Case Digest

Laurel vs. Misa

Topic: Treason
Laurel vs. Misa
77 Phil. 856

FACTS: The accused was charged with treason. During the Japanese occupation, the accused
adhered to the enemy by giving the latter aid and comfort. He claims that he cannot be tried for
treason since his allegiance to the Philippines was suspended at that time. Also, he claims that he
cannot be tried under a change of sovereignty over the country since his acts were against the
Commonwealth which was replaced already by the Republic.

HELD/RATIO: The accused was found guilty. A citizen owes absolute and permanent allegiance to
his government or sovereign. No transfer of sovereignty was made; hence, it is presumed that the
Philippine government still had the power. Moreover, sovereignty cannot be suspended; it is either
subsisting or eliminated and replaced. Sovereignty per se wasn’t suspended; rather, it was the
exercise of sovereignty that was suspended. Thus, there is no suspended allegiance. Regarding the
change of government, there is no such change since the sovereign – the Filipino people – is still the
same. What happened was a mere change of name of government, from Commonwealth to the
Republic of the Philippines.

DISSENT: During the long period of Japanese occupation, all the political laws of the Philippines
were suspended. Thus, treason under the Revised Penal Code cannot be punishable where the laws
of the land are momentarily halted. Regarding the change of sovereignty, it is true that the
Philippines wasn’t sovereign at the time of the Commonwealth since it was under the United
States. Hence, the acts of treason done cannot carry over to the new Republic where the
Philippines is now indeed sovereign.
G.R. No. L-2318 March 31, 1950
PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. vs. TEOFILO PAAR

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-2318 March 31, 1950

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
TEOFILO PAAR (alias TEOFILO PAJAR, alias BEN PAJAR), defendant-appellant.

Padilla, Carlos and Fernando for appellant.

Office of the Solicitor General Felix Angelo and Assistant Solicitor General Ruperto Kapunan, Jr., for
appellee.

TORRES, J.:

This is an appeal from a judgment of the now defunct People's Court which found Teofilo Paar guilty
of treason and sentenced him to the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and to pay a fine of P10, 000 and
the costs. The defendant of the fifteen counts, and the prosecution presented evidence to support
only the allegations made in the first, fourth, seventh and eight counts.

From our study of the evidence, we find that as regards the first count, it has been established by the
prosecution, and the defense did not deny, that between October, 1944, and February, 1945, Teofilo
Paar worked for the Japanese Kempei Tai as an undercover man. In fact, the appellant himself, by
his testimony, and that of his witness Juan S. Alano, admitted that he affiliated himself with the
Military Police of Baguio. The government witness have, during that period of time, seen him parading
in the streets of Baguio with members of the Kempei Tai, dressed in their uniform and carrying a .45
caliber pistol.

It is claimed by appellant that he entered the service of the Kempei Tai without the intent of betraying
his country and his people, and that even if he were responsible for or participated in the arrest of
civilians on suspicion of underground activities, he can not be held liable for treason in view of the
absence of the essential elements of adherence. The record, however, shows that his overt acts
evidenced his adherence to the enemy, and even in the absence of either proof, the very act of giving
information to the enemy, constitutes not only giving aid and comfort, but also show adherence to the
enemy. It clearly appears that Teofilo Paar joined the Kempei Tai or Japanese Military Police, whose
main purpose was to obtain information and other necessary data to suppress the resistance
movement. This is treasonous adherence which constitutes a violation of article 114 of the Revised
Penal Code.

Much emphasis is given by appellant on the allegation that Teofilo Paar joined the Kempei Tai upon
the advise of one Major Laconico of the underground movement. Apart from the fact that he never
mentioned Major Laconico to the CIC (Counter Intelligence Corps of the USAFFE) when he was
being investigated by said organization, if he was really made to join the Kempei Tai in obedience to
instructions of Major Laconico and in furtherance of the resistance movement his direct participation
in the activities of the Kempei Tai, for whom he was acting as agent or undercover man, having been
observed by the witnesses for the prosecution, completely negatives his exculpatory explanations.

