Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-20687

April 30, 1966

MAXIMINO VALDEPEAS, petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
Jose F. Aquirre for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General A. A. Narra and Solicitor O. R. Ramirez for
respondent.
CONCEPCION, J.:
Appeal by petitioner Maximino Valdepeas from a decision of the Court of Appeals, affirming that of the Court of First
Instance of Cagayan, convicting him of the crime of abduction with consent, and sentencing him to an indeterminate
penalty ranging from three (3) months and twenty-five (25) days of arresto mayor to one (1) year, eight (8) months
and twenty-one (21) days of prision correccional, with the accessory penalties prescribed by law, to indemnify Ester
Ulsano in the sum of P1,000, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.
The only question raised by petitioner is whether "the Court of Appeals erred in not reversing the decision of the trial
court, dated June 30, 1960, for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused and the subject matter of the action
for the offense of abduction with consent".
The pertinent facts are: On January 25, 1956, Ester Ulsano, assisted by her mother, Consuelo Ulsano, filed with the
Justice of the Peace Court of Piat, Cagayan, a criminal complaint,1 duly subscribed and sworn to by both, charging
petitioner Maximino Valdepeas with forcible abduction with rape of Ester Ulsano. After due preliminary investigation,
the second stage of which was waived by Valdepeas, the justice of the peace of Piat found that there was probable
cause and forwarded the complaint to the court of first instance of Cagayan2 in which the corresponding information
for forcible abduction with rape3 was filed.4 In due course, said court of first instance rendered judgment5 finding
petitioner guilty as charged and sentencing him accordingly.6
On appeal taken by petitioner, the Court of Appeals7 modified the decision of the court of first instance, convicted him
of abduction with consent and meted out to him the penalty set forth in the opening paragraph of this
decision.1wph1.t
A motion for reconsideration and new trial having been filed by petitioner contesting the finding, made by the Court of
Appeals, to the effect that complainant was below 18 years of age at the time of the occurrence, said Court 8 granted
the motion, set aside its aforementioned decision and remanded the case to the court a quo for the reception of
additional evidence on said issue. After a retrial, the court of first instance rendered another decision,9 reiterating said
finding of the Court of Appeals, as well as its judgment 10 of conviction for abduction with consent and the penalty
imposed therein. Petitioner appealed again to the Court of Appeals 11 which 12affirmed that of the court of first
instance 13 with costs against the petitioner. Again petitioner filed 14 a motion for reconsideration based, for the first
time, upon the ground that "the lower court had no jurisdiction over the person of appellant and over the subject
matter of the action, with respect to the offense of abduction with consent." Upon denial of the motion, 15 petitioner
interposed the present appeal by certiorari.
Petitioner's theory is that no complaint for abduction with consent has been filed by either Ester Ulsano or her mother,
Consuelo Ulsano, and that, accordingly, the lower court acquired no jurisdiction over his person or over the crime of
abduction with consent and had, therefore, no authority to convict him of said crime. We find no merit in this pretense.
Jurisdiction over the person of an accused is acquired upon either his apprehension, with or without warrant, or his
submission to the jurisdiction of the court. 16 In the case at bar, it is not claimed that petitioner had not been
apprehended or had not submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court. Indeed, although brought before the bar of

justice as early as January 25, 1956, first, before the then justice of the peace court of Piat, then before the court of
first instance of Cagayan, later before the Court of Appeals, thereafter back before said court of first instance, and
then, again, before the Court of Appeals, never, within the period of six (6) years that had transpired until the Court of
Appeals, rendered its last decision, 17 had he questioned the judicial authority of any of these three (3) courts over his
person. He is deemed, therefore, to have waived whatever objection he might have had to the jurisdiction over his
person, and, hence, to have submitted himself to the Court's jurisdiction. What is more, his behaviour and every
single one of the steps taken by him before said courts particularly the motions therein filed by him implied, not
merely a submission to the jurisdiction thereof, but, also, that he urged the courts to exercise the authority thereof
over his person.
Upon the other hand, it is well settled that jurisdiction over the subject matter of an action in this lease the crime of
abduction with consent is and may be conferred only by law; 18 that jurisdiction over a given crime, not vested by
law upon a particular court, may not be conferred thereto by the parties involve in the offense; and that, under an
information for forcible abduction, the accused may be convicted of abduction with consent. 19 It is true that, pursuant
to the third paragraph of Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code,
. . . the offenses of seduction, abduction, rape or acts of lasciviousness, shall not be prosecuted except upon
a complaint filed by the offended party or her parents, grandparents, or guardian, nor, in any case, if the
offender has been expressly pardoned by the above-named persons, as the case may be.
The provision does not determine, however, the jurisdiction of our courts over the offenses therein enumerated. It
could not affect said jurisdiction, because the same is governed by the Judiciary Act of 1948, not by the Revised
Penal Code, which deals primarily with the definition of crimes and the factors pertinent to the punishment of the
culprits. The complaint required in said Article 344 is merely a condition precedent to the exercise by the proper
authorities of the power to prosecute the guilty parties. And such condition has been imposed "out of consideration for
the offended woman and her family who might prefer to suffer the outrage in silence rather than go through with the
scandal of a public trial." 20
In the case at bar, the offended woman and her mother have negated such preference by filing the complaint
adverted to above and going through the trials and tribulations concomitant with the proceedings in this case, before
several courts, for the last ten (10) years. Petitioner says that the complaint was for forcible abduction, not abduction
with consent; but, as already adverted to, the latter is included in the former. Referring particularly to the spirit of said
provision of Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, we believe that the assent of Ester Ulsano and her mother to
undergo the scandal of a public trial for forcible abduction necessarily connotes, also, their willingness to face the
scandal attendant to a public trial for abduction with consent.
The gist of petitioner's pretense is that there are some elements of the latter which are not included in the former,
and, not alleged, according to him, in the complaint filed herein, 21 namely: 1) that the offended party is a virgin; and
2) that she is over 12 and under 18 years of age. The second element is clearly set forth in said complaint, which
states that Ester Ulsano is "a minor ... 17 years of age ...", and, hence, over 12 and below 18 years of age.
As regards the first element, it is settled that the virginity mentioned in Article 343 of the Revised Penal Code, 22as an
essential ingredient of the crime of abduction with consent, should not be understood in its material sense and does
not exclude the idea of abduction of a virtuous woman of good reputation, 23 because the essence of the offense "is
not the wrong done to the woman, but the outrage to the family and the alarm produced in it by the disappearance of
one of its members." 24
The complaint in the case at bar 25 alleges, not only that Ester Ulsano is a minor 17 years of age, but also that
petitioner "willfully, unlawfully and feloniously" took her "by force and violence ... against her will and taking advantage
of the absence of her mother" from their dwelling and carried "her to a secluded spot to gain carnal intercourse with
the offended party against her will, using force, intimidation and violence, with lewd designs." This allegation implies
that Ester is a minor living under patria protestas, and, hence, single, thus leading to the presumption that she is a
virgin, 26 apart from being virtuous and having a good reputation, 27 for, as Chief Justice Moran has aptly put it, the
presumption of innocence includes, also, that of morality and decency, and, as a consequence, of chastity. 28
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against the petitioner Maximino Valdepeas. It
is so ordered

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-38634 June 20, 1988
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES), petitioner,
vs.
HON. DELFIN VIR. SUNGA, as Presiding Judge, CFI Branch I, Camarines Sur, ARISTON ANADILLA, RAFAEL
ANADILLA and JOSE ANADILLA, respondents.

PADILLA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the order * of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, 10th Judicial
District, Branch I, dated 20 March 1974, dismissing motu proprio Criminal Case No. L-244, entitled "People of the
Philippines, Complainant versus Ariston Anadilla, Rafael Anadilla and Jose Anadilla, Accused," as well as of the order
dated 22 April 1974 of the same court denying the motion for reconsideration of said earlier order.
The facts are not disputed.
On 10 August 1964, an information for Attempted Homicide was filed by the Provincial Fiscal of Camarines Sur
against accused-private respondents Rafael Anadilla, Ariston Anadilla and Jose Anadilla. Trial of the case was set on
11 and 12 March 1974. The hearing set on 11 March 1974 was, however, postponed in view of the absence of one of
the accused, respondent Rafael Anadilla who had not yet been arrested by the police authorities. On the same date,
the court a quo issued an order for the arrest of said accused, and at the same time set the trial of the case for 29
and 30 July 1974.

On 20 March 1974, the court a quo issued the now assailed order which reads:
Considering that the offended party, Jose Dadis is no longer interested in the further prosecution of
this case and there being no objection on the part of the accused Ariston Anadilla, Rafael Anadilla
and Jose Anadilla, this case is hereby DISMISSED with costs de oficio.
Consequently, the order of arrest issued by this Court against the accused Rafael Anadilla dated
March 11, 1974, is hereby ordered lifted and has no force and effect.
The bail bond posted for the provisional liberty of the accused is hereby ordered cancelled.
In the case of Ariston Anadilla and Jose Anadilla, the Provincial Warden is hereby ordered to
release said accused from their detention immediately upon receipt of this order.
SO ORDERED. 1
The affidavit of desistance, relied upon by the aforequoted order, was executed by the offended party on 20 March
1974 and subscribed and sworn to before the branch Clerk of Court Atty. R.B. Torrecampo. It alleged, among others,
that:
That he was the complainant in Criminal Case No. L-244, entitled, People vs. Ariston Anadilla, et
al., for Attempted Homicide, which case is pending before the first branch of this Court; that he is
no longer interested in the further prosecution of this case and that he has already forgiven the
accused for their acts; that his material witnesses could no longer be contacted and that without
their testimonies, the guilt of the accused cannot be proven beyond reasonable doubt, and that in
view of these circumstances, he requests the Prosecuting Fiscal for the dismissal of the said
case. 2
The Provincial Fiscal moved to reconsider the order of dismissal. This was denied by the court a quo in an order
dated 22 April 1974. 3 This petition was thereupon filed before this Court.
The issue in this petition is whether the courta a quo may dismiss a criminal case on the basis of an affidavit of
desistance executed by the offended party, but without a motion to dismiss filed by the prosecuting fiscal.
The issue presented is not novel. In Crespo v. Mogul, 4 promulgated on 30 June 1987, the Court had occasion to
state the rule in regard to the respective powers of the prosecuting fiscal and the court, after the complaint or
information has been filed in court. In said case, the issue raised was whether the trial court, acting on a motion to
dismiss a criminal case filed by the Provincial Fiscal upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice to whom the case
was elevated for review, may refuse to grant the motion and insist on the arraignment and trial of the case on the
merits.
In the Crespo case, an information for Estafa had already been filed by the Assistant Fiscal before the Circuit Criminal
Court of Lucena City. Arraignment of the accused and trial of the case were, however, deferred because of a pending
appeal by the accused/respondent to the Secretary of Justice. Reversing the resolution of the Office of the Provincial
Fiscal, the Undersecretary of Justice directed the fiscal to move for immediate dismissal of the information filed
against the accused. Upon such instructions, the Provincial Fiscal filed a motion to dismiss for insufficiency of
evidence. The Judge denied the motion and set the arraignment. On a certiorari recourse to the Court of Appeals, the
petition was dismissed. Review of the Court of Appeals decision was then sought by the accused with this Court,
raising the issue previously stated herein, Resolving, the Court held:
xxx xxx xxx
The filing of a complaint or information in Court initiates a criminal action. The Court thereby
acquires jurisdiction over the case, which is the authority to hear and determine the case. When
after the filing of the complaint or information a warrant for the arrest of the accused is issued by
the trial court and the accused either voluntarily submitted himself to the Court or was duly
arrested, the Court thereby acquired jurisdiction over the person of the accused.

The preliminary investigation conducted by the fiscal for the purpose of determining whether a
prima facie case exists warranting the prosecution of the accused is terminated upon the filing of
the information in the proper court. In turn, as above stated, the filing of said information sets in
motion the criminal action against the accused in Court. Should the fiscal find it proper to conduct a
reinvestigation of the case, at such stage, the permission of the Court must be secured. After such
reinvestigation the finding and recommendations of the fiscal should be submitted to the Court for
appropriate action. While it is true that the fiscal has the quasi-judicial discretion to determine
whether or not a criminal case should be filed in court or not [sic], once the case had already been
brought to Court whatever disposition the fiscal may feel should be proper in the case thereafter
should be addressed for the consideration of the Court. The only qualification is that the action of
the Court must not impair the substantial rights of the accused or the right of the People to due
process of law.
xxx xxx xxx
The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is filed in Court any
disposition of the case as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the
sound discretion of the Court. Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of the
prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is already in Court he cannot impose his opinion
on the trial court. The Court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case before it. The
determination of the case is within its exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A motion to dismiss
the case filed by the fiscal should be addressed to the Court who has the option to grant or deny
the same. It does not matter if this is done before or after the arraignment of the accused or that
the motion was filed after a reinvestigation or upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice who
reviewed the records of the investigation." (Emphasis supplied). 5
In the case at bar, the Court has taken note that before the case was set for trial, almost ten (10) years had elapsed
from the date of filing of the information. It was not, therefore, unusual that the complainant-offended party, in his
affidavit of desistance manifested that his material witnesses could no longer be contacted, but, without their
testimony, the guilt of the accused could not be proved beyond reasonable doubt.
The prosecuting fiscal in his motion for reconsideration of the order dismissing the case, obviously believed that
despite such manifestation of the complainant, he (fiscal) could prove the prosecution's case.
To avoid similar situations, the Court takes the view that, while the Crespo doctrine has settled that the trial court is
the sole judge on whether a criminal case should be dismissed (after the complaint or information has been filed in
court), still, any move on the part of the complainant or offended party to dismiss the criminal case, even if without
objection of the accused, should first be referred to the prosecuting fiscal for his own view on the matter. He is, after
all, in control of the prosecution of the case and he may have his own reasons why the case should not be dismissed.
It is only after hearing the prosecuting fiscal's view that the Court should exercise its exclusive authority to continue or
dismiss the case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. Without costs.
SO ORDERED.
Yap, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Paras and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-28949

June 23, 1969

JIBIN ARULA, petitioner,

vs.
Brigadier General ROMEO C. ESPINO, Members of the General Court-Martial, namely, CANDIDO B. GAVINO,
President, CRISOGONO T. MAKILAN, RUBEN S. MONTOYA, SIXTO R. ALHAMBRA, SEGUNDINO S.
QUINTANS, PEDRO FERNANDEZ, JOSE APOLINARIO, AVELINO MENEZ, EFRAIN MACLANG, and MABINI
BERNABE, LAW Member, respondents.
Gregorio M. Familar for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General Antonio P. Barredo and Solicitor Raul I. Goco and Col. Manuel V. Reyes (AFP Judge
Advocate General), Col. Primitivo D. Chingcuangco (AFP Deputy Judge Advocate General), Lt. Col. Pedro Malit,
Captain Ciriaco P. Cruz of the AFP, and Amelito Mutuc for respondents.

CASTRO, J.:
I. Preliminary Statement
The present original petition for certiorari and/or prohibition with prayer for writ of preliminary injunction seeks the
annulment of Special Order 208 1 (issued on April 6, 1968 by the respondent Brigadier General Romeo C. Espino as
commanding general of the Philippine Army), which special order convenes a general court-martial and appoints the
members thereof, and to prohibit permanently the said court-martial, composed of the other respondents, from taking
cognizance of and proceeding with the trial of the case before it with respect to the shooting and wounding of the
petitioner Jibin Arula. The petition was filed with this Court on April 25, 1968, 2 and given due course the following day,
April 26. We issued a temporary restraining order on the same day, April 26, "effective immediately and until further
orders from this Court," and set the "hearing on the injunction and merits" for May 6.
On May 4 the respondent filed their answer (with opposition to the issuance of writ of preliminary injunction). On this
day also, Capt. Alberto Soteco, MSgt. Benjamin Munar, Reynaldo Munar and Eugenio Alcantara, thru counsel filed a
motion to intervene; Attorneys Jesus G. Barrera, J. Antonio Araneta and Crispin Baizas of the Citizens' Legal
Assistance Committee of the Philippine Bar Association moved for leave to appear as amici curiae.
At the hearing of the case on May 6, in Baguio City, Atty. Gregorio M. Familar argued for the petitioner, Solicitor
General Antonio Barredo argued for the respondents. 3 The petitioner was given 5 days to submit a memorandum of
additional facts and additional arguments. The respondents were granted leave to submit an answer thereto, and
allowed to present within 3 days the affidavit of Capt. Ruperto I. Amistoso. The motion to intervene was likewise
granted, and the intervenors were given 5 days to file the necessary pleadings.
On May 7 this Court gave leave to Attys. Barrera, Araneta and Baizas to appear as amici curiae, granting them 10
days from notice within which to submit their memorandum. On the same day the Solicitor General submitted the
affidavit of Capt. Amistoso, in compliance with this Court's May 6 resolution.1awphil.nt

On May 11 the petitioner filed an amended petition; on May 22 the intervenor filed an answer with counter petition for
preliminary injunction; and on May 27 the respondents submitted their answer to the amended petition. On June 18
the amici curiae filed their memorandum, making common cause with the petitioner.
This case was reheard on August 26. The petitioner thereafter, on September 19, filed his memorandum of authorities
and exhibits. The intervenors filed their reply memorandum of authorities and exhibits on October 23. And on
November 12 the Solicitor General filed the respondents' reply to the petitioner's memorandum of authorities and
exhibits.
II. Facts
Shorn of trivia and minutiae, the uncontroverted facts converge in sharp focus.
The petitioner Arula was on December 17, 1967 recruited by one Capt. Teodoro R. Facelo of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines at Simunul, Sulu, to undergo training. On the following January 3, he, together with other recruits, was
taken to Corregidor island. On March 18 a shooting incident occurred at Corregidor, resulting in, among other things,
the infliction of serious physical injuries upon the petitioner. Despite his wounds he succeeded in fleeing Corregidor,
and on March 23, he filed, a criminal complaint with the city fiscal of Cavite City for frustrated murder against Capt.
Alberto Soteco, Benjamin Munar alias Lt. Baqui, Reynaldo Munar alias Lt. Rey, Eugenio Alcantara alias Lt.
Alcantara, 4 and nine others. Acting on the criminal complaint, the city fiscal on March 29 sent subpoenas to the
persons above enumerated, advising them that the preliminary investigation was set for April 3 at 9: 00 o'clock in the
morning, and requiring them to appear at his office on the same date and time.
On April 2 the petitioner sent a letter to the commanding officer of the Philippine Army, informing the latter that he was
"not filing any charges" with the military authorities against the army personnel responsible for his injuries, for the
reason that he had "already filed the corresponding criminal complaint" with the city fiscal of Cavite City. On the
following day, April 3, the date set for the preliminary investigation, army lawyers headed by Capt. Jose Magsanoc
appeared on behalf of the respondents and requested for transfer of the preliminary investigation which, as a result of
such request, was reset for April 16.
Meanwhile, the respondent General Espino directed Capt. Alfredo O. Pontejos of his command to conduct a pre-trial
investigation of the Corregidor incident to pinpoint responsibility therefor. As early as March 22, however, all of the
army personnel, except two, supposedly involved in the hapless incident had already been placed under technical
arrest and restricted to camp limits. (These last two were subsequently, on April 16, placed under technical arrest.)
On April 6 Capt. Pontejos, as pre-trial investigator, submitted his written report, which contained the substance of the
declarations of Andrew Gruber, Colonel Wilfredo E. Encarnacion, Trainee Capt. Rosauro Novesteras, Lt. Tomas
Rainilo of the Special Forces Training Unit (provisional), 2nd Class Trainee Wilfredo Pahayhay, Trainee Dugasan Ahid
and 2nd Lt. Antonio Santos. Appended thereto was an array of documents.
Recommended for trial by general court-martial are Major Eduardo Martelino, alias Major Abdul Latif Martelino, Capt.
Cirilo Oropesa, Capt. Teodoro R. Facelo, Capt. Ruperto E. Amistoso, Capt. Alberto G. Soteco, 1st Lt. Eduardo B.
Batalla, 2nd Lt. Rolando Abadilla, MSgt. Benjamin C. Munar, MSgt. Federico Ilangilang, MSgt. Cesar Calinawagan,
TSgt. Timoteo C. Malubay, TSgt. Pedro Banigued, SSgt. Narciso T. Dabbay, Cpl. Rolando Buenaventura, Cpl. Felix
Lauzon, Cpl. Evaristo Ruiz, Cpl. Orlando Decena, Cpl. Francisco Grinn, Cpl. Agustin Dagdag, Cpl. Alfredo F. Forfieda
and Pfc. Wilfredo Latonero.
On April 14, Capt. Pontejos submitted a supplemental report, recommending trial by general court-martial of Capt.
Solferino Titong alias Capt. Mike, trainee Reynaldo Munar alias Lt. Rey and trainee Eugenio Alcantara alias Lt.
Alcantara.
On the same day (April 6) that Capt. Pontejos submitted his pre-trial investigation report, the respondent General
Espino issued Special Order 208, appointing a General court-martial, composed of the other respondents, to try the
case against the army personnel involved in the Corregidor incident, intervenors herein being among them. Charges
and specifications for violations of articles of war 94 and 97 5 were filed with the general court-martial; additional
charges and specifications were subsequently filed and renumbered.

