5GW Theory Timeline

5GW Theory Timeline
(June 2010)
(Orignially appeared online at http://timeline.dreaming5gw.com)
Page 1
Notes on This Text
Notes on This Text

This text is a translation of the 5GW Theory Timeline, originally appearing at http://timeline.dreaming5gw.com, into a text/pdf
format. As such, many stylistic changes from the original were required. However, the content included here has not been edited
from the original version.
Stylistic and formatting decisions for this document were intended for clarity and ease of use, but because this document is
intended for personal use and use by a select, small group of acquaintances, the quickest route was deemed most appropriate. In
other words: not a lot of bells and whistles and perhaps even a little bit of negligence.
Because this document is intended to be an archival version of the original website, little attention has been paid to the many
“broken” links appearing here. Given the nature of the Internet, many of the listed “original” links to original sources will no longer
lead to those sources. Primarily, links to web pages on d-n-i.net, dreaming5gw.com, and phaticcommunion.com will no longer
work because those sites no longer exist; but other links may also be broken, for any number of reasons.
The sources given here are listed in chronological order. In cases where sources were published on the same date but no time of
day was given, a “best guess” evaluation determined the chronology.
Readers should be aware that this document makes no claims to accuracy in the summarized information for the listed sources
which have discussed, at length or briefly, the theory of 5GW or the theory of the “generations of modern warfare.” The summaries
are personal observations made by the authors of those summaries (in almost all cases, Curtis Gale Weeks) and were originally
intended to form the basis of a future deeper exploration of the subject: little more than journal entries.
Page 2
Forward
Forward
What follows will seem a ragged, haphazard collection of sources and summaries of sources discussing the theory of “5GW”. As
anyone familiar with the subject will know, the depth and breadth of this document is laughable when compared to the many
discussions that have filled the last several years: not much that has been written in the past couple of years is included. Indeed,
many blog articles written even earlier do not appear here.
The 5GW Theory Timeline was a project that simply required more time than I wished to devote to it. That is unfortunate. But what
follows here might serve as a starting point for anyone newly coming into the discussion.
The original website included the following on its About page:
About
The 5GW Theory Timeline began as a project for collecting and collating sources that
discussed, however in passing, the theory of fifth generation warfare or fifth gradient
warfare.
Anyone familiar with the subject will notice glaring holes in the Timeline. Although
many very early references to 5GW are included, the Timeline is far from complete; few
of the many references post-2006 have yet to be added, for instance. Nonetheless, actual
discussion of 5GW did not begin until recently -- earliest on-line source thus far found is
from August 19, 2003 -- and users of the Timeline may find the earliest references helpful
in understanding how the theory of 5GW began to take root.
Since this is a reference tool that relies heavily on online sourcing, some links have broken
or changed between the time they were added to the Timeline and the present. Whenever
possible, we will update the links to direct back toward original sources. Some sources
have simply disappeared from the internet, some links to original sources will not work,
but those sources will remain as-is on the Timeline as a record of the development of the
theory of 5GW.
Summaries included on each entry are entirely the view of the Timeline author who added
the entry. Objectivity in summarizing the original source is our goal, but as with all
interpretation, bias cannot be ruled out. Length and breadth of summary, in my case, may
be a measure of the available content in the linked source or may be a measure of my own
interest in what the original source addressed. Occasionally, I have added interpolations
of my own, but I have tried to note when I have. Visitors are encouraged to leave
comments on entries with any notes of their own.
Curtis Gale Weeks
Page 3
Table of Contents
Table of Contents
Table of Contents
Notes on This Text.....................................................................................................................................2
Forward......................................................................................................................................................3
Table of Contents.......................................................................................................................................4
Entries........................................................................................................................................................9
The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation.....................................................................10
William S. Lind (October 15, 1989)
5th Generation Warfare.......................................................................................................................14
Oss.net (August 19, 2003)
Fifth Generation Warfare?...................................................................................................................15
William S. Lind (February 3, 2004)
The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century.........................................................................17
Colonel Thomas X. Hammes (September 12, 2004)
Unto the Fifth Generation of War........................................................................................................21
Mark Safranski (July 17, 2005)
Orientation and Action, Part I: The OODA Loop................................................................................23
Dan tdaxp (July 18, 2005)
5GW....................................................................................................................................................27
Younghusband (July 19, 2005)
Fifth Generation War in the OODA Loop...........................................................................................28
Boot on Unrestricted War....................................................................................................................30
Curtis Gale Weeks (July 20, 2005)
Dreaming 5th Generation War.............................................................................................................31
Dreaming 5th Generation War: Comment...........................................................................................33
Emerging NetWar / SecretWar Tactic: Stealth Shareholder Activism.................................................34
Blog Notice..........................................................................................................................................35
SecretWarriors Walk Without Rhythm, Won't Attract the Worm........................................................37
SecretWar: Plain Jane Tries to Kill the Yakuza Boss..........................................................................39
5GW Reloaded: Reflecting on 5th Generation War Concepts............................................................41
5GW Effectors.....................................................................................................................................43
Page 4
Table of Contents

5th Generation Thumbnail Sketches...................................................................................................46
Phil (July 26, 2005)
Limitations of 5GW.............................................................................................................................48
Curtis Gale Weeks (August 2, 2005)
Limitations of 5GW: Comment...........................................................................................................50
Alan Sullivan (August 3, 2005)
Limitations of 5GW: Comment...........................................................................................................51
SecretWar (5GW)................................................................................................................................52
Dan tdaxp (August 6, 2005)
On “Fifth Generation” Warfare?..........................................................................................................54
Bryce Lane (August 6, 2005)
Revisiting 5th Generation War............................................................................................................57
Mark Safranski (August 7, 2005)
Personal Equals Political.....................................................................................................................59
5GW: Soundless + Formless + Polished + Leading............................................................................61
Dan tdaxp (February 4, 2006)
Truly formless 5GW............................................................................................................................62
Younghusband (March 10, 2006)
Truly Formless 5GW: Comment.........................................................................................................64
Dan tdaxp (March 10, 2006)
Arherring (March 11, 2006)
John Robb (March 11, 2006)
Curtis Gale Weeks (March 12, 2006)
Initiating 5GW.....................................................................................................................................69
Observing the Maturing World............................................................................................................72
Fifth Generation Warfare: 4GW No Longer Applies..........................................................................77
Mitchell Langbert (September 26, 2006)
Can Georgia become a MicroPower?..................................................................................................78
John Robb (October 7, 2006)
The sandwich generations-of-war strategy..........................................................................................79
Thomas P. M. Barnett (October 8, 2006)
A Strategic Dagwood...........................................................................................................................82
Mark Safranski (October 8, 2006)
5GW and Ruleset Automation.............................................................................................................84
Dan tdaxp (October 8, 2006)
Page 5
Table of Contents
Dreaming 5GW: In Surround Sound...................................................................................................86

Curtis Gale Weeks (October 9, 2006)
Lots of discussion of what 5GW is......................................................................................................89
5GW And Beyond...............................................................................................................................90
Shlok Vaidya (October 9, 2006)
Micropowers and the Art of 5GW.......................................................................................................92
THE CHANGING FACE OF WAR: Into the 5th Generation (5GW)................................................94
My own personal 5GW dream............................................................................................................96
Totally unreal.......................................................................................................................................99
A thousand flowers will bloom on 5GW, and countless more weeds...............................................100
Barnett and Robb...............................................................................................................................102
5GW is Closed Source (and Global Guerillas Theory is Incoherent)...............................................105
Against William Lind, Against John Robb, in favor of 5GW...........................................................107
War in the next generation.................................................................................................................110
Kent's Imperative (November 12, 2006)
The unbearable lightness of the bench..............................................................................................112
Kent's Imperative (May 17, 2007)
The Generations of War without the Jargon......................................................................................113
Found on Wikipedia: “The Dulles Plan”...........................................................................................115
PurpleSlog (August 23, 2007)
Pre-Modern Wars on a Pre-Modern Continent..................................................................................116
Dan tdaxp (September 6, 2007)
XGW: Left of Boom - Right of Boom...............................................................................................118
Arherring (October 21, 2007)
X vs X: Boom and the Generations in Conflict.................................................................................121
5GWhat? The Meaning of “Warfare” in 2008...................................................................................124
Justin Boland (May 22, 2008)
5GW as the Event Horizon................................................................................................................126
Dan tdaxp (May 23, 2008)
XGW as a System for the Classification of Doctrines......................................................................128
Arherring (May 26, 2008)
The XGW Framework: Classification and Creation of Doctrines for Conflict and Confrontation. .130
Page 6
Table of Contents
Arherring (January 6, 2009)

Appendix: Summary Descriptions of xGW From Select Sources.........................................................133
0GW..................................................................................................................................................134
from The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation.................................................134
from The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century....................................................134
from Orientation and Action, Part I: The OODA Loop...........................................................134
from Observing the Maturing World........................................................................................134
from Against William Lind, Against John Robb, in favor of 5GW.........................................134
from The Generations of War without the Jargon....................................................................135
from Pre-Modern Wars on a Pre-Modern Continent................................................................135
from XGW: Left of Boom - Right of Boom............................................................................135
from X vs X: Boom and the Generations in Conflict..............................................................135
from XGW as a System for the Classification of Doctrines....................................................135
from The XGW Framework: Classification and Creation of Doctrines for Conflict and
Confrontation...........................................................................................................................135
1GW..................................................................................................................................................137
Confrontation...........................................................................................................................139
2GW..................................................................................................................................................140
Confrontation...........................................................................................................................142
3GW..................................................................................................................................................143
Page 7
Table of Contents
Confrontation...........................................................................................................................145
4GW..................................................................................................................................................147
Confrontation...........................................................................................................................150
5GW..................................................................................................................................................151
Confrontation...........................................................................................................................153
Appendix: Index of Entries: Authors...................................................................................................154
Appendix: Original Chronological Table..............................................................................................157
Page 8
Entries
Entries
Page 9
The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation

William S. Lind (October 15, 1989)
Article (electronic) published by William S. Lind on October 15, 1989
Site: DNI[1]
Permalink to original: "The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation[2]"
Summary for The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation:
This is the origin of the GMW, Generations of Modern Warfare, concept. It outlines in some
detail 1GW through 3GW and even gives some detail for 4GW while leaving 4GW open to further
discovery.
William Lind wrote this with Colonel Keith Nightengale (USA), Captain John F. Schmitt
(USMC), Colonel Joseph W. Sutton (USA), and Lieutenant Colonel Gary I. Wilson (USMCR)
(Summary written by Curtis Gale Weeks)
Descriptions of the generations/gradients of warfare.
On 0GW
[No Description Given]
Page 10
On 1GW
"First generation warfare reflects tactics of the era of the smoothbore musket, the
tactics of line and column. These tactics were developed partially in response to
technological factors — the line maximized firepower, rigid drill was necessary to
generate a high rate of fire, etc.— and partially in response to social conditions and
ideas, e.g., the columns of the French revolutionary armies reflected both the élan of
the revolution and the low training levels of conscripted troops. Although rendered
obsolete with the replacement of the smoothbore by the rifled musket, vestiges of first
generation tactics survive today, especially in a frequently encountered desire for
linearity on the battlefield. Operational art in the first generation did not exist as a
concept although it was practiced by individual commanders, most prominently
Napoleon."
On 2GW
"Second generation warfare was a response to the rifled musket, breechloaders,

barbed wire, the machinegun, and indirect fire. Tactics were based on fire and
movement, and they remained essentially linear. The defense still attempted to prevent
all penetrations, and in the attack a laterally dispersed line advanced by rushes in
small groups. Perhaps the principal change from first generation tactics was heavy
reliance on indirect fire; second generation tactics were summed up in the French
maxim, "the artillery conquers, the infantry occupies." Massed firepower replaced
massed manpower. Second generation tactics remained the basis of U.S. doctrine until
the 1980s, and they are still practiced by most American units in the field."
Page 11
On 3GW
" Third generation warfare was also a response to the increase in battlefield firepower.
However, the driving force was primarily ideas. Aware they could not prevail in a
contest of materiel because of their weaker industrial base in World War I, the
Germans developed radically new tactics. Based on maneuver rather than attrition,
third generation tactics were the first truly nonlinear tactics. The attack relied on
infiltration to bypass and collapse the enemy's combat forces rather than seeking to
close with and destroy them. The defense was in depth and often invited penetration,
which set the enemy up for a counterattack.
While the basic concepts of third generation tactics were in place by the end of 1918,
the addition of a new technological element-tanks-brought about a major shift at the
operational level in World War II. That shift was blitzkrieg. In the blitzkrieg, the basis
of the operational art shifted from place (as in Liddell-Hart's indirect approach) to
time."
On 4GW
"In broad terms, fourth generation warfare seems likely to be widely dispersed and
largely undefined; the distinction between war and peace will be blurred to the
vanishing point. It will be nonlinear, possibly to the point of having no definable
battlefields or fronts. The distinction between "civilian" and "military" may disappear.
Actions will occur concurrently throughout all participants' depth, including their
society as a cultural, not just a physical, entity. Major military facilities, such as
airfields, fixed communications sites, and large headquarters will become rarities
because of their vulnerability; the same may be true of civilian equivalents, such as
seats of government, power plants, and industrial sites (including knowledge as well
as manufacturing industries). Success will depend heavily on effectiveness in joint
operations as lines between responsibility and mission become very blurred. Again, all
these elements are present in third generation warfare; fourth generation will merely
accentuate them."
On 5GW
Notes for The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation:
[1] http://www.d-n-i.net
Page 12
[2] http://www.d-n-i.net/fcs/4th_gen_war_gazette.htm
Page 13
5th Generation Warfare
5th Generation Warfare
Oss.net (August 19, 2003)

Article (electronic) published by Oss.net on August 19, 2003
Site: Oss.net[1]
Permalink to original: "5th Generation Warfare[2]"
Summary for 5th Generation Warfare:
An apparent press release from OSS.net, through PRNewswire, in Windows .doc format, detailing
need for fifth-generation tactics to create “the necessary new national security paradigm,” as
described by Robert David Steele.
“5th Generation “holistic” warfare requires a coherent global security strategy that
places its primary emphasis on nurturing legitimate governance everywhere. Only
legitimate governments can be effective at internal security against the minority
seeking to be terrorists
<snip>
“5th Generation warfare is total war through total engagement, and it demands that
the first priority be on both homeland education and infrastructure, followed by very
high investments in global peaceful preventive measures (what Joe Nye calls ‘soft
power’), with narrowly focused military intervention being a last resort…..”
Notes for 5th Generation Warfare:

[1] http://www.oss.net/
[2] http://www.oss.net/dynamaster/file_archive/040126/0edbc426d03357fb9970806bd01dca56/A041-5th
%20Generation%20Warfare.doc
Page 14
Fifth Generation Warfare?
William S. Lind (February 3, 2004)

Article (electronic) published by William S. Lind on February 3, 2004
Site: Defense and the National Interest[1]
Permalink to original: "Fifth Generation Warfare?[2]"
Summary for Fifth Generation Warfare?:
William S. Lind, co-author of “The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation[3]” which
for the first time modeled modern warfare as a generational framework, and generally considered
the “father” of the generational model, answers building speculation of a budding fifth generation
style of warfare:
From what I have seen thus far, honest attempts to discover a Fifth Generation
suggest that their authors have not fully grasped the vast change embodied in the
Fourth Generation. The loss of the state’s monopoly, not only on war but also on
social organization and first loyalties, alters everything. We are only in the earliest
stages of trying to understand what the Fourth Generation means in full and how it
will alter - or, in too many cases, end - our lives.
Attempting to visualize a Fifth Generation from where we are now is like trying to
see the outlines of the Middle Ages from the vantage point of the late Roman Empire.
There is no telescope that can reach so far.
In other words, the fourth generation of warfare has yet to fully materialize (or: has not been fully
visualized, itself.)
Page 15
Notes for Fifth Generation Warfare?:

[1] http://www.d-n-i.net/index.html
[2] http://www.d-n-i.net/lind/lind_2_03_04.htm
Page 16
The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century
Colonel Thomas X. Hammes (September 12, 2004)

Book published by Colonel Thomas X. Hammes on September 12, 2004
Site: Zenith Press, The Sling and the Stone[1]
Permalink to original: "The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century[2]"
Summary for The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century:
[3]
The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century[4]

by USMC, Colonel Thomas X. Hammes
From the publisher’s site:
Ongoing events in Iraq show how difficult it is for the world’s only remaining
superpower to impose its will upon other peoples. From Vietnam, French and US, to
Afghanistan, Russian and US, to Israel and the Palestinians, to Somalia and Kosovo,
recent history is replete with powerful military forces being tied up by seemingly
weaker opponents. This is Fourth Generation War (4GW), and Colonel Thomas
Hammes, United States Marine Corps, tells you all about it.
Hammes includes an overview of warfare through the ages as well as

recommendations for prescriptive actions in today’s world. This is an insightful book
analysing the strengths and weaknesses of coventional military power against an
enemy with a superior political willpower and ability to fight over time using
unconventional means.
Page 17
The book, which primarily considers 4GW, mentions 5GW briefly in three places near the end:
1. First, by stating that innovative leadership training will be required “not just to deal with
the seventy-year-old phenomenon of 4GW but also to deal with 5GW as it evolves.” [pages
274-275, paperback edition.]
2. “Only a highly flexible organization can hope to succeed in 4GW and still be prepared to
deal with emerging 5GW…” & “We can continue to man 3GW organizations using an
1890s personnel system….Or we can accept that 4GW has arrived and that 5GW is
evolving and organize ourselves accordingly.” [page 289, paperback edition.]
3. “Fourth-generation war has been around for more than seventy years; no doubt the fifth
generation is evolving even as we attempt to deal with its predecessor. We may not
recognize it as it evolves around us. Or we may look at several alternative futures and see
each as fifth-generation war.” The bio-attacks on Capitol Hill — anthrax and ricin — are
considered a precursor of 5GW; Hammes emphasizes the superempowered destructive
individual or small group as a viable, perhaps defining aspect of 5GW. He then reiterates
his belief that the U.S. should reorganize its military and societal capability for dealing
with 4GW forces and 5GW forces that may evolve — but does not suggest that America
should develop 5GW force structures itself. I.e., 4GW and 5GW will characterize the
opponent, not the U.S. [pages 290-291, paperback edition; last two pages of the book.]
On 0GW
Page 18
On 1GW
"The first generation of war grew not just from the invention of gunpowder but also
from the political, economic, and social structures that developed as Europe
transitioned from a feudal system to a system of nation-states ruled by monarchs...
Massed manpower had been the rule in ancient Greece and Rome and had even been a
major part of war during the Middle Ages. However, the combination of changes
across society provided the much larger armies and massed direct-fire weapons that
marked the culmination of the first generation of war at Waterloo."
On 2GW
"Several key factors normally associated with second-generation war (2GW) drove
the supremacy of the defense over the offense: machine guns, magazine-fed rifles,
rapid-fire artillery, and barbed wire. The combined effect of these elements took away
freedom of movement and forced both sides to rely on firepower--mostly indirect
firepower--in tactical engagements."
On 3GW
"Although still primarily an infantry army, the Germans organized their armored
forces into Panzer Corps and used them to shatter the cohesion of the Allied forces.
The result was another astonishing victory. Britain was evacuating its forces from
Dunkirk only sixteen days after the invasion. France lasted only another month. In
contrast to four bloody years of stalemate in World War I, the Germans conquered
France in weeks. The victory stunned the Western powers. They were certain the
Germans had created an entirely new form of warfare.
Third-generation warfare had arrived."
Page 19
On 4GW
"Fourth-generation warfare (4GW) uses all available networks--political, economic,

social, and military--to convince the enemy's political decision makers that their
strategic goals are either unachievable or too costly for the perceived benefit. It is an
evolved form of insurgency. Still rooted in the fundamental precept that superior
political will, when properly employed, can defeat greater economic and military
power, 4GW makes use of society's networks to carry on its fight. Unlike previous
generations of warfare, it does not attempt to win by defeating the enemy's military
forces. Instead, via the networks, it directly attacks the minds of enemy decision
makers to destroy the enemy's political will. Fourth-generation wars are lengthy--
measured in decades rather than months or years."
On 5GW
"Fourth-generation war has been around for more than seventy years; no doubt the
fifth generation is evolving even as we attempt to deal with its predecessor. We may
not recognize it as it evolves around us. Or we may look at several alternative futures
and see each as fifth-generation war."
Notes for The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century:
[1] http://www.zenithpress.com/
[2] http://www.zenithpress.com/Store/Product_Details.aspx?ProductID=16085
[3] http://www.amazon.com/gp/redirect.html%3FASIN=0760324077%26tag=phaticcommuni-
20%26lcode=xm2%26cID=2025%26ccmID=165953%26location=/o/ASIN/0760324077%253FSubscriptionId=0
B24FJ1ZKPWTZ1W4MBR2
[4] http://www.amazon.com/gp/redirect.html%3FASIN=0760324077%26tag=phaticcommuni-
20%26lcode=xm2%26cID=2025%26ccmID=165953%26location=/o/ASIN/0760324077%253FSubscriptionId=0
B24FJ1ZKPWTZ1W4MBR2
Page 20
Unto the Fifth Generation of War