It stands to reason that, if appellant was really "plated" by Major Laconico in the City of Baguio, as an
observer, to further the resistance movement, he had many other means to accomplish his alleged
mission of helping the guerrillas. But his close association with the Kempei Tai, that most hated
organization of the Japanese invader, his participation in the arrest of several persons who were
subsequently deprived of their freedom and tortured on suspicion that they were sympathetic with the
underground forces, far from convincing us the that he joined the Japanese Military Police for a
worthy patriotic purpose, strengthens our belief that he deliberately, for sordid motives, entered the
service of the Kempei Tai, because he thought that Japan would win the last war. .
To substantiate count No. 41, the prosecution, through the testimony of Patricia Guerrero, a waitress
in the City Lunch Restaurant in Baguio, proved that in the morning of October 3, 1944, while she was
dressing up, she heard a knock on the door of her room on the upper floor of the Mayo Building.
Before opening the door, she peeped through the window and saw the accused standing beside a
car. When Patricia opened the door of her room she met two members of the Japanese Military
Police who ordered her to dress up because she was to be taken to their headquarters. She went
with the two Japanese, but when she reached the car, the accused was no longer around. She was
investigated and maltreated by the Japanese who wanted to get information about the resistance
movement.

As they could not get anything from her, she was made to work as washer-woman in the garrison,
until she was released sometime on December 20, 1944. The testimony of Patricia Guerrero was, to
a certain extent, corroborated by Carlitos Costales.

It is noted, however, that Carlitos Costales did not corroborate the statement of Patricia Guerrero that
she saw the appellant standing beside a car parked in front of the house and which brought the two
Japanese members of the Military Police who arrested Patricia. it appears, therefore, that while the
evidence of the prosecution regarding this count establishes the adherence of the appellant to the
enemy, it fails to prove the same overt act as required by law.

Three witnesses were put on the stand by the prosecution in support of count No. 7. In December,
1944, Melquiades Valdez, assistant sanitary inspector in Baguio, was making an inspection around
the market accompanied by Dr. Emilio Reyes. While they were conversing, Teofilo Paar approached
the group and inquired for Melquiades Valdez. The latter identified himself and par told Dr. Reyes that
he was taking Valdez to the military police for questioning. The accused conducted Valdez to the
Kempei Tai, and upon arrival the names of Valdez and one Antonio Romero and handed it ton the
Japanese guard, saying: here are Valdez and Romero." Valdez was investigated and tortured on the
charge of listening to radio broadcasts from San Francisco and spreading the new heard by him.

Regarding the eight counts, it appears at about noon of December 30, 1944, while Dr. Irineo Solano
was in the house of Felisa Caliao, his niece, named Maria Taverna, and informed him that a Filipino
and Japanese were waiting for him. Solano met the visitors, the accused and Japanese. In answer to
defendant's query, if he was Irineo Solano, the latter identified himself and the accused told him that
he was to go with the Japanese officer. Doctor Solano was conducted to the Japanese officer. Doctor
Solano was conducted to the Japanese Military Police headquarters and once in the garrison, the
accused left the group. Investigated on account of his guerrilla activities and his pro-American
propaganda work, the doctor was maltreated and was not released until January 14, 1945.

The testimony of Doctor Solano was corroborated by that of Felisa Caliao regarding the fact that on
December 30, 1944, while the doctor was in her house, Solano was taken by a Filipino who
happened to be this appellant; she further said that Paar called for doctor Solano and took him to the
car where a Japanese officer was waiting.

The evidence is a very clear from the testimonies of Melquiades Valdez and Dr. Emilio Reyes, that
the former was arrested and brought to the headquarters of the military police by Teofilo Paar who
delivered him to the Japanese garrison. Soon after the accused delivered Melquiades Valdez to
Kempei Tai, he was investigated for disseminating news broadcasted by the San Francisco station
known as KGEI. The testimonies of Valdez and Dr. Reyes are corroborated by a third witness Antonio
Romero, who substantially told the court his observations in connection with the arrest of Melquiades
Valdez.

The testimony of Doctor Solano, corroborated by that of Felisa Caliao, established that the appellant
was responsible for the arrest of the doctor. The appellant alleged that he could not have participated
in the arrest of Melquiades Valdez and Dr. Irineo Solano, because he didn't know either of them. But
it seems to us that his mere denial cannot only by the victim of this treasonable act but also by Dr.
Emilio Reyes and Felisa Caliao.