At the hearing by the general court-martial on April 16, the petitioner Arula adduced testimony to prove specification
1, charge 1 (violation of the 94th article of war) which directly and squarely pertains to the shooting and wounding of
the said petitioner.
On April 19 the Armed Forces lawyers moved to dismiss the complaint filed with the city fiscal of Cavite upon the
ground that the civil courts had lost jurisdiction over the case because a court-martial had been convened.
It is here pertinent to note that on March 21 President Ferdinand Marcos (as Commander-in-Chief) ordered an
investigation of the reported killings of commando trainees on Corregidor Island, and, on the following day, March 22,
directed the creation of a court-martial to try whomsoever might be responsible for the reported killings. (See the
March 22 and 23, 1968 issues of the Manila Times, Philippines Herald and Manila Daily Bulletin.) So that before the
petitioner Arula filed his criminal complaint (on March 23) with the city fiscal of Cavite, the President had already
ordered an investigation of the Corregidor incident and the convening of a court-martial relative thereto.
III. Issues
The petitioner poses as the dominant issue the jurisdiction of the general court-martial to take cognizance of charge
1, specification 1 for frustrated murder involving the petitioner's injuries. More specifically he avers that; .
1. the offense was committed outside a military reservation because Corregidor where the offense was
committed had been declared by President Ramon Magsaysay as a "national shrine";
2. he, the petitioner, is a civilian, not subject to military law because he had never enlisted in the Army nor
had he been formally inducted therein; and
3. the Court of First Instance of Cavite has already taken cognizance of the case, to the exclusion of the
general court-martial.
On the other hand, the respondents maintain that the general court-martial has jurisdiction over the offense
committed against the petitioner, to the exclusion of the Cavite CFI, because:
1. the petitioner, like all the persons accused before the general court-martial, is subject to military law:
2. the offense (shooting and wounding of the petitioner) was committed inside a military reservation by
persons subject to military law; and
3. the general court-martial acquired jurisdiction over the case ahead of any civil court with concurrent
jurisdiction.
At the threshold, the respondents traverse the petitioner's legal personality to bring and maintain the present action. 6
On their part, the intervenors refuted point by point the arguments advanced by the petitioner in his amended petition.
Upon the other hand, the amici curiae, as stated earlier, made common cause with the petitioner.
On the basis of the pleadings of all the parties, the following issues are joined: (1) Does the petitioner have legal
personality to institute and maintain the present action for certiorari and prohibition to stop the general court-martial
from proceeding with the hearing of the case insofar as it concerns the injuries inflicted upon him? (2) In the
affirmative, does the general court-martial have jurisdiction over the case? This in turn depends on the resolution of
the sub-issues of (a) whether the petitioner is a person subject to military law; (b) if he is not, whether Corregidor is a
military reservation; and (c) whether the filing by the petitioner of a criminal complaint (involving the same offense)
with the city fiscal of Cavite City forthwith invested the Court of First Instance of Cavite jurisdiction to try the case to
the exclusion of the general court-martial.
IV. Discussion

Of basic and immediate involvement is article of war 94 of Commonwealth Act 408, as amended by Republic Act 242,
which provides in full as follows:
Various Crimes. Any person subject to military law who commits any felony, crime, breach of law or
violation of municipal ordinance which is recognized as an offense of a penal nature and is punishable under
the penal laws of the Philippines or under municipal ordinances, (A) inside a reservation of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, or (B) outside any such reservation when the offended party (and each one of the
offended parties if there be more than one) in a person subject to military law, shall be punished as a courtmartial may direct, Provided, That, in time of peace officers and enlisted men of the Philippine Constabulary
shall not be triable by courts-martial for any felony, crime, breach of law or violation of municipal ordinances
committed under this article. In imposing the penalties for such offenses falling within this article, the
penalties for such offenses provided in the penal laws of the Philippines or such municipal ordinances shall
be taken into consideration.
The parties are agreed on the purview and meaning of this article. It places persons subject to military law 7 under the
jurisdiction of courts-martial, concurrent with the jurisdiction of the proper civil courts, when they commit any felony,
crime, breach of law or violation of municipal ordinance which is recognized as an offense of a penal nature and is
punishable under the penal laws of the Philippines or under municipal ordinances, (a) inside a reservation of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, or (b) outside any such reservation when the offended party (and each one of the
offended parties if there be more than one) is a person subject to military law. Whenever persons subject to military
law commit offenses punishable under article of war 94 outside a military reservation and the offended party (or any
one of the offended parties it there be more than one) is not a person subject to military law, they fall under the
exclusive jurisdiction of civil courts. This article of war removes officers and enlisted men of the Philippine
Constabulary entirely from the jurisdiction of courts-martial when they commit offenses under this article in time
of peace, notwithstanding that the said offenses are committed within military reservations; or outside such
reservations and the offended party (and each one of the offended parties if there be more than one is a person
subject to military law.
Nor is it disputed that the crime of frustrated murder, the offense imputed to the military personnel accused before the
general court-martial, is embraced within the purview of article of war 94. That the said accused are members of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines and are not officers or enlisted men of the Philippine Constabulary, is likewise
conceded.
The divergence of opinion is to whether Corregidor was, on March 18, 1968 (the date when the offense was allegedly
committed), a military reservation, and, if it was not, as to whether the petitioner was at that time a person subject to
military law.
1. On May 31, 1948 President Elpidio Quirino issued Proclamation No. 69 8 (hereinafter referred to as P-69) declaring
"Corregidor, including the adjacent islands and detached rocks surrounding the same," a military reservation and
placing it under the direct supervision and control of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. The petitioner's insistence
that Corregidor is no longer a military reservation is anchored on Executive Order No. 58 9(hereinafter referred to as
EO 58) issued on August 16, 1954 by President Ramon Magsaysay, which declared "all battlefield areas in
Corregidor and Bataan province" as national shrines and "except such portions as may be temporarily needed for the
storage of ammunition or deemed absolutely essential for safeguarding the national security," opening them "to the
public, accessible as tourist resorts and attractions, as scenes of popular pilgrimages and as recreational centers,"
from which the petitioner argues that Corregidor is no longer a military reservation because it has been converted into
a national shrine and made accessible to the public.
For several cogent reasons, it is our view that this argument is devoid of merit.
In the first place, EO 58 does not expressly repeal P-69. From the terms contained within the four corners of the later
presidential decree cannot be inferred or implied a repeal of the former presidential act. It cannot, therefore, be safely
said that implied repeal of P-69 was intended. Well-entrenched is the rule that implied repeals are not favored
(Camacho vs. ClR, 80 Phil. 848; Visayan Electric Co. vs. David, 94 Phil. 969; North Camarines Lumber Co., Inc. vs.
David, 51 OG 1860, Manila Electric Co. vs. City of Manila, 98 Phil. 951; Manila Letter Carriers Association vs. Auditor
General, 57 OG 9027).
In the second place, there is nothing in the language of EO 58 from which it can be reasonably inferred that the
declaration of certain areas in Corregidor island as battlefield areas or as national shrines necessarily divests such

areas or the entire island of Corregidor itself of their character as a military reservation and national defense
zone. Even if an area were actually declared as a "national shrine" or "battlefield area" or "historic site" by the
National Shrines Commission, its character as part of a national defense zone or military reservation would not
thereby be abated or impaired. A military reservation or national defense zone under the provisions of
Commonwealth Act 321 10 can concurrently be used and developed as a national shrine without excluding it from the
operation of the said Act. This Act makes the entry of a private person into a national defense zone subject to
regulations prescribed by the President, thereby not precluding the possibility that civilians may be permitted to enter
and remain in a proclaimed national defense zone under appropriate regulations. Paragraph 1 of EO 58 declares that
even portions of battlefield areas declared as national shrines are not to be opened to the public as tourist resorts or
recreational centers if they are deemed "absolutely essential for safeguarding the national security."
In the third place, if the President had intended to repeal P-69, he would have done so in an unequivocal manner. If
he had intended to remove certain portions of Corregidor island from the ambit of P-69, he would have expressly
withdrawn such portions, describing them by specific metes and bounds. This is the uniform pattern of presidential
orders modifying the extent of an area previously reserved for a certain public purpose. A typical example is
Proclamation No. 208 dated May 28, 1967 (63 OG No. 31, 6614) wherein President Ferdinand E. Marcos excluded
from the operation of Proclamation No. 423 dated July 12, 1957 (which had established the Fort Bonifacio military
reservation) a certain portion of the land embraced therein situated in Taguig, Rizal, and reserved the same for
national shrine purposes under the administration of the National Shrines Commission, subject to private rights, if
any, and to future survey.
In the fourth place, admitting in gratia argumenti that the declaration of a certain area as a battlefield area under EO
58 would have the effect of removing it from the Operation of P-69, the fact remains that the Corregidor airstrip,
where the shooting and wounding of the petitioner allegedly took place, has not been actually delimited and officially
declared as a national shrine. In its overall context as well as in its specific phraseology, EO 58 affects and opens to
the public only those areas of Corregidor island to be selected, declared, delimited and developed as historic sites by
the National Shrines Commission. This official act of the National Shrines Commission is the operative act that can
give to any portion of Corregidor island the status of a "national shrine," or "battlefield area" or "historic site." There is
no showing that the airstrip in Corregidor has been officially declared by the National Shrines Commission a national
shrine, battlefield area, or historic site.
The duty of the Commission to recondition the airstrip in Corregidor (paragraph 6, EO 58) does not, in fact and in law,
make the said air-strip itself a "battlefield area" or "historic site" within the contemplation of EO 58. Clearly, the airstrip
and resthouses mentioned are only service facilities to promote tourism.
To buttress his claim that Corregidor island, in its entirety, is a battlefield area, the petitioner invokes Executive Order
No. 123 dated March 15, 1968, which, amending EO 58, authorizes the National Shrines Commission, with the prior
approval of the President, "to enter into any contract for the conversion of areas within national shrines into tourist
spots and to lease such areas to any citizen or citizens of the Philippines, or any corporation 60% of the capital stock
of which belongs to Filipino citizens." In the absence, however, of the delimitation and marking of the historical sites
or battlefield areas and pending the conversion of portions thereof into tourist spots (disposable for lease to private
parties), the status and identity of the entire Corregidor island as a national defense zone remain unchanged.
With some vehemence, the petitioner presses the contention that "the entire island of Corregidor, including the
airstrip, was a battlefield from the time it was first bombed on December 29, 1941, until its surrender on May 6, 1942."
To unmask the emptiness of this conclusion, we have only to recall the requirement of EO 58 that the "Commission
shall immediately proceed to determine the historic areas [battlefield areas in Corregidor Island and Bataan province]
to be preserved, developed and beautified for the purposes of this order, establish the boundaries thereof and mark
them out properly" (par. 4). Such requirement of delimitation would indeed be an absolute superfluity insofar as
Corregidor is concerned if this island in its entirety were in fact and in design a battlefield area within the purview of
EO 58.
In sum and substance, we do not discern any incompatibility or repugnance between P-69 and EO 58 as would
warrant the suggestion that the former has given way to the latter, or that the latter, in legal effect, has obliterated the
former.
2. We now proceed to assess the claim of the petitioner that the general court-martial is barred from asserting and
exercising jurisdiction because the Court of First Instance of Cavite a court of concurrent jurisdiction first
acquired jurisdiction over the case.

Let us initially examine the relevant facts.

On March 23 the petitioner filed a criminal complaint with the city fiscal of Cavite City for frustrated homicide against
those accused before the general court-martial.
On March 29, the city fiscal of Cavite City sent subpoenas to the aforesaid accused, advising them that the
preliminary investigation would be conducted on April 3 at 9:00 a.m.
On April 2 the petitioner wrote to the Commanding Officer, Philippine Army, Fort Bonifacio, Rizal, informing the latter
that he was not filing charges with the military authorities against those responsible for his injuries, because he had
already filed the corresponding criminal complaint with the city fiscal of Cavite City.
On April 3 Army lawyers appeared before the city fiscal of Cavite City on behalf of those army personnel involved in
the shooting and wounding of the petitioner and requested for transfer of the preliminary investigation which was,
accordingly, reset for April 16.
On April 19 the same Army lawyers moved to dismiss Arula's complaint upon the ground that the civil courts had lost
jurisdiction because a court-martial had already been convened. This motion was rejected by the city fiscal.
This was the status of the criminal complaint filed by the petitioner with the city fiscal of Cavite City when the present
petition was instituted by him. This status has remained static and at present obtains.
On the other hand, the pertinent proceedings had by and before the military authorities may be summarized as
follows:
On March 21 the President of the Philippines (as Commander-in-Chief) ordered a full investigation of the Corregidor
incident, and, on the following day, March 22, directed the creation of a court-martial to try all officers and enlisted
men responsible for any crime or crimes committed in connection with the said incident.
On March 27 Major Eduardo Martelino, et al., were placed under technical arrest and restricted to camp limits.
On April 6 Capt. Alfredo O. Pontejos, pre-trial investigator, submitted his pre-trial report recommending trial by general
court-martial of Major Eduardo Martelino, et al. Acting on this recommendation, General Espino, by Special Order
208, appointed a general court-martial to try the case against the said Major Eduardo Martelino, et al., for violation of
the 94th and 97th articles of war, and forthwith the corresponding charges and specifications were filed.
On April 14 the pre-trial investigator, Capt. Pontejos, submitted a supplemental report recommending trial by general
court-martial of Capt. Solferino Titong alias Capt. Mike, trainee Reynaldo Munar alias Lt. Rey, and trainee Eugenie
Alcantara alias Lt. Alcantara.
On April 16, the general court-martial "reconvened." 11 The first prosecution witness to testify on this day was the
petitioner himself. The court-martial then adjourned to meet again on April 19, 1968.
This was the status of the case before the general court-martial when the present action was commenced.
Does our jurisprudence yield any rule of thumb by which we may conclusively resolve the issue generated by the
above two sets of facts? It does.
Although for infractions of the general penal laws, military courts and civil courts have concurrent jurisdiction, the rule
enunciated in Crisologo vs. People of the Philippines 12 accords to the court first acquiring jurisdiction over the person
of the accused by the filing of charges and having him in custody the preferential right to proceed with the trial. Thus

As to the claim that the Military Court had no jurisdiction over the case, well known is the rule that when
several courts have concurrent jurisdiction of the same offense, the court first acquiring jurisdiction of the
prosecution retains it to the exclusion of the others. This rule, however, requires that jurisdiction over the

person of the defendant shall have first been obtained by the court in which the first charge was filed (22
C.J.S., pp. 186-187). The record in the present case shows that the information for treason in the People's
Court was filed on March 12, 1946, but petitioner had not yet been arrested or brought into the custody of
the Court the warrant of arrest had not been issued when the indictment for the same offense was filed
in the military court on January 13, 1947. Under the rule cited, mere priority in the filing of the complaint in
one court does not give that court priority to take cognizance of the offense, it being necessary in addition
that the court where the information is filed has custody or jurisdiction of the person of the defendant.
(Emphasis supplied)
The salutary rule expounded in Crisologo was explicitly affirmed in Quirico Alimajen vs. Pascual Valera, et al., L13722, February 29, 1960. Speaking for the Court, Justice J.B.L., Reyes unequivocally restated the rule in the
following words:
While the choice of the court where to bring an action, where there are two or more courts having concurrent
jurisdiction thereon, is a matter of procedure and not jurisdiction, as suggested by the appellant, the moment
such choice has been exercised, the matter becomes jurisdictional. Such choice is deemed made when the
proper complaint or information is filed with the court having jurisdiction over the same and said court
acquires jurisdiction over the person of the defendant; from which time the right and power of the court to try
the accused attaches (see People vs. Blanco, 47 Off. Gaz No. 7, 3425; Crisologo vs. People, 50 Off. Gaz.,
No. 3, 1021). (Emphasis supplied).
A thoroughgoing review of American jurisprudence has failed to yield a contrary doctrine. The doctrine restated and
re-affirmed in countless decisions of the Federal and States courts in the United States is the same: jurisdiction to try
a particular criminal case is vested in a court only when the appropriate charge is filed with it AND when jurisdiction of
the person is acquired by it through the arrest of the party charged or by his voluntary submission to the court's
jurisdiction.
The record in the present case discloses that on April 6 and thereafter, charges and specifications were preferred
against Major Eduardo Martelino and several others including the accused Soteco, Benjamin Munar, Reynaldo Munar
and Eugenio Alcantara for violations of the 94th article of war. An order for their arrest and/or custody was issued
(annex 13). Reynaldo Munar and Eugenio Alcantara were subsequently, that is, on April 16, placed under technical
arrest (annex 14). On the other hand, no indictment has yet been filed with the CFI of Cavite on the basis of the
complaint lodged by the petitioner with the City Fiscal's Office of Cavite City (see annexes B and C), the same being
merely in the preliminary investigation phase. The mere filing of a complaint with the prosecuting fiscal cannot have
parity with the filing of such complaint with the court. And even if there could be such parity, the criterion laid down
in Crisologo is not the mere filing of the complaint or information but the actual taking into custody of the accused
under the process of one court or the other.
Evidently, the general court-martial has acquired jurisdiction, which it acquired exclusively as against the CFI of
Cavite, not only as to the element of precedence in the filing of the charges, but also because it first acquired custody
or jurisdiction of the persons of the accused. Court-martial jurisdiction over the accused having properly attached,
such military jurisdiction continues throughout all phases of the proceedings, including appellate review and execution
of the sentence. 13
In the deliberations of this Court on this case, it was suggested that the rule clearly delineated in Crisologo and
explicitly affirmed in Alimajen should be abandoned in the resolution of the present case, because once Arula filed his
complaint with the city fiscal of Cavite, the military, as a matter of "comity" and "public policy," should have yielded
jurisdiction to the civil courts. This suggestion, to our mind, completely ignores, among other things of fundamental
import which we need not dwell on here, the overriding consideration that the military should be accorded, and is
entitled to, priority in disciplining its own members.
It was also suggested that this Court adopt a rule which would vest jurisdiction to try a criminal case in a civil court
once a complaint has been filed with the proper city or provincial fiscal. This suggestion is, in our view, unacceptable
because it would be productive of absurd results which would obtain even among civil courts themselves in
situations of conflict of jurisdiction, that is, as between one civil court and another civil court having concurrent
jurisdiction over the same offense.
Juan de la Cruz kidnaps a woman in Manila and takes her by motor vehicle to Pangasinan, passing the provinces of
Rizal, Bulacan, Pampanga and Tarlac. In Pangasinan he slays her. Meanwhile, her relatives learn of the kidnapping,

and forthwith file a complaint for kidnapping against Juan de la Cruz with the provincial fiscal of Bulacan. Shortly after
the killing which takes place two days after the filing of the complaint by her relatives with the provincial fiscal of
Bulacan, the provincial fiscal of Pangasinan files an information for kidnapping with murder against Juan de la Cruz,
who is thereafter arrested by virtue of forcible process issued by the court of first instance of Pangasinan. It is true
that under these circumstances the courts of first instance of Manila, Rizal, Bulacan, Pampanga, Tarlac and
Pangasinan have concurrent jurisdiction over the offense of kidnapping with murder because this felony is a
continuing one. But can it be logically argued, can the proposition be reasonably sustained, that because the relatives
of the victim had filed with the provincial fiscal of Bulacan a complaint for kidnapping, before the provincial fiscal of
Pangasinan filed the information for kidnapping with murder with the CFI of Pangasinan, the latter court could not
validly acquire jurisdiction, and the CFI of Bulacan, by the mere filing of a complaint by the victim's relatives with the
provincial fiscal of Bulacan, has thereby preempted jurisdiction to the exclusion of the CFI of Pangasinan?
To paraphrase: beyond the pale of disagreement is the legal tenet that a court acquires jurisdiction to try a criminal
case only when the following requisites concur: (1) the offense is one which the court is by law authorized to take
cognizance of, (2) the offense must have been committed within its territorial jurisdiction, and (3) the person charged
with the offense must have been brought into its forum for trial, forcibly by warrant of arrest or upon his voluntary
submission to the court. In the case at bar, while the first two requisites are indispensably present with respect to the
Court of First Instance of Cavite, the third requisite has not even become viable, because no information has been
filed with the court, nor have the accused persons been brought under its jurisdiction. Upon the other hand, all these
three requisites obtained, by the latest, as of April 16 in respect to the general court-martial. The charges and
specifications were before that day forwarded to the court-martial for trial; all the accused as of that day were already
under technical arrest and restricted to camp limits; the offense is one that is cognizable by the court-martial under
the authority of article of war 94; the offense was committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the court-martial.
3. The petitioner insists nevertheless that the respondent General Espino acted in excess of his jurisdiction and with
grave abuse of discretion "in hastily constituting and convening a general court-martial to try the case involving Arula,
without the same being thoroughly investigated by the pre-trial investigator, resulting in the filing of charges against
persons without prima facie evidence in violation of the Constitution, existing laws, and Art. 7114 of the Articles of War."
The petitioner has not at all elaborated on this contention, although apparently on the basis of this bare accusation,
his counsel, in the oral argument had on May 6, expressed in no uncertain terms his apprehension that the trial by the
court-martial will be in the language of those who are not disinclined to be mundane one big, thorough
"whitewash."
We are not impressed by this contention.
It is our view that the respondent Espino acted well within the periphery of his authority as commanding general of the
Philippine Army in constituting and convening the general court-martial in question. In issuing Special Order 208 for
the purpose of constituting and convening the general court-martial, the respondent Espino was guided by the report
and recommendation of Capt. Pontejos, the pre-trial investigating officer. In his report of April 6 (annex 6) Capt.
Pontejos gave the abstract of the declarations made by several persons concerning the Corregidor incident. The said
report was accomplished pursuant to the provisions of article of war 71. And so was his supplemental report of April
14 (annex 7).
Moreover, it would appear that the persons who should be most concerned in questioning the absence of a pretrial
investigation, or the unseemly haste with which it was conducted, are those accused before the court-martial and
this not one of the 23 accused has done.
But even a failure to conduct a pre-trial investigation does not deprive a general court-martial of jurisdiction.
The better accepted concept of pre-trial investigation is that it is directory, not mandatory, and in no way affects the
jurisdiction of a court-martial. In Humphrey vs. Smith, 336 U.S. 695, 93 L ed 986 (1949), the Court said:
We do not think that the pre-trial investigation procedure required by Article 70 15can property be construed
as an indispensible pre-requesiteto exercise of Army general court-martial jurisdiction. The Article does
serve important functions in the administration of the court-martial procedures and does provide safeguards
to an accused. Its language is clearly such that a defendant could object to trial in the absence of the
required investigation. In that event the court-martial could itself postpone trial pending the investigation. And
the military reviewing authorities could consider the same contention, reversing a court-martial conviction
where failure to comply with Article 70 has substantially injured an accused. But we are not persuaded that

Congress intended to make otherwise valid court-martial judgments wholly void because pre-trial
investigations fall short of the standards prescribed by Article 70. That Congress has not required analogous
pre-trial procedure for Navy court-martial is an indication that the investigatory plan was not intended to be
exalted to the jurisdictional level.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Shortly after enactment of Article 70 in 1920 the Judge Advocate General of the Army did hold that where
there had been no pre-trial investigation, court-martial proceedings were void ab initio. But this holding has
been expressly repudiated in later holdings of the Judge Advocate General. This later interpretation has
been that the pre-trial requirements of Article 70 are directory, not mandatory, and in no way affect the
jurisdiction of a court-martial. The War Department's interpretation was pointedly called to the attention of
Congress in 1947 after which Congress amended Article 70 but left unchanged the language here under
consideration. (Emphasis supplied)..
A trial before a general court-martial convened without any pre-trial investigation under article of war 71 would of
course be altogether irregular; but the court-martial might nevertheless have jurisdiction. 16 Significantly, this rule is
similar to the one obtaining in criminal procedure in the civil courts to the effect that absence of preliminary
investigation does not go into the jurisdiction of the court but merely to the regularity of the proceedings. 17
Likewise, the respondent Espino's authority, as commanding general of the Philippine Army, to refer military charges
against members of his command for trial by general court-martial cannot legally be assailed. Under article of war
8, 18 as implemented by the Manual for Courts-Martial (PA) and Executive Order 493, series 1952,19 the commanding
officer of a major command or task force is empowered to appoint general courts-martial.
The referral of charges to a court-martial involves the exercise of judgment and discretion (AW 71). A petition
forcertiorari, in order to prosper, must be based on jurisdictional grounds because, as long as the respondent acted
with jurisdiction, any error committed by him or it in the exercise thereof will amount to nothing more than an error of
judgment which may be reviewed or corrected only by appeal. 20 "Even an abuse of discretion is not sufficient by itself
to justify the issuance of a writ of certiorari." 21
The speedy referral by the appointing authority, herein respondent Espino, of the case to a general court-martial for
trial is not jurisdictional error. (See Flackman v. Hunter, 75 F. Supp. 871). Speedy trial is a fundamental right accorded
by the Constitution (Art. III, Sec. 1[17]), the Rules of Court (Rule 115, Sec. 7[h]) and article of war 71 to an accused in
all criminal prosecutions.
This right to a speedy trial is given greater emphasis in the military where the right to bail does not exist. In Ex parte
Milligan (4 Wall [71 US] 1), the Supreme Court of the United States observed that the discipline necessary to the
efficiency of the Army required swifter modes of trial than are furnished by the common law courts.
In the military, the right to a speedy trial is guaranteed to an accused by article of war 71 which requires that when a
person subject to military law is placed in arrest or confinement, immediate steps shall be taken to try the person
accused or to dismiss the charge and release him. This article further requires that, if practicable, the general courtmartial charges shall be forwarded to the appointing authority within eight days after the accused is arrested or
confined; if the same is not practicable, he shall report to the superior authority the reasons for delay.
The importance of the right to speedy trial is underscored by the fact that an officer who is guilty of negligence or
omission resulting in unnecessary delay may be held accountable therefor under article of war 71 (Reyes v.
Crisologo, 75 Phil. 225).
The apprehension, heretofore adverted to, expressed by the counsel for the petitioner at the hearing on May 6 that
the rights of the petitioner will not be fully vindicated should be dismissed as purely speculative. Such thinking at
this stage has no basis in law and in fact. Moreover, it is well-settled that mere apprehension or fear entertained by an
individual cannot serve as the basis of injunctive relief. 22 The presumption that official duty will be regularly performed
by officers sworn to uphold the Constitution and the law cannot be overthrown by the mere articulation of misgivings
to the contrary.