Blog Post published by Mark Safranski on July 17, 2005
Site: ZenPundit[1]
Permalink to original: "Unto the Fifth Generation of War[2]"
Summary for Unto the Fifth Generation of War:
Early and detailed consideration of aspects which might constitute fifth generation warfare,
beginning with concepts of 4GW and building from there.
Key trends mentioned:
• Superempowerment
• Fluidity
• Multidimensional Battlespace
• Autonomous Surrogates
Key technologies and sciences mentioned:
• Artificial Intelligence
• Genomics
• Alternative Fuels
Page 21
• Quantum Computing
• Human Brain Research
• Complexity and Chaos Theory
• Nanotechnology
• String Theory
In addition, the concept of “driving deeper” is specifically noted:
“A strong possibility exists that given successive generations of warfare tend to drive
“deeper” into enemy territory, that 5GW will mean systemic liquidation of enemy
networks and their sympathizers, essentially a total war on a society or subsection of
a society.”
An alternative conceptualization of potential fifth generation warfare is suggested with an early

reference to Thomas P. M. Barnett’s[3] ” ‘System Administration’ based Global Transaction
Strategy” as a type of 5GW.
Colonel Thomas X. Hammes’ The Sling and the Stone is also quoted.
Notes for Unto the Fifth Generation of War:

[1] http://zenpundit.blogspot.com/
[2] http://zenpundit.blogspot.com/2005/07/unto-fifth-generation-of-war.html
[3] http://www.thomaspmbarnett.com/weblog/
Page 22
Orientation and Action, Part I: The OODA Loop

Blog Post published by Dan tdaxp on July 18, 2005
Site: tdaxp[1]
Permalink to original: "Orientation and Action, Part I: The OODA Loop[2]"
Summary for Orientation and Action, Part I: The OODA Loop:
Building off a post written by Mark Safranski of ZenPundit[3] — “successive generations of

warfare tend to drive ‘deeper’ into enemy territory” — Dan tdaxp utilizes Boyd’s OODA loop to
show how the fifth generation of warfare “goes deeper” into the enemy’s OODA cycle.
First strong mapping of the xGW framework onto the OODA cycle.
[4]
Originally titled, “Go Deep: OODA and the Rainbow of Generational Warfare.”
Links to:
• “Unto the Fifth Generation of War” posted on ZenPundit 07-17-2005
Page 23
On 0GW
On 1GW
"
• example: Napoleonic War
• characteristic: mass armies
• method of fighting: man-to-man
1GWs, like the Napoleon Wars, were extremely fluid. Armies could march whenever men’s
feet could carry them. Information was relatively symmetrical — precise locations of either
army were unavailable to any commander, while general knowledge of the land was known
to all commanders....1GW was defined by conflict centered around an enemy’s ability
to decide and act. "
On 2GW
"
• example: First World War
Page 24
• method of fighting: fixed-artillery-to-men
2GWs, like the First World War, were sticky. Armies took marched, drove, or took trains to
the front line — where they stopped. In 2nd Generation War, action is easy: charge. You
know exactly where you are, exactly where the enemy is, and exactly where you are going
to die...2GW was defined by conflict centered around an enemy’s ability to orient and
decide."
On 3GW
"
• example: Second World War
• characteristic: blitzkrieg, fast transitions from one maneuver to the next
• method of fighting: tanks/bombers-to-cities/armies
3GWs, like the trenches for most of the Second World War or the Lawrence of Arabia
campaign in the First World War, were fluid again. But conflict kept burrowing deeper into
the OODA loop and redshifting further away from action. Victory in 3rd Generation Wars
required the ability to instill madness — to mess with the enemy’s minds. The purpose of
3rd Generation Warfare is to paralyze the enemy with doubt. We move even deeper into the
OODA loop, to the red end of the rainbow. 3GW is defined by conflict centered around
an enemy’s ability to orient. "
On 4GW
"
Page 25
• example: Vietnam War
• characteristic: dispiriting the enemy
• method of fighting: propagandists-to-populations
If older generations of war were like fluids, 4GW was like a gas. It spreads everywhere yet
regular armies have a hard time even finding battles. Like 3rd Generation Wars, 4th
Generation Wars focus on the picture inside the enemy’s head. But while 3GW tries to
destroy the picture, 4GW builds a new one....While 3GW tries to paralyze the enemy with
doubt, 4GW tries to deny him even that much — 4GW drains the will of the enemy so he
“waits and sees,” robbing him of his ability to want to do anything. In practice, this means
4GW tries to destroy an enemy’s civil society, turning his population into mindless
cowards. To achieve this, 4GW is defined by conflict centered around Observe and
Orient."
On 5GW
" If traditional war centered on an enemy’s physical strength, and 4GW on his moral
strength, the 5th Generation of War would focus on his intellectual strength. A 5th
Generation War might be fought with one side not knowing who it is fighting. Or even, a
brilliantly executed 5GW might involve one side being completely ignorant that there ever
was a war. "
Notes for Orientation and Action, Part I: The OODA Loop:

[1] http://www.tdaxp.com/
[2] http://www.tdaxp.com/archive/2005/07/18/orientation-and-action-part-i-the-ooda-loop.html
[4] http://www.flickr.com/photos/dreaming5gw/1240780391/
Page 26
5GW
5GW
Younghusband (July 19, 2005)

Blog Post published by Younghusband on July 19, 2005
Site: Coming Anarchy[1]
Permalink to original: "5GW[2]"
Summary for 5GW:
Early note of discussions of 5GW theory which links to the blogs ZenPundit and tdaxp, including
excerpts from those.
Links to:
• “Orientation and Action, Part I: The OODA Loop” posted on tdaxp 07-18-2005
• “Fifth Generation War in the OODA Loop” posted on ZenPundit 07-19-2005
Notes for 5GW:

[1] http://cominganarchy.com/
[2] http://cominganarchy.com/2005/07/19/5gw/
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Fifth Generation War in the OODA Loop

Site: ZenPundit[1]
Permalink to original: "Fifth Generation War in the OODA Loop[2]"
Summary for Fifth Generation War in the OODA Loop:
Mark Safranski reponds to Dan tdaxp’s conceptualization of the “deeper” aspects of each
succeeding generation of warfare vis-a-vis John Boyd’s OODA Loop.
Whereas Mark Safranski had earlier conceived of a shift in battlespace deeper into enemy
territory, he now concedes that Dan tdaxp’s consideration of a shift in perspectives and the
decision making process that is “deeper” for each succeeding generation of warfare fits the xGW
framework very well.
Mark Safranski also ponders the distinct time frames associated with 4GW and, possibly, 5GW:
It occurs to me after reading Dan’s post the that a very powerful shift of longitudinal
perspective takes place. 4GW is executed over a very long time frame, sometimes
decades. 5GW is conceived in terms of strategic vision over an even longer time
frame, sometimes before an opponent realizes that they will be an opponent but the
execution time may be very short in comparison to 4GW.
Links to:
Page 28
Notes for Fifth Generation War in the OODA Loop:

[2] http://zenpundit.blogspot.com/2005/07/fifth-generation-war-in-ooda-loop-dan.html
Page 29
Boot on Unrestricted War
Boot on Unrestricted War

Blog Post published by Curtis Gale Weeks on July 20, 2005
Site: Phatic Communion[1]
Permalink to original: "Boot on Unrestricted War[2]"
Summary for Boot on Unrestricted War:
A look at the book Unrestricted Warfare which also references the blog tdaxp and links the blog
Coming Anarchy which had recently noted discussion of 5GW theory at tdaxp and the blog
ZenPundit.
Links to:
• “5GW” posted on Coming Anarchy 07-19-2005
Notes for Boot on Unrestricted War:

[1] http://phaticcommunion.com/
[2] http://www.phaticcommunion.com/archives/2005/07/boot_on_unrestr.php
Page 30
Dreaming 5th Generation War

Blog Post published by tdaxp on July 20, 2005
Site: tdaxp[1]
Permalink to original: "Dreaming 5th Generation War[2]"
Summary for Dreaming 5th Generation War:
A follow-up to an earlier post which extends consideration of the “deeper” aspects of fifth
generation warfare as it relates to John Boyd’s OODA Loop.
A reiteration of earlier points argued —
• “5th Generation of War would focus on [the enemy’s] intellectual strength.”
• “a brilliantly executed 5GW might involve one side being completely ignorant that there
ever was a war”
— and an exploration of them in multiple parts:
The Uncaring War: contemplates fingerspitzengefuhl, or “fingertip feeling”, or a greater

emphasis on the implicit (but perhaps unconscious/subconscious) than on the explicit (feelings,
rational thought, morality.)
Lessons from Software Development: secrecy will require advance and precise planning;
software development may provide a key for 5GW methodology: The waterfall development vs.
prototyping. Conclusion: “5th Generation Wars will be created with Waterfall Development”
which enables great secrecy.
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5th Generation Networks: envisions a non-hierarchical teamwork approach to conducting 5GW;

each member is equally valued by the group and equally committed to the project.
A Boydian Approach to 5GW: on co-opting the enemy (but not phrased as such) by manipulating
the enemy’s OODA process so that he becomes “entangled” without being aware of what
entangles him.
A Dream of 5GW: An example of a theoretical fifth generation war is given, through the lens of a
particular “Border War” involving “a highly-able team of Nativists [that] wishes to militarize the
Southwest border of the United States against Mexican migrants.” Two proxy groups are created
by the Nativists, here called “Islamaphobes” and “Islamophiles”, which honestly believe in, and
fight for, their individual causes; but the tension they create is merely a prelude to another major
Islamic terrorist attack on the U.S., which causes the U.S. to clamp down on all immigration. The
purpose of creating the -phobes and the -philes is merely to ratchet up debate before all debate is
summarily closed in a manner that also helps out the anti-Mexican-immigrants goal of the Nativist
5GW organization; and said organization is the only organization that knows exactly what has
occurred.
This blog post also contains an early mention of Peter Wiggin, the brother of Ender Wiggin from
science fiction author Orson Scott Card’s[3] Ender’s Game and Shadow of the Hegemon.
Notes for Dreaming 5th Generation War:

[2] http://www.tdaxp.com/archive/2005/07/20/dreaming-5th-generation-war.html
[3] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Orson_Scott_Card
Page 32
Dreaming 5th Generation War: Comment
Dreaming 5th Generation War: Comment

Comment published by Curtis Gale Weeks on July 21, 2005
Site: tdaxp[1]
Permalink to original: "Dreaming 5th Generation War: Comment[2]"
Summary for Dreaming 5th Generation War: Comment:
Curtis Gale Weeks comments on the post “Dreaming 5th Generation War[3]” published by Dan
tdaxp on the blog tdaxp.
The comment ponders “a scenario in which multiple, seemingly unrelated events hurt one nation
(or a group of nations) repeatedly, as if ‘the hand of God’ were behind those events” as an example
of fifth generation war unfolding.
Notes for Dreaming 5th Generation War: Comment:

[2] http://www.tdaxp.com/archive/2005/07/20/dreaming-5th-generation-war.html#c177495
[3] http://www.tdaxp.com/archive/2005/07/20/dreaming-5th-generation-war.html
Page 33
Emerging NetWar / SecretWar Tactic: Stealth Shareholder Activism
Emerging NetWar / SecretWar Tactic: Stealth Shareholder

Activism

Blog Post published by tdaxp on July 22, 2005
Site: tdaxp[1]
Permalink to original: "Emerging NetWar / SecretWar Tactic: Stealth Shareholder
Activism[2]"
Summary for Emerging NetWar / SecretWar Tactic: Stealth Shareholder Activism:
A look at how shareholder activism may be one method by which a 5GW organization can operate
secretly (although said activism may also be used for 4GW) which concludes with two points:
• Major Benefit of Shareholder Activism for 5GW: SecretWarrior can affect

change through publicly inoccuous front organizations
• Major Detriment of Shareholder Activism for 5GW: Relies on visibility of

front groups to be effective, requires “hearts and minds”
The point is also made: that [shareholder activist] 5GW fighters need not influence all members of
a target population but only need influence the most powerful within that population or those
members of the population who are in a position to institute policy changes.
Notes for Emerging NetWar / SecretWar Tactic: Stealth Shareholder Activism:

[2] http://www.tdaxp.com/archive/2005/07/22/emerging-netwar-secretwar-tactic-stealth-shareholder-activis.html
Page 34
Blog Notice
Blog Notice

Permalink to original: "Blog Notice[2]"
Summary for Blog Notice:
Among other things, this blog post contemplates the changing world and whether pre-5GW styles
of fighting will quickly grow cost-ineffective:
The present question is whether we are approaching a time when the costs of pre-
5GW types of wars will far outweigh any potential benefits. If so, pre-5GW wars will
not disappear — because madmen, idiots, and egomaniacs don’t always do a cost
analysis before initiating violent conflicts! — but perhaps democratic nations (at
least) have more checks on such madmen, and advances in technology and
knowledge in general would unearth the net loss which high-tech pre-5GW wars
promise.
For instance, wars over the control of natural resources might offer a good payback,
but not if infrastructure is too destroyed to make use of those natural resources!
Links to:
• “Dreaming 5th Generation War” posted on tdaxp 07-20-2005
• “Emerging NetWar / SecretWar Tactic: Stealth Shareholder Activism” posted on tdaxp 07-
22-2005
• “SecretWarriors Walk Without Rhythm, Won’t Attract the Worm” posted on tdaxp 07-23-
Page 35
Blog Notice
2005
Notes for Blog Notice:

[2] http://www.phaticcommunion.com/archives/2005/07/blog_notice.php
Page 36
SecretWarriors Walk Without Rhythm, Won't Attract the Worm
SecretWarriors Walk Without Rhythm, Won't Attract the

Worm

Site: tdaxp[1]
Permalink to original: "SecretWarriors Walk Without Rhythm, Won't Attract the
Worm[2]"
Summary for SecretWarriors Walk Without Rhythm, Won't Attract the Worm:
This post uses John Boyd’s OODA loop to stress the importance of secrecy in fifth generation
warfare efforts:
In SecretWar, or 5GW, the fighter tries to hurt without being hurt — at all. If the
world knows the SecretWarrior exists, she has already lost. 5th Generation War
allows very weak fighters to attack, because the world does not know about them. If
the world knew about a 5GWarrior she could be eliminated easily.
Dan tdaxp also quotes a comment left on an earlier post at tdaxp by Curtis Gale Weeks and
concludes that Secret Warriors [5GWarriors] must “walk without rhythm” to avoid detection.
Links to:
• “Dreaming 5th Generation War: Comment” posted on tdaxp 07-21-2005
Page 37
SecretWarriors Walk Without Rhythm, Won't Attract the Worm
Notes for SecretWarriors Walk Without Rhythm, Won't Attract the Worm:
[2] http://www.tdaxp.com/archive/2005/07/23/secretwarriors-walk-without-rhythm-won-t-attract-the-worm.html
Page 38
SecretWar: Plain Jane Tries to Kill the Yakuza Boss

Site: tdaxp[1]
Permalink to original: "SecretWar: Plain Jane Tries to Kill the Yakuza Boss[2]"
Summary for SecretWar: Plain Jane Tries to Kill the Yakuza Boss:
The metaphor of a “Plain Jain” who tries to kill a Yakuza Boss is utilized to argue that
“randomness is very attractive” and would severely reduce the secrecy of a 5GW operation:
For a woman crossing the dance floor, tripping is even more noticeable than swaying
her hips.
The 5GWarrior must hide in the crowd, making the most probable explanation of her
behavior that she is just “normal,” not that she is attempting to murder a Boss.
I.e., where previously Dan tdaxp had argued that “walking without rhythm[3]” — or, with
randomness — would serve to obscure the 5GW attack, the argument is now made that the
assassin (in this metaphor) would present a rhythm that is “normal” and entirely expected; she
must shape the enemy’s observations by presenting normalcy.
The argument is applied to a comment previously left by Curtis Gale Weeks on another post at
tdaxp concerning a succession of random events utilized to attack a nation or group of nations,
with the conclusion that such a method of operation would be bad for a fifth generation warrior:
Because randomness is very attractive, a succession of “random” catastrophes

striking a nation will be very, very suspicious. People are superstitious — they are
Page 39
gifted with “fingertip feeling” or Fingerspitzengefuhl — and will implicitly decide

that something is doing this to them. To a 5GWarrior, who cannot afford to have her
cover exposed, a paranoid victim is a dangerous victim.
Links to:
• “Dreaming 5th Generation War: Comment” posted on tdaxp 07-21-2005
• “5GW Reloaded: Reflecting on 5th Generation War Concepts” posted on ZenPundit 07-25-
2005
Notes for SecretWar: Plain Jane Tries to Kill the Yakuza Boss:
[2] http://www.tdaxp.com/archive/2005/07/25/secretwar-plain-jane-tries-to-kill-the-yakuza-boss.html
[3] http://www.tdaxp.com/archive/2005/07/23/secretwarriors-walk-without-rhythm-won-t-attract-the-worm.html
Page 40
5GW Reloaded: Reflecting on 5th Generation War Concepts

