Caste Class and Politics

South Asia Research
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Engaging with Discourse on Caste, Class and Politics in India

Ashok K. Pankaj
South Asia Research 2007; 27; 333
DOI: 10.1177/026272800702700305
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SOUTH ASIA
R E S E A RCH
www.sagepublications.com
DOI: 10.1177/026272800702700305
Vol. 27(3): 333–353
Copyright © 2007
SAGE Publications
Los Angeles,
London,
New Delhi,
Singapore
ENGAGING WITH DISCOURSE ON

CASTE, CLASS AND POLITICS IN INDIA
Ashok K. Pankaj
INSTITUTE FOR HUMAN DEVELOPMENT, NEW DELHI, INDIA
ABSTRACT This article maps the changing profile of pre-Mandal

and post-Mandal debates on caste, class and politics in India, show-
ing that the centrality of caste as an agent of politics and its dom-
inant role in public-political life has remained a reality throughout.
What is contested now is the extent to which recognition of caste
as an instrument of socio-political change (following the Mandal
Commission) and caste-centric socio-political movements of the
1980s and 1990s (the Dalit and Backward Class movements) has
reinforced caste-centric public-political life by giving it a modern
value and a secular purpose.
The article argues that the contemporary elaborate discourses
on caste, class, and politics in India should seek to develop new
paradigms for the discussion of caste and should interrogate more
vigorously the democratic and secular roles of caste in relation to
class and politics.
KEYWORDS: backward class movements, caste, class, Dalits, Mandal
Commission, modernisation, politics, secularism, tradition
Introduction
Even though the contemporary discourse on caste, class and politics in India has been
liberated from the straitjacket debate of modernisation vs. traditionalisation and
dichotomous vs. dynamic relations, the centrality of caste as an agent of politics and
its dominant role in Indian socio-political life have neither been removed nor firmly
challenged. Rather, recognition of caste as an instrument of socio-political change by
the Mandal Commission and caste-centric socio-political movements of the 1980s
and 1990s, such as Dalit and Backward Class movements, have not only enlivened
new debates in India, but have reinforced a caste-centric public-political life, giving
it a modern value and a secular purpose.
While during the pre-Mandal phase of the 1960s and 1970s, the discourse on
caste, class and politics in India was dominated by theories of political modernisation,

334 South Asia Research Vol. 27 (3): 333–353
since the 1980s it has been inspired by the new awakening of Dalits and Backward
Classes and their movements for social and political empowerment. Hence, the
contemporary discourse is deeply interested in investigating the changing landscape
of socio-political life as a result of the political assertion of Dalits and Backward
Classes and its overall impacts on Indian politics. Moreover, if the earlier discourse
was conditioned by transition from a colonial political system to parliamentary
democracy, political stability of the dominant party system based on consensus politics
and social coalition, the contemporary discourse has been contexualised by decline
of the dominant party system, recurrent political instability triggered by the dismantl-
ing of old models of caste coalition, assertion of Dalits and Backward Classes, Mandal-
isation of politics, proliferation of caste-based political parties, frustration with caste
politics and violent caste wars. Whereas early discourses culminated in the development
of functional perspectives on caste, class and politics, present ones are equally con-
cerned with dysfunctional roles of caste in Indian politics. The salient features of these
two phases of debate can be presented in tabular form (see Table 1):
Table 1 Changing Discourse on Caste, Class and Politics in India

(Pre-1980) (Post-1980)
1. Influenced by theories of political No longer inspired by modernisation

modernisation theories
2. Theoretically rooted in modernity vs. Empirically rooted in new socio-political
tradition debate and dynamic vs. movements of Dalits and Backward Classes
dichotomous relations
3. Conditioned by political stability, Conditioned by volatile politics, increasing

smooth transition to democracy, successful political instability, violent caste wars
electoral politics and cohesive social life and incessant caste tensions
4. Focused on functional perspectives Equally concerned with
of caste in Indian politics dysfunctional role of caste in Indian politics
The contemporary discourse on caste, class and politics in India appears unable to
contest vigorously enough the new rationalisations of caste. In particular, it has failed
to challenge and derationalise its modern roles and secular values. The present study
argues that the changed profile of this caste-politics discourse needs to be considered
afresh. This task can be achieved either through the quarantining of caste from
politics—though how that is possible will need to be vigorously examined—or/and
through the search for a new paradigm of politics. The former must necessarily follow
the latter, as the first cannot be achieved without the second. The contemporary dis-
course on caste, class and politics in India should thus urgently look for new paradigms.
This article consists of three major sections. The first one briefly maps out the
debate on caste, class and politics in the pre-Mandal phase. The second one focuses in