We thus ineluctably reach the following conclusions: (1) the airstrip on Corregidor island where the shooting and
wounding of the petitioner Arula allegedly took place has not been removed from the ambit of Proclamation No. 69,
series of 1948, and is therefore to be properly considered a part of the military reservation that is Corregidor island;
(2) because the prime imputed to the accused, who are persons subject to military law, was committed in a military
reservation, the general court-martial has jurisdiction concurrent with the Court of First Instance of Cavite to try the
offense; and (3) the general court-martial having taken jurisdiction ahead of the Court of First Instance of Cavite, must
be deemed to have acquired jurisdiction to the exclusion of the latter court.
With the view that we take of this case, resolving the issue of whether the petitioner Arula is a person subject to
military law would be at best a purposeless exercise in exegesis if not altogether an exercise in futility.
Although it would appear that in the above disquisition we have assumed the existence of legal standing on the part
of the petitioner to bring and maintain the present action we must hasten, without equivocation, to state that we have
so assumed, but only ad hoc, that is, solely for the purposes of the present case. We do not here resolve the general
abstract issue of whether a complaining witness in any or every criminal prosecution has legal standing to question
the jurisdiction of the court trying the case. Happily, in upholding the jurisdiction of the general court-martial to the
exclusion of the Court of First Instance of Cavite, in the context of the environmental circumstances of the case at
bar, we have not been pressed by any compelling need to do so.
ACCORDINGLY, the present petition is denied, and the restraining order issued by this Court on April 26, 1968 is
hereby lifted. No costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Zaldivar, and Capistrano, JJ., concur.
Teehankee and Barredo, JJ., took no part.

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-6410

November 24, 1954

JUAN Y. BELTRAN, Petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE EUSEBIO F. RAMOS, ETC.,Respondent.

Onofre M. Mendoza for petitioner.
Eusebio F. Ramos in his own behalf.
JUGO, J.:
The petitioner, Juan Y Beltran, was charged before the Court of First Instance of Occidental Mindoro
with the crime of malversation of public funds, alleged in the information to have been committed in
the municipality of San Jose, province of Occidental Mindoro, on or about July 6, and 12, 1951. The
trial commenced in all the municipalities of San Jose, Mamburao, and Lubang all of Occidental
Mindoro, on or about July 6, and 12, 1951. The trial commenced in the municipalities of San Jose,
Mamburao, and Lubang, all of Occidental Mindoro. The continuation of the trial was transferred to the
municipality of Calapan, province of Oriental Mindoro. The defendant Beltran, herein petitioner,
objected to the continuation of the trial in Calapan on the ground that it is outside of the territorial
boundaries of the province of Occidental Mindoro where the crime was committed. The trial court
overruled the objection and ordered the trial to proceed in Calapan. The petitioner filed in this Court a
petition for a writ of prohibition to enjoin the trial court from continuing the trial in
Calapan.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The respondent contends that the provinces of Occidental and Oriental Mindoro constitute the Eight
Judicial District under the provisions of the Judiciary Act of 1948 (Republic Act NO. 296). There being
no separate court for the province of Occidental Mindoro, it is claimed that the judge of the district
may hold his sessions in either of the two provinces. This contention is untenable in the present case
for the reason that the Rules of Court expressly provide that a criminal case should be instituted and
tried in the municipality or province where the offense was committed or any of its essential
ingredients took place. This is fundamental principle, the purpose being not to compel the defendant
to move to, and appear in a different court from that of the province where the crime was committed,
as it would cause him great inconvenience in looking for his witnesses and other evidence in another
place. Although the judge of a district may hold the trial in any particular case subject to the specific
provisions, or section 14 (a), Rule 106, in order not to violate the Rules of Court and disregard the
fundamental rights of the accused. Sometimes a judicial district includes provinces far distant from
each other. Under the theory of the respondent, the accused may be subjected to the great
inconvenience of going to a far distant province with all his witnesses to attend the trial there. This is
prohibited by the Rules of Court as being unfair to the
defendant.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
There is no contradiction between the Judiciary Act and Rule 106, section 14 (a). They should,
therefore, be enforced together harmoniously.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
In view of the foregoing, the respondent judge is enjoined from continuing the trial of the abovementioned case in Calapan, Oriental Mindoro, without pronouncement to costs. So
ordered.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Paras, C.J., Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Angelo Bautista, Concepcion and Reyes,
J.B.L., JJ., concur.

SECOND DIVISION

YUSUKE FUKUZUME,*
Petitioner,

G.R. No. 143647

Present:

- versus -

PUNO, Chairman,**
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO, SR.,
TINGA, and
CHICO-NAZARIO,*** JJ.
Promulgated:

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Respondent.

November 11, 2005

x-----------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Decision[1] of
the Court of Appeals (CA) dated March 13, 2000 in CA-G.R. CR No. 21888, which affirmed with modification the
judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati, Branch 146 dated October 21, 1996 in Criminal Case No. 95083, finding herein accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of estafa, sentencing him to suffer
the penalty of imprisonment for twenty (20) years and to pay private complainant the sum of P424,000.00; and the
CA Resolution dated June 16, 2000 denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.[2]
The facts of the case are as follows:
Private complainant Javier Ng Yu (Yu) is a businessman engaged in buying and selling aluminum scrap
wires.[3] Sometime in July 1991, Yu, accompanied by a friend, Mr. Jovate,[4] who was the vice-president of Manila
Electric Company, went to the house of herein accused-appellant Yusuke Fukuzume (Fukuzume) in Paraaque.
[5]
Jovate introduced Fukuzume to Yu telling the latter that Fukuzume is from Furukawa Electric Corporation
(Furukawa) and that he has at his disposal aluminum scrap wires.[6] Fukuzume confirmed this information and told Yu
that the scrap wires belong to Furukawa but they are under the care of National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR).
[7]
Believing Fukuzumes representation to be true, Yu agreed to buy the aluminum scrap wires from Fukuzume.[8] The
initial agreed purchase price was P200,000.00.[9] Yu gave Fukuzume sums of money on various dates which
eventually totaled P290,000.00, broken down as follows: P50,000.00, given on July 12, 1991; P20,000.00, given on
July 22, 1991; P50,000.00, given on October 14, 1991; and, P170,000.00, given on October 18, 1991.[10] Fukuzume
admitted that he received the same from Yu and that he still owes him the amount of P290,000.00.[11] To support his
claim that the aluminum scrap wires being sold are indeed owned by Furukawa, that these scrap wires are with
NAPOCOR, and that Furukawas authorized representatives are allowed to withdraw and dispose of said scrap wires,
Fukuzume gave Yu two certifications dated December 17, 1991 and December 27, 1991 purportedly issued by
NAPOCOR and signed by its legal counsel by the name of R. Y. Rodriguez.[12] At the time that Fukuzume gave Yu the
second certification, he asked money from the latter telling him that it shall be given as gifts to some of the people in
NAPOCOR. Yu gave Fukuzume money and, in exchange, the latter issued two checks, one for P100,000.00 and the
other for P34,000.00.[13] However, when Yu deposited the checks, they were dishonored on the ground that the
account from which the checks should have been drawn is already closed.[14] Subsequently, Yu called up Fukuzume
to inform him that the checks bounced.[15] Fukuzume instead told him not to worry because in one or two weeks he
will give Yu the necessary authorization to enable him to retrieve the aluminum scrap wires from NAPOCOR.[16] On
January 17, 1992, Fukuzume gave Yu a letter of even date, signed by the Director of the Overseas Operation and
Power Transmission Project Divisions of Furukawa, authorizing Fukuzume to dispose of excess aluminum conductor
materials which are stored in their depots in Tanay and Bulacan.[17] Thereafter, Fukuzume agreed to accompany Yu

when the latter is going to take the aluminum scrap wires from the NAPOCOR compound.[18] When Yu arrived at the
NAPOCOR compound on the scheduled date, Fukuzume was nowhere to be found.[19] Hence, Yu proceeded to show
the documents of authorization to NAPOCOR personnel. However, the people from NAPOCOR did not honor the
authorization letter issued by Furukawa dated January 17, 1992.[20] NAPOCOR also refused to acknowledge the
certifications dated December 17, 1991 and December 27, 1991 claiming that these are spurious as the person who
signed these documents is no longer connected with NAPOCOR as of December 1991.[21] Unable to get the
aluminum scrap wires from the NAPOCOR compound, Yu talked to Fukuzume and asked from the latter the refund of
the money he paid him.[22] Fukuzume promised to return Yus money.[23] When Fukuzume failed to comply with his
undertaking, Yu sent him a demand letter asking for the refund of P424,000.00 plus loss of profits.[24] Subsequently,
Yu filed a complaint with the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI).[25]
In an Information, dated November 4, 1994, filed with the RTC of Makati, Fukuzume was charged with
estafa committed as follows:
That sometime in the month of July, 1991 up to September 17, 1992, in the Municipality of
Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, with intent to prejudice and defraud Javier Yu y Ng, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously make false representation and fraudulent manifestation that he is the
duly authorized representative of Furukawa Electric Co. Ltd., in the Philippines, and was authorized
to sell excess aluminum conductor materials not being used by Napocor and Furukawa, the
accused knowing full well that those representations were false and were only made to induce and
convince said Javier Yu y Ng to buy said materials, who believing said representations to be true,
gave and delivered the total amount of P424,000.00 but the accused once in possession of the
money, far from complying with his obligation to deliver said aluminum conductor materials to
herein complainant, with intent of gain, unfaithfulness and abuse of confidence, applied and used
for his own personal use and benefit the said amount and despite repeated demands failed and
refused and still fails and refuses to account for, to the damage and prejudice of Javier Yu y Ng in
the aforementioned amount of P424,000.00.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[26]
Upon being arraigned on February 28, 1995, Fukuzume pleaded not guilty.[27] Trial ensued.
In its Decision dated October 21, 1996, the trial court found Fukuzume guilty as charged. The dispositive
portion of the RTC decision reads:
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing premises considered, the Court hereby finds the accused
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of estafa and hereby orders him to suffer the
maximum penalty of imprisonment for twenty (20) years. With respect to his civil liability, accused is
hereby ordered to pay complainant the amount of P424,000.00 plus legal interest from the date of
demand until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.[28]
Aggrieved by the trial courts decision, Fukuzume filed an appeal with the CA.
On March 13, 2000, the CA promulgated its decision affirming the findings and conclusions of the trial court
but modifying the penalty imposed, thus:
although the trial court correctly imposed the maximum penalty of imprisonment for twenty
(20) years, it failed to determine the minimum penalty for the offense committed (prision
correccional in its maximum period toprision mayor in its minimum period but imposed in the
maximum period), hence, the penalty is modified to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor in its minimum period, as the minimum, to not more than twenty (20) years of reclusion
temporal in its maximum period, as maximum.[29]

Accordingly, the dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from, except for the aforementioned modification
in the prison term of appellant, is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.[30]

Hence, herein petition filed by Fukuzume based on the following grounds:

THE DECISION OF THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS THAT THE TRIAL COURT OF
MAKATI HAS JURISDICTION IS NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW OR WITH THE APPLICABLE
DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HAD DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN A
WAY NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW OR WITH THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME
COURT WHEN IT CONCLUDED THAT THE ALLEGED FALSE PRETENSE WAS EXECUTED
PRIOR TO OR SIMULTANEOUS WITH THE ALLEGED COMMISSION OF THE FRAUD.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HAD DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN A
WAY NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW OR WITH THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME
COURT BY FAILING TO CONSIDER THAT THE ORIGINAL TRANSACTION BETWEEN THE
PETITIONER AND PRIVATE COMPLAINANT HAD BEEN NOVATED AND CONVERTED INTO A
MERE DEBTOR-CREDITOR RELATIONSHIP, THEREBY EXTINGUISHING THE INCIPIENT
CRIMINAL LIABILITY THEREOF, IF ANY.[31]
We agree with Fukuzumes contention that the CA erred in ruling that the RTC of Makati has jurisdiction over
the offense charged. The CA ruled:
The trial court of Makati has jurisdiction. Subject to existing laws, in all criminal
prosecutions, the action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or territory
wherein the offense was committed or any one of the essential ingredients thereof took place (Rule
110, Sec. 15, Rules of Court). Although the false representation and verbal contract of sale of the
aluminum scrap wires took place at appellants residence in Paraaque, appellant and private
complainant nevertheless admitted that the initial payment of P50,000.00 for said transaction was
made at the Hotel Intercontinental in Makati City (Record, pp. 15, 68). Hence, an element of the
crime that the offended party was induced to part with his money because of the false pretense
occurred within the jurisdiction of the lower court giving it jurisdiction over the instant case.
The CA ruled on the basis of the sworn statement of Yu filed with the NBI on April 19, 1994 [32] and the affidavit of
Fukuzume which was subscribed on July 20, 1994.[33]
With respect to the sworn statement of Yu, which was presented in evidence by the prosecution, it is clear
that he alleged therein that on July 12, 1991, he gave Fukuzume the amount of P50,000.00 at the Intercontinental
Hotel in Makati. However, we agree with Fukuzumes contention that Yu testified during his direct examination that on
July 12, 1991 he gave the amount of P50,000.00 to Fukuzume in the latters house. It is not disputed that Fukuzumes
house is located in Paraaque. Yu testified thus:
Q Mr. Witness, you testified the last time that you know the accused in this case, Mr.
Yusuke Fukuzume?
A Yes, sir.
Q Now, would you enlighten us under what circumstance you came to know the accused?
A I know the accused Mr. Yusuke Fukuzume through Mr. Hubati.

Q And why or how did Mr. Hubati come to know the accused, if you know?
A Mr. Hubati came to my place dealing with the aluminum scrap wires.
ATTY. N. SERING
Your Honor, may I move to strike out the answer. It is not responsive to the question.
COURT
Please wait until the answer is completed.
Q Now, you met this Mr. Hubati. How?
A He came to me offering me aluminum scrap wires.
FISCAL E. HIRANG
Q When was that, Mr. Witness?
A That was in 1991, sir.
COURT
When?
FISCAL E. HIRANG
Your Honor please, may the witness be allowed to consult his memorandum.
A July 12, 1991, sir.
Q And what transpired during that time you met Mr. Hubati?
A We went to the house of Mr. Fukuzume and game (sic) him some amount of money.
Q Now, would you tell the Court the reason why you parted to the accused in this case the
amount of money?
A In payment of the aluminum scrap wires and we have documents to that effect.
Q Now, please tell us what really was that transaction that took place at the house of Mr.
Fukuzume on that particular date?
A Our agreement with Mr. Hubati and with Mr. Fukuzume is that, I am going to give money
in payment of the aluminum scrap wires coming from Furukawa Eletric Company.
Q How much is the amount of money which you agreed to give to the accused?
A Our first agreement was for P200,000.
Q Where is that aluminum scrap located?
A The electric aluminum scrap wires was or were under the care of the National Power
Corporation but according to Mr. Fukuzume it belongs to Furukawa Electric
Company.
Q In short, Mr. Witness, on July 12, 1991, you only gave to the accused the amount
of P50,000?
ATTY. N. SERING
Objection, Your Honor.
FISCAL E. HIRANG

The complainant testified he gave P50,000. I am asking how much the complainant gave
to the accused on that particular date.
A On July 12, I gave him P50,000 on that date.
Q Not P200,000?
A No, sir.[34]
Settled is the rule that whenever there is inconsistency between the affidavit and the testimony of a witness in court,
the testimony commands greater weight considering that affidavits taken ex parte are inferior to testimony given in
court, the former being almost invariably incomplete and oftentimes inaccurate.[35]
More importantly, we find nothing in the direct or cross-examination of Yu to establish that he gave any
money to Fukuzume or transacted business with him with respect to the subject aluminum scrap wires inside or
within the premises of the Intercontinental Hotel in Makati, or anywhere in
Makati for that matter. Venue in criminal cases is an essential element of jurisdiction.[36] Citing Uy vs. Court of
Appeals,[37] we held in the fairly recent case of Macasaet vs. People[38] that:
It is a fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in criminal cases the
offense should have been committed or any one of its essential ingredients took place within the
territorial jurisdiction of the court. Territorial jurisdiction in criminal cases is the territory where the
court has jurisdiction to take cognizance or to try the offense allegedly committed therein by the
accused. Thus, it cannot take jurisdiction over a person charged with an offense allegedly
committed outside of that limited territory. Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a court over the criminal
case is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information. And once it is so shown, the
court may validly take cognizance of the case. However, if the evidence adduced during the trial
show that the offense was committed somewhere else, the court should dismiss the action
for want of jurisdiction.[39](Emphasis supplied)
Where life or liberty is affected by its proceedings, the court must keep strictly within the limits of the law authorizing it
to take jurisdiction and to try the case and to render judgment.[40]
In the present case, the criminal information against Fukuzume was filed with and tried by the RTC of
Makati. He was charged with estafa as defined under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code, the
elements of which are as follows:
1. That there must be a false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means.
2. That such false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means must be made or executed
prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud.
3. That the offended party must have relied on the false pretense, fraudulent act, or
fraudulent means, that is, he was induced to part with his money or property because of the false
pretense, fraudulent act, or fraudulent means.
4. That as a result thereof, the offended party suffered damage.[41]
The crime was alleged in the Information as having been committed in Makati. However, aside from the sworn
statement executed by Yu on April 19, 1994, the prosecution presented no other evidence, testimonial or
documentary, to corroborate Yus sworn statement or to prove that any of the above-enumerated elements of the
offense charged was committed in Makati. Indeed, the prosecution failed to establish that any of the subsequent
payments made by Yu in the amounts of P50,000.00 on July 12, 1991, P20,000.00 on July 22, 1991, P50,000.00 on
October 14, 1991 and P170,000.00 on October 18, 1991 was given in Makati. Neither was there proof to show that

the certifications purporting to prove that NAPOCOR has in its custody the subject aluminum scrap wires and that
Fukuzume is authorized by Furukawa to sell the same were given by Fukuzume to Yu in Makati. On the contrary, the
testimony of Yu established that all the elements of the offense charged had been committed in Paraaque, to wit: that
on July 12, 1991, Yu went to the house of Fukuzume in Paraaque; that with the intention of selling the subject
aluminum scrap wires, the latter pretended that he is a representative of Furukawa who is authorized to sell the said
scrap wires; that based on the false pretense of Fukuzume, Yu agreed to buy the subject aluminum scrap wires; that
Yu paid Fukuzume the initial amount of P50,000.00; that as a result, Yu suffered damage. Stated differently, the crime
of estafa, as defined and penalized under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code, was consummated
when Yu and Fukuzume met at the latters house in Paraaque and, by falsely pretending to sell aluminum scrap wires,
Fukuzume was able to induce Yu to part with his money.
The Office of the Solicitor General argues that Fukuzume himself alleged in his affidavit dated July 20, 1994
that in an unspecified date, he received P50,000.00 from Yu at the Intercontinental Hotel in Makati. However, we
cannot rely on this affidavit for the reason that it forms part of the records of the preliminary investigation and,
therefore, may not be considered evidence. It is settled that the record of the preliminary investigation, whether
conducted by a judge or a prosecutor, shall not form part of the record of the case in the RTC.[42] In People vs.
Crispin,[43] this Court held that the fact that the affidavit formed part of the record of the preliminary investigation does
not justify its being treated as evidence because the record of the preliminary investigation does not form part of the
record of the case in the RTC. Such record must be introduced as evidence during trial, and the trial court is not
compelled to take judicial notice of the same.[44] Since neither prosecution nor defense presented in evidence
Fukuzumes affidavit, the same may not be considered part of the records, much less evidence.
From the foregoing, it is evident that the prosecution failed to prove that Fukuzume committed the crime of
estafa in Makati or that any of the essential ingredients of the offense took place in the said city. Hence, the judgment
of the trial court convicting Fukuzume of the crime of estafa
should be set aside for want of jurisdiction, without prejudice, however, to the filing of appropriate charges with the
court of competent jurisdiction.
It is noted that it was only in his petition with the CA that Fukuzume raised the issue of the trial courts
jurisdiction over the offense charged. Nonetheless, the rule is settled that an objection based on the ground that the
court lacks jurisdiction over the offense charged may be raised or considered motu propio by the court at any stage of
the proceedings or on appeal.[45] Moreover, jurisdiction over the subject matter in a criminal case cannot be conferred
upon the court by the accused, by express waiver or otherwise, since such jurisdiction is conferred by the sovereign
authority which organized the court, and is given only by law in the manner and form prescribed by law.[46] While an
exception to this rule was recognized by this Court beginning with the landmark case of Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy,
[47]
wherein the defense of lack of jurisdiction by the court which rendered the questioned ruling was considered to be
barred by laches, we find that the factual circumstances involved in said case, a civil case, which justified the
departure from the general rule are not present in the instant criminal case.
Thus, having found that the RTC of Makati did not have jurisdiction to try the case against Fukuzume, we
find it unnecessary to consider the other issues raised in the present petition.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision and resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 21888
are SET ASIDE on ground of lack of jurisdiction on the part of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 146.
Criminal Case No. 95-083 is DISMISSED without prejudice.
SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION
VICENTE FOZ, JR. and DANNY G. FAJARDO,
Petitioners,

G.R. No. 167764

Present:

- versus -

CARPIO, J., Chairperson,

CARPIO MORALES,*
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA, and
PERALTA, JJ.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Respondent.

