard:
Lenin and Trotsky.
Was that why all the thinkers and fighters of Russian socialism from Chernyshevs
ky to Plekhanov struggled, and why all its countless martyrs shed their blood, i
n order to provide Lenin and Trotsky with absolute power? No, they wanted to fre
e Russia and to establish the conditions there which would make it possible for
the proletariat to develop the strength and maturity that would enable it to fre
e itself.
In October 1917 the majority of the Bolsheviks themselves still knew that this w
as the task of the proletarian revolution, and for that reason they were against
the seizure of power that Lenin and Trotsky planned; not because they were in g
eneral against the seizure of power by the proletariat, which would be a nonsens
e, but because they were against the type of seizure of power planned by those t
wo men, since they foresaw that only evil could arise from this for Russia and f
or its proletariat, as is proved by statements quoted by Trotsky from Zinoviev,
Lozovsky and others, the "experienced revolutionists, Old Bolsheviks" whom Trots
ky accuses of having adopted an essentially social democratic position in this "
most critical period" (p.76).[10]
It was the position that the entire socialist and revolutionary movement had ado
pted up until then. Only when they got their hands on power did those vacillatin
g Bolsheviks forget, like so many victorious revolutionaries before them who bec
ame intoxicated with power, their own past and all knowledge of what inspired th
em when they themselves had to conduct difficult struggles against the existing
power.

For Lenin and Trotsky, during the October days, it was basically a question only
of personal power, not the seizure of power by the proletariat.
Trotsky repeatedly points out that Lenin at that time rightly said: Now or never
. And, in point of fact, he may have been right in this if the aim was only to c
apture all power for Lenin. For that, the conditions were perhaps present only i
n the chaos of October 1917. Once this critical moment had passed, it would perh
aps not have been possible again for Lenin to capture absolute power for himself
. But from the standpoint of the seizure of power by the proletariat in October
it would be ridiculous to say: "Now or never!" In all industrialised countries t
he proletariat must, along with the development of industry itself, inexorably g
ain in strength and maturity, and its eventual victory is assured. And this vict
ory, which will arise from the struggles of countless millions, cannot depend on
whether or not any single individual has caught the right moment for it.
Incidentally, what a contradiction it is, on the one hand, to say that in Russia
there was only one special situation, a single moment, which would never be rep
eated, for the the insurrection that would capture power for the Communists, whe
reas, on the other hand, the right moment for the world revolution recurs consta
ntly!
In 1917, on the basis of his utopianism, which it now turns out was as primitive
as it was extreme, Lenin could still think that if only he conquered power ever
ything would be won for the proletariat. He could just knock together the new so
ciety with a few heavy hammer blows.
But to believe today, after the experience of the last seven years, that the cen
tral problem of socialism consists only in the question of how one conquers powe
r, without any consideration of the methods, the aims and the conditions of this
conquest
to speak today of the lessons of the "October experiment" and only dis
cuss the question of the military victory of one's own sect, or rather its high
command, without the slightest reference to the economic and social conditions o
f that time, is to demonstrate an almost frightening military cretinism. The mil
itary are concerned only with defeating the enemy, destroying its resources and
imposing on their own army the blind obedience of all subordinates. They are not
concerned with anything more.
And that is exactly how Trotsky thinks today. It does not occur to him that it i
s necessary to examine whether those within his own ranks whom he accuses of bei
ng "social democrats", "Mensheviks" and "accomplices of the bourgeoisie" were pe
rhaps fundamentally correct when they saw, in a coup d'tat against fraternal soci
alist parties, a danger to the progress of Russia and its proletariat, even if t
oday they are ashamed of the good sense they showed at that time. Perhaps today
the facts speak a language which cannot be misunderstood and which clearly shows
what a "blind alley", to use Veresaev's words,[11] Russia and its working class
es have been led into by the "October experiment".
The present holders of power there still do not understand any of this. While th
ey resort to contradictory methods, seeking to win the trust and confidence of c
apitalists and governments abroad in order to get hold of loans, and at the same
time making propaganda for the overthrow of these governments and capitalists t
hrough the world revolution, they get ever deeper into the swamp.
Anyone who looks at things from an economic standpoint will find that the "Octob
er experiment" has by no means been a success. Militarily, however, it has succe
eded. Every opponent inside Russia has been defeated, and the blind obedience of
subordinates has been fully imposed, not only among the general population but
also in the Red Army and the Communist Party itself.
And today Trotsky will nevertheless no longer think quite so favourably of the "

October experiment" as he did a few months ago, when he wrote his latest works.
And he may perhaps discover some lessons in this experiment which have hitherto
eluded him.
For him, the central problem during the October days was the seizure of power, o
f personal power. It appears to have been a complete success: Lenin and Trotsky
became autocrats to whom everyone submitted. Trotsky himself made the greatest c
ontribution to the construction of that terrible apparatus of domination whose m
achinery crushes anyone that is prepared to defy the ruling elite. But lo and be
hold! Because of purely personal differences, or so it would seem, the worshippe
r of power comes into conflict with his colleagues who, after Lenin's withdrawal
from the affairs of government, have made themselves at home at the head of the
state, and he himself is then seized by this merciless machinery. To such perfe
ct working order has he brought it. What a success! What was for him the means t
o total power has condemned him to complete powerlessness. His "arts" have thus
brought power to those whom he himself criticises as "Mensheviks" and "opportuni
sts". And therefore also as robbers and murderers!
Perhaps Trotsky will now begin to think a little less contemptuously of democrac
y.
That a man like Trotsky, who for all his weaknesses nevertheless stands head and
shoulders above his Bolshevik opponents and who has done so much for their stat
e apparatus, should be disposed of so rapidly and so easily is most surprising.
That Patroclus and even Achilles should fall and Thersites return has of course
often occurred in history; and it has not infrequently happened that in a duel b
etween Thersites and Achilles the former has won by some dirty trick.[12] But th
at Achilles should challenge Thersites to a duel and at the first sign of resist
ance lay down his arms without a fight
that has hardly any precedent in history.
And just as rarely has it occurred that, if Achilles is banished, the whole arm
y of his comrades who have fought beside him lines up almost unanimously behind
Thersites and enthusiastically agrees. This phenomenon is a serious symptom of t
he inner weakness of Bolshevism. It appears so serious because it is perhaps the
most prominent example, but it is in no way the only one of its kind. In a soci
al structure as decayed as Soviet Russia, conflicts between members of the rulin
g caste are inevitable. But until now every attempt by a former champion of the
Communist Party to raise criticisms of the government has ended with the critic
being transferred to some sinecure and condemned to silence. And each of them ha
s quietly accepted this.
That shows that not only has the Medusa's head of the Terror and the Cheka petri
fied the mass of the population but it also seems to have killed off all indepen
dent life among those who hold it in their hands. It has transformed the champio
ns of the ruling party itself into slaves and subservient creatures.
That is very convenient for the existing rulers, as long as everything goes smoo
thly. But so much the worse for the regime if it enters into a crisis that threa
tens its existence. Then it will look around in vain for defenders. Does anyone
imagine that those who allow a Trotsky to fall without a word of opposition will
risk their lives, if one day it should come to that, in order to save a Zinovie
v?
The ease of Trotsky's suppression shows that the regiment of Bolshevism
few men with backbone in its ranks. It is a colossus with feet of clay
n no longer survive any serious crisis, and which is moreover incapable
egeneration from within. The first deep-going crisis that it meets must
atastrophe for it.
Editorial notes

has very
which ca
of any r
end in c

[1] Marx-Engels, Collected Works, Vol.11, p.79.

[2] Trotsky, The Lessons of October, in The Challenge of the Left Opposition, 19
23-25, 1975, p.247.
[3] Ibid., p.253. [Transcriber's Note: This quote was shortened in the original
English translation].
[4] Marx-Engels, Collected Works, Vol.11, 1979, p.85.
[5] Ibid., pp.85-6. Kautsky's emphasis.
[6] Ibid., p.86. The translation has been amended.
[7] Marx-Engels, Collected Works, Vol.6, 1976, p.497.
[8] Trotsky, The Lessons of October, op.cit., pp.244-5.
[9] Ibid., p.203.
[10] Ibid., p.254.
[11] Presumably a reference to the Russian writer Vikenty Veresaev (1867-1945).
[12] Kautsky refers to characters and events in the Iliad, the Greek epic poem a
ttributed to Homer.