Pankaj: Engaging with Discourse on Caste, Class and Politics in India 335
more detail on the main thrusts of more recent debates, while the third section examines
the future of caste in Indian politics and the role of social scientists in the formulation
of new paradigms.
The Debates of the Pre-Mandal Phase

Caste with its cultural and structural attributes was essentially perceived as a traditional
social institution, whereas politics in its contemporary meaning was seen as a modern
process. Juxtaposition of caste and politics led to serious debates about the relationship
between tradition and modernity (Kothari, 1970a; 1970b). What is the relationship
between tradition and modernity where caste and politics meet? Do they create
dynamic processes of interaction based on continuity and change, or do we find a di-
chotomous relationship? Does it lead to fission or fusion? How does tradition respond
to modernisation? How do the forces of modernisation influence traditions and how,
in turn, do they get affected? Is tradition anachronistic to the process of modernisation?
If it is, why is it surviving despite the onslaught of modernity? And if it is not, how
does ‘tradition’ cope with the challenges of ‘modernity’? These were the basic questions
raised in the early phase of discourses on caste, class and politics in India, which took
place with reference to three settings (a) the tradition vs. modernity debate; (b) caste
and class relations; and (c) interaction of caste and politics.
Indian Tradition-Modernity Debates

Theoretical approaches to the study of tradition and modernity in relation to caste
and politics consisted in turn of two main streams, emphasising either the dichotomy
of tradition and modernity or the dynamic relations between them. In the dichotomous
perspective, tradition and modernity are mainly seen in opposition to each other.
The idea was that modernity would be realised only when tradition was destroyed
and superseded, as modernity evolves, so it was imagined, through the destruction of
tradition (Rudolph and Rudolph, 1969: 3). In terms of caste-politics relations in
particular, analysts of this school tend to contemplate castes as valueless and mean-
ingless institutions in a modern democratic political set-up, putting the cultural and
structural attributes of both into opposition. Whereas the traditional system of castes
is based on notions of hierarchy/holism; pollution/purity; sacred/non-sacred; her-
editary occupation and ascribed status; local and parochial perspectives, modernity
assumes that local ties and ‘little’ perspectives give way to ‘great’ universal commitments
and cosmopolitan attitudes; that the rational way of thinking and action takes prece-
dence over irrationality of emotion, pollution and purity; that the status of an in-
dividual is achieved rather than ascribed; that social position and economic occupation
are decided by capability and skill, not by virtue of birth; that the individual will be
the primary unit of society and politics, and not the group. Modernist approaches
more or less inevitably find caste anachronistic to modern politics.
South Asia Research Vol. 27 (3): 333–353

The continuity and change model, on the other hand, emphasises dynamic relations
between tradition and modernity, caste and politics. The prominent argument of
this school is that modernity is never a complete and neat break with tradition, rather
a process of evolution that generates new forces of modernisation while retaining
elements of tradition. Tradition holds components of modernity, and modernity retains
elements of tradition. Weber (2002 [1958]) had linked ‘modern’ entrepreneurship in the
West to a character structure associated with ‘traditional’ Protestant ethics. Singer
and Cohn (1968) in their early study of Hindu industrialists of Madras found joint
family systems suitably converted into joint business houses based on division of labour.
Therefore, explaining modernity and tradition as mutually exclusive and contra-
dictory would appear to rest on misdiagnosis of tradition as found in traditional so-
cieties and a misunderstanding of modernity as seen in modern societies. Every society
encompasses in itself a range of sentiments, psychological predispositions, norms
and structures that may belong to typical ideal-type traditional attributes, yet will
also have inherent and latent forces of modernisation. Similarly, all civilisations called
‘modern’ encompass in themselves manifest and latent values, structures and norms,
dominant values and motifs that fit a model of ‘tradition’. The risk of overlooking
this was succinctly put by Rudolph and Rudolph (1969: 3):
The assumption that modernity and tradition are radically contradictory rests on a
misdiagnosis of tradition as it is found in traditional societies, a misunderstanding of
modernity as it is found in modern societies, and a misapprehension of the relationship
between them.
The modernity-tradition debate as articulated through caste-politics relations has

been increasingly dominated by the continuity and change model. In this dynamic
perspective, tradition itself becomes a facilitator of modernisation and yet does not
get consumed in the process. Caste, though essentially a traditional institution, gets
absorbed in modern political processes without shedding all its cultural and structural
attributes. Rudolph and Rudolph (1969: 10) setting the theoretical paradigm of the
continuity and change model of caste politics study, write:
If tradition and modernity are seen as continuous rather than separated by an abyss, if
they are dialectically rather than dichotomously related, and if internal variations are
attended to and taken seriously, then those sectors of traditional society that contain
or express potentialities for change from dominant norms and structures become critical
for understanding the nature and processes of modernization.
Therefore, ‘the components of “new” men may exist among the “old”’ (Rudolph and
Rudolph, 1969: 11), and caste with its traditional attributes can become a structural
and ideological means of political mobilisation in modern competitive electoral pol-
itics. Kothari (1970a: 8) held that modernisation is an upward movement from one
stage of progress to another, but this does not mean the end of ‘tradition’. Citing from