Promulgated:
October 9, 2009

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:

Before the court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the
[1]

Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA), Cebu City, dated November 24, 2004 in CA-G.R. CR No. 22522, which
affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 23, Iloilo City, dated December 4, 1997 in Criminal
Case No. 44527 finding petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of libel. Also assailed is the CA
Resolution[2] dated April 8, 2005 denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
In an Information[3] dated October 17, 1994 filed before the RTC of Iloilo City, petitioners Vicente Foz, Jr. and
Danny G. Fajardo were charged with the crime of libel committed as follows:

That on or about the 5th day of July, 1994 in the City of Iloilo, Philippines and within the jurisdiction
of this court, both the accused as columnist and Editor-Publisher, respectively, of Panay News, a
daily publication with a considerable circulation in the City of Iloilo and throughout the region, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with malicious intent of impeaching the virtue,
honesty, integrity and reputation of Dr. Edgar Portigo, a physician and medical practitioner in Iloilo
City, and with the malicious intent of injuring and exposing said Dr. Edgar Portigo to public hatred,
contempt and ridicule, write and publish in the regular issue of said daily publication on July 5,
1994, a certain article entitled MEET DR. PORTIGO, COMPANY PHYSICIAN, quoted verbatim
hereunder, to wit:
MEET DR. PORTIGO,
COMPANY PHYSICIAN

PHYSICIAN (sic) are duly sworn to help to do all their best to promote the health of
their patients. Especially if they are employed by a company to serve its employees.
However, the opposite appears to be happening in the Local San Miguel Corporation
office, SMC employees are fuming mad about their company physician, Dr. Portigo,
because the latter is not doing well in his sworn obligation in looking after the health
problems of employees, reports reaching Aim.. Fire say.
One patient, Lita Payunan, wife of employee Wilfredo Payunan, and residing
in Burgos, Lapaz, Iloilo City, has a sad tale to say about Dr. Portigo. Her story began
September 19 last year when she felt ill and had to go to Dr. Portigo for consultation.
The doctor put her under observation, taking seven months to conclude that she had
rectum myoma and must undergo an operation.
Subsequently, the family sought the services of a Dr. Celis and a Dr. de los Reyes at
Doctor's Hospital. Incidentally, where Dr. Portigo also maintains a clinic. Dr. Portigo
got angry, sources said, after knowing that the family chose a surgeon (Dr. Celis) on
their own without his nod as he had one to recommend.
Lita was operated by Dr. de los Reyes last March and was released from the
hospital two weeks after. Later, however, she again complained of difficulty in
urinating and defecating[. On] June 24, she was readmitted to the hospital.
The second operation, done by Dr. Portigo's recommendee, was devastating to the
family and the patient herself who woke to find out her anus and vagina closed and a
hole with a catheter punched on her right side.
This was followed by a bad news that she had cancer.
Dr. Portigo recommended another operation, this time to bore another hole on the
left side of Lita. But a Dr. Rivera to whom he made the referral frankly turned it down
because it would only be a waste of money since the disease was already on the
terminal state.
The company and the family spent some P150,000.00 to pay for the wrong
diagnosis of the company physician.
My sympathy for Lita and her family. May the good Lord, Healer of all healers, be on
your side, May the Healer of all healers likewise touch the conscience of physicians
to remind them that their profession is no license for self-enrichment at the expense
of the poor. But, sad to say, Lita passed away, July 2, 1994.
Lita is not alone. Society is replete with similar experience where physicians treat
their patients for profits. Where physicians prefer to act like agents of multinational
corporations prescribing expensive drugs seen if there are equivalent drugs sold at
the counter for much lower price. Yes, Lita, we also have hospitals, owned by a socalled charitable religious institutions and so-called civic groups, too greedy for
profits. Instead of promoting baby-and mother-friendly practices which are cheaper
and more effective, they still prefer the expensive yet unhealthy practices.
The (sic) shun breast feeding and promote infant milk formula although mother's
milk is many times cheaper and more nutrious (sic) than the brands they peddle.
These hospitals separate newly born from their moms for days, conditioning the
former to milk formula while at the same time stunting the mother's mammalia from
manufacturing milk. Kadiri to death!
My deepest sympathy to the bereaved family of Mrs. Lita Payunan who died July 2,
1994, Her body lies at the Payunan residence located at 236-G Burgos St.,
Lapaz, Iloilo City. May you rest in peace, Inday Lita.

wherein said Dr. Portigo was portrayed as wanting in high sense of professional integrity, trust and
responsibility expected of him as a physician, which imputation and insinuation as both accused
knew were entirely false and malicious and without foundation in fact and therefore highly libelous,
offensive and derogatory to the good name, character and reputation of the said Dr. Edgar Portigo.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[4]

Upon being arraigned[5] on March 1, 1995, petitioners, assisted by counsel de parte, pleaded not guilty to the crime
charged in the Information. Trial thereafter ensued.
On December 4, 1997, the RTC rendered its Decision[6] finding petitioners guilty as charged. The dispositive portion
of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the facts obtaining and the jurisprudence aforecited, JUDGMENT is
hereby rendered finding both accused Danny Fajardo and Vicente Foz, Jr. GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT for the crime of Libel defined in Article 353 and punishable under Article
355 of the Revised Penal Code, hereby sentencing aforenamed accused to suffer an indeterminate
penalty of imprisonment of Three (3) Months and Eleven (11) Days of Arresto Mayor, as Minimum,
to One (1) Year, Eight (8) Months and Twenty-One (21) Days of Prision Correccional, as Maximum,
and to pay a fine of P1,000.00 each.[7]

Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied in an Order[8] dated February 20, 1998.
Dissatisfied, petitioners filed an appeal with the CA.
On November 24, 2004, the CA rendered its assailed Decision which affirmed in toto the RTC decision.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, which the CA denied in a Resolution dated April 8, 2005.
Hence, herein petition filed by petitioners based on the following grounds:
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THE SUBJECT ARTICLE LIBELOUS
WITHIN THE MEANING AND INTENDMENT OF ARTICLE 353 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE.
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THE EXISTENCE OF MALICE IN THIS
CASE AND IN NOT FINDING THAT THE SUBJECT ARTICLE IS CONSTITUTIONALLY
PROTECTED AS PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS.
III. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE CONVICTION OF
PETITIONER FAJARDO WHO HAPPENS TO BE MERELY PUBLISHER OF PANAY NEWS AND
COULD NOT POSSIBLY SHARE ALL THE OPINIONS OF THE NEWSPAPER'S OPINION
COLUMNISTS.[9]
Petitioners argue that the CA erred in finding that the element of defamatory imputation was satisfied when petitioner
Foz, as columnist, portrayed Dr. Portigo as an incompetent doctor and an opportunist who enriched himself at the
expense of the poor. Petitioners pose the question of whether a newspaper opinion columnist, who sympathizes with
a patient and her family and expresses the family's outrage in print, commits libel when the columnist criticizes the
doctor's competence or lack of it, and such criticism turns out to be lacking in basis if not entirely false. Petitioners
claim that the article was written in good faith in the belief that it would serve the public good. They contend that the
CA erred in finding the existence of malice in the publication of the article; that no malice in law or actual malice was

proven by the prosecution; and that the article was printed pursuant to the bounden duty of the press to report
matters of public interest. Petitioners further contend that the subject article was an opinion column, which was the
columnists exclusive views; and that petitioner Fajardo, as the editor and publisher of Panay News, did not have to
share those views and should not be held responsible for the crime of libel.
The Solicitor General filed his Comment, alleging that only errors of law are reviewable by this Court in a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45; that petitioners are raising a factual issue, i.e., whether or not the element of
malice required in every indictment for libel was established by the prosecution, which would require the weighing
anew of the evidence already passed upon by the CA and the RTC; and that factual findings of the CA, affirming
those of the RTC, are accorded finality, unless there appears on records some facts or circumstance of weight which
the court may have overlooked, misunderstood or misappreciated, and which, if properly considered, may alter the
result of the case a situation that is not, however, obtaining in this case.
In their Reply, petitioners claim that the first two issues presented in their petition do not require the evaluation of
evidence submitted in court; that malice, as an element of libel, has always been discussed whenever raised as an
issue via a petition for review on certiorari. Petitioners raise for the first time the issue that the information charging
them with libel did not contain allegations sufficient to vest jurisdiction in the RTC of Iloilo City.
The Court finds that the threshold issue for resolution is whether or not the RTC of Iloilo City, Branch 23, had
jurisdiction over the offense of libel as charged in the Information dated October 17, 1994.

The Court notes that petitioners raised for the first time the issue of the RTC's jurisdiction over the offense
charged only in their Reply filed before this Court and finds that petitioners are not precluded from doing so.
In Fukuzume v. People,[10] the Court ruled:
It is noted that it was only in his petition with the CA that Fukuzume raised the issue of the
trial courts jurisdiction over the offense charged. Nonetheless, the rule is settled that an objection
based on the ground that the court lacks jurisdiction over the offense charged may be raised or
considered motu proprio by the court at any stage of the proceedings or on appeal. Moreover,
jurisdiction over the subject matter in a criminal case cannot be conferred upon the court by the
accused, by express waiver or otherwise, since such jurisdiction is conferred by the sovereign
authority which organized the court, and is given only by law in the manner and form prescribed by
law. While an exception to this rule was recognized by this Court beginning with the landmark case
of Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy, wherein the defense of lack of jurisdiction by the court which rendered
the questioned ruling was considered to be barred by laches, we find that the factual circumstances
involved in said case, a civil case, which justified the departure from the general rule are not
present in the instant criminal case.[11]

The Court finds merit in the petition.

Venue in criminal cases is an essential element of jurisdiction. The Court held in Macasaet v. People[12] that:
It is a fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in criminal cases the offense
should have been committed or any one of its essential ingredients took place within the territorial
jurisdiction of the court. Territorial jurisdiction in criminal cases is the territory where the court has
jurisdiction to take cognizance or to try the offense allegedly committed therein by the accused.
Thus, it cannot take jurisdiction over a person charged with an offense allegedly committed outside
of that limited territory. Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is
determined by the allegations in the complaint or information. And once it is so shown, the
court may validly take cognizance of the case. However, if the evidence adduced during the trial
show that the offense was committed somewhere else, the court should dismiss the action for want
of jurisdiction. (Emphasis supplied.)[13]

Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 4363, provides the specific rules as to the
venue in cases of written defamation, to wit:
Article 360. Persons responsible.Any person who shall publish, exhibit or cause the publication or
exhibition of any defamation in writing or by similar means, shall be responsible for the same.

The author or editor of a book or pamphlet, or the editor or business manager of a daily newspaper,
magazine or serial publication, shall be responsible for the defamations contained therein to the
same extent as if he were the author thereof.

The criminal action and civil action for damages in cases of written defamations, as provided for in
this chapter shall be filed simultaneously or separately with the court of first instance of
the province or city where the libelous article is printed and first published or where any of
the offended parties actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense: Provided,
however, That where one of the offended parties is a public officer whose office is in the City of
Manila at the time of the commission of the offense, the action shall be filed in the Court of First
Instance of the City of Manila or of the city or province where the libelous article is printed and first
published, and in case such public officer does not hold office in the City of Manila, the action shall
be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where he held office at the time of the
commission of the offense or where the libelous article is printed and first published and in case
one of the offended parties is a private individual, the action shall be filed in the Court of First
Instance of the province or city where he actually resides at the time of the commission of the
offense or where the libelous matter is printed and first published x x x. (Emphasis supplied.)

In Agbayani v. Sayo,[14] the rules on venue in Article 360 were restated as follows:

1. Whether the offended party is a public official or a private person, the criminal action may be filed
in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where the libelous article is printed and first
published.

2. If the offended party is a private individual, the criminal action may also be filed in the Court of
First Instance of the province where he actually resided at the time of the commission of the offense.

3. If the offended party is a public officer whose office is in Manila at the time of the commission of
the offense, the action may be filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila.

4. If the offended party is a public officer holding office outside of Manila, the action may be filed in
the Court of First Instance of the province or city where he held office at the time of the commission
of the offense.[15]

Applying the foregoing law to this case, since Dr. Portigo is a private individual at the time of the publication
of the alleged libelous article, the venue of the libel case may be in the province or city where the libelous article was
printed and first published, or in the province where Dr. Portigo actually resided at the time of the commission of the
offense.

The relevant portion of the Information for libel filed in this case which for convenience the Court quotes
again, to wit:
That on or about the 5th day of July, 1994 in the City of Iloilo, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this court, both the accused as columnists and Editor-Publisher, respectively, of
Panay News, a daily publication with a considerable circulation in the City of Iloilo and throughout
the region, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with malicious intent of
impeaching the virtue, honesty, integrity and reputation of Dr. Edgar Portigo, a physician and
medical practitioner in Iloilo City, and with the malicious intent of injuring and exposing said Dr.
Edgar Portigo to public hatred, contempt and ridicule, write and publish in the regular issue of said
daily publication on July 5, 1994, a certain article entitled MEET DR. PORTIGO, COMPANY
PHYSICIAN....

The allegations in the Information that Panay News, a daily publication with a considerable circulation in the City
of Iloilo and throughout the region only showed that Iloilo was the place where Panay Newswas in considerable
circulation but did not establish that the said publication was printed and first published in Iloilo City.

In Chavez v. Court of Appeals,[16] which involved a libel case filed by a private individual with the RTC of Manila, a
portion of the Information of which reads:
That on or about March 1995, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused
[Baskinas and Manapat] conspiring and confederating with others whose true names, real
identities and present whereabouts are still unknown and helping one another, with malicious intent
of impeaching the honesty, virtue, character and reputation of one FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, former
Solicitor General of the Philippines, and with the evident purpose of injuring and exposing him to
public ridicule, hatred and contempt, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and maliciously cause
to be published in Smart File, a magazine of general circulation in Manila, and in their respective
capacity as Editor-in-Chief and Author-Reporter, ....[17]

the Court ruled that the Information did not sufficiently vest jurisdiction in the RTC of Manila to hear the libel charge in
consonance with Article 360. The Court made the following disquisition:

x x x Still, a perusal of the Information in this case reveals that the word published is utilized in the
precise context of noting that the defendants cause[d] to be published in 'Smart File', a magazine of
general circulation in Manila. The Information states that the libelous articles were published
in Smart File, and not that they were published in Manila. The place Manila is in turn employed to
situate where Smart File was in general circulation, and not where the libel was published or first
printed. The fact that Smart File was in general circulation in Manila does not necessarily establish
that it was published and first printed in Manila, in the same way that while leading national dailies
such as the Philippine Daily Inquirer or the Philippine Star are in general circulation in Cebu, it does
not mean that these newspapers are published and first printed in Cebu.
Indeed, if we hold that the Information at hand sufficiently vests jurisdiction in Manila courts since the
publication is in general circulation in Manila, there would be no impediment to the filing of the libel
action in other locations where Smart File is in general circulation. Using the example of
the Inquirer or the Star, the granting of this petition would allow a resident of Aparri to file a criminal
case for libel against a reporter or editor in Jolo, simply because these newspapers are in general
circulation in Jolo. Such a consequence is precisely what Rep. Act No. 4363 sought to avoid.[18]

In Agustin v. Pamintuan,[19] which also involved a libel case filed by a private individual, the Acting General Manager
of the Baguio Country Club, with the RTC of Baguio City where the Information therein alleged that the libelous
article was published in the Philippine Daily Inquirer, a newspaper of general circulation in the City of Baguio and the
entire Philippines, the Court did not consider the Informationsufficient to show that Baguio City was the venue of the
printing and first publication of the alleged libelous article.
Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code as amended provides that a private individual may also file the libel case in
the RTC of the province where he actually resided at the time of the commission of the offense. The Information filed
against petitioners failed to allege the residence of Dr. Portigo. While the Information alleges that Dr. Edgar Portigo is
a physician and medical practitioner in Iloilo City, such allegation did not clearly and positively indicate that he was
actually residing in Iloilo City at the time of the commission of the offense. It is possible that Dr. Portigo was actually
residing in another place.

Again, in Agustin v. Pamintuan,[20] where the Information for libel alleged that the offended party was the Acting
General Manager of the Baguio Country Club and of good standing and reputation in the community, the Court did
not find such allegation sufficient to establish that the offended party was actually residing in Baguio City. The Court
explained its ruling in this wise:
The residence of a person is his personal, actual or physical habitation or his actual residence or
place of abode provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency; no particular length of
time of residence is required. However, the residence must be more than temporary. The term
residence involves the idea of something beyond a transient stay in the place; and to be a resident,
one must abide in a place where he had a house therein. To create a residence in a particular
place, two fundamental elements are essential: The actual bodily presence in the place, combined
with a freely exercised intention of remaining there permanently or for an indefinite time. While it is
possible that as the Acting General Manager of the Baguio Country Club, the petitioner may have
been actually residing in Baguio City, the Informations did not state that he was actually residing
therein when the alleged crimes were committed. It is entirely possible that the private complainant
may have been actually residing in another place. One who transacts business in a place and
spends considerable time thereat does not render such person a resident therein. Where one may
have or own a business does not of itself constitute residence within the meaning of the statute.
Pursuit of business in a place is not conclusive of residence there for purposes of venue.[21]
Settled is the rule that jurisdiction of a court over a criminal case is determined by the allegations of the
complaint or information, and the offense must have been committed or any one of its essential ingredients took
place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court.[22] Considering that the Information failed to allege the venue
requirements for a libel case under Article 360, the Court finds that the RTC of Iloilo City had no jurisdiction to hear
this case. Thus, its decision convicting petitioners of the crime of libel should be set aside for want of jurisdiction
without prejudice to its filing with the court of competent jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated November 24, 2004 and the Resolution dated April 8,
2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 22522 are SET ASIDE on the ground of lack of jurisdiction on the
part of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 23, Iloilo City. Criminal Case No. 44527 is DISMISSED without prejudice.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

CLARITA DEPAKAKIBO GARCIA,

G.R. No. 170122

Petitioner,

- versus SANDIGANBAYAN and REPUBLIC OF

THEPHILIPPINES,
Respondents.
x-----------------------------------------x
CLARITA DEPAKAKIBO GARCIA,

G.R. No. 171381

Present:

Petitioner,

- versus SANDIGANBAYAN and REPUBLIC OF

THEPHILIPPINES,
Respondents.

CARPIO, J., Chairperson,

CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,* and
PERALTA, JJ.
Promulgated:
October 12, 2009

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

The Case

Before us are these two (2) consolidated petitions under Rule 65, each interposed by petitioner Clarita D.
Garcia, with application for injunctive relief. In the first petition for mandamus and/or certiorari, docketed
as G.R. No. 170122, petitioner seeks to nullify and set aside the August 5, 2005 Order,[1] as reiterated in another
Order dated August 26, 2005, both issued by the Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division, which effectively denied the
petitioners motion to dismiss and/or to quash Civil Case No. 0193, a suit for forfeiture commenced by the
Republic of the Philippines against the petitioner and her immediate family. The second petition for certiorari,
docketed as G.R. No. 171381, seeks to nullify and set aside the November 9, 2005 Resolution [2] of the
Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division, insofar as it likewise denied the petitioners motion to dismiss and/or quash Civil
Case No. 0196, another forfeiture case involving the same parties but for different properties.

The Facts

To recover unlawfully acquired funds and properties in the aggregate amount of PhP 143,052,015.29 that
retired Maj. Gen. Carlos F. Garcia, his wife, herein petitioner Clarita, children Ian Carl, Juan Paulo and Timothy
Mark (collectively, the Garcias) had allegedly amassed and acquired, the Republic, through the Office of the
Ombudsman (OMB), pursuant to Republic Act No. (RA) 1379,[3] filed with the Sandiganbayan (SB) on October 29,
2004 a petition for the forfeiture of those properties. This petition, docketed as Civil Case No. 0193, was
eventually raffled to the Fourth Division of the anti-graft court.

Civil Case No. 0193 was followed by the filing on July 5, 2005 of another forfeiture
case, docketed as Civil Case No. 0196, this time to recover funds and properties amounting
to PhP 202,005,980.55.Civil Case No. 0196 would eventually be raffled also to the Fourth
Division of the SB. For convenience and clarity, Civil Case No. 0193 shall hereinafter be also
referred to as Forfeiture I and Civil Case No. 0196 as Forfeiture II.

Prior to the filing of Forfeiture II, but subsequent to the filing of Forfeiture I, the OMB charged the
Garcias and three others with violation of RA 7080 (plunder) under an Information dated April 5, 2005which placed
the value of the property and funds plundered at PhP 303,272,005.99. Docketed as Crim. Case No. 28107, the
Information was raffled off to the Second Division of the SB. The plunder charge, as the parties pleadings seem to
indicate, covered substantially the same properties identified in both forfeiture cases.
After the filing of Forfeiture I, the following events transpired in relation to the case:
(1) The corresponding summons were issued and all served on Gen. Garcia at his
place of detention. Per the Sheriffs Return[4] dated November 2, 2005, the summons were duly
served on respondent Garcias. Earlier, or on October 29, 2004, the SB issued a writ of attachment
in favor of the Republic, an issuance which Gen. Garcia challenged before this Court, docketed
as G.R. No. 165835.
Instead of an answer, the Garcias filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of the SBs lack
of jurisdiction over separate civil actions for forfeiture. The OMB countered with a motion to
expunge and to declare the Garcias in default. To the OMBs motion, the Garcias interposed an
opposition in which they manifested that they have meanwhile repaired to the Court
on certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 165835 to nullify the writ of attachment SB issued in which
case the SB should defer action on the forfeiture case as a matter of judicial courtesy.
(2) By Resolution[5] of January 20, 2005, the SB denied the motion to dismiss; declared
the same motion as pro forma and hence without tolling effect on the period to answer. The
same resolution declared the Garcias in default.
Another resolution[6] denied the Garcias motion for reconsideration and/or to admit
answer, and set a date for the ex-parte presentation of the Republics evidence.
A second motion for reconsideration was also denied on February 23, 2005, pursuant to
the prohibited pleading rule.
(3) Despite the standing default order, the Garcias moved for the transfer and
consolidation of Forfeiture I with the plunder case which were respectively pending in different
divisions of the SB, contending that such consolidation is mandatory under RA 8249. [7]

On May 20, 2005, the SB 4th Division denied the motion for the reason that the forfeiture
case is not the corresponding civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the
criminal case of plunder.
(4) On July 26, 2005, the Garcias filed another motion to dismiss and/or to quash
Forfeiture I on, inter alia, the following grounds: (a) the filing of the plunder case ousted the SB
4th Division of jurisdiction over the forfeiture case; and (b) that the consolidation is imperative in
order to avoid possible double jeopardy entanglements.
By Order[8] of August 5, 2005, the SB merely noted the motion in view of movants having
been declared in default which has yet to be lifted.

It is upon the foregoing factual antecedents that petitioner Clarita has interposed her first special
civil action for mandamus and/or certiorari docketed as G.R. No. 170122, raising the following issues:
I. Whether or not the [SB] 4th Division acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion x x x in issuing its challenged order of August 5, 2005 and August 26 2005
that merely Noted without action, hence refused to resolve petitioners motion to
dismiss and/or to quash by virtue of petitioners prior default in that:
A. For lack of proper and valid service of summons, the [SB] 4th Division could not
have acquired jurisdiction over petitioners, [and her childrens] x x x persons, much
less make them become the true parties-litigants, contestants or legal adversaries
in forfeiture I. As the [SB] has not validly acquired jurisdiction over the petitioners
[and her childrens] x x x persons, they could not possibly be declared in default,
nor can a valid judgment by default be rendered against them.
B. Even then, mere declaration in default does not per se bar petitioner from
challenging the [SB] 4th Divisions lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of
forfeiture I as the same can be raised anytime, even after final judgment. In the
absence of jurisdiction over the subject matter, any and all proceedings before the
[SB] are null and void.

C. Contrary to its August 26, 2005 rejection of petitioners motion for reconsideration of the
first challenged order that the issue of jurisdiction raised therein had already been passed upon
by [the SB 4th Divisions] resolution of May 20, 2005, the records clearly show that the grounds
relied upon by petitioner in her motion to dismiss and/or to quash dated July 26, 2005 were
entirely different, separate and distinct from the grounds set forth in petitioners manifestation
and motion [to consolidate] dated April 15, 2005 that was denied by it per its resolution of
May 20, 2005.

D. In any event, the [SB] 4th Division has been ousted of jurisdiction over the subject
matter of forfeiture I upon the filing of the main plunder case against petitioner
that mandates the automatic forfeiture of the subject properties in forfeiture cases
I & II as a function or adjunct of any conviction for plunder.

E. Being incompatible, the forfeiture law (RA No. 1379 [1955]) was impliedly repealed by the
plunder law (RA No. 7080 [1991]) with automatic forfeiture mechanism.

F. Since the sought forfeiture includes properties purportedly located in the USA, any penal
conviction for forfeiture in this case cannot be enforced outside of the Philippines x x x.

G. Based on orderly procedure and sound administration of justice, it is imperative

that the matter of forfeiture be exclusively tried in the main plunder case to avoid
possible double jeopardy entanglements, and to avoid possible conflicting decisions
by 2 divisions of the [SB] on the matter of forfeiture as a penal sanction.
[9]
(Emphasis added.)