Site: ZenPundit[1]
Permalink to original: "5GW Reloaded: Reflecting on 5th Generation War Concepts[2]"
Summary for 5GW Reloaded: Reflecting on 5th Generation War Concepts:
A link fest linking to many more items than can be displayed below.
Mark Safranski ponders two ideas introduced by Dan tdaxp of the blog tdaxp: that 5GW will
target an enemy’s intellectual strength, and that secrecy will be key in fifth generation warfare.
General approval is given to these ideas for describing what is likely for fifth generation warfare,
with the caveat: that those two aspects of 5GW “may end up [to] be less significant than aspects
of 5GW that have yet to materialize.” Mark Safranski links the scope of societal changes with the
advancement to 5GW in the xGW model while implying that exact predictions of what these
societal changes will be are difficult to make. Indeed, future societal changes “may favor defense
over offense.”
Additionally, fifth generation warriors may in fact implement their changes “from above” but not
as a result of revolution; rather, “by moving up through legitimate channels to implement an
invisible evolution from above.”
Links to:
Page 41
• “Blog Notice” posted on Phatic Communion 07-23-2005
2005
• “Emerging NetWar / SecretWar Tactic: Stealth Shareholder Activism” posted on tdaxp 07-
22-2005
Notes for 5GW Reloaded: Reflecting on 5th Generation War Concepts:

[2] http://zenpundit.blogspot.com/2005/07/5gw-reloaded-reflecting-on-5th.html
Page 42
5GW Effectors
5GW Effectors

Site: Dreaming 5GW[1]
Permalink to original: "5GW Effectors[2]"
Summary for 5GW Effectors:
(Originally appeared on the defunct blog Phatic Communion.)
A post dissecting what kind of activity the 5GWarrior would utilize. Specifically, a consideration
of “rhythm” and “randomness” leads to a questioning of the secrecy aspect assumed to exist in
fifth generation warfare, via a metaphor Dan tdaxp had already utilized: The female assassin that
targets a Yakuza Boss:
1. The yakuza boss, when killed, would no longer appear to be alive. That is, if an action
occurs, its effects are always observable, even if we don’t happen to see the action itself.
2. What kind of effects will a 5GW warrior desire? What kind of activity will the 5GW
warrior attempt in order to obtain the results desired? Specifically, why would a 5GW
warrior engage in activity the results of which are entirely unobservable; would such
results truly be results, if they do not produce cascading effects or a changed reality?
3. If results are observable, to what degree can the “secret” in terms such as SecretWar and
SecretWarrior, obtain or persist?
Page 43
5GW Effectors
These questions lead to two alternative unfoldings for fifth generation warfare:
Crossing the Rubicon: in which the effects caused by the fifth generation attacker may be clearly
seen, but even if they are ultimately connected by the target to some enemy and understood to be a
concerted effort to defeat the target, the target has already been influenced to “cross the rubicon”,
unable to avoid the remaining negative effects of the fifth generation attack: “A successful 5GW
will leave the target on a downward spiral into insignificance. The target’s knowing it has been a
victim won’t save the target from the spiral.”
The SecretWarrior as Benefactor: The most influential members of a society able to operate
with no or very limited negative suspicion are those who can promise the most benefit to that
society; and, a society which believes it is moving toward a brighter future may also “cross the
rubicon” — but without realizing that the achievements it has made are in fact much less than
what it might have achieved had the 5GW not occurred. Such a society might be quite happy and
content with its future prospects, never even knowing that a fifth generation war had targeted them
and limited them.
This post was later cross-posted to the blog Dreaming 5GW under the same name[3].
Links to:
2005
• “SecretWar: Plain Jane Tries to Kill the Yakuza Boss” posted on tdaxp 07-25-2005
• “5th Generation Thumbnail Sketches” posted on tdaxp 07-26-2005
Notes for 5GW Effectors:

[1] http://dreaming5gw.com
Page 44
5GW Effectors
[2] http://www.dreaming5gw.com/2006/10/5gw_effectors.php
[3] http://www.fifthgeneration.phaticcommunion.com/archives/2006/10/5gw_effectors.php
Page 45
5th Generation Thumbnail Sketches
Phil (July 26, 2005)

Blog Post published by Phil on July 26, 2005
Site: tdaxp[1]
Permalink to original: "5th Generation Thumbnail Sketches[2]"
Summary for 5th Generation Thumbnail Sketches:
A guest post at the blog tdaxp which examines two points recently offered by two other bloggers
—
• that 5GW is a war on the enemy’s “intellectual strength”
• that 5GW will go “deeper” into a target’s society
— and combines them in a consideration of who, exactly, may be the fifth generation warriors.
The 5GWers may in fact be citizens of the targeted population who desire that country’s defeat or
at least can be persuaded to act in a way that leads to that country’s defeat. The thumbnail sketches
are given in terms of 4GW:
In 4GW the enemy attempts to use the target country’s media as a vehicle to sap the
people’s and political leaders’ will to fight. In 5GW the enemy actually becomes the
media and the political leadership. In 4GW a terrorist organization might attack a
school or a courthouse in order to show that the government can’t defend itself; in
5GW the enemy would become the teachers and judges.
Page 46
The point is also made that states will have virtually no role in such warfare, since the warfare is
intellectual in nature; furthermore, an early mention is made of defense against 5GW requiring the
development of 5GW tactics by the defender.
Links to:
Notes for 5th Generation Thumbnail Sketches:

[2] http://www.tdaxp.com/archive/2005/07/26/5th-generation-thumbnail-sketches.html
Page 47
Limitations of 5GW
Limitations of 5GW

Blog Post published by Curtis Gale Weeks on August 2, 2005
Permalink to original: "Limitations of 5GW[2]"
Summary for Limitations of 5GW:
(Originally appeared on the defunct blog Phatic Communion)
A blog post that considers fifth generation war waged against whole societies: what features
should be considered?
• Would small 5GW forces be able to defeat a large and complex society, given that a large
society is also comprised of many smaller sub-sets or groups?
• “[I]f attacking the intelligence is the primary modus operandi of the 5GW force, that force
would need to be, er, quite intelligent indeed in order to have any hope of success.” The
attacker “would need an extraordinary understanding — a fundamental comprehension —
of the targeted society or force.”
• Because of the complexity of a large society, the 5GW attacker would need to attack [the
intelligence of] the most influential members within that society who could then influence
large portions of that society; but many others would not be so easily fooled: “the
disenfranchised, the sub- and counter-cultural groups — in short: those who do not
subscribe to the worldviews shared by most members of that society.”
Conclusion:
1. The 5GW attacker would “need to influence the majority and the leaders of that majority,
Page 48
Limitations of 5GW
or indeed create a majority will”; but
2. “the oddball [disenfranchised] elements of a society are more likely to be sensitive to

changes in the majority opinion than those who hold the majority opinion” and are
therefore quite likely to realize something is occurring.
Early introduction of the idea of “canaries in the mine” during fifth generation war: oddball or
disenfranchised elements within a society may act as signals that a 5GW is occurring.
Moreover: Those odd elements within a society might raise a defense against the 5GW attacker,
but their defensive efforts may therefore seem to target the dominant elements of a society which
have been influenced or co-opted by the 5GW attacker. The dominant elements, blind to the 5GW,
may only see that they are being attacked by members of their own society; thus civil war may
ensue — or is it possible that a main operation of 5GW that targets a whole society would be the
instigation of civil war within that targeted society?
Notes for Limitations of 5GW:

[2] http://www.dreaming5gw.com/2006/10/limitations_of_5gw.php
Page 49
Limitations of 5GW: Comment
Alan Sullivan (August 3, 2005)

Comment published by Alan Sullivan on August 3, 2005
Permalink to original: "Limitations of 5GW: Comment[2]"
Summary for Limitations of 5GW: Comment:
Alan Sullivan suggests that 9/11 fits the prevailing description of fifth generation war. Some
responses to the attack on the WTC, vis-a-vis the airline industry, were horribly bad and in fact
hurt the U.S. Furthermore, such knee-jerk reactions solidified al-Qaeda’s will to attack again.
Notes for Limitations of 5GW: Comment:

[2] http://www.phaticcommunion.com/archives/2005/08/limitations_of.php#comment-286
Page 50

Comment published by Curtis Gale Weeks on August 3, 2005
Permalink to original: "Limitations of 5GW: Comment[2]"
Summary for Limitations of 5GW: Comment:
Curtis Gale Weeks responds to a comment left by Alan Sullivan, who suggested that 9/11 fits the
description of a fifth-generation attack:
The present insurgency in Iraq, the followup bombings in Madrid and London, the
bombings in Egypt (and the abduction of foreign diplomats in Iraq) have the
hallmark of a 4GW war: the effort to sap the will of the targeted enemy. In Madrid,
al-Qaeda succeeded.
9/11 was something else, since it really initiated so many present countermoves by
America, rather than sap America’s will. Most of America didn’t realize we were
fighting jihadists until 9/11.
Notes for Limitations of 5GW: Comment:

[2] http://www.phaticcommunion.com/archives/2005/08/limitations_of.php#comment-287
Page 51
SecretWar (5GW)
SecretWar (5GW)

Blog Post published by Dan tdaxp on August 6, 2005
Site: tdaxp[1]
Permalink to original: "SecretWar (5GW)[2]"
Summary for SecretWar (5GW):
Dan tdaxp responds to a blog post published on Phatic Communion and further embellishes the
idea that fifth generation war is “Secret War.”
Points made:
• Economy of force improves with each succeeding generation of warfare; so 5GW targeting
a society or culture will involve small 5GW forces able to defeat the larger societies or
cultures.
• Contra CGW, these 5GW would not need to intellectually understand the targeted society
in-depth, but rather will need great “fingertip feeling or ‘fingerspitzengefuhl’ “, or good
implicit knowledge rather than explicit knowledge of the targeted society.
• An open society is naturally well-defended from a 5GW attack: transparency forces the
Secret Warrior to operate in the open, which risks the secrecy of the 5GW attack.
• Contra CGW (?), merely influencing the most influential members of a society should be
sufficient for a 5GW attack since “Universal buy-in has never been a prerequisite for
power.” I.e., the dissenting voices of a small minority will be overlooked or, through
transparency and general great openness, conspiracies and dissent will be laid to rest.
• Co-optation by SecretWarriors: “the President wouldn’t be a SecretWarrior, but he would
Page 52
SecretWar (5GW)
be a tool of the SecretWarrior.”
• Operation Northwoods[3] is referenced as a potential proto-5GW which would have

purposely “created a majority will [CGW]”
• Contra CGW, small minorities such as the disenfranchised and sub-/counter-cultural

elements are naturally dismissed, overlooked, their potential for warnings of 5GW attacks
lost in the background noise, and thus secrecy will be maintained nonetheless: “Any real
SecretWar attack met with warnings that are lost in the background noise is the same as a
SecretWar without warning.”
• If “Secret Networks”, or those waging 5GW “latch on” to partisan groups, they would
benefit from the disruption caused by the conflict between said partisan groups even while
those groups also benefited from ratcheting up the partisan conflict; but, differently.
Links to:
• “Fifth Generation Warfare?” posted on Defense and the National Interest 02-03-2004
• “Limitations of 5GW” posted on Phatic Communion 08-02-2005
Notes for SecretWar (5GW):

[2] http://www.tdaxp.com/archive/2005/08/06/secretwar-5gw.html
[3] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Northwoods
Page 53
On “Fifth Generation” Warfare?
Bryce Lane (August 6, 2005)

Article (electronic) published by Bryce Lane on August 6, 2005
Site: Defense and the National Interest[1]
Permalink to original: "On “Fifth Generation” Warfare?[2]"
Summary for On “Fifth Generation” Warfare?:
[No publication date given or found; listed date is an approximation based on the date of a blog
post first-reference of “On ‘Fifth Generation’ Warfare?”]
The world is composed of a psychological terrain that has less and less to do with
topography or national boundaries.
This is a pdf article which introduces 4 elements within our modern world that will bear on the
development of 5GW, followed by 3 suggestions for defending against 5GW.
4 Elements promoting the shift to 5GW and/or describing 5GW:
• Technological advances which may permit very small groups or individuals to cause major
effects upon the systems, mostly negative. (I.e., superempowerment defined through access
to technology.)
• Cultural identities and cultures are weakening and may receive competition from
idiosyncratic identities or individualistic ideologies. Thus, certain individuals may “see
themselves and their identities writ large across the fabric of humanity and history itself.”
Page 54
• Targeted groups or peoples will be turned against themselves by the 5GW attacker.
Specific changes in culture and ideology are not the primary goal, however; rather, such
reactions within the target are “gratifying to the inside psychology of the initiating group.”
The subsequent results leading from reactionary responses are the primary goal.
• Factionalism will make identifying friend and foe very difficult. Reactionary factions may
seek to benefit from the upheaval, thus may cause more chaos and conflict even if they are
not behind the 5GW attack.
3 Suggested defensive initiatives:
• Improved civic skills for managing the chaos. Those who would feed off the quick-
changing conditions need to be redirected, their activities channeled. Media will be key.
• Greater networking, or inter-connection, within a society, would help identify those

seeking to benefit from whatever chaos is occurring. (Those who would benefit, by
latching on to the dynamics of the chaos, may not be the original initiators of the chaos.)
Those who would benefit are not invisible nor particularly hidden, since they generally will
come from the middle- and upper-middle classes with access to the tools for effecting large
changes within a society.
• Streamline infrastructure and internal systems so that they become less available as
potential targets and/or potential weapons. “Remove opportunities” rather than focusing
only on the individuals within the society.
Concluding thoughts/summary within the article: Superempowerment will make possible and
more likely the attempt to write one’s own identity large over the society/cultural system, in
particular with regard to those who are anti-social or indeed are sociopaths.
Page 55
Notes for On “Fifth Generation” Warfare?:

[1] http://www.d-n-i.net/
[2] http://www.d-n-i.net/fcs/pdf/lane_fifth_gen.pdf
Page 56
Revisiting 5th Generation War
Mark Safranski (August 7, 2005)

Blog Post published by Mark Safranski on August 7, 2005
Site: ZenPundit[1]
Permalink to original: "Revisiting 5th Generation War[2]"
Summary for Revisiting 5th Generation War:
Mark Safranski references Thomas P.M. Barnett’s[3] thoughts on “system perturbation” and
“cascading effects” when contemplating Bryce Lane’s article “On ‘Fifth Generation’ Warfare?”
while agreeing with Lane that geography no longer serves to define “the Logospheric state of
5GW conflict.”
A consideration of recent blog posts on tdaxp and Phatic Communion leads to the introduction of
the concept of “white noise” and 5GW. Those who hold the levers of power within a society may
be influenced to act in ways which produce indirect results desired by fifth generation attackers;
the actual changes or activities may not be the final goal but rather “distractors” which a) produce
other indirect outcomes, or emergence, desired by the 5GW attacker, and b) enable the 5GW
attacker to remain hidden.
Links to:
• “Limitations of 5GW” posted on Phatic Communion 08-02-2005
• “SecretWar (5GW)” posted on tdaxp 08-06-2005
• “On “Fifth Generation” Warfare?” posted on Defense and the National Interest 08-06-2005
Page 57
Notes for Revisiting 5th Generation War:

[2] http://zenpundit.blogspot.com/2005/08/revisiting-5th-generation-war.html
Page 58
Personal Equals Political

Blog Post published by Curtis Gale Weeks on August 9, 2005
Permalink to original: "Personal Equals Political[2]"
Summary for Personal Equals Political:
“The Chimeras”, a poem by W. H. Auden[3], is related to 5GW.
Speculation of a label given to the effort to either pre-empt a 5GW attack or defend against one:
“The War on Confusion.”
The label is drawn from the present taxonomy being used to describe the pre-emption/defense
against 4GW — The War on Terror.
It is suggested that either label points to the need for personal, individual development in a
4GW/5GW world, as a defense; furthermore, that superempowerment of individuals, which will
figure heavily in the future dynamics of the world, correlates with the suggestion of a necessity for
personal development.
It is thought that “the poem might offer deep insights into the conflicts facing us by offering
insights into the very personal aspects of that conflict, the aspects of our own personal reactions
and the actions of those who oppose us.”
Links to:
Page 59
• “SecretWar (5GW)” posted on tdaxp 08-06-2005
Notes for Personal Equals Political:

[2] http://www.phaticcommunion.com/archives/2005/08/personal_equals.php
[3] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Auden
Page 60
5GW: Soundless + Formless + Polished + Leading
5GW: Soundless + Formless + Polished + Leading
Dan tdaxp (February 4, 2006)

Blog Post published by Dan tdaxp on February 4, 2006
Site: tdaxp[1]
Permalink to original: "5GW: Soundless + Formless + Polished + Leading[2]"
Summary for 5GW: Soundless + Formless + Polished + Leading:
I won’t say that between Sun Tzu, Musashi, and tdaxp, you shall learn everything
you need to about 5GW….
But add VNV Nation’s Matter + Form, and you probably will.
Soundless, formless, polished, leading: These are attributes of a 5GW campaign/force.
A polished 5GW army will soundlessly and formlessly [lead] his enemy to where he
wants him to be: and that will be the end of the 5GW. The loser will never know he
lost. A repeated 5GW victim may sense his illness, but with 5GW attacking his
Observation capacity, the victim’s response will probable make his situation worse.
Notes for 5GW: Soundless + Formless + Polished + Leading:

[2] http://www.tdaxp.com/archive/2006/02/04/5gw-soundless-formless-polished-leading.html
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Truly formless 5GW
Truly formless 5GW
Younghusband (March 10, 2006)

Blog Post published by Younghusband on March 10, 2006
Permalink to original: "Truly formless 5GW[2]"
Summary for Truly formless 5GW:
A consideration of two blog posts on tdaxp, followed by an alternative speculation of what will
constitute fifth-generation warfare.
Emergent communities, or emergent networks, may be examples of 5GW organization, particularly

since these groups may form around an idea or cause but without having any actual (or at least
formal) channels used for communication and coordination. This may leave them formless
although their primary targets may continue to “see” a coherent operation/organization behind the
attacks — thus jumping to conclusions about who is the attacker.
The movie The Usual Suspects[3] is referenced: Keyser Söze;
“The greatest trick the Devil ever pulled was convincing the world he didn’t exist.”
Could the opposite be true? Could the greatest trick a terrorist movement ever pull is
convincing the world that it did exist? I could see how warring on this myth
(effectively a figment of the paranoid imagination) to the ends of the earth could
definitely bankrupt a state.
Links to:
• “5GW: Soundless + Formless + Polished + Leading” posted on tdaxp 02-04-2006
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Truly formless 5GW
Notes for Truly formless 5GW:

[2] http://cominganarchy.com/2006/03/10/truly-formless-5gw/
[3] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Usual_Suspects
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Truly Formless 5GW: Comment
Dan tdaxp (March 10, 2006)

Comment published by Dan tdaxp on March 10, 2006
Permalink to original: "Truly Formless 5GW: Comment[2]"
Summary for Truly Formless 5GW: Comment:
A description of xGW is offered which stresses the viability of each succeeding generation of war
with respect to prior generations:
Every generation of war is a qualitative shift. One way of thinking that is that it
allows an opponent to win at a something like 20x disadvantage against an earlier
generation of war. So 20 5GWers could defeat 400 4GWers, who could defeat 8000
3GWers, who could defeat 160000 2GWers, etc.
Notes for Truly Formless 5GW: Comment:

[2] http://cominganarchy.com/2006/03/10/truly-formless-5gw/#comment-73124
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Arherring (March 11, 2006)

Comment published by Arherring on March 11, 2006
From the idea that each successive generation within the xGW framework is developed to respond
to, and to defeat, the previous generation, Arherring considers the possibility that
by definition wouldn’t 5GW be the next logical step for a National / State actor to
move toward in order to function against transnational 4GW players?
With respect to 5GW, “the main weapon it will wield will be the idea of connectivity,” and the
ideas or cause which Younghusband (in the commented post) supposes may lead to the emergence
of diverse and unconnected groups may rather be used in a viral way to specifically influence
those groups:
I imagine it to be sort of viral, with each person in the organization being a vector to
spread the idea be they a soldier, a diplomat, an engineer, or a relief worker.