his own earlier work (Kothari, 1970a: 8), Kothari (1997: 58) demonstrates the growing
strength of this approach when he reiterates that ‘[a] “modernizing” society is neither
modern nor traditional. It simply moves from one threshold of integration and per-
formance to another, in the process transforming both the indigenous structures and
attitudes and the newly introduced institutions and ideas’. This perceives modern-
isation as a dynamic process that takes place in dialectical terms through mutual
interaction between tradition and modernity; through the process of fusion not fission;
and through complex processes of continuity and change. Singh (1986: 191), among
others, supports this approach and writes that traditional Indian society has relevance
not only for analysing the direction that the process of modernisation may eventually
take through major socio-cultural transformations, but is also important for under-
standing the causality and sequence of events through which modernisation impacts
on traditional Indian society. The continued incorporation of caste into democratic
politics in India illustrates prominently that tradition and modernity interact in a
dynamic process, and its essence is continuity and change, not static rigidity. Well
before Mandalisation, it seems, this was recognised by more and more scholars.
Debates about Caste and Class

Caste-class relations in the pre-Mandal phase were prominently debated through
approaches to the study of tradition and modernity. The debate polarised at two
levels, exclusiveness of caste and class and fusion of caste and class respectively. Those
who believed in the dichotomy of tradition and modernity and tended to subscribe
to cultural perspectives of caste, highlighted its uniqueness and favoured the ex-
clusiveness of caste and class. Dumont (1998 [1966]), Hocart (1950), Hutton (1946),
Pocock (1955), Srinivas (1962), and others argued that caste and class belong to dif-
ferent social realities. They tended to explain caste as a unique traditional phenomenon
of Indian society and class as a universal phenomenon of modern society. The former
is portrayed as a backward social institution, the latter belongs to advanced industrial
societies. Since tradition and modernity are perceived as mutually exclusive, caste
and class maintain a distinct reality. Moreover, cultural perspectives of caste emphasise
certain dominant ideas and values, such as pollution and purity, rules of social inter-
course and endogamy, distinguishing caste from class and creating fixed boundaries
rather than fuzzy edges and overlaps. Defining caste through concepts of status-
rigidity and immutability, organic solidarity and functional interdependence, while
linking class to the ideology of individualism, competition and equality, put caste
and class into polar opposites. Such scholars also considered caste as a closed and
rigid system, whereas class is perceived as open and flexible. Therefore, in the caste
system units of ranking are groups, status is ascribed and there is legitimacy of ritual
hierarchy. In a class system, the units of rankings are individuals, status is achieved
and is legitimised through material achievements.
However, this was not the only perspective. Barth (1960), Beteille (1966), Desai
(1975), Ghurye (1950), Kothari (1970a; 1970b), Sharma (1980) and others subscribed

more to structural perspectives and argued that both caste and class represent the same
structural reality. Domination and subjugation, surplus and exploitation, privileges
and deprivations are reference points universally found in caste and class. Some be-
lieved in the universality of caste as a social category. Ghurye (1961) found through
comparative study that almost all the major civilisations of ancient times recognised
distinctions by birth. Barth’s (1960) study of Muslims of North Pakistan located
structural elements of caste in different social groups, much as Imtiaz Ahmad (1978)
later confirmed the presence of caste-like structures in Muslim societies of India.
Moreover, such scholars affirm that caste holds the tendency and potentiality to
become a class; caste inheres an underdeveloped but potentially explosive class char-
acter. Secondly, they hold that caste as class is a real and empirical phenomenon of
Indian society. When a caste behaves as an interest group, as Karl Marx explained in
terms of dialectical logic, a ‘class in itself ’ becomes a ‘class for itself ’ (Marx and Engels,
1958), as elements of class-consciousness and unity develop into class antagonism.
Rudolph and Rudolph (1969) and Kothari (1970a and 1970b) proved beyond doubt
associational features of caste and its class behaviour in Indian politics. Further, caste
conflicts are also class conflicts. Upper and lower castes can also be upper and lower
classes respectively.
Caste-class convergence is much evident in landowning pattern. Gough (1977;
1980) in her early study of landowning pattern of Tanjore district found, hardly sur-
prising, that Brahmins are landowners as well. On the other hand, non-Brahmins
and Adi-Dravidas, the lower castes, are often landless. Mukherjee (1981) and Beteille
(1966; 1969) found similar caste-class convergences in their studies. Also, caste riots
are often pronounced class conflicts between upper castes/class and lower castes/class
(Omvedt, 1982). Caste conflicts, particularly attacks on landless low-caste labour-
ers and their counter attacks, not only in feudal, backward and economically less de-
veloped states such as Bihar, but even more in modern, capitalistically developed
states like Punjab, Gujarat and Maharashtra, created reason to believe that the under-
lying factor behind such caste conflicts is the summation and articulation of class
interests (Omvedt, 1982).
Lastly, such scholarship suggested caution while studying Indian society, in view
of a tendency among Western scholars to locate class in India as seen in the early in-
dustrial societies of the West. Clear polarisation of classes, however, is not evident in
the agrarian society of India. To a large extent, caste and class thus represent the same
structural reality. Since caste incorporates class and class incorporates caste, neither
the ‘caste view’ alone, nor the ‘class view’ on its own can explain the entire gamut of
India’s social reality (Sharma, 1980).
Caste and Politics in the Pre-Mandal Phase