With respect to Forfeiture II, the following events and proceedings occurred or were taken after the
petition for Forfeiture II was filed:
(1) On July 12, 2005, the SB sheriff served the corresponding summons. In his return
of July 13, 2005, the sheriff stated giving the copies of the summons to the OIC/Custodian of
the PNP Detention Center who in turn handed them to Gen. Garcia. The general signed his
receipt of the summons, but as to those pertaining to the other respondents, Gen. Garcia
acknowledged receiving the same, but with the following qualifying note: Im receiving the
copies of Clarita, Ian Carl, Juan Paolo & Timothy but these copies will not guarantee it being
served to the above-named (sic).
(2) On July 26, 2005, Clarita and her children, thru special appearance of counsel, filed
a motion to dismiss and/or to quash Forfeiture II primarily for lack of jurisdiction over their
persons and on the subject matter thereof which is now covered by the plunder case.
To the above motion, the Republic filed its opposition with a motion for alternative
service of summons. The motion for alternative service would be repeated in another motion
of August 25, 2005.
(3) By Joint Resolution of November 9, 2005, the SB denied both the petitioners motion
to dismiss and/or to quash and the Republics motion for alternative service of summons.
On January 24, 2006, the SB denied petitioners motion for partial reconsideration. [10]

From the last two issuances adverted to, Clarita has come to this Court via the instant petition
for certiorari, docketed as GR No. 171381. As there submitted, the SB 4th Division acted without or in excess
of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in issuing its Joint Resolution dated November 9, 2005 and its
Resolution of January 24, 2006 denying petitioners motion to dismiss and/or to quash in that:
A. Based on its own finding that summons was improperly served on petitioner, the [SB] ought to have
dismissed forfeiture II for lack of jurisdiction over petitioners person x x x.
B. By virtue of the plunder case filed with the [SB] Second Division that mandates the automatic
forfeiture of unlawfully acquired properties upon conviction, the [SB] Fourth Division has no
jurisdiction over the subject matter of forfeiture.
C. Being incompatible, the forfeiture law (RA No. 1379 [1955]) was impliedly repealed by the
plunder law (RA No. 7080 [1991]) with automatic forfeiture mechanism.
D. Based on orderly procedure and sound administration of justice, it is imperative that the
matter of forfeiture be exclusively tried in the main plunder case to avoid possible double
jeopardy entanglements and worse conflicting decisions by 2 divisions of the Sandiganbayan on
the matter of forfeiture as a penal sanction.[11] (Emphasis added.)

Per Resolution of the Court dated March 13, 2006, G.R. No. 170122 and G.R. No. 171381 were
consolidated.
The Courts Ruling

The petitions are partly meritorious.

The core issue tendered in these consolidated cases ultimately boils down to the question of jurisdiction
and may thusly be couched into whether the Fourth Division of the SB has acquired jurisdiction over the person of
petitionerand her three sons for that matterconsidering that, first, vis--vis Civil Case Nos. 0193 (Forfeiture I) and
0196 (Forfeiture II), summons against her have been ineffectively or improperly served and, second, that the
plunder caseCrim. Case No. 28107has already been filed and pending with another division of the SB, i.e., Second
Division of the SB.
Plunder Case in Crim. Case No. 28107 Did Not Absorb
the Forfeiture Cases in Civil Case Nos. 0193 and 0196

Petitioner maintains that the SB 4th Division has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of Forfeitures I
and II as both cases are now covered or included in the plunder case against the Garcias. Or as petitioner puts it a
bit differently, the filing of the main plunder case (Crim. Case No. 28107), with its automatic forfeiture mechanism
in the event of conviction, ousted the SB 4th Division of its jurisdiction over the subject matter of the forfeiture
cases. The inclusion of the forfeiture cases with the plunder case is necessary, so petitioner claims, to obviate
possible double jeopardy entanglements and colliding case dispositions. Prescinding from these premises,
petitioner would ascribe grave abuse of discretion on the SB 4th Division for not granting its separate motions to
dismiss the two forfeiture petitions and/or to consolidate them with the plunder case on the foregoing ground.

Petitioners contention is untenable. And in response to what she suggests in some of her pleadings, let it
be stated at the outset that the SB has jurisdiction over actions for forfeiture under RA 1379, albeit the proceeding
thereunder is civil in nature. We said so in Garcia v. Sandiganbayan[12] involving no less than petitioners husband
questioning certain orders issued in Forfeiture I case.
Petitioners posture respecting Forfeitures I and II being absorbed by the plunder case, thus depriving the
4th Division of the SB of jurisdiction over the civil cases, is flawed by the assumptions holding it together, the first
assumption being that the forfeiture cases are the corresponding civil action for recovery of civil liability ex
delicto. As correctly ruled by the SB 4th Division in its May 20, 2005 Resolution,[13] the civil liability for forfeiture
cases does not arise from the commission of a criminal offense, thus:
Such liability is based on a statute that safeguards the right of the State to recover
unlawfully acquired properties. The action of forfeiture arises when a public officer or employee
[acquires] during his incumbency an amount of property which is manifestly out of proportion of

his salary x x x and to his other lawful income x x x. [14] Such amount of property is then
presumed prima facie to have been unlawfully acquired.[15] Thus if the respondent [public
official] is unable to show to the satisfaction of the court that he has lawfully acquired the
property in question, then the court shall declare such property forfeited in favor of the State,
and by virtue of such judgment the property aforesaid shall become property of the State. [16] x x
x (Citations in the original.)
Lest it be overlooked, Executive Order No. (EO) 14, Series of 1986, albeit defining only the jurisdiction
over cases involving ill-gotten wealth of former President Marcos, his immediate family and business associates,
authorizes under its Sec. 3[17] the filing of forfeiture suits under RA 1379 which will proceed independently of any
criminal proceedings. The Court, in Republic v. Sandiganbayan,[18]interpreted this provision as empowering the
Presidential Commission on Good Government to file independent civil actions separate from the criminal actions.
Forfeiture Cases and the Plunder Case Have Separate Causes of Action; the Former Is Civil in Nature while the
Latter Is Criminal

It bears stressing, as a second point, that a forfeiture case under RA 1379 arises out of a cause of action
separate and different from a plunder case, thus negating the notion that the crime of plunder charged in Crim.
Case No. 28107 absorbs the forfeiture cases. In a prosecution for plunder, what is sought to be established is the
commission of the criminal acts in furtherance of the acquisition of ill-gotten wealth. In the language of Sec. 4 of
RA 7080, for purposes of establishing the crime of plunder, it is sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt a
pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy [to amass, accumulate or
acquire ill-gotten wealth]. On the other hand, all that the court needs to determine, by preponderance of
evidence, under RA 1379 is the disproportion of respondents properties to his legitimate income, it being
unnecessary to prove how he acquired said properties. As correctly formulated by the Solicitor General, the
forfeitable nature of the properties under the provisions of RA 1379 does not proceed from a determination of a
specific overt act committed by the respondent public officer leading to the acquisition of the illegal wealth. [19]

Given the foregoing considerations, petitioners thesis on possible double jeopardy entanglements should a
judgment of conviction ensue in Crim. Case 28107 collapses entirely. Double jeopardy, as a criminal law concept,
refers to jeopardy of punishment for the same offense, [20] suggesting that double jeopardy presupposes two
separate criminal prosecutions. Proceedings under RA 1379 are, to repeat, civil in nature. As a necessary corollary,
one who is sued under RA 1379 may be proceeded against for a criminal offense. Thus, the filing of a case under
that law is not barred by the conviction or acquittal of the defendant in Crim. Case 28107 for plunder.

Moreover, given the variance in the nature and subject matter of the proceedings between the plunder
case and the subject forfeiture cases, petitioners apprehension about the likelihood of conflicting decisions of two
different divisions of the anti-graft court on the matter of forfeiture as a penal sanction is specious at best. What
the SB said in this regard merits approving citation:

On the matter of forfeiture as a penal sanction, respondents argue that the division
where the plunder case is pending may issue a decision that would collide or be in conflict with
the decision by this division on the forfeiture case. They refer to a situation where this Courts
Second Division may exonerate the respondents in the plunder case while the Fourth Division
grant the petition for forfeiture for the same properties in favor of the state or vice versa.
Suffice it to say that the variance in the decisions of both divisions does not give rise to
a conflict. After all, forfeiture in the plunder case requires the attendance of facts and
circumstances separate and distinct from that in the forfeiture case. Between the two (2) cases,
there is no causal connection in the facts sought to be established and the issues sought to be
addressed. As a result, the decision of this Court in one does not have a bearing on the other.
There is also no conflict even if the decisions in both cases result in an order for the
forfeiture of the subject properties. The forfeiture following a conviction in the plunder case will
apply only to those ill-gotten wealth not recovered by the forfeiture case and vise (sic) versa.
This is on the assumption that the information on plunder and the petition for forfeiture cover
the same set of properties.[21]
RA 7080 Did Not Repeal RA 1379

Petitioner takes a different tack in her bid to prove that SB erred in not dismissing Forfeitures I and II with
her assertion that RA 7080 impliedly repealed RA 1379. We are not convinced.

Nowhere in RA 7080 can we find any provision that would indicate a repeal, expressly or impliedly, of RA
1379. RA 7080 is a penal statute which, at its most basic, aims to penalize the act of any public officer who by
himself or in connivance with members of his family amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth in the
aggregate amount of at least PhP 50 million. On the other hand, RA 1379 is not penal in nature, in that it does not
make a crime the act of a public official acquiring during his incumbency an amount of property manifestly out of
proportion of his salary and other legitimate income. RA 1379 aims to enforce the right of the State to recover the
properties which were not lawfully acquired by the officer.
It has often been said that all doubts must be resolved against any implied repeal and all efforts should be
exerted to harmonize and give effect to all laws and provisions on the same subject. To be sure, both RA 1379 and
RA 7080 can very well be harmonized. The Court perceives no irreconcilable conflict between them. One can be
enforced without nullifying the other.
Sandiganbayan Did Not Acquire Jurisdiction over
the Persons of Petitioner and Her Children

On the issue of lack of jurisdiction, petitioner argues that the SB did not acquire jurisdiction over her
person and that of her children due to a defective substituted service of summons. There is merit in petitioners
contention.

Sec. 7, Rule 14 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure clearly provides for the requirements of a
valid substituted service of summons, thus:

SEC. 7. Substituted service.If the defendant cannot be served within a reasonable time
as provided in the preceding section [personal service on defendant], service may be effected (a)
by leaving copies of the summons at the defendants residence with some person of suitable age
and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at defendants office or regular
place of business with some competent person in charge thereof.

It is basic that a court must acquire jurisdiction over a party for the latter to be bound by its decision or
orders. Valid service of summons, by whatever mode authorized by and proper under the Rules, is the means by
which a court acquires jurisdiction over a person.[22]

In the instant case, it is undisputed that summons for Forfeitures I and II were served personally on Maj.
Gen. Carlos Flores Garcia, who is detained at the PNP Detention Center, who acknowledged receipt thereof by
affixing his signature. It is also undisputed that substituted service of summons for both Forfeitures I and II were
made on petitioner and her children through Maj. Gen. Garcia at the PNPDetention Center. However, such
substituted services of summons were invalid for being irregular and defective.

In Manotoc v. Court of Appeals,[23] we broke down the requirements to be:

(1) Impossibility of prompt personal service, i.e., the party relying on substituted service or the sheriff
must show that defendant cannot be served promptly or there is impossibility of prompt servicewithin a reasonable
time. Reasonable time being so much time as is necessary under the circumstances for a reasonably prudent and
diligent man to do, conveniently, what the contract or duty requires that should be done, having a regard for the
rights and possibility of loss, if any[,] to the other party.[24] Moreover, we indicated therein that the sheriff must
show several attempts for personal service of at least three (3) times on at least two (2) different dates.

(2) Specific details in the return, i.e., the sheriff must describe in the Return of Summons the facts and
circumstances surrounding the attempted personal service.

(3) Substituted service effected on a person of suitable age and discretion residing at defendants house or
residence; or on a competent person in charge of defendants office or regular place of business.

From the foregoing requisites, it is apparent that no valid substituted service of summons was made on
petitioner and her children, as the service made through Maj. Gen. Garcia did not comply with the first two (2)
requirements mentioned above for a valid substituted service of summons. Moreover, the third requirement was
also not strictly complied with as the substituted service was made not at petitioners house or residence but in the
PNP Detention Center where Maj. Gen. Garcia is detained, even if the latter is of suitable age and
discretion. Hence, no valid substituted service of summons was made.

The stringent rules on valid service of summons for the court to acquire jurisdiction over the person of
the defendants, however, admits of exceptions, as when the party voluntarily submits himself to the jurisdiction of
the court by asking affirmative relief.[25] In the instant case, the Republic asserts that petitioner is estopped from
questioning improper service of summons since the improvident service of summons in both forfeiture cases had
been cured by their (petitioner and her children) voluntary appearance in the forfeiture cases. The Republic points
to the various pleadings filed by petitioner and her children during the subject forfeiture hearings. We cannot
subscribe to the Republics views.
Special Appearance to Question a Courts Jurisdiction
Is Not Voluntary Appearance

The second sentence of Sec. 20, Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure clearly provides:
Sec. 20. Voluntary appearance.The defendants voluntary appearance in the action shall
be equivalent to service of summons. The inclusion in a motion to dismiss of other grounds
aside from lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant shall not be deemed a
voluntary appearance. (Emphasis ours.)

Thus, a defendant who files a motion to dismiss, assailing the jurisdiction of the court over his person,
together with other grounds raised therein, is not deemed to have appeared voluntarily before the court. What the
rule on voluntary appearancethe first sentence of the above-quoted rulemeans is that the voluntary appearance of
the defendant in court is without qualification, in which case he is deemed to have waived his defense of lack of
jurisdiction over his person due to improper service of summons.

The pleadings filed by petitioner in the subject forfeiture cases, however, do not show that she
voluntarily appeared without qualification. Petitioner filed the following pleadings in Forfeiture I: (a) motion to
dismiss; (b) motion for reconsideration and/or to admit answer; (c) second motion for reconsideration; (d) motion
to consolidate forfeiture case with plunder case; and (e) motion to dismiss and/or to quash Forfeiture I. And in
Forfeiture II: (a) motion to dismiss and/or to quash Forfeiture II; and (b) motion for partial reconsideration.

The foregoing pleadings, particularly the motions to dismiss, were filed by petitioner solely for special
appearance with the purpose of challenging the jurisdiction of the SB over her person and that of her three
children. Petitioner asserts therein that SB did not acquire jurisdiction over her person and of her three children
for lack of valid service of summons through improvident substituted service of summons in both Forfeiture I and
Forfeiture II. This stance the petitioner never abandoned when she filed her motions for reconsideration, even
with a prayer to admit their attached Answer Ex Abundante Ad Cautelam dated January 22, 2005 setting forth
affirmative defenses with a claim for damages. And the other subsequent pleadings, likewise, did not abandon her

stance and defense of lack of jurisdiction due to improper substituted services of summons in the forfeiture
cases. Evidently, from the foregoing Sec. 20, Rule 14 of the 1997 Revised Rules on Civil Procedure, petitioner and
her sons did not voluntarily appear before the SB constitutive of or equivalent to service of summons.

Moreover, the leading La Naval Drug Corp. v. Court of Appeals[26] applies to the instant case. Said case
elucidates the current view in our jurisdiction that a special appearance before the courtchallenging its
jurisdiction over the person through a motion to dismiss even if the movant invokes other groundsis not
tantamount to estoppel or a waiver by the movant of his objection to jurisdiction over his person; and such is not
constitutive of a voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court.

Thus, it cannot be said that petitioner and her three children voluntarily appeared before the SB to cure
the defective substituted services of summons. They are, therefore, not estopped from questioning the jurisdiction
of the SB over their persons nor are they deemed to have waived such defense of lack of
jurisdiction. Consequently, there being no valid substituted services of summons made, the SB did not acquire
jurisdiction over the persons of petitioner and her children. And perforce, the proceedings in the subject
forfeiture cases, insofar as petitioner and her three children are concerned, are null and void for lack of
jurisdiction. Thus, the order declaring them in default must be set aside and voided insofar as petitioner and her
three children are concerned. For the forfeiture case to proceed against them, it is, thus, imperative for the SB to
serve anew summons or alias summons on the petitioner and her three children in order to acquire jurisdiction
over their persons.

WHEREFORE, the petitions for certiorari and mandamus are PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Sandiganbayan,
Fourth Division has not acquired jurisdiction over petitioner Clarita D. Garcia and her three children. The
proceedings in Civil Case Nos. 0193 and 0196 before the Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division, insofar as they pertain to
petitioner and her three children, are VOID for lack of jurisdiction over their persons. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION
[G. R. No. 156747. February 23, 2005]
ALLEN A. MACASAET, NICOLAS V. QUIJANO, JR., and ALFIE LORENZO, petitioners, vs. THE PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES and JOSELITO TRINIDAD, respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court of the
Decision[1] dated 22 March 2002 and Resolution dated 6 January 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No.
22067 entitled, People of the Philippines v. Alfie Lorenzo, et al.
The factual antecedents are as follows:
In an Information dated 10 July 1997, Alfie Lorenzo, Allen Macasaet, Nicolas Quijano, Jr., and Roger Parajes,
columnist, publisher, managing editor, and editor, respectively of the newspaper Abante were charged before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, with the crime of libel. The information, which was raffled off to Branch 93
of said court, reads:
The undersigned accuses ALFIE LORENZO, ALLEN MACASAET, NICOLAS QUIJANO JR., ROGER B. PARAJES and
JORDAN CASTILLO, of the crime of LIBEL, committed as follows:
That on or about the 13th day of July, 1996 in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused ALFIE LORENZO, columnist, ALLEN
MACASAET, publisher, NICOLAS QUIJANO JR., managing editor, ROGER B. PARAJES, editor, respectively of Abante a
newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, and JORDAN CASTILLO, conspiring, confederating together and mutually
helping one another, with evident intent of exposing JOSELITO MAGALLANES TRINIDAD, a.k.a. JOEY TRINIDAD a.k.a.
TOTO TRINIDAD to public hatred, dishonor, discredit and contempt and ridicule, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously and maliciously write, publish, exhibit and circulate and/or cause to be written, published, exhibited and circulated in
the aforesaid newspaper, in its issue of July 13, 1996 an article which reads as follows:
Humarap sa ilang reporters si Jordan Castillo hindi para magkaroon ng writeups kundi para ituwid lang ang ilang bagay na
baluktot at binaluktot pang lalo ng isang Toto Trinidad.
Hindi namin naging barkada si Joey Trinidad. Bah, Toto na pala siya ngayon. Anong palagay niya sa sarili niya, si Direk Toto
Natividad siya? Nakikibuhat lang talaga yang taong yan sa amin sa Liberty Ave. noon. Ni hindi nga pinapansin ni Tito Alfie yan
dahil nga sa amoy-pawis siya pagkatapos mag-barbell. Kami naka-shower na, si Joey punas lang nang punas sa katawan niya ng
T-shirt niyang siya ring isusuot niya pagkatapos na gawing pamunas!
Madalas ngang makikain sa amin yan noon. Galit na galit nga ang mayordoma naming si Manang Hilda noon dahil nagkukulang
ang rasyon namin dahil dagdag pakainin nga yang si Joey. Tamang-tama nga lang sa amin ang kanin at ulam, pero sinusugod pa
niya ang kaldero para magkayod ng natitirang tutong sa kaldero. Naaawa nga ako madalas diyan kaya sineshare ko na lang ang
pagkain ko sa kanya.
Ewan ko kung anong naisipan ng taong yan at pagsasalitaan pa niya ng masama si Tito Alfie. Hindi man lang siya tumanaw ng
utang na loob na kahit konti at kahit na sandali ay naitawid ng gutom niya. Hindi ko alam kung may kunsenya pa ang gangyang
klaseng tao, pero sana naman ay makunsensya ka, Pare!

Madalas nga itinatago ka na nga namin ni Tito Alfie para hindi mahighblood sa iyo, ganyan pa ang gagawin mo. Napupuyat nga
si Manang Hilda sa pagbabantay sa iyo at hindi makatulog ang matanda hanggat hindi ka pa umuuwi, magsasalita ka pa ng mga
inimbento mo. Pati nga si Eruel ay madalas mabanas sa iyo, natatandaan mo pa ba, dahil sa kakulitan mo! Pilit mo kaming
binubuyo na sabihin kay Tito Alfie na tulungan ka rin tulad ng tulong na ibinibigay ni Tito Alfie na pag-aalaga sa amin. Pero hate
na hate ka nga ni Tito Alfie dahil sa masamang ugali, natatandaan mo pa ba yun? Kaya tiyak ko na imbento mo lang ang lahat ng
pinagsasabi mo para makaganti ka kay Tito Alfie, ani Jordan sa mga nag-interbyu sa kanyang legitimate writers.
Hindi na siguro namin kailangan pang dagdagan ang mga sinabi ng sinasabi ni Toto Trinidad na mga barkada niya at kapwa niya
kuno Liberty Boys!
thereby publicly imputing a crime, vice or defect, real or imaginary or an act, omission, condition, status or circumstance and
causing in view of their publication, discredit and contempt upon the person of said JOSELITO MAGALLANES TRINIDAD
a.k.a. JOEY TRINIDAD a.k.a. TOTO TRINIDAD, to his damage and prejudice. [2]
In an Order dated 16 July 1997, Judge Apolinario D. Bruselas, Jr., presiding judge of RTC, Branch 93, Quezon
City, set the arraignment of the petitioners on 27 August 1997.[3]
On 22 August 1997, petitioners filed before the court a quo an Urgent Motion to Suspend Arraignment and/or
Defer Proceedings dated 21 August 1997 claiming that they intended to elevate the adverse Resolution of the Office
of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City to the Department of Justice (DOJ) for review. Despite this motion, the
scheduled arraignment of petitioners pushed through on 27 August 1997. During said proceeding, petitioners Lorenzo
and Quijano, Jr., together with their co-accused Parajes and Castillo, refused to enter any plea and so the trial court
ordered that a plea of not guilty be entered into the records on their behalf.[4] As for petitioner Macasaet, his
arraignment was rescheduled to 20 October 1997 due to his failure to attend the previously calendared arraignment.
On 12 September 1997, petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss the libel case on the ground that the trial court did
not have jurisdiction over the offense charged. According to petitioners, as the information discloses that the
residence of private respondent was in Marikina, the RTC of Quezon City did not have jurisdiction over the case
pursuant to Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, to wit:
The criminal and civil action for damages in cases of written defamations as provided for in this chapter, shall be filed
simultaneously or separately with the Court of First Instance of the province or city where the libelous article is printed and first
published or where any of the offended parties actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense [5] (Emphasis
supplied.)
Subsequently, on 23 September 1997, the trial court received by way of registered mail, petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration and to Withdraw Plea dated 3 September 1997.[6] Petitioners argued therein that the trial court
committed grave error when it denied the petitioners Urgent Motion to Suspend Arraignment and/or Defer
Proceedings and continued with the scheduled arraignment on 27 August 1997. According to petitioners and their coaccused, by the trial judges denial of their Urgent Motion to Defer Arraignment and/or Defer Proceedings, he had
effectively denied them their right to obtain relief from the Department of Justice. Moreover, banking on the case
of Roberts, et al. v. Court of Appeals,[7] the petitioners and their fellow accused contended that since they had already
manifested their intention to file a petition for review of the Resolution of the city prosecutor of Quezon City before the
DOJ, it was premature for the trial court to deny their urgent motion of 21 August 1997. Finally, petitioners and their
co-accused claimed that regardless of the outcome of their petition for review before the DOJ, the withdrawal of their
not guilty pleas is in order as they planned to move for the quashal of the information against them.
In an Order dated 26 September 1997, [8] Judge Bruselas, Jr., ruled that with the filing of the Motion to Dismiss,
the court considers the accused to have abandoned their Motion for Reconsideration and to Withdraw Plea and sees
no further need to act on the same.
In his Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss dated 23 September 1997, [9] the public prosecutor argued that the
RTC, Quezon City, had jurisdiction over the case. He maintained that during the time material to this case, private
respondent (private complainant below) was a resident of both 28-D Matino St. corner Malumanay St., Sikatuna
Village, Quezon City and Karen St., Paliparan, Sto. Nio, Marikina, Metro Manila, as shown in his Reply-Affidavit of 11
October 1996 filed during the preliminary investigation of the case.
For their part, the petitioners and their co-accused countered that it was incorrect for the public prosecutor to
refer to the affidavit purportedly executed by private respondent as it is axiomatic that the resolution of a motion to