Discarding count No. 4 because, as already stated, the evidence presented by the prosecution does
not apply with the two-witness rule required by article 114 of the Revised Penal Code, we are
satisfied that this appellant who, by his own admission is a Filipino's Court for the crime of treason,
not only because of his adherence to the enemy but also on the account of his having committed
treasonable overt acts resulting from his having directly participated in the arrest, detention and
torture of the persons mentioned elsewhere in this decision.
The People's Court sentenced him to reclusion perpetua, but from our careful considerations of the
facts, it seems to us that, inasmuch as the treasonable acts committed by this appellant have not
resulted in the killing of the persons arrested by the Kempei Tai, through his intervention, the ends of
justice will be served if this culprit is sentenced to a lesser term of imprisonment.

Appellant is, therefore, sentenced to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of
reclusion temporal, with the accessories of the law. Thus, modified, the judgment appealed from is
otherwise affirmed, costs.

Moran, C.J., Ozaeta, Pablo, Bengzon, Tuason, Montemayor and Reyes, JJ., concur.

MORAN, C.J.:

Mr. Justice Paras, for the reasons given in this opinion, voted for the modification of the judgment
appealed from, but, on account of his being on leave at the time of the promulgation thereof, his
signature does not appear herein.
PHILIPPINE JURISPRUDENCE - FULL TEXT
The - Arellano Law Foundation
G.R. No. 93335 September 13, 1990
JUAN PONCE ENRILE vs. OMAR U. AMIN

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC
G.R. No. 93335 September 13, 1990

JUAN PONCE ENRILE, petitioner,

vs.
HON. OMAR U. AMIN, Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 135, HON. IGNACIO M.
CAPULONG, Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 134, Pairing Judge, SPECIAL
COMPOSITE TEAM of: Senior State Prosecutor AURELIO TRAMPE, State Prosecutor FERDINAND
ABESAMIS and Asst. City Prosecutor EULOGIO MANANQUIL; and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondents.

Ponce Enrile, Cayetano, Reyes & Manalastas Law Offices for petitioner.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

Together with the filing of an information charging Senator Juan Ponce Enrile as having committed rebellion
complexed with murder 1 with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, government prosecutors filed
information charging him for violation of Presidential Decree No. 1829 with the Regional Trial Court of Makati.
The second information reads:

That on or about the 1st day of December 1989, at Dasmariñas Village, Makati, Metro Manila
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, having
reasonable ground to believe or suspect that Ex-Col. Gregorio "Gringo" Honasan has committed
a crime, did then and there unlawfully, feloniously, willfully and knowingly obstruct, impede,
frustrate or delay the apprehension of said Ex. Lt. Col. Gregorio "Gringo" Honasan by harboring
or concealing him in his house.

On March 2, 1990, the petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion (a) to hold in abeyance the issuance of a warrant of
arrest pending personal determination by the court of probable cause, and (b) to dismiss the case and
expunge the information from the record.

On March 16, 1990, respondent Judge Ignacio Capulong, as pairing judge of respondent Judge Omar Amin,
denied Senator Enrile's Omnibus motion on the basis of a finding that "there (was) probable cause to hold the
accused Juan Ponce Enrile liable for violation of PD No. 1829."

On March 21, 1990, the petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration and to Quash/Dismiss the Information on
the grounds that:

(a) The facts charged do not constitute an offense;

(b) The respondent court's finding of probable cause was devoid of factual and legal basis; and

(c) The pending charge of rebellion complexed with murder and frustrated murder against Senator Enrile as
alleged co-conspirator of Col. Honasan, on the basis of their alleged meeting on December 1, 1989 preclude
the prosecution of the Senator for harboring or concealing the Colonel on the same occasion under PD 1829.

On May 10, 1990, the respondent court issued an order denying the motion for reconsideration for alleged lack
of merit and setting Senator Enrile's arraignment to May 30, 1990.

The petitioner comes to this Court on certiorari imputing grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction committed by the respondent court in refusing to quash/ dismiss the information on the following
grounds, to wit:

I. The facts charged do not constitute an offense;

II. The alleged harboring or concealing by Sen. Enrile of Col. Honasan in a supposed meeting
on 1 December 1989 is absorbed in, or is a component element of, the "complexed" rebellion
presently charged against Sen. Enrile as alleged co-conspirator of Col. Honasan on the basis of
the same meeting on 1 December 1989;

III. The orderly administration of Justice requires that there be only one prosecution for all the
component acts of rebellion;

IV. There is no probable cause to hold Sen. Enrile for trial for alleged violation of Presidential
Decree No. 1829;

V. No preliminary investigation was conducted for alleged violation of Presidential Decree No.
1829. The preliminary investigation, held only for rebellion, was marred by patent irregularities
resulting in denial of due process.

On May 20, 1990 we issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the respondents from conducting further
proceedings in Criminal Case No. 90-777 until otherwise directed by this Court.

The pivotal issue in this case is whether or not the petitioner could be separately charged for violation of PD
No. 1829 notwithstanding the rebellion case earlier filed against him.

Respondent Judge Amin sustained the charge of violation of PD No. 1829 notwithstanding the rebellion case
filed against the petitioner on the theory that the former involves a special law while the latter is based on the
Revised Penal Code or a general law.

The resolution of the above issue brings us anew to the case of People v. Hernandez (99 Phil. 515 [1956]) the
rulings of which were recently repeated in the petition for habeas corpus of Juan Ponce Enrile v. Judge
Salazar, (G.R. Nos. 92163 and 92164, June 5, 1990). The Enrile case gave this Court the occasion to reiterate
the long standing proscription against splitting the component offenses of rebellion and subjecting them to
separate prosecutions, a procedure reprobated in the Hernandez case. This Court recently declared:

The rejection of both options shapes and determines the primary ruling of the Court, which that
Hernandez remains binding doctrine operating to prohibit the complexing of rebellion with any
other offense committed on the occasion thereof, either as a means to its commission or as an
unintended effect of an activity that commutes rebellion. (Emphasis supplied)

This doctrine is applicable in the case at bar. If a person can not be charged with the complex crime of
rebellion for the greater penalty to be applied, neither can he be charged separately for two (2) different
offenses where one is a constitutive or component element or committed in furtherance of rebellion.

The petitioner is presently charged with having violated PD No. 1829 particularly Section 1 (c) which states:

SECTION 1. The penalty of prison correccional in its maximum period, or a fine ranging from
1,000 to 6,000 pesos or both, shall be imposed upon any person who knowingly or wilfully
obstructs, impedes, frustrates or delays the apprehension of suspects and the investigation and
prosecution of criminal cases by committing any of the following acts:

xxx xxx xxx

(c) harboring or concealing, or facilitating the escape of, any person he knows, or has
reasonable ground to believe or suspect has committed any offense under existing penal laws
in order to prevent his arrest, prosecution and conviction.

xxx xxx xxx

The prosecution in this Makati case alleges that the petitioner entertained and accommodated Col. Honasan
by giving him food and comfort on December 1, 1989 in his house. Knowing that Colonel Honasan is a fugitive
from justice, Sen. Enrile allegedly did not do anything to have Honasan arrested or apprehended. And because
of such failure the petitioner prevented Col. Honasan's arrest and conviction in violation of Section 1 (c) of PD
No. 1829.

The rebellion charges filed against the petitioner in Quezon City were based on the affidavits executed by three
(3) employees of the Silahis International Hotel who stated that the fugitive Col. Gregorio "Gringo" Honasan
and some 100 rebel soldiers attended the mass and birthday party held at the residence of the petitioner in the
evening of December 1, 1989. The information (Annex "C", p. 3) particularly reads that on "or about 6:30 p.m.,
1 December, 1989, Col. Gregorio "Gringo" Honasan conferred with accused Senator Juan Ponce Enrile
accompanied by about 100 fully armed rebel soldiers wearing white armed patches". The prosecution thereby
concluded that:

In such a situation, Sen. Enrile's talking with rebel leader Col. Gregorio "Gringo" Honasan in his
house in the presence of about 100 uniformed soldiers who were fully armed, can be inferred
that they were co-conspirators in the failed December coup. (Annex A, Rollo, p. 65; Emphasis
supplied)

As can be readily seen, the factual allegations supporting the rebellion charge constitute or include the very
incident which gave rise to the charge of the violation under Presidential Decree No. 1829. Under the
Department of Justice resolution (Annex A, Rollo, p. 49) there is only one crime of rebellion complexed with
murder and multiple frustrated murder but there could be 101 separate and independent prosecutions for
harboring and concealing" Honasan and 100 other armed rebels under PD No. 1829. The splitting of
component elements is readily apparent.

The petitioner is now facing charges of rebellion in conspiracy with the fugitive Col. Gringo Honasan.
Necessarily, being in conspiracy with Honasan, petitioners alleged act of harboring or concealing was for no
other purpose but in furtherance of the crime of rebellion thus constitute a component thereof. it was motivated
by the single intent or resolution to commit the crime of rebellion. As held in People v. Hernandez, supra:

In short, political crimes are those directly aimed against the political order, as well as such
common crimes as may be committed to achieve a political purpose. The decisive factor is the
intent or motive. (p. 536)

The crime of rebellion consists of many acts. It is described as a vast movement of men and a complex net of
intrigues and plots. (People v. Almasan [CA] O.G. 1932). Jurisprudence tells us that acts committed in
furtherance of the rebellion though crimes in themselves are deemed absorbed in the one single crime of
rebellion. (People v. Geronimo, 100 Phil. 90 [1956]; People v. Santos, 104 Phil. 551 [1958]; People v.
Rodriguez, 107 Phil. 659 [1960]; People v. Lava, 28 SCRA 72 [1969]). In this case, the act of harboring or
concealing Col. Honasan is clearly a mere component or ingredient of rebellion or an act done in furtherance of
the rebellion. It cannot therefore be made the basis of a separate charge. The case of People v. Prieto 2 (80
Phil., 138 [1948]) is instructive:

In the nature of things, the giving of aid and comfort can only be accomplished by some kind of
action. Its very nature partakes of a deed or physical activity as opposed to a mental operation.
(Cramer v. U.S., ante) This deed or physical activity may be, and often is, in itself a criminal
offense under another penal statute or provision. Even so, when the deed is charged as an
element of treason it becomes Identified with the latter crime and can not be the subject of a
separate punishment, or used in combination with treason to increase the penalty as article 48
of the Revised Penal Code provides. Just as one can not be punished for possessing opium in a
prosecution for smoking the Identical drug, and a robber cannot be held guilty of coercion or
trespass to a dwelling in a prosecution for robbery, because possession of opium and force and
trespass are inherent in smoking and in robbery respectively, so may not a defendant be made
liable for murder as a separate crime or in conjunction with another offense where, as in this
case, it is averred as a constitutive ingredient of treason.

The prosecution tries to distinguish by contending that harboring or concealing a fugitive is punishable under a
special law while the rebellion case is based on the Revised Penal Code; hence, prosecution under one law
will not bar a prosecution under the other. This argument is specious in rebellion cases.

In the light of the Hernandez doctrine the prosecution's theory must fail. The rationale remains the same. All
crimes, whether punishable under a special law or general law, which are mere components or ingredients, or
committed in furtherance thereof, become absorbed in the crime of rebellion and can not be isolated and
charged as separate crimes in themselves. Thus:
 This does not detract, however, from the rule that the ingredients of a crime form part and parcel
thereof, and hence, are absorbed by the same and cannot be punished either separately
therefrom or by the application of Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. ... (People v.
Hernandez, supra, at p. 528)

The Hernandez and other related cases mention common crimes as absorbed in the crime of rebellion. These
common crimes refer to all acts of violence such as murder, arson, robbery, kidnapping etc. as provided in the
Revised Penal Code. The attendant circumstances in the instant case, however, constrain us to rule that the
theory of absorption in rebellion cases must not confine itself to common crimes but also to offenses under
special laws which are perpetrated in furtherance of the political offense.

The conversation and, therefore, alleged conspiring of Senator Ponce Enrile with Colonel Honasan is too
intimately tied up with his allegedly harboring and concealing Honasan for practically the same act to form two
separate crimes of rebellion and violation of PD No. 1829.