The central concern of caste-politics debates in this phase has been absorption of new
democratic political institutions and processes into traditional Indian society. How
does modern politics negotiate with traditional Indian society and what is the response

of the latter to the former? Is caste/tradition a constraint to democratic politics and

political modernisation, or is it a facilitator of modern politics? Is tradition-based pol-
itical modernisation essentially functional, or is it latent with dysfunctional tensions?
Caste-politics relations in this phase have been mainly explored through these questions.
Scholars who focused on dynamic relations have mainly come out with a functional
perspective of caste-politics relations and have argued that caste has helped in the as-
similation of democratic politics in India, adopting many of the roles of modern pol-
itical institutions and process. Some of the important roles played by caste in this
respect have been explained as (a) mediator between tradition and modernity; (b) agent
of political mobilisation; and (c) creation of caste associations as a base for political
communication, representation and leadership recruitment.
Kothari (1970a: 224–49; 1970b: 8–23) and Rudolph and Rudolph (1969: 24–
103) produced interesting studies of caste-based political modernisation in India and
analysed in detail various roles of caste in modern democratic politics. These roles
have generally been subsumed under political mobilisation processes, expressed in
terms of vertical, horizontal and differential mobilisation, as Rudolph and Rudolph
(1969: 24–6) explain:
Vertical mobilization is the marshaling of political support by traditional notables in

local societies that are organized and integrated by rank, mutual dependence, and the
legitimacy of traditional authority…Vertical mobilization remains a viable strategy for
dominant classes and castes…. Horizontal mobilization involves the marshaling of
popular political support by class or community leaders and their specialized organ-
izations…. Differential mobilization involves the marshaling of direct and indirect
political support by political parties (and other integrative structures) from viable, but
internally differentiated, communities through parallel appeals to ideology, sentiments
and interest. The agent of mobilization in this case is the political party rather than the
local notable or community association.
These three types of political mobilisation also reflect stages of political awareness
and development. In vertical mobilisation, the society is least politicised and political
awareness is limited to certain individuals or an elite group. Horizontal mobilisation
indicates a moderate level of political awareness, as the caste or community group be-
comes politicised, but political awareness still remains a group phenomenon. In dif-
ferential mobilisation, political awareness has penetrated to the level of the individual,
the exercise of political rights becomes now a matter of individual choice.
Scholars who believe in the dichotomy of tradition and modernity cry of ‘casteism
in politics’, as they perceive tradition and modernity as polar opposites and even con-
tradictory. Nationalist elites of newly independent states and Western intellectuals
have expressed deep apprehensions about the use of linguistic, religious, ethnic, tribal
and caste identities in democratic politics (Harrison, 1960). First, they argue that
traditional structures and loyalties have inherent potentialities to organise as a strong
political force and identity, which may even culminate in demands for separate nation-
hood. Second, all encompassing roles of ascriptive structures negate the very essence
of democracy, as associations claim and get precedence over individuals in time and
importance. To substantiate such arguments, scholars have alluded to India and other
Afro-Asian countries as theatres of frequent civil wars, religious clashes, ethnic geno-
cide, and separatist and secessionist movements. Partition of the Indian subcontin-
ent on the basis of the ‘two-nation theory’, the linguistic reorganisation of Indian
states in 1956 and the violent language movement of the early 1960s are often quoted.
Harrison (1960) expresses deep concern about the use of such primordial loyalties in
politics. More recent movements for Khalistan, Bodoland and greater Nagaland were
said to reflect the same trend.
While scholars have voiced apprehensions about the use of ascriptive institutions
in politics, the behaviour of castes in politics has been different from linguistic, re-
ligious and tribal associations. Political mobilisation of caste groups often has specific
purposes, aimed at distribution of status or resources, or securing representation in
legislatures and services through reservations. The nature of their demands often indi-
cates a willingness to become part of the mainstream. Such demands are amenable to
management through party politics and there are various limitations to caste-based
political mobilisation, as Rudolph and Rudolph (1969) show. Moreover, Kothari (1970a;
1997: 58) defends caste in politics as a natural phenomenon. He argues that democratic
politics will essentially operate and articulate themselves through social organisations
and institutions. Since the bulk of India’s population is organised around caste, it is
but natural that politics will be organised and articulated through caste. Here again,
then, the close inter-linkage of caste and politics remains a prominent feature and
achieved increasing recognition during the debates in the pre-Mandal phase.
Debates of the Post-Mandal Period