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John Robb (March 11, 2006)

Comment published by John Robb on March 11, 2006
John Robb, responding to a comment left by Arherring that states might use 5GW to combat 4GW
networks — through the use of viral memes? — offers an alternative interpretation: fifth-
generation warriors, called here by John Robb “GG’s” (“global guerrillas”), may
ignore the decision making of the government entirely (their entire OODA loop) and
focus directly on the population/economy.
In effect, this would shut down states as viable actors for 5GW and also leave them unable to
defend against 5GW [ed.: implication added.]

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Comment published by Curtis Gale Weeks on March 12, 2006
Responding to various other comments, and particularly considering comments left by Arherring
and Dan tdaxp, Curtis Gale Weeks suggests the necessity of reconsidering 5GW from a “nuts and
bolts” perspective:
Dan’s broad characterization of the effectiveness of 5GW forces who are fighting
prior-generation forces is a little too abstract or even inconsequential, since it does
not describe exactly how a 5GW force may fight a 4GW force. I’m talking, nuts and
bolts. Consider the effective 4GW forces that have emerged in modern times; then
ponder how a shadowy—indeed, a formless—5GW force will fight a 4GW force in
order to achieve the 20x advantage.
If a “fuzzy” 4GW force seeks to “sap the will” of opponents, how will a “hidden” 5GW defeat
such a force without that force knowing it was the victim of 5GW? Primarily: Why would the
4GW force continue to act in a manner that becomes self-destructive — never seeing that the path
is self-destructive?
Additionally, the idea is introduced that 5GW forces will utilize all prior generations of warfare
fighting, when necessary, generally by co-opting or influencing prior-generation forces:
I think that, quite unlike all previous forms of warfare, a 5GW force will utilize all
the previous forms of warfare, in whatever combinations are appropriate to given
situations. This does not mean that the 5GW force will necessarily bomb the hell out
of people or engage in guerrilla warfare; instead, it means that the 5GW force will be
manipulating 4GW, 3GW, 2GW, 1GW forces against each other. The 5GW force
might even slip into direct 4GW activity in order to frame other parties, but very
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carefully, so as not to be discovered itself. This utilization of all other forms of

warfare is qualitatively different than how the other types of warfare operate.

Page 68
Initiating 5GW
Initiating 5GW

Blog Post published by Curtis Gale Weeks on March 14, 2006
Permalink to original: "Initiating 5GW[2]"
Summary for Initiating 5GW:
(Originally posted at the now defunct blog Phatic Communion.)
Building upon conversations on the blogs tdaxp and Coming Anarchy, CGW expands upon a
comment he left on Coming Anarchy by considering how in fact 5GW forces will operate in a
“nuts and bolts” fashion. Previously, most discussions of 5GW focused on the abstract or general
aspects of fifth generation warfare without considering how those aspects will constrain the
activities of fifth generation forces:
In comments to the thread at Coming Anarchy, Dan reintroduced the concept of

greater effectiveness for succeeding generations of warfare — a 5GWarrior would,
theoretically, be 20x as strong as a 4GWarrior, or able to kill (or neutralize) 20-times
more 4GW opponents as a 4GWarrior would his 5GW foes. Whatever the actual
number, such a concept makes sense, or else there would be no evolutionary reason
for succeeding generations of warfare. But the concept makes claims which have yet
to be supported in our theory of 5GW, since we do not have a clear concept of how
the 5GW neutralizes 20x 4GW opponents if the two are in combat….
This is a major problem in the theory of 5GW. Although we have a working theory of
broad qualities of 5GW, I wonder if we can think our way through proofs of these
qualities. In Greek tragedies, some disguised god or goddess would lend a strategic
hand or lay traps for the protagonist; and, in 5GW mythology, we so far have dreams
of such gods and goddesses who accomplish their tasks with magic. We do not really
know how they do it.
Some “god-like” actions may have merit, e.g. Katrina-like natural disasters which entirely obsess
the target of those disasters. Whether such an approach is used by a 5GW force may depend upon
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Initiating 5GW
the sophistication of the target: Will the target have the forensic capabilities and organization
which will allow it to ultimately trace back the effects to the cause, should the 5GW force directly
create major disasters? Generally, the ideas that 1) all effects are observable and 2) being physical,
or a matter of physics, they are traceable, means that direct kinetic activities by 5GW forces are
quite dangerous for them, although given the sophistication or lack thereof of the target such
activities may have some use within 5GW.
Alternatively, 5GW forces may try to frame other parties when creating major disasters, to throw
off pursuit and also to set up conflict between two other parties. Preferably, these other parties
who are framed will be “usual suspects” — and better yet, they will want to claim responsibility
for disasters even if they had nothing to do with those disasters. Again, however, this approach
may be dangerous for 5GW actors, not only because of the potential for incriminating forensic
evidence but also because the framed parties may reject claims of responsibility.
However, either of the above possibilities may work even if the cause is detected or traced back to
the 5GW force (or at least away from the framed party) if time-lag between the original
disaster/attack and the discovery of subterfuge is great enough to have left the targets in a
downward spiral from which they cannot escape or in a position of extreme weakness.
The blog post concludes from these considerations:
What things are hardest to track? Answer: memes.
Memetic engineering (though not so-called within the post) will offer the best possibility for
influence and manipulation of other forces without detection. A variety of examples and
possibilities are offered. The post finally answers a question implied by previous conversations on
other blogs:
So, then, how could a hidden 5GW force defeat a fuzzy 4GW force? Influence it to
fight another force, one it already despises — and, preferably, one it cannot defeat.
Or, introduce dispute within it, of the sort that would paralyze its activities, create
massive amounts of in-fighting. Or, befriend it; give it real accomplishments (perhaps
by surreptitiously influencing other parties who can give them these) which,
nonetheless, lead to final outcomes quite different than it originally intended.
Because a 4GW force tends to be decentralized, dependent on local actors and local
activities, focus on influencing them. Do not try to destroy the 4GW force; focus on
changing it.
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Initiating 5GW
This blog post was later cross-posted to the blog Dreaming 5GW[3].
Links to:
• “Truly formless 5GW” posted on Coming Anarchy 03-10-2006
• “Truly Formless 5GW: Comment” posted on Coming Anarchy 03-11-2006
• “5GW: Soundless + Formless + Polished + Leading” posted on tdaxp 02-04-2006
Notes for Initiating 5GW:

[2] http://www.dreaming5gw.com/2006/10/initiating_5gw.php
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Observing the Maturing World

Permalink to original: "Observing the Maturing World[2]"
Summary for Observing the Maturing World:
(Originally published at the now-defunct blog Phatic Communion.)
A mapping of the xGW framework onto John Boyd’s OODA theory utilizing a Revised OODA
developed by Curtis Gale Weeks. Part 3 of a 3-part series on the OODA, following “Rethinking
the OODA[3]” and “EBO is Everything in War — Almost[4]”.
The post has several sections:
Introduction — in which the previous post in the series, on EBO, is summarized. The limitations
of EBO are thought to be a result of the difference between reason, which is informed by past
experiences/learning, and concrete cause/effect chains occuring in the present. I.e., observations in
the present, which EBO tries to influence, are not the sole determinant of an individual’s decision
to act in a particular way; thus, EBO is limited. However, no one may conduct warfare or engage
in conflict without altering the present physical environment, which means that EBO, of some
form, is important to modern warfare.
We Observe, We Orient, We Decide/Act — a section which examines Dan tdaxp’s and William
Lind’s ideas concerning the generational warfare model, focusing on the observational aspects of
each generation. Whereas Dan tdaxp considered the way each successive generation of warfare
attempts to attack the enemy’s decision process by “going deeper” into the enemy’s OODA, and
William Lind focused on the technological and tactical differences between each succeeding
generation, both approaches may be seen to reflect changes in observational capability due to
changing technology and changing societal forces.
Going Deeper into OODA — in which Dan tdaxp’s mapping of xGW onto John Boyd’s OODA is
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considered in depth, in light of the previous sections of the post, with a reiteration of the
importance of EBO as characterized in the previous post in the series.
And Deeper…… — in which a new mapping of xGW is offered, but onto the Revised OODA
designed by CGW, followed by notes explaining the implications and variations upon previous
mappings:
[5]
The blog post was later cross-posted to the blog Dreaming 5GW[6]. (Original site is now defunct.)
Links to:
Page 73
On 0GW
On 1GW
"While it is true that 1GW forces had a bit more observational capability —
reconnaissance capability — ..., one’s own scouts or the spies in an enemy’s encampment
would have been greatly limited in what they could observe and report. In the first place,
their reports would have been old news by the time they were received by one’s generals
— perhaps months old in the case of espionage activity; perhaps days old if movement
from the enemy forces to one’s own force (to report) required days. Individual movements
on the battlefield once battle had commenced would be too chaotic, ever-shifting, man-to-
man, making the scout relatively useless. Furthermore, a limited range weapon must still
be targeted, and targeting elements behind the enemy lines — or beyond the range of those
weapons — would have been relatively useless. In the case of limited long-range
capabilities, the targeting mechanisms then in use were relatively primitive; it was enough
if the cannonball or shell hit somewhere the enemy was if it hit behind the front line."
On 2GW
"2GW observational capabilities were improved by speed of communication as well as

targeting of weaponry. The telegraph and railway sped up long-range communications, and
rifles and artillery had better aim as well as better reach. Primitive air forces also increased,
and sped up, observational capabilities. Greater fire power in artillery and aerial bombings
meant that one could more accurately target more enemies whenever one used these things
(unlike, say, a cannonball in the previous generation that might have hit nothing when it
fell or only one or a handful of enemies. I.e., increased destruction capability actually
helped limit the need to know an exact enemy placement.)"
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On 3GW
"3GW also saw the improvement in observational capabilities — a necessary improvement

if one is to know where one’s enemy is, exactly, and how that enemy’s forces and
strongholds are organized, in order to know how to maneuver most effectively to disrupt
and overcome that enemy’s defenses. Again, improved air forces, communications
technologies, transportation, and firepower improved one’s observational range and speed.
Keeping one’s own forces in contact, and operating efficiently and not at cross-purposes,
also required quicker communications and observational capabilities."
On 4GW
"4GW continues the trend. The Internet, for instance, is being used by 4GWarriors even as
I type this. Satellite communications, cell phones, thumbnail disk drives, and the net of
media sources criss-crossing the globe allow the fast transmission of data, increasing
observational capability. Despite this fact, 4GW insurgents and terrorists are often quite
separate from their enemies: they may live among an enemy society, but they have yet to
infiltrate into the Deepest realm of their enemies’ forces; i.e., be among those forces
without being detected. (Admittedly, infiltration of the Iraqi defense forces has somewhat
occurred, and in all likelihood infiltration of the Iraqi government has also occurred at
some level. But infiltration of the U.S. armed forces or government? Unlikely, although
the theft of databases — such as the recently-stolen armed forces personnel database —
and intercept communications might give 4GW forces a window-peek into the U.S.
operations. Or else, the New York Times will boldly publish details of those operations.)"
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On 5GW
"5GW, as broadly outlined by Dan at tdaxp in the linked post and as I’ve theorized[7],
might seek an even broader-ranged observational capability than that currently available to
4GW forces; namely, very deep-level infiltration of a society, a society’s armed forces, and
a society’s institutions and government, or else open communication of intentions from
proxy warriors who are nonetheless unaware that they are being so used....
5GW... is the deepest of all, so entrenched within the target, the target does not know that
the 5GW force exists. When the target makes any decision, the target believes it is in full
command of its decision-making ability. The 5GW force merely creates information in
relation to other information-sets it has not created; the target observes all information
available and continues on his way toward making a decision and acting. Selective
information creation will be the 5GW force’s modus operandi, and the 5GW force’s goal is
to have the target act on that information."
Notes for Observing the Maturing World:

[2] http://www.dreaming5gw.com/2006/10/observing_the_maturing_world.php
[3] http://www.phaticcommunion.com/archives/2006/06/rethinking_the.php
[4] http://www.phaticcommunion.com/archives/2006/07/ebo_is_everythi.php
[5] http://www.flickr.com/photos/dreaming5gw/517144444/
[6] http://www.fifthgeneration.phaticcommunion.com/archives/2006/10/observing_the_maturing_world.php
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Fifth Generation Warfare: 4GW No Longer Applies
Fifth Generation Warfare: 4GW No Longer Applies
Mitchell Langbert (September 26, 2006)

Blog Post published by Mitchell Langbert on September 26, 2006
Site: Democracy Project[1]
Permalink to original: "Fifth Generation Warfare: 4GW No Longer Applies[2]"
Summary for Fifth Generation Warfare: 4GW No Longer Applies:
Mr. Langbert seems to envision 5GW as the evolution of nationalistic 4GW (Mao, Ho Chi Min) to
that of the purely ideologically driven (al Qaeda, the Arab Mujahadeen) 4GW (or, in Langbert’s
view, 5GW.) In essence the absence of jingoism and the introduction of ideology as a cause of
guerrilla resistance amounts to 5GW. Further affecting this evolution are the introduction of new
technologies unavailable during the time of Mao or Ho Chi Min, specifically mentioned are
cellular communication and the internet.
(Summary written by subadei)
Notes for Fifth Generation Warfare: 4GW No Longer Applies:

[1] http://www.democracy-project.com/
[2] http://www.democracy-project.com/archives/002814.html
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Can Georgia become a MicroPower?
Can Georgia become a MicroPower?

Blog Post published by John Robb on October 7, 2006
Site: Global Guerrillas[1]
Permalink to original: "Can Georgia become a MicroPower?[2]"
Summary for Can Georgia become a MicroPower?:
The idea is that small states can protect themselves if they are willing to use
economic systems disruption as a strategic weapon.
Said systems disruption, and the Global Guerrilla dynamic, are called fifth-generation warfare.
Scenarios involving the Ukraine, Georgia, and Russia are considered:
The answer is similar to the approach used by Ukraine when faced with a similar
level of economic pressure earlier this year. In that crisis, Russia tried to cut-off
supplies of natural gas to the Ukraine while at the same time pumping natural gas
through pipelines that ran through the country. Of course, the Ukrainians naturally
siphoned off the gas they needed from Russia’s european customers. These customers
quickly forced Russia to resolve the crisis.
Such methods may work to influence the target down a pre-determined path (in this case, retreat?)
Notes for Can Georgia become a MicroPower?:

[1] http://globalguerrillas.typepad.com/globalguerrillas/
[2] http://globalguerrillas.typepad.com/globalguerrillas/2006/10/journal_the_noo.html
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The sandwich generations-of-war strategy

Blog Post published by Thomas P. M. Barnett on October 8, 2006
Site: Thomas P. M. Barnett[1]
Permalink to original: "The sandwich generations-of-war strategy[2]"
Summary for The sandwich generations-of-war strategy:
“[W]orking off my SysAdmin force/Department of Everything Else concepts,” and off a comment
left by RevG, Thomas Barnett discusses the importance of the 3GW Leviathan.
The advent of nuclear weapons failed to achieve a new generation of war, although it did focus the
development of war into 1) limited warfare and 2) proxy warfare and 4GW. This manner of
conducting conflict was “defensible in the go-go 90s, when globalization was going to do all the
heavy lifting for us and didn’t need a bodyguard”, but is no longer enough and will not work for
“the Long War.”
But just collecting bad guys without altering the conditions by which they arise
inside the Gap basically plays into the 4GW strategies of Robb’s global guerrillas,
because keeping governments in the Gap sub-optimal is what gives 4GW warriors
their chance for rule through chaos (i.e., no weak gov in Lebanon, no Hamas).
“The Leviathan-SysAdmin pairing represents a sandwiching-of-generations strategy.” — The

3GW Leviathan keeps peer competitors in line while the SysAdmin moves in to alter the
paradigms within the Gap:
But say we get the SysAdmin up and running, are we entering the realm of 5th
Generation Warfare?
I would say yes.
However, with respect to Dan tdaxp’s OODA and xGW framing, Thomas Barnett counters that
Page 79
although a too-upfront and obvious approach to shaping the Gap may seem to be a weakness —
The key phrase from Dan’s analysis that clicked it for me is that once you’re
observed doing your thing in 5GW, the gig is up…
— in truth, transparency is the key to success, since it opposes the status quo of authoritarian
regimes.
Development-in-a-Box really gets you into 5GW because it alters the observed
reality—pre-emptively—in a sort of bribe-the-proles mode that steals the thunder of
the 4GW warrior of today in the same way that social welfare nets and trade unions
stifled the rise of socialism in Europe…
<snip>
The sort of transparency-on-steroids made possible by rule-set automation and

enterprise/agency/national resilience (Steve DeAngelis’ dream and self-made new
industry) makes the Core too tough a venue for 4GWers to pull off anything more
than occasional pinpricks.
Essentially, then, the 5GW “sandwich” strategy would mean that the 5GW sandwich works after
the 3GW Leviathan force has successfully built a space for the SysAdmin to operate, not only
holding off potential 3GW opponent peer competitors but also by keeping 4GW opponents from
being able to expand beyond the Gap.
Links to:
Page 80
Notes for The sandwich generations-of-war strategy:

[2] http://www.thomaspmbarnett.com/weblog/2006/10/the_sandwich_generationsofwar.html
Page 81
A Strategic Dagwood
A Strategic Dagwood
Mark Safranski (October 8, 2006)

Blog Post published by Mark Safranski on October 8, 2006
Site: ZenPundit[1]
Permalink to original: "A Strategic Dagwood[2]"
Summary for A Strategic Dagwood:
An exploration ideas from Thomas P. M. Barnett’s post “The sandwich generations-of-war

strategy”, with agreement than the U.S Leviathan helps to keep Old Core and New Core powers
from re-inaugurating the era of great 3GW war between powers; i.e., that the U.S. force keeps
3GW power primarily for itself and operates as a closing book-end to 3GW dynamics.
Globalization has become the premiere economic model for the world, as a consequence, by
forcing methods other than autarky for organizing economic systems:
The strategic choice isn’t globalization or statism so much as globalization vs.

anarchy - and even that failed state chaos contains a corrupt strand of connectivity to
the Core. 4GW forces are primarily reactionary movements, regardless of whether
they are Nepal’s Maoist guerillas or al Qaida’s neo-Salafi terrorists, trying ” to stand
athwart history and yell ‘Halt!’ “
“Offensively shaping the battlespace and…defensively bring the Gap into the light.” — a
characterization of the 5GW aspects of Thomas Barnett’s strategy; however, with connectivity
comes new dangers:
Vastly increasing the connectivity and transparency of a Gap state also increases the
opportunities and parameters for John Robb’s Global Guerillas or superempowered
individuals - we can see this in how the Islamist insurgency makes use of, for
example, the internet.
Development-in-a-Box is a necessary response to present circumstances:
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A Strategic Dagwood
The threat today to Globalization does not come from Nasserites or Baathists, their
ideology is dead, but from apocalyptic Islamism. Reducing the appeal of Islamist
extremism with practical improvements and nonzero sum partnership is vital.
Strategy cannot be compartmentalized into separate boxes anymore.
Links to:
• “The sandwich generations-of-war strategy” posted on Thomas P. M. Barnett 10-08-2006
• “5GW and Ruleset Automation” posted on tdaxp 10-08-2006
Notes for A Strategic Dagwood:

[2] http://zenpundit.blogspot.com/2006/10/strategic-dagwood-dr.html
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5GW and Ruleset Automation

Blog Post published by Dan tdaxp on October 8, 2006
Site: tdaxp[1]
Permalink to original: "5GW and Ruleset Automation[2]"
Summary for 5GW and Ruleset Automation:
A consideration of ideas found in Thomas P. M. Barnett’s post, “The sandwich generations-of-war

strategy” (although not actually linking it).
Development-in-a-Box is part of the work of Enterra Solutions, Barnett’s (and Steve

DeAngelis’s employer) — a firm that focuses on ruleset automation and other
business process services. I general I agree…
However, Development-in-a-Box “has its limitations”:
The Long War will not be won by just explicit rulests or implicit rulesets, just
horizontal controls or vertical controls. And one is not more important than the other.
Both Automated Rulesets (like what Enterra sells) and Internal Rulesets (what people
quietly believe) are important.
Rather than “automated rulesets” and “implicit rulesets”, what are required are “functional
rulesets.” A consideration of Sharia law, Communist rule in China, and American federalism
implies that each is a functional ruleset for those who follow it.
Links to:
Page 84
Notes for 5GW and Ruleset Automation:

[2] http://www.tdaxp.com/archive/2006/10/08/5gw-and-ruleset-automation.html
Page 85
Dreaming 5GW: In Surround Sound

Blog Post published by Curtis Gale Weeks on October 9, 2006
Permalink to original: "Dreaming 5GW: In Surround Sound[2]"
Summary for Dreaming 5GW: In Surround Sound:
Original inaugural post of the blog Dreaming 5GW. (Others, earlier web posts, were eventually
imported from the defunct site Phatic Communion.)
An initial consideration of secrecy leads into a broad outline of how fifth generation warfare may
play out, building upon the idea of memetic engineering:
The goal is to have the target believe he is acting entirely under his own free will
(which he actually is) while not realizing that another has influenced him to act in a
particular way.
Ultimately, a cascading series of acts committed by multiple targets — perhaps in

collusion or in confrontation — will lead to a paradigmatic shift not only in general
world views but also in the concrete world (which is constantly being shaped by acts
motivated by world views.)
This consideration and recent blog posts on the blogs ZenPundit, tdaxp, and Thomas P. M.
Barnett, lead the author to wonder “that Thomas Barnett’s PNM theory is very 5GWish.” Both
5GW and PNM have violent and non-violent features. A previous conversation at the blog
PurpleSlog had considered the possibility that Thomas Barnett’s PNM theory might be a type of
fifth generation warfare.
“The sandwich generations-of-war strategy,” a recent blog post on Thomas Barnett’s blog, is
considered; but CGW believes Thomas Barnett is wrong to assume that “we deny evolution
toward 5GW in those parts of the Gap we deny to our enemies” [TPMB]. Rather, the triumph of
Page 86
U.S. 3GW in the Gap would only produce opponents who would necessarily be forced to operate
at the next generational level; stopping the development of 4GW in the Gap with a superior 3GW
(assuming that would be possible) would force our enemies to develop a 5GW strategy.
However,
the idealized version of Barnett’s system would likely produce — it is hoped — a

world view paradigm shift within a significant portion of the Gap populace that
would serve to preempt opposition…
Even so, the attempt to create that paradigm shift openly, as prescribed by Thomas Barnett, would
keep it from being 5GW,
simply because the cards held in hand are displayed openly for whatever opposition
exists at the outset, and because 5GW will be about having others make the decisions
and act as if they were acting entirely on their own. That kind of decision to believe
in a reality is the kind most likely to stick. It is in fact the kind of decision, leading to
perseverance, any opposition within the Gap will have.
The post concludes by quoting a portion of Mark Safranski’s reaction to Thomas Barnett’s post —
citing increased connectivity and openness as a potential vehicle for empowering “Global
Guerrillas” [re: John Robb] — and then considering the possibility that so many millions within
the gap may be greatly influenced by a handful of superempowered individuals.
Links to:
• “A Strategic Dagwood” posted on ZenPundit 10-08-2006
• “5GW and Ruleset Automation” posted on tdaxp 10-08-2006
Page 87
Notes for Dreaming 5GW: In Surround Sound:

[2] http://www.dreaming5gw.com/2006/10/dreaming_5gw_in_surround_sound.php
Page 88
Lots of discussion of what 5GW is
Lots of discussion of what 5GW is

Site: John Robb's Weblog[1]
Permalink to original: "Lots of discussion of what 5GW is[2]"
Summary for Lots of discussion of what 5GW is:
It’s clear we are in a phase transition from classic 4GW guerrilla warfare to
something worse.
That something worse is: “the super-empowered individual that can use the technologies of self-
replication to collapse/kill on a grand scale” — which John Robb calls the defining aspect of
5GW.
Links to:
• “A Strategic Dagwood” posted on ZenPundit 10-08-2006
Notes for Lots of discussion of what 5GW is:

[1] http://globalguerrillas.typepad.com/johnrobb/
[2] http://globalguerrillas.typepad.com/johnrobb/2006/10/lots_of_discuss.html
Page 89
5GW And Beyond
5GW And Beyond
Shlok Vaidya (October 9, 2006)

Blog Post published by Shlok Vaidya on October 9, 2006
Site: Shlok Vaidya's Thinking[1]
Permalink to original: "5GW And Beyond[2]"
Summary for 5GW And Beyond:
Building off a thought published by John Robb on his personal weblog, that the destructive
technologically superempowered fighter defines fifth-generation warfare, Shlok offers his reasons
why this will be so while offering a glimpse at “6GW” and “7GW”:
Technological Singularity Track — 5GW marks where “the human body becomes the
limitation”; 6GW will occur when humans have replaced their human body (except for brain?)
with technology; and 7GW will occur “when brains are made obsolete by machines”.
OODA Loop Track — With consideration of Dan tdaxp’s xGW & OODA mapping: “The human
decision cycle becomes irrelevant.” Presumably, this will apply to 7GW, previously described.
Links to:
• “Lots of discussion of what 5GW is” posted on John Robb’s Weblog 10-09-2006
Page 90
5GW And Beyond
Notes for 5GW And Beyond:

[1] http://www.shloky.com/
[2] http://www.shloky.com/?p=337
Page 91
Micropowers and the Art of 5GW

Permalink to original: "Micropowers and the Art of 5GW[2]"
Summary for Micropowers and the Art of 5GW:
A blog post considering how “micropowers” might utilize 5GW to conduct warfare in the future.
The post begins with a look at a discussion on the blogs Coming Anarchy and Global Guerrillas,
concerning the issue of micropowers and how Georgia (the nation) might be able to thwart
Russian influence.
John Robb suggests systempunkt attacks; system disruption could coerce Russia to back down:
This approach would not be 5GW, but 4GW (even though John Robb has called it fifth-
generation), for two reasons:
1. “Directly hiring terrorists / mercenaries to carry out the operation may be old school very
shortly. It allows too much opportunity for tracing the activity back to the employer,
threatens the very secrecy necessary for running a successful 5GW operation.”
2. “Again, we have the standard GG and 4GW ‘negativity’ approach, of merely: disruption,
chaos, confusion, destruction. 5GW may indeed use these things, but the ultimate goal is
not so much systempunkt as the creation of new orders that will continue to operate long
after the 5GW force has finished its operations.”
The post continues with a consideration of how micropowers, which seem to be forming on the
world stage, may be setting the stage for 5GW. First, they are too small to directly attack (by
whatever means, kinetic or non-kinetic) much larger nations; retaliations would be swift and
probably decisive. Second, the “power” in “micropowers” may translate to a great capacity for
influence if not control on the world stage: thus, a 5GW paradigm which greatly differs from pre-
5GW paradigms.
Page 92
Links to:
• “Can Georgia become a MicroPower?” posted on Global Guerrillas 10-07-2006
Notes for Micropowers and the Art of 5GW:

[2] http://www.dreaming5gw.com/2006/10/micropowers_and_the_art_of_5gw.php
Page 93
THE CHANGING FACE OF WAR: Into the 5th Generation (5GW)
THE CHANGING FACE OF WAR: Into the 5th Generation

(5GW)

Site: Global Guerrillas[1]
Permalink to original: "THE CHANGING FACE OF WAR: Into the 5th Generation
(5GW)[2]"
Summary for THE CHANGING FACE OF WAR: Into the 5th Generation (5GW):
Citing William Lind’s “The Changing Face War: Into the Fourth Generation[3]”, John Robb
expands the xGW framework from Lind’s stopping point and into a consideration of fifth
generation warfare.
Much of this new generation was derived and accelerated in cauldron of Iraq, just as
the basis for 3rd generation of warfare was proved out in the Spanish Civil war.
Three key elements appear to be emerging:
• Open Source Warfare — “This new structure doesn’t only radically expand the number
of potential participants, it shrinks the group size well below any normal measures of
viability.”
• Systems Disruption — broad-spectrum sabotoge, perhaps often occurring as a Black

Swan[4], may “undermine and reorder global systems.”
• Virtual States — “black globalization”, or “military/economic integration” outside the

normal channels protected by nation-states, may enable diverse non-state groups “to gain
greater degrees of independence and financial wealth through the warfare they conduct.”
Page 94
THE CHANGING FACE OF WAR: Into the 5th Generation (5GW)
The author adds a concluding note:
NOTE: Whether you call these developments 4GW on steroids or the start of a 5th
generation, it just doesn’t matter.
Notes for THE CHANGING FACE OF WAR: Into the 5th Generation (5GW):
[1] http://globalguerrillas.typepad.com/globalguerrillas/
[2] http://globalguerrillas.typepad.com/globalguerrillas/2006/10/the_changing_fa.html
[4] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Black_swan_theory
Page 95
My own personal 5GW dream

Permalink to original: "My own personal 5GW dream[2]"
Summary for My own personal 5GW dream:
Thomas P. M. Barnett lays out his own personal 5GW dream, building from a post that appeared at
Dreaming 5GW:
I was going to post there, on Weeks’ site, but then I started to feel proprietary about
it, meaning I was beginning to like the point enough to want it on my own site so I
could find it months from now when writing Vol. III, which will definitely include an
exploration of 5GW from my own peculiar perspective…
Rather than develop 5GW theory, he decides to approach the subject of fifth generation warfare
that he has “essentially laid out in both books” which he has already written.
—namely, the use of System Perturbations to alter existing rule sets or to replace
them entirely with new ones.
System perturbations may well appear quite negative at the beginning; however:
In short, sometimes you’ll take beatings in order to give better beatings later on.
Nietszchean, I know, but to me, 5GW is more about shaping (and yes, manipulating
isn’t a bad word either) your own population’s morale than it is disabling your
enemy’s population (whom you seek to reduce through the best sort of seduction).
Utilizing 5GW against the Gap will produce 5GW responses, since “first responses are typically
symmetrical.” Aggressive 5GW offenses in the Gap will disorient authoritarian types while
shaping the observations of those within the Gap wanting to escape the status quo.
Page 96
The point is made that 9/11 was “Osama’s reach for 5GW-level strategy” — but did not actually
achieve a 5GW level.
Thomas Barnett gives an xGW perspective on his two published books while offering a look at the
still-as-yet-unwritten third book:
I’m in that reaching mode toward Vol. III more and more. To me, PNM was all about
moving off 3GW and recognizing the realities of 4GW, while BFA suggested the
institutional changes and strategic alliance choices necessary to move us beyond
4GW engagement (the Long War, as we call it now) and into what I would call 5GW
shaping of the future battlespace (by locking down Asia and gaining its strategic aid
in shrinking the Gap in all those places where our enemies are—to date—not yet
strong, such as the entire Gap outside of the Persian Gulf and Afghanistan/Pakistan).
Finally, a 5GW scenario is suggested, in which America takes a false “beating in Afghanistan and
Iraq” as long as a strategic alliance can be built with China:
I push China toward the self-realization of strategic alliance with the United States in
a number of ways: 1) letting their “infiltration” of the rest of the Gap go unchecked
(Oh, how lax of me!) and 2) by moving them closer to the identification as the new
“face” of globalization…
I.e., by withdrawing in seeming defeat, America can not only force China to take a stand in
helping to “shrink the Gap,” but allow China to become an “alternative” to America in the eyes of
those living in the Gap — even if in reality America and China have very common goals with
respect to the Gap.
Links to:
• “Dreaming 5GW: In Surround Sound” posted on Dreaming 5GW 10-09-2006
Page 97
Notes for My own personal 5GW dream:

[2] http://www.thomaspmbarnett.com/weblog/2006/10/my_own_personal_5gw_dream.html
Page 98
Totally unreal
Totally unreal

Site: John Robb's Weblog[1]
Permalink to original: "Totally unreal[2]"
Summary for Totally unreal:
John Robb believes Thomas P. M. Barnett “is trying to refashion global guerrillas as his big idea”
after the latter has discussed PNM and BFA as his own type of 5GW.
Links to:
• “My own personal 5GW dream” posted on Thomas P. M. Barnett 10-16-2006
• “THE CHANGING FACE OF WAR: Into the 5th Generation (5GW)” posted on Global G
uerrillas 10-16-2006
Notes for Totally unreal:

[1] http://globalguerrillas.typepad.com/johnrobb/
[2] http://globalguerrillas.typepad.com/johnrobb/2006/10/totally_unreal.html
Page 99
A thousand flowers will bloom on 5GW, and countless more weeds
A thousand flowers will bloom on 5GW, and countless more

weeds

Permalink to original: "A thousand flowers will bloom on 5GW, and countless more
weeds[2]"
Summary for A thousand flowers will bloom on 5GW, and countless more weeds:
Responding to John Robb’s accusation that he is attempting “to refashion global guerrillas as his
big idea”, Thomas P. M. Barnett affirms that he did not “employ” 5GW in his books but thought
that his own published ideas correlate with some contemporary, blogospheric discussion of fifth
generation warfare.
To me, the shifting of the conversation from 4GW to 5GW that this universe of
bloggers is pursuing seems natural enough: since 4GW is viewed as an asymmetrical
response to our “overmatch” in 3GW capabilities, it’s only natural that our attempted
response to 4GW be cast as some further iteration.
The claim is made that John Robb’s sensitivity — “since he offers his own, particularly striking
definition of 5GW” — may be related to the fact that John Robb’s book is nearing publication;
also, that his own (Barnett’s) attempt to fit his ideas within the framework of 5GW has come as a
result of having his own ideas already discussed within that context by other bloggers.
Although appreciating John Robb’s exploration of the dynamic of Global Guerrillas —

“specifically some of his descriptions of the dynamics we’ll meet from nonstate actors in coming
years” — Thomas Barnett does not believe the GG phenomenon constitutes a new form of
warfare, nor that the threats explored by John Robb are as serious as John Robb describes them:
I see them primarily as friction in globalization’s advance, just the latest (and most
cynical and self-serving) iteration of individual-level resistance to the global
Page 100
A thousand flowers will bloom on 5GW, and countless more weeds
economy’s advance.
Finally, TPMB considers the “Long War” and notes that much more friction will occur within the
Gap:
But make no mistake, there will be future decisions to open fronts in this Long War
—many of them over time. I believe all will be located within the Gap. I also
recognize that all will be considered hopeless diversions to some, and God knows
that some will be, as we’re unlikely to make wise choices throughout a decades-long
struggle.
But I don’t believe this Long War will become the defining reality of globalization,
because I don’t see nonstate actors, nor their networks, becoming stronger over time,
much less dominant. John sees these “networked tribes” as being already dominant, a
view I often run into in this business, but one that I find pointlessly hyperbolic—
hence my complete lack of desire to claim any of it for my own definitions of future
warfare.
Links to:
• “Totally unreal” posted on John Robb’s Weblog 10-16-2006
Notes for A thousand flowers will bloom on 5GW, and countless more weeds:
[2] http://www.thomaspmbarnett.com/weblog/2006/10/a_thousand_flowers_will_bloom.html
Page 101
Barnett and Robb
Barnett and Robb

Permalink to original: "Barnett and Robb[2]"
Summary for Barnett and Robb:
A consideration of John Robb’s and Thomas P. M. Barnett’s recent explorations of fifth generation
warfare.
On Thomas Barnett’s 5GW speculation:
• “Not very secret, is it?” — It would inspire domestic and foreign opposition; this is a nod
to the idea that 5GW requires secrecy.
• “I wish he would stop thinking about other countries for a bit and think about the American
psyche.” — referring to Thomas Barnett’s idea that America could welcome a “false”
defeat in order to shape views in China and the Gap; the implication is that shaping
domestic memes is also very important.
• “I do like Barnett’s thinking, however, and he’s far more right than wrong…”
On John Robb’s 5GW speculations:
His method is disingenuous, to say the least, since he has previously:
1. Argued that GG is 4GW; because ‘Lind said so’.
Page 102
Barnett and Robb
2. Argued that it’s just too, too early to call 5GW. (And this less than a week
ago!) Even worse, he usually says such things while saying, in effect, I agree
with Lind: too early to call ‘er!
3. And now, he pulls a Lind, steals a title, and his destruction-oriented mythical
creatures have become 5GW Warriors
However, with respect to John Robb, “Robb may be more right than wrong, at least on some
particulars”:
…as I’ve argued before, Robb’s outlining a phenomenon rather than a generation of
warfare or any type of coherent operational methodology. When I read GG, I pay
close attention to what Robb is saying, because he is in large part describing a
significant aspect of the environment that will face us…
— that follows a consideration of the role of non-state actors, or what John Robb calls “Global
Guerrillas,” which concludes with the assertion that John Robb has failed to consider the role of
“angels” in the system who might naturally oppose the “demons” he has drawn for us to consider.
Links to:
• “My own personal 5GW dream” posted on Thomas P. M. Barnett 10-16-2006
• “Totally unreal” posted on John Robb’s Weblog 10-16-2006
• “A thousand flowers will bloom on 5GW, and countless more weeds” posted on Thomas P.
M. Barnett 10-17-2006
Page 103
Barnett and Robb
Notes for Barnett and Robb:

[2] http://www.dreaming5gw.com/2006/10/barnett_and_robb.php
Page 104
5GW is Closed Source (and Global Guerillas Theory is Incoherent)
5GW is Closed Source (and Global Guerillas Theory is

Incoherent)

Site: tdaxp[1]
Permalink to original: "5GW is Closed Source (and Global Guerillas Theory is
Incoherent)[2]"
Summary for 5GW is Closed Source (and Global Guerillas Theory is Incoherent):
An attack on John Robb’s concept of Global Guerrillas, particularly Robb’s linking of Global
Guerrillas to 5GW theory.
Dan tdaxp resonds,
5GW is not open source. 5GW is closed source.
Primarily, secrecy — which will be important for fifth generation operations — means that, unlike
the “open source warfare” suggested by Robb for Global Guerrillas, fifth-generation warfare will
necessarily be closed source.
Links to:
• “A thousand flowers will bloom on 5GW, and countless more weeds” posted on Thomas P.
M. Barnett 10-17-2006
Page 105
5GW is Closed Source (and Global Guerillas Theory is Incoherent)
• “Micropowers and the Art of 5GW” posted on Dreaming 5GW 10-14-2006
Notes for 5GW is Closed Source (and Global Guerillas Theory is Incoherent):
[2] http://www.tdaxp.com/archive/2006/10/17/5gw-is-closed-source-and-global-guerillas-theory-is-incohere.html
Page 106
Against William Lind, Against John Robb, in favor of 5GW

Permalink to original: "Against William Lind, Against John Robb, in favor of 5GW[2]"
Summary for Against William Lind, Against John Robb, in favor of 5GW:
Dan of the blog tdaxp, contributor to the blog Dreaming 5GW, suggests two problems with the
way 5GW theory has been approached, singling out William Lind and John Robb as examples.
In the first case, “worthless academic philosophy” may swamp the theory of 5GW making it
similarly worthless. As an example, Dan suggests that William Lind’s use of the idea of a
“dialectically qualitative shift[3]” to describe succeeding Generations within GMW theory has
“shades of Hegelian-Marxist-Dialectic b.s. about it.”
In the second case, Dan uses John Robb as an example of those who would latch onto, and attempt
to co-opt, the phrases 5GW or fifth-generation warfare as buzzwords upon which they can place
their own pre-existing theories: “These writers seek to use deception to push their own agenda, by
hijacking a more respected and developed theory’s terminology to push their own.”
Dan suggests a safeguard against both “these twin evils of academic theosophy and marketing
buzzwordspeak”: by using G in xGW to describe a scale measuring “the kinetic intensity of
conflict.” 0GW, then, would be the most violent — genocidal — and, at the other end of the scale,
5GW would be the least kinetically intense.
In giving such a structure, it is implied that a rational, verifiable framework for xGW would
safeguard the theory from haphazard and opportunistic uses.
Links to:
• “5GW and Ruleset Automation[4]” posted on tdaxp 10-08-2006
• “Fifth Generation Warfare?[5]” posted on Defense and the National Interest 02-03-2004
Page 107
• “Totally unreal[6]” posted on John Robb’s Weblog 10-16-2006
On 0GW
"It seems to be that “G” measures the kinetic intensity of conflict, which every new G
being approximately 20 times less intense than the one below it.
This holds up under a first analysis. Pre-Modern Warfare (the Zeroth Generation of
Modern Warfare, “0GW,” about 0Gs) is unremittingly genocidal. If the AD 1900s had
the same fatality-from-war rate as the 6000s BC, we should have seen something like
two billion war deaths. We might say that form the dawn of man to the dawn of
agriculture war meant from measuring around 0.1 Gs on the kinetic intensity scale to .
9 Gs.
Or think of it another way: 0G Warfare focuses on ending an enemy’s ability to fight

by killing their men."
On 1GW
On 2GW
On 3GW
Page 108
On 4GW
"By the time we get to 4G Warfare almost none of the battle is in the field, but in the
minds of men who will live regardless. "
On 5GW
"This 5GW we talk of seems to be even more mental and less physical, seeking to
leave the men, material, and even will of the enemy essentially unchanged. If kinetic
intensity is seen as morally bad, then every new G is a moral improvement. 5GW may
truly be “moral war,” compared to everything that has come before."
Notes for Against William Lind, Against John Robb, in favor of 5GW:
[2] http://www.dreaming5gw.com/2006/10/against_william_lind_against_j.php
[4] http://www.tdaxp.com/archive/2006/10/08/5gw-and-ruleset-automation.html
[6] http://globalguerrillas.typepad.com/johnrobb/2006/10/totally_unreal.html
Page 109
War in the next generation
Kent's Imperative (November 12, 2006)

Blog Post published by Kent's Imperative on November 12, 2006
Site: Kent's Imperative[1]
Permalink to original: "War in the next generation[2]"
Summary for War in the next generation:
A consideration of the “next generation of analysts and collectors which must confront these
challenges” arising with the advent of 5GW.
The view is circumspect as the author contemplates previous contemplation inspired by various
others writing about fifth generation warfare:
Much of the body of this new theory of warfare relies not upon the things of
technological innovation (although the toys are always easiest to point to when
seeking out the novel), but rather the patterns of use and shifting of behaviors
enabled by these introduced objects and capabilities. The skillsets required to piece
together these behaviors and the exploitable weaknesses therein (particularly under
the time and operational constraints found in the field), are often fundamentally
different than those currently taught by the methodologists or the structured analysis
proponents that currently dominate the community’s schoolhouses. We are seeking
alternatives but thus far find few.
Links to:
• “5GW And Beyond” posted on Shlok Vaidya’s Thinking 10-09-2006
Page 110
Notes for War in the next generation:

[1] http://kentsimperative.blogspot.com/
[2] http://kentsimperative.blogspot.com/2006/11/war-in-next-generation.html
Page 111
The unbearable lightness of the bench
The unbearable lightness of the bench
Kent's Imperative (May 17, 2007)

Blog Post published by Kent's Imperative on May 17, 2007
Site: Kent's Imperative[1]
Permalink to original: "The unbearable lightness of the bench[2]"
Summary for The unbearable lightness of the bench:
A UK legal case involving the prosecution of terrorist activities is used as an example of the
failure of the legal system to operate in a 4GW/5GW environment.
This however underscores even more clearly the abject failure of the legal approach
in counter-terrorism operations. In the Long War, the network is just another element
of the battlespace, and it is futile to attempt to use structures designed centuries ago
to obtain victory in this new age. Moving forward, deeper into the 21st century
evolution of 4th and 5th generation warfare, it will no longer be merely futile but,
like this incident illustrates, entirely absurd.
The term “lawfare” is specifically singled out as a 5GW activity.
Notes for The unbearable lightness of the bench:

[1] http://kentsimperative.blogspot.com/
[2] http://kentsimperative.blogspot.com/2007/05/unbearable-lightness-of-bench.html
Page 112
The Generations of War without the Jargon

Blog Post published by Dan tdaxp on August 7, 2007
Site: tdaxp[1]
Permalink to original: "The Generations of War without the Jargon[2]"
Summary for The Generations of War without the Jargon:
Dan of the blog tdaxp gives a summary of the Generations of Modern Warfare model, in simple,
plain English.
On 0GW
On 1GW
"The first generation, or 1GW, emphasizes concentration-of-soldiers. The most

famous 1GW was the Napoleonic Wars, where the commander who could throw the
most soldiers at the decisive point would in the war. "
On 2GW
"The second generation, or 2GW, emphasizes concentration-of-force. The most

famous 2GW was the western front of World War I, where the force that could
concentrate the most artillery and explosive power at one point could win the day.
Both 1GW and 2GW are made possible by reducing your fog of war, so that you know
where your soldiers (1GW) or artillery (2GW) should go."
Page 113
On 3GW
"The third generation, or 3GW, emphasizes maneuver. The most famous 3GW was the
German Blitz against France in 1940, where the force that could break through and
carry the commander’s intent would win the day."
On 4GW
"The fourth generation, or 4GW, emphasis networks. The most famous 4GW were the
Communist insurgencies in Asia, where the force that could alienate the population
from the other side through unconventional means would prevail in the end. Both
3GW and 4GW are made possible by maximizing your enemy’s fog of war, so he is
unable to properly command his troops (3GW) or rely on his population (4GW)."
On 5GW
"The fifth generation of modern warfare, or 5GW, is more speculative. It is assumed

that as each generation of modern warfare “goes deeper” into the enemy’s social
thinking (from where he concentrates soldiers, to where he prepares for an artillery
barrage, to how he springs back from a blitz that seems to come from everywhere, to
what he does when faced with insurgents who kill the tax collector), 5GW will go
deeper yet. As each higher generation of war looks less like “traditional” war than the
generation before it, it has been argued that 5GW will not even appear to be a “war” at
all…"
Notes for The Generations of War without the Jargon:

[1] http://www.tdaxp.com
[2] http://www.tdaxp.com/archive/2007/08/07/the-generations-of-war-without-the-jargon.html
Page 114
Found on Wikipedia: “The Dulles Plan”
Found on Wikipedia: “The Dulles Plan”
PurpleSlog (August 23, 2007)

Blog Post published by PurpleSlog on August 23, 2007
Site: PurpleSlog[1]
Permalink to original: "Found on Wikipedia: “The Dulles Plan”[2]"
Summary for Found on Wikipedia: “The Dulles Plan”:
An alleged secret plan to overthrow the Soviet government through ideological manipulation.
Does it relate to 5GW?
(Summary written by subadei)
Notes for Found on Wikipedia: “The Dulles Plan”:

[1] http://purpleslog.wordpress.com/
[2] http://purpleslog.wordpress.com/2007/08/23/found-on-wikipedia-the-dulles-plan/
Page 115
Pre-Modern Wars on a Pre-Modern Continent
Dan tdaxp (September 6, 2007)

Blog Post published by Dan tdaxp on September 6, 2007
Site: tdaxp[1]
Permalink to original: "Pre-Modern Wars on a Pre-Modern Continent[2]"
Summary for Pre-Modern Wars on a Pre-Modern Continent:
Dan of the blog tdaxp highlights a blog post written by Steve Pampinella in which the question is
asked whether the African wars should be considered 4GW-style wars.
Dan answers that, no, “The African wars tend not to be state-centered, but that is because they are
before-the-state, not after-the-state.” In other words, the African wars are 0GW, not 4GW.
On 0GW
"Steve Pampinella, a friend of this blog, sent me a link to a very solid article, which
wonders [if] the African Wars should be considered as part of the fourth generation of
modern war (4GW)....
The short answer is No, the African wars are not 4GW. The African wars tend not to
be state-centered, but that is because they are before-the-state, not after-the-
state...Africa’s wars are pre-modern wars, or “0GW.” "
On 1GW
Page 116
On 2GW
On 3GW
On 4GW
"Steve Pampinella, a friend of this blog, sent me a link to a very solid article, which
wonders of the African Wars should be considered as part of the fourth generation of
[R]eferring to the pre-modern African wars as “4GW” demonstrates a poor

understanding of both Africa and 4GW."
On 5GW
Notes for Pre-Modern Wars on a Pre-Modern Continent:

[2] http://www.tdaxp.com/archive/2007/09/06/pre-modern-wars-on-a-pre-modern-continent.html
Page 117
XGW: Left of Boom - Right of Boom
Arherring (October 21, 2007)

Blog Post published by Arherring on October 21, 2007
Permalink to original: "XGW: Left of Boom - Right of Boom[2]"
Summary for XGW: Left of Boom - Right of Boom:
Arherring explores the relationship of xGW theory to the idea of “Boom” (kinetic action), using
the following diagram to map out the generations:
On 0GW
Page 118
On 1GW
"1GW Operative Action: Organization and concentration of mass to move toward or

from key points on the field of battle.
Hannibal to Napoleon, the great captains of history knew the key to victory lay in
attacking into and from, or holding, the key points of the battlefield. To do this most
effectively, they organized their army, and the force represented by its mass, in order
to most effectively and efficiently accomplish this. The organization and placement of
mass in 1GW puts it just to the left of Boom on the continuum."
On 2GW
"2GW Operative Action: Destruction of an opponent’s mass in order to weaken the

opponent to the point that resistance is impossible.
As the “King of the Battlefield” artillery ruled the muddy trenches of World War 1,
just as air power shattered any resistance inside the “Kill Box” of the First Gulf War,
and with the “Shock and Awe” of the Second Gulf War. Both are examples of the
2GW effort to cause enough direct attrition of enemy forces that the opponent is
unable to organize and concentrate its mass, becoming unable to effectively resist.
However, without the kinetic action the attrition does not occur. This places 2GW just
to the right of the Boom."
On 3GW
"3GW Operative Action: Dislocation of the opponent by attacking and defending

critical vulnerabilities.
When an opponent is dislocated positionally, functionally, morally or temporally, the

opponent loses the ability to oppose effectively, this is the essence of 3GW/Manuever
warfare. In relation to kinetics, however, does 3GW move to fight or fight to move?
This question has a direct bearing on the placement of 3GW relative to the Boom.
While ‘a boom’ may occur before the movement occurs, the dislocative aspect of the
movement prior to ‘the Boom’ (or the overwhelming threat of the Boom on a critical
vulnerability of the opponent), places 3GW on the timeline farther to the left of both
the Boom and 1GW."
Page 119
On 4GW
"4GW Operative Action: Using a disruptive attack or threat of disruptive attack to

cause the perception of an unwinnable situation in an opponent, resulting in a loss of
morale or will until the opponent is rendered incapacitated.
Even more than 3GW, 4GW employs a threat of kinetic action more than actual
kinetic action. At first glance it may seem that the threat of attack always precedes the
Boom. However, without the Boom or the perceived threat of the Boom there is no
effective attack on the will of the opponent. This places the operative action of 4GW
on the continuum farther to the right than the Boom and 2GW."
On 5GW
"5GW Operative Action: Manipulation and influence in order to define and shape
outcomes and effects.
5GW embodies an overwhelming focus on positional manipulation and shaping of the

battlefield so that when kinetic action or the threat of kinetic action occurs the
outcome is essentially predetermined. The opponent is, as a result, without resistance
because the response is by the target’s own choice or follows a previously established
pattern that is familiar to the target. This places 5GW far to the left of 3GW, 1GW and
the Boom on the timeline."
Notes for XGW: Left of Boom - Right of Boom:

[2] http://www.dreaming5gw.com/2007/10/xgw_left_of_boom_right_of_boom.php
Page 120
X vs X: Boom and the Generations in Conflict

Permalink to original: "X vs X: Boom and the Generations in Conflict[2]"
Summary for X vs X: Boom and the Generations in Conflict:
A post which looks at each generation in relationship to “Boom” or the operative kinetics
occurring in each generational style of conflict.
Additionally, each generation is compared to the generation before it and the generation after it, in
order to show how, given a particular match-up, one generation will have the positional, proactive
advantage over the prior generation which must react to that proactive generation’s kinetics, using
this diagram:
Page 121
On 0GW
On 1GW
On 2GW
"2GW defeats 1GW because, 1) 2GW forces can advance at multiple points, with
some autonomy for the individual units, and 2) massed artillery is quite capable of
dispersing the kinetic attacks on the field of battle."
On 3GW
"3GW defeats 2GW because of much greater mobility, circumventing with pro-action
the 2GW position of artillery and combat units (not only in space but also in time.)"
On 4GW
"4GW defeats 3GW because of even more mobility: including even the option of
moving among civilians or, indeed, among friendly forces. Additionally, 4GW begins
to make better use of memetic engineering, or of altering observations to create
kinetic responses in individuals thus oriented, kinetic responses possibly quite far
from the 3GW force’s field of battle: another degree of dispersal of kinetics. The
CoGs may include the morale of the population supporting the 3GW force; the CoGs
may include destruction and murder within civilian populations, at any point civilians
can be found."
Page 122
On 5GW
"5GW defeats 4GW by refining memetic engineering, mulitplying domains to be

shaped, and thus operating outside the scope of the 4GW observational range.
Changes which occur within an agricultural sector in a far removed nation-state (or
T.A.Z.) may ultimately lead to effects within the 4GW force’s acknowledged field of
battle; etc. Indeed, the 4GW force’s concept of the field of battle may be altered."
Notes for X vs X: Boom and the Generations in Conflict:

[2] http://www.dreaming5gw.com/2007/10/x_vs_x_boom_and_the_generation.php
Page 123
5GWhat? The Meaning of “Warfare” in 2008
Justin Boland (May 22, 2008)

Blog Post published by Justin Boland on May 22, 2008
Site: Skilluminati Research[1]
Permalink to original: "5GWhat? The Meaning of “Warfare” in 2008[2]"
Summary for 5GWhat? The Meaning of “Warfare” in 2008:
Through several stages, the blog author examines whether fifth generation warfare can be called
“warfare.”
Is blogging warfare?
The author mentions the DoD concept of information operations, answering affirmatively.
Is activism warfare?
The author alludes to the White House at “war” with liberal activism. Also, the author makes
reference to “low intensity conflict.” Again, the answer is affirmative.
Are domestic law enforcement operations warfare?
Drawing parallels between domestic law enforcement and foreign counter-insurgency, the author
again answers affirmatively.
Summing up the blog post, the author confutes “conflict” with “war” further by considering how
expanding populations, resource conflict, homicide, and even super-empowered individuals —
“from Al Gore to Vladimir Putin to Hugo Chavez to George Bush” to the individual on the ground
— may ultimately be responsible for the outcomes of many conflicts. However, quoting a blog
comment left elsewhere by “Smitten Eagle”, the blog author promises a follow-up post which
would tie the Uncertainty Principle into the consideration (given the large scope of so many actors
Page 124
involved in conflict?)
Links to:
Notes for 5GWhat? The Meaning of “Warfare” in 2008:

[1] http://www.skilluminati.com/
[2] http://www.skilluminati.com/research/entry/5gwhat_the_meaning_of_warfare_in_2008
Page 125
5GW as the Event Horizon
Dan tdaxp (May 23, 2008)

Blog Post published by Dan tdaxp on May 23, 2008
Site: tdaxp[1]
Permalink to original: "5GW as the Event Horizon[2]"
Summary for 5GW as the Event Horizon:
Dan tdaxp links to a comment under a blog post at Skilluminati Research[3] in which the
commenter ponders the way fifth generation warfare will be a blending of warfare with
“everything else”:
I agree 100% that 5GW is an event horizon for warfare theory—it’s where war
merges with everything else, where things become so radically different that the old
theory is more of a hinderance than a help. (Thirtyseven commenting at Skilluminati
Research)
Seizing upon the idea that 5GW will be an “event horizon for warfare theory”, Dan tdaxp agrees,
“with one change: 5GW is the event horizon, beyond which the xGW framework breaks down as
violence is dispersed and action indirect enough that the study of war becomes the study of
politics.”
A lively discussion ensues, during which William Lind’s “generations of modern warfare” (GMW)
— an important precursor to study of 5GW — is distinguished from “xGW”, to which 5GW
belongs. 0GW - 5GW are more properly seen to exist through the framework of xGW than
through Lind’s GMW.
Page 126
Notes for 5GW as the Event Horizon:

[2] http://www.tdaxp.com/archive/2008/05/23/5gw-as-the-event-horizon.html
[3] http://www.skilluminati.com/
Page 127
XGW as a System for the Classification of Doctrines
Arherring (May 26, 2008)

Blog Post published by Arherring on May 26, 2008
Permalink to original: "XGW as a System for the Classification of Doctrines[2]"
Summary for XGW as a System for the Classification of Doctrines:
Arherring outlines the xGW framework following discussions elsewhere concerning the
differences between GMW (Generations of Modern Warfare) and xGW (Gradient Warfare)
models.
On 0GW
"0GW is the heading for genocidal/survival warfare. Individuals fight for themselves
and for the right of their line to survive."
On 1GW
"1GW encompasses projection of force to and from key geographical postions. The
Spartans and Persians at Thermopylae is a good example of this as are the campaigns
of Hannibal and many other battles from antiquity to modern times."
On 2GW
"2GW covers doctrines of attrition, where force is used to degrade the physical ability
of the enemy to oppose you by direct force. Agincourt is a prime example of this but
so are many battles in the American Civil War, WW1 and WW2."
Page 128
On 3GW
"3GW is for doctrines that dislocate the strength of an enemy with a strike at the
essential weakness of an enemy (2GW is strength on strength, and 3GW is strength on
weakness). The German bypassing of the Maginot Line is an example of avoiding
strength to attack weakness and displacing the enemy. This kind of displacement may
be positional, temporal, material and/or moral. The Mongols were masters of this, so
was ‘Stonewall Jackson’ and Erwin Rommel."
On 4GW
"4GW makes the jump into the moral that 3GW starts. 4GW doctrines strike at the
enemy’s perceived ability to continue fighting. Scorched earth is an example of 4GW
in that even before an invader feels the pinch of not being able to provide for
themselves from conquered territory (even if alternative supply can be arranged) they
begin to feel unable to continue the fight in the face of such destruction and
resolution."
On 5GW
"5GW is even more subtle, it’s activity goes below perception into the context of
conflict. What a target observes is manipulated in order to cause the target to react in a
specific and completely natural manner."
Notes for XGW as a System for the Classification of Doctrines:

[2] http://www.dreaming5gw.com/2008/05/xgw_as_a_system_for_the_classi.php
Page 129
The XGW Framework: Classification and Creation of Doctrines for Conflict and Confrontation
The XGW Framework: Classification and Creation of

Doctrines for Conflict and Confrontation
Arherring (January 6, 2009)

Blog Post published by Arherring on January 6, 2009
Permalink to original: "The XGW Framework: Classification and Creation of Doctrines
for Conflict and Confrontation[2]"
Summary for The XGW Framework: Classification and Creation of Doctrines for Conflict and
Confrontation:
Arherring, on the blog Dreaming 5GW (and cross-posted to Red Herrings[3]), first notes the
distinction between GMW (Generations of Modern Warfare) and xGW; second, outlines five
broad subject areas which must be considered for an understanding of the xGW model:
1. Premise of Conflict and Confrontation
2. Premise of Basic Principles
3. Kinetic and Non-kinetic Force
4. Technology
5. Classification and Application
Third, Arherring gives short descriptions of each gradient of warfare, 0GW - 5GW.
Page 130
On 0GW
"0 (Base) Gradient - Darwinian Warfare - 0GW
Confrontation and Conflict at its most basic level is an expression of natural selection.
This genetic imperative is the principle behind any doctrine that is essentially the
projection of Force for the survival of an individual organism.
Note: Howard Bloom argues in The Lucifer Principle [4]that ideas/memes act in the
same manner."
On 1GW
"First Gradient - Cooperative Warfare - 1GW
Cooperative warfare doctrines are based upon the principle of creating organizations
that require the individual to surrender control to the group in order to project Force to
accomplish goals that are necessary to the survival of the group."
On 2GW
"Second Gradient - Attrition Warfare - 2GW
The Principle behind attrition warfare describes doctrines that use the strength of the
attacker to target the strength of the opponent."
Page 131
On 3GW
"Third Gradient - Maneuver Warfare - 3GW
Maneuver Warfare doctrines are based upon the principle of avoiding the strength of
the opponent in order to attack the critical vulnerability of the opponent.
Note: The principles of 2GW and 3GW are informed mostly by the thinking of Col.
Robert Leonhard’s books, The Art of Maneuver: Maneuver Warfare Theory and
AirLand Battle[5], and The Principles of War for the Information Age.[6] He bases
these principles upon the concepts and writings of Sun-Tzu, Carl von Clausewitz,
John Boyd, William Lind, and B. H. Liddell-Hart, among others."
On 4GW
"Fourth Gradient - Moral Warfare - 4GW
Fourth gradient doctrines are based upon the principle of the attainment of a
functional invulnerability that prevents the opponent from being able to orient upon a
threat and creates a perception that saps the ability of the opponent to function
effectively."
On 5GW
"Fifth Gradient - Contextual Warfare - 5GW
Fifth gradient doctrines are based upon the principle of manipulation of the context of
the observations of an opponent in order to achieve a specific effect."
Notes for The XGW Framework: Classification and Creation of Doctrines for Conflict and Confrontation:
[2] http://www.dreaming5gw.com/2009/01/the_following_is_an_attempt.php
[3] http://arherring.wordpress.com/2009/01/26/the-xgw-framework-classification-and-creation-of-doctrines-for-
conflict-and-confrontation/
[4] http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0871136643
Page 132
Appendix: Summary Descriptions of xGW From Select Sources
Appendix: Summary Descriptions of xGW

From Select Sources
Page 133
0GW
0GW
from The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation
from The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century
from Orientation and Action, Part I: The OODA Loop
from Observing the Maturing World
from Against William Lind, Against John Robb, in favor of 5GW
It seems to be that “G” measures the kinetic intensity of conflict, which every new G
being approximately 20 times less intense than the one below it.
This holds up under a first analysis. Pre-Modern Warfare (the Zeroth Generation of
Modern Warfare, “0GW,” about 0Gs) is unremittingly genocidal. If the AD 1900s had
the same fatality-from-war rate as the 6000s BC, we should have seen something like
two billion war deaths. We might say that form the dawn of man to the dawn of
agriculture war meant from measuring around 0.1 Gs on the kinetic intensity scale
to .9 Gs.
Or think of it another way: 0G Warfare focuses on ending an enemy’s ability to fight

by killing their men. (Dan tdaxp, October 30, 2006.)
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0GW
from The Generations of War without the Jargon
from Pre-Modern Wars on a Pre-Modern Continent
Steve Pampinella, a friend of this blog, sent me a link to a very solid article, which
wonders [if] the African Wars should be considered as part of the fourth generation of
The short answer is No, the African wars are not 4GW. The African wars tend not
to be state-centered, but that is because they are before-the-state, not after-the-
state...Africa’s wars are pre-modern wars, or “0GW.” (Dan tdaxp, September 6,
2007.)
from XGW: Left of Boom - Right of Boom
from X vs X: Boom and the Generations in Conflict
from XGW as a System for the Classification of Doctrines
0GW is the heading for genocidal/survival warfare. Individuals fight for themselves
and for the right of their line to survive. (Arherring, May 26, 2008.)
Confrontation
0 (Base) Gradient - Darwinian Warfare - 0GW
Confrontation and Conflict at its most basic level is an expression of natural

selection. This genetic imperative is the principle behind any doctrine that is
Page 135
0GW
essentially the projection of Force for the survival of an individual organism.
Note: Howard Bloom argues in The Lucifer Principle that ideas/memes act in the
same manner. (Arherring, January 6, 2009.)
Page 136
1GW
1GW
First generation warfare reflects tactics of the era of the smoothbore musket, the
tactics of line and column. These tactics were developed partially in response to
technological factors — the line maximized firepower, rigid drill was necessary to
generate a high rate of fire, etc.— and partially in response to social conditions and
ideas, e.g., the columns of the French revolutionary armies reflected both the élan of
the revolution and the low training levels of conscripted troops. Although rendered
obsolete with the replacement of the smoothbore by the rifled musket, vestiges of
first generation tactics survive today, especially in a frequently encountered desire for
linearity on the battlefield. Operational art in the first generation did not exist as a
concept although it was practiced by individual commanders, most prominently
Napoleon. (William S. Lind, October 15, 1989.)
The first generation of war grew not just from the invention of gunpowder but also
from the political, economic, and social structures that developed as Europe
transitioned from a feudal system to a system of nation-states ruled by monarchs...
Massed manpower had been the rule in ancient Greece and Rome and had even been
a major part of war during the Middle Ages. However, the combination of changes
across society provided the much larger armies and massed direct-fire weapons that
marked the culmination of the first generation of war at Waterloo. ( Colonel Thomas
X. Hammes, September 12, 2004.)
• example: Napoleonic War
• method of fighting: man-to-man
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1GW
1GWs, like the Napoleon Wars, were extremely fluid. Armies could march whenever
men’s feet could carry them. Information was relatively symmetrical — precise
locations of either army were unavailable to any commander, while general
knowledge of the land was known to all commanders....1GW was defined by
conflict centered around an enemy’s ability to decide and act. (Dan tdaxp, July
18, 2005.)
While it is true that 1GW forces had a bit more observational capability —
reconnaissance capability — ..., one’s own scouts or the spies in an enemy’s
encampment would have been greatly limited in what they could observe and report.
In the first place, their reports would have been old news by the time they were
received by one’s generals — perhaps months old in the case of espionage activity;
perhaps days old if movement from the enemy forces to one’s own force (to report)
required days. Individual movements on the battlefield once battle had commenced
would be too chaotic, ever-shifting, man-to-man, making the scout relatively useless.
Furthermore, a limited range weapon must still be targeted, and targeting elements
behind the enemy lines — or beyond the range of those weapons — would have been
relatively useless. In the case of limited long-range capabilities, the targeting
mechanisms then in use were relatively primitive; it was enough if the cannonball or
shell hit somewhere the enemy was if it hit behind the front line. ( Curtis Gale
Weeks, July 5, 2006.)
The first generation, or 1GW, emphasizes concentration-of-soldiers. The most

famous 1GW was the Napoleonic Wars, where the commander who could throw the
most soldiers at the decisive point would in the war. (Dan tdaxp, August 7, 2007.)
Page 138
1GW
1GW Operative Action: Organization and concentration of mass to move toward or

from key points on the field of battle.
Hannibal to Napoleon, the great captains of history knew the key to victory lay in
attacking into and from, or holding, the key points of the battlefield. To do this most
effectively, they organized their army, and the force represented by its mass, in order
to most effectively and efficiently accomplish this. The organization and placement
of mass in 1GW puts it just to the left of Boom on the continuum. (Arherring,
October 21, 2007.)
1GW encompasses projection of force to and from key geographical postions. The
Spartans and Persians at Thermopylae is a good example of this as are the campaigns
of Hannibal and many other battles from antiquity to modern times. (Arherring, May
26, 2008.)
Confrontation
First Gradient - Cooperative Warfare - 1GW
Cooperative warfare doctrines are based upon the principle of creating organizations
that require the individual to surrender control to the group in order to project Force
to accomplish goals that are necessary to the survival of the group. (Arherring,
January 6, 2009.)
Page 139
2GW
2GW
Second generation warfare was a response to the rifled musket, breechloaders, barbed
wire, the machinegun, and indirect fire. Tactics were based on fire and movement,
and they remained essentially linear. The defense still attempted to prevent all
penetrations, and in the attack a laterally dispersed line advanced by rushes in small
groups. Perhaps the principal change from first generation tactics was heavy reliance
on indirect fire; second generation tactics were summed up in the French maxim, "the
artillery conquers, the infantry occupies." Massed firepower replaced massed
manpower. Second generation tactics remained the basis of U.S. doctrine until the
1980s, and they are still practiced by most American units in the field. (William S.
Lind, October 15, 1989.)
Several key factors normally associated with second-generation war (2GW) drove the
supremacy of the defense over the offense: machine guns, magazine-fed rifles, rapid-
fire artillery, and barbed wire. The combined effect of these elements took away
freedom of movement and forced both sides to rely on firepower--mostly indirect
firepower--in tactical engagements. ( Colonel Thomas X. Hammes, September 12,
2004.)
• example: First World War
• method of fighting: fixed-artillery-to-men
2GWs, like the First World War, were sticky. Armies took marched, drove, or took
Page 140
2GW
trains to the front line — where they stopped. In 2nd Generation War, action is easy:
charge. You know exactly where you are, exactly where the enemy is, and exactly
where you are going to die...2GW was defined by conflict centered around an
enemy’s ability to orient and decide. (Dan tdaxp, July 18, 2005.)
2GW observational capabilities were improved by speed of communication as well as

targeting of weaponry. The telegraph and railway sped up long-range
communications, and rifles and artillery had better aim as well as better reach.
Primitive air forces also increased, and sped up, observational capabilities. Greater
fire power in artillery and aerial bombings meant that one could more accurately
target more enemies whenever one used these things (unlike, say, a cannonball in the
previous generation that might have hit nothing when it fell or only one or a handful
of enemies. I.e., increased destruction capability actually helped limit the need to
know an exact enemy placement.) ( Curtis Gale Weeks, July 5, 2006.)
The second generation, or 2GW, emphasizes concentration-of-force. The most

famous 2GW was the western front of World War I, where the force that could
concentrate the most artillery and explosive power at one point could win the day.
Both 1GW and 2GW are made possible by reducing your fog of war, so that you
know where your soldiers (1GW) or artillery (2GW) should go. (Dan tdaxp, August
7, 2007.)
Page 141
2GW
2GW Operative Action: Destruction of an opponent’s mass in order to weaken the

opponent to the point that resistance is impossible.
As the “King of the Battlefield” artillery ruled the muddy trenches of World War 1,
just as air power shattered any resistance inside the “Kill Box” of the First Gulf War,
and with the “Shock and Awe” of the Second Gulf War. Both are examples of the
2GW effort to cause enough direct attrition of enemy forces that the opponent is
unable to organize and concentrate its mass, becoming unable to effectively resist.
However, without the kinetic action the attrition does not occur. This places 2GW just
to the right of the Boom. (Arherring, October 21, 2007.)
2GW defeats 1GW because, 1) 2GW forces can advance at multiple points, with
some autonomy for the individual units, and 2) massed artillery is quite capable of
dispersing the kinetic attacks on the field of battle. (Curtis Gale Weeks, October 24,
2007.)
2GW covers doctrines of attrition, where force is used to degrade the physical ability
of the enemy to oppose you by direct force. Agincourt is a prime example of this but
so are many battles in the American Civil War, WW1 and WW2. (Arherring, May 26,
2008.)
Confrontation
Second Gradient - Attrition Warfare - 2GW
The Principle behind attrition warfare describes doctrines that use the strength of the
attacker to target the strength of the opponent. (Arherring, January 6, 2009.)
Page 142
3GW
3GW
Third generation warfare was also a response to the increase in battlefield firepower.
However, the driving force was primarily ideas. Aware they could not prevail in a
contest of materiel because of their weaker industrial base in World War I, the
Germans developed radically new tactics. Based on maneuver rather than attrition,
third generation tactics were the first truly nonlinear tactics. The attack relied on
infiltration to bypass and collapse the enemy's combat forces rather than seeking to
close with and destroy them. The defense was in depth and often invited penetration,
which set the enemy up for a counterattack.
While the basic concepts of third generation tactics were in place by the end of 1918,
the addition of a new technological element-tanks-brought about a major shift at the
operational level in World War II. That shift was blitzkrieg. In the blitzkrieg, the basis
of the operational art shifted from place (as in Liddell-Hart's indirect approach) to
time. (William S. Lind, October 15, 1989.)
Although still primarily an infantry army, the Germans organized their armored
forces into Panzer Corps and used them to shatter the cohesion of the Allied forces.
The result was another astonishing victory. Britain was evacuating its forces from
Dunkirk only sixteen days after the invasion. France lasted only another month. In
contrast to four bloody years of stalemate in World War I, the Germans conquered
France in weeks. The victory stunned the Western powers. They were certain the
Germans had created an entirely new form of warfare.
Third-generation warfare had arrived. ( Colonel Thomas X. Hammes, September 12,
2004.)
• example: Second World War
• characteristic: blitzkrieg, fast transitions from one maneuver to the next
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3GW
• method of fighting: tanks/bombers-to-cities/armies
3GWs, like the trenches for most of the Second World War or the Lawrence of Arabia
campaign in the First World War, were fluid again. But conflict kept burrowing
deeper into the OODA loop and redshifting further away from action. Victory in 3rd
Generation Wars required the ability to instill madness — to mess with the enemy’s
minds. The purpose of 3rd Generation Warfare is to paralyze the enemy with doubt.
We move even deeper into the OODA loop, to the red end of the rainbow. 3GW is
defined by conflict centered around an enemy’s ability to orient. (Dan tdaxp, July
18, 2005.)
3GW also saw the improvement in observational capabilities — a necessary

improvement if one is to know where one’s enemy is, exactly, and how that enemy’s
forces and strongholds are organized, in order to know how to maneuver most
effectively to disrupt and overcome that enemy’s defenses. Again, improved air
forces, communications technologies, transportation, and firepower improved one’s
observational range and speed. Keeping one’s own forces in contact, and operating
efficiently and not at cross-purposes, also required quicker communications and
observational capabilities. ( Curtis Gale Weeks, July 5, 2006.)
The third generation, or 3GW, emphasizes maneuver. The most famous 3GW was the
German Blitz against France in 1940, where the force that could break through and
carry the commander’s intent would win the day. (Dan tdaxp, August 7, 2007.)
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3GW
3GW Operative Action: Dislocation of the opponent by attacking and defending

critical vulnerabilities.
When an opponent is dislocated positionally, functionally, morally or temporally, the

opponent loses the ability to oppose effectively, this is the essence of 3GW/Manuever
warfare. In relation to kinetics, however, does 3GW move to fight or fight to move?
This question has a direct bearing on the placement of 3GW relative to the Boom.
While ‘a boom’ may occur before the movement occurs, the dislocative aspect of the
movement prior to ‘the Boom’ (or the overwhelming threat of the Boom on a critical
vulnerability of the opponent), places 3GW on the timeline farther to the left of both
the Boom and 1GW. (Arherring, October 21, 2007.)
3GW defeats 2GW because of much greater mobility, circumventing with pro-action
the 2GW position of artillery and combat units (not only in space but also in time.)
(Curtis Gale Weeks, October 24, 2007.)
3GW is for doctrines that dislocate the strength of an enemy with a strike at the
essential weakness of an enemy (2GW is strength on strength, and 3GW is strength
on weakness). The German bypassing of the Maginot Line is an example of avoiding
strength to attack weakness and displacing the enemy. This kind of displacement may
be positional, temporal, material and/or moral. The Mongols were masters of this, so
was ‘Stonewall Jackson’ and Erwin Rommel. (Arherring, May 26, 2008.)
Confrontation
Third Gradient - Maneuver Warfare - 3GW
Page 145
3GW
Maneuver Warfare doctrines are based upon the principle of avoiding the strength of
the opponent in order to attack the critical vulnerability of the opponent.
Note: The principles of 2GW and 3GW are informed mostly by the thinking of Col.
Robert Leonhard’s books, The Art of Maneuver: Maneuver Warfare Theory and
AirLand Battle, and The Principles of War for the Information Age. He bases these
principles upon the concepts and writings of Sun-Tzu, Carl von Clausewitz, John
Boyd, William Lind, and B. H. Liddell-Hart, among others. (Arherring, January 6,
2009.)
Page 146
4GW
4GW
In broad terms, fourth generation warfare seems likely to be widely dispersed and
largely undefined; the distinction between war and peace will be blurred to the
vanishing point. It will be nonlinear, possibly to the point of having no definable
battlefields or fronts. The distinction between "civilian" and "military" may
disappear. Actions will occur concurrently throughout all participants' depth,
including their society as a cultural, not just a physical, entity. Major military
facilities, such as airfields, fixed communications sites, and large headquarters will
become rarities because of their vulnerability; the same may be true of civilian
equivalents, such as seats of government, power plants, and industrial sites (including
knowledge as well as manufacturing industries). Success will depend heavily on
effectiveness in joint operations as lines between responsibility and mission become
very blurred. Again, all these elements are present in third generation warfare; fourth
generation will merely accentuate them. (William S. Lind, October 15, 1989.)
Fourth-generation warfare (4GW) uses all available networks--political, economic,

social, and military--to convince the enemy's political decision makers that their
strategic goals are either unachievable or too costly for the perceived benefit. It is an
evolved form of insurgency. Still rooted in the fundamental precept that superior
political will, when properly employed, can defeat greater economic and military
power, 4GW makes use of society's networks to carry on its fight. Unlike previous
generations of warfare, it does not attempt to win by defeating the enemy's military
forces. Instead, via the networks, it directly attacks the minds of enemy decision
makers to destroy the enemy's political will. Fourth-generation wars are lengthy--
measured in decades rather than months or years. ( Colonel Thomas X. Hammes,
September 12, 2004.)
• example: Vietnam War
• characteristic: dispiriting the enemy
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4GW
• method of fighting: propagandists-to-populations
If older generations of war were like fluids, 4GW was like a gas. It spreads
everywhere yet regular armies have a hard time even finding battles. Like 3rd
Generation Wars, 4th Generation Wars focus on the picture inside the enemy’s head.
But while 3GW tries to destroy the picture, 4GW builds a new one....While 3GW
tries to paralyze the enemy with doubt, 4GW tries to deny him even that much —
4GW drains the will of the enemy so he “waits and sees,” robbing him of his ability
to want to do anything. In practice, this means 4GW tries to destroy an enemy’s civil
society, turning his population into mindless cowards. To achieve this, 4GW is
defined by conflict centered around Observe and Orient. (Dan tdaxp, July 18,
2005.)
4GW continues the trend. The Internet, for instance, is being used by 4GWarriors
even as I type this. Satellite communications, cell phones, thumbnail disk drives, and
the net of media sources criss-crossing the globe allow the fast transmission of data,
increasing observational capability. Despite this fact, 4GW insurgents and terrorists
are often quite separate from their enemies: they may live among an enemy society,
but they have yet to infiltrate into the Deepest realm of their enemies’ forces; i.e., be
among those forces without being detected. (Admittedly, infiltration of the Iraqi
defense forces has somewhat occurred, and in all likelihood infiltration of the Iraqi
government has also occurred at some level. But infiltration of the U.S. armed forces
or government? Unlikely, although the theft of databases — such as the recently-
stolen armed forces personnel database — and intercept communications might give
4GW forces a window-peek into the U.S. operations. Or else, the New York Times
will boldly publish details of those operations.) ( Curtis Gale Weeks, July 5, 2006.)
By the time we get to 4G Warfare almost none of the battle is in the field, but in the
minds of men who will live regardless. (Dan tdaxp, October 30, 2006.)
Page 148
4GW
The fourth generation, or 4GW, emphasis networks. The most famous 4GW were the
Communist insurgencies in Asia, where the force that could alienate the population
from the other side through unconventional means would prevail in the end. Both
3GW and 4GW are made possible by maximizing your enemy’s fog of war, so he is
unable to properly command his troops (3GW) or rely on his population (4GW).
(Dan tdaxp, August 7, 2007.)
Steve Pampinella, a friend of this blog, sent me a link to a very solid article, which
wonders of the African Wars should be considered as part of the fourth generation of
[R]eferring to the pre-modern African wars as “4GW” demonstrates a poor

understanding of both Africa and 4GW. (Dan tdaxp, September 6, 2007.)
4GW Operative Action: Using a disruptive attack or threat of disruptive attack to

cause the perception of an unwinnable situation in an opponent, resulting in a loss of
morale or will until the opponent is rendered incapacitated.
Even more than 3GW, 4GW employs a threat of kinetic action more than actual
kinetic action. At first glance it may seem that the threat of attack always precedes
the Boom. However, without the Boom or the perceived threat of the Boom there is
no effective attack on the will of the opponent. This places the operative action of
4GW on the continuum farther to the right than the Boom and 2GW. (Arherring,
October 21, 2007.)
4GW defeats 3GW because of even more mobility: including even the option of
moving among civilians or, indeed, among friendly forces. Additionally, 4GW
begins to make better use of memetic engineering, or of altering observations to
create kinetic responses in individuals thus oriented, kinetic responses possibly quite
far from the 3GW force’s field of battle: another degree of dispersal of kinetics. The
Page 149
4GW
CoGs may include the morale of the population supporting the 3GW force; the CoGs
may include destruction and murder within civilian populations, at any point civilians
can be found. (Curtis Gale Weeks, October 24, 2007.)
4GW makes the jump into the moral that 3GW starts. 4GW doctrines strike at the
enemy’s perceived ability to continue fighting. Scorched earth is an example of 4GW
in that even before an invader feels the pinch of not being able to provide for
themselves from conquered territory (even if alternative supply can be arranged) they
begin to feel unable to continue the fight in the face of such destruction and
resolution. (Arherring, May 26, 2008.)
Confrontation
Fourth Gradient - Moral Warfare - 4GW
Fourth gradient doctrines are based upon the principle of the attainment of a
functional invulnerability that prevents the opponent from being able to orient upon a
threat and creates a perception that saps the ability of the opponent to function
effectively. (Arherring, January 6, 2009.)
Page 150
5GW
5GW
Fourth-generation war has been around for more than seventy years; no doubt the
fifth generation is evolving even as we attempt to deal with its predecessor. We may
not recognize it as it evolves around us. Or we may look at several alternative futures
and see each as fifth-generation war. ( Colonel Thomas X. Hammes, September 12,
2004.)
If traditional war centered on an enemy’s physical strength, and 4GW on his moral
strength, the 5th Generation of War would focus on his intellectual strength. A
5th Generation War might be fought with one side not knowing who it is fighting. Or
even, a brilliantly executed 5GW might involve one side being completely ignorant
that there ever was a war. (Dan tdaxp, July 18, 2005.)
5GW, as broadly outlined by Dan at tdaxp in the linked post and as I’ve theorized,
might seek an even broader-ranged observational capability than that currently
available to 4GW forces; namely, very deep-level infiltration of a society, a society’s
armed forces, and a society’s institutions and government, or else open
communication of intentions from proxy warriors who are nonetheless unaware that
they are being so used....
5GW... is the deepest of all, so entrenched within the target, the target does not know
that the 5GW force exists. When the target makes any decision, the target believes it
is in full command of its decision-making ability. The 5GW force merely creates
information in relation to other information-sets it has not created; the target observes
all information available and continues on his way toward making a decision and
Page 151
5GW
acting. Selective information creation will be the 5GW force’s modus operandi, and
the 5GW force’s goal is to have the target act on that information. ( Curtis Gale
Weeks, July 5, 2006.)
This 5GW we talk of seems to be even more mental and less physical, seeking to
leave the men, material, and even will of the enemy essentially unchanged. If kinetic
intensity is seen as morally bad, then every new G is a moral improvement. 5GW
may truly be “moral war,” compared to everything that has come before. (Dan tdaxp,
October 30, 2006.)
The fifth generation of modern warfare, or 5GW, is more speculative. It is assumed

that as each generation of modern warfare “goes deeper” into the enemy’s social
thinking (from where he concentrates soldiers, to where he prepares for an artillery
barrage, to how he springs back from a blitz that seems to come from everywhere, to
what he does when faced with insurgents who kill the tax collector), 5GW will go
deeper yet. As each higher generation of war looks less like “traditional” war than the
generation before it, it has been argued that 5GW will not even appear to be a “war”
at all… (Dan tdaxp, August 7, 2007.)
5GW Operative Action: Manipulation and influence in order to define and shape
outcomes and effects.
5GW embodies an overwhelming focus on positional manipulation and shaping of

the battlefield so that when kinetic action or the threat of kinetic action occurs the
outcome is essentially predetermined. The opponent is, as a result, without resistance
because the response is by the target’s own choice or follows a previously established
pattern that is familiar to the target. This places 5GW far to the left of 3GW, 1GW
Page 152
5GW
and the Boom on the timeline. (Arherring, October 21, 2007.)
5GW defeats 4GW by refining memetic engineering, mulitplying domains to be

shaped, and thus operating outside the scope of the 4GW observational range.
Changes which occur within an agricultural sector in a far removed nation-state (or
T.A.Z.) may ultimately lead to effects within the 4GW force’s acknowledged field of
battle; etc. Indeed, the 4GW force’s concept of the field of battle may be altered.
(Curtis Gale Weeks, October 24, 2007.)
5GW is even more subtle, it’s activity goes below perception into the context of
conflict. What a target observes is manipulated in order to cause the target to react in
a specific and completely natural manner. (Arherring, May 26, 2008.)
Confrontation
Fifth Gradient - Contextual Warfare - 5GW
Fifth gradient doctrines are based upon the principle of manipulation of the context
of the observations of an opponent in order to achieve a specific effect. (Arherring,
January 6, 2009.)
Page 153
Appendix: Index of Entries: Authors
Chronological Index by Author
William S. Lind (October 15, 1989)...............................................................................................10
Oss.net (August 19, 2003)..............................................................................................................14
William S. Lind (February 3, 2004)...............................................................................................15
Colonel Thomas X. Hammes (September 12, 2004)......................................................................17
Mark Safranski (July 17, 2005)......................................................................................................21
Dan tdaxp (July 18, 2005)..............................................................................................................23
Younghusband (July 19, 2005).......................................................................................................27
Curtis Gale Weeks (July 20, 2005).................................................................................................30
Dan tdaxp (July 20, 2005)..............................................................................................................31
Dan tdaxp (July 22, 2005)..............................................................................................................34
Dan tdaxp (July 23, 2005)..............................................................................................................37
Dan tdaxp (July 25, 2005)..............................................................................................................39
Phil (July 26, 2005)........................................................................................................................46
Page 154
Curtis Gale Weeks (August 2, 2005)..............................................................................................48
Alan Sullivan (August 3, 2005)......................................................................................................50
Dan tdaxp (August 6, 2005)............................................................................................................52
Bryce Lane (August 6, 2005)..........................................................................................................54
Mark Safranski (August 7, 2005)...................................................................................................57
Dan tdaxp (February 4, 2006).........................................................................................................61
Younghusband (March 10, 2006)...................................................................................................62
Dan tdaxp (March 10, 2006)...........................................................................................................64
Arherring (March 11, 2006)............................................................................................................65
John Robb (March 11, 2006)..........................................................................................................66
Curtis Gale Weeks (March 12, 2006).............................................................................................67
Curtis Gale Weeks (March 14, 2006).............................................................................................69
Curtis Gale Weeks (July 5, 2006)...................................................................................................72
Mitchell Langbert (September 26, 2006)........................................................................................77
John Robb (October 7, 2006)..........................................................................................................78
Thomas P. M. Barnett (October 8, 2006)........................................................................................79
Mark Safranski (October 8, 2006)..................................................................................................82
Dan tdaxp (October 8, 2006)..........................................................................................................84
Curtis Gale Weeks (October 9, 2006).............................................................................................86
Page 155
John Robb (October 9, 2006)..........................................................................................................89
Shlok Vaidya (October 9, 2006).....................................................................................................90
Curtis Gale Weeks (October 14, 2006)...........................................................................................92
John Robb (October 16, 2006)........................................................................................................94
Thomas P. M. Barnett (October 16, 2006)......................................................................................96
John Robb (October 16, 2006)........................................................................................................99
Thomas P. M. Barnett (October 17, 2006)....................................................................................100
Curtis Gale Weeks (October 17, 2006).........................................................................................102
Dan tdaxp (October 17, 2006)......................................................................................................105
Dan tdaxp (October 30, 2006)......................................................................................................107
Kent's Imperative (November 12, 2006)......................................................................................110
Kent's Imperative (May 17, 2007)................................................................................................112
Dan tdaxp (August 7, 2007)..........................................................................................................113
PurpleSlog (August 23, 2007)......................................................................................................115
Dan tdaxp (September 6, 2007)....................................................................................................116
Arherring (October 21, 2007).......................................................................................................118
Curtis Gale Weeks (October 24, 2007).........................................................................................121
Justin Boland (May 22, 2008)......................................................................................................124
Dan tdaxp (May 23, 2008)............................................................................................................126
Arherring (May 26, 2008).............................................................................................................128
Arherring (January 6, 2009).........................................................................................................130
Page 156
Appendix: Original Chronological Table

Total Entries: 60
The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth
October 15, 1989
Generation Original
William S. Lind, DNI
5th Generation Warfare August 19, 2003
Oss.net, Oss.net Original
February 3, 2004
William S. Lind, Defense and the National Original
Interest
The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st
Century September 12, 2004
Colonel Thomas X. Hammes, Zenith Press, Original
The Sling and the Stone
Unto the Fifth Generation of War July 17, 2005
Mark Safranski, ZenPundit Original
Orientation and Action, Part I: The OODA
July 18, 2005
Loop Original
Dan tdaxp, tdaxp
5GW July 19, 2005
Younghusband, Coming Anarchy Original
Fifth Generation War in the OODA Loop July 19, 2005
Boot on Unrestricted War July 20, 2005
Curtis Gale Weeks, Phatic Communion Original
Dreaming 5th Generation War July 20, 2005
Dan tdaxp, tdaxp Original
Dreaming 5th Generation War: Comment July 21, 2005
Curtis Gale Weeks, tdaxp Original
Emerging NetWar / SecretWar Tactic: Stealth
July 22, 2005
Shareholder Activism Original
Dan tdaxp, tdaxp
Blog Notice July 23, 2005
SecretWarriors Walk Without Rhythm, Won’t
July 23, 2005
Attract the Worm Original
Dan tdaxp, tdaxp
Page 157
SecretWar: Plain Jane Tries to Kill the Yakuza

July 25, 2005
Boss Original
Dan tdaxp, tdaxp
5GW Reloaded: Reflecting on 5th Generation
July 25, 2005
War Concepts Original
Mark Safranski, ZenPundit
5GW Effectors July 26, 2005
Curtis Gale Weeks, Dreaming 5GW Original
5th Generation Thumbnail Sketches July 26, 2005
Phil, tdaxp Original
Limitations of 5GW August 2, 2005
Limitations of 5GW: Comment August 3, 2005
Alan Sullivan, Phatic Communion Original
Limitations of 5GW: Comment August 3, 2005
SecretWar (5GW) August 6, 2005
On “Fifth Generation” Warfare? August 6, 2005
Bryce Lane, Defense and the National Interest Original
Revisiting 5th Generation War August 7, 2005
Personal Equals Political August 9, 2005
5GW: Soundless + Formless + Polished +
February 4, 2006
Leading Original
Dan tdaxp, tdaxp
Truly formless 5GW March 10, 2006
Younghusband, Coming Anarchy Original
Truly Formless 5GW: Comment March 10, 2006
Dan tdaxp, Coming Anarchy Original
Arherring, Coming Anarchy Original
John Robb, Coming Anarchy Original
Curtis Gale Weeks, Coming Anarchy Original
Initiating 5GW March 14, 2006
Page 158
Observing the Maturing World July 5, 2006

Fifth Generation Warfare: 4GW No Longer
September 26, 2006
Applies Original
Mitchell Langbert, Democracy Project
Can Georgia become a MicroPower? October 7, 2006
John Robb, Global Guerrillas Original
The sandwich generations-of-war strategy October 8, 2006
Thomas P. M. Barnett, Thomas P. M. Barnett Original
A Strategic Dagwood October 8, 2006
5GW and Ruleset Automation October 8, 2006
Dreaming 5GW: In Surround Sound October 9, 2006
Lots of discussion of what 5GW is October 9, 2006
John Robb, John Robb's Weblog Original
5GW And Beyond October 9, 2006
Shlok Vaidya, Shlok Vaidya's Thinking Original
Micropowers and the Art of 5GW October 14, 2006
THE CHANGING FACE OF WAR: Into the
October 16, 2006
5th Generation (5GW) Original
John Robb, Global Guerrillas
My own personal 5GW dream October 16, 2006
Thomas P. M. Barnett, Thomas P. M. Barnett Original
Totally unreal October 16, 2006
John Robb, John Robb's Weblog Original
A thousand flowers will bloom on 5GW, and
October 17, 2006
countless more weeds Original
Thomas P. M. Barnett, Thomas P. M. Barnett
Barnett and Robb October 17, 2006
5GW is Closed Source (and Global Guerillas
October 17, 2006
Theory is Incoherent) Original
Dan tdaxp, tdaxp
Against William Lind, Against John Robb, in
October 30, 2006
favor of 5GW Original
Dan tdaxp, Dreaming 5GW
Page 159
War in the next generation November 12, 2006

Kent's Imperative, Kent's Imperative Original
The unbearable lightness of the bench May 17, 2007
Kent's Imperative, Kent's Imperative Original
The Generations of War without the Jargon August 7, 2007
Found on Wikipedia: “The Dulles Plan” August 23, 2007
PurpleSlog, PurpleSlog Original
Pre-Modern Wars on a Pre-Modern Continent September 6, 2007
XGW: Left of Boom - Right of Boom October 21, 2007
Arherring, Dreaming 5GW Original
X vs X: Boom and the Generations in Conflict October 24, 2007
5GWhat? The Meaning of “Warfare” in 2008 May 22, 2008
Justin Boland, Skilluminati Research Original
5GW as the Event Horizon May 23, 2008
XGW as a System for the Classification of
May 26, 2008
Doctrines Original
Arherring, Dreaming 5GW
The XGW Framework: Classification and
Creation of Doctrines for Conflict and January 6, 2009
Confrontation Original
Arherring, Dreaming 5GW
Page 160

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Notes on This Text

Curtis Gale Weeks

Curtis Gale Weeks (July 26, 2005)

Dreaming 5GW: In Surround Sound...................................................................................................86

Arherring (January 6, 2009)

The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation

(Summary written by Curtis Gale Weeks)

Descriptions of the generations/gradients of warfare.

[No Description Given]

"Second generation warfare was a response to the rifled musket, breechloaders,

[No Description Given]

5th Generation Warfare

Oss.net (August 19, 2003)

Summary for 5th Generation Warfare:

(Summary written by Curtis Gale Weeks)

Notes for 5th Generation Warfare:

Fifth Generation Warfare?

William S. Lind (February 3, 2004)

Summary for Fifth Generation Warfare?:

(Summary written by Curtis Gale Weeks)

Notes for Fifth Generation Warfare?:

The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century

Colonel Thomas X. Hammes (September 12, 2004)

The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century[4]

From the publisher’s site:

Hammes includes an overview of warfare through the ages as well as

(Summary written by Curtis Gale Weeks)

Descriptions of the generations/gradients of warfare.

[No Description Given]

"Fourth-generation warfare (4GW) uses all available networks--political, economic,

Unto the Fifth Generation of War

Mark Safranski (July 17, 2005)

Summary for Unto the Fifth Generation of War:

Key trends mentioned:

Key technologies and sciences mentioned:

• Human Brain Research

• Complexity and Chaos Theory

In addition, the concept of “driving deeper” is specifically noted:

An alternative conceptualization of potential fifth generation warfare is suggested with an early

(Summary written by Curtis Gale Weeks)

Notes for Unto the Fifth Generation of War:

Orientation and Action, Part I: The OODA Loop

Dan tdaxp (July 18, 2005)

Summary for Orientation and Action, Part I: The OODA Loop:

Building off a post written by Mark Safranski of ZenPundit[3] — “successive generations of

• “Unto the Fifth Generation of War” posted on ZenPundit 07-17-2005

(Summary written by Curtis Gale Weeks)

Descriptions of the generations/gradients of warfare.

[No Description Given]

• example: Napoleonic War

• characteristic: mass armies

• method of fighting: man-to-man

• example: First World War

• characteristic: mass armies

• method of fighting: fixed-artillery-to-men

• example: Second World War

• characteristic: blitzkrieg, fast transitions from one maneuver to the next

• method of fighting: tanks/bombers-to-cities/armies

• example: Vietnam War

• characteristic: dispiriting the enemy

• method of fighting: propagandists-to-populations

Notes for Orientation and Action, Part I: The OODA Loop: