Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
that the obvious object of the subpoena was to badger her into admitting that
she was Emma Lees mother
ISSUE: WON to compel Tiu Chuan (Emma Lees stepmother) to testify would
be a violation of Section 25, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, the rule on
parental privilege?
Ruling: NO. Tiu Chuan can be compelled to testify against Petitioner Emma
Lee.
Facts:
Tiu claimed before the trial court the right not to testify against her
stepdaughter, petitioner Emma Lee, invoking Section 25, Rule 130 of the
Rules of Evidence, which reads:
* Spouses Lee Tek Sheng (Lee) and Keh Shiok Cheng (Keh) entered the
Philippines in the 1930s as immigrants from China. They had 11 children,
collectively called herein as the Lee-Keh children.
* In 1948, Lee brought from China a young woman named Tiu Chuan (Tiu),
supposedly to serve as housemaid. The respondent Lee-Keh children believe
that Tiu left the Lee-Keh household, moved into another property of Lee
nearby, and had a relation with him.
The above is an adaptation from a similar provision in Article 315 of the Civil
Code that applies only in criminal cases. But those who revised the Rules of
Civil Procedure chose to extend the prohibition to all kinds of actions,
whether civil, criminal, or administrative, filed against parents and other direct
ascendants or descendants.
* Shortly after Keh died in 1989, the Lee-Keh children learned that Tius
children with Lee (collectively, the Lees other children) claimed that they, too,
were children of Lee and Keh. This prompted the Lee-Keh children to request
the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to investigate the matter. After
conducting such an investigation, the NBI concluded in its report:
[I]t is very obvious that the mother of these 8 children is certainly not KEH
SHIOK CHENG, but a much younger woman, most probably TIU CHUAN.
Upon further evaluation and analysis by these Agents, LEE TEK SHENG is in
a quandary in fixing the age of KEH SHIOK CHENG possibly to conform with
his grand design of making his 8 children as their own legitimate children,
consequently elevating the status of his second family and secure their
future. The doctor lamented that this complaint would not have been
necessary had not the father and his second family kept on insisting that the
8 children are the legitimate children of KEH SHIOK CHENG.1
* The NBI found, for example, that in the hospital records, the eldest of the
Lees other children, Marcelo Lee (who was recorded as the 12th child of Lee
and Keh), was born of a 17-year-old mother, when Keh was already 38 years
old at the time. Another of the Lees other children, Mariano Lee, was born of
a 23-year-old mother, when Keh was then already 40 years old, and so forth.
In other words, by the hospital records of the Lees other children, Kehs
declared age did not coincide with her actual age when she supposedly gave
birth to such other children, numbering eight.
* On the basis of this report, the respondent Lee-Keh children filed two
separate petitions, a Special Proceeding C-1674 for the deletion from the
certificate of live birth of the petitioner Emma Lee, one of Lees other
children, the name Keh and replace the same with the name Tiu to indicate
her true mothers name.
* In April 2005 the Lee-Keh children filed with the RTC an ex parte request for
the issuance of a subpoena ad testificandum to compel Tiu, Emma Lees
presumed mother, to testify in the case. The RTC granted the motion but Tiu
moved to quash the subpoena, claiming that it was oppressive and violated
Section 25, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, the rule on parental privilege, she
being Emma Lees stepmother.3
* On August 5, 2005 the RTC quashed the subpoena it issued for being
unreasonable and oppressive considering that Tiu was already very old and
But here Tiu, who invokes the filial privilege, claims that she is the
stepmother of petitioner Emma Lee. The privilege cannot apply to them
because the rule applies only to "direct" ascendants and descendants, a
family tie connected by a common ancestry. A stepdaughter has no common
ancestry by her stepmother. Article 965 thus provides:
Art. 965. The direct line is either descending or ascending. The former unites
the head of the family with those who descend from him. The latter binds a
person with those from whom he descends.
Consequently, Tiu can be compelled to testify against petitioner Emma Lee.
Facts:
* A tract of land about 20,644 square meters was one of three lots[2] involved
in two consolidated cases[3] for recovery of possession and ownership filed
in the 1940s
by respondents predecessor Irene Bien (through her attorney-in-fact
Gregorio Clemea) against petitioners predecessor Pedro Clemea y Zurbano.
* Irene Bien in her complaint averred that she acquired the parcel of land by
purchase from Victoriano Napa as per deed of sale in her favor x x x; and the
said Victoriano Napa in turn acquired the same by purchase from Francisco
Barrameda who also bought the said land from the administrator of the estate
of Pedro Clemea y Conde which sale had been duly authorized and
approved by this Honorable Court in Civil Case No. 3410-In re The Estate of
Pedro Clemea y Conde; that; defendant (Pedro Clemea Y Zurbano) ever
since he was removed as administrator of the Estate of Pedro Clemea y
Conde in the year 1939 deliberately continued to occupy and usurp the
possession and use of the above described parcel of land x x x, and has ever
since refused to relinquish the possession of the same to the lawful owner;
that by reason of this unlawful occupation and usurpation by the defendant,
the plaintiff will suffer damages and in fact has suffered damages beginning
this October 1943 harvest at the rate of 25cavans of palay per harvest or 50
cavans yearly.
* In his answer, Pedro Clemea y Zurbano alleged that the land was his and
that it was in his exclusive possession.[5] His claim of ownership was
similarly based on a sale by the estate of the late Pedro Clemea y Conde to
his predecessor-in-interest.
* Neither one of the original parties lived to see the end of the trial. Both
Plaintiff and Defendant dies. They were substituted by their heirs.
* RTC ruled in a modified decision that the contending parties had failed to
prove their respective claims of ownership and therefore the land in question
still belonged to its original owner, the estate of the late Pedro Clemea y
Conde. RTC also stated that
Additional Notes:
* From that order, respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA). It was
docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 50912. In a decision dated April 4, 2002,[13]
the CA affirmed the RTCs resolution of the issues relating to the other two
parcels of land but reversed the ruling on the ownership of the land covered
by TD 5299. It proceeded to award respondents P118,000 in damages as
compensation for their having been deprived of possession and the owners
share in the harvest.
* Petitioners no longer dispute respondents ownership of the property
covered by TD 5299. They insist, however, that they cannot be held liable to
respondents for the harvest because (1) they never took possession of the
property declared in TD 5299 and (2) the evidence the CA relied on to
determine the amount of damages, proceeding as it did from one of the
plaintiffs, was self-serving and therefore could not have been a proper basis
for such an award.
Issue: WON the averment of Pedro Clemea y Zurbano (petitioners
predecessor) in his Answer constituted a judicial admission?
Ruling: YES
Petitioners contention that the land was never in their possession should be
dismissed outright for two reasons, both of them simple and rather obvious.
FACTS:
During the pendency of the labor case, news articles about irregularities in
IBC-13 were published in the July 18, 1992 issue of the Manila Times and the
Philippine Star, and in the July 19, 1992 issue of the Manila Bulletin.
In these news articles, respondent Virgilio P. Balaguer, then President of IBC13, was quoted to have said that he uncovered various anomalies in IBC-13
during his tenure which led to the dismissal of an operations executive for
selling forged certificates of performance.
In a letter dated July 20, 1992, petitioner urged respondents to confirm or
deny if he was the person alluded to in the news article as the operations
executive of IBC-13 who was dismissed for selling forged certificates of
performance. None of the respondents replied to the letter.
On September 25, 1992, petitioner filed before the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City a complaint for damages against Balaguer. Petitioner claimed
that respondents caused the publication of the subject news articles which
defamed him by falsely and maliciously referring to him as the IBC-13
operations executive who sold forged certificates of performance. He alleged
that in causing these false and malicious publications, respondents violated
Articles 19, 20, 21, and 26 of the Civil Code.
Balaguer denied that he had anything to do with the publications. However,
he argued that the publications are not actionable because they are true and
without malice; are of legitimate public concern and interest because IBC-13
is under sequestration; that petitioner is a newsworthy and public figure; and
that they are privileged communication. Balaguer filed a counterclaim against
petitioner for alleged malicious filing of the civil case.
IBC-13 also denied participation in the publications. It claimed that assuming
press statements were issued during a press conference, the same was
done solely by Balaguer without its authority or sanction. IBC-13 also filed a
counterclaim against petitioner and a cross-claim against Balaguer.
On August 31, 1993, the Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision finding
petitioners dismissal as illegal, which was affirmed by the National Labor
Relations Commission. The Commission, however, declared respondents to
be acting in good faith, hence, it deleted the award of moral and exemplary
damages.
However, on October 29, 2003, the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City held
that petitioner is entitled to an award of damages.
Respondents moved for reconsideration but it was denied. Hence, they
appealed to the Court of Appeals which granted their appeal and reversed
the RTCs decision.
ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not the respondents failure to respond to the letter of the
petitioner constitutes admission on his part that he was the source of the said
defamatory news reports?
(2) Whether or not IBCs cross-claim against Balaguer is an admission
against the latter?
RULING:
The petition lacks merit.
(1) Our Rules of Court state that each party must prove his own affirmative
allegations and that the burden of proof lies on the party who would be
defeated if no evidence were given on either side. Thus, in civil cases, the
burden of proof is generally on the plaintiff, with respect to his complaint.
In proving his claim, petitioner relied on the July 20, 1992 letter, the
newspaper articles, and the alleged admission of respondents. Based on the
above pieces of evidence, the Court finds that petitioner was unable to
I think the termination of Mr. Villanueva has nothing to do with that press
statement release because the period that covers that report is from specific
date 1986 to 1989. (TSN, 07 November 2000, p. 19)
Pending the resolution of the appeal with the MAB, Redmont filed a
Complaint with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), seeking the
revocation of the certificates for registration of petitioners on the ground that
they are foreign-owned or controlled corporations engaged in mining in
violation of Philippine laws. Redmont also filed a Manifestation and Motion to
Suspend Proceeding before the MAB praying for the suspension of the
proceedings on the appeals filed by McArthur, Tesoro and Narra.
Subsequently, Redmont filed before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 92 a Complaint for injunction with application for issuance of a
temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction,
praying for the deferral of the MAB proceedings pending the resolution of the
Complaint before the SEC.
The RTC issued an Order granting Redmonts application for a TRO and
setting the case for hearing the prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction.
Meanwhile, Redmont filed a Motion for Reconsideration on the Order of the
MAB but before the MAB could resolve the same, Redmont filed before the
RTC a Supplemental Complaint.
The RTC issued an Order granting the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction enjoining the MAB from finally disposing of the appeals of
petitioners and from resolving Redmonts Motion for Reconsideration and
Supplement Motion for Reconsideration of the MAB Resolution.
The MAB issued a second Order denying Redmonts Motion for
Reconsideration and Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration and resolving
the appeals filed by petitioners.
Hence, the petition for review filed by Redmont before the CA, to which the
CA rendered a Decision finding that McArthur, Tesoro and Narra are foreign
corporations and the rejection of their applications for Mineral Product
Sharing Agreement should be recommended to the Secretary of the DENR.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the exception of res inter alios acta or the "admission by copartner or agent" rule and "admission by privies" under the Rules of Court are
applicable in the instant case? YES
Whether or not statements coming from MBMI Resources, Inc., which is not
a party to the case, or a partner of the petitioners, be deemed admissible?
YES
RULING:
Redmont alleged that at least 60% of the capital stock of McArthur, Tesoro
and Narra are owned and controlled by MBMI Resources, Inc. (MBMI), a
100% Canadian corporation. Redmont reasoned that since MBMI is a
considerable stockholder of petitioners, it was the driving force behind
petitioners filing of the MPSAs over the areas covered by applications and
are likewise disqualified from engaging in mining activities through MPSAs,
which are reserved only for Filipino citizens.
In their Answers, petitioners averred that they were qualified persons under
Section 3(aq) of Republic Act No. (RA) 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of
1995.
Petitioners claim that the CA erred in applying Sec. 29, Rule 130 of the Rules
by stating that "by entering into a joint venture, MBMI have a joint interest"
with Narra, Tesoro and McArthur. They challenged the conclusion of the CA
which pertains to the close characteristics of "partnerships" and "joint venture
agreements." Further, they asserted that before this particular partnership
can be formed, it should have been formally reduced into writing since the
capital involved is more than three thousand pesos (PhP 3,000). Being that
there is no evidence of written agreement to form a partnership between
petitioners and MBMI, no partnership was created.
The Court disagreed.
Secs. 29 and 31, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court provide:
Sec. 29. Admission by co-partner or agent.- The act or declaration of a
partner or agent of the party within the scope of his authority and during the
existence of the partnership or agency, may be given in evidence against
such party after the partnership or agency is shown by evidence other than
such act or declaration itself. The same rule applies to the act or declaration
of a joint owner, joint debtor, or other person jointly interested with the party.
Sec. 31. Admission by privies.- Where one derives title to property from
another, the act, declaration, or omission of the latter, while holding the title,
in relation to the property, is evidence against the former.
Petitioners claim that before the above-mentioned Rule can be applied to a
case, "the partnership relation must be shown, and that proof of the fact must
be made by evidence other than the admission itself." Thus, petitioners
assert that the CA erred in finding that a partnership relationship exists
between them and MBMI because, in fact, no such partnership exists.
According to the Supreme Court, a partnership is defined as two or more
persons who bind themselves to contribute money, property, or industry to a
common fund with the intention of dividing the profits among themselves. On
the other hand, joint ventures have been deemed to be "akin" to partnerships
since it is difficult to distinguish between joint ventures and partnerships.
Thus:
[T]he relations of the parties to a joint venture and the nature of their
association are so similar and closely akin to a partnership that it is ordinarily
held that their rights, duties, and liabilities are to be tested by rules which are
closely analogous to and substantially the same, if not exactly the same, as
those which govern partnership. In fact, it has been said that the trend in the
law has been to blur the distinctions between a partnership and a joint
venture, very little law being found applicable to one that does not apply to
the other.
Though some claim that partnerships and joint ventures are totally different
animals, there are very few rules that differentiate one from the other; thus,
joint ventures are deemed "akin" or similar to a partnership. In fact, in joint
venture agreements, rules and legal incidents governing partnerships are
applied.
Accordingly, culled from the incidents and records of this case, it can be
assumed that the relationships entered between and among petitioners and
MBMI are no simple "joint venture agreements." As a rule, corporations are
prohibited from entering into partnership agreements; consequently,
corporations enter into joint venture agreements with other corporations or
partnerships for certain transactions in order to form "pseudo partnerships."
Obviously, as the intricate web of "ventures" entered into by and among
petitioners and MBMI was executed to circumvent the legal prohibition
against corporations entering into partnerships, then the relationship created
should be deemed as "partnerships," and the laws on partnership should be
applied. Thus, a joint venture agreement between and among corporations
may be seen as similar to partnerships since the elements of partnership are
present.
Considering that the relationships found between petitioners and MBMI are
considered to be partnerships, then the CA is justified in applying Sec. 29,
Rule 130 of the Rules by stating that "by entering into a joint venture, MBMI
have a joint interest" with Narra, Tesoro and McArthur.
ISSUE:
WON the lone testimony of prosecutions witness, Bonifacio Gremio is
admissible as evidence to prove conspiracy?
RULING:
YES
The rule that The act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the
conspiracy and during its existence, may be given in evidence against the coconspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act or
declaration, applies only to extrajudicial acts or declaration, but not to
testimony given on the stand at the trial, where the defendant has the
opportunity to cross- examine the declarant." When Bonifacio Gremio, in this
case, took the witness stand and testified on the participations of Domingo
Atencio and Silvestre Colisao in the crime, he was not making an
admission or declaration as a co-conspirator; he was an eye-witness
identifying them in connection with the incident, and whose testimony could
have been shaken by cross-examination or disproved by other evidence. As
it happened here, Bonifacios testimony pointing to the existence of
conspiracy among Ricardo Atencio, Domingo Atencio and Silvestre Colisao,
remained and withstood cross-examinations by the separate counsel for the
accused.
