Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
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. July 1, 1939
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}{EPORTONT-HE
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i ,ARMY
JuLy ~"I939 to Jun~ 30, I943
BIENNIAL REPORTS OF
.
Chief of StafJ of the United States
to
Army
.
WASHINGTON
ORGANIZATION
LOGISTICS'
TRAINING
AIR FORCES
, .
PLANNING
I
)6. GOVERNMENT OF OCCUPIED AREAS
173
17. ARMS SUPPLIED TO FRENCH
174
)8. CASABLANCA CQNFERENCE '
175
/
) 9. '''' ASHINGTON CONFERENCE
175
20. CIVILIANS AID FIGHTING UNITS
176
21. l\fIDDLE EAST 'CONSTRUCTION CURTAILED ..
I .
176
22. PACIFIC OPERATIONS PLANNED
177
'23 .. AID TO, RUSSIA 1.. ..,
, I
24. ''''OMEN'S ARMY AUXILIARY CORPS
177
25. OFFICER PROGRAM
179
26. CONSTRUCTION PROGRAM 182
27. PUBLIC RELATIONS 185
28~ HEALTI.I IN THE ARMY , 187
29. ORGANIZED LEISURE TIME 'ACTIVITIES 188
3. EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM EXPANDED 191
1 .3 1. TRAINING
191
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3
PART ONE
,BIENNIAL REPORT
, i
of the
Chief of Staff of the United States Army
-July I" I939" to June 3D} I94I
to
The Secretary of War
" \
BIENNIAL REPORT OFI
GENERAL GEORGE C. l\fARSHALL
Chief of Staff of the United States ArnJ,y
I'. .' .
~~==..,-
the part of the 'Ameri~an people this period was
Iuarked .by a slow awakening to the necessity of
augmenting our armed forces. _
In a democracy such as ours the vVar Depart-
ment is lilnited'in its action by the appropriations
approved by the President and provided by. the
Congress. These agencies are in turn motivated
by tne will of the people. Consequently the out-
standing. characteristic of the first phase was. an
increasing interest in national defense, but an in-
terest still irisufficient to prevent reductions in
Inilitary appropriations which the War Depart-.
ment had requested as necessary ~o' carry oJ1t
certain objectives. This phase terminated with.
the decIsive sllccesses of the Gennan Army in
\Vestern Europe in May, 1940. .
The second phase, which covers approxim~tely .
the fiscal year 1941, was marked by a growing
national consciousness of the seriousness of the
international situation, and by the ready appro- '
,priation of billions of dollars for national defense.
It witnessed the peacetime mobilization of a citizen
anny upon a wartilne scale, and the establishment
of scores of great military cainps in large training
areas. It required the reorientation of national .
industry to an unprecedented peacetime produc- .
tion rate .. It involved, in effect, a great experiment
i.n denl0cracy, a test of the ability of a government'
such as ours' to prepare itself in time of peace
,against the ruthless and arbitrary action of other
governments whose leaders take such measures as
they see fit, and strike -\vhen and where they will
with sudden and terrific violence.
(I939-I94I) . 11
,
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THE FIRST PHASE ~
STATE OF'THE ARM'ED FORCES JULY', '939 J
THE UNDERSIGNED became Acting Chief of Staff
on July I, 1939 and Chief of Staff, September I, ~
. 1939. On July 1 the active Army of the United
States consisted of approximately i74,000 en~isted "
men' scattered over 130 posts, camps and stations.~
A schematic view of the organization of the active~
anny at this time is given by Chart I. * .
; \Vithin the United States we had no field army. 1
There existed the mere .framework of about three ~
an.d one-half .square divisions approximately fifty
per cent complete as to personnel and scattered
alnong a number bf army posts. There was such,
a shortage in motor transportation that divisional
I
II 12 , (I 9 J9- I 94 ~)
t ...
'my statement to the Senate 'MilitaryAffairs Com- "
mittee included this summary of the situation"
that it was of vital importance that we have mod-
,ern equipment for the Regular Army and National
Guard; that: we modernize our artillery; that',ve
replace our 34-yea~-0Id rifles with more modern,
weapons; that we have the antitank and antiair- I
z.. -.i.;.._...;._~....;.
17,000 n1en to the Regul~r Anny permitted the"
reorganization of our pathetically incoI11plete.
square divisions' into five new type triangular ~
'divisions, and also permitted the assembly of those .
divisions, along with other units, in the field for ~
the winter .. It enabled us to establish the peace'1
compielnent of corps troops for one army corps.
The limited emergency permitted the number of
armory drills of the National Guard to be in-
creased froln 48 to 60 per year' and an additional
week of field training to be conducted that' fall
. suppleIUentary to the two weeks of summer can1p
and to provide for the training of the recentlyte-
. cruited men.
The urgent necessity for Army maneuvers- in-
Volving large units was manifest. For the past
five years field training had been limited to the
assernbly of the four paper' organizations, called'.,
field annies, once every four years, and then only
for a two-week period, of which about five days
could be devoted to very limited action due to
lack of Inotor transportation and the unseasoned
,state of the National Guard personnel. This sys-
ten1,.together with a general lack of corps troops,
heavy artillery, engineers, medical regiments, sig-
nal _battalionS',quartermaster truck trains, and a
complete lack of corps headquarters and experi~
ence.d high~.r commanders, made it virtually im-
pOSSIble for the mobile combat troops of the
~{e&"ular Army to be prepared as an immediately
a~aIlable COlllbatforce, experienced in the tech-
. ~Ique of l~rge-scale,field operations. It w<;Ls
essen-
tIal that the. higher commanders and staffs' be
14 (:I939-I94I )
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ing tl~e impossible. With respect to the time fac'
,1:'
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industrialists regarding their production capacities
and rates of deliveries with respect to airplane
engines and other itenis of heavy ordnance. As
th.e ~risis abroad developed, they grew increasingly
wIllIng to undertake production schedules that
had previously been regarded as out of the ques-
tion.
The expansion of the ArnlY during the SU111nler
of 1940 in general followed the long standing pro-
~ective mobilization plan, but the violent change
In the international situation as to the French
!)eet al?d the peril of England, necessitated an
1111nledlate reorientation regarding the Ineans at
?ur disposal. The possible loss of the British Navy
Introduced a new time factor for our defensive
preparations, and ilTIrnediately imposed an urgent
and trelnendous delnand for the manufacture of
tilne-conslulling critical iteiTISof equipluent.
In. 'weighing the problems of the tilTIe factor
. against the possibilities of the situation, two aspects
of the ..matter had to be considered. One related
to the.'possible dangers of the .situation within the
next SIXmonths. The other related to what should
be done over a period. of years. I t was considered
~hat for the tinle being the first issue was of dOln-
Illant ilnportance. Ordnance, anll11unition and
other critical itenls of equipment could not be
produced overnight, but the other requisite for
an arnled force, that is, personnel, was available
and could be conditioned, discipliped and trained
with the old vVorld vVar material available and
the materiel then under manufacture. It was not
believed that the Inen necessary to fonn an anny
(I 939- I 94 I). 'J 9
of the size required to meet the contingencies of
the'situation could be ob~ained by voluntary en-
listment. The alternative was a selective service
system which would furnish sufficient personnel
to bring the National Guard and the Regular
Army to full streng~h in the shortest possible time,
and to do this in a controlled and therefore effi-
cient manner, in contrast to the piecemeal, un-
balanced basis of voluntary enlistments. It was
suggested by members of Congress that the Regu-
lar Army be tremendously increased. However,
this would have been a futile procedure unless
the necessary equipment could be made available,
and this could have been arranged only by sub-
verting the National Guard and making a funda-
mental change in the existing military policy of
the Government. The decision was made to call
the National Guard into the Federal service and
. utilize its personne\ and equipment with t.hat of
the Regular Army to. train the first contingent of
the thousands of men necessary for the defense
of the country. .
The federalization of the National Guard and
the speedy enactment of selective service legisla-
tion at once became matters of urgent importance
to the 'Var Department in the summer of 1940.
The original request for the federalization of the
National Guard occurred in l\lay with the purpose
of utilizing summer calnps while preparing
the cantonments for the' expanded artny, so that
when cold weather set in, the necessary semi-per- ..
manent preparations would have been completed
for the firstincrelnent and construction well under
20 (I939-I94I)
way for the relnainder. The delnocratic.processes
of legislation resulted in a prolonged debate on
these two measures, which continued throughout
the SUlnlner.
In my testinlony before the Senate Appropria-'
tions COlnmittee on August 5, the following state-
Inen ts were nlade:, '
"Shelter is a serious problem at the present mo-
ll1ent. \Ve thought that Congress would settle the
question of authority to order out the National
Guard, and the matter of cOl1lpulsory training by
the first of August. On that basis, the Guard ,vas to
be brought into the Federal service during Sep-.
tember and the first induction of Inen under the
Selective Service Act during October. \Vhat has
happened is that the ,veeks have been passing and
we have no authority to enter into contracts to
provide the additional shelter required.
"\Ve have been tryit1g to find SOIne' manner,
SOlne Ineans for getting startec;l. \Ne want to pro-
ceed in an orderly and businesslike manner. 'Ve
know exactly what we 'want to do and exactly
where we want to do it, but we have neither the
authority nor the funds and titne is fleeting. So far
c~s construction is concerned the winter is upon us,
because it requires froln 3 to 4 months to provide
proper shelteL vVe had hopes at first to gain time
by providing a progressive tnobilization of the
National Guard during the sunlnler. \Ve plannt::d
to ~'put troops in tent calnps, while better shelter
Was being prepared in the climates that delnand
-special protection against the winter. However,
weeks have CODleand have gone and we have been
(1939-1941) Morris Swett Library, USAF1\S
urtable to. Inake a start. The present uncertainties"
make a businesslike procedure almost impossible.
We must make a start. toward getting water lines
laid; a'start on the sewage-disposal syStems; a start
on the te!!lporary roads and certainly the walks to
keep our people out of the mud; and we must get
under way the start of construction of temporary
h()spit'l.l facilities. These are fundalnental necessi-
ties and take time to develop."
One factor of assistance in this dilemma was the
$29,500,000 which the President authorized from
his emergency .fund on August 2, 1940. The avail-
.ability of this Sum permitted the initiation o~ con-
struction of basic utilities,. hospitals and ware-
houses in twelve National Guard camps and also
a divIsional cantonment at Fort Dix, New Jersey.
The problelns of funds were further compli-
cated by the concurrent consideration of author-.
ity to call the National Guard and Selective Serv-,
ice legislation. Authorization for the National
Guard to be called into Federal service was finally
given on August 27, 1940, but the $128,000,000
1
necessary for initial construction was not appI::O-
.J
priated until September 9. The" first Guard units
"were inducted on September 16, the same day that ,j
the Selective Service Act was signed by the Presi-
dent. Incidentally, the departlnent would have pre- l
ferred to delay these inductions for about a month J
l j
Service construction becalue available September
24:, as the leaves were beginning to fall.
-"--
tilne the New York base alone has been handling
a v~lume of tonnage comparable to that handled
d unng the W orId War.
Incident to the tremendous amount of business
handled by the General Staff during this current
expansion, it has been found necessary to increase
the number of Deputy Chiefs of Staff from one. to
. three .. One of these Deputies is charged solelyWit?
all matters pertaining to the air force. Another. IS
charged with matters pertaining to supply, equIp-
. Inent, construction and the Armored Force. The
other Deputy handles all other matters incident
to General Staff business. .
STATE OF THE ARMED FORCES JULY 1, 1941
j
creasing nUluber of items and the next four
months should greatly inlprove the situation.
Small as it was, the Regular Army personnel has
b~en the invaluable leaven of the present forces
wIthout which developments to date would have
been impossible except in rather superficial results
to be measured principally in numbers. The prog-
ress made has proved the soundness of the plans
laboriously prepared throughout the years ~y the
General Staff, despite the lack of opportunity to
work with large bodies of troops, or for that mat-
t~r, ,~ith a complete organization of any kind in
ContInental United States. The elaborate school
system of the Army maintained since 1920 has de-
clared a huge dividend. Our experienced officers
and noncommissioned officers have been ready in
te~h.nical knowledge, in skill as instructors and
abIlIty as leaders to unify the various elements of
our professional and citizen soldiers into a great
anny of the United States.
RECOMMEDATIONS FOR THE ELIMINATION OF CER-
TAIN LEGAL LIMITATIONS AND RESTRICTIONS
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fiist priOrity
.. d... "lid
.IVlSlons, IS.now near y camp ete .4 1
Must we replace most of the trained officer per-"
sonnel of a division-the leaders __at the moment
of departure for strategic localities? In two of the
regular divisions we have restricted the enlisted
personnel to three-year men, but in the others, of
necessity, the number of selectees varies from 25 %
to 50%. The problem here is the same as for the"
Reserve officer personnel. The National Guard
units involve three distinct limitations as to per- ~
.sonnel-that for the National Guard unit, that for
the 10% Reserve- officers in their regiments and
now being increased, and that pertaining to selec-
tees who comprise more than 50% of the men in
the ranks. Eurthermore, a task force involves all
components. vVhile we may select regular units as
the divisional components for task forces, we must
utilize National Guard organizations for the spe-
cial supporting units-antiaircraft, heavy artillery,
engineers, ete. So we have becorne involved in a
complete confusion of restrictive details, regard-
ing personnel. Add to this problern the fact that
plans for large '\.lnitsmust cover every conceivable
contingency, based on the means "available; that
time is required to prepare such a force; and that
under present conditions we must submit these
pl~ns to the time consuming business of public
investigation and debate-alof.g with the advertise-
. ment of such plans to the world at large, and I
. submit that the limitations referred to. should be
removed as quickly as possible if we are to have a
fair opportunity to protect. ourselves against the
coldly calculated, secret and sudden action that
\ 34 (I939-I94 I )/1
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n:ight be directed against us. Incidentally, our
hIstory includes SOl1le.unfortunate incidents re-
sUlting
from quite sinlilar le<ral
b
difliculties, which
. rIsked. a. battle or possibly a calnpaign. In the pre~-
ent cnSIS the risks to the nation are far l110re sen-
ous .
.A year ago last July the Arni.y was c~nfronted
WIth a problem very silnilar to that of thIS July so
far as the time factor and an eflicient basis for pro-
cedure are concerned. 1~hen ",vedesired authority
to put the first increnlent of the National Guard
into s.ummer caInps to conunence its training, and
We wIshed to be <riven the nJ.oney so that we could
proc~e? ilnmedi'ately under favorable weather
COndItIons with the construction of cantonl1lents
suitable for occupancy in the winter season. The
summer had passed before we were able to pro-
ceed in this matter.
Another limitation at the present til1le involves
leadership. There has been sublnitted to the Con-
gress within the past few days the draft of a joint
resolution designed to vitalize the leadership in
the Anny. .
The purpose of this legislation is to remove froin
the active list a few officers who slow down the
deve!opinent of our emergency anny through lack
of qualities of vigor, and intelligent, aggressive
leadership. Under existing law the. commissions
of officers of, the Reserve Corps Inay be revoked at
the discretion of the President and the Federal
recognition of officers of the National Guard Inay
be Withdrawn upon the recommendation of a
board of officers appointed by the Secretary of
(I939-I94I) 35
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War. In the case of officers of the Regular Army,
however, the law governing their removal froIl1
, the active list requires a procedure so cumbersome
as to make it totally ineffective during a national
emergency. In brief, the War Department desires
Iauthority to correct deficiencies in the. Regular
, Army as it is now able to do-'for the National
Guard and the Officers Reserve Corps. -
So far as temporary promotions are concerned,
the War Department has recently established a
mechanism to improve leadership. A system of
promotion by selection to the grade of colonel has
been instituted, and to date 286 lieutenant colo-.
nels have been selected for advancement. It is in-
tended that this procedure will be carried pro-
gressively . into the lower grades. / In all these
matters the interests of the soldier and the nation,
rather than that of. the individual officer, have
governed. L
--=~~~~ __ J.
sonne! and Il1ateriel, the Ordnance Departlnent in
production of anns and anuJlunition, the Quar-
tennaster Corps in construction, supplies and
~llotor transportation, and the Corps of Engineers
In the organization of new units and the sudden
undertaking of a construction program for the Air
Corps and for the leased bases. 1'he creation and
developnlent of the Arnlored Force has been an
enornious task, and is being accomplished with
the ,utnl0st speed and with relnarkable efficiency .
.1. he Inerging of the three cornponents of our
lluhtary establishnlent into a unified AnnyoLthe
United States has been acconlplished with high
Inorale and a generous spirit of cooperation
throughout. The nlen in the ranks have worked
hard and uncoInplainingly in good weather and
bad and throughout a difllcult .winter. Probably
the Inost gratifying feature of the past year has
been the quality and the attitude of the nlen
drawn into the ArnlY unde'r the Selective Service
Act. They have been a fine exaIl1ple of Inen cheer-
fUlly and earnestly perfornling the duties to ,vhich
they have been called as citizens for the security
of their govenunent. This particularly applies to
the older men for whOln this service has iInposed
the greatest sacrifice and the heaviest physical or-
deal.
'[he dealings of the War Departlnent with the
Bureau of the Budget and with the C0111nlittees
of Congress during the past year have been .with-
O~lt precedent in the evident desire of those offi-
~lals to lend every possible aid to the Departnlent
In Ineeting the situation. -
( I 939- /94 I) 37
'. .\ ,.... I
, In closing ,this repor,t it Shouldbe.srated that the 1'\
I progress achIeved dunng the past two years .could
not have .been made without the highly efficient .\
cooperation of the War Department staff and the
commanders and staffs in the field. Their cheerful
acceptance of the tremendous burdens of respon-
sibility has furnished a reassurance which cannot
be measured :n words of thanks. .
G. C. MARSHALL,
General~ United States Army,
Chief of Staff.,
Washington~ D. C.~
July I~ I94I ..
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ORGANIZA TION
l\IILITARY OPERATIONS abroad constitute a gl'eat
laboratory and proving ground for the devel?p-
TIlent and testing of organization an~ Inaten.el.
These operations have been charactenzed by In-
~reasinguse and ilnportance of armored, Inotor-
lzed and other specialized divisions and by con-
current effort for developrnent of means to coun-
ter annored (tank) divisions operating in close
coordination with air and Inotorized units from
1l10?ile striking forces of great ,speed and pow~r
wlllch so far have been unifonnly successful In
th~ir operations. We have given careful consider- :
allon to foreign Inilitary developlnents and, as a
result, ourb.
own of<Yanization is undergoing con-
~ta~lt cllange and developlllent. We do not mIn-
~mlZe the enonnous power of armored units used
In conjunction with accOlnpanying air power; but
we do not overlook the fact that the Anny of the
~ l~ited States differs in one important character-
IstIC fronl the annies of Europe. Ours Inust be an
all-purpose ArnlY as we are in an entirely different
position fronl a European nation which knows its
traditional or potential enemies and the terrain
over which it will have to fight. We must be pre~
pared to operate in the Arctic or in the tropics, in
deserts or rnountains, and the elements of our
ground forces rnust be properly balanced to meet
any contingencies. Our organization nlust be a
balanced one with arrnored, air and foot elenlents
in proper proportion to provide the rllaxinllull
flexibility.
(1939-1941) 39
_ After three years of careful. study and tests, an
. organization for a triangular infantry. division waS
approved and placed in effect in the Regular Army
during the fiscal year 1940. The square division,
adopted during the World War 'and modified sev~
eral times since, has been retained in the National
Guard.
The organization of the horse cavalry regiment
was revised as a first step in the reorganization of
the horse cavalry' division. New organizations
adopted included the horse-mechanized cavalry
.regiment designed as the reconnaissance unit of
a corps; the antitank battalion,' and the corps topo-
graphic company. In addition, approximately 100
tables of organization for other units were re~
viewed and brought up to date without ,any essen-
tial changes in organization.
Six Regular Army infantry divisions and twO
.sets of corps troops were formed during the report
period, partly by consolidations or conversions of
existing units and partly by utilization. of in-
creased personnel made available by augmenta-
tions to the Army. In addition to these large units.
a number of small units' were organized. These
~vere.used to complete battalions and regiments
and to provid~ service elements, previously lack-
ing. 'The organization of these units not only
materially increased the field efficiency of the
~rmy, but greatly facilitated the greater expan-
SIon soon to conle. The new organizations were
tested in division, corps, and Army maneuvers in
.the winter and spring of 1939-194. These ma-
40 (I939-I94I)
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ARMORED FORCE
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?ling of. one of the Regular Army' divisions;' Dur- .
lng the large .maneuvers in the Sabine Area, any' ,
Nat~onal Guard state adjutant general and 'any
National Guard division commander who had not
patticipatedas a division commander in a,corps
exercise was invited to attend the maneuvers as
observer: , .
Throughout the' fiscal year 1940,' practical
training in the' field for officers of all grade,Swas
stressed. Courses at the Command and General
Staff School and the spec~al service schools of the
arms and services were suspended February .I~t;
1940, and officers on duty there were sent to unIts
of the Army undergoing field training. :
In order to disseminate to officers and men_of
~he Army the lessons gained from the current war
l~ .Europe, steps were taken to facilitate the re- ,
VISIonof our training literature and revision of.,
all mobilization training programs; Increased ap-
propriations by Congress for' this purpose -have. '
made this possible.- - -;':
.' During the fiscal year_1941, the Army ~xtended'
Its training activity on a scale never before at-
~empted in peacetime. The. primary training ob-
Jective Was the preparation of units to take the
field on short notice at existing strength ready to
function effectIvely in combat. - ' ..
Taking advantage of the lessons learned in the
~xercises conducted by Regular Army' units dur-
Ing the preceding winter and spring; all four'
.armies c'lrried out maneuvers in the summer and
fall, of 1940, involving all continental Regular
Army and National Guard mobile forces. Progress I
(Z939-Z94z) 47 .
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maneuvers' involving" mo're than -half a million
men. ' . ,'."
oro provide means for the training of selectees,
those inducted early were assigned to Regular
Army and National Guard units. The replacement
training center prograIll of the army mobi~ization
plan wa3 initiated and as fast as constructIon was
completed, 21 cen~ers were opened. The nlajority
began operating in ~Iarch. and April,. and by J~ne
were functioning at Illaximum capacity, receIVIng
sel~c~eesfronl reception centers. At replacen:~nt
traInIng centers selectees and recruits are gIven'
basic training iI; their arm -or service for a period
of 13 week~ and then are assigned to units. The
luaximum trainee capacity of these centers is now'
ap~r.oximately 182,500. This systeIll is greatly
faCIhtating the training of the entire arnlY, "
Training in special operations was conducted
?y selected units. Two divisions trained in land-.
~n~operations, two combat teams participated in
]Oln~ exercises with the Navy' in the Caribbean
~rea, and units stationed in the snow belt special-
Ized.in winter,warfare training and tests of special
eqUIpment. - ':
Special attention has been given to air training.
Tactical squadrons in continental United States '
and overseas stations have increased 500 per' cent.,
fr~m the 1939 total. This has required additional
flY~ngpersonnel, 'likewise has accounted for,' the
?f1ginal three schools operating iri1939, expand~
lng to a total of 40 schools, 28 of which are con':
dueted through civilian, contract arrangement.
Additional flying training schools' are authorized
. (Z939-Z94I) , 49
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;:tr~dlikely by the end of the present calendar y~ar
will be in full operation. rT'welve of the flyIng
schools have been design'ated for the training of
R. A. F. Hying c;dets.
, .Pilot training has been, increased 700 per. cell;t
from the output of graduates in. 1939. It is esU-
mated that at the close of the present fiscal year,
the production of pilots for this period will be
approximately 3,400. Enlisted personnel has kept
.pace in the development, for its strengtH has in-
cr~ased six times over that existing in 1939. The
present figure of 132,0_o0 has been augmented by
nearly 10,000 flying cadets, together with perso~-
.nel from former National Guard squadrons noW
inducted into Federal service. To assure that suf-
" ficient technicians are available for combat crewS
and' ground crews, the technical schools have
stepped up their productioriof trained graduates
16 times over the output of 1939. The close of the
current fiscal year will see 20,000 graduates r.eturn
to squadrons where'their services will be largely
instrumental in the success of the Air Corps ex-
.pans ion program.
Evaluation of lessons learned from current op-
erations abroad and numerous changes in our or-
ganization and equipment have necessitated a wide
, ,revision of training literature for the Army. Sixty
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field manuals and one hundred sixty technical
:1
I':; \ manuals ivereprepared and printed during the
J ~! fiscal year. Complete revision of army extension
Iii cqurses is in progress.
. Supplemented by the facilities of the motion
J
picture industry, the Signal Corps is engaged in a
5 '. (I939-I94I)
;
compl~e~lensivetrai~ing film prod~ction prograr~.
Some eighty training films and ninety fihn strip
sU.bject~have already been completed and ,~is-
tnbuted throuo-hout the service. These visual aids
are proving
. new army.
ot
great value in the training of the
.
PERSONNEL
REGULAR ARMY
Officers: rrhe authorizedco~missioned strength
of the Regular Army at 'the close of the fiscal year
1940 was 13,637, and at the close of the fiscal year
1941, it, was 14,0 16. Under the provisions of the
A~t ?f April 3, 1939, the comlnissioned strength
wIll !ncrease to 14,490 in the fiscal year 1942, and
ContInue to increas'e annually by approximately
equal increments until the strength of 16,719 is
reached on June 30, 1949. Present plans do not
I Contemplate any additional increase in the Reg-
ular Army cOlnmissioned strength beyond that
now authorized. Increased demands for commis-
~ioned personnel will continue to be met by bring- .
Ing Reserve officers to extended active duty. _
. During the past fiscal .year there has been a re-
dIstribution of Regular Army officers in an effort
to. maintain the greatest possible number on duty
WIth the field forces and in the overseas garrisons. \
As new units have been activated and new installa-'
tions have been created, it has been necessary to
reassign Regular Army officers so as to provide a
l nUcleus 6f experienced officer personnel with these,
( I 939- I 94 I) 51 '
-=-.1
I
~i
ENLISTED RESERVE
, .
---L
to acc?mmodate the Army, -as autho~ized by the \,
S.elective Service Act and the act calling th~ Na-
tIonal Guard into federal service for a period ?f
one year. _ .
9-ua:termaster Corps Construction: This legis-
latIon Imposed upon the Quartermaster Corps the
tremendous task of housing approximately 1,4?0,-
000 Illen. As time was a major factor, cons~rucuon
was pushed vigorously throughout the wI~ter of
]940-41. Progress was hampered by excepuonally
unfavorable climatic conditions and shortages of
labor and materials. However, construction neces-
sary to house the above number of men has now.
been ac~omplished, and some 45 communities with
PopUlatIons ranging from 10,000 to 63,000 have
been COI1.structed.l\Jore than one-half of these com-
,Illunities have been erected at new camp sites,
f where initiation of 'construction ,vas dependent
, :upon land acquisition.
The developlnent of the necessary services in a
gr~~t .many cases called for the instalhition of basic
utl~ItIes at some distances frOlll the centers of popu-
latIon. The established 'policy provided. for tent
camps for National Guard units in those sections
where climatic conditions permitted such housing
for the period of. National Guard service, and for
mobilization type cantonment construction in
~ther cases. The housing for well over half a inil-
~l?~ men at new camps is approximately evenly
dIVIded between teruporary cantonments and tent
camp construction. HOllsing constructed during
the emergency at established permanent Regular
Army posts consists 1110Stlyof. cantonment con-'
(1939-1941) 55
I.,'i,',.:
r, ,
struc~ion. Existing perm~~ent~a~~ties have bee~
utilized wherever possible, and no new permane~i
,,'j housing has been authorized. ',]
, Hospitalization has been provided at the' postS
, :'.'.1\,1,:
:( and camps by enlarging existing hospitals, can:,
I,
,I
verting permanent barracks into hospitals, or b~
I::
. the erection 'of new cantonment hospitals. The
capacity of general hospitals has been increase~
approximately 10,0<;>0 beds by the c~:)l:struc~ion. 0;
9, new,' general hospItals and by addItIons to, eXlst
ing hospitals. " ,
'. . In addition to the housing and hospitalizatio J J
ne(:essary to accommodate an army of 1,400,00.
men, recreation facilities,' chapels, service clubs
hostess houses, railroad facilities necessary fo i l
their con,venience ,and comfort have been prlf.
vided. '
Corps of' Engineer Construction: In order t;i
distribute the load of construction and to assisP
in expediting the Air Corps construction progra
the transfer, from the Quartermaster Corps to th
Corps of Engineers of all construction at Air Corp
stations, Panama excepted, and all construction i
Alaska, was authorized on Novemb~r 20, 194
The authority for this transfer is contained i
Section 102, Public 781, Seventy-Sixth Congresi
approved September 9, 1940. Seventy-two project~
were transferred during the period December 1
1940-l\larch 1, 1941, and 15 additional project!
were a~signed directly to the Corps of Engine~rs.
Dunng the early part of the fourth quarter 0:
the fiscal year 1941, the Corps of Engineers wa!
respons~ble for Air Corps construction work ir
56 (I939-I94r'
: the ~otal a'~ount' of $624,465,000. The 'Corps of-
I EngIneers has been able to assume, this additional,
~onstruction load by making use of its decentral- '
IZ~d'organization of eleven divisions and fifty,
dIstricts covering the entire ~ontinental Unite~
Stat.es,Alaska, and the insul~.r possessions. In those
projects which were taken over from the Quarter-
master Corps, the continued orderly progress of
the work during the transition period was assured
by absorbing in the organization of the Corps of
Engineers a large "part of the local personnel of,
the Quartermaster Corps. ~ I ' : ....
I
b. A.ntiaircraft: Consid~rable progress has beel1
ma?~ In providing for- critical items of. modern
antIaIrcraft equipment. Funds made avaIlable. by
a~propriations for the fiscal year 1941, together
WIth.items previously provided Jar, will generally ,
provIde guns and automatic weapons, as well as the
necessary searchlights and fire control instrumen~s
for t~e 88 antiaircraft regiments, mobile and s~mI-
?1ob1Ie, and the 16 separate antiaircr~ft battahons
Included in the expanded force. ..'
The only items of this type remaInIng to be
financed to complete the requirements of the f?rce
of approximately 2,200,000 men, are some cahb~r
.50 machine.guns and mounts, 37-mm. automatIc
guns, the necessary fire control equipment for.
these weapons, and some searchlight trucks .
. The 90-mm.antiaircraft gun has been standard-
Ized, and a large number of these guns are in pro-
duction.
c. Se.acoast Defense: A modernization program
Was initiated in fiscal year 1941 to replace out-
moded armament with equipment. of the mQst
~odern type for all harbor defenses in the con-
tInental United States. The 'programs for augmen-
tation of the seacoast defenses of Hawaii and the
Panama Canal were substantially advanced in fis-
cal year 1941. .
. Funds made availab'le by appropriations for the
fIscal year 1941 will' provide essential fire control
elements and some ordnance materiel for existing
annament aid installations. Shortages in equip-
ment for the modernization progralll initiated in
fiscalyear 1941 must be financed by subsequent' ap-
(I939-I94I) 59
.- .>4!:c.',
I
.,-,------- ........... ,.!"".:
.. :::...--,~~
ii::
1j:1 I
. . ~
J! 'and Regular Army units are placed on. this list.j
j according to their probable elnployment in t~e.
,,', event of an emergency" and. according to '~~ell
t~aining needs. AJI equipment and alnulun!tl0
resources, ,whether procured from Natlon~ l
Guard, Regular Army funds, or funds not specIf-
ically appropriated to either, have been pooled"
and distribution is being Inade to both componentS,
in such a manner as to best meet ,the problems of
the present emergency. The Chief of the National,
Guard Bure~u has cooperated in every way in the
establish.ment of policies affecting the diversion of
equipment or, funds to or from the National,
Guard. . _I
.l_~_._.
, 6~_ _ _ __ ._, ( r 939- r 94I 1
with init~al requirements andq.ll1ple reserves.
Some equipment for service units under the pro-'
gram has been deferred to the fiscal ye~r 1942 .
.l\faterial progress has been made in the develop~
meq,t and acquisition of combat aircraft which. ~re
equal or ~~perior in performance and adaptabilIty
to any mIlitary planes in the world today.
l\fanufacturing plant space has ~een exp~nded
130 ~er cent to facilitate production ?f aircraft
an~ aIrcraft accessories. Actual production, mean-
whIle, was three times greater in the fiscal year
1941 than in the,fiscal year 1939.
NATIONAL GUARD
The National Guard has made more substantial
~ains in training, personnel, and equip~ent dur-
l~g .the fiscal years 1940 and 1941 than during a?y
Slml~ar peacetime period in its history. Upon In-
ductIon it provided 20,006 officers, 216 warrant
officers, and 282,805 enlisted men. The following
~omparative figures illustrate the steady increase
In the total strength of the actual Guard:
June 30,1939 199,491.
June 30, 1940 241,612
June 30, 1941 303,027.
For the fiscal year 1940, armory drill periods
were increased from 48 hours to 60 hours, and
seven days were added to the normal period of field
training at or near home stations. A resulting im-
provement in the combat efficiency of the Guard
~vasnoted during the maneuvers of the First Army
In August, 1939. "
(I939-I94I) 63
I
. ., '. ' e
'Plans had long been establIshed for the entranc
of the.' Nationai Guard into the active military ser
vice of the United States in the event of a natIona,
elnergency declared by Congress. Pressure of inter:
national events made, it apparent that the. Na'
tional Guard would be used even though the
specific emergency should not exist as legally CoIl
templated. ;
- Joint Resolution No. 96, approved August 27'
194, authorized the President to order the Na:
tional Guard into serVice' for twelve consecutive,
Inonths. Executive orders designated units to be
.inducted in successive increments commencing o~
Septelnber 16, 1940,' with four infantry divisio~s'i
eightee'n coast artillery units, and four Air Corp:
squadro~s, and continuing until the last divisiot1'
1
entered active service on' March 5, 194 I, and the
last unit on June 23, 1941. By the end of the fisca!
year, all of the National Guard was in active serv'
l
l~e except for one new infantry battalion and~
~lght n.ewly organized observation sql~adrons. The,
inductIon dates and stations of NatIOnal Guard
units are indicated on' Chart 9. lI
While this induction was being planned and
put into effect, other activities were initiated and'
continued to perfect the training and organization'
of the Guard for prospective tasks. Training was:
intensified. There was an attendance of 802 officerS
and 261 enlisted men at;Anny Service Schools, andl
733 officers and 402 enlisted Inen at temporary;
sch?oIsand canlps ?f instruction. !his attendance'l
whIch w~s. approxImately four times the normal,
quota, utIlIzed the facilities at the various schools
64' . . - . (I935'-I9P!
11 ....... _
to capa~ity. For the fiscal year 1941 th~ annual
field traInIng period was again increased from 15
to 21 days and an additional period of seven days
was."authorized; the number of armory drills was
a~aln increased; there was nation-wide participa-
tIon in the maneuvers held by all four field armies
during the summer of 1940
To make the character of our forces conform
~ot~e new demands of modern war, many reorgan-
IZatIons, conversions and increases were made
prior to federal indu'ction. Four National Guard
cavalry divisions were broken up. Sevent.een cav-
alry regiments were converted into 7 horse-mec~-
I anlzed cavalry regiments, 7 field artillery regI-
I ments: 7 coast artillery regiluents :and s.epar~te
battahons, and one antitank battahon. EIght In-
fantry regiments were converted into 4 field artil-
ler~ regiments, - 8 coast artillery regituents, one
antitank battalion and one luilitary police bat""
t r '
I a IOn. Tank companies were withdrawn from in-
fantry divisions and formed into tank battalions.
IAntitank units were expanded and increased in
! number. Nine new observation squadrons '\Tere
I organized. " - .
I Officer allotments were increased from mainte-
! nance strength to equal Regtilar Army peace
Istrength. The .increase in strength authorized by
i executive order of September 6, 1939, was virtu-
ally complete at the beginning of the fiscal year.
I As a result of increases in officer strength, con-
Iversion of units, and officer losses for physical and
IOther reasons; a great Inany appointnlents and
promotions were made in the National Guard
i (Z939-Z94 I) 65
I
I.
-~~I
. .1
throughout the country. This necessitated exa~:j
ination and formal procedure for fede:a~ re~ogIldl
tion, and the magnitude of the task IS IndIcate i
by the fact that the National Guard Bureau cOrll.
pl~ted action on cases as follows: :
July, 1940 ......... 1089 January, 1941 3521 1
&
its National Guard is in active federal service.
Under this authority, and by virtue of existing and
new state legislation, these forces were created
under such designations as State Guard, Defense
Force, Reserve Militia Active Militia, Reserve
~lilitary Force, Home 'Guards, Protective Force,
Home Defense Force Defense Guard, State De-
f
ense Corps, Reserve ' Defense Corps. More than
three-fourths of the states have raised suchforces.
Rifles and bayonets have been made available
for issue in quantities equal to fifty pe~ cent of the
normal National Guard allotment to each state,
a.nd training literature has been issued. Ammuni-
tion, cartridge belts, mess kits, and other items of
field equipment have been made available for sale
to the states, while procurement of uniforms has
be:n left to the states alone. By June 30, 1941,
UnIts had been organized "\fith a total strength of
85,587.
ORGANIZED RESERVES
. The activities of "thiscomponent show a marked
Increase throughout the two years c~vered by this
repOrt. Never before has the Officers' Reserve
Corps been afforded stICh splendid opportunities
for training in peacetime.
During the fiscal year 1940 appropriations made
POssible the training.of a greater number of offi-
cers for'14-day periods than previously. The num-
ber of students taking 3-month courses at service
Schools ,vas three times greater than it had been
the year before. In addition, about 2,500 officers
(I939-194~) 67
were trained for 28-day periods with units of the
Third Army during the spring of 1940.
During 1939-40, opportunities for extended ~c'
tive duty for periods of six' months or more ~lt~
the Air Corps and other Regular Army unItS
including opportunities offere~ under the ThOJ11i
ason Act-were expanded dunng the last half 0 i
the fiscal year, and on June 30, 1940, more thaIlI
2,700 Reserve officers were on such duty. I
Even greater strides were made during the fiscal'
year 1941. The passage of Public Resolution No.
96, Seventy-Sixth Congress, which became effective
August 27, 1940, permitted the ordering of Re'
serve officers to extended active duty, with OJI
without their consent, for a period of twelve coIl'
secutive months. Pursuant to this authority thel
number of Reserve officers on active duty h~si
steadil y increased, and on J tine 30, 1941, approxl,l
mately 55,000 Reserve officers, or about 55 % of
those eligible, were on active duty. These officers,l
have been used to meet the need for additionall
officers in carrying out the current military expan'
sion and wherever possible have been assigned as,
replacements, thereby making additional RegUlarl
Army officers available for troop duty.
Fourteen-day training was discontinued, except,
in isolated cases, as the opportunities for bringing
Reserve officers to doty f9r extended periods,l
elirninated the need for this type of trailJing.
Although the eligible strength. showed no ma'
terial increase during either of the fiscal years,
greater effectiveness of the Officers' Reserve Corps
has been attained through improved training op'
68 (I939-I941
POrtu~~ties and physical ;;andards. An i.ncre~s~of.
appr:oximately 1 o~ over previous years In ongIn,!l1
appointments fromothe Reserve Officers' Training
Corps was a contributing factor. This inc~ease was
offset by a corresponding decrease of app0111t,?ents
from .civillife as a result of a general suspensIon of
appOIntments from this source imposed at the close
0. the calendar year 1939. In addition, a classifica-
tIon system, which was set up during t~e past y~ar, \
has made readily available detailed InformatIon
pertaining to the Officers' Reserve Corps along
SUch lines as civil pur.suits of th~ .individual,
progress of training,. and other statIstIc~1 data.
yoluntary training performed through the pur-_
S~lItof courses of instruction of the Army Exten-
~lon Courses and attendance at troop schools was
~nc~e~sed,resulting in a better preparation of the
In~IVIdual for entering upon a tour of extend~d
actIve duty. Improvelnent in all phases was satIs-
fact?ry with possibilities of further progress as the
avaIlable facilities (lre augmented. .
UNITED STATESMILITART ACADEMr
Legislation for the fiscal years 1937 and 1938
appropriated funds for the acquisition of approxi-
mately 6,068 acres of land. Of this alnount, the
War Department has acquired title to 2,533 acres.
At the end of the fiscal year 1941, the renlaining
land-approximately 3,535 acres-"\vas in process of
acquisition by condemnation proceedings through
the Department of Justice, and it was expected
that the greater part of this land would be secured
before January I, 1942.
~1939-I94I ) 69
\ .i
.RESERVE OFFICERS' TRAINING CORPS
The applications for new R.O.T.C. units in i
~
~
,'I
'placed on practical training, including methods'~
instruction, in order to prepare the graduate 01
the. imlnediate command and instruction of sllla!.
unIts. "
\ "
~;~;v::::~e:o::~:::
;~~:ec::::e
During the period covered by this report, the
War Departlnent continued to carryon its assigned,l
missions pertaining to the administration and
- supply of the Civilian Conservation Corps. These;
. diversified activities have been- accomPlisheo,
pro111ptly and efficiently.' .
The authorized enrolled strength of the CorpSi
was 300,000, composed of 272,800 juniors and,
27,200 veterans. These enrollees were allocated,
al1long 1,500 companies, 1,364 of which were made
up of juniors and 136 of veterans. The 1,500
camps, each having a capacity of 200 enrollees,'
were distributed throughout the United States,
with sonle located in every state, as well as in the
2
7 /, ( I 939- I 94 I)
i
I
77
PART TWO
BIENNIAL REPORT
of the
Chief of Staff of the United States Army
(1941-1943) . 81
Dear Mr. Secretary: ..
-_ ...
... !
Report covering the period from July 1, 1941, to.
June 30, 1943. . d'
In my first report, which covered the peno ~
between July 1, 1939, to June 30, 1941, the evel!ts
Were treated in two phases. The first phase .I
cluded the fall of France and covered the peno ~ dl
of national uncertainty as to the influence of thf
war upon the United States. The second phase,~i
commencing with the Battle of Britain and ter'
minating with the German declaration of ,~arj
agains~ Russia, was conspicuous for a grOWlI1
national appreciation of the seriousness of ~hfj
international situation and was marked by a IIm"1
ited peacetime mobilization of the cit.izen ,army, ,I'
82 (Z94Z-Z943) J
~e? and resources to check the momentum of the
tIS assaults, while establishing protected lines
o communication around the world, and at the
same time initiating a vast expansion of our mili-
tary and naval establishments. (Chart 10.) *
~emocratic governments devote their resources
fhlI?arily to improving the standard of living of
. elr people. Therefore, when attacked by na-
~Ions which have concentrated on preparations
or a War of conquest, the initial successes inevi-
ta?ly will go to the aggressors. This was the case
~lth the democracies of Western Europe' ~nd
ater on was found true in the case of the UnIted
Sta.tes. Approximately eight months were re-
q~Ired by this country, acting in collaboration
WIthits Allies, to accumulate the munitions, train
the initial forces, and then to transport them to
theaters. of operations where they could be em-
plOyedin offensive action against the enemy. This
phase of the great emergency ended in August,
194.2, with the successful assault on the Japanese
POsItionsat Guada1canal and Tulagi in the Solo-
lUonIslands. i '-
84 (I94I-I943J
I
ti'.on Intervened to save the situation. Under the
I
l
cent per divisiQn)4 to permit them to be traine
2
9 (I94I-I943
~r employment wherever the defenses of the
est~rn Hemisphere might require, and to make
certaIn that we had in the Panama Canal Zone,
I-Iawaii and Alaska ,sufficient garrisons and arma-
~ent to prevent a hostile landing. All this took
tune, and time was ,vhat we lacked. .
. Deficiencies in arms and equipment especially
~n ammunition and airplanes required for the
Immediate defense of the Western Hemisphere,:II=
~he Panama Canal Zone, .Alaska, an~ for the Re~u-
ar Army and National Guard with supporting
troops, were so serious that adequate reinforce-
ments for the Philippines at this time would have
left the United States in a position of great peril
should there be a break in the defenses of Great
Britain. It was not until new troops had been
trained and equipped and Flying Fortresses,
fi?~ter planes, tanks, guns and slllall arms amlllU-
~ltion began to COllle off asseinbly lines on a par-
tIal quantity production basis in the late SUllllller
of 1941 that reinforcelllents for our most distant
OUtpost could be provided without jeopardy to
COntinental United States.
i' .. Vitally important in the strategic defense of the United States
t~ Brazil which offers the nearest point of approach to this con-
2 nent from the East. It is also vital to the security of the Panama
t al~~l that the various avenues of approach through Brazilian
d~r~ltory be in friendly hands and adequately guarded. The tra-
pitlonal friendship between Brazil and the United States and com-
tete agreement between the two peoples on matters of interest
dO tbe \Vestern Hemisphere has had an important bearing on our
a efense ~reparations. (:Iose cooperation betwee~ the Unite.d States
z.7d H.raZlI was crystallized through the formatIOn of a JOlllt Bra-
s~-Unlled States Defense Commission in May, 1942. This commis-
Ion has since been working on mutual defense plans and matters
related to our common w~r eft'ort.
(I 94 I. I 94 3 ) .
93
As an example of the degree of our shortages,
the necessity for disapproving the requests ~f th~
Government of the Netherlands East IndIes
cited. After urgent requests through the variot1~
channels the representatives of that governmetl
fin~lly called on me personally in the latter part
of August, '94', and made a moving appeal fori l
among .other things, an initial allotment 0J
25,000,000 rounds of small arms caliber .30 a~l
munition. They stated that they feared the d1S'j
integration of their ground forces unless at least
a small amount of ammunition was promrtlYt
issued. We had an extremely critical situatlo/I
here in the United States but the dilemma 0t
these fine people was so tragic in the face of tbe
Japanese threat that it was finally decide? tOl
accept the hazard of reducing the ammUnitIOn
reserve for the troops in movement to Icela?d. tO
an extent. which would permit seven mIlh~~I
rounds bemg turned over to the Dutch. Four mill
lion of these rounds were to be made quicklY
available by shipment from Manila, replacemeIl(j
shipments being started from San Francisco iJ1
mediately. (Incidentally, seven million round~
was to be the daily delivery of a plant which was
due to get into production in early October, b?t
that, was to be too late for the gathering storm 111
the Far EasL)j
On all the fighting fronts the Allies were in ~
desperate situation due to lack of adequate mate:
riel while facing an enemy who possessed a~
abundance of the lnost modern equipment COIl~
ceived at that tilne. The trying problenl of the
94 (I94I-I94J)
.~
'Y~r Department was to meet the urgent neces-
SItIes.of critical fronts without jeopardy to the
iecunty of continental United States. l\10ney in
arge appropriations had been made available but
not available was the time in which to convert this
money into munitions ready for issue.
b T~e Lend-Lease Act was passed in March, 1941,
Ut It was not until the latter part of that year
that it began to be effective in its results. An agree-
~e.n.t for aid to Russia in cooperation. with .the
bflhsh was implemented in October and was Just
ec~ming effective when we entered the war .as a
bellIgerent. In spite of our situation, it was vital -
that We help both Russia and the United King-
~orn for out: own security. This. matter ",:as con-
~dered so important that Lend-Lease aId con-
tInued throughout the crisis of our entrance into
the War without notable interruptions except in
the case of a few critical items.5 .
CHANGING SITUATION
GLOBAL WAR
102 (I94I-I943!
I
ground.. . d
.(By the .end o~ January, Japanese troops ha e
seIzed the Important oil center of Tarakan on th
northeast coast of Borneo, captured Rabaul ~nd
Kavieng in the Bismarck Archipelago and Kleta
on Bougainville Island in the Solomons, were
rapidly approaching Singapore* from the no.r~h,
a':ld controlled the sea and air routes to the P!l1hP i
pInes. They stood along a 4,00o-mile frontler. 0
the Dutch East Indies and the l\lelanesian Barner
with their f?rces in position to threaten the- re-
maining Dutch possessions, Australia and the
islands to its north and east.)
The difficulties of the supply situation 011
Bataan, under the Japanese blockade, were greatly
aggravated by the fact that thousands of civi~ians
accompanied the army into the Bataan Peninsula .
.The number/ of people to be supplied quis:klY
forced a reduction of the entire comn1and to half
rations. Efforts were iInlnediate1y initiated to or-
ganize b.ockade running from the N ethe:l~nds
East IndIes and Australia and to carry medIcInes,
Singapore fell to the Japanese on February 15, 1942 ..
10'1 (I94I-I943)
speCialfuses' and othe'r 'criticallnunitions
ll1 .' ,
by"sub-
t anne. The blockade r~nning, financed ..from
S~e funds placed at the disposal of. the C.hIef of
aff by Congress, involved many dIfficultIes; for
example, it was found that the small ship owners
and crew Inembers approached in Java, l'imor,
~nd New Guinea would not accept checks on our I
r ShOrt.ly after-
flag of truce- passed through the front
ilne thIs morning, hostilities ceased for the most part
R' Bataan .. At about 10 o'clock this morning General
lng was sent .,
Illa d
for to confer with the Japanese cam-
I n er. He has not returned, as of 7 0' clock p.m., nor
nas result of conference been disclosed. Since the fall of
Cataan the hostile air force has renewed its attack on
n orregidor. This island was heavily bombed this after-
Oon but has suffered no damage of military conse-
qUence.
.......
Early in !943, the northeast coast of New Guinea
Wasfinally cleared of the enemy by American ~nd
AUstralian troops under the command of LIeu-
tenant General Robert L. Eichelberger, as far
nOrth as Buna, but only after he had been sys-
tematically rooted out of his foxholes along the
beaches and destroyed by the determined assaults
of our men. Success in this campaign is all the - ~~I
EUROPEAN THEATER
(I 94 1-1943) . lIS I~
III
the Southwest Pacific, largely to garrison Ne~
Caledonia. It therefore Was not possible to. se~
I more than a single division to ,Ireland until t e
folloWing summer. .
Steps were immediately taken to build up in the
United King.d?m a strong American !1ir forc
. notably precIsIon bombers. These unIts woul
afford additional protection to the British IsleS
d
against ariy invasion attempt.
The movement of United States troops to the
United Kingdom utilized our shortest line of c~I1I'
munications overseas and effected a concentratIOl1
of British, Canadian and American forces .which,
with the suPPOrt of the powerful metropolita~
Royal Air Force, forced tfie enemy to employ addl'
, tional troops in northwestern France, thereby re'
ducing the strength he could employ elsewhere.
In the latter part of January, 1942, the first
. convoy of our troops arrived in Northern Ireland.
The complicated transportation, construction and
administrative problems were solved with t!'e
close' cooperation of all the British agenCieS
concerned.
By June -the gathering strength of United
States forces in the United Kingdom made it ~ec'
essary to establish a headquarters and organlza-
tio~ for a EJiropean The".ter of Operations,: and
Major General (now General) Dwight D. Elsen'
hower Wasplaced in command. ..
The United States Army Air F~rces assault 011
, the continent of Europe was launched on July 4.
1942, when six American aircraft and crews par-
ticipated in a Royal Air Force attack on tar-
116 (I94I-I943)
tetsomber
in Holland. The combined American~British
offensive against the continent of Europe
tOday gives prolnise of being a decisive factor in
~he ultimate destruction of the German citadel. ~t '
as for its objectives the reduction of German aIr
Com~at strength to a virtual impotenc~; t~e dis-
rUption of vital elements of the enemy s hnes of
c~mmuni"cations; the progressive destruction and
dIslocation of the Gernlan 111ilitary, industrial and
e~ononlic system; and by the resultant psycholo:
gI~al impact on the German people, the under-
llllning of their nlorale and their willingness to
CO~tinue to support the war. effort. Thus the
objective of the combined homber offensive is the
elinlination of both the Gennan ability and will
to Continue to "\vage war. .
"tnn
.which permits small specific targets to be singled
out for destruction. The viplence of the Genna?
fighter plane reaction to our daylight attacks ~~
convincing evidence of the deadly effect of preel
I'" sion bombing. The enemy must find a counter t.o
this technique or 'accept the emasculation of hlS
.~ .i
industries and his fighter command. b-
I
Allied operations to cope with German SU f
marine activities furnish an excellent example 0d
British and American cooperation, coordInate
to achieve maximum results. There are three pos-
sible types of offensive action against sUbmari',l~s;
that is, to sink them at sea, to destroy the factone
which build and equip them, and to attack the
bases from which they operate. Factories and
bases may be. rendered inoperative either by 3
night mass attack to effect general destruction 011
the area or by daylight precision attacks against
vital utilities such as power plants, fuel supplY
installations or special repair facilities. . d
Reports during the past months have menti~le
with increasing frequency air attacks agallls:
Lorient, St. Nazaire, Brest, and LaPallice, al
V-boat bases on the Westcoast of France. The pre-
cision attacks have been aimed against critical
points, the destruction of which render the gen-
.eral installations ineffective, a particularly impor-
tant procedure Where the docks and other vital
installations have been protected by heavy con-
crete overhead cover. The night bombing attacks
carried out by the British have involved loads of
over 1,000 .tons dropped in a single operiltio~
with the effect of devastating general service facilt~
118 (I94I-I943)
ties ' k'
efli . and of shattering the morale and wor lng
. Clency of the personnel operating the subma-
~lne bases. At the same time heavy attacks h~ve
I se~n made day and night against the sUblnarll;e
hhlpyards at Vegesack (near Bremen) and \VI1-
~e1mshaven, and against the Essen, Dusseldorf,
lannheim, Karlsruhe and other industrial areas
producing component parts for submarine~.
~hese bombing operations, together 'with the
f~tIon of the Anti-Submarine Command and AI-
led destroyers and escort vessels~appear to be in
processof driving the submarine from the seas.
Experience over the European continent has
demonstrated the soundness of the tactical doc-
trines of our air forces and of the basic design of
the~r aircraft. Notable early examples were raids
~galnst Vegesack and Wilhelmshaven during
dlarch, 1943, in which 180 of our heavy bombers
bestroyed over 80 German fighters with a loss of
Utfiye of our own planes. These raids effectively
CUtOut of action for a period of many months the
egesack plaint and administered crippling dam-
age to the naval installations at Wilhelmshaven.
E: Our air assaults on Germany and northwestern_
urope have grown heavier a~d heavier with the
Constantly increasing strength of the 8th Air Force
operating out of th~ United Kingdom. More re-
cently it has been possible to coordinate these
~tacks closely with operations using bases in
orth Africa. The enforced concentration of the
Germans' most experienced fighter pilots in north-
'Vestern.Europe had an important bearing on air.
/194 1.1943) llg
Operations during the final ba'ttle in TUliisia aI1d
on the situation in Russia." . . js'
The bUild-up of depots. airfields and adnu.11d
trative services for our operations in the Unite f
Kingdom has involved a tremendous program 00
shippi?g, cons.truction, and the orgaJ.lization of ~o
extenSIVeservice command. These vital factor~ 0
modern war are time-consuming in preparatl0
and impose a heavy burden on our air an? ocefe 1
transportation facilities, but they provide ~ .
solid foundation which is an imperative.xequ~rel
Inent in conducting the specialized and technlca
warfare of the present day. Hi
. On May 10, 1943, following the unfortun~tl
aIrplane accident which resulted in the death 0
Lieutenant General Frank M. Andrews, coJ1l;
and
Ill of the Enropean Theater of Operations,~
assllll1ed ~by Lieutenant General Jacob L. Devel .
-j
DIPLOMATIC NEGOTIATIONS
I
I
pulsed on November
. 1'3
0
30th. Strong Axis counter'
attacks with tanks forced Allied withdrawals frol1l I
(I94I-I94})
I
Jebourba, but similar enemy aggressiv~ action
rlr~eted against Medjez-e1-Bab was successfully
I
i eSlSted.The short and easily maintained air and
Sea Ii.~es 0 f communlcat::.on
l' .. b etween S..lleI y an.d
f UnISlapermitted the rapid build-up of the AXIS
aorees.The nearest ports of Allied entry at Bone
Tn.;; Philippeville were of very limited capacity.
th e enemy's greatest advantage, however, lay In
e possession of all-weather airfields, as the devel-
~Prnent of the rainy season for a time rendered
gh~er-plane support of our advance troops im-
ihsSlble. Difficulties of .supply became so serious
i at active operations were practically suspended
n
r .early December. Meanwhile the enemy rapidly
elnforced his positions which assumed the char-
:ct er of a bridgehead protecting the Bizerte- Tunis
irea and extending southward to cover the bases
~to the coastal plain leading to Sousse, Sfax, and
thabes. Medjez-el-Bab remained the key point of
e Allied position.
Of In the midst of this campaign, the assassination
tv Admiral Darlan created a political crisis which
asIllet by the action of the French North-African.
~ov,ernorsin designating General Giraud as Dar-
n s SUccessor. -
FALL OF TUNISIA
j
H
11 Eisenhower radioed. the following comments .
. 'c
The air attacks of this period provided a .claS~.
example of strategic and tactical use of air powe
Allied air forces over a long period of time ha~ J
studied every aspect of the enemy air trans1.'0J
activity across the Sicilian Straits. They awal~~o
,... ,
the moment to catch a maximum concentrat! 0
," of transpOrt aircraft on the Tunisian or Siciha.
fields and to strike When the enemy was in grea\
t need of this air transport service. On Apil
est
5 h the oPPOrtunity developed and air attac..
of consistent intensity Were launched on the all)
6
13 . (I94 I-I94J
~~OlU~s of Sicily and Tunisia, resulting in the de-
uetIon of over 150 enemy airplanes on. th.e
ground and 50 more shot down in the air; AXIS
fOrts and shipping were also heavily attacked.
~ all, during a period of 14 days, 147 transport
~ anes and 31 vessels, large and small, we~e danl-
fed or. dest!oyed. The suddenne~s of thIS c~m.
~ ete and vIolent rupture of AXIS COmmUl1lCa-
tlO~s with their Tunisian forces undoubtedly
calUeas
aCt' a surprise
.. , ..upset
, their plans for delaying
IOns and the defense of the Cape Bon Penin-
~~la,and precipitated the. collapse of the German
d Italian forces.
thThe 'advance of the British Eighth A~myup
.e eoast pinched out the II Corps whIch was
\Vlthdrawn and started on an extremely difficult
~ovement across the, rear of the British F~rst
forrny to reappear on th~left flank of the AllIed
rees. General Patton, who had commanded the
horps during the operation concerned with the
reaking of the l\lareth Line, was withdrawn in
~rder to go ahead with the plans for the expedi-
IOn to'Sicily, and l\lajor General (now Lieuten-
h~t General) Omar N. Bradley, who had been
.Is deputy, assumed cOffilnand.
" ~ecognizing the weakness of the .broad river
.t leys within the bridgehead, ,Von Arnim heav- .
~Y.rnined all possible avenues of mechaniiedap-
aroac~. By the 20th of April the II Corps was
~tacklng across the mountainous terrain north
1\fedjez-el-Bab, clearing the way for an arm-'
~red thrust into the. Tine River Valley which
(esUlted in the fracture of the Axis position. On
/941-1943) 137
feet meant an immediate increase ofshipP~
equivalent to Some 240 vessels. A Fren<;h N b'
had been reborn, celebrating its birthday by t ~
capture of 48,719 prisoners following a deep pe
etration of the enemy's position. American tro~
had demonstrated their battle efficiency and :
~ined. a wealth of experience which co.uld aJ
dIssemmated throughout' the army. AllIed. u
forces had successfully demonstrated a technlq
involVing effective coordination with groUV
forces and the strategic application of air powe
Unity of Allied effort, command and staff, ~
been demonstrated to the world in a most CO I'
vincing manner, as evidence of the gI;owing col
centration of power which will sweep' the enetJ1
out of control of the European continent:19
MIDDLE EAST
ASIATIC THEATER
OPERATIONS IN ALASKA
149
SUMMARY
Reviewing briefly the military situation as "'d
find it on July I, 1943, it will be remember:~
that our entry into war was marked by a ~ucche
sion of serious reverses, at Pearl Harbor, m t ..
Philippines and through the Malaysian Arc hIt
pelago. It was a time for calm courage and st.ou
t!
a,
resolution on the part of the people of the Umt~ d
f' States. With our Pacific Fleet crippled and t e
Philippines overwhelmed at the outset, we we~f
forced to watch the- enemy progressively en~ .
our resistance to his advances. One year ago t ~
German offensive in Russia was sweeping through
the Donetz Basin, jeopardizing the whole -of sout .
Russia and the Caucasus and ominously menaC
ing the Allied positions ip the Middle East, par'
ticularly the oil supply at Abadan on which the
naval forces in the eastern Mediterranean, th.e
Indian Ocean and Australia depended, in addl'
tion to the air and ground motorrequireme?~
in those theaters. Rommel's Afrika Korps WIt.
selected Italian troops had the British with thelr
backs to Cairo, threatening the lifeline of the
British Empire. Our successes in the Coral Sea
and at Midway and the repulse of the Japanese
forces in the Aleutians had not prevented the
Ja~anese from carving out a vast empire frolll
whIch they threatened India, Australia and our
position in the Pacific. Just a year ago also the
ability of the United States to transport its power
in s~pplies, I.nunitions and troops across the ~t.
lantlc was bemg challenged by sUbmarines whICh
15 (I94I-I943)
~h.a
s~ngle month had sunk 70o,~OO gross tons of
!
"I
Ipplng.. .,' ,
-julyi. 1943, finds the United States.Army-and .~
Navy united ao-ainst the Axis powers In purpose
~~d in operati~n, a unity shared when the ~ccai.
N n. delnands by the British Commonwea l t 1 0
1II
1\
figahtI?ns.the Chinese, Dutch, Ffr~ncdhanddother ~
. tIng elements among our nen s an sup- '~~
l
forced us to organize special units and ship the~
abroad without the desired degree of prepa!a.
tion. Fortunately, the development of the traIl1
.lUg program. the adequacy of ammunitIOn. .. an(I1
1 the -influence of officers who have been returnC(
I to the United States after participation in C01I1i
~. bat have given us for the first tin1e a reserve- 0
: trained units ready for dispatch to the v~riot
I theaters as rapidly as shipping becomes avallab e:
Another factor is now operating to our ad:an
I
j
:: tage. We are reaching the end of the expansH~n,
I ;already it has been possible to reduce many tral~'
ing installations to a purely maintenance bas;S
to furnish replacements for the present strengt.1
of the army. It also has been practicable. a~~ 11
is h.ighly desira~le. to .lengthen the basic tr~mJll~
penod for soldl(:~rs and to extend the perIod 0
training for officer candidates; and most ilnp~r'
tant of all. it is no longer necessary to drain ~nIt:
of their best officers and -men to furnish traul,ec
cadres for new organizations or students for the
officer candidate and technical schools. In other
words, General l\fcNair and his people are noW
, free for the first time to concentrate their atten-
tion on polishing up the existing lnilitary ma-
chines and developing them to the highest de'
gree of efficiency in preparation for the great bat-
tles to COlne.
AIR FORCES
L
. .
trall1l11g,suppl .
y and preparatIOn of war p laOs
.b-
sound principles and policies had been esta f
lished in preparation for just such an emergelrr.
as arose. \Vhen the \Var Department was re f.
ganized, an increased proportion of air forceo
g
ficers were assigned to the General Btaff an,l. a1
the same time it was divorced from operano s
activities except in the case of the \Var PlaI1
Division. The latter group became the Opc:t
tions Division of the General Staff, charged WIt
t he
preparation of strategic plans and the coor;
dination of operations throughout the world. 7e.
th~ Army it prepares the proposals and the. d
taIled plans for the Joint and the ConlbIIle
Chiefs of Staff. Its divisions are in direct contact
'. w
~lth every' the~ter of war. Its members are CO d
tInually travehng by air to secure first-han
knOWledgeof local conditions and requiremen :
Their participation in bombing raids, in Ian.
ing operations and in the fighting has result,cd \0
d
a growing casualty list reflecting the intunate
Contacts they maintain with conditions in tbe
field. The practice has been established wherebY
members of the Operations Division serve. a
period of duty in each theater" in exchange WJth
representatives of the staff of theater commanders
who serve a corresponding tour of duty in. Wa:
Depa~tment Operations Division. Under the d~'
rection of 1\Iajor General T. T. Handy and hIS
predecessors, Major General L. T, Gerow an~
General Eisenhower, the Operations Division 0
the "Var Department General Staff has been a
tower of strength to the undersigned in the diree'
160 (I94I-I94J)
tion and. coordination of our military effort.
An outstanding feature of operations in the
present war has been their amphibious character
\vhich requires close coordination with the Navy 'I','
nOtonly in the protection furnished to t.he trans- .j
P?rts en route to landing beaches but In "actual ~
(lIr, antiaircraft and <Tunfire'support of landing JI
parties after the troops leave the ships. In trans- ;~
POrting more than two million Inen of the Anny :t
~~ersea5 throu<Th subrnarine-infested waters, the .J
i~avyhas livel' up to its traditional record. .'
The developtnent of the powerful war a.rmy
ff today was rnade possible by the detennuI.ed
~
~
ea~ership of the Constitutional Commander-In-
ChIef, and the wisdorn and firm integrity of pur-
Poseof the Secretary of \Var. It has been depend-
ent Upon vast appropriations and the strong sup-
!,
POrt of the Congress, and the cooperation of I
I
TlInerous governrnent agenc~es. Individuals, civ-
I Ian organizations-patriotic and commercial-
all have given strong support to the Army pro-
gram. Outstanding has been the courageous ac-
ceptance of sacrifice by the families of those men
\vho have already fallen in the struggle. .
. The end is not yet clearly in sight but victory
l~ C:rtain. In 'every emergency the courage, ini-
~IatIve,and spirit of our soldiers and their young
eaders and of our pilots and their crews have
been an inspiration at the n10rnent, and a com-
plete assurance of the final victory to come.
TVashington D. C.
J G. C. l\IARsHALL,
JUly I I943.
J Chief of Staff.
\ 161
L
PART THREE.
NOTES
L
NOTES
I, Battle Maneuvers Realistic
s'These maneuvers are conducted under the. supervi.
/on of the Army Ground Forces, the divisions in train. f1
tJ:
g ~eing organized into army corps and armies. Real-
IS emphasized and wherever possible they are con-
.f'
~I
t (1941-1943) 165
, .
formations with command groups capable of d1. f.ectio~
pi'_
the operations of from two to eirrht such units. ThIS ireD
mits rapid assembly of exactly ~he type un~ts req~ziJl
for any type operation and is the basis for organl
supporting troops for task forces.
l
, ' i
' theSe
concept for the prosecution of the war. Based ~n tiv ,
considerations a plan which set forth .the obJe~,i
es
allotted the available means, and prescnbed CoIllr ''&,
arrangem~nts w~s deyeloped an? subseq.uen~ly a~p do tbe
'II!II - by the Jomt ChIefs of Staff. ThIS planmng mdu d!'lel
ri clearing
Georgia. of the Japanese from Rendova Island an .1
-t ! .
I,
,',
,.. ,
'j,
'4. Bomber Attacks Effective - 'ro~I
."
~H
Large. scal~ ~aylight rai~s reql.!ire unlimited
for precIse aImmg from lUg'll altItudes. Days of ~ tpe
ce~;i'"
':1
it~d ceilings are rare in Europe, particularly In tbe
wmter, and, in order to avoid a waste of good dayS, e 9
development of -accurate weather forecasting ~ec~ to
matter of extreme importance. It has been desIra b'
build up bombing missions of 300 planes or more '0&C
jl cause of the strength of the German fighter force
:II the antiaircraft defenses on the western front. By jtllrtb
1, 1943, over 1,000 heavy bombers were based In si~e
/I
II
United Kingdom. During the last week of July, rOb
American missions, averaging almost 300 heavy bOrer-
II ers each,' were flown, all but one against Germany; fort
haps the greatest tribute to the heavy bomber ehe~
was the enemy's recognition of its importance. 1 ref
attacks caused him to increase his production of figJ \0'
aircraft at the expense of bombers, to allocate neW P ".
duction largely to the western front, to withdraW 'ae
perienced single-engine fighter pilots from the RUSSI f1vo
and Mediterranean fronts for the defense of G~rrn~h;
and later to withdraw fighter aircraft from RUSSIa.du
net result was that the Germans were unable to con 'Idcl
any sustained offensives this summer in Russia or bU\o
up sufficient strength in the central Mediterranean
oppose the Allied offensive,.
23. A id to Russia
b 'fhe following assistance has been rendered to Russia
Y the United States in the form of military equipment:
oVer 3,000 airplanes, 2,400 tanks, 109,000 sub-machine
gUns, 16,000 Jeeps, 80,000 trucks, 7,000 motorcycles,
130:000 field telephones and 75,000 tons of explosives,
\vhlCh have actually arrived in Russia with a great
lllany other items of munitions as well as foodstuffs and
raw material.
24. lVomen's Army Auxiliary CorJ)s
. On May 14, 1942, the President signed the bill estab-
lishing the 'Vomen's Army Auxiliary Corps. The basic
Purpose of this organization was to utilize the services
of Women wherever possible and thus release a corre-
(194I-I943) 177
Spondmg . number of soldiers
. . for combat duty..
. Although
d by
the immediate authorized strength was estabhsh~ bad
the President as 25,000, by November the W AA tb
justilied
0 its purpose to such an exte~a tha~ the streftrng
of 15 ,000 Was authorized and an mtenslve recru
Campaign was undertaken. fori
The lirst W Mc training center was open~d :'-t fOO
Des Moines, Iowa, On JUly 20, 1942, and wahm sl%
weeks a basic training course for auxiliaries and ~'nt'
Weeks' course for officer candidates established.
that time training centers have been establis!ted at foCI
bat
tona Beach, Florida, Fort Oglethorpe, Georgia, and
Devens, Massachusetts. (Chart 22.) I1lp'
The training which the Women receive in the~e caTh'
prepares them to take their place in Army hfe.. nl-
.four weeks' basic training course is. designed to m
C
cate the principles of Army discipline, customs and 01
COurtesies as well as to teach the members metho~ it
caring for government property. Followiug the d as
course, WAAC's may immediately go into the lie! , to or
Where special talents are indicated they may be sent t.
specialist schools to receive additional training. For 1\1
ample, women assigned to the administrative speera "
schools are trained in Army administrative procedu ~
r
a matter which can be handled as efficiently by a WOUl\
as by a man. The schools for bakers and cooks tea~.
'Y AA C's . the fundamen tals of Army cooking and 'e s
Clent methods of preparation of foods for large group
as well as the principles of dietetics and balanced menl~
Those assigned to motor transport duties are not 0(1
taught the basic principles of operating Army vehic1 :-
c
but also elementary repair and maintenance wor-
Women, Whose tests indicate they have aptitudes, Ul~:
be assigned to schools for radio operators and reparr
men, Or given instruction in photographic techniques
and developing and printing pictures and camera u;'
and repair. Those Who manifest qualities of leadership
are selected for officer candidate school and there they
receive8 more intensive training in military procedure
'7 (Z94I-z94J)
:nd .di.scipline and receive further ins~r~c.ti~:min Army
dmIllIstration and command responsIbIlItIes.
There is a growing demand for WAAC's se!vices
~hroughout the Army. Enlistees represent the hIghest
Ypeof American womanhood and as a whole the women
~ave maintained the highest standards in .every respec~.
hey have fulfilled their duties in an effiCIent and bUSI-
ness-like manner and have been a definite asset to the
Army. Each woman enrolled in the W AAC has post-
Poned the induction of a man since they are counted as
a man in computing the ultimate manpower require-
l1lents of the Army.
A. little over a year after the Corps 'Was established,
~ore than 65,000 women were members and are serving
In more than 240 posts, camps and stations in the United
States and abroad. In the 155 specialists jobs they have
taken over they have fulfilled their primary purpose of
:eleasing able-bodied men for active duty on the fight-
Ing front. In addition, a number have been shipped to
?verseas stations and are performing valuable functions
I~ activities as chauffeurs, and in administrative capaci-
tIes at the various headquarters. Plans for the inc;rease
ff the Army during the calendar year of 1943 provide
?r approximately 150,000 \VAAC's, an equivalent in
~le to almost 10 divisions of soldiers released for com-
at duty .
. On July 1, 1943, the President signed a bill chang-
In.g the status of the Corps from an auxiliary serving
~te
WIth the Army to a component of the Army and giving
members the right to Army ratings, grades, priv-
1 eges, responsibilities, and benefits.
--~--
Active
Retired
Res
NG :
ADS
. Sub-total .. 5
.
.
.
9,
2
22
24
2 647
24
671
16
68
957!
8
910
47
1
80
---
10
Total 5 25 9
==-=---===~---.::-= 6
7 4 1,065
~
Of .the 910 active ~ist RegUlar Ar.my generals,
, 865
f1ic
were temporary appOllltments only III general 0 de' ef
grades, while 45 held permanent rank in those g-ra is'
~lthough only about 3.7 percent of the Army's com~o,
SlOned strength Was made up of National Guardsm of.
somewhat over seven percent of the Army's general
fieers had come from the National Guard.
/ 4 (I94I-Ig43
jacent to the Arctic Circle is of special design, with
.Plenty of insulation, vestibules and storm windows.
186 (I94I-I94J)
, The Bureau maintains direct contact with the arms ,i
31. Training
Ground Forces Training
h T~e technical warfare of today requires that all troops
e ~lghly trained in a variety of complicated subjects.
l'hls training involves not only physical conditioning
~opermit men to effectively operate in climates ranging
rom the sub-arctic to the tropics, but it also requires
that troops be prepared to conduct difficult amphibious
Operations, be qualified in jungle, mountain and desert
Wa:fare, and also be capable of fighting as a coordinated
lInn in large scale mobile operations.
d' Before they can undertake advanced training, all sol-
.lers must be indoctrinated with certain basic prin-
CIples, such as discipline, personal sanitation, first aid,
~Uard duty, the use and care of weapons, etc. Accord-
l~gly, branch replacement training centers were estab-
lshed throughout the United States to which selectees
\\rere assigned upon their induction for a period of 13
\\reeks, following which they were assigned to tactical
(194I-I943J 191
-------!iiliii!!lIi_IIlIIlI~
":Iit~ for their advanced trammg (chart 26). At th'd be'
to
gUlllmg of the war, trammg centers were expande da
a capacity of .~'J6,ooo hut stilf could not ac;commo tC w"
the large numbers being inducted at that t1m~. It "
mnsequently necessary for certain divisions ':Vlnch .w~ g
being activated to organize their own baSic tral~~t
centers and give this primary training to the sol I
upon his assignment to the division. . .. 0'
Between July I, '941, and July I, 1943, 50 ~lVISlftO
were activated within the Army. This expa?s!~n a
posed a difficult problem. To organize ~ dlvlSlOn'od
nUcleus of trained personnel had to be avaLlable .arou t
which the di\'ision could be built. This reqU1reUle~1
. resulted in the establishment of a cadre system where,;,
the cadre, or nucleus, of a new division was drawn fro.
divisions then in existence. The situation was not e~
tirely satisfactory because divisions were being activate
at such a rapid rate that a parent division, for instanc~
might be called upon to' furnish two or more cadr~.
While itself iu the primary stages of training and ~eve I
0plllent. Also, the requirement that the cadre conSJSt i,
hlg-h type personnel imposed unfortunate and praet
cally a ('"ontinuous drain on the key men of the parent
division.
Activating and !ransforming an infantry. divisi<;m ~ntd
a competent flg-htIng-team of 15,000 men IS a long an
complicated job (ch'art 27). A unit of this size demandJ
not only ma'.'~ of the skil!s and special services nece~f
sary for a CIVlltan communIty of comparable SIZe, but I
mUst also be prepared to move with all its equipment
and Sustain itself in the field under combat conditions.
For instance, within a 'typical infantry division ,the
transportation of men, equipment and supplies reqll~res
more than 1500 men. The preparation of food reqUlreS
more than 650 men. The administrative duties in COil'
nection with food and supplies require more than 700
men; medical, 600; communications, 150; repair, and
maintenance of equipment, 4/';0 soldiers; while a variety
of other specialized services a~counts for 1600 additional
1
92 (I94I~I5J4j)
men. All of these soldiers receive not only intensive
tra' . b . ..
t Inmg in their specialties but also ~om at tr.al?~ng
o SUpport effectively the 8000 men In the divISIOn
:hose principal job is at the. fighting front. (All .figures
re approximate.) \ . - .....
.To meet the urgency the War Department evolved a
?stem to insure that when the approximate 15,000 se-
ectees arrived at their division training area there
~ould be a minimum of lost motion and waste of time
~n immediately instituting the training program. For
~ns~ance, the. key officer personnel of a division' were
heSIgnated and assigned approximately three months
efore a division was to be activated. These officers were
then given a course of instruction at a school pertinent
~~ ~~eir activities, following which they arrived at the
IVISlOnactivation area approximately 43 days before
the activation date. The remainder of the officers and
e!llisted cadre, which was to furnish thenon-commis- -
sioned officers and certain 'specialists, such as cooks and
technicians, arrived at the division activation area ap-
proximately 38 days before the activation date with the
~sult. that .w?~n the selectees themselves arriv~d on
f -day the divIsIOn program could be launched without
ur.ther delay. Normally the enlisted personnel are not
assI~ned to a division until they have undergone a
perIod of 13 weeks basic training in a replacement train-
Ing center and are versed in the fundamentals of being
.a soldier .
. Following assignment to a division 13 additional
wee~s are spent in learning the tactics and techniques
of hIS particular arm moving progressively through the.
~latoon, company,. battalion, and regimental. training.
t the end of the 26 weeks the various components of
th~ division-the infantry regiment, field artillery bat-
tahon, and service regiment-are trained and are ca-
rab!e of working as a team within themselves. The' fol-
d~W.lI~g13 weeks are devoted to divisional training. The
b~VlslOnitself learns. to opera.te as ~ teaT? of the com-
Ined arms and servIces. Dunng thIS penod the in fan-
(194I.~943) 193
t~y, field artillery, division reconnaissance trooS~auce en"
gmeer battalions, quartermaster company, or all
company, medical battalion and signal compa~~ne""
have been integrated to one smooth running mac 11 eu'
the division. The final 13 weeks are'devoted. t? m;u 01-
vers and field exercises during which the dlVISlO ~ a
is!les its fie!d training and learns to work as part ~
lug-her unit. in
To meet the need for specialized training of cert~n_
~nIts selected for specific operations the Desert Tr~ib'
' !ng Center was established in 1\1arch, 1942, the AmPtain
10USTraining- Center in .May, 1942, and the 1\10un Ill-
. Training-~.' Ce~lter at Camp .' Hale California, . in SepteD~ rt
ber .o! "942. The 30,000 square miles. of the tpe
Trammg Center terrain havc becn a major asse.t.to to
training facilities of the ground forces. In adchtlOn ce
providing experience in desert operations, the abse~e"
of restrictions on the use of land permits complete .Iror'
dom of action in large scale maneuvers. Th~ area !S 'ug
ganized as a theater of operations to prOVIde tralIll d
under realistic conditions and maneuvers are condu.ct~e"
with the accompanying problems of supply, ma'~al
nance, field bivouacs, etc., prevalent in actual corn aI
and under the nearest permissible approach to actUas
combat conditions. In addition, large maneuverar;si'
have becn establishcd in Tennessce, Oregon, and Lou '~
ana, where units of all the arms and services, compfl t
ing forces approximately the size of army corps, are,s'fu
at the conclusion of the division training phases . 0r
eight weeks of intcnsive practical field training. . d
~ practical aspect of the training given .to gro~lna_
unIts has been the establishment of "battle Incloctnn S
tion" courses which are intended to simulate, as fara
is practical, actual conditions existent on the field r d'
battle. Exercises requirino-' the breaching of barbe
wire entanglements, crossil~o-other obstacl~s which may
b
e encountered in combat, sHch b as streams, wooe1s, to wns,f
mined and fortified areas, all while under a screen ?u
live ammunition fire, has been an important factor 1)
191 (I94I-I943
Pr~?ucing units competent to enter combat against ex-
perIenced and seasoned enemies.
, A ir Forces Training
I In a general way the training schedule of an air. ~orce
COrnbat group is characteristic of any other mIlItary
~earn(chart 28). The group, however, ge~erally does .not
t SS~~ble until the completio? .of a peno~ of t~c?nIc~1
~alUlI:g of various key indIvIduals. ~hIS trall:llng IS
tlVen In technical schools where the pIlots, naVIgators,
b ornbardiers, radio operators, aerial gunners~ a~d othe~s
/C?~e expert as individuals in their speCIaltIes. ThIs.
dndividually trained group i~ then asse~b!ed ~nd un-
e.rgoes.a period of progressIve team traInIng In ~per-
a.tIonal training units similar, with obvious modIfica-
tIons pertinent to the air forces, to ground force units.
the expansion of the Army necessitated a carefu.uY
E1anned program to insure that the standards whIch
ad been established during peactime were not low-
tred. The extent of the expansion is indicated by the
act .that in the 19 years prior to 1941, the total number
o~pIlots trained was less than 7,000. Today the rate of
PI~ot production is about 75,000 per year not including
g.hder, liaison, observation and women pilots. In addi- .
tIon there has been incorporated a substantial training
P:ogram for British, Dutch, Canadian, and Chinese
hilots. The program for the training of the Chinese has
ad an important bearing on operations against the
J apanese and is continuously expanding .
. ~? addition to the combat flying crews who, although
IndIvidual specialists, must attain a high degree of co- ...
Operative effort, the air forces have been faced with a
problem of training competent ground crews-soldiers
~ho regardless of the weather or the hour, service planes,
.0 rush repair jobs, keep vitally important instruments
l~ precise order and carry out other maintenance activi-
hs.
t ~he s.izeof th~ ground crews ne~essarily varies with
~ e sItuatIon but In general compnses a substantially
arger number than the flying crews themselves. The
(z94I-I943) 195
. ,m. the ntimber
, . ed,
~xpan.SlOn of'h ground tec n1c1an~
.. traInriot
IS mdlcated by the fact that in the 20-year penoddEa
tes
to JUly 1, 1941,' there were less than 15,000 gra ring
from the A.ir, Corps technical training schools. D~eted
the su.cceedmg" 21 months over 503,000 men c?mPeased'
prescnbed courses ,which' incidentally had Inc~ teS
from 30 to 90 specialties. The total number of gra. u:
for the period covered by this report approxl1l1 tes
621),000. '0-
tt
target~ and operating conditions which wil1 be encoun- ,
redm
that particular theater. For instance, the prob-
of a fighter groUp in the Solomons. is entirely dil-
rns
s~re~tfrom those operating out of the United Kingdom.
a:~tla~ly a different situation exists in the units opt:<-
lUg In Burma, India, and China.
., ....
SCAL!
STATUTE MILES
199
CAPE YORK
PENIN. CORAL
200
eo
40
Mll (appraxima'.>
'=
ARCHIPEI.AGO
-~ LOUISIAOE
..".",
ARCHIPELAGO
\TEST AFRICA
'- 1lAJ.LROAD Narrow Gauge'
Map C
23
24
Map D: Battle of Tunisia, January I2-April 28, I943
25
i
ANDAMAN
ISLANDS
208
, -~
C' ...
Itt
CHARTS.
/ . ,/
r-,
I lPARTIALLY ORGANIZED REGULAR
L - ..J , \
ARMY UNITS
-
~~ 8,600
E:J. I
~-.."
I
!!!!! TRO~PS ~
[ I
.A!l. .fQBg, 17,000
OVE~~
GARRISONS (4S.3OOJ
210
I" . I
ENLISTED PERSONNEL OF
1-
~ 56000 . :\'11
,,'
, . ~ ~ ~
~
~
I
I
I
I
. I I.
.I
I :f
l'~
1 I
..JI I ,.j
I
L ___ I I.. ~_..J
I
.... --~1 I
~__ I-__ J
.J
U
Chart I
211
I
o ORGANIZED REGULAR ARMY UNITS
r-'
I IPARTIALLY ORGANIZED REGULAR
, L_..J ARMY UNITS
o PERSONNEL REQUIRED TO
COMPLETE I)NITS
r
AIR FORCE 31,300
OVERSEAS GARRiSONS
212
ENLISTED PERSONNEL. OF
THE ACTI~E ARMY
JANUARY 31,1940- 227,000
(AuttloriZ ed 5ept.8,1939)
INFANTRY ~ ~OOO
.~~'
.U.
~.~. ,/~~O p;:
" \ L---'
.. _----, I \
'JI
(~~
\
, ,,
.... -."'"
,i
Chart 2
213
O~ANIZEO REGULARAR"~ UNIT.
r-'.
'.
. .
'PARTIALLY ORGANIZED REGULAR
t._..J ARMY \mITS
OPERSONNEL REQUIRED TO
COMPLETE UNI.lS
1 (
MRSEA~ GARRISONS .
ENLISTED PERSONNEL Of
THE ACTIVE ARMY
AUGUST15.1940-280,000
(AuthOrized June 13,1940)
OVERHEAD ~7.800
- Chart J 21
5
, E
O PERSONNEL REQUIRED
COMPLETE UNITS
TO
-
M! ~ ~ (549'",,1(167,600)
~ (I ~ ~(46,500)
~~
216
ARMORED DIVISIONS (43,200)
,~~~~
.~~~0
~.,
, . ~(161.100)
~
~'~ i"'."71
Chart 4
217
218
( ;
Chart 5
STATES ARMY
~ ,
,~
!
,.1
~ T='::'"' :::::=
~ NotloMl Gl,tQrd $q\lGN D;., .. tons
~C"OI" 01,"'0"
l
Q]Armo'.d CM.,I.IOftI
Cha1'~ 5
219
220
Chert 6
CENTERS
. '.
Chart 6
221
Chart 7
~G CENTERS
" ~
',:1
... ~
Chart 7
223
, j
I ._:.. '.'~~ .
I\.- ...
:... ...r---'-
. -- _.~._.:..
:
'- 0
.....
o
f . CHART 8
~HOOLS
~I
It
\
.j
,. ,
,
Chart 8
I
INDUCTiON OF Nlf
t :.
IN~
. SEPT. 16,1940'::
.,
... c
Jl I C 0
226
, .
j'
\1
OJ
..
j;l
oil
:~.
. /
22j
., , 'KEY:TO CHART 9 '
Map I~DUCTION OF NATIONAL',GUARD
Refer- Date of
ence Induction Location and Units
Sept. 16, ~940 Camp Barkeley, Texas' .
45 Division,
Fort Bliss, Texas
202 Coast Artillery (AA)
Columbia, South' Carolina "
105 Observation Squadron.
Fort Dix, New Jersey
44 Division
119 Observation Squadron
Camp Edwards, Mas~achusetts.
198 Coast Artillery (AA)
'Harbor Defenses of Boston
241 Coast Artillery (HD)
HD of Chesapeake Bay
246 Coast Artillery (HD)
HD of the Columbia
249 C9ast Artillery (HD) .
HD of Long Island Sound
242 Coast Artillery (HD)
HD of N arragansettBay
, 243 Coast Artillery
HD of Portland, Maine
240 Coast Artillery (HD)
HD of Puget Sound
248 Coast Artillery (HD)
HD of, Sandy Hook
245 Coast Artillery aID)
Hawaii ,
251 Coast Artillery (AA)
Camp Hulen, Texas
197 Coast Artillery (AA)
203 Coast Artillery (AA)
211 Coast Artillery (AA)
Fort Jackson, South Carolina
, 228 30 Division
Map
Refer- Date, of Location and Units
ence Induction Fort Lewis. Washington
. 41 Division .
116 Observation Squadron
Camp McQuaide. California
250 Coast Art~llery (155mm
gun) ,
Camp Pendleton, Virginia
244"Coast Artillery (155111m
gun)'
Fort Screven.. Georgia
. 252 Coast Artillery (155111ffi
gun)
Fort Sill. Oklahoma'
154 Observation Squadron
Camp Stewart, Georgia
213 Coast Artillery (AA)
Camp Beauregard, Louisiana
107 Observation Squadron
Hawaii, .
298 Infa~try (less 3d Bn.)'
299 Infantry (less Co. L)
Camp Livingston, Louisiana
32 Division.
Fort McClellan,. Alabailla
27 Division
102 Observation Squadron
Meridian, Mississippi .
153 Observation Squadron
Puerto Rican Department I
. 37 Division r
(3) Nov. 18. 1940 Fort McIntosh, Texas
56 Cavalry Brigade
. (4) Nov. .25, 1940 Camp Blanding, Florida
31 Division
Camp Bowie, Texas
36 Division .
III Observation Squadron
Fort Bragg, North Carolina
112 Observation Squadron
Fort Devens, Massachusetts
152 Observation Squadron _
Camp Edwards, Massachusetts
101 Observation Squadron
Fort Jackson, South Carolina
128 Field Artillery (75mm)
Jacksonville, Florida
106 Observation Squadron
./ Fort Knox, Kentucky
192 Tank Battalion
Camp Livingston, Louisiana .
106 Cavalry (horse-mechan-
ized) . I I
Fort Ord, California-
102 Radio Intelligence Co.
147 Field Artillery (75mm
gun)
Camp Stewart, Georgia
214 Coast Artillery (AA)
(5) Dec. 23, 1940
Little Rock, Arkansas
110 Observation Squadron
Camp Robinson, Arkansas
~5 Division
(6) 153 Infantry
Jan. 6, 1941 Fort Beni. Harrison, Indiana
201 Infantry (less 3d Bn.)
230
'\
Map
Refer.- Date of , Location and Units ~
ence Induction; Fort Benning, Georgia
101 Antitank Battalion
193 Tank Battalion
Fort Bliss- Texas
,120 Observation Squadron
200 Coast Artillery (AA)
206 Coast Artillery (AA)"
260 Coast Artillery (AA)
Fort Custer, Michigan
184 Field Artillery (155mm-
hoW)
Camp Edwards, Massachusetts
102 Coast Artillery Bn. (AA)
208 Coast Artillery (AA) ,
_Camp Haan, California
101 CA Brigade Hq. & Hq.
Battery
'"215 Coast Artillery (AA)
216 Coast Artillery (AA)
HD of Galveston, Texas
265 Coast Artillery (HD)
Camp Hulen, Texas
10
5 Coast Artillery Bn. (AA)
106 Coast ArtilleryBn. (AA)
204 Coast Artillery (AA) ,
Fort Jackson, South Carolina
, 102 Cavalry (horse-mechan-
ized)
Fort McClellan. Alabama
151 'Medical Battalion
Fort Sam Houston, Texas
104 Antitank. Battalion
Fort Sill, Oklahoma -
142 Field Artillery (155mm
how)
Camp Bowie, Texas
113 Cavalry (horse-mechan-
ized) " 231
Alap ~
R'e!er- Date oj
ence. Induction -
Location and Units r a
I
10.1Signal Battalion.
102 Antitank BattalIon
135 Medical Regiment
141 Field Artillery (155mm
.. how)
166 Field ArtiIIery (155mm
how)
190 Field Artillery (155mm
(8) '~ gun)
Jan. 16, 19'P)
Camp Edwards,' Massachusetts
(9) Jan.
- 26 Division
17, 1941
Meridian, Mississippi
113 Observation Squadron
Camp Shelby, Mississippi
(10) Jan. 38 Division
22, 1941
\
Indiantown Gap Military
Reservation
Service Co., 103 QM Regiment
2d Bn., 103 QlVIRegimen~ ,
Company F, 103 QM RegI-
(11) Jan. ment
27, 1941
Fort' Bragg, North Carolina
. 112 Field Artillery (horse-
drawn)
134 Medical Regiment
178 Field Artillery (155mm
how)
Camp Claiborne, Louisiana
232 ,151 Combat E~gineers .
Map '\
Refer- Date or' Location and Units
ence Induction f
Fort Devens, Massachusetts
101 Cavalry (horse-mechan-.
ized) 1
. Fort Ethan Allen, Vermont
186 Field Artillery (155mm I I
how) .
Harbor Defenses of the Delaware
122 Coast Artillery Bn. (gun)
261 Coast Artillery Bn.(HD)
Battle Creek, Michigan .
!\
i'
~ .
.108 Observation Squadron
Fort Ethan Allen, Vermont
71 FA Brigade Hq. & Hq.
Battery
187 Field Artillery (155mm
how)
Frederick, Maryland
104 Observation Squadron
Fort Geo. G. Meade, Maryland
2g Division
105 Antitank Battalion
Ig1 Tank Battalion
Fort Lewis, Washington, .
144 Field Artillery (155mm
how)
205 Coast Artillery (AA)
Madison Barracks, New York
258 Field Artillery (155mm
gun)
Camp Beauregard, Louisiana
log Observation Squadron
Camp Claiborne, Louisiana
34 Division
Camp Haan, California
217 Coast Artillery (AA)
Fort Lewis, Washington
103 Antitank Battalion
194 Tank Battalion (less Co. D)
233
"'lap
Refer- Doteot
'ence Induction
Location and Units
Camp. Stewart, georgia. (AA) .
Hh Coast ArtIllery Bn.
102 CA Brigade Hq. & Hq .
. Battery
14 Coast Artillery Bn. (A1
17 Coast Artillery Bn. (A .
207 Coast Artillery (AA)
209 Coast Artillery (AA)
212 Coast Artillery (AA)
(14) Feb. 17, 1941
Harrisburg, Pennsylvania
13 Observation Squadron
Indiantown Gap Military~es't.
28 Divisi9n (less units mdLl~)
eel on January 22, 194
14 Cavalry (horse-mechan-
'ized)
Camp Blanding, Florida
43 Division
74 FA Brigade Hq. & Hq.
Battery
.172 Field Artillery (15Smm
how)
.179 Field Artillery (155mm
h<?w)
Camp Forrest, Tennessee
75 FA Brigad~ Hq. & Hq.
Battery
168 Field Artillery (155mm
gun)
181 Field Artillery (1.55mm
how) .
191 Field Artillery (155mm
how)
Jacksonville, Florida .
118 Observation Squadron
Fort Lewis, Washingtol1
115 Cavalry (horse-mechan-
234 ized)
M~p
Refer- Date of Location and Units
ence Induction Fort Sheridan, Illinois.
103 Coast Artillery Bn. (AA)
210 Coast Artillery (AA)
Paso Robles, California
115 Observation Squadron \
CampSan Luis Obispo, California
40 Division'
\ Camp Forrest, Tennessee
(17) March 5, 1941
, 33 Division'
107 Cavalry (horse-,mechan-
,
ized)
Fort Dix~ New Jersey }
(18) MarcJ:110, 1941 101 Military police Battalion ' "III
372 Infantry' . .t
Fort Francis E. Warren,
(19) April 1, 1941 Wyoming
76 FA Brigade Hq. & Hq.
Battery
183 Field Artillery (155mm
hoW) ,
188 Field Artillery (155mm
how)
Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri
(20) April 7, 194 1
~72FA Brigade Hq. & Hq.
Battery . - .
119 Field Artillery (155mm
gun) .
177 Field Artillery (155ffiffi
,how). "-
182 Field Artillery .(155ffiffi
how)
1
Fort Dix, New Jersey
(21) June 2, 194 126 Observation Squadron
Camp Haan, California .
(22) June 23, 1941, .121 Coast Artillery Bn. (gun)
23,5
o C E
o C E A N
--
DEPLOYMENT OF P
WITH ARRIVAL .DATE (
.L.
,t
;111
. .
...
I N D I
OCEAN
~ERICAN TROOPS
~ FIRST CONTINGENT
5000
= ""'"
FMAMJ
1943
Chart II
239
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC
NUMBER (Fifth Air Force)
600
. L;~~END
Lost Possibly
D.. " ~.. m,
1//;'::.
.".o.n{;;\%< ProbObly Lost
Due to U.S Action
500
400
300
200
100
U.S. ENEMY
MAR.
1943 .
244
NORTH "AFRICA
(Twelfth Air Force) NUMBER
600
500
400
300
200
u.s. NEMY
MAY
245
'.~
- .... ." 4-
......... ~
,-~--
I
Chart 15; (Key OIl page 2-/8)
247
I-
...
0
fIl:Q 0
~ 0
~
0... 0 0
~ ~ 0
0 ~
0
~ ~ ~ Q
~E' ~
00
<t <t
~
Chart I6
249
""--~-~--t-: -, ' "' ,
ORGANIZATION'
STAFF L
Blli
OF WAR
I
______________ JI
~F STAFF I
Chart I7
. 'j
.'
..ORGANIZATION. OF THE
. '
\~y SERV1CE FORCES
Chart IS
253
ACTiVATION OF ~RM.I
ARM OR SERVICE , STRENGTH
./
o
ADJUTANT GENERAL' 11,378
ENGINEER
50,562
FINANCE
882
MEDICAL
53,295
MILITARY ,POLICE
ORDNANCE
QUARTERMASTER
, SIGNAL
TRANSPORTATION
SPECIAL SERVICE
WAAC
,HEADQUARiERS
254
SERVICE . FORCE UNITS
NO.OF .UNITS
200 . 300 400 500 GOO
STATISTICS
GROUND
TECHNICAL
INFORMATION
, SECTION
GPO
G-2
PLANS" MILITARY
PERSONNEL
INTELLIGENCE
."
corMA.
IARMY GROUND' .FORCES
r GENERAL
A
~D FORCES
\
r STAFF
It)
I,STA~F (GSC)
a G;'4 REQUIREMENTS
257
ORGANIZATION OF T~
en AOVtSI ""u,
.) ACT 'II ea's -.111 DEPUTY CHIEF OF THE AIR STAFF
:: ::::':":0
,
-:::'''YING
""UCIES
OUT-OF eG's POUC?
AND CHANOES IN POLICIES TO
~
CO
INTELLIGENCE
PLA"" 8 LIJ.ISO ..
OPEfil:ATIONAI.. DIVISION AIR CREW TRAINING
DIVISION
DIVISION
MILITARV P[RSON~L
COUNTER INTELLIGENCE UNIT TR,lINING
DIVfS ..,)N
~VISION ... DIVISION
CIVIU"'N ,,RSO"'!'4[L
TECHNICAL TRAINING
, OIvt$ION INFORMATIONAL DIVISION
DIVISIO~
SPCCIAL. SEItVICES
OIvIS:::JN TJtAIN~NG PLANS TRAINING AlDS DiVISION
DIVISION
A'A CHAPLA.,.
PLANS, ANALYSIS tl
HISTOmCAL DIVIStON
REPORTS DIVISiON
I
I.
I
I
I
I
I
-r------.=-t -------1
r----l.l r----J'
I
L.
I
AI:I:~~CE'r
JI
i AI~OU:::C!!
L
I -'I
fEARMY . AIR. FORCES
ASS'T (;HIEF OF' AlR STAFf ASS'T CHIEF OF' AIR STAFF' ASs'r CHIEF' OF AIR STAFF
MATERIEL.. MAINTENANCE. OPERATIONS, CC)t.tM1TMENTS
AND OlSTR1BUTIO'II
a REQUIREMENTS
-CO~TROi.-orFICC-
RESOURCES DIVISION
COMBINED SUBJECTS
MAT[FnEl DIVISION
REQUIREMENTS OIVISION DIVISION
TRAFFIC DiVISION
AlA TRANSP'QRT
DiVISION
STRATEGICAL PlANS BUDGET AND fiSCAL
AIR COMMUNIC.ATtONS
SUPPLY ANO SERVICES
DIVISION
DIVISION
---------AiR ENGINEER
DIVISION DIViSiON
AIR ft~ANCE OfFICER
AIR QUARTERMASTER
POLICY AND SPECIAL SPECIAl. ASSISTANT
TECHNIC-AL SERVICES
GOMMU""CATlcr,tS EQUIPMENT
SU8JECTS DIVISION ON GLIDER PftOGRAM
orrlCER DIVISION
WORKING COMMITTEE
AERONAUTICAL BOARO
,..------ ---'-----, I
r-~--.
I;:.: :i::;:;
: ~~.::::
W'JII_L'l.'\f1'1
~
Chari 21
'j
Chart 2)
- ~""
MAJOR WAR CONSTRUCTION- CORPS OF ENGINEERS
'llllON VALUE OF WORK IN PLACE , BilliON
$10
$10
e
s
-4
2
2
o
.J A SON D .. F M AM" .. A' SON D .. F M .A M .. .. A SON 0 .. F M A MJ
1940 . 1941 194Z' 1943
Chart 24
U.s. ARMY BATTLECASOALTIES
7 DECEMBER 1941T1fPOUOIt JO ""UNit 1945
\'
TOTAL CASUALTIES, OFFICERS AND ENLISTED MEN .
THOUSAND
10
IlISSING
'1lIS0NE~S
lNTERNEl;:$
OFFICERS OVERSEAS AS PERCENT
OFFICERS KILLED AS PERCENT OF TOTAL OVERSEAS STRENGTI1
OF TOTAL KILLED o ,5 10.
AIlM OR SERVICE 0' 10 15 20 25 " 30
AIR CORPS
INFANTRY
F*' 4:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.1
THOUSAND
ARM OR SERVICE 0 5 '/ 10 15 20. 25
AIR CORPS
INFANTRY
ARTILLERY ~
OTHERS
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBunON
ARM OR SERVICE 0 20 40 60 eo 100
AIR CORPS
INFANTRY
ARTILLERY
OTHERS
Chart 25
'/
......
W CORP!. OF E~C'H[[R9
X CORPS OF MILITARY_ PaLteE
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