Clearly, the petitioner's alleged act of harboring or concealing which was based on his acts of conspiring with
Honasan was committed in connection with or in furtherance of rebellion and must now be deemed as
absorbed by, merged in, and Identified with the crime of rebellion punished in Articles 134 and 135 of the RPC.

Thus, national, as well as international, laws and jurisprudence overwhelmingly favor the
proposition that common crimes, perpetrated in furtherance of a political offense, are divested of
their character as "common" offenses, and assume the political complexion of the main crime of
which they are mere ingredients, and consequently, cannot be punished separately from the
principal offense, or complexed with the same, to justify the imposition of a graver penalty.
(People v. Hernandez, supra, p. 541)

In People v. Elias Rodriguez, 107 Phil. 659 [1960], the accused, after having pleaded guilty and convicted of
the crime of rebellion, faced an independent prosecution for illegal possession of firearms. The Court ruled:

An examination of the record, however, discloses that the crime with which the accused is
charged in the present case which is that of illegal possession of firearm and ammunition is
already absorbed as a necessary element or ingredient in the crime of rebellion with which the
same accused is charged with other persons in a separate case and wherein he pleaded guilty
and was convicted. (at page 662)

xxx xxx xxx

[T] he conclusion is inescapable that the crime with which the accused is charged in the present
case is already absorbed in the rebellion case and so to press it further now would be to place
him in double jeopardy. (at page 663)

Noteworthy is the recent case of Misolas v. Panga, (G.R. No. 83341, January 30, 1990) where the Court had
the occasion to pass upon a nearly similar issue. In this case, the petitioner Misolas, an alleged member of the
New Peoples Army (NPA), was charged with illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions in furtherance of
subversion under Section 1 of PD 1866. In his motion to quash the information, the petitioner based his
arguments on the Hernandez and Geronimo rulings on the doctrine of absorption of common in rebellion. The
Court, however, clarified, to wit:

... in the present case, petitioner is being charged specifically for the qualified offense of illegal
possession of firearms and ammunition under PD 1866. HE IS NOT BEING CHARGED WITH
THE COMPLEX CRIME OF SUBVERSION WITH ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS.
NEITHER IS HE BEING SEPARATELY CHARGED FOR SUBVERSION AND FOR ILLEGAL
POSSESSION OF FIREARMS. Thus, the rulings of the Court in Hernandez, Geronimo and
Rodriguez find no application in this case.

The Court in the above case upheld the prosecution for illegal possession of firearms under PD 1866 because
no separate prosecution for subversion or rebellion had been filed. 3 The prosecution must make up its mind
whether to charge Senator Ponce Enrile with rebellion alone or to drop the rebellion case and charge him with
murder and multiple frustrated murder and also violation of P.D. 1829. It cannot complex the rebellion with
murder and multiple frustrated murder. Neither can it prosecute him for rebellion in Quezon City and violation
of PD 1829 in Makati. It should be noted that there is in fact a separate prosecution for rebellion already filed
with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. In such a case, the independent prosecution under PD 1829 can
not prosper.
As we have earlier mentioned, the intent or motive is a decisive factor. If Senator Ponce Enrile is not charged
with rebellion and he harbored or concealed Colonel Honasan simply because the latter is a friend and former
associate, the motive for the act is completely different. But if the act is committed with a political or social
motive that is in furtherance of rebellion, then it should be deemed to form part of the crime of rebellion instead
of being punished separately.

In view of the foregoing, the petitioner can not be tried separately under PD 1829 in addition to his being
prosecuted in the rebellion case. With this ruling, there is no need for the Court to pass upon the other issues
raised by the petitioner.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Information in Criminal Case No. 90-777 is QUASHED. The writ
of preliminary injunction, enjoining respondent Judges and their successors in Criminal Case No. 90-777,
Regional Trial Court of Makati, from holding the arraignment of Sen. Juan Ponce Enrile and from conducting
further proceedings therein is made permanent.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes, Griño-Aquino and
Regalado, JJ., concur.

Medialdea, J., took no part.

Fernan, C.J. and Paras, J., are on leave.