Antonio in preparation for their plan to form a corporation. The lots are to be
eventually infused in the capitalization of Damasa Corporation, where he and
Antonio are to have 40% and 60% stake, respectively.
A witness for petitioner, one Dr. Cecilia Fuentes, testified on Peregrinas
medical records. According to her interpretation of said records, it was
physically impossible for Peregrina to have signed the Deed of Sale on
March 11, 1994, when she was reported to be suffering from edema.
Peregrina died on April 4, 1994.
RTC: declared the Deed of Sale void, ordered the cancellation of the new
TCTs in Antonios name
CA: affirmed RTCs ruling
ISSUE:
1.WON the videotaped statement of Anita should be excluded being a
hearsay evidence. No, but it should be excluded because it is not
authenticated
2. WON the medical records were admissible as evidence. NO
RULING:
1. Evidence is hearsay when its probative force depends, in whole or in part,
on the competency and credibility of some persons other than the witness by
whom it is sought to be produced. There are three reasons for excluding
hearsay evidence: (1) absence of cross-examination; (2) absence of
demeanor evidence; and (3) absence of oath.41 It is a hornbook doctrine that
an affidavit is merely hearsay evidence where its maker did not take the
witness stand.42
Verily, the sworn statement of Anita was of this kind because she did not
appear in court to affirm her averments therein.
Sisters Anita Lozada Slaughter and Peregrina Lozada Saribay were the
registered co-owners of two lots in Cebu City.
Yet, a more circumspect examination of our rules of exclusion will show that
they do not cover admissions of a party;43 the videotaped statement of Anita
appears to belong to this class.
The sisters, who were based in the United States, sold the lots to their
nephew Antonio J.P. Lozada (Antonio) under a Deed of Sale. Armed with a
Special Power of Attorney8 from Anita, Peregrina went to the house of their
brother, Dr. Antonio Lozada (Dr. Lozada), located at 4356 Faculty Avenue,
Long Beach California.9
In the meantime, PRHC requested the Connel Bros. Co., Philippines for a
quotation of the Peerless UL/FU Fire pump similar to those installed by
Firematic in Tektite Tower I. However, Connel Bros. Philippines, Inc. replied
by letter dated September 2, 1993 that it would be difficult for them to trace
whether they had records of transactions with Technotrade-USA, because the
pump model and serial number that PRHC furnished were not of Peerless
origin."
Meanwhile, Firematic billed PRHC P1,402,559.93 for the balance of the
amount of the automatic sprinkler supplies installed. However, PRHC
rejected the claim.
PRHC sent a letter to Firematic claiming that, based on its Purchase Order,
the brand "Peerless" should have been used; however, the manufacturer of
the brand (Peerless Pump Co., USA), did not have any record of having
manufactured the pumps that Firematic delivered and installed on the Tektite
Towers project.
In a letter dated March 2, 1994, Connel Bros. stated that Peerless Pump Co.
never had direct negotiation with Technotrade, and as such, the latter is not a
dealer of "Peerless" pump.
Firematic sent its final billing and a demand letter prepared by its counsel to
PRHC for the payment of the latter's balance of the contract price amounting
to P3,919,283.13, including the unacted charge order attached
thereto.rbl r l l
PRHC denied liability. It informed Firematic that all the fire pumps and
accessories supplied by it shall be removed, and the cost of replacement,
including the labor cost of the installation, would be chargeable to its account.
Again, Firematic failed to respond.
In the meantime, PRHC purchased the replacement for the "defective"
materials installed by Firematic.
Firematic filed a Complaint for Collection for Sum of Money plus Damages
against PRHC.
PRHC filed a Motion for Leave to Amend Answer to Conform to Evidence
which Firematic opposed. In its Amended Answer, PRHC claimed that, with
respect to the fire sprinkler system, the actual works completed by Firematic
amounted to only P20,613,302.45. Thus, it (PRHC) made an overpayment of
P1,485,000.00. As to the fire alarm system, the works actually completed in
accordance with the technical specifications amounted to only
P2,597,966.49. Again, there was an overpayment of P650,000.00.
RTC: ruled in favor of PRHC. Complaint dismissed.
The RTC concluded that in failing to deliver genuine Peerless Pumps as
agreed upon, and to install fire alarm system that could be interfaced with the
system, Firematic failed to comply with the technical specifications of the
contracts.
CA: reversed RTC.
The CA declared that PRHC's belated claim was highly doubtful since PRHC
had ordered the pumps from Technotrade, albeit through the Firematic, and
were inspected and scrutinized by its consultants who are experts in their
fields. The appellate court likewise agreed with Firematic that the documents
presented in evidence by PRHC to prove that the pumps supplied by
Technotrade were not genuine "Peerless" pumps are inadmissible for being
hearsay. According to the CA, it is possible that it was not the appellant but
Technotrade that was guilty of fraud in supplying dubious pumps to PRHC.
ISSUE:
W/N the Court of Appeals committed reversible error when it unjustifiably
disregarded petitioner's evidence showing the supplied pumps as fakes and
not of "Peerless" origin, on the ground that said evidence is hearsay.
(The threshold issue raised is whether or not the fire pumps supplied and
delivered by respondent to petitioner conformed to the technical
specifications of the contract.)
HELD: NO.
Respondent reiterates that the evidence presented by petitioner to prove that
the fire pumps were not genuine is inadmissible in evidence for being
hearsay. Respondent maintains that, as shown by the evidence on record,
petitioner owed it P10,399,418.89 for the fire sprinkler supplies and fire alarm
system.
Petitioner insists that the fire pumps supplied and installed by respondent are
"not of Peerless origin" because of the following: (1) respondent failed to
present proofs of the genuineness of the pumps; (2) respondent failed to
answer petitioner's letters requiring it to present the aforesaid proofs, thus,
estoppel by silence applies; and (3) the manufacturer of the Peerless pumps
verbally informed Connel Bros. that the subject fire pumps "are not of
Peerless origin."
Well-settled is the rule that the party alleging fraud or mistake in a transaction
bears the burden of proof. The circumstances evidencing fraud are as varied
as the people who perpetrate it in each case. It may assume different shapes
and forms; it may be committed in as many different ways. Thus, the law
requires that fraud be established, not just by preponderance of evidence,
but by clear and convincing evidence.
In this case, petitioner relied on the principle of estoppel by silence, as well
as on Letter No. L/93-272 and Letter No. L/94-043 of Connel Bros. to prove
that the fire pumps, which respondent supplied and installed, were not
genuine.
However, petitioner failed to present the signatory of the letters (E.L. Sta.
Maria, Jr.) to testify on the veracity of the contents of the letters; thus,
respondent was not given the opportunity to cross-examine him. It also
appears that the person who signed the letters had no personal knowledge of
the facts stated therein, as he claimed that he had been "verbally advised"
that the manufacturer of Peerless pumps never had direct negotiation with
Technotrade, and as such, the latter is not a dealer of the pumps.
(NOTE: Below is the related ruling, sorry I just followed the flow of the actual
decision mao wala siya sa taas nakabutang after sa ISSUE)
Well-entrenched is the rule that a private certification is hearsay where the
person who issued the same was never presented as a witness. The same is
true of letters. While hearsay evidence may be admitted because of lack of
objection by the adverse party's counsel, it is nonetheless without probative
value. Stated differently, the declarants of written statements pertaining to
disputed facts must be presented at the trial for cross-examination. The lack
of objection may make incompetent evidence admissible, but admissibility of
evidence should not be equated with weight of evidence. Indeed, hearsay
evidence whether objected to or not has no probative value.
Petitioner asserts that respondent impliedly admitted that the fire pumps it
installed were "not of Peerless origin" because of its failure to dispute
petitioner's accusation and to present proofs that the fire pumps delivered
were genuine. Thus, petitioner contends that estoppel by silence applies to
respondent.
Labor Arbiter Mayor, Jr. Decision: OSCI and PSI are hereby ordered to jointly
and severally pay complainant.
In the meantime, pending resolution of the instant case, Romy B. Bastol died
on December 13, 2009 from his undisputed ailment of acute myocardial
infarction.
SC RULING:
We deny the appeal for lack of merit.
ISSUES:
admission when Labor Arbiter Lustria did not act on its Motion to Dismiss
filed on July 25, 2001 on the ground of Bastol's failure to present additional
evidence. Neither did Labor Arbiter Lustria give it an opportunity to submit
contrary evidence by setting, at the very least, another hearing. Thus, OSCI
concludes that Labor Arbiter Lustria acted wantonly, whimsically and
capriciously to its grave prejudice by admitting and using the late submission
of Bastol as basis for his decision, and the CA, in turn, gravely erred in
sanctioning the Labor Arbiter by granting Bastol's petition for certiorari. We
cannot agree. The nature of the proceedings before the Labor Arbiter is not
only non-litigious and summary, but the Labor Arbiter is also given great
leeway to resolve the case; thus, he may "avail himself of all reasonable
means to ascertain the facts of the controversy." The belated submission of
additional documentary evidence by Bastol after the case was already
submitted for decision did not make the proceedings before the Labor Arbiter
improper. The basic reason is that technical rules of procedure are not
binding in labor cases. Indeed, technical rules of evidence do not apply if the
decision to grant the petition proceeds from an examination of its sufficiency
as well as a careful look into the arguments contained in position papers and
other documents. And neither can OSCI rely on lack of due process. The
essence of due process lies simply in an opportunity to be heard, and not
that an actual hearing should always and indispensably he held. Considering
that OSCI indeed contested the late submission of Bastol by filing its most
vehement objection thereto on November 27, 2001, it cannot complain of not
being accorded the opportunity to be heard and much less can it demand for
the setting of an actual hearing. What OSCI could have and ought to have
done was to present its own counter-affidavits. But it did not.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the instant petition for lack of
merit. The Decision of CA is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that
what is REINSTATED is the Decision of Labor Arbiter LUSTRIA.
Notes:
A job of a bosun, as the position of petitioner, is not exactly a walk in the
park. A bosun manages actual deck work schedules and assignments
directed by the Chief Officer and emergency duties as indicated in the Station
Bill. He attends to maintenance and upkeep of all deck equipment, cargo,
riggings, safety equipment and helps in maintaining discipline of the deck
hands. He assists in ships emergency drills and in any event of emergency
and performs other duties and responsibilities as instructed or as necessary.
Principle of "Law of the Case" inapplicable "Law of the case" has been
defined as the opinion delivered on a former appeal--it is a term applied to an
established rule that when an appellate court passes on a question and
remands the case to the lower court for further proceedings, the question
there settled becomes the law of the case upon subsequent appeal.
The EREU then filed a petition for certification election in Eagle Ridge Golf &
Country Club. Eagle Ridge opposed this petition, followed by its filing of a
petition for the cancellation of EREUs Reg. Cert. Eagle Ridges petition
ascribed misrepresentation, false statement, or fraud to EREU in connection
with the adoption of its constitution and by-laws, the numerical composition of
the Union, and the election of its officers. [That the EREU declared in its
application for registration having 30 members, when the minutes of its
December 6 organizational meeting showed it only had 26 members. The
misrepresentation was exacerbated by the discrepancy between the
certification issued by the Union secretary and president that 25 members
actually ratified the constitution and by-laws and the fact that 26 members
affixed their signatures on the documents, making one signature a forgery.]
Finally, Eagle Ridge contended that 5 employees who attended the
organizational meeting executed affidavits or Sinumpaang Salaysay attesting
that they arrived late at said meeting; that they did not know that the
documents they signed pertained to the organization of a union; and that they
now wanted to be excluded from the Union. The withdrawal, Eagle Ridge
maintained, reduced the union membership to 20 or 21, below the mandatory
minimum 20% membership requirement under Art. 234(c) of the Labor Code.
Reckoned from 112 rank-and-file employees of Eagle Ridge, the required
number would be 22 or 23 employees.
To rebut the allegations in the affidavits of retraction of the union members,
EREU presented the Sama-Samang Sinumpaang Salaysay dated March 20
of 8 union members; another Sama-Samang Sinumpaang Salaysay, also
bearing date March 20, of 4 other union members; and the Sworn Statement
dated March 16 of the Unions legal counsel, Atty. Domingo T. Aonuevo.
These affidavits attested to the orderly and proper proceedings of the
organizational meeting on December 6, 2005.
DOLE Regional Director: Eagle Ridges petition for cancellation was granted.
EREU was delisted from the roster of legitimate labor organizations.
Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR): Reversal. EREU shall remain in the roster
of legitimate labor organizations.
CA: Dismissed Eagle Ridges MR.
ISSUE: WON the affidavits of retraction are admissible in evidence against
the Union.
HELD:
The probative value of the affidavits cannot overcome those of the supporting
affidavits of 12 union members and their counsel as to the proceedings and
the conduct of the organizational meeting on December 6.
The 6 affiants of the affidavits of retraction were not presented in a hearing
before the Hearing Officer (DOLE Regional Director), as required under the
Rules Implementing Book V of the Labor Code covering Labor Relations.
Said Rules is embodied in Department Order No. (DO) 40-03 and took effect
on March 15, 2003 to replace DO 9 of 1997. Sec. 11, Rule XI of DO 40-03
specifically requires:
It is settled that affidavits partake the nature of hearsay evidence, since they
are not generally prepared by the affiant but by another who uses his own
language in writing the affiants statement, which may thus be either omitted
or misunderstood by the one writing them. The above rule affirms the general
requirement in adversarial proceedings for the examination of the affiant by
the party against whom the affidavit is offered. In the instant case, it is
required for affiants to re-affirm the contents of their affidavits during the
hearing of the instant case for them to be examined by the opposing party,
i.e., the Union.
Evidently, the allegations in the six affidavits of retraction have no probative
value and at the very least cannot outweigh the rebutting attestations of the
duly re-affirmed affidavits presented by the Union.
Petition DISMISSED.
ISSUE: WON the CA erred in declaring that petitioner was not able to
sufficiently establish conspiracy among Joyohoy and Ronald and Cesario.
HELD:
It was established that the goods were brought out of the warehouse upon
the order of Joyohoy who should have delivered the products to the
authorized dealers, collected their payments, then remitted his collections to
petitioners depositary bank. Unfortunately, Joyohoy used his position and
abused the trust reposed in him, in misappropriating the subject paint
products.
In finding Ronald and Cesario liable, the trial court relied on the testimony of
the warehouseman Romeo Gutierrez (Romeo) that Joyohoy instructed him
on several occasions to release to the former various paint products. The
testimony of Manuel Antolin (Antolin) was also cited to show how the alleged
defraudation was discovered by petitioner. Likewise adduced as evidence
was the handwritten response letter sent by Joyohoy to petitioner stating that
the subject paint products were withdrawn by Ronald and Cesario and/or
their representatives. Said pieces of evidence, however, lack probative value.
A thorough evaluation of the testimony of Romeo shows that, indeed, the
subject paint products were withdrawn from the warehouse upon the
authority and instruction of Joyohoy. However, it is wanting in details as to the
alleged participation of Ronald and Cesario that would make them
conspirators in defrauding petitioner. While petitioner claimed in its complaint
that Ronald and Cesario had a hand in the preparation of fictitious sales
orders and invoices, Romeo admitted in his testimony that he himself was the
one who prepared them upon the instruction of Joyohoy. If at all, Ronald and
Cesarios participation was limited to receiving the subject paint products. But
apart from Romeos bare allegation, there is no iota of evidence to show such
fact of receipt.
The testimony of Antolin establishes a disparity in the accounts, as appearing
in petitioners records and those of the dealers. It shows that Joyohoy was
repeatedly involved in anomalous transactions by preparing fictitious sales
invoices, withdrawing paint products from the warehouse, then selling them
to various establishments in Mindanao with whom petitioner had no dealings.
However, notwithstanding the overwhelming evidence against Joyohoy, no
clear evidence could link Ronald and Cesario to these fraudulent
transactions.
As to the letter of Joyohoy, wherein he narrated the participation of Ronald
and Cesario, considering that he did not testify on the contents thereof, the
same is hearsay. An unverified and unidentified private document cannot be
accorded probative value. It must be rejected because the party against
whom it is presented is deprived of the right and opportunity to crossexamine the person to whom the statements or writings are attributed. Its
executor or author should be presented as a witness to provide the other
party the opportunity to question its contents. The petitioners failure to
present the author of the letter renders its contents suspect and of no
probative value.
In view of the foregoing, Ronald and Cesario cannot be held jointly and
severally liable with Joyohoy. The CA was, therefore, correct in dismissing
the complaint as against Ronald and Cesario.
NOTE: It is a basic rule in civil cases that the party having the burden of proof
must establish his case by preponderance of evidence. Preponderance of
evidence is the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate evidence on either
side and is usually considered to be synonymous with the term greater
weight of the evidence or greater weight of the credible evidence. It is
evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that
which is offered in opposition thereto. Although the evidence adduced by
plaintiff is stronger than that presented by defendant, a judgment cannot be
entered in favor of the former, if his evidence is not sufficient to sustain his
cause of action.
discussed as to how much is the fee and how the killing will be had. They
ordered him to return back to the vehicle and just fetched them in
Binangonan.
On Cross, he testified that he with Beverly went to Hilltop Police Station and
fetched Malibiran and company to go to Paombong Bulacan. When they
reached the bridge near the sea, they rode a banca, about six of them plus
the one rowing the boar towards an Island. In the Island, there was one
person waiting. He stayed there for just for about ten (10) minutes, and
during that period, at about one arms length he overheard their conversation
concerning a man to bring the bomb in the car.
The Prosecution also presented Janet Pascual. She testified that on
December of 1994, Beverly was able to duplicate Reynaldos key at the time
when they have shopped for many things, Reynaldo asked her to bring the
goods to the car in the compartment as the kids would still shop. After having
done so, she proceeded to a key duplicator in Virra Mall and had the key
duplicated. Thereafter on the succeeding days or weeks, she was able to
give the duplicate to Malibiran. That they would use the grenade since
Malibiran has one in his house but his only problem is how to get inside the
car and place the grenade.
As to when the killing would take place, the witness heard that they will do it
during the baptism of the child of Gloria, Rolando Malibirans sister. They
chose that date so that they would not be suspected of anything and that
pictures would be taken in the baptism to reflect that Malibiran took part in
the same. During the wake, witness met Malibiran and told her among others
that on the day he placed a grenade on Reynaldos car he saw a security
guard roving and so what he did was to hurriedly tie the wire in the grenade.
As far as she knows, there were four or five grenades placed. She told this
secret to another friend so that in case something happened to her, it was the
doing of Malibiran and Beverly.
On Cross examination, she was asked whether Malibiran did it alone, she
said that he has a look out as what Malibiran told him. When confronted why
she was testifying only now, she said she was bothered by her conscience.
As to how did she get the information of key duplication, she said that it was
told to her by Beverly.
The Trial Court convicted both the accused of the crime charged. The CA
affirmed the conviction. Reynaldo did not appeal hence the judgment of
conviction as to him because final and executory. Only Beverly now comes
before the SC.
Appellant claims that the circumstantial evidence proven during trial only
shows that there was a possibility that appellant may have conspired with
Rolando, but nevertheless claims that it came short of proving her guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. She further argues that the testimony of Oswaldo
was in some parts hearsay and replete with inconsistencies. Specifically,
appellant contends that the testimony of Oswaldo that "he overheard a
conversation between Malibiran (Rolando) and Beverly (appellant) that they
will fetch a man in Bulacan that knows how to place a bomb in a vehicle" is
hearsay. Likewise, in her Reply Brief, appellant claims that the testimony of
Janet is hearsay.
ISSUE: 1) WHETHER OR NOT THE WITNESS TESTIMONY IS HEARSAY NO
2) WHETHER CONVICTION WAS PROPER BASED ON CIRCUMSTANTIAL
EVIDENCE (you may or may not discuss this issue) - YES
HELD:
1) The testimonies of Oswaldo and Janet are not covered by the hearsay
rule.
The hearsay rule states that a witness may not testify as to what he merely
learned from others either because he was told, or he read or heard the
same. This is derived from Section 36, Rule
130, Revised Rules of Court, which requires that a witness can testify only to
those facts that he knows of or comes from his personal knowledge, that is,
that are derived from his perception. Hearsay testimony may not be received
as proof of the truth of what he has learned.
The law, however, provides for specific exceptions to the hearsay rule. One is
the doctrine of independently relevant statements, where only the fact that
such statements were made is relevant, and the truth or falsity thereof is
immaterial. The hearsay rule does not apply; hence, the statements are
admissible as evidence. Evidence as to the making of such statement is not
secondary but primary, for the statement itself may constitute a fact in issue
or be circumstantially relevant as to the existence of such a fact. The witness
who testifies thereto is competent because he heard the same, as this is a
matter of fact derived from his own perception, and the purpose is to prove
either that the statement was made or the tenor thereof.
In this case, Oswaldo's testimony that he overhead a conversation between
Rolando and appellant that they would fetch a man in Bulacan who knew
how to place a bomb in a vehicle is admissible, if only to establish the fact
that such statement was made and the tenor thereof. Likewise, Janet may
testify on matters not only uttered in her presence, since these may be
considered as independently relevant statements, but also personally
conveyed to her by appellant and Rolando.
2) There is nothing on record to convince the Court to depart from the
findings of the RTC. On the contrary, the testimony of Janet as corroborated
by Oswaldo, though circumstantial, leaves no doubt that appellant had in fact
conspired with Rolando in bringing about the death of her husband Reynaldo.
As a rule of ancient respectability now molded into tradition, circumstantial
evidence suffices to convict, only if the following requisites concur: (a) there
is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are
derived are proven; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such
as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
AS TO APPELLANTS FLIGHT/EVASION OF ARREST:
What sealed appellant's fate was that, as observed by the RTC, there were
already outstanding warrants of arrest against appellant and Rolando as
early as September 11, 1997; yet they evaded arrest and were only arrested
on December 4, 1998. It is well settled that flight, when unexplained, is a
circumstance from which an inference of guilt may be drawn. "The wicked
flee, even when no man pursueth; but the righteous are as bold as a lion.
Appellant did not even proffer the slightest explanation for her flight.
AS TO HER INDIFFERENCE/LACK OF EMOTIONS:
Appellant's seeming indifference or lack of emotions cannot be categorically
quantified as an indicium of her guilt. There is no hard and fast gauge for
measuring a person's reaction or behavior when confronted with a startling,
not to mention horrifying, occurrence. It has already been stated that
witnesses of startling occurrences react differently depending upon their
situation and state of mind, and there is no standard form of human
behavioral response when one is confronted with a strange, startling or
frightful experience. The workings of the human mind placed under emotional
stress are unpredictable, and people react differently some may shout,
some may faint and others may be shocked into insensibility. Also,
appellant's failure to testify in her defense should not be taken against her.
The Court preserves the rule that an accused has the right to decline to
testify at the trial without any inference of guilt drawn from his failure to be on
the witness stand. The constitutional right to be presumed innocent still
prevails.
The purpose of all evidence is to get at the truth. The reason for the hearsay
rule is that the extrajudicial and unsworn statement of another is not the best
method of serving this purpose. In other words, the great possibility of the
fabrication of falsehoods, and the inability to prove their untruth, requires that
the doors be closed to such evidence. So long therefore as a declarant is
available as a witness, his extrajudicial statement should not be heard.
Where, however, the declarant is dead or has disappeared, his previous
statements, out of court, if not inadmissible on other grounds, are the best
evidence. But they are not rendered inadmissible by the mere fact that the
declarant is unavailable, something else is necessary. One fact which will
satisfy this necessity is that the declaration is or was against the declarant's
interest, and this is because no sane person will be presumed to tell a
falsehood to his own detriment.
Facts:
[1] That death is imminent and the declarant is conscious of that fact;
This involves a murder case against one Rodel Yarza who arrived at his
home from Divisoria, and told his wife Zenaida after dinner to play pusoy (a
game of cards) somewhere in their neighborhood.
[2] That the declaration refers to the cause and surrounding circumstances of
such death;
At about 9oclock in the eve, his wife went out to fetch her husband and was
told by the latter to go home ahead and would soon follow her.
[3] That the declaration relates to facts which the victim is competent to testify
to; and
Shortly after the wife reached home, she was informed by her brother (Alex
Tablizo) that her husband was seriously stabbed and was brought to the
nearby hospital.
[4] That the declaration is offered in a case wherein the declarants death is
the subject of inquiry
The wife left immediately to see her husband, and upon arrival, she went
beside him and asked who it was who stabbed him. He replied: Nette, my
playmates and the one who stabbed me was Rene.
Soon after, due to financial reasons, the victim was forced to transfer to
another hospital. At around 2:30 in the morning, he was pronounced dead.
Trial Court issued warrants of arrest against the four accused, but only
Renato Bautista was arrested at his parents home while the other three
remained at large.
Upon arraignment, accused pleaded not guilty and posed different version of
story (read fulltext, not worth repeated, only weak alibis)
Eventually, TC and CA convicted the accused.
Maintaining his innocence, accused-appellant argued that the testimony of
Zenaida Yarza should not be admitted as a dying declaration simply because
it was not made under the consciousness of impending death.
Issue: WON Zenaidas testimony is admissible?
Held:
YES, as an exception to the hearsay rule.
The general rule is that [A] witness can testify only to those facts which he
knows of his personal knowledge; that is, which are derived from his own
In the given case, while it is true that the victim, Rodel Yarza, did not explicitly
mention that he knows or feels that he is about to die, this does not negative
the fact that the victim, who was already pale, weak from a fatal wound, and
perspiring profusely, was conscious of his impending death at the time he
declared to his wife who attacked and stabbed him. He in fact died a few
hours thereafter. The law does not require that the declarant explicitly state
his perception[12] that he has given up the hope of life.[13] It is enough if,
from the circumstances, it can be inferred with certainty that such must have
been his state of mind.[14] Judged by the nature and extent of his wounds,
there can be no other conclusion than that the victim must have realized the
seriousness of his condition. Thus, it can safely be inferred that he made the
declaration under the consciousness of impending death.
Accused-appellant insists that had the victim believed his death was
imminent, he would have immediately given the details of the attack against
him; instead, he acquiesced to his wifes suggestion, while they were at the
hospital, that they talk about it later after his condition be safe first.[19] Thus,
the defense argues, the victim Rodel Yarza, at the time he gave his so-called
dying declaration was confident that he would recover from his wounds.
We are unpersuaded. The hope to survive, as we know, springs eternal in the
human heart, but then the victim knew in this case that his life was,
notwithstanding medical intervention, slowly ebbing away. Contrary to the
contention of the defense, Rodel Yarzas alleged acquiesence to his wifes
suggestion that they talk about the details of the incident later when his
condition be safe first bolsters the position that, indeed, the victim was only
too aware of the seriousness of his condition.
Moreover, the fact that Rodel Yarza did not expire right after his declaration to
his wife at about 10:00 oclock in the evening of December 14, 1989, but
survived until 2:30 oclock the following morning, or about four (4) hours from
the time he made the declaration, will not alter the probative force of his
dying declaration since it is not indispensable that a declarant expires
immediately thereafter. It is the belief in impending death and not the rapid
succession of death, in point of fact, that renders the dying declaration
admissible
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the court a quo is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
rkd/
exciting influence of the startling occurrence, the victim made the declaration
without any prior opportunity to contrive a story implicating petitioner. Also,
the declaration concerned the one who shot the victim. Thus, the latters
statement was correctly appreciated as part of the res gestae.
Aside from the victims statement, which is part of the res gestae, that of
Ernita -- Kapitan, ngano nimo gipatay ang akong bana? (Captain, why did
you shoot my husband?) -- may be considered to be in the same category.
Her statement was about the same startling occurrence; it was uttered
spontaneously, right after the shooting, while she had no opportunity to
concoct a story against petitioner; and it related to the circumstances of the
shooting.
Facts:
Petitioners Jesus Geraldo and Amado Ariate were charged with Homicide
against the victim ARTHUR U. RONQUILLO (shot with a gun)
In a document dated July 1, 2002 and denominated as "Affidavit"5 which was
subscribed and sworn to before Clerk of Court II Manuel A. Balasa, Sr. on
July 26, 2002, the victim's son Arnel gave a statement in a question and
answer style that herein petitioners Jesus Geraldo and Amado Ariate were
the ones who shot his father.
In another document dated July 4, 2002 also denominated as "Affidavit"6
which was subscribed and sworn to also before the same Clerk of Court II
Balasa on July 26, 2002, Mirasol also gave a statement in a question and
answer style that her father uttered that herein petitioners shot him.
At the witness stand, Mirasol echoed her father's declaration that "Badjing"
and "Amado" shot him. Arnel substantially corroborated Mirasol's statement.7
Upon the other hand, petitioners gave their side of the case as follows:
Petitioner Ariate, a barangay tanod of Bunga, declared that Barangay
Kagawad Omboy Roz (Roz) woke him up at 3:00 a.m. of July 1, 2002 and
informed him that the victim was shot. He and Roz thus borrowed a tricycle,
proceeded to the crime scene and, along with others, brought the victim to
the hospital where he was pronounced dead on arrival. Ariate submitted
himself to a paraffin test and tested negative for gunpowder residue/nitrates.8
Petitioner Geraldo declared that he slept in his house located also in
Barangay Bunga, Lanuza at 9:30 p.m. of June 30, 2002 and woke up at 4:00
a.m. the following day. At 6:30 a.m., on seeing many people in the vicinity of
the 45-meter away house of one Josita Bongabong where the victim's body
was found, he inquired and learned that the victim was shot. Policemen
subsequently went to his house and advised him to take a paraffin test. He
obliged and was tested at the PNP Crime Laboratory and was found negative
for gunpowder residue/nitrates.9
In the course of the testimony of Ariate, his counsel presented the PNP
Chemistry Report reflecting the negative results of the paraffin test on him
and Geraldo.
RTC: convicted accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Homicide. On the nature and weight of the dying declaration of the victim, the
trial court observed:
A dying declaration may be xxx oral or in writing. As a general rule, a dying
declaration to be admissible must be made by the declarant while he is
conscious of his impending death. However, even if a declarant did not make
a statement that he was on the brink of death, the degree and seriousness of
the wound and the fact that death supervened shortly afterwards may be
considered as substantial evidence that the declaration was made by the
victim with full realization that he was in a dying condition; People vs. Ebrada,
296 SCRA 353.
Even assuming that the declaration is not admissible as a dying declaration,
it is still admissible as part of the res gestae since it was made shortly after
the startling occurrence and under the influence thereof, hence, under the
circumstances, the victim evidently had no opportunity to contrive.15
(Underscoring supplied)
Dr. Valentin T. Bernales (Dr. Bernales), the medico-legal officer who issued
the autopsy report, testified that the victim was stabbed twice at the back and
the assailant was situated within arms length. The victim succumbed from
the stab wounds, both of which, are fatal. Dr. Bernales also noted that there
were contuse abrasions on different parts of the victims body.
Appellants invoked denial and alibi as their defense. Joe-An, a resident of
Wawa, Sto. Nio, alleged that he was at his house on 8 December 2002.
While he was taking his dinner, he saw people running towards the bridge.
He went out of the house to check on what had happened. He approached a
group of people talking about the commotion. Thereafter, he saw the police
and barangay tanods arrive. He was immediately handcuffed and asked to
go with the police. Joe-An alleged that he was physically forced by the police
to admit the killing of Nio. Joe-An denied knowing the victim or his girlfriend,
Dianne, but admitted that Joel is an acquaintance.
Joel likewise denied his participation in killing Nio. He stated that he was
sleeping at around 11 p.m. on 8 December 2002 when he was awakened by
an argument involving his mother and four (4) men outside his room. He then
got out of the room and saw PO3 Lipana, PO2 Brigola, and two other police
"assets." The group invited him for questioning. When the two assets
suddenly grabbed him, Joel resisted but he was forcibly brought to the police
station. He saw Dianne at the station but the latter did not identify him as the
culprit. Instead, Dianne even sought his help to identify the person who killed
her boyfriend. This fact notwithstanding, the police refused to let him go. He
testified that he did not know the victim or Dianne personally.
The RTC rendered judgment convicting appellants, and were sentenced to
suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA pursuant to R.A. 9346 which
repealed the death penalty law. However, pursuant to Sec. 3 thereof, they are
not eligible for parole.
Lending full credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, the
trial court concluded that the appellants conspired in assaulting and stabbing
Nio. It gave full weight to the dying declaration uttered by Nio to his
brother, as well as the statement of Dianne, who allegedly witnessed
appellants threaten Nio the night before the incident. It also appreciated the
aggravating circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation in the
commission of the crime. Furthermore, the trial court regarded the
uncorroborated testimonies of appellants to be "full of inconsistencies and
unworthy of weight and credence."
The Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the decision of the RTC by
awarding exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000.00.
ISSUE:
(1) Whether the testimonies of the witnesses are sufficient to prove
appellants guilt beyond reasonable doubt?
(2) Whether or not Nios dying declaration is admissible in the case at bar?
RULING:
No.
(1) We respect the findings that Jonel Falabrica Serenas is guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of murder not by virtue of identification by Dianne but as
established by the dying declaration of the victim. Upon the other hand, we
reverse the conviction of Joel Lorica Labad.
The trial court, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, accorded full weight to
the testimony of the prosecution witness, Dianne, who declared on the
witness stand that she actually saw appellants maul and stab the victim.
Diannes testimony is doubtful to say the least. This Court is mindful of the
rule that if there is an inconsistency between the affidavit and the testimony
of a witness, the latter should be given more weight since affidavits being
taken ex-parte are usually incomplete and inaccurate. Corollary to this is the
doctrine that, where the discrepancies are irreconcilable and unexplained
and they dwell on material points, such inconsistencies necessarily discredit
the veracity of the witness' claim. The second rule is apt to the case at bar.
Nowhere in her affidavit did Dianne point to appellants as the perpetrators of
the crime. From the tenor of her affidavit, Diannes suspicion that appellants
committed the crime merely arose from the alleged threats made by
appellants on the victim the day before the incident.
We cannot simply brush aside the fact that while Dianne pointed to the
persons who threatened to do harm on the victim, she failed to identify who
the perpetrators of the crime are. To the mind of the Court, this omission in
Diannes affidavit is so glaring on a material point, i.e., the failure to attribute
authorship to the crime. Therefore, the testimony of Dianne altogether
becomes suspect.
Nevertheless, the prosecutions case did not necessarily crumble. The
victims dying declaration is a most telling evidence identifying Joe-an.
(2) Yes.
Appellants question the alleged dying declaration of the victim in that they
were not sufficiently identified as the persons responsible for Nios death.
Appellants anchor their argument on the utterance of the word "Joe-An"
when the victim was asked on who stabbed him. Appellants advance that the
victim may have been referring to some other person. Moreover, the victim
did not even mention "Joel" or "Joel Labad," the other suspect.
The OSG defends the victims dying declaration and insists that there was no
mistake that the victim was indeed referring to Joe-An, considering that the
latter was familiar to him.
As an exception to the rule against hearsay evidence, a dying declaration or
ante mortem statement is evidence of the highest order and is entitled to
utmost credence since no person aware of his impending death would make
a careless and false accusation.
In order for a dying declaration to be held admissible, four requisites must
concur: first, the declaration must concern the cause and surrounding
circumstances of the declarant's death; second, at the time the declaration
was made, the declarant must be under the consciousness of an impending
death; third, the declarant is competent as a witness; and fourth, the
declaration must be offered in a criminal case for homicide, murder, or
parricide, in which the declarant is the victim.
All requisites for a dying declaration were sufficiently met by the statement of
the victim communicated to Cesar. First, the statement pertained to Nio
being stabbed, particularly pin-pointing Joe-An as the perpetrator. Second,
Nio must have been fully aware that he was on the brink of death
considering his bloodied condition when Cesar met him near the bridge.
Third, the competence of Nio is
unquestionable had he survived the stabbing incident. Fourth, Nios
statement was being offered in a criminal prosecution for his murder.
Note however that based on the testimonies of witnesses, there was no
direct evidence linking appellant Joel to the crime.
While the police officers caught Joel hiding under the bridge, this incident
appears to be circumstantial and cannot stand to prove Joels complicity
without any corroborating evidence. Admittedly, Joels defense of denial and
alibi are inherently weak, however, it is doctrinal that the weakness of the
defense cannot be the basis for conviction. The primary burden still lies with
the prosecution whose evidence must stand or fall on its own weight and who
must establish by proof beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused
before there can be conviction. At this juncture, we acquit appellant Joel.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals was MODIFIED. Appellant JONEL
FALABRICA SERENAS was found GUILTY of the crime of murder and was
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. For failure of the
prosecution to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, appellant JOEL
LORICA LABAD was ACQUITTED.
superior strength. The appellant, through the Public Attorney's Office (PAO),
appealed the Decision of the CA to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Analyns statement can be considered a dying declaration
based on Rule 130 of the Rules of Court?
RULING:
Section 37, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, provides:
FACTS:
The evidence of the prosecution follows:
Geraldino Galido (Geraldino) testified that at 9 o'clock in the evening of
November 6, 1994, while he was in his house together with his two brothers,
his brother-in-law and second cousin, they heard three (3) shouts for help
coming from the house of Efren Galido (Efren). They immediately went to the
place and at the distance of about 7 to 8 meters, he saw appellant stab the
victim Analyn twice while she was lying on her back. He was able to identify
the appellant because of the torch being carried by the women near him.
Efren, live-in partner of Analyn, testified that appellant is known as "Digol" in
their place. At 9 o'clock in the evening of November 6, 1994, he was at the
house of his elder brother Geraldino, which is about 100 meters away from
his house. While at the house of his brother, he heard a shout coming from
his niece, Ivy Jean Borra. Upon hearing Ivy, he immediately ran home. When
he arrived home, he saw his son sleeping, so he went downstairs and
proceeded to the road where he met his sister-in-law holding a torch. He got
a torch from his sister-in-law, went ahead and looked for Analyn. He found
Analyn lying and moaning on the grassy portion of the side of the road about
20 meters away from their house. He lifted Analyn and saw blood coming
from her breast. He asked Analyn who did it to her and Analyn answered,
"Digol." He placed Analyn on the ground and tried to run after the person who
did it to her, but he was restrained by his brother.
Dr. Edgardo Jabasa testified that he conducted an autopsy on the body of
Analyn. He found nine (9) stab wounds in the body of Analyn. Two of the stab
wounds penetrated the heart, making it impossible for the victim to survive.
He also testified that Analyn's uterus was enlarged at 6 to 7 months gestation
with a dead male fetus. He further testified that the wounds appear to have
been inflicted by a single sharp bladed and pointed instrument.
Upon the other hand, the defense adduced the testimonies of the appellant,
Felimon Salcedo, Marcelina Lecta and Mario Manatoc. Appellant's main
defense is alibi.
The RTC of San Miguel, Jordan, Guimaras rendered a Decision finding
appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder.
Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal and the case was elevated to the CA for
review. The CA rendered a Decision affirming with modification the decision
of the RTC. It ruled that the appellant is guilty of murder qualified by abuse of
there is the least chance for the accused to be present at the crime scene,
the defense of alibi must fail.
WHEREFORE, the appeal was DISMISSED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals was AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. Appellant Rodrigo Salcedo,
alias Digol, was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder,
and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua without any
benefit of parole under R.A. No. 9346.
In the early case of People v. Sasota, 9 the Court affirmed the conviction of
the accused for murder although the body of the victim was not found or
recovered. In said case, the SC ruled that in case of murder or homicide, it is
not necessary to recover the body of the victim or show where it can be
found. It is enough that the death and the criminal agency causing death is
proven. The Court recognized that there are cases where the death and
intervention of the criminal agency that caused it may be presumed or
established by circumstantial evidence.
However, the ruling in the Sasota case cannot be applied to the case at
bench. In the Sasota case, the prosecution witnesses saw the four (4) armed
accused forcibly take the victim from his house to a lake, beating him up all
the way to the boat. While sailing, the accused continued ill-treating the
victim until the latter died. The body of the victim was never found.
In this case, however, the prosecution witnesses testified that they merely
saw one of the accused, Carlos Daguing, tie up the hands of Moronia. He
was then taken in the direction of barangay Monterico and was never seen or
heard from since. At no point during the trial was it ever established that any
of the eight (8) accused beat up Moronia or in any way laid a violent hand on
him.
Nogalada even testified that he did not hear any shot fired by any of the eight
(8) armed accused 10 so as to warrant a reasonable conclusion that Moronia
was killed by accused-appellant or any of his co-conspirators.
Indeed, even the possible motive of accused-appellant and his group for
abducting Moronia was not definitively established.
FACTS:
could render succor or save him;" 21 (4) the deceased could not have
threatened the accused, Alex Padrones, or accost him challengingly, because
"[dluring one's birthday one is engrossed with his friends and no doubt did
never (sic) think or prepare for any trouble; 22 and that (5) Padrones could
not have been the victim of a mauling because "he did not submit [himself]
for treatment. (read the full text kay lingaw ang findings sa RTC :p )
ISSUE:
1. WON the handwritten statement of deceased Sison is admissible as
evidence. NO
2. WON Biare shall be convicted? NO
The records of the case disclose that the victim was at the MGR Family
Disco and Restaurant MGR for brevity), at Surallah, South Cotabato,
celebrating his birthday over beer and refreshment with about fourteen
nephews and nieces, 3 whereupon the two accused-appellants arrived, one
after the other. Joseph Biare arrived at about 12:30 or one o'clock in the
morning of August 4, 1986, and about ten minutes later, Alex Padrones
appeared.
The two accused were friends who had not met for six months. They
exchanged pleasantries and separated thereafter. Padrones sat at a table
where he met certain women with one of whom he danced. Biare meanwhile
sat alone on another table.
The victim then approached Padrones, squeezed his mouth, and uttered
challenging words: "Are you not afraid of the Sisons?" 6 (In apparent
reference to the Sisons of South Cotabato, a family with a long history of
local and national political authority and clout).
Padrones blocked the victim's hand and alleged that he saw a knife shining
amidst blinking disco lights.7 He likewise alleged that the Victim began
attacking him with his knife, which he was able to parry with his left hand.
Antonio Llaneta, who was with the victim, struck him (Padrones) on the left
cheek.
When the brawl ended, Biare brought Padrones to the latters home.
On August 6, 1986, the authorities commenced frustrated homicide charges
against Alex Padrones only.
On August 13, 1986, Lorenzo Sison signed a handwritten statement in his
hospital bed to the Surallah police accusing Padrones of having inflicted one
stab wound on him. He also implicated Biare and charged him with stabbing
him once. 15
On August 21, 1986, he expired on account of respiratory failure and internal
bleeding.
Fiscal Isaac Moran of the Provincial Fiscal's office filed an amended
information accusing both accused of murder, qualified by treachery and
evident premeditation.
RTC convicted both accused of murder.
RTCs findings:
(1) the two accused-appellants went to MGR on August 3, 1986 in a wellplanned conspiracy to eliminate the deceased; (2) they pretended that they
had just met there by chance, but had all along plotted to kill the victim; (3)
the accused-appellant, Joseph Biare, deliberately positioned himself so that
"no one of the several companions of the victim who celebrated his birthday
RULING:
1. It constitutes hearsay evidence and is inadmissible.
The victim's alleged antemortem statement is not in fact, an antemortem
statement. 41 It was executed on August 13, 1986, when the deceased died
on August 21, 1986. A dying declaration, to be one, must have been "under
the consciousness of an impending death. 42 At the time he rendered it, he
could not say that he was on the pangs of death, based on his actual
condition at that time, and that he believed that death was soon at hand. 43
It bears to stress that a mere cursory examination of the three signatures
appearing on the three-page statement, in bold and clear strokes with two of
them occupying four inches of the page, and in grand flourishes, pronounced
and considered by the trial judge as a dying declaration, precludes any
indication that the signer thereof was under an impending death. Further, if
the deceased were truly on the point of death, he could not have had the
strength to affix three signatures as above described.
2. The testimony of Antonio Llaneta suggests that both accused lunged at the
victim once each giving rise to two injuries.
In the stand, Llaneta testified that he believed that it was Jojo Biare who
was the other person who stabbed Sison since he was near with their group.
While he was categorical that Alex Padrones did inflict a stabbing wound on
Lorenzo Sison, he could not say the same thing as far as Joseph Biare was
concerned. It was his opinion or belief that Biare did make a thrust on the
victim, but evidently that was his opinion. Our law on evidence, however,
excludes opinions, as a general rule, and allows only facts. 33 What is
important is that he did not see Biare in the act of thrusting his knife.
It is also noteworthy that in his sworn statement to the police 34 executed the
morning after the incident, Llaneta did not implicate Biare, but confessed
having seen Padrones only, stabbing the victim twice. In addition, the
prosecution itself never pressed him, Llaneta, in naming Biare; apparently the
latter's name cropped up upon the very prodding of the trial judge. The record
indeed shows that upon His Honor's questioning, "In your doubt, who was
that person?" 35 the defense objected, "We object, he said he was not sure,"
36 although His Honor overruled the latter: "Let that be on record. " 37
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, the accused, Joseph Biare, is ACQUITTED on reasonable
doubt. The accused, Alex Padrones, is convicted of homicide, with no
modifying circumstances, and is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of
eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor to seventeen (17) years and
four (4) months of reclusion temporal
Appellant Pioquinto de Joya visited the wake only once. During the second
day of the four-day wake, Herminia saw herein appellant Pioquinto de Joya
enter the kitchen and peep under the cabinet of the (Valencias) house.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. PIOQUINTO DE
JOYA y CRUZ, Defendant-Appellant. [G.R. No. 75028. November 8,
1991.]
FELICIANO, J.:
Pioquinto de Joya y Cruz, 72 y.o. was charged before the Regional Trial
Court of the crime of robbery with homicide. He pleaded not guilty.
FACTS:
"The spouses Arnedo Valencia and Herminia Salac-Valencia, together with
their ten (10) year old son Alvin Valencia and Herminia Valencias 88-year old
mother, Eulalia Diamse, are residents of Balagtas St., Baliuag, Bulacan. Both
spouses are teachers by profession. In the afternoon of January 31, 1978,
Herminia Salac-Valencia left for school to teach. Her mother Eulalia Diamse,
88 y.o. was then [sitting] at their sofa watching the television set. Her Son
Alvin likewise left for school at 1:00 oclock. And at 3:00 oclock in the
afternoon, his classes were dismissed and he proceeded home.
At around 3:00 oclock in the afternoon of that same day, the spouses
Valencias neighbor by the name of Gloria Capulong, together with a friend,
went out of the formers house to visit a friend. While at her yard, Gloria
Capulong looked back to the direction of the Valencias house. She noticed
appellant Pioquinto de Joya standing and holding a bicycle at the yard of the
Valencias.
When Alvin reached home, he saw his grandmother Eulalia Diamse lying
down prostrate and drenched with her own blood. He immediately threw his
bag and ran towards her. He then held her hands and asked her: "Apo, Apo,
what happened?"
. . . [Eulalia Diamse held his hand and after which said: "Si Paqui." After
saying these words, she let go of Alvins hand and passed away.
Dr. Tolentino arrived at around 4:00 oclock that same afternoon and
examined the body of Eulalia Diamse. Said doctor declared that said Eulalia
Diamse had a heart attack which caused her death. When asked by Herminia
Valencia why her mothers ears were punctured, no reply was given by said
doctor. Herminia requested for a death certificate, but Dr. Tolentino did not
issue one and instead immediately left.
Herminia found out that the two (2) gold rings worn by her mother were
missing. The right earring of her mother was likewise missing. All of these
were valued [at] P300.00
That same afternoon, Herminia saw the room of the groundfloor ransacked.
The contents of the wardrobe closet (aparador) were taken out. Its secret
compartment/box was missing. And the lock of the aparador was destroyed.
On the same night, Herminia found a beach walk step-in (Exhibit "B") by the
side of the cabinet near the door of their room downstairs, more or less one
meter from where the victim was lying prostrate.
Herminia was able to recognize the said step-in because of its color and size,
as the other half of the pair she bought for her husband Arnedo but which she
gave to Socorro de Joya, the wife of herein appellant, before Christmas of
1977 when she saw the old and wornout pair of slippers of the latter.
ears. But Eulalia herself did not say so and we cannot speculate what the
rest of her communication might have been had death not interrupted her.
HEARSAY Continued.
because "Jonie," the killer, was from that place; that since he was also from
San Isidro he sought refuge in his brothers house where he met "Jonie;" that
"Jonie" admitted spontaneously that he stabbed Malaspina because after a
boxing match before the latter untied his gloves and punched him; that as
there were many persons milling around the house "Jonie" jumped out and
escaped through the window; that he was arrested at eight oclock in the
morning of 24 June 1989 while he was in a store in the barangay. RTC:
petitioner guilty of murder qualified by treachery
Consider this factual scenario: the alleged declarant Zoilo Fuentes Jr., a
cousin of accused-appellant, verbally admitted to the latter, and later to their
common uncle Felicisimo Fuentes, that he (Zoilo) killed the victim because of
a grudge, after which he disappeared. One striking feature that militates
against the acceptance of such a statement is its patent untrustworthiness.
Zoilo who is related to accused-appellant had every motive to prevaricate.
The same can be said of accused-appellant and his uncle Felicisimo.
Secondly, we need not resort to legal rhetorics to find that the admission of
such a statement may likewise be, according to Wigmore, "shocking to the
sense of justice." Let us assume that the trial court did admit the statement of
Zoilo and on that basis acquitted Accused-Appellant. Let us assume further
that Zoilo was subsequently captured and upon being confronted with his
admission of guilt readily repudiated the same. There is nothing, absolutely
nothing, that can bind Zoilo legally to that statement. But more importantly,
the far weightier reason why the admission against penal interest cannot be
accepted in the instant case is that the declarant is not "unable to testify."
"Done in City of Stockton, California, U.S.A., this 12th day of January 2004.
Petitioners filed an action for reconveyance, claiming that they are entitled to
inherit one-half of the property in question by right of representation.
During the hearing, petitioner Corazon was presented as the lone witness,
with the following documentary evidence offered to prove petitioners' filiation
to their father and their aunt, to wit: a family picture; baptismal certificates of
Teodora and Hermogenes Dezoller; certificates of destroyed records of birth
of Teodora and Hermogenes Dezoller; death certificates of Hermogenes and
Teodora; certification of destroyed records of live birth of Corazon and Rene
Dezoller; joint affidavits of Pablo Verzosa and Meliton Sitjar attesting to the
parents, date and place of birth of Corazon and Rene Dezoller; joint affidavit
of Juliana Cariaga and Manuela Cariaga attesting to the fact of marriage
between Martin Guerrero and Teodora Dezoller; and the marriage certificate
of Martin and Teodora Guerrero.
facie showing is sufficient and that only slight proof of the relationship is
required. Finally, it may not be amiss to consider as in the nature of
circumstantial evidence the fact that both the declarant and the claimants,
who are the subject of the declaration, bear the surname Dezoller.
HELD:
The primary proof to be considered in ascertaining the relationship between
the parties concerned is the testimony of Corazon to the effect that Teodora
Dezoller Guerrero in her lifetime, or sometime in 1946, categorically declared
that the former is Teodora's niece. Such a statement is considered a
declaration about pedigree which is admissible, as an exception to the
hearsay rule, under Section 39, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, subject to the
following conditions: (1) that the declarant is dead or unable to testify; (2) that
the declarant be related to the person whose pedigree is the subject of
inquiry; (3) that such relationship be shown by evidence other than the
declaration; and (4) that the declaration was made ante litem motam, that is,
not only before the commencement of the suit involving the subject matter of
the declaration, but before any controversy has arisen thereon.
There is no dispute with respect to the first, second and fourth elements.
What remains for analysis is the third element, that is, whether or not the
other documents offered in evidence sufficiently corroborated the declaration
made by Teodora in her lifetime regarding the pedigree of petitioner Corazon
or, if at all, it is necessary to present evidence other than such declaration.
JISON vs CA
PP vs LLANITA
HELD:
Generally, the character of a party is regarded as legally irrelevant in
determining a controversy. One statutory exception is that relied upon by
With the foregoing disquisition, the Court of Appeals is correct in holding that
the character or reputation of a complaining witness in a sexual charge is a
proper subject of inquiry. This leads us to the ultimate question is
Magdalenas derogatory record sufficient to discredit her credibility?
suddenly hacked at him with a bolo but that he was not hit. Eleuterio
retaliated by stabbing Benedicto with a knife, inflicting a single though mortal
wound on the deceased. Eleuterio claimed that Benedicto had stood in front
of his house, intoxicated and challenging passersby to a fight moments
before his death. He was charged with murder and pleaded not guilty .
The defense also presented evidence to prove the bad moral character and
quarrelsome disposition of the deceased. Barangay Captain Uldarico
Gobangco testified that "whenever the victim got drunk, he would challenge
anybody to a fight and that he was also [known] to steal a carabao." The
Barangay Captain also stated that, per the notebook where the customarily
recorded all incidents occurring in their barangay, a complaint for theft had
been lodged against the deceased Basas. The trial court, however, noted that
the statements of the Barangay Captain Gobangco that the deceased had
habitually challenged other people to a fight whenever he was drunk found
no support in his own notebook.
ISSUE: WHETHER THE TESTIMONY OF THE BARANGAY CAPTAIN
COULD BE GIVEN CREDENCE BY THE COURT. - NO
HELD: No.
While the accused may prove the bad moral character of the victim, the proof
must be of his general reputation in the community and not merely of isolated
and specific acts. Thus, the mere allegation that a complaint for theft had
been filed against the victim cannot establish his general reputation. Besides,
there was no showing that Basas was ever convicted of that charge,
assuming it had ever been filed.
Moreover, as the trial court held, no evidentiary value can be attributed to the
Barangay Captain's notebook. That notebook can hardly be considered an
official record, for record-keeping is vested in the Barangay Secretary and not
in the Barangay Captain. Moreover, an incomplete record, especially one
with blank or torn pages allowing the inclusion or deletion of certain matters,
lacks reliability; its contents are open to the suspicion that they are reflective
not of all actual events, but only of those which the recorder, for reasons of
his own, wanted to record.
Even if it had been proved by competent evidence that the deceased was of
a quarrelsome disposition, such evidence would only have established a
probability that he had indeed started an unlawful assault on Eleuterio. This
probability cannot overcome the positive statement of the prosecution
witnesses during trial that the accused-appellant had assaulted Basas
without any provocation.
Callanga. From there, he saw Lozano and Tubis enter the said house. After a
few minutes, he saw Lozano and Tubis come out of the house carrying two
tires which they placed inside the baggage compartment of the Toyota
Cressida. He called his fellow tanods and they intercepted the Cressida. The
two tires were recovered and Lozano and Callanga were arrested. Tubis was
able to escape. Thereafter, Paz Gonzales was summoned to the Barangay
Office where she identified the two tires as the same tires which were stolen
from her.
TC: The stolen tires were recovered in the possession of accused Luis Chito
Lozano, Willie Callanga and Lorenzo Tubis. There can be no other
conclusion that they are the thieves. Hence, they were found guilty to the
theft.
On appeal, Accused-appellant posits the view that since both witnesses (Paz
Gonzales and Jose Lazaro Jr.) had no personal knowledge that the said tires
were recovered in the possession of the accused, their testimonies are purely
hearsay, hence without any probative value. CA nevertheless convicted the
accused. Hence this case.
Issue: WON the witness testimonies are admissible?
Held:
YES, as an exception to the hearsay rule.
The Court of Appeals did not err in convicting accused Lozano and his coaccused. They are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of theft.
There was no direct evidence pointing to accused Lozano and his coaccused in stealing the missing items, not even for the actual taking of the
two tires. All that was established was that they were in possession of the two
(2) tires. It appears, therefore, that the TC and the CA relied on circumstantial
evidence with respect to the other items. (Recall requisites of circumstantial
evidence, all of it was complied in this case)
Moreover, the information conveyed to Lazaro, Jr. by one of his fellow tanods
regarding the arrest of appellant and his cohorts and the recovery of the tires
is admissible to prove that the stolen tires were actually found in the
possession of appellant and his partners. While said information may have
consisted of out-of-court statements by an out-of-court declarant (Lazaro,
Jr.), this person could have testified thereon (as he in fact did), as a present
sense impression.
A statement describing or explaining an event or condition made while the
declarant was perceiving the event or condition, or immediately thereafter, is
not barred by the rule against hearsay. The rationale for the present sense
impression exception is that (1) There is no substantial danger
that defects in the declarants memory will affect the value of the statement;
(2) the declarant would not have had much time to fabricate before making
the statement; and (3) in many cases, the person to whom the statement was
addressed would have been in a position to check its accuracy; hence, the
declarant could speak with care.
In the present case, there is no doubt that the barangay tanod who reported
the arrest and recovery to Lazaro, Jr. did not have the opportunity to fabricate
his statement as he instantly transmitted the information to Lazaro, Jr. who
verified the correctness and truthfulness of such account.
Pertinent portions of his testimony are hereby quoted:
Q: Could you tell us if up to present you are a member of the Barangay
Tanod?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: On July 26, 1997 at about 7:20 in the morning, could you still remember
where were you?
A: I was in my house, sir.
Q: When you are in your house, could you still remember what happened?
A: Somebody called me, a male person called me, sir.
Q: Could you tell us the reason why he called you?
A: He gave me the information, sir.
Q: Could you tell us the information that he gave to you?
A: With regards to the white Toyota Cressida, sir.
Q: After receiving that information, what did you do?
A: According to the person they entered the house of Willie Bong Callanga,
sir.
Q: What did you do?
A: He told me that I might need some informations with regards to the two (2)
tires which were stolen because the two (2) persons were acting suspectedly,
sir.
COURT:
Who was that person given that information?
A: Your Honor, I would not tell it to the Court anymore, because he does not
want to be involved in this case.
COURT:
Proceed.
Q: Did you give the information as requested?
A: Because the place where the car was nearby my place.
COURT:
What did you do after you got the information given to you and you saw the
white car?
A: Your Honor, I went up to the second floor of my house, and in that place I
was able to see the yard of Willie Bong Callanga, Your Honor.
COURT:
What did you see after you went up?
A: I saw three (3) male persons talking, Your Honor.
COURT:
Who were these three (3) male persons?
A: Willie Bong Callanga, Lorenzo Tubis, and Chito Lozano, Your Honor.
COURT:
What did you find after you saw them.
A: After their conversation, Your Honor, the three (3) of them went inside the
house, and after that went out the house, and two (2) of them were carrying
the tires each.
COURT:
Who was carrying the tires?
A: Luis Chito Lozano and Lorenzo Tubis, Your Honor.
COURT:
What kind of tires?
A: Tires of the car, Your Honor.
COURT:
What did they do with the two (2) tires of the car? What happened at the
Barangay Hall?
A: We arrived there at the same time with the Toyota Cressida together with
the two (2) persons who were arrested and it was then Pas Gonzales
identified the two (2) tires, Your Honor, as she was the owner of the two (2)
tires.
COURT:
Who were on boarded at Toyota Cressida?
A: It was only Luis Chito Lozano who was boarded the car, Your Honor.
COURT:
Do you know what happened to Lorenzo Tubis and Willie Bong Callanga?
A: According to my fellow barangay tanod, Lorenzo Tubis was able to
escape, Your Honor.
COURT:
How about Willie Bong Callanga?
A: After we conducted the investigation on Chito Lozano the Police officer
arrested Willie Bong Callanga, Your Honor.
COURT:
Where was this house of Willie Bong Callanga located when you saw him at
his yard together with Lozenzo Tubis and Chito Lozano conversing?
A: My neighbor, Your Honor.
COURT:
What place?
A: Airport View Subdivision, Barangay Moonwalk, Paraaque, your Honor.[
Clearly, the testimony of Jose Lazaro, Jr. was not merely hearsay. He
personally witnessed the incident as reported by his fellow tanod.
Immediately thereafter, Paz Gonzales confirmed that the tires recovered from
accused Lozano and his co-accused were the same tires stolen from her car.
[24]
was the result of a fall from a building x x x" However, as to what would be
the more credible cause of death, this is what he had to say:
x
x
x
FISCAL
RAMOS:
Q So as far as the probabilit(ies) are concerned, are you looking for a
possibility
that
he
fell
on
(sic)
a
high
place?
A All in all the fall of (sic) a high place is very remot(e). x x x
Both TC and CA ruled for the conviction of Accused-Appellant. The latter
raised that the prosecution's primary evidence is hearsay hence inadmissible
in evidence.
Issue: WON Josephine's testimony is a mere hearsay? NO.
is considered hearsay and may not be received as proof of the truth of what
he has learned. The hearsay rule is based upon serious concerns about the
trustworthiness and reliability of hearsay evidence inasmuch as such
evidence are not given under oath or solemn affirmation and, more
importantly, have not been subjected to cross-examination by opposing
counsel to test the perception, memory, veracity and articulateness of
the out-of-court declarant or actor upon whose reliability on which the worth
of the out-of-court statement depends.20
Res gestae, as an exception to the hearsay rule, refers to those exclamations
and statements made by either the participants, victims, or spectators to a
crime immediately before, during, or after the commission of the crime, when
the circumstances are such that the statements were made as a
spontaneous reaction or utterance inspired by the excitement of the occasion
and there was no opportunity for the declarant to deliberate and to fabricate a
false statement. The rule in res gestae applies when the declarant himself did
not testify and provided that the testimony of the witness who heard the
declarant complies with the following requisites: (1) that the principal act, the
res gestae, be a startling occurrence; (2) the statements were made before
the declarant had the time to contrive or devise a falsehood; and (3) that the
statements must concern the occurrence in question and its immediate
attending circumstances.21
The Court is not convinced to accept the declarations as part of res gestae.
While it may concede that these statements were made by the bystanders
during a startling occurrence, it cannot be said however, that these
utterances were made spontaneously by the bystanders and before they had
the time to contrive or devise a falsehood. Both SFO III Rochar and Lt. Col.
Torres received the bystanders statements while they were making their
investigations during and after the fire. It is reasonable to assume that when
these statements were noted down, the bystanders already had enough time
and opportunity to mill around, talk to one another and exchange information,
not to mention theories and speculations, as is the usual experience in
disquieting situations where hysteria is likely to take place. It cannot therefore
be ascertained whether these utterances were the products of truth. That the
utterances may be mere idle talk is not remote.
At best, the testimonies of SFO III Rochar and Lt. Col. Torres that these
statements were made may be considered as independently relevant
statements gathered in the course of their investigation, and are admissible
not as to the veracity thereof but to the fact that they had been thus
uttered.22
Furthermore, admissibility of evidence should not be equated with its weight
and sufficiency.23 Admissibility of evidence depends on its relevance and
competence, while the weight of evidence pertains to evidence already
admitted and its tendency to convince and persuade.24 Even assuming that
the declaration of the bystanders that it was the members of the CPP/NPA
who caused the fire may be admitted as evidence, it does not follow that
such declarations are sufficient proof. These declarations should be
calibrated vis--vis the other evidence on record.
While the documentary evidence presented by petitioner, i.e., (1) the police
blotter; (2) the certification from the Bacolod Police Station; and (3) the Fire
Investigation Report may be considered exceptions to the hearsay rule, being
entries in official records, nevertheless, as noted by the CA, none of these
documents categorically stated that the perpetrators were members of the
CPP/NPA.26 Rather, it was stated in the police blotter that: "a group of
persons accompanied by one (1) woman all believed to be CPP/NPA more
or less 20 persons suspected to be CPP/NPA,"27 while the certification from
the Bacolod Police station stated that " some 20 or more armed men
believed to be members of the New Peoples Army NPA,"28 and the fire
investigation report concluded that "(I)t is therefore believed by this
Investigating Team that the cause of the fire is intentional, and the armed
mensuspected to be members of the CPP/NPA where (sic) the ones
responsible "29 All these documents show that indeed, the "suspected"
got hysterical and repeatedly told Arlene Gorospe what happened. It did not
take long before policemen from the Southern Command (SOCO) arrived.
During the trial, the unfortunate incident was candidly narrated by Rodolfo
Jundos, Jr.
xxx
Q - When you first enter that room where you find the body of the victim
Lorelyn Bacubas, what was the condition of the room?
A - Nakita ko po na magulo yong kama tapos yong drawer na lagayan ng
mga damit kasi salamin po yong ibaba may mga basag po at may mga patak
ng dugo.
Q - What else did you find?
A - May scissor po sa left side ng braso nya, sa gilid po.
xxx
Q - What did you do when you saw the victim in this case already sprawled
on the floor?
A - Nung nakita na naming hindi na gumagalaw si Ling-Ling at ang
pagkaalam namin ay patay na, bumaba na po kami.
xxx
Q - After you went down, what did you do next?
A - Pag-baba po namin ni Divina, tumakbo po kami don sa pinto, sa bahay
po ng bayaw ko at humingi po kami ng tulong.
Q - Who is your brother-in-law?
A - Arleen Gorospe sir.
xxx
Q - What did you do with Arleen Gorospe?
A - Pag-bukas po ng pinto, una pong pumasok si Divina at nag-hysterical na
nagsisigaw na Manang Rose, yong asawa po ni Arleen Gorospe, si Ling-Ling
ginahasa at pinatay ni Boyet.
Q - And what next happened?
A - Sinalaysay po ni Divina, pero ako poy na shock at napaupo na lang ako
sa sopa, umakyat din po si Arleen sa taas at may tumawag na rin ng
pulis.24 (Emphasis Ours)
Arlene Gorospe corroborated the testimony of Jundos that in the early
morning of December 25, 2000, Jundos and the accused-appellants wife,
Divina, knocked at his door to inform him of the incident after which he
immediately proceeded upstairs and saw the victim naked and lifeless with
her t-shirt pulled up.25
Issue: WON the statement of the accused-appellants wife immediately after
the fateful incident is part of res gestae?
Ruling:
The statements of accused-appellants wife, Divina, immediately after the
fateful incident all the more convince the Court as to accused-appellants
guilt. Part of the res gestae and admissible in evidence as an exception to
the hearsay rule were Divinas utterances to Gorospe after seeing the dead
and raped body of the victim, i.e., May nagyari sa itaas at galing doon si
Boyet, and her subsequent narration of seeing the accused-appellant going
out of the victims room and running away therefrom.33 In People v
Cantonjos34the Court held that:
Res gestae utterances refer to those exclamations and statements made by
either the participants, victims, or spectators to a crime immediately before,
during, or after the commission of the crime, when the circumstances are
such that the statements were made as a spontaneous reaction or utterance
inspired by the excitement of the occasion and there was no opportunity for
the declarant to deliberate and to fabricate a false statement. A declaration is
deemed part of the res gestae and thus admissible in evidence as an
exception to the hearsay rule when the following requisites concur: (1) the
principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence; (2) the statements
were made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and (3) the
statements must concern the occurrence in question and its immediately
attending circumstances.
The aforementioned requisites are present in this case. The res gestae or the
startling event is the rape and death of the victim. The statements of Divina to
Gorospe were made spontaneously and before she had the time to contrive
or devise such declarations, and said statements all concerned the
occurrence in question or the immediately attending circumstances thereof.
In the absence of evidence that the witnesses for the prosecution were
actuated by improper motive, the presumption is that they were not so
actuated and their testimonies are entitled to full faith and credit.35
Golden Delta accepted the proposal and began utilizing a portion of the PSI
compound as its warehouse and bodega, stacking and storing its
construction materials there. Golden Delta claimed that the arrangement
went smoothly from March 2000 to December 2001.
Before December 5, 2001, however, Golden Delta decided to resume its
operations at its own warehouse. Thereafter, Golden Delta started to retrieve
and transfer its stocks from the PSI compound to its own warehouse in
Dungon A. Golden Deltas employees were able to load three out of four
trucks with assorted construction materials, but were only able to bring out
two loaded trucks from the PSI compound to its warehouse in Dungon A.
When Golden Deltas people returned to retrieve the remaining materials,
they were prevented from doing so by the guards of PSI, allegedly upon the
instructions of Jardiolin. Despite numerous telephone calls by Golden Delta
to the officers and personnel of PSI, the latter allegedly refused to allow
Golden Delta to withdraw its remaining stocks.
On September 9, 1999, at around seven (7) oclock in the evening, AAA was
inside their house with her 10-year-old brother BBB and a nephew, who was
still a toddler, when appellant suddenly showed up. As admitted by appellant,
he came from a drinking spree that began at about eleven (11) oclock in the
morning. AAA told appellant to leave and go home, but he did not heed her.
Appellant then made sexual advances on AAA.
AAA was able to evade appellant when he tried to embrace her, but appellant
pulled a bladed weapon from his pocket. Sensing danger, AAA ran upstairs to
the second level of their house. Appellant followed AAA, leaving BBB and the
toddler in the first floor of the house. BBB heard appellant ordering AAA to
remove her clothes, otherwise, he will stab her. Scared with the turn of
events, the two (2) children hid at the lower portion of the house for around
twenty (20) minutes, and came out only when CCC, the mother of AAA and
BBB, arrived.
CCC, together with her elder daughter DDD and a certain Abelardo Motol
(Abelardo), was on her way home when she and her companions heard AAA
scream. They hurried towards the house and searched it but found it to be
empty. As they searched further, appellant came out from somewhere in the
kitchen area of the house. They noticed that he was bloodied and he told
them that he was chasing someone. Appellant then joined in the search for
AAA. Before long, Abelardo found the lifeless body of AAA lying on the
ground nearby. AAA was half-naked and she appeared to have been ravished
when they found her. Immediately, Abelardo called the barangay officials and
the police.
Barangay Kagawad Carmelita Mawac and other barangay officials and
tanods, arrived. They noticed the bloodstains on appellants clothing.
Carmelita asked appellant what he did, but appellant denied any knowledge
of what happened. Carmelita then went to the half-naked body of AAA and
again asked appellant why he did such a thing to his cousin. At that point,
appellant admitted to the barangay officials and tanods that he was the one
(1) who committed the crime. He admitted that he raped and killed AAA. The
other Barangay Tanod also obtained the same confession from appellant
when he interviewed him in front of other people.
On the part of the defense, appellant denied participation in the crime. He
likewise denied that he confessed to the crime.
The RTC found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the rape and
killing of AAA.The trial court did not give credence to appellants alibi since he
even categorically admitted that he was at the crime scene and saw AAAs
lifeless body. Because the crime occurred more or less around the time
appellant left the drinking session, the trial court held that it was not
impossible for appellant to accomplish his bestial act shortly after he left the
drinking session as he had to pass by AAAs house on his way home. Also,
other than his bare denial, appellant did not offer any evidence to support his
alibi.
The trial court further pointed out that during the trial, appellant was positively
identified by the 10-year-old brother of AAA, BBB, as the culprit who chased
AAA with a bladed weapon and threatened to kill her if she would not remove
her clothes. BBB, who was only an arms length away from AAA and
appellant, was able to describe vividly the appearance of appellant that night,
his attire, and how appellant tried to embrace and chase AAA.
The trial court found no improper motive on the part of BBB to testify falsely
against appellant. BBBs testimony was notably straightforward and
spontaneous and considering his age, the trial court held that it was
improbable for him to concoct such a terrifying story against his own cousin.
Lastly, the RTC also took into consideration the confession of appellant that
he was the one (1) who raped and killed AAA. The trial court noted that the
confession was made voluntarily and spontaneously in public, and witnessed
by prosecutions witnesses, who were not shown to have any ill motive
ISSUE:
According to the testimony of U.P. Police Officer Salvador,139 when he
arrived at the scene, he interviewed the bystanders who all told him that they
could not recognize the attackers since they were all masked.
The issue is whether or not the testimony of the UP police officer who elicited
his information from the bystanders are admissible as evidence.
Note: this is a big deal because if the malefactors were all masked, their
identities wont be established, hence the accused herein must be acquitted
x x x persons who witness an event perceive the same from their respective
points of reference. Therefore, almost always, they have different accounts of
how it happened. Certainly, we cannot expect the testimony of witnesses to a
crime to be consistent in all aspects because different persons have different
impressions and recollections of the same incident. x x x145
RULING:
(Emphasis supplied)
As a general rule, "[a] witness can testify only to the facts he knows of his
personal knowledge; that is, which are derived from his own perception, x x
x."140 All other kinds of testimony are hearsay and are inadmissible as
evidence. The Rules of Court, however, provide several exceptions to the
general rule, and one of which is when the evidence is part of res gestae,
thus:
Section 42. Part of res gestae. - Statements made by a person while a
starting occurrence is taking place or immediately prior or subsequent thereto
with respect to the circumstances thereof, may be given in evidence as part
of res gestae. So, also, statements accompanying an equivocal act material
to the issue, and giving it a legal significance, may be received as part of the
res gestae.141 In People v. Rodrigo Salafranca,142 this court has previously
discussed the admissibility of testimony taken as part of res gestae, stating
that:
A declaration or an utterance is deemed as part of the res gestae and thus
admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule when the
following requisites concur, to wit: (a) the principal act, the res gestae, is a
startling occurrence; (b) the statements are made before the declarant had
time to contrive or devise; and (c) the statements must concern the
occurrence in question and its immediately attending circumstances.
xxxx
The term res gestae has been defined as "those circumstances which are the
undersigned incidents of a particular litigated act and which are admissible
when illustrative of such act." In a general way, res gestae refers to the
circumstances, facts, and declarations that grow out of the main fact and
serve to illustrate its character and are so spontaneous and
contemporaneous with the main fact as to exclude the idea of deliberation
and fabrication.
The rule on res gestae encompasses the exclamations and statements made
by either the participants, victims, or spectators to a crime immediately
before, during, or immediately after the commission of the crime when the
circumstances are such that the statements were made as a spontaneous
reaction or utterance inspired by the excitement of the occasion and there
was no opportunity for the declarant to deliberate and to fabricate a false
statement.
The test of admissibility of evidence as a part of the res gestae is, therefore,
whether the act, declaration, or exclamation is so intimately interwoven or
connected with the principal fact or event that it characterizes as to be
regarded as a part of the transaction itself, and also whether it clearly
negatives any premeditation or purpose to manufacture testimony.143
When the bystanders' testimonies are weighed against those of the victims
who witnessed the entirety of the incident from beginning to end at close
range, the former become merely corroborative of the fact that an attack
occurred. Their account of the incident, therefore, must be given considerably
less weight than that of the victims.
============================
Concluding words of ponente:
This is not the first fraternity-related case to come to this court; neither will it
be the last. Perhaps this case and many cases like it can empower those
who have a better view of masculinity: one which valorizes courage, sacrifice
and honor in more life-saving pursuits.
"Giting at dangal" are words of the anthem of the University of the
Philippines. It colors the stories of many who choose to expend their energy
in order that our people will have better lives. Fraternity rumbles are an
anathema, an immature and useless expenditure of testosterone. It fosters a
culture that retards manhood. It is devoid of "giting at dangal."
============================
was, therefore, neither justification nor necessity for the presentation of the
entries as the person who made them was available to testify in court.16
As a subordinate, Mercado could not have done more than record what was
reported to him by his superior the branch manager, and unless he was
allowed to be privy to the latters dealings with the defendant, the information
that he received and entered in the ledgers was incapable of being confirmed
by him.
In the fac[e] of the denial by the defendant of the existence of any such
agreement, and the absence of any document reflecting it, the testimony of a
party to the transaction, i.e., Mr. [Q]ui, or of any witness to the same, would
be necessary.
Thus, petitioner was not able to prove that respondent had incurred a
negative balance in his account. Consequently, there was nothing to show
that respondent was indebted to it in the amount claimed.
CA: affirmed
ISSUE:
WON the entries in the ledger, as testified to by Mercado, were competent
evidence to prove how and when the negative balance was incurred
RULING:
BERSAMIN, J.: Spouses Quirino V. Dela Cruz and Gloria Dela Cruz,
petitioners herein, operated the Barangay Agricultural Supply, an agricultural
supply store in Aliaga, Nueva Ecija engaged in the distribution and sale of
fertilizers and agricultural chemical products, among others. At the time
material to the case, Quirino, a lawyer, was the Municipal Mayor of Aliaga,
Nueva Ecija. On March 23, 1978, Gloria applied for and was granted by
respondent Planters Products, Inc. (PPI) a regular credit line of P200, 000 for
a 60-day term, with trust receipts as collaterals. Quirino and Gloria submitted
a list of their assets in support of her credit application for participation in the
Special Credit Scheme (SCS) of PPI. On August 28, 1978, Gloria signed in
the presence of the PPI distribution officer/assistant sales representative two
documents labelled Trust Receipt/Special Credit Scheme, indicating the
invoice number, quantity, value, and names of the agricultural inputs (i.e.,
fertilizer or agricultural chemicals) she received upon the trust of PPI.
PPI brought against Quirino and Gloria in the CFI a complaint for the
recovery of a sum of money with prayer for a writ of preliminary attachment.
PPI alleged that Gloria had violated the fiduciary undertaking in the Trust
Receipt agreement covering product withdrawals under the Special Credit
Scheme which were subsequently charged to defendant dealers regular
credit line; therefore, she is guilty of fraudulently misapplying or converting to
her own use the items delivered to her as contained in the invoices. It
charged that Gloria did not return the goods indicated in the invoices and did
not remit the proceeds of sales. In her answer, the petitioners alleged that
Gloria was only a marketing outlet of PPI under its SCS Program, not a
dealer primarily obligated to PPI for the products delivered to her; that she
had not collected from the farmers participating in the SCS Program because
of the October 27-28, 1979 typhoon Kading that had destroyed the
participating farmers crops; and that she had paid P50,000.00 to PPI despite
the failure of the farmers to pay.
RTC decision: ordering the petitioners to pay the plaintiff PPI
The RTC found that based on the terms and conditions of the SCS Program,
a creditor-debtor relationship was created between Gloria and PPI; that her
liability was predicated on Section 4 of the Trust Receipts Law (Presidential
Decree No. 115) and on the ruling in Robles v. Court of Appeals to the effect
that the failure of the entrustee (Gloria) to turn over to the entruster (plaintiff)
the proceeds of the sale of goods covered by the delivery trust receipts or to
return the goods constituted estafa and that the petitioners could not use as a
defense the occurrence of typhoon Kading because there was no privity of
contract between the participating farmers and PPI.
CA: affirmed the judgment of the RTC
The CA held the petitioners liable to PPI for the value of the fertilizers and
agricultural chemical products covered by the trust receipts because a
creditor-debtor relationship existed between the parties when, pursuant to the
credit line of P200,000.00 and the SCS Program, the petitioners withdrew
several fertilizers and agricultural chemical products on credit; that the
petitioners then came under obligation to pay the equivalent value of the
withdrawn goods, or to
return the undelivered and/or unused products within the specified period.
Moreover, Defendants-appellants cannot pass their obligation to pay the
equivalent value of the undelivered and/or unused fertilizers and agricultural
chemical products under the trust receipts to the farmers-participants
considering that the contract was between plaintiff-appellee Planters
Products Inc. and defendants-appellants Quirino and Gloria Dela Cruz, and
the farmers-participants were never privy to the said transaction.
Issues: W/N the CA erred in affirming the decision of the RTC
notwithstanding that the award to PPI of the amount of P240,335.10 plus
16% interest per annum was based on hearsay evidence, leaving absolutely
no other evidence to support the award.
proof of their total liability for P240,355.10, the amount stated therein. We do
not agree with the petitioners. With Exhibit V being a private document,
authentication pursuant to the rules on evidence was a condition for its
admissibility. Llanera, admittedly the person who had prepared the document,
was competent to testify on the due execution and authenticity of Exhibit V.
Such authentication was done in accordance with Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court, whose Section 20 states:
Section 20. Proof of private document. Before any private document offered
as authentic is received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must
be proved either: (a) By anyone who saw the document executed or written;
or (b) By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the
maker. Any other private document need only be identified as that which it is
claimed to be.
Further, the petitioners dispute the contents of Exhibit V by invoking Section
43, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
Section 43. Entries in the course of business. Entries made at, or near the
time of the transactions to which they refer, by a person deceased, or unable
to testify, who was in a position to know the facts therein stated, may be
received as prima facie evidence, if such person made the entries in his
professional capacity or in the performance of duty and in the ordinary or
regular course of business.
The invocation of the rule is misplaced, however, because the rule speaks of
a situation where the person who made the entries is dead or unable to
testify, which was not the situation here. Regardless, we have to point out
that entries made in the course of business enjoy the presumption of
regularity.53 If properly authenticated, the entries serve as evidence of the
status of the account of the petitioners. In Land Bank v. Monets Export and
Manufacturing Corporation,54 the Court has explained that such entries are
accorded unusual reliability because their regularity and continuity are
calculated to discipline record keepers in the habit of precision; and that if the
entries are financial, the records are routinely balanced and audited; hence,
in actual experience, the whole of the business world function in reliance of
such kind of records. Nor have the petitioners proved that the entries
contained in Exhibit V were incorrect and untruthful. They cannot be
permitted to do so now at this stage of final appeal, especially after the lower
courts found and accepted the statement of account contained therein to be
properly authenticated and trustworthy. Indeed, the Court is in no position to
review and overturn the lower courts unanimous finding and acceptance
without strong and valid reasons because they involved an issue of fact.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the Decision promulgated on April 11,
2003 by the Court of Appeals, subject to the MODIFICATIONS that: (a) the
rate of interest is 12% per annum reckoned from the filing of the complaint
until full payment; and (b) the award of attorneys fees is deleted.
various paper products. Petitioner George Haw (Haw) is the President while
his wife, Connie Haw, is the General Manager. Respondent Arma Traders is
also a domestic corporation engaged in the wholesale and distribution of
school and office supplies, and novelty products. Respondent Antonio Tan
(Tan) was formerly the President while respondent Uy Seng Kee Willy (Uy) is
the Treasurer of Arma Traders. They represented Arma Traders when dealing
with its supplier, Advance Paper, for about 14 years. On the other hand,
respondents Manuel Ting, Cheng Gui and Benjamin Ng worked for Arma
Traders as Vice-President, General Manager and Corporate Secretary,
respectively. On various dates from September to December 1994, Arma
Traders purchased on credit notebooks and other paper products amounting
to P7,533,001.49 from Advance Paper. Upon the representation of Tan and
Uy, Arma Traders also obtained three loans from Advance Paper to settle its
obligations to other suppliers because its own collectibles did not arrive on
time. Because of its good business relations with Arma Traders, Advance
Paper extended the loans. As payment for the purchases on credit and the
loan transactions, Arma Traders issued 82 postdated checks payable to cash
or to Advance Paper. Tan and Uy were Arma Traders authorized bank
signatories who signed and issued these checks which had the aggregate
amount of P15,130,636.87. Advance Paper presented the checks to the
drawee bank but these were dishonored either for insufficiency of funds or
account closed. Despite repeated demands, however, Arma Traders failed
to settle its account with Advance Paper.
Petitioners filed a complaint for collection of sum of money with application
for preliminary attachment against Arma Traders, Tan, Uy, Ting, Gui, and Ng.
RTC Ruling : the purchases on credit and loans were sufficiently proven by
the petitioners. Ordered Arma Traders to pay Advance Paper .
The RTC held that the respondents failed to present hard, admissible and
credible evidence to prove that the sale invoices were forged or fictitious, and
that the loan transactions were personal obligations of Tan and Uy.
Nonetheless, the RTC dismissed the complaint against Tan, Uy, Ting, Gui
and Ng due to the lack of evidence showing that they bound themselves,
either jointly or solidarily, with Arma Traders for the payment of its account.
CA Ruling: set aside the RTCs order. It affirmed the RTC decision dismissing
the complaint against respondents Tan, Uy, Ting, Gui and Ng. Petitioners
failed to prove by preponderance of evidence the existence of the purchases
on credit and loans based on the following grounds: First, Arma Traders was
not liable for the loan in the absence of a board resolution authorizing Tan
and Uy to obtain the loan from Advance Paper. The CA acknowledged that
Tan and Uy were Arma Traders authorized bank signatories. However, the
CA explained that this is not sufficient because the authority to sign the
checks is different from the required authority to contract a loan. Second, the
CA also held that the petitioners presented incompetent and inadmissible
evidence to prove the purchases on credit since the sales invoices were
hearsay. The CA pointed out that Haws testimony as to the identification of
the sales invoices was not an exception to the hearsay rule because there
was no showing that the secretaries who prepared the sales invoices are
already dead or unable to testify as required by the Rules of Court. Further,
the CA noted that the secretaries were not identified or presented in court.
Hence, The Petition.
SC Ruling : RTC Decision reinstated
ISSUE: W/N Haws testimony is hearsay?
HELD: YES, but the respondents failed to object to the admissibility of the
sales invoices on the ground that they are hearsay. The rule is that failure to
object to the offered evidence renders it admissible, and the court cannot, on
its own, disregard such evidence. When a party desires the court to reject the
evidence offered, it must so state in the form of a timely objection and it
cannot raise the objection to the evidence for the first time on appeal.
Because of a partys failure to timely object, the evidence becomes part of
the evidence in the case. Thereafter, all the parties are considered bound by
any outcome arising from the offer of evidence properly presented. In Heirs of
Policronio M. Ureta, Sr. v. Heirs of Liberato M. Ureta, however, we held:
Hearsay evidence whether objected to or not cannot be given credence for
having no probative value. This principle, however, has been relaxed in cases
where, in addition to the failure to object to the admissibility of the subject
evidence, there were other pieces of evidence presented or there were other
circumstances prevailing to support the fact in issue.
We agree with the respondents that with respect to the identification of the
sales invoices, Haws testimony was hearsay because he was not present
during its preparation and the secretaries who prepared them were not
presented to identify them in court. Further, these sales invoices do not fall
within the exceptions to the hearsay rule even under the entries in the
course of business because the petitioners failed to show that the entrant
was deceased or was unable to testify. But even though the sales invoices
are hearsay, nonetheless, they form part of the records of the case for the
respondents failure to object as to the admissibility of the sales invoices on
the ground that they are hearsay. Based on the records, the respondents
through Ng objected to the offer for the purpose [to] which they are being
offered
only
not
on
the
ground
that
they
were
hearsay.ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary The petitioners have proven their claims
for the unpaid purchases on credit by preponderance of evidence. We are not
convinced by the respondents argument that the purchases are spurious
because no less than Uy admitted that all the checks issued were in
payments of the contractual obligations of the Arma Traders with Advance
Paper. Moreover, there are other pieces of evidence to prove the existence of
the purchases other than the sales invoices themselves. For one, Arma
Traders postdated checks evince the existence of the purchases on credit.
Moreover, Haw testified that within one or two weeks, Arma Traders paid the
purchases in the form of postdated checks. He personally collected these
checks on Saturdays and upon receiving the checks, he surrendered to Arma
Traders the original of the sales invoices while he retained the duplicate of
the invoices. The respondents attempted to impugn the credibility of Haw by
pointing to the inconsistencies they can find from the transcript of
stenographic notes. However, we are not persuaded that these
inconsistencies are sufficiently pervasive to affect the totality of evidence
showing the general relationship between Advance Paper and Arma Traders.
Additionally, the issue of credibility of witnesses is to be resolved primarily by
the trial court because it is in the better position to assess the credibility of
witnesses as it heard the testimonies and observed the deportment and
manner of testifying of the witnesses. Accordingly, its findings are entitled to
great respect and will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of any
showing that the trial court overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some
facts or circumstances of weight and substance which would have affected
the result of the case. WHEREFORE, premises considered, we GRANT the
petition. The decision dated March 31, 2006 and the resolution dated March
7, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 71499 are REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court decision in Civil Case No. 9472526 dated June 18, 2001 is REINSTATED. No costs.
Salvacion Tusi, wife of Edgardo, testified that she knew appellants because
they usually had their drinking sessions at Edwins place, which was beside
her residence; that in one such drinking session, Edgardo, annoyed by the
noise made by the appellants and Edwin, was prompted to admonish them to
tone down their voices; that the appellants and Edwin resented Edgardos
admonition; that while she and Edgardo were resting in front of their house at
around 5 pm on May 30, 1999, Toribio arrived and without saying anything
stabbed Edgardo twice on his side; that she shouted for help, but her cousin
Ruben Bernal could not do anything because Edwin, Filomeno and Gregorio
had meanwhile joined Teofilo in assaulting Edgardo
Ruben Bernal and Jaime Bernal corroborated Salvacions recollection of the
assault on Edgardo. According to them, the appellants ganged up on
Edgardo, with Teofilo wielding a kitchen knife with which he stabbed Edgardo
twice and Gregorio hacking Edgardo on the head with a bolo while Filomeno
and Edwin restrained Edgardo. They heard Edwin tell the appellants to
ensure that Edgardo was lifeless before leaving him.
Dr. Romeo T. Salen, Medico Legal Officer of the Western Police District (now
Manila Police District) Crime Laboratory, appeared in court in representation
of Dr. Emmanuel L. Aranas, and brought the following documents: (a)
Request for Examination on the Cadaver of the deceased transmitted by the
Las Pias Police and received by Dr. Aranas; (b) Certification of Identification
and Consent for Autopsy signed by the brother of Edgardo; (c) Post Mortem
Examination or Anatomical Sketch; (d) Medico Legal Report; and (e) Death
Certificate of Edgardo prepared by Dr. Aranas.
Dr. Salen explained that based on Dr. Aranas written findings, Edgardo had
sustained 12 wounds in the head, neck and chest, eight of which had been
fatal.
Defense:
The findings on the wounds sustained by Tusi as found on the medico legal
report was written in a technical language which is not well understood by the
lower court, and said matter required the special knowledge, skill, experience
or training possessed by Dr. Salen as a Medico Legal Officer of the WPD
Crime Laboratory to give to the lower court the meaning of the technical
language used, particularly, whether or not the wounds described therein
were fatal. Hence, the lower court could receive in evidence Dr. Salens
interpretation of Dr. Aranas findings.
The testimony of an expert witness is not indispensable to a successful
prosecution for murder. While the autopsy report of a medico legal expert in
cases of murder, or homicide, is preferably accepted to show the extent of
the injuries suffered by the victim, it is not the only competent evidence to
prove the injuries and the fact of death. The testimonies of credible witnesses
are equally admissible regarding such injuries and the surrounding
circumstances thereof.
On the non-offer of evidence, notwithstanding the fact that the medical legal
report and the anatomical sketch were not formally offered, they are
nonetheless, admissible because
Evidence not formally offered can be considered by the court as long as they
have been properly identified by testimony duly recorded and they have
themselves been incorporated in the records of the case. All the documentary
and object evidence in this case were properly identified, presented and
marked as exhibits in court
In this case, the counsel of accused-appellants had the opportunity to crossexamine Dr. Salen, but did not do so, insisting that the latter is not qualified
as a medico legal expert, and that his testimony is hearsay.
Judgment of conviction AFFIRMED.
Toribio self-defense
Filomeno and Gregorio denial and alibi
RTC: Found appellants guilty of murder. Reclusion perpetua.
CA: Affirmed RTC judgment.
ISSUE: WON THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING
CREDENCE TO HEARSAY EVIDENCE WHICH BECAME THE BASIS FOR
THE CONVICTION OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS.
HELD:
The testimony of Dr. Salen as regards the Anatomical Sketch, and Medico
Legal Report, among other things, prepared by Dr. Aranas falls under the
exception to the hearsay rule because the said sketch and report are entries
in official records made by Dr. Aranas in the performance of his duty as a
Medico Legal Officer of the WPD Crime Laboratory. Dr. Aranas had personal
knowledge of the facts stated by him the said sketch and report relative to the
nature and number of wounds sustained by Tusi because he was the one
who performed the autopsy on the cadaver of Tusi. Dr. Salen acquired such
facts from the sketch and report made by his predecessor, Dr. Aranas, who
had a legal duty to turn over the same to him as his successor. Such entries
were duly entered in a regular manner in the official records, hence, the
entries in said sketch and report are prima facie evidence of the facts therein
stated and are admissible under Section 44, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
As an officer having legal custody of the said sketch and report, Dr. Salen
attested that the copies presented in the lower court were the original ones
prepared by Dr. Aranas.
The only other witness was Karen Guivencan, whom Footluckers employed
as its store auditor. She declared that Go had requested her to audit
petitioner after some customers had told him that they had already paid their
accounts but the office ledger had still reflected outstanding balances for
them; that she first conducted her audit by going to the customers; that she
discovered in the course of her audit that the amounts appearing on the
original copies of receipts in the possession of around 50 customers varied
from the amounts written on the duplicate copies of the receipts petitioner
submitted to the office; that upon completing her audit, she submitted to Go a
written report denominated as "List of Customers Covered by Saleswoman
LERIMA PATULA w/ Differences in Records as per Audit Duly Verified March
16-20, 1997" marked as Exhibit A; and that based on the report, petitioner
had misappropriated the total amount ofP131,286.92.
The Prosecution marked the ledgers of petitioners various customers
allegedly with discrepancies as Exhibits B to YY and their derivatives,
inclusive.
RTC: Found petitioner guilty of estafa.
ISSUE: WON Guivencans testimony on the ledgers and receipts (Exhibits B
to YY, and their derivatives, inclusive) to prove petitioners misappropriation
or conversion was inadmissible for being hearsay.
It is apparent, too, that a person who relates a hearsay is not obliged to enter
into any particular, to answer any question, to solve any difficulties, to
reconcile any contradictions, to explain any obscurities, to remove any
ambiguities; and that she entrenches herself in the simple assertion that she
was told so, and leaves the burden entirely upon the dead or absent author.
Thus, the rule against hearsay testimony rests mainly on the ground that
there was no opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. The testimony may
have been given under oath and before a court of justice, but if it is offered
against a party who is afforded no opportunity to cross-examine the witness,
it is hearsay just the same.
Moreover, the theory of the hearsay rule is that when a human utterance is
offered as evidence of the truth of the fact asserted, the credit of the assertor
becomes the basis of inference, and, therefore, the assertion can be received
as evidence only when made on the witness stand, subject to the test of
cross-examination. However, if an extrajudicial utterance is offered, not as an
assertion to prove the matter asserted but without reference to the truth of
the matter asserted, the hearsay rule does not apply. For example, in a
slander case, if a prosecution witness testifies that he heard the accused say
that the complainant was a thief, this testimony is admissible not to prove that
the complainant was really a thief, but merely to show that the accused
uttered those words. This kind of utterance is hearsay in character but is not
legal hearsay. The distinction is, therefore, between (a) the fact that the
statement was made, to which the hearsay rule does not apply, and (b) the
truth of the facts asserted in the statement, to which the hearsay rule applies.
HELD:
Testimonial and documentary evidence, being hearsay, did not prove
petitioners guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Guivencan conceded having no personal knowledge of the amounts actually
received by petitioner from the customers or remitted by petitioner to
Footluckers. This means that persons other than Guivencan prepared
Exhibits B to YY and their derivatives, inclusive, and that Guivencan based
her testimony on the entries found in the receipts supposedly issued by
petitioner and in the ledgers held by Footluckers corresponding to each
customer, as well as on the unsworn statements of some of the customers.
Accordingly, her being the only witness who testified on the entries effectively
deprived the RTC of the reasonable opportunity to validate and test the
veracity and reliability of the entries as evidence of petitioners
misappropriation or conversion through cross-examination by petitioner. The
denial of that opportunity rendered the entire proof of misappropriation or
conversion hearsay, and thus unreliable and untrustworthy for purposes of
determining the guilt or innocence of the accused.
To elucidate why the Prosecutions hearsay evidence was unreliable and
untrustworthy, and thus devoid of probative value, reference is made to
Section 36 of Rule 130, Rules of Court, a rule that states that a witness can
testify only to those facts that she knows of her personal knowledge; that is,
which are derived from her own perception, except as otherwise provided in
the Rules of Court. The personal knowledge of a witness is a substantive
prerequisite for accepting testimonial evidence that establishes the truth of a
disputed fact. A witness bereft of personal knowledge of the disputed fact
cannot be called upon for that purpose because her testimony derives its
value not from the credit accorded to her as a witness presently testifying but
from the veracity and competency of the extrajudicial source of her
information.
In case a witness is permitted to testify based on what she has heard another
person say about the facts in dispute, the person from whom the witness
derived the information on the facts in dispute is not in court and under oath
to be examined and cross-examined. The weight of such testimony then
depends not upon the veracity of the witness but upon the veracity of the
other person giving the information to the witness without oath. The
information cannot be tested because the declarant is not standing in court
as a witness and cannot, therefore, be cross-examined.
Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court is understandably not the only rule
that explains why testimony that is hearsay should be excluded from
consideration. Excluding hearsay also aims to preserve the right of the
opposing party to cross-examine the original declarant claiming to have a
direct knowledge of the transaction or occurrence. If hearsay is allowed, the
right stands to be denied because the declarant is not in court. It is then to be
stressed that the right to cross-examine the adverse partys witness, being
the only means of testing the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies, is
essential to the administration of justice.
ACQUITTAL. The prosecution failed to prove petitioners guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------ADDTL:
To address the problem of controlling inadmissible hearsay as evidence to
establish the truth in a dispute while also safeguarding a partys right to
cross-examine her adversarys witness, the Rules of Court offers two
solutions. The first solution is to require that all the witnesses in a judicial trial
or hearing be examined only in court under oath or affirmation. Section 1,
Rule 132 of the Rules of Court formalizes this solution, viz:
Section 1. Examination to be done in open court. - The examination of
witnesses presented in a trial or hearing shall be done in open court, and
under oath or affirmation. Unless the witness is incapacitated to speak, or the
question calls for a different mode of answer, the answers of the witness shall
be given orally. (1a)
The second solution is to require that all witnesses be subject to the crossexamination by the adverse party. Section 6, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court
ensures this solution thusly:
Section 6. Cross-examination; its purpose and extent. Upon the termination
of the direct examination, the witness may be cross-examined by the adverse
party as to any matters stated in the direct examination, or connected
therewith, with sufficient fullness and freedom to test his accuracy and
truthfulness and freedom from interest or bias, or the reverse, and to elicit all
important facts bearing upon the issue. (8a)
MIRO vs MENDOZA
DIMAGUILA vs MONTEIRO
HELD:
Under the rules of evidence, a witness can testify only to those facts which
the witness knows of his or her personal knowledge, that is, which are
derived from the witness own perception. Concomitantly, a witness may not
testify on matters which he or she merely learned from others either because
said witness was told or read or heard those matters. Such testimony is
considered hearsay and may not be received as proof of the truth of what the
witness has learned. This is known as the hearsay rule.
"Hearsay is not limited to oral testimony or statements; the general rule that
excludes hearsay as evidence applies to written, as well as oral statements."
There are several exceptions to the hearsay rule under the Rules of Court,
among which are entries in official records. Section 44, Rule 130 provides:
Entries in official records made in the performance of his duty by a public
officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty
specially enjoined by law are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.
In Alvarez v. PICOP Resources, this Court reiterated the requisites for the
admissibility in evidence, as an exception to the hearsay rule of entries in
official records, thus:
(a) that the entry was made by a public officer or by another person specially
enjoined by law to do so;
(b) that it was made by the public officer in the performance of his or her
duties, or by such other person in the performance of a duty specially
enjoined by law; and
(c) that the public officer or other person had sufficient knowledge of the facts
by him or her stated, which must have been acquired by the public officer or
other person personally or through official information.
Notably, the presentation of the police report itself is admissible as an
exception to the hearsay rule even if the police investigator who prepared it
was not presented in court, as long as the above requisites could be
adequately proved.
Here, there is no dispute that SPO1 Dungga, the on-the-spot investigator,
prepared the report, and he did so in the performance of his duty. However,
what is not clear is whether SPO1 Dungga had sufficient personal knowledge
of the facts contained in his report. Thus, the third requisite is lacking.
Respondents failed to make a timely objection to the police reports
presentation in evidence; thus, they are deemed to have waived their right to
do so. As a result, the police report is still admissible in evidence.
DISCUSSION ON RES IPSA LOQUITUR:
(The court applied this doctrine in favor of Malayan. Respondents claim that
since Malayan Insurance did not present any witness who shall affirm any
negligent act of Reyes in driving the Fuzo Cargo truck before and after the
incident, there is no evidence which would show negligence on the part of
respondents. The court thus held that, applying the said doctrine, the burden
to show the lack of negligence is on the respondents. See discussion)
While negligence is not ordinarily inferred or presumed, and while the mere
happening of an accident or injury will not generally give rise to an inference
or presumption that it was due to negligence on defendants part, under the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, which means, literally, the thing or transaction
speaks for itself, or in one jurisdiction, that the thing or instrumentality speaks
for itself, the facts or circumstances accompanying an injury may be such as
to raise a presumption, or at least permit an inference of negligence on the
part of the defendant, or some other person who is charged with negligence.
Requisites for the application of the res ipsa loquitur rule:
(1) the accident was of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless
someone is negligent;
(2) the instrumentality or agency which caused the injury was under the
exclusive control of the person charged with negligence; and
(3) the injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action or
contribution on the part of the person injured.
One of the theoretical bases for the doctrine is its necessity, i.e., that
necessary evidence is absent or not available.
The res ipsa loquitur doctrine is based in part upon the theory that the
defendant in charge of the instrumentality which causes the injury either
knows the cause of the accident or has the best opportunity of ascertaining it
and that the plaintiff has no such knowledge, and therefore is compelled to
allege negligence in general terms and to rely upon the proof of the
happening of the accident in order to establish negligence. The inference
which the doctrine permits is grounded upon the fact that the chief evidence
of the true cause, whether culpable or innocent, is practically accessible to
the defendant but inaccessible to the injured person.
It has been said that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur furnishes a bridge by
which a plaintiff, without knowledge of the cause, reaches over to defendant
who knows or should know the cause, for any explanation of care exercised
by the defendant in respect of the matter of which the plaintiff complains. The
res ipsa loquitur doctrine, another court has said, is a rule of necessity, in that
it proceeds on the theory that under the peculiar circumstances in which the
doctrine is applicable, it is within the power of the defendant to show that
there was no negligence on his part, and direct proof of defendants
negligence is beyond plaintiffs power. Accordingly, some courts add to the
three prerequisites for the application of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine the
further requirement that for the res ipsa loquitur doctrine to apply, it must
appear that
the injured party had no knowledge or means of knowledge as to the cause
of the accident, or that the party to be charged with negligence has superior
knowledge or opportunity for explanation of the accident.
FACTS:
M/V Maria Efigenia XV, owned by Maria Efigenia Fishing Corporation on its
way to Navotas, Metro Manila collided with the vessel Petroparcel owned by
the Luzon Stevedoring Corporation (LSC). After investigation was conducted
by the Board of Marine Inquiry, Philippine Coast Guard Commandant Simeon
N. Alejandro rendered a decision finding the Petroparcel at fault. Based on
this finding by the Board and after unsuccessful demands on petitioner,
private respondent sued the LSC and the Petroparcel captain, Edgardo
Doruelo, before the CFI of Caloocan City. In particular, private respondent
prayed for an award of P692,680.00, allegedly representing the value of the
fishing nets, boat equipment and cargoes of M/V Maria Efigenia XV, with
interest at the legal rate plus 25% thereof as attorney's fees. Meanwhile,
during the pendency of the case, petitioner PNOC Shipping and Transport
Corporation sought to be substituted in place of LSC as it had already
acquired ownership of the Petroparcel.
Private respondent later sought the amendment of its complaint on the
ground that the original complaint failed to plead for the recovery of the lost
value of the hull of M/V Maria Efigenia XV. In the amended complaint, private
respondent averred that M/V Maria Efigenia XV had an actual value of
P800,000.00 and that, after deducting the insurance payment of
P200,000.00, the amount of P600,000.00 should likewise be claimed.
Furthermore, on account of the sinking of the vessel, private respondent
supposedly incurred unrealized profits and lost business opportunities that
would thereafter be proven.
Private respondent presented exhibits which were mere price quotations
issued personally to Del Rosario who requested for them from dealers of
equipment similar to the ones lost at the collision of the two vessels.
On the other hand, petitioner only presented Lorenzo Lazaro, senior
estimator at PNOC Dockyard & Engineering Corporation, as sole witness and
it did not bother at all to offer any documentary evidence to support its
position. Lazaro testified that the price quotations submitted by private
respondent were "excessive" and that as an expert witness, he used the
quotations of his suppliers in making his estimates. However, he failed to
present such quotations of prices from his suppliers.
The RTC ruled in favor of private respondent. CA affirmed in toto.
ISSUE: WHETHER THE PRICE QUOTATIONS SHOULD BE GIVEN
PROBATIVE WEIGHT
HELD:
If no objection is made, hearsay becomes evidence by reason of the want of
such objection even though its admission does not confer upon it any new
attribute in point of weight. Its nature and quality remain the same, so far as
its intrinsic weakness and incompetency to satisfy the mind are concerned,
and as opposed to direct primary evidence, the latter always prevails.
The failure of the defense counsel to object to the presentation of
incompetent evidence, like hearsay evidence or evidence that violates the
rules of res inter alios acta, or his failure to ask for the striking out of the
same does not give such evidence any probative value. But admissibility of
evidence should not be equated with weight of evidence. Hearsay evidence
whether objected to or not has no probative value.
Private respondent did not present any other witnesses especially those
whose signatures appear in the price quotations that became the bases of
the award. We hold, however, that the price quotations are ordinary private
writings which under the Revised Rules of Court should have been proffered
along with the testimony of the authors thereof. Del Rosario could not have
testified on the veracity of the contents of the writings even though he was
the seasoned owner of a fishing fleet because he was not the one who
issued the price quotations. Section 36, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of
Court provides that a witness can testify only to those facts that he knows of
his personal knowledge.
For this reason, Del Rosario's claim that private respondent incurred losses
in the total amount of P6,438,048.00 should be admitted with extreme
caution considering that, because it was a bare assertion, it should be
supported by independent evidence. Moreover, because he was the owner of
private respondent corporation whatever testimony he would give with regard
to the value of the lost vessel, its equipment and cargoes should be viewed in
the light of his self-interest therein. We agree with the Court of Appeals that
his testimony as to the equipment installed and the cargoes loaded on the
vessel should be given credence considering his familiarity thereto. However,
we do not subscribe to the conclusion that his valuation of such equipment,
cargo and the vessel itself should be accepted as gospel truth. We must,
therefore, examine the documentary evidence presented to support Del
Rosario's claim as regards the amount of losses.
The price quotations presented as exhibits partake of the nature of hearsay
evidence considering that the persons who issued them were not presented
as witnesses. Any evidence, whether oral or documentary, is hearsay if its
probative value is not based on the personal knowledge of the witness but on
the knowledge of another person who is not on the witness stand. Hearsay
evidence, whether objected to or not, has NO PROBATIVE VALUE unless
the proponent can show that the evidence falls within the exceptions to the
hearsay evidence rule. On this point, we believe that the exhibits do not fall
under any of the exceptions provided under Sections 37 to 47 of Rule 130.
It is true that one of the exceptions to the hearsay rule pertains to
"commercial lists and the like" under Section 45, Rule 130 of the Revised
Rules on Evidence. In this respect, the Court of Appeals considered private
respondent's exhibits as "commercial lists." This rule states:
the occupation." These are simply letters responding to the queries of Del
Rosario.
Held:
The All Asia Capital report upon which the Union relies to support its position
regarding the wage issue cannot be an accurate basis and conclusive
determinant of the rate of wage increase. Section 45 of Rule 130 Rules of
Evidence provides:
Nonetheless, by petitioner's own allegations, its actual total net income for
1996 was P5.1 billion.8 An estimate by the All Asia financial analyst stated
that petitioner's net operating income for the same year was about P5.7
billion, a figure which the Union relies on to support its claim. Assuming
without admitting the truth thereof, the figure is higher than the P4.171 billion
allegedly suggested by petitioner as its projected net operating income. The
P5.7 billion which was the Secretary's basis for granting the P2,200.00 is
higher than the actual net income of P5.1 billion admitted by petitioner. It
would be proper then to increase this Court's award of P1,900.00 to
P2,000.00 for the two years of the CBA award.
The Court takes judicial notice that the new amounts granted herein are
significantly higher than the weighted average salary currently enjoyed by
other rank-and-file employees within the community. It should be noted that
the relations between labor and capital is impressed with public interest
which must yield to the common good.11 Neither party should act
oppressively against the other or impair the interest or convenience of the
public.12 Besides, matters of salary increases are part of management
prerogative.13
AUGUSTO SAMALIO VS CA
DOROTEO TOLEDO Vs PP