quash is limited to a consideration of the information as filed with the court, and no other. Further, as both the
complaint-affidavit executed by private respondent and the information filed before the court state that private
respondents residence is in Marikina City, the dismissal of the case is warranted for the rule is that jurisdiction is
determined solely by the allegations contained in the complaint or information.[10]
On 16 October 1997, petitioners and their fellow accused filed a Supplemental Reply [11] attaching thereto
certifications issued by Jimmy Ong and Pablito C. Antonio, barangay captains of Barangay Malaya, Quezon City
and Barangay Sto. Nio, Marikina City, respectively. The pertinent portion of the barangay certification[12] issued by
Barangay Captain Ong states:
This is to certify that this office has no record on file nor with the list of registered voters of this barangay regarding a certain
person by the name of one MR. JOSELITO TRINIDAD.
This further certifies that our BSDOs (have) been looking for said person seeking information regarding his whereabouts but to
no avail.
On the other hand, the certification[13] issued by Barangay Captain Antonio, reads in part:
This is to certify that JOSELITO TRINIDAD of legal age, single/married/separate/widow/widower, a resident of Karen Street,
Sto. Nio, Marikina City is a bonafide member of this barangay.
...
This is being issued upon request of the above-named person for IDENTIFICATION.
During the hearing on 20 October 1997, the trial court received and marked in evidence the
two barangay certifications. Also marked for evidence were page 4 of the information stating the address of private
respondent to be in Marikina City and the editorial box appearing in page 18 of Abante indicating that the tabloid
maintains its editorial and business offices at Rm. 301/305, 3/F BF Condominium Bldg., Solana cor. A. Soriano Sts.,
Intramuros, Manila. The prosecution was then given five (5) days within which to submit its comment to the evidence
submitted by the petitioners and their fellow accused.
In his Rejoinder to Supplemental Reply,[14] private respondent contended that the certification issued by
the barangay captain of Barangay Malaya was issued after he had already moved out of the apartment unit he was
renting in Sikatuna Village, Quezon City; that owners of residential houses do not usually declare they rent out rooms
to boarders in order to avoid payment of local taxes; and that there is no showing that a census was conducted
among the residents of Barangay Malaya during the time he resided therein.
As regards the certification issued by the barangay chairman of Sto. Nio, Marikina City, private respondent
argued that it is of judicial notice that barangay and city records are not regularly updated to reflect the transfer of
residence of their constituents and that a perusal of said certification reveals that the barangay captain did not
personally know him (private respondent). Finally, private respondent claimed that his receipt of the copy of
petitioners Appeal to the DOJ, which was sent to his alleged address in Sikatuna Village, Quezon City, proved that he
did, in fact, reside at said place.
On 24 November 1997, the trial court rendered an Order dismissing the case due to lack of jurisdiction. [15] The
court a quo noted that although the information alleged the venue of this case falls within the jurisdiction of Quezon
City, the evidence submitted for its consideration indicated otherwise. First, the editorial box of Abante clearly
indicated that the purported libelous article was printed and first published in the City of Manila. In addition, the trial
court relied on the following matters to support its conclusion that, indeed, jurisdiction was improperly laid in this case:
a) on page 4 of the information, the address of private respondent appeared to be the one in Marikina City although
right below it was a handwritten notation stating 131 Sct. Lozano St., Barangay Sacred Heart, QC; b) the
two barangay certifications submitted by the petitioners; and c) the Memorandum for Preliminary Investigation and
Affidavit-Complaint attached to the information wherein the given address of private respondent was Marikina City.
On 03 December 1997, private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration[16] insisting that at the time the
alleged libelous article was published, he was actually residing in Quezon City. According to him, he mistakenly
stated that he was a resident of Marikina City at the time of publication of the claimed defamatory article because he

understood the term address to mean the place where he originally came from. Nevertheless, the error was rectified
by his supplemental affidavit which indicated Quezon City as his actual residence at the time of publication of the 13
July 1996 issue of Abante.
On 22 January 1998, private respondent filed a supplemental motion for reconsideration to which he attached
an affidavit executed by a certain Cristina B. Del Rosario, allegedly the owner of the house and lot in Sikatuna
Village, Quezon City, where private respondent supposedly lived from July 1996 until May 1997. She also stated in
her affidavit that she was not aware of any inquiry conducted by the barangay officials ofBarangay Malaya regarding
the residency of private respondent in their locality.
Through an Order dated 12 February 1998, the trial court denied private respondents motion for
reconsideration, ruling thus:
[Del Rosarios] affidavit appears to have been executed only on 19 January 1998 to which fact the court can only chuckle and
observe that evidently said affidavit is in the nature of a curative evidence, the weight and sufficiency of which is highly suspect.
[17]

Undaunted, the public and the private prosecutors filed a notice of appeal before the court a quo.[18] In the
Decision now assailed before us, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the trial courts conclusion and ordered
the remand of the case to the court a quo for further proceedings. The dispositive portion of the appellate courts
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Order dated November 24, 1997 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 93, Quezon
City, in Criminal Case No. Q-97-71903, dismissing the case filed against herein accused-appellees on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and a new one entered remanding the case to the court a quo for further
proceedings.[19]
The Court of Appeals held that jurisprudentially, it is settled that the residence of a person must be his personal,
actual or physical habitation or his actual residence or abode and for the purpose of determining venue, actual
residence is a persons place of abode and not necessarily his legal residence or domicile. [20] In this case, the defect
appearing on the original complaint wherein the residence of private respondent was indicated to be Marikina City
was subsequently cured by his supplemental-affidavit submitted during the preliminary investigation of the case.
Moreover, as the amendment was made during the preliminary investigation phase of this case, the same could be
done as a matter of right pursuant to the Revised Rules of Court.[21]
As for the barangay certifications issued by the barangay chairmen of Barangay Malaya and Barangay Sto. Nio,
the Court of Appeals ruled that they had no probative value ratiocinating in the following manner:
. . . With respect to the requirement of residence in the place where one is to vote, residence can mean either domicile or
temporary residence (Bernas, The 1987 Constitution A Primer, 3rd Ed., p. 209). Therefore, one who is a resident of Quezon City
can be a voter of Marikina if the latter is his domicile. Conversely, a person domiciled in Marikina can vote in Quezon City if he
resides in the latter. It is just a matter of choice on the part of the voter. Thus, logic does not support the supposition that one who
is not a registered voter of a place is also not a resident theref. Furthermore, the right to vote has the corollary right of not
exercising it. Therefore, one need not even be a registered voter at all. The same principle applies to the certification issued by the
barangay in Marikina.[22]
The appellate court likewise gave weight to the affidavit executed by Del Rosario and observed that petitioners
failed to controvert the same.
The petitioners thereafter filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the Court of Appeals in a
Resolution promulgated on 6 January 2003.[23]
Hence, this petition raising the following issues:
I

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN RULING THAT THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
OF QUEZON CITY HAS TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION OVER THE CRIME CHARGED.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN ADMITTING THE AFFIDAVIT OF CRISTINA B.
DEL ROSARIO.
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN SUSTAINING RESPONDENT TRINIDADS PERSONALITY TO APPEAL A
CRIMINAL CASE.[24]
Petitioners insist that the evidence presented before the trial court irrefutably established the fact that private
respondent was not a resident of Quezon City at the time the alleged libelous publication saw print. According to
them, the information dated 10 July 1997 filed before the RTC of Quezon City indicated private respondents address
to be in Karen St., Paliparan, Sto. Nio, Marikina City. Further supporting this claim were the affidavit-complaint [25] and
the memorandum for preliminary investigation[26] where references were explicitly made to said address. Thus,
petitioners are of the view that the Court of Appeals erred in relying on the supplemental affidavit executed by private
respondent claiming that its execution amounted to nothing more than a mere afterthought.
In addition, petitioners argue that the appellate court erred when it took into account the affidavit executed by
Del Rosario. They insist that its belated submission before the trial court and the prosecutions failure to present the
affiant to testify as regards the veracity of her statements undermined the evidentiary value of her affidavit. More, as
the affidavit was not formally offered as evidence, it was only proper that the trial court disregarded the same in
dismissing the case.
Finally, petitioners contend that private respondent did not have the requisite personality to appeal from the
decision of the trial court as it is only the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) which is authorized by law to institute
appeal of criminal cases. Thus, the Court of Appeals made a mistake in holding that While it is true that only the OSG can file an appeal representing the government in a criminal proceeding, the private
complainant nevertheless may appeal the civil aspect of the criminal case. The case at bar was dismissed due to the alleged
improper laying of venue resulting in the alleged lack of jurisdiction of the trial court and not based on the merits of the case. It
cannot therefore be argued that private complainants appeal pertains to the merits of the criminal case as what happened in
accused-appellees cited case in the motion to strike, VicentePalu-ay vs. Court of Appeals (GR No. 112995, July 30, 1998).
Needless to say, the private complainant has an interest in the civil aspect of the dismissed criminal case which he had the right to
protect. In the interest of justice and fair play, therefore, the Brief filed by private complainant in the present case should be
treated as pertaining only to the civil aspect of the case. [27]
In his Comment/Opposition dated 25 April 2003, [28] private respondent reiterated his position that the RTC of
Quezon City had jurisdiction over this libel case. According to him, the affidavit executed by Del Rosario, the alleged
owner of the house he leased in Sikatuna Village, Quezon City, established, beyond doubt, that he resided in said
place during the time the claimed defamatory article appeared on the pages of Abante. In addition, he draws attention
to the fact that petitioners and their co-accused furnished him a copy of the petition for review, filed before the DOJ, at
the aforementioned address in Quezon City.
Anent the affidavit of Del Rosario, private respondent maintains that the prosecution exerted efforts to present
the affiant before the trial court. Unfortunately, Del Rosario was out of town when she was supposed to be presented
and so the public and the private prosecutors decided to submit for resolution their motion for reconsideration sans
the affiants testimony. Citing the case of Joseph Helmuth, Jr. v. People of the Philippines, et al.,[29] private respondent
avers that this Court had previously admitted the affidavits of witnesses who were not presented during the trial
phase of a case.
As regards the petitioners contention that he (private respondent) did not have the personality to bring this case
to the appellate level, private respondent contends that the proper party to file the Notice of Appeal before the trial
court is the public prosecutor as what happened in this case.

On its part, the OSG filed its Comment dated 07 July 2003 [30] wherein it prayed for the dismissal of this petition
based on the following: First, as the petition is concerned with the determination of the residence of private
respondent at the time of the publication of the alleged libelous article, Rule 45 should be unavailing to the petitioners
because this remedy only deals with questions of law.
Second, venue was properly laid in this case as private respondents residency in Quezon City during the time
material to this case was sufficiently established. The OSG claims that the errors appearing in the memorandum for
preliminary investigation and in the affidavit complaint with regard to private respondents residence were corrected
through the supplemental affidavit private respondent executed during the preliminary investigation before the
Quezon City prosecutors office.
Third, the OSG takes the view that the public prosecutor was the proper party to file the notice of appeal before
the trial court since its (OSGs) office is only authorized to bring or defend actions on appeal on behalf of the People
or the Republic of the Philippines once the case is brought before this Honorable Court of the Court of Appeals.
We find merit in the petition and therefore grant the same.
Jurisdiction has been defined as the power conferred by law upon a judge or court to try a case the cognizance
of which belongs to them exclusively[31] and it constitutes the basic foundation of judicial proceedings.[32]The term
derives its origin from two Latin words jus meaning law and the other, dicere meaning to declare.[33] The term has also
been variably explained to be the power of a court to hear and determine a cause of action presented to it, the power
of a court to adjudicate the kind of case before it, the power of a court to adjudicate a case when the proper parties
are before it, and the power of a court to make the particular decision it is asked to render.[34]
In criminal actions, it is a fundamental rule that venue is jurisdictional. Thus, the place where the crime was
committed determines not only the venue of the action but is an essential element of jurisdiction. [35] In the case of Uy
v. Court of Appeals and People of the Philippines,[36] this Court had the occasion to expound on this principle, thus:
It is a fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in criminal cases the offense should have been committed or
any one of its essential ingredients took place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. Territorial jurisdiction in criminal
cases is the territory where the court has jurisdiction to take cognizance or to try the offense allegedly committed therein by the
accused. Thus, it cannot take jurisdiction over a person charged with an offense allegedly committed outside of that limited
territory. Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is determined by the allegations in the complaint or
information. And once it is so shown, the court may validly take cognizance of the case. However, if the evidence adduced during
the trial show that the offense was committed somewhere else, the court should dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction. [37]
The law, however, is more particular in libel cases. The possible venues for the institution of the criminal and the
civil aspects of said case are concisely outlined in Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic
Act No. 4363. It provides:
Art. 360. Persons responsible. - . . .
The criminal action and civil action for damages in cases of written defamations as provided for in this chapter, shall be filed
simultaneously or separately with the Court of First Instance of the province or city where the libelous article is printed and first
published or where any of the offended parties actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense: Provided, however,
That where one of the offended parties is a public officer whose office is in the City of Manila at the time of the commission of
the offense, the action shall be filed in the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila or of the city or province where the
libelous article is printed and first published, and in case such public officer does not hold office in the City of Manila, the action
shall be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where he held office at the time of the commission of the
offense or where the libelous article is printed and first published and in case one of the offended parties is a private individual,
the action shall be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where he actually resides at the time of the
commission of the offense or where the libelous matter is printed and first published.
In Agbayani v. Sayo,[38] we summarized the foregoing rule in the following manner:
1. Whether the offended party is a public official or a private person, the criminal action may be filed in the Court of First
Instance of the province or city where the libelous article is printed and first published.

2. If the offended party is a private individual, the criminal action may also be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province
where he actually resided at the time of the commission of the offense.
3. If the offended party is a public officer whose office is in Manila at the time of the commission of the offense, the action may
be filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila.
4. If the offended party is a public officer holding office outside of Manila, the action may be filed in the Court of First Instance
of the province or city where he held office at the time of the commission of the offense. [39]
In the case at bar, private respondent was a private citizen at the time of the publication of the alleged libelous
article, hence, he could only file his libel suit in the City of Manila where Abante was first published or in the province
or city where he actually resided at the time the purported libelous article was printed.
A perusal, however, of the information involved in this case easily reveals that the allegations contained therein
are utterly insufficient to vest jurisdiction on the RTC of Quezon City. Other than perfunctorily stating Quezon City at
the beginning of the information, the assistant city prosecutor who prepared the information did not bother to indicate
whether the jurisdiction of RTC Quezon City was invoked either because Abante was printed in that place or private
respondent was a resident of said city at the time the claimed libelous article came out. As these matters deal with the
fundamental issue of the courts jurisdiction, Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, mandates that
either one of these statements must be alleged in the information itself and the absence of both from the very face of
the information renders the latter fatally defective. Sadly for private respondent, the information filed before the trial
court falls way short of this requirement. The assistant city prosecutors failure to properly lay the basis for invoking
the jurisdiction of the RTC, Quezon City, effectively denied said court of the power to take cognizance of this case.
For the guidance, therefore, of both the bench and the bar, this Court finds it appropriate to reiterate our earlier
pronouncement in the case of Agbayani, to wit:
In order to obviate controversies as to the venue of the criminal action for written defamation, the complaint or information
should contain allegations as to whether, at the time the offense was committed, the offended party was a public officer or a
private individual and where he was actually residing at that time. Whenever possible, the place where the written defamation
was printed and first published should likewise be alleged. That allegation would be a sine qua non if the circumstance as to
where the libel was printed and first published is used as the basis of the venue of the action. [40]
Anent private respondent and OSGs contention that the supplemental affidavit submitted during the preliminary
investigation of this libel suit cured the defect of the information, we find the same to be without merit. It is
jurisprudentially settled that jurisdiction of a court over a criminal case is determined by the allegations of the
complaint or information.[41] In resolving a motion to dismiss based on lack of jurisdiction, the general rule is that the
facts contained in the complaint or information should be taken as they are. [42] The exception to this rule is where the
Rules of Court allow the investigation of facts alleged in a motion to quash [43] such as when the ground invoked is the
extinction of criminal liability, prescriptions, double jeopardy, or insanity of the accused. [44] In these instances, it is
incumbent upon the trial court to conduct a preliminary trial to determine the merit of the motion to dismiss. As the
present case obviously does not fall within any of the recognized exceptions, the trial court correctly dismissed this
action.
In the assailed decision, the Court of Appeals likewise put premium on the affidavit executed by Del Rosario
which was attached to private respondents supplemental motion for reconsideration. According to the appellate court,
said document supports private (respondents) claim that indeed, he was a resident of Quezon City at the time the
alleged libelous article was published.[45] The pertinent provision of the Rules of Court, under Rule 10, Section 6
thereof, states:
Sec. 6. Supplemental Pleadings. - Upon motion of a party the court may, upon reasonable notice and upon such terms as are just,
permit him to serve a supplemental pleading setting forth transactions, occurrences or events which have happened since the date
of the pleading sought to be supplemented. The adverse party may plead thereto within ten (10) days from notice of the order
admitting the supplemental pleading.
By the very nature of a supplemental pleading, it only seeks to reinforce and augment the allegations contained
in the principal pleading. It does not serve to supplant that which it merely supplements; rather, it ought to co-exist
with the latter. Further, the admission of a supplemental pleading is not something that parties may impose upon the

court for we have consistently held that its admittance is something which is addressed to the discretion of the court.
[46]

Explicit in the aforequoted provision of the Rules of Court is the requirement that the contents of a supplemental
pleading should deal with transactions, occurrences or events which took place after the date of the pleading it seeks
to supplement. A reading of the supplemental motion for reconsideration filed by private respondent discloses no
additional or new matters which transpired after he filed his original motion for reconsideration. The fact that he
attached thereto the affidavit of his alleged lessor fails to persuade us into giving to said supplemental motion the
same evidentiary value as did the Court of Appeals. For one, private respondent did not even bother to explain the
reason behind the belated submission of Del Rosarios affidavit nor did he claim that he exerted earnest efforts to file
it much earlier in the proceedings. He must, therefore, bear the consequences of his own lethargy.
Finally, we come to the issue of whether the private prosecutor and the public prosecutor had the personality to
file the notice of appeal before the trial court. Petitioners insist that the OSG should have been the one to file said
notice in its capacity as the sole representative of the [g]overnment in the Court of Appeals in criminal cases.[47]
Under Presidential Decree No. 478, among the specific powers and functions of the OSG was to represent the
government in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals in all criminal proceedings. This provision has been
carried over to the Revised Administrative Code particularly in Book IV, Title III, Chapter 12 thereof. Without doubt,
the OSG is the appellate counsel of the People of the Philippines in all criminal cases. In such capacity, it only takes
over a criminal case after the same has reached the appellate courts.[48]
The next question should then be: when does the jurisdiction of the trial court end and that of the Court of
Appeals commence? Happily, the Revised Rules of Court is clear on this point. Rule 41, Section 9 of the Rules states
that (i)n appeals by notice of appeal, the court loses jurisdiction over the case upon the perfection of the appeals filed
in due time and the expiration of the time to appeal of the other parties. [49] When a party files a notice of appeal, the
trial courts jurisdiction over the case does not cease as a matter of course; its only effect is that the appeal is deemed
perfected as to him.[50] As explained by our former colleague, Justice Florenz Regalado
. . . [I]n the meantime, the trial court still retains jurisdiction over the case. However, where all the parties have either thus
perfected their appeals, by filing their notices of appeal in due time and the period to file such notice of appeal has lapsed for
those who did not do so, then the trial court loses jurisdiction over the case as of the filing of the last notice of appeal or the
expiration of the period to do so for all the parties.[51]
Applied to the case at bar, we deem it proper that the notice of appeal was filed by the private and the public
prosecutors before the trial court. The Rules cannot be any clearer: until the filing of the last notice of appeal and the
expiration of the period to perfect an appeal by all the parties, the lower court still has jurisdiction over the case. It is
only after the occurrence of these two incidents when the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals begins and at which time
the OSG is supposed to take charge of the case on behalf of the government.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated 22 March 2002 and Resolution dated 6 January
2003 of the Court of Appeals are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the 24 November 1997 Decision of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 93, Quezon City, dismissing Criminal Case No. Q-97-71903 is hereby REINSTATED. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISION
WONINA M. BONIFACIO, JOCELYN UPANO,
VICENTE ORTUOSTE AND JOVENCIO PERECHE,
SR.,
Petitioners,

G.R. No. 184800

Present:

PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,

CARPIO MORALES,
- versus LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BERSAMIN, and
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MAKATI, BRANCH
VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.
149, and JESSIE JOHN P. GIMENEZ,
Promulgated:
Respondents.
May 5, 2010
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Via a petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, petitioners Wonina M. Bonifacio, et al. assail the issuances of Branch 149
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati (public respondent) Order [1] of April 22, 2008 which denied their motion to quash
the Amended Information indicting them for libel, and Joint Resolution [2] of August 12, 2008 denying reconsideration of the first
issuance.

Private respondent Jessie John P. Gimenez [3] (Gimenez) filed on October 18, 2005, on behalf of the Yuchengco Family
(in particular, former Ambassador Alfonso Yuchengco and Helen Y. Dee (Helen) and of the Malayan Insurance Co., Inc.
(Malayan),[4] a criminal complaint,[5] before the Makati City Prosecutors Office, for thirteen (13) counts of libel under Article 355
in relation to Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) against Philip Piccio, Mia Gatmaytan and Ma. Anabella Relova
Santos, who are officers of Parents Enabling Parents Coalition, Inc. (PEPCI), John Joseph Gutierrez, Jeselyn Upano, Jose Dizon,
Rolanda Pareja, Wonina Bonifacio, Elvira Cruz, Cornelio Zafra, Vicente Ortueste, Victoria Gomez Jacinto, Jurencio Pereche,
Ricardo Loyares and Peter Suchianco, who are trustees of PEPCI, Trennie Monsod, a member of PEPCI (collectively, the
accused), and a certain John Doe, the administrator of the website www.pepcoalition.com.

PEPCI appears to have been formed by a large group of disgruntled planholders of Pacific Plans, Inc. (PPI) a wholly
owned subsidiary of Great Pacific Life Assurance Corporation, also owned by the Yuchengco Group of Companies (YGC) who
had previously purchased traditional pre-need educational plans but were unable to collect thereon or avail of the benefits
thereunder after PPI, due to liquidity concerns, filed for corporate rehabilitation with prayer for suspension of payments before
the Makati RTC.

Decrying PPIs refusal/inability to honor its obligations under the educational pre-need plans, PEPCI sought to provide
a forum by which the planholders could seek redress for their pecuniary loss under their policies by maintaining a website on the
internet under the address of www.pepcoalition.com.

Gimenez alleged that PEPCI also owned, controlled and moderated on the internet a blogspot[6] under the website
address www.pacificnoplan.blogspot.com, as well as a yahoo e-group[7] atno2pep2010@yahoogroups.com. These websites are
easily accessible to the public or by anyone logged on to the internet.

Gimenez further alleged that upon accessing the above-stated websites in Makati on various dates from August 25 to
October 2, 2005, he was appalled to read numerous articles [numbering 13], maliciously and recklessly caused to be published by
[the accused] containing highly derogatory statements and false accusations, relentlessly attacking the Yuchengco Family, YGC,
and particularly, Malayan.[8] He cited an article which was posted/published on www.pepcoalition.com on August 25, 2005 which
stated:
Talagang naisahan na naman tayo ng mga Yuchengcos. Nangyari na ang mga kinatatakutan kong pagbagsak
ng negotiation because it was done prematurely since we had not file any criminal aspect of our case. What
is worse is that Yuchengcos benefited much from the nego. x x x . That is the fact na talagang hindi
dapat pagtiwalaan ang mga Yuchengcos.
LETS MOVE TO THE BATTLEFIELD. FILE THE CRIMINAL CASES IN COURT, BSP AND AMLC
AND WHEREVER. Pumunta tayong muli sa senado, congreso, RCBC Plaza, and other venues to air our
grievances andcall for boycott ng YGC. Let us start within ourselves. Alisin natin ang mga investments
and deposits natin sa lahat ng YGC and I mean lahat and again convince friends to do the same. Yung
mga nanonood lang noon ay dapat makisali na talaga ngayon specially those who joined only after knowing
that there was a negotiation for amicable settlements.

FOR SURE MAY TACTICS PA SILANG NAKABASTA SA ATIN. LET US BE READY FOR IT
BECAUSE THEY HAD SUCCESSFULLY LULL US AND THE NEXT TIME THEY WILL TRY TO
KILL US NA. x x x [9](emphasis in the original)

By Resolution of May 5, 2006,[10] the Makati City Prosecutors Office, finding probable cause to indict the accused, filed
thirteen (13) separate Informations[11] charging them with libel. The accusatory portion of one Information, docketed as Criminal
Case No. 06-876, which was raffled off to public respondent reads:
That on or about the 25th day of August 2005 in Makati City, Metro Manila, Philippines, a place
within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then the trustees of Parents
Enabling Parents Coalition and as such trustees they hold the legal title to the
website www.pepcoalition.com which is of general circulation, and publication to the public conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping with one another together with John Does, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously and publicly and maliciously with intention of attacking the honesty, virtue, honor
and integrity, character and reputation of complainant Malayan Insurance Co. Inc., Yuchengco Family
particularly Ambassador Alfonso Yuchengco and Helen Dee and for further purpose exposing the
complainant to public hatred and contempt published an article imputing a vice or defect to the complainant
and caused to be composed, posted and published in the said website www.pepcoalition.com and injurious
and defamatory article as follows:
Talagang naisahan na naman tayo ng mga Yuchengcos. Nangyari na ang mga
kinatatakutan kong pagbagsak ng negotiation. x x x x x x x x x
For sure may tactics pa silang nakabasta sa atin. Let us be ready for it because they had
successfully lull us and the next time they will try to kill us na. x x x
A copy of the full text of the foregoing article as published/posted
in www.pepcoalition.com is attached as Annex F of the complaint.
That the keyword and password to be used in order to post and publish the above defamatory article are
known to the accused as trustees holding legal title to the above-cited website and that the accused are the
ones
responsible for the posting and publication of the defamatory articles that the article in question was posted
and published with the object of the discrediting and ridiculing the complainant before the public.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[12]

Several of the accused appealed the Makati City Prosecutors Resolution by a petition for review to the Secretary of
Justice who, by Resolution of June 20, 2007,[13] reversed the finding of probable cause and accordingly directed the withdrawal of
the Informations for libel filed in court. The Justice Secretary opined that the crime of internet libel was non-existent, hence, the
accused could not be charged with libel under Article 353 of the RPC. [14]

Petitioners, as co-accused,[15] thereupon filed on June 6, 2006, before the public respondent, a Motion to Quash [16] the
Information in Criminal Case No. 06-876 on the grounds that it failed to vest jurisdiction on the Makati RTC; the acts complained
of in the Information are not punishable by law since internet libel is not covered by Article 353 of the RPC; and the Information
is fatally defective for failure to designate the offense charged and the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense
of libel.

Citing Macasaet v. People,[17] petitioners maintained that the Information failed to allege a particular place within the
trial courts jurisdiction where the subject article was printed and first published orthat the offended parties resided in Makati at
the time the alleged defamatory material was printed and first published.

By Order of October 3, 2006,[18] the public respondent, albeit finding that probable cause existed, quashed the
Information, citing Agustin v. Pamintuan.[19] It found that the Information lacked any allegations that the offended parties were
actually residing in Makati at the time of the commission of the offense as in fact they listed their address in the complaintaffidavit at Yuchengco Tower in Binondo, Manila; or that the alleged libelous article was printed and first published in Makati.

The prosecution moved to reconsider the quashal of the Information, [20] insisting that the Information sufficiently
conferred jurisdiction on the public respondent. It cited Banal III v. Panganiban[21]which held that the Information need not
allege verbatim that the libelous publication was printed and first published in the appropriate venue. And it pointed out that
Malayan has an office in Makati of which Helen is a resident. Moreover, the prosecution alleged that even assuming that the
Information was deficient, it merely needed a formal amendment.

Petitioners opposed the prosecutions motion for reconsideration, contending, inter alia, that since venue is
jurisdictional in criminal cases, any defect in an information for libel pertaining to jurisdiction is not a mere matter of form that
may be cured by amendment.[22]

By Order of March 8, 2007,[23] the public respondent granted the prosecutions motion for reconsideration and
accordingly ordered the public prosecutor to amend the Information to cure the defect of want of venue.

The prosecution thereupon moved to admit the Amended Information dated March 20, 2007, [24] the accusatory portion
of which reads:
That on or about the 25th day of August 2005 in Makati City, Metro Manila, Philippines, a place
within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then the trustees of Parents
Enabling Parents Coalition and as such trustees they hold the legal title to the
website www.pepcoalition.com which is of general circulation, and publication to the public conspiring,
confederating together with John Does, whose true names, identities and present whereabouts are still
unknown and all of them mutually helping and aiding one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously and publicly and maliciously with intention of attacking the honesty, virtue, honor and
integrity, character and reputation of complainant Malayan Insurance Co. Inc., Yuchengco Family particularly
Ambassador Alfonso Yuchengco and Helen Dee and for further purpose exposing the complainant to public
hatred and contempt published an article imputing a vice or defect to the complainant and caused to be
composed, posted and published in the said website www.pepcoalition.com, a website accessible in Makati
City, an injurious and defamatory article, which was first published and accessed by the private
complainant in Makati City, as follows:

x x x x (emphasis and underscoring in the original; italics supplied)

Petitioners moved to quash the Amended Information[25] which, they alleged, still failed to vest jurisdiction upon the
public respondent because it failed to allege that the libelous articles were printed and first published by the accused
in Makati; and the prosecution erroneously laid the venue of the case in the place where the offended party accessed the internetpublished article.

By the assailed Order of April 22, 2008, the public respondent, applying Banal III, found the Amended Information to
be sufficient in form.

Petitioners motion for reconsideration[26] having been denied by the public respondent by Joint Resolution of August 12,
2008, they filed the present petition for Certiorari and Prohibition faulting the public respondent for:
1. NOT FINDING THAT THE ACTS ALLEGED IN THE INFORMATION ARE NOT PUNISHABLE BY
LAW;
2. ADMITTING AN AMENDED INFORMATION WHOSE JURISDICTIONAL ALLEGATIONS
CONTINUES TO BE DEFICIENT; and
3. NOT RULING THAT AN AMENDMENT IN THE INFORMATION FOR THE PURPOSE OF CURING
JURISDICTIONAL DEFECTS IS ILLEGAL. [27]

With the filing of Gimenezs Comment[28] to the petition, the issues are: (1) whether petitioners violated the rule on
hierarchy of courts to thus render the petition dismissible; and (2) whether grave abuse of discretion attended the public
respondents admission of the Amended Information.

The established policy of strict observance of the judicial hierarchy of courts, [29] as a rule, requires that recourse must
first be made to the lower-ranked court exercising concurrent jurisdiction with a higher court. [30] A regard for judicial hierarchy
clearly indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first level courts should be filed in the RTC and
those against the latter should be filed in the Court of Appeals. [31] The rule is not iron-clad, however, as it admits of certain
exceptions.

Thus, a strict application of the rule is unnecessary when cases brought before the appellate courts do not involve
factual but purely legal questions.[32]

In the present case, the substantive issue calls for the Courts exercise of its discretionary authority, by way of exception,
in order to abbreviate the review process as petitioners raise a pure question of law involving jurisdiction in criminal complaints

for libel under Article 360 of the RPC whether the Amended Information is sufficient to sustain a charge for written defamation
in light of the requirements underArticle 360 of the RPC, as amended by Republic Act (RA) No. 4363, reading:
Art. 360. Persons responsible.Any person who shall publish, exhibit or cause the publication or
exhibition of any defamation in writing or by similar means, shall be responsible for the same.
The author or editor of a book or pamphlet, or the editor or business manager of a daily newspaper, magazine
or serial publication, shall be responsible for the defamations contained therein to the same extent as if he
were the author thereof.
The criminal action and civil action for damages in cases of written defamations, as provided for in this
chapter shall be filed simultaneously or separately with the Court of First Instance of the province or city
where the libelousarticle is printed and first published or where any of the offended parties actually
resides at the time of the commission of the offense: Provided, however, That where one of the offended
parties is a public officer whose office is in the City of Manila at the time of the commission of the offense,
the action shall be filed in the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila or of the city or province where
the libelous article is printed and first published, and in case such public officer does not hold office in the
City of Manila, the action shall be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where he held
office at the time of the commission of the offense or where the libelous article is printed and first published
and in case one of the offended parties is a private individual, the action shall be filed in the Court of First
Instance of the province or city where he actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense or
where the libelous matter is printed and first published x x x. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Venue is jurisdictional in criminal actions such that the place where the crime was committed determines not only the
venue of the action but constitutes an essential element of jurisdiction. [33] This principle acquires even greater import in libel
cases, given that Article 360, as amended, specifically provides for the possible venues for the institution of the criminal and civil
aspects of such cases.

In Macasaet,[34] the Court reiterated its earlier pronouncements in Agbayani v. Sayo[35] which laid out the rules on venue
in libel cases, viz:
For the guidance, therefore, of both the bench and the bar, this Court finds it appropriate to reiterate
our earlier pronouncement in the case of Agbayani, to wit:
In order to obviate controversies as to the venue of the criminal action for written defamation, the
complaint or information should contain allegations as to whether, at the time the offense was committed, the
offended party was a public officer or a private individual and where he was actually residing at that
time. Whenever possible, the place where the written defamation was printed and first published
should likewise be alleged. That allegation would be a sine qua non if the circumstance as to where the
libel was printed and first published is used as the basis of the venue of the action. (emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

It becomes clear that the venue of libel cases where the complainant is a private individual is limited to only either of
two places, namely: 1) where the complainant actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense; or 2) where the
alleged defamatory article was printed and first published. The Amended Information in the present case opted to lay the venue
by availing of the second. Thus, it stated that the offending article was first published and accessed by the private complainant

in Makati City. In other words, it considered the phrase to be equivalent to the requisite allegation of printing and
first publication.

The insufficiency of the allegations in the Amended Information to vest jurisdiction in Makati becomes pronounced
upon an examination of the rationale for the amendment to Article 360 by RA No. 4363. Chavez v. Court of Appeals[36] explained
the nature of these changes:
Agbayani supplies a comprehensive restatement of the rules of venue in actions for criminal libel, following
the amendment by Rep. Act No. 4363 of the Revised Penal Code:
Article 360 in its original form provided that the venue of the criminal and civil actions for written
defamations is the province wherein the libel was published, displayed or exhibited, regardless of the place
where the same was written, printed or composed. Article 360 originally did not specify the public officers
and the courts that may conduct the preliminary investigation of complaints for libel.
Before article 360 was amended, the rule was that a criminal action for libel may be instituted in any
jurisdiction where the libelous article was published or circulated, irrespective of where it was written or
printed (People v. Borja, 43 Phil. 618). Under that rule, the criminal action is transitory and the injured party
has a choice of venue.
Experience had shown that under that old rule the offended party could harass the accused in a libel
case by laying the venue of the criminal action in a remote or distant place.
Thus, in connection with an article published in the Daily Mirror and the Philippine Free Press, Pio Pedrosa,
Manuel V. Villareal and Joaquin Roces were charged with libel in the justice of the peace court of San Fabian,
Pangasinan (Amansec v. De Guzman, 93 Phil. 933).
To forestall such harassment, Republic Act No. 4363 was enacted. It lays down specific rules as to the
venue of the criminal action so as to prevent the offended party in written defamation cases from
inconveniencing the accused by means of out-of-town libel suits, meaning complaints filed in remote
municipal courts (Explanatory Note for the bill which became Republic Act No. 4363, Congressional
Record of May 20, 1965, pp. 424-5;Time, Inc. v. Reyes, L-28882, May 31, 1971, 39 SCRA 303, 311).
x x x x (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Clearly, the evil sought to be prevented by the amendment to Article 360 was the indiscriminate or arbitrary laying of
the venue in libel cases in distant, isolated or far-flung areas, meant to accomplish nothing more than harass or intimidate an
accused. The disparity or unevenness of the situation becomes even more acute where the offended party is a person of sufficient
means or possesses influence, and is motivated by spite or the need for revenge.

If the circumstances as to where the libel was printed and first published are used by the offended party as basis for the
venue in the criminal action, the Information must allege with particularity wherethe defamatory article was printed
and first published, as evidenced or supported by, for instance, the address of their editorial or business offices in the case of
newspapers, magazines or serial publications. This pre-condition becomes necessary in order to forestall any inclination to harass.

The same measure cannot be reasonably expected when it pertains to defamatory material appearing on a website on
the internet as there would be no way of determining the situs of its printing and first publication. To credit Gimenezs premise of
equating his first access to the defamatory article on petitioners website in Makati with printing and first publication would
spawn the very ills that the amendment to Article 360 of the RPC sought to discourage and prevent. It hardly requires much
imagination to see the chaos that would ensue in situations where the websites author or writer, a blogger or anyone who posts
messages therein could be sued for libel anywhere in the Philippines that the private complainant may have allegedly accessed
the offending website.

For the Court to hold that the Amended Information sufficiently vested jurisdiction in the courts of Makati simply
because the defamatory article was accessed therein would open the floodgates to the libel suit being filed in all other locations
where the pepcoalition website is likewise accessed or capable of being accessed.

Respecting the contention that the venue requirements imposed by Article 360, as amended, are unduly oppressive, the
Courts pronouncements in Chavez[37] are instructive:
For us to grant the present petition, it would be necessary to abandon the Agbayani rule providing
that a private person must file the complaint for libel either in the place of printing and first publication, or at
the complainants place of residence. We would also have to abandon the subsequent cases that reiterate this
rule in Agbayani, such as Soriano, Agustin, and Macasaet. There is no convincing reason to resort to such a
radical action.These limitations imposed on libel actions filed by private persons are hardly onerous,
especially as they still allow such persons to file the civil or criminal complaint in their respective places
of residence, in which situation there is no need to embark on a quest to determine with precision
where the libelous matter was printed and first published.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)

IN FINE, the public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioners motion to quash the
Amended Information.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Order of April 22, 2008 and the Joint Resolution of August
12, 2008 are hereby SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Br. 149 is hereby DIRECTED TO QUASH the
Amended Information in Criminal Case No. 06-876 and DISMISS the case.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Baguio City

THIRD DIVISION
ANGELITO P. MAGNO, G.R. No. 171542
Petitioner,
Present:
CARPIO MORALES, J., Chairperson,
BRION,
- versus - BERSAMIN,
VILLARAMA, JR., and
SERENO, JJ.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

MICHAEL MONSOD, ESTHER LUZ
MAE GREGORIO, GIAN CARLO
CAJOLES, NENETTE CASTILLON, Promulgated:
DONATO ENABE and ALFIE
FERNANDEZ,
Respondents. April 6, 2011
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
BRION, J.:
Through a petition for review on certiorari,[1] petitioner Angelito P. Magno seeks the reversal of the
Amended Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA), dated September 26, 2005[2] in People of thePhilippines, et al.
v. Hon. Augustine A. Vestil, Presiding Judge, RTC Mandaue City, Br. 56, et al. (docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 79809),
and its Resolution dated February 6, 2006[3] denying respondents motion for reconsideration.[4] The assailed rulings
denied the petition for certiorari filed under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court and upheld the ruling [5] of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Mandaue City, which precluded Atty. Adelino B. Sitoy from acting as private prosecutor in
Criminal Case No. DU-10123.[6]
THE FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS
On May 14, 2003, the Office of the Ombudsman filed an information for multiple frustrated murder and double
attempted murder against several accused, including Magno, who were public officers working under the National
Bureau of Investigation.[7]
During the scheduled arraignment, Magno, in open court, objected to the formal appearance and authority of Atty.
Sitoy, who was there as private prosecutor to prosecute the case for and on behalf of the Office of the
Ombudsman.[8] The oral objection was reduced to writing on July 21, 2003 when Magno filed an opposition[9] before
Branch 56 of the RTC of Mandaue City, citing the provisions of Section 31 of Republic Act (RA) No. 6770.[10]
The Office of the Ombudsman submitted its comment,[11] while the accused submitted their joint opposition.[12] The
respondents likewise submitted their comments to the opposition of the other co-accused. [13]
On September 25, 2003, the RTC issued an Order, ruling that the Ombudsman is proper, legal and authorized entity
to prosecute this case to the exclusion of any other entity/person other than those authorized under R.A. 6770. [14]
In open court, the Office of the Ombudsman moved for the reconsideration of the Order, which the RTC later
denied in its October 1, 2003 Order.[15]
Proceedings before the CA
On October 13, 2003, the respondents, through the Ombudsman for the Visayas and Atty. Sitoy, filed a
petition for certiorari before the CA.[16] They contended that the RTC committed a grave abuse of discretion in
prohibiting the appearance of Atty. Sitoy as counsel for the private offended parties, as the Rules of Court expressly
provides that a private offended party may intervene, by counsel, in the prosecution of offenses. [17]
Magno, in his comment[18] filed on December 15, 2003, insisted that what he questioned before the RTC was the
appearance and authority of the private prosecutor to prosecute the case in behalf of the Ombudsman. [19] He
stressed that while the Office of the Ombudsman can designate prosecutors to assist in the prosecution of criminal
cases, its authority in appointing, deputizing or authorizing prosecutors to prosecute cases is confined only to
fiscals, state prosecutors and government lawyers. It does not extend to private practitioners/private prosecutors.
[20]
He further stressed that while the Order of the RTC states that the Office of the Ombudsman is the proper legal
and authorized entity to prosecute the case, it did not affect the right to intervene personally, as the Office of the
Ombudsman can take the cudgels for the private respondents in prosecuting the civil aspect of the case. [21]

On February 16, 2005, the CA, in its original Decision, declared that the private prosecutor may appear for the
petitioner in the case, but only insofar as the prosecution of the civil aspect of the case is concerned. [22]
The respondents moved for the reconsideration[23] of the CA decision. On September 26, 2005, the CA amended its
decision,[24] ruling that the private prosecutor may appear for the petitioner in Criminal Case No. DU-10123 to
intervene in the prosecution of the offense charged in collaboration with any lawyer deputized by the Ombudsman
to prosecute the case.[25]
Failing to obtain a reconsideration[26] of the amended CA decision, Magno elevated the dispute to this
Court through the present petition for review on certiorari[27] filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Procedure.
PETITIONERS ARGUMENTS
Magno submits that the CA did not have jurisdiction to entertain the petition for certiorari; the power to
hear and decide that question is with the Sandiganbayan.[28] To support this contention, Magno invokes Engr.
Teodoto B. Abbot v. Hon. Judge Hilario I. Mapayo, etc., et al.[29] where the Court held that the Sandiganbayan has
the exclusive power to issue petitions for certiorari in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.[30]
Even if the Court were to set aside this procedural lapse, Magno adds, the private prosecutor cannot be
allowed to intervene for the respondents as it would violate Section 31 of RA No. 6770. [31] Section 31 limits the
Ombudsmans prerogative to designate prosecutors to fiscals, state prosecutors and government lawyers. It does
not, Magno maintains, allow the Ombudsman to deputize private practitioners to prosecute cases for and on behalf
of the Office of the Ombudsman.[32]
RESPONDENTS ARGUMENTS
The Office of the Ombudsman, through the Office of the Special Prosecutor, submitted its memorandum
on February 8, 2008. Substantively, the Ombudsman maintains that Atty. Sitoy may intervene in the case pursuant
to Section 16, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, which reads:
Sec. 16. Intervention of the offended party in criminal action. Where the civil action for
recovery of civil liability is instituted in the criminal action pursuant to Rule 111, the offended
party may intervene by counsel in the prosecution of the offense.
The Ombudsman maintains that Section 31 of RA No. 6770 did not amend Section 16, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court.
[33]
Section 31 merely allows the Ombudsman to designate and deputize any fiscal, state prosecutor or lawyer in the
government service to act as special investigator or prosecutor to assist in the investigation and prosecution in
certain cases.[34] The Ombudsman opines that the two provisions of law are not diametrically opposed nor in
conflict,[35] as a private prosecutor may appear for the private offended complainants in the prosecution of an
offense independent of the exclusive right of the Ombudsman to deputize.[36] The Ombudsman, however, did not
address the contention that the Sandiganbayan, not the CA, has appellate jurisdiction over the RTC in this case.
THE COURTS RULING
We resolve to grant the petition.
The Sandiganbayan, not the CA, has appellate jurisdiction
over the RTCs decision not to allow Atty. Sitoy to
prosecute the case on behalf of the Ombudsman
Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1606 created the Sandiganbayan. Section 4 thereof establishes the
Sandiganbayans jurisdiction:

Section 4. Jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all
cases involving:

A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corruption
Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, of the Revised Penal Code, where
one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a
permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:
xxxx
B. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the public
officials and employees mentioned in subsection of this section in relation to their office.
C. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A,
issued in 1986.
In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to Salary Grade 27 or higher, as
prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or military or PNP officers mentioned above, exclusive original
jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial
court, and municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as
provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended.
The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final judgments, resolutions or
orders of regional trial courts whether in the exercise of their own original jurisdiction or of their
appellate jurisdiction as herein provided.
The Sandiganbayan shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions for the issuance of the writs
of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, injunctions, and other ancillary writs and
processes in aid of its appellate jurisdiction and over petitions of similar nature, including quo
warranto, arising or that may arise in cases filed or which may be filed under Executive Order Nos. 1,
2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986: Provided, That the jurisdiction over these petitions shall not be
exclusive of the Supreme Court.
The procedure prescribed in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as well as the implementing rules that the Supreme
Court has promulgated and may hereafter promulgate, relative to appeals/petitions for review to the Court of
Appeals, shall apply to appeals and petitions for review filed with the Sandiganbayan. In all cases elevated to
the Sandiganbayan and from the Sandiganbayan to the Supreme Court, the Office of the Ombudsman,
through its special prosecutor, shall represent the People of the Philippines, except in cases filed pursuant to
Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.
In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories with the public officers or
employees, including those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, they shall be tried
jointly with said public officers and employees in the proper courts which shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction
over them.
Any provision of law or Rules of Court to the contrary notwithstanding, the criminal action and the
corresponding civil action for the recovery of civil liability shall at all times be simultaneously instituted
with, and jointly determined in, the same proceeding by the Sandiganbayan or to appropriate courts, the filing
of the criminal action being deemed to necessarily carry with it the filing of civil action, and no right to
reserve the filing of such civil action separately from the criminal action shall be recognized: Provided,
however, That where the civil action had theretofore been filed separately but judgment therein has not yet
been rendered, and the criminal case is hereafter filed with the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate court, said
civil action shall be transferred to the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate court, as the case may be, for
consolidation and joint determination with the criminal action, otherwise the separate civil action shall be
deemed abandoned." [emphasis and underscoring supplied]

This is clear: the Sandiganbayan has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over resolutions issued by RTCs in the exercise
of their own original jurisdiction or of their appellate jurisdiction.

We reaffirmed this rule in Abbot.[37] In that case, petitioner Engr. Abbot filed a petition
for certiorari before the CA, claiming that the RTC gravely abused its discretion for not dismissing the information
for Malversation thru Falsification of Public Document. The CA refused to take cognizance of the case, holding that
the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the petition. Recognizing theamendments made to PD No. 1606 by RA No.
7975,[38] we sustained the CAs position since Section 4 of PD No. 1606 has expanded the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction
to include petitions formandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, injunction, and other ancillary writs and
processes in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.[39]
In the present case, the CA erred when it took cognizance of the petition for certiorari filed by Magno.
While it is true that the interlocutory order issued by the RTC is reviewable by certiorari, the same was incorrectly
filed with the CA. Magno should have filed the petition for certiorari with the Sandiganbayan, which has exclusive
appellate jurisdiction over the RTC since the accused are public officials charged of committing crimes in their
capacity as Investigators of the National Bureau of Investigation. [40]
The CA should have dismissed the petition outright. Since it acted without authority, we overrule
the September 26, 2005 Amended Decision of the CA and the subsequent denial of Magnos motions for
reconsideration.
Jurisdiction is conferred by law, and
the CAs judgment, issued without
jurisdiction, is void.
There is no rule in procedural law as basic as the precept that jurisdiction is conferred by law,[41] and any
judgment, order or resolution issued without it is void [42] and cannot be given any effect.[43]This rule applies even if
the issue on jurisdiction was raised for the first time on appeal or even after final judgment. [44]
[45]

We reiterated and clarified the rule further in Felicitas M. Machado, et al. v. Ricardo L. Gatdula, et al.,
as follows:

Jurisdiction over a subject matter is conferred by law and not by the parties action or
conduct. Estoppel generally does not confer jurisdiction over a cause of action to a tribunal where none, by
law, exists. In Lozon v. NLRC, we declared that:
Lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit is yet another matter. Whenever it appears
that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, the action shall be dismissed. This
defense may be interposed at any time, during appeal or even after final judgment. Such is
understandable, as this kind of jurisdiction is conferred by law and not within the courts, let alone
the parties, to themselves determine or conveniently set aside.

We note that Magno had already raised in his supplemental motion for reconsideration before the
CA[46] the ground of lack of jurisdiction before the CAs Decision became final. The CA did not even consider this
submission, choosing instead to brush it aside for its alleged failure to raise new or substantial grounds for
reconsideration.[47] Clearly, however, its lack of jurisdiction is a new and substantial argument that the CA should
have passed upon.
The Office of the Ombudsman cannot rely on the principle
of estoppel to cure the jurisdictional defect of its petition
before the CA
The Ombudsman cannot rely on the principle of estoppel in this case
since Magno raised the issue of jurisdiction before the CAs decision became final. Further, even if the issue had
been raised only on appeal to this Court, the CAs lack of jurisdiction could still not be cured. InMachado,
[48]
citing People of the Philippines v. Rosalina Casiano,[49] we held:

In People v. Casiano, this Court, on the issue of estoppel, held:

The operation of the principle of estoppel on the question of jurisdiction seemingly depends upon
whether the lower court actually had jurisdiction or not. If it had no jurisdiction, but the case was tried
and decided upon the theory that it had jurisdiction, the parties are not barred, on appeal, from
assailing such jurisdiction, for the same must exist as a matter of law, and may not be conferred by
consent of the parties or by estoppel. However if the lower court had jurisdiction, and the case was heard
and decided upon a given theory, such, for instance, as that the court had no jurisdiction, the party who
induced it to adopt such theory will not be permitted, on appeal, to assume an inconsistent position that the
lower court had jurisdiction.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petitioners petition for review on certiorari, and DECLARE the Amended
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 79809, promulgated on September 26, 2005, as well as its
Resolution of February 6, 2006, NULL AND VOID for having been issued without jurisdiction. The respondents are
hereby given fifteen (15) days from the finality of this Decision within which to seek recourse from the
Sandiganbayan. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-75079 January 26, 1989

SOLEMNIDAD M. BUAYA, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE WENCESLAO M. POLO, Presiding Judge, Branch XIX, Regional Trial) Court of Manila and
the COUNTRY BANKERS INSURANCE CORPORATION, respondents.
Apolinario M. Buaya for petitioner.
Romeo G. Velasquez for respondent Country Bankers Insurance Corporation.

PARAS, J.:
Petitioner, Solemnidad M. Buaya, in the instant petition for certiorari, seeks to annul and set aside the orders of denial
issued by the respondent Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XIX on her Motion to Quash/Dismiss
and Motion for Reconsideration in Criminal Case No. L-83-22252 entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Solemnidad
M. Buaya." The Motion to Dismiss was anchored on the following grounds (a) the court has no jurisdiction over the
case and (b) the subject matter is purely civil in nature.
It appears that petitioner was an insurance agent of the private respondent, who was authorized to transact and
underwrite insurance business and collect the corresponding premiums for and in behalf of the private respondent.
Under the terms of the agency agreement, the petitioner is required to make a periodic report and accounting of her
transactions and remit premium collections to the principal office of private respondent located in the City of Manila.
Allegedly, an audit was conducted on petitioner's account which showed a shortage in the amount of P358,850.72. As
a result she was charged with estafa in Criminal Case No. 83-22252, before the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch XIX with the respondent Hon. Wenceslao Polo as the Presiding Judge. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss.
which motion was denied by respondent Judge in his Order dated March 26, 1986. The subsequent motion for
reconsideration of this order of denial was also denied.
These two Orders of denial are now the subject of the present petition. It is the contention of petitioner that the
Regional trial Court of Manila has no jurisdiction because she is based in Cebu City and necessarily the funds she
allegedly misappropriated were collected in Cebu City.
Petitioner further contends that the subject matter of this case is purely civil in nature because the fact that private
respondent separately filed Civil Case No. 83-14931 involving the same alleged misappropriated amount is an
acceptance that the subject transaction complained of is not proper for a criminal action.
The respondents on the other hand, call for adherence to the consistent rule that the denial of a motion to dismiss or
to quash, being interlocutory in character, cannot be questioned by certiorari and it cannot be the subject of appeal
until final judgment or order rendered (See. 2, Rule 41, Rules of Court). the ordinary procedure to be followed in such
a case is to enter a Plea, go to trial and if the decision is adverse, reiterate the issue on appeal from the final
judgment (Newsweek Inc. v. IAC, 142 SCRA 171).
The general rule is correctly stated. But this is subject to certain exceptions the reason is that it would be unfair to
require the defendant or accused to undergo the ordeal and expense of a trial if the court has no jurisdiction over the
subject matter or offense or it is not the court of proper venue.
Here, petitioner questions the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court of Manila to take cognizance of this criminal case
for estafa.
It is well-settled that the averments in the complaint or information characterize the crime to be prosecuted and the
court before which it must be tried (Balite v. People, L-21475, Sept. 30,1966 cited in People v. Masilang, 142 SCRA
680).
In Villanueva v. Ortiz, et al . (L-15344, May 30, 1960, 108 Phil, 493) this Court ruled that in order to determine the
jurisdiction of the court in criminal cases, the complaint must be examined for the purpose of ascertaining whether or
not the facts set out therein and the punishment provided for by law fall within the jurisdiction of the court where the

complaint is filed. The jurisdiction of courts in criminal cases is determined by the allegations of the complaint or
information, and not by the findings the court may make after the trial (People v. Mission, 87 Phil. 641).
The information in the case at reads as follows:
The undersigned accuses Solemnidad Buaya of the crime of estafa, committed as follows:
That during the period 1980 to June 15, 1982, inclusive, in the City of Manila,
Philippines, the said accused did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously defraud the Country Bankers Insurance Corporation represented by
Elmer Banez duly organized and earth under the laws of the Philippine with
principal address at 9th floor, G.R. Antonio Bldg., T.M. Kalaw, Ermita, in said City,
in the following manner, to wit. the said having been authorized to act as
insurance agent of said corporation, among whose duties were to remit
collections due from customers thereat and to account for and turn over the
same to the said Country Bankers Insurance Corporation represented by Elmer
Banez, as soon as possible or immediately upon demand, collected and received
the amount of P368,850.00 representing payments of insurance premiums from
customers, but herein accused, once in possession of said amount, far from
complying with her aforesaid obligation, failed and refused to do so and with
intent to defraud, absconded with the whole amount thereby misappropriated,
misapplied and converted the said amount of P358,850.00 to her own personal
used and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of said Country Bankers
Insurance Corporation in the amount of P358,850.00 Philippine Currency.
CONTRARY TO LAW. (p. 44, Rollo)
Section 14(a), Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court provides: In all criminal prosecutions the action shall be
instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or province wherein the offense was committed or any of the
essential elements thereof took place.
The subject information charges petitioner with estafa committed "during the period 1980 to June 15, 1982
inclusive in the City of Manila, Philippines . . . ." (p. 44, Rollo)
Clearly then, from the very allegation of the information the Regional Trial Court of Manila has jurisdiction.
Besides, the crime of estafa is a continuing or transitory offense which may be prosecuted at the place where any of
the essential elements of the crime took place. One of the essential elements of estafa is damage or prejudice to the
offended party. The private respondent has its principal place of business and office at Manila. The failure of the
petitioner to remit the insurance premiums she collected allegedly caused damage and prejudice to private
respondent in Manila.
Anent petitioners other contention that the subject matter is purely civil in nature, suffice it to state that evidentiary
facts on this point have still to be proved.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit The case is remanded to the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch XIX for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 103276. April 11, 1996]
DOMINGO DE GUZMAN, petitioner, vs. THE SANDIGANBAYAN (Second Division) and the PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.

SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; RULES OF PROCEDURE; MAY BE LIBERALLY CONSTRUED TO SERVE THE END OF
JUSTICE. - The power of this Court to suspend its own rules or to except a particular case from its operations
whenever the purposes of justice require it, cannot be questioned. In not a few instances, this Court ordered a
new trial in criminal cases on grounds not mentioned in the statute, viz: retraction of witness, negligence or
incompetency of counsel, improvident plea of guilty, disqualification of an attorney de officio to represent the
accused in trial court, and where a judgment was rendered on a stipulation of facts entered into by both the
prosecution and the defense. Similarly, in a considerable host of cases has this prerogative been invoked to
relax even procedural rules of the most mandatory character in terms of compliance, such as the period to
appeal. Let us not forget that the rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools designed to facilitate the
attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate
rather than promote substantial justice, must always be avoided. Even the Rules of Court envision this
liberality. This power to suspend or even disregard the rules can be so pervasive and encompassing so as to
alter even that which this Court itself has already declared to be final, as we are now compelled to do in this
case.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; APPLICABLE IN CASE A PARTY WAS PENALIZED DUE TO THE NEGLIGENCE OF HIS
COUNSEL. - Petitioners present dilemma is certainly not something reducible to pesos and centavos. No less
than his liberty is at stake here. And he is just about to lose it simply because his former lawyers pursued a
carelessly contrived procedural strategy of insisting on what has already become an imprudent remedy, as
aforediscussed, which thus forbade petitioner from offering his evidence all the while available for presentation
before the Sandiganbayan. Under the circumstances, higher interests of justice and equity demand that
petitioner be not penalized for the costly importunings of his previous lawyers based on the same principles why
this Court had, on many occasions where it granted new trial, excused parties from the negligence or mistakes
of counsel. To cling to the general rule in this case is only to condone rather than rectify a serious injustice to
petitioners whose only fault was to repose his faith and entrust his innocence to his previous lawyers.
3. ID.; SUPREME COURT; NOT TRIER OF FACTS. - The receipts and other documents constituting his evidence
which he failed to present in the Sandiganbayan are entitled to be appreciated, however, by that forum and not
this Court, for the general rule is that we are not triers of facts. Without prejudging the result of such
appreciation, petitioners documentary evidences prima facie appear strong when reckoned with the lone
prosecution witness Angeles testimony, indicating that official training programs were indeed actually conducted
and that the P200,000.00 cash advance he received were spent entirely for those programs.
APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL
Zambrano, Gruba & Associates for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
RESOLUTION
FRANCISCO, J.:
The Court in its June 16, 1994 En Banc Resolution[1] denied with finality petitioners motion for reconsideration of
the Courts April 12, 1994 Decision[2] affirming his conviction by the Sandiganbayan [3] of violation of Section 3(e) of the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act[4] for his alleged failure to account for P200,000.00 received for certain official
training programs of the Department of Agriculture. Entry of judgment was ordered to be made in due course. [5] Six
(6) years and one (1) month as minimum, to nine (9) years and one (1) day as maximum in jail await petitioner.
As the Sandiganbayan and the Court saw it then, petitioners guilt was duly established by 1) lone prosecution
witness Josephine Angeles[6] testimony that no such training programs were held at the designated places, [7] and 2)
petitioners failure to present a single receipt to support due disbursement of the P200,000.00, resulting from his
former lawyers insistence in filing a demurrer to evidence despite prior leave for that purpose having been denied by
the Sandiganbayan.

To avert his looming imprisonment and with full awareness that he has nothing in our Rules of Court to rely on,
petitioner takes a novel recourse by filing the instant Omnibus Motion For Leave to Vacate First Motion For
Reconsideration In The Light Of The Present Developments And To Consider Evidence Presented Herein And To Set
Aside Conviction.[8] This was filed on petitioners behalf by a new counsel, as shown by the Entry of Appearance and
Motion For Leave To Submit Attached Omnibus Motion filed on June 27, 1994 [9] after petitioners former lawyers
withdrew their appearance.[10]
In this Omnibus Motion, petitioner, for the first time, seeks to be relieved from what he considers as the serious
and costly mistake of his former lawyers [11] in demurring to the prosecution evidence after court leave was denied, the
effect of which deprived him of presenting before the Sandiganbayan the pieces of documentary evidence that would
have completely belied the accusation against him. Annexed to the Omnibus Motion are photocopies of the list of
expenses and receipts[12] in support of the liquidation voucher (Exhibit E) showing due disbursement of the
P200,000.00 received for training programs actually conducted - the original records of which are all along kept in the
Records Section of the Bureau of Plant Industry as per letter of the Bureau Director Emillano P. Gianzon [13] and which
are readily available. Petitioner now appeals to the Courts sense ofjustice and equity that these documents be
summoned and appreciated by the Court itself or by the Sandiganbayan after remanding the case thereto, if only to
give him the final chance to prove his innocence.
When required by the Court to comment on the Omnibus Motion,[14] the Solicitor General, representing
respondents, was granted no less than eight (8) extensions to do so, [15] the last one with warning that no further
extension will be given. None was filed. Instead, the Solicitor General filed a ninth (9th) motion for extension which
was denied considering the warning contained in the eighth (8th) extension.[16] The tenth (10th) motion for extension
was merely noted by the Court.[17] Thereafter, the Court in a Resolution dated August 15, 1995 required the Solicitor
Generals Office to 1) SHOW CAUSE why it should not be disciplinarily dealt with for its repeated failure to file
comment and 2) file its comment, both within ten (10) days from notice. In compliance therewith, the Solicitor
Generals Office filed its Comment and Explanation. The Court accepted such Explanation, noted the Comment filed
and required petitioner to file a Reply thereto within ten (10) days from notice in a Resolution dated October 10, 1995.
A Reply was thus filed by petitioner in due time.
The Solicitor Generals Office advances the following arguments in its Comment:
1. Petitioners Omnibus Motion is violative of the Courts adopted policy on second motions for reconsideration
as expressed in a Resolution dated April 7, 1988 stating that:
Where the Court has resolved to deny a motion for reconsideration and decrees the denial to be final, no motion for leave to file
second motion for reconsideration shall be entertained.
2. Petitioner is bound by the mistake of his former lawyers, assuming that the latter indeed committed one.
3. Even granting the petitioner is not bound by his former lawyers mistake, the documentary evidence petitioner
now attempts to present would nonetheless not cast at all a reasonable doubt on his guilt for violation of Section 3 of
R.A. No. 3019, as amended, to warrant a reversal of his conviction by the Sandiganbayan.
Petitioners Reply, on the other hand, contains the following counter-arguments:
1. The Omnibus Motion is not violative of the prohibition on second motions for reconsideration since such
motion does not seek leave to file a second motion for reconsideration but for leave to vacate the first Motion For
Reconsideration filed on May 6, 1994 and in its stead to admit the Omnibus Motion containing the petitioners
documentary evidence and arguments. Thus, petitioners Motion to vacate the first motion for reconsideration is but
necessary to his defense that he should be excused from the mistake of his former lawyers.
2. Adherence to the general rule that the client is bound by his counsels mistake is to deprive petitioner of his
liberty through a technicality.
3. The pieces of evidence petitioner is now presenting for appreciation either by this Court or the
Sandiganbayan will, contrary to the OSGs claim, disprove his guilt of the charge levelled against him.

After carefully considering anew petitioners plight and keeping in mind that substantial rights must ultimately reign supreme over
technicalities, this Court is swayed to reconsider.
The power of this Court to suspend its own rules or to except a particular case from its operations whenever the
purposes of justice require it, cannot be questioned.[18] In not a few instances, this Court ordered a new trial in
criminal cases on grounds not mentioned in the statute, viz: retraction of witness, [19] negligence or incompetency of
counsel,[20] improvident plea of guilty,[21] disqualification of an attorney de oficio to represent the accused in trial court,
[22]
and where a judgment was rendered on a stipulation of facts entered into by both the prosecution and the defense.
[23]
Similarly, in a considerable host of cases has this prerogative been invoked to relax even procedural rules of the
most mandatory character in terms of compliance, such as the period to appeal. Take for instance the relatively
recent case of PNB, et al. v. CA, et al.[24] where the Court once again extended this liberality of allowing an appeal
filed beyond the reglementary 15-day period. It should be noted that Mr. Justice Melo, while dissenting therein,
[25]
nonetheless made this crucial observation:
The majority opinion, with due respect would suspend the rule - actually the law - for what it says are petitioners detailed
demonstration of the merits of the appeal without, however, delving on such so-called merits. The simple merits of ones case, lost
through neglect, to my mind should not automatically call for the suspension of applicable rules, laws, or jurisprudence. At the
very least, before this may be done transcendental matters, surely, life, liberty, or the security of the State, should be at risk, but
obviously, not simple matters which can be reduced to pesos and centavos. (Italics supplied)
Clearly, when transcendental matters like life, liberty or State security are involved, suspension of the rules is likely to
be welcomed more generously.
Petitioners present dilemma is certainly not something reducible to pesos and centavos. No less than his liberty
is at stake here. And he is just about to lose it simply because his former lawyers pursued a carelessly contrived
procedural strategy of insisting on what has already become an imprudent remedy, as aforediscussed, which thus
forbade petitioner from offering his evidence all the while available for presentation before the Sandiganbayan. Under
the circumstances, higher interests of justice and equity demand that petitioner be not penalized for the costly
importunings of his previous lawyers based on the same principles why this Court had, on many occasions where it
granted new trial, excused parties from the negligence or mistakes of counsel. [26] To cling to the general rule in this
case is only to condone rather than rectify a serious injustice to petitioners whose only fault was to repose his faith
and entrust his innocence to his previous lawyers. Consequently, the receipts and other documents constituting his
evidence which he failed to present in the Sandiganbayan are entitled to be appreciated, however, by that forum and
not this Court, for the general rule is that we are not triers of facts. Without prejudging the result of such appreciation,
petitioners documentary evidences prima facieappear strong when reckoned with the lone prosecution witness
Angeles testimony, indicating that official training programs were indeed actually conducted and that the P200,000.00
cash advance he received were spent entirely for those programs. In this connection, the Court in US v. Dungca,
[27]
had occasion to state that:
xxx, the rigor of the rule might in an exceptional case be relaxed, this would be done only under very exceptional
circumstances, and in cases where a review of the whole record taken together with the evidence improvidently omitted would
clearly justify the conclusion that the omission had resulted in the conviction of one innocent of the crime charged.(Italics
supplied)
Let us not forget that the rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment
of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than
promote substantial justice, must always be avoided. Even the Rules of Court envision this liberality.[28] This power to
suspend or even disregard the rules can be so pervasive and encompassing so as to alter even that which this Court
itself has already declared to be final, as we are now compelled to do in this case. And this is not without additional
basis. For in Ronquillo v. Marasigan,[29] the Court held that:
The fact that the decision x x x has become final, does not preclude a modification or an alteration thereof because even with the
finality of judgment, when its execution becomes impossible or unjust, as in the instant case, it may be modified or altered to
harmonize the same with justice and the facts. (Italics supplied)
The Rules of Court was conceived and promulgated to set forth guidelines in the dispensation of justice but not to
bind and chain the hand that dispenses it, for otherwise, courts will be mere slaves to or robots of technical rules,
shorn of judicial discretion. That is precisely why courts in rendering real justice have always been, as they in fact
ought to be, conscientiously guided by the norm that when on the balance, technicalities take a backseat against

substantive rights, and not the other way around. Truly then, technicalities, in the appropriate language of Justice
Makalintal, should give way to the realities of the situation.[30] And the grim reality petitioner will surely face, if we do
not compassionately bend backwards and flex technicalities in this instance, is the disgrace and misery of
incarceration for a crime which he might not have committed after all. More so, considering that petitioners record as
public servant remained unscathed until his prosecution. Indeed, while guilt shall not escape, innocence should not
suffer.[31]
In resume, this is a situation where a rigid application of rules of procedure must bow to the overriding goal of
courts of justice to render justice where justice is due - to secure to every individual all possible legal means to prove
his innocence of a crime of which he is charged. To borrow Justice Padilla s words in People v. CA, et al.,[32] (where
substantial justice was upheld anew in allowing therein accuseds appeal despite the withdrawal of his notice of
appeal and his subsequent escape from confinement) that if only to truly make the courts really genuine instruments
in the administration of justice, the Court believes it imperative, in order to assure against any possible miscarriage of
justice resulting from petitioners failure to present his crucial evidence through no fault of his, that this case be
remanded to the Sandiganbayan for reception and appreciation of petitioners evidence.
WHEREFORE, petitioners Omnibus Motion is GRANTED and the Courts April 12, 1994 Decision and June 16,
1994 Resolution are hereby RECONSIDERED. Accordingly, let this case be REMANDED to the Sandiganbayan for
reception and appreciation of petitioners evidence. No costs.
SO ORDERED.