While the Indian discourse on caste, class and politics in the 1960s and 1970s provided
the broader theoretical framework for the study of caste-politics relations, during the
1980s and 1990s scholars looked for alternative paradigms to explain caste-class
relations and caste-politics interaction. The earlier modernising perspective of caste-
politics relation that had explained caste-based politics and mobilisation as functional
for Indian democracy could no longer explain the destabilising developments of the
1980s and 1990s. The increasingly evident inability of the modernisation theory to
explain dysfunctional consequences of increasing political instability, political fission,
proliferation of parties, rise of Dalits and Backward Classes and their socio-political
assertion, and the decline of the Congress model of social coalition provided the first
urge to search for alternative paradigms of understanding. The legitimacy of traditional
institutions as facilitator of modernisation became questionable. While the earlier
discourse on caste, class and politics was much more rooted in theory, new develop-
ments required empirical testing. For example, the emergence of a new middle class
had to be verified empirically. Hence, the new discourse maintains a fine balance be-
tween theory building and empirical testing. The developments of the 1980s and

1990s have added new dimensions to the study of caste, class and politics, characterised
by the prominence of three themes: (a) caste vs. class to measure socio-economic
backwardness; (b) formation of a new middle class; and (c) Dalit assertion and Back-
ward Class politics.
The Caste-Class Debate on a New Plank

While the pre-Mandal discourse on caste-class relations was framed by the theory of
social stratification, more recent debates have been triggered by the state policy of
positive discrimination for socially and educationally backward classes. In 1972, the
Gujarat Government constituted a Commission for the Socially and Educationally
Backward Classes under the chairmanship of Justice A.R. Baxi to identify socially
and educationally backward groups of people who deserve special concession as were
already given to Scheduled Castes (SCs) and Scheduled Tribes (STs). The Commission
submitted its report in 1976, recommending caste as a unit of identification for in-
corporation also in socially and educationally backward classes. In 1977, Bihar intro-
duced a caste-based reservation policy for Other Backward Classes (OBCs), which
led to massive protests and violence by upper castes and forward classes. In 1978, the
Janata Party-led Coalition Government at the Centre constituted a Backward Class
Commission under the Chairmanship of B.P. Mandal. The Mandal Commission
also recommended caste as a category for incorporation in socially and educationally
backward classes for the purpose of extending reservations in government services to
the OBCs along the lines of the SCs and STs. The Mandal Commission Report
could not be implemented till another coalition government of the erstwhile Janata
Party came to power under V.P. Singh at the Centre in 1989. On 9 August 1990 it
declared its decision to implement the report of the Mandal Commission. The decision
of the Janata Dal Government to implement 27 per cent reservation in government
services for the OBCs resulted in unprecedented levels of pan-Indian caste polarisation
for and against reservation, with massive impacts on the socio-political life in contem-
porary India. The new debates on caste and class have been contexualised by the
above developments.
Hence, whereas in the early phase, the central question was whether a caste is a
class, the contemporary concern focuses on empirical identification of units for the
measurement of social and educational backwardness. The central question of enquiry
is now whether a caste should be accepted as a permanent and fixed category for the
identification of socially and educationally backward classes, or should we go beyond
caste to find out a more secular and flexible criterion? This shift in emphasis has not
only pushed the caste-class debate to a new horizon, but has made the modernity-
tradition approach virtually redundant for contemporary purposes.
Desai (1984) and Shah (1985) have immortalised the new debate on caste and
class, the former appearing to initiate the debate by arguing that a secular and flexible
unit for the measurement of social and educational backwardness should be evolved
for the state policy of positive discrimination, while Shah responded that caste is a

permanent and fixed category for the identification of socially and educationally
backward classes. Both scholars have advanced convincing arguments and used em-
pirical data to substantiate them.
Desai (1984) finds the Mandal Commission Report inconsistent in its perspective
and recommendations. He contends that the selection of caste as a fixed and perman-
ent category for the identification of socially and educationally backward classes may
not only legitimise the institution of caste, but stands against the new reality of Indian
social life, characterised by the formation of a new class consciousness and unity,
often leading to the destruction of caste consciousness and unity. His opposition to
caste-based reservation policy for the OBCs is on two counts. First, according to Desai
(1984: 1111):
Recognition of caste as the unit for inclusion or exclusion in the SEBC [Socially and
Educationally Backward Classes] goes against the Backward Class movements which
are to be understood as a refusal to accept, or as protests against, the caste status ascribed
to some groups in the traditional hierarchy. Some of these movements, though may
not be all, indicate also the way to assert ‘equality’. It will be the negation of this con-
sciousness of equality which is in keeping with the spirit of the Constitution…if caste
is recognised as the unit equivalent to socially and educationally backward class. It
would mean legitimising caste by state action and perpetuating the caste system, which
is inconsistent with the ideal of the Constitution.
Second, according to Desai (1984: 1111):
Apart from the perspective and spirit of the Constitution, there is the question of fact.
In what sense do ‘the caste and ethnic groups’ exist as ‘recognisable and persistent col-
lectivities’? The pertinent question is: are and were these collectivities called castes and
groups the same or homogeneous everywhere in different regions of the state or every-
where in the state horizontally? Is each such horizontal segment vertically homogeneous
economically, occupationally and educationally or even status-wise in the same region
and the state? If yes, with reference to which elements? Are these elements persistent?
His other resentment of caste-based reservation policy is its potentiality to transfer

inegalitarian ideology and values to egalitarian religious communities like Muslims
and Christians. On the positive side, Desai (1984: 1113) pleads that the caste system
is giving way to a system of secular identification, where ‘the two central principles of
caste system have strong rivals in the new secular basis of differentiation and strati-
fication. The old basis of unity, namely, caste consciousness, is weakening in the face
of interest conscious unities’. These are products of contemporary economic and
political developments along with corresponding changes in social norms and standards
of behaviour and in the aspiration of all people. Therefore, Desai pleads for
identification of social and educational backwardness on the basis of secular criteria,
where individuals matter, not collectivities, and where individual status is determined

by occupational position, educational background, lifestyle, consumption pattern

and the source of livelihood obtained through one’s own efforts and not through the
legacy of ancestral occupation. Hence Desai (1984: 1115) confirms his perception
that ‘caste is not co-terminous with secular class and much less does the new strati-
fication based on secular attributes concur with traditional caste hierarchy or status
system’. To Desai (1984: 1116), ‘[b]ackwardness is not a permanent and ‘persistent’
attribute of a citizen. It is the result of secular social forces of power and pelf ’. Thus,
caste should not be identified with class.
Shah (1985) takes the opposite position by arguing that social and educational
backwardness still has much to do with one’s birth in a particular caste group, which
is ascriptive and not achieved. He contests Desai’s proposition that in contemporary
Indian society, the life chances of an individual are determined by economic conditions
and not by birth in a particular caste. For him, even economic conditions of an indi-
vidual are determined by birth in a particular family or caste. As Shah (1985: 133–4)
writes: ‘It is true that birth should not decide one’s backwardness. But it is equally
true that in the given economic and political structure, one’s birth in a particular
family by and large determines one’s life chances’. The so-called upper castes have
not only enjoyed control over resources for centuries but also dominated the culture
of the masses, providing ideology and spreading it through various devices. Thus, so
Shah (1985: 134): ‘It takes time, even if we assume that the upper castes and classes
are generous and have become secular, for the lower castes to get liberated from the
Brahminical ideological hegemony’. A 1983 household survey conducted by the
Centre for Social Studies in Surat illustrates the importance of caste in terms of
educational and economic achievements (Shah, 1985: 133):
There are more hurdles in the path of the poor Koli than that of the poor Patidar to
obtain educational and economic opportunities. These differences are not necessarily
because of their traditional unequal social status in the caste hierarchy based on purity
and pollution. They are because of the different historical experience, as one received
certain advantages in the past in the feudal economic and political structure which the
other was denied. The persons from the lower caste were denied access to educational
institutions for centuries. Hence, one belonging to higher castes has inherited the trad-
ition of education whereas the other has to open a new chapter… Because of the
overall environment of the collectivity, the poor Brahmin boy gets somewhat more
congenial environment for study than the poor Koli boy.
Other differences with Desai pertain to class formation. Desai (1984) observes the
formation of a secular class of individuals cutting across caste identities in contem-
porary Indian society. Shah (1985) argues that even though economic differenti-
ations among the individuals of a particular caste may have widened and this may
have happened in most castes, that does not necessarily lead to formation of class-
consciousness cutting across caste consciousness. Rather, new economic stratification

may have taken place within a caste, but this has not happened at the cost of caste
consciousness. Shah (1985: 134) argues:
I suspect that economic stratification, and not class formation, has taken place within
many castes engaged in agriculture. Economic stratification does influence the life style
and values of the members as the life style of a highly paid industrial worker differs from
that of a low paid worker in the same factory. But such differences do not necessarily
lead to the emergence of antagonistic ‘class interests’. Needless to say, economic
differentiations have yet to cross caste boundaries to lead to the formation of classes.
Therefore, class is not formed simply by interest-conscious unities, but it has to be

supported by interest antagonism as well, which is not well pronounced in con-
temporary Indian society. Other scholars, including Alam (1999), Bhambhri (1999),
Kothari (1994), Pushpendra (1999), Sheth (1999) and Srinivas (2003) have con-
tributed to this debate by taking either position. The Government and the higher ju-
diciary are other parties to this ongoing debate, putting their weight firmly behind
the ‘caste is class’ theory.
The Rise of a New Middle Class

An offshoot of the caste-class debate in the more recent period concerns the theory of
the rise of a new middle class. Desai (1984) provided a grounding for the study of
new class formation when he challenged caste-based reservation policies and pleaded
for a class-based policy defined through secular terms rather than caste. Sheth (1999:
2508) has theorised this development through the admittedly inelegant concept
of ‘classisation of caste’ and proposed that as a cumulative result of detachment of
caste from ritual status hierarchy and its linkage to the power structure of representa-
tive democracy, a different kind of class structure has evolved over the last 40 years.
He explains that political and economic forces of India’s post-Independence period
have detached caste from its traditional ideological, political and economic roles to
produce a new kind of social structure where an individual’s income, occupational
position, educational achievement and lifestyle matter more in terms of social status
than ritually defined fixed status as commanded traditionally. Differentiations of
income, occupation and consumption patterns have also led to new kinds of social
relations established among individuals, cutting across caste lines and transcending
caste ideologies. Moreover, politicisation of caste has produced a new kind of collective
consciousness among castes detached from ritual status consciousness, driven by
the common aspirations of individuals for greater political participation, increasing
representation in bureaucracy and modern status based on better earnings, educational
and occupational positions. Therefore, de-ritualisation of caste and its politicisation
through democratic politics have produced a new kind of stratification, a social system
which cannot be defined either purely in caste or class terms. It is neither completely

devoid of features of the caste system, nor completely based on class sentiments.
Sheth (1999: 2508) explains this ‘classisation of caste’ theory:
I, therefore, view classisation as a twofold process: (a) releasing of individual members

of all castes (albeit, extent of which may vary from one caste to another) from the re-
ligiously sanctioned techno-economic and social organisation (i e, occupational
and status hierarchy) of the village system; (b) and linking of their interests and iden-
tities to organisations and categories relevant to urban-industrial system and modern
politics… Thus viewed, classisation is a process by which castes, but more frequently
their individual members, relate to categories of social stratification of a type different
from that of caste…. In short, caste has ceased to ‘reproduce’ itself, as it did in the past.
The observable formation of a middle class is a major derivative of his classisation of

caste theory, which Sheth (1999: 2509) has called the ‘new middle class’, seen as
‘socially much more diversified compared to the old, upper caste oriented middle
class that existed at the time of independence’. It is also new because entry into the
new middle class has not been facilitated by, and does not depend on, ritual social
status and Sanskritisation, but the acquisition of modern status based on educational
achievements, occupational positions, economic earnings and modern consumption
patterns. This new middle class, recruited from various castes, develops distinct
characteristics in terms of ritual detachment, acquisition of identity or consciousness
of belonging to the middle class and convergence of their economic and political
interests with other members of the middle class rather than their caste fellows. Thus,
the new middle class is becoming politically and culturally more unified, though
socially much more diversified. This process of formation of the new middle class has
been substantiated by a survey conducted by the Centre for the Study of Developing
Societies in Delhi during June–July 1996.
Remarkably, M.N. Srinivas, a votary of caste-based reservation policy as a member
of the expert committee of the Mandal Commission, also accepted the emergence of
the new middle class as a social fact at the fag end of his life. In a special article pub-
lished posthumously, Srinivas (2003: 459) wrote ‘An obituary on caste as a system’
and noted:
While the middle class is primarily urban, and it is dominated largely by the upper,
and dominant castes, and elite sections of minorities and ethnic groups, all sections of
Indian society are represented within it, thanks to the spread of education, and massive
affirmative action policies by the state…. Consumerism is an important characteristic
of the middle classes and it is spreading to other sections of society…. Among the
middle classes, similarity of education, lifestyle and proximity, are becoming increasingly
more important than caste in forming friendships, and marriages.
Srinivas (2003: 458) also found this new middle class a more powerful dissolver of
caste than the purely ideological Bhakti Movement of the medieval period or other

social movements. Probably fed up with the ‘reincarnation of caste’, he wished India
to move on towards a more secular social reality, asserting that ‘[a] massive assault on
mass poverty plus rapid economic growth will be the best dissolvers of caste identities.
Membership of the middle class seems to provide a solvent to the caste divisiveness’
(Srinivas, 2003: 459).
Pushpendra (1999) also supports his ‘classisation of caste’ theory through the study
of electoral behaviour of Dalits. A National Survey of the parliamentary elections of
1996 and 1998 conducted by the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies in
Delhi revealed the presence of a sizeable section of middle class and elite Dalits. It
also recorded that a large section of Scheduled Caste voters belonging to the upper or
upper middle class preferred to vote for the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) (apparently
an upper caste party), whereas most of the lower class Dalits voted exclusively for the
Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) or other Dalit parties. This adds a political dimension to
the classisation of caste theory. Whereas Pushpendra (1999) explains this development
through the voting behaviour of Dalits, Alam (1999) observes that oppressed castes
have forged a class-like solidarity to fight for equality.
However, scholars of the opposite spectrum have vehemently registered their
protests against the classisation of caste theory, arguing that caste identity has not
dissolved, even though class-based stratification may have become a new reference
point for individuals. Shah (1985) in his reply to Desai (1984) admitted that the
traditional pollution-purity concept may have become diluted in relation to caste.
Nonetheless, caste consciousness has survived all kinds of economic and political
changes and cuts across the different economic classes to sustain the ethnic ideology
of caste ‘we-ness’. Therefore, the social reality is that ‘[p]ersons of different economic
strata of the same caste feel as one… without much effort, whereas one has to make
consistent efforts to feel one with the members of the same economic stratum
belonging to a different caste’ (Shah, 1985: 134). Singh, in private communication
to Desai (1984: 1107) takes a more rigid cultural perspective of caste and comments
in this connection:
Even granting that the process of modernisation and mobility and industrial expansion
has created a serious hiatus between caste status and social status in some parts of the
country, and in some pockets in all parts of the country, the entrenchment of people’s
identity in caste and community remains intact not only endogamously but also
politically and culturally.
Kothari (1994) finds that the rise of Dalits and their socio-political assertion have
re-entrenched caste identity and consciousness. He explains that consciousness of
caste has been ironically invoked by those who have suffered most from the system.
Earlier, it was upper castes that used to invoke caste identities in socio-political life;
today, it is Dalits who do the same, which rather indicates strengthening of the caste
system than its erosion or weakening. Mukherjee (1999: 1761) sums up the debate
by proposing that ‘[t]oday, in India, caste in class depicts the reality, and not caste per

se or caste and class’. Bhambhri (1999: 2619) suggests that caste in India has survived
as an ideological superstructure of Hindu society, an integral part of the social base of
material arrangements for extraction of surplus values, and explains:
… caste has been used as an instrument for the ‘extraction and appropriation of surplus
value’ in Indian agrarian social structure. Caste is both an ideological superstructure
of Hinduism and it is also an integral part of the ‘social base of material arrange-
ments’…Hinduism of every variety is very much in existence as a reference point of
the worldview of the oppressed castes.
Bhambri’s first proposition that caste is still an instrument of economic exploitation

of the oppressed by upper castes has to be accepted with a caveat. But one has to re-
spect his second proposition that caste as an ideological superstructure of Hinduism
has survived as a reference point for the worldview of oppressed castes.
Caste and Politics: The Political Assertion of Dalits and Backward Classes
The notable political upsurge of Dalits and Backward Classes in the 1980s and 1990s
has contributed to a number of political developments, including decline in dominance
of the Congress Party and erosion of its social coalition base. Divisive politics and the
proliferation of caste-based political parties led to the simultaneous rise of Brahmanical
and Dalit parties (the BJP and BSP respectively), casteisation of government and
bureaucracy and also violent caste conflicts, with initial consolidation and later frag-
mentation of the OBCs. Hence, studying the causes of the socio-political assertion of
Dalits and Backward Classes and their major consequences for polity and society has
recently acquired more prominence in the discourse on caste, class and politics in India.
‘Democratisation of politics’ and ‘consolidation of democracy’ are important ex-
planations of this phase (Jaffrelot, 2003), while Kohli (2001) has argued that dem-
ocracy in India has acquired greater legitimacy through the widening social base
and enhanced participation of the erstwhile marginalised sections. Phenomena like
caste conflicts, political instability and proliferation of caste-based political parties
have been explained as passing (temporal) developments, which may give way
to more permanent features of the democratisation of politics, strengthening Indian
democracy.
Jaffrelot (2003) calls the political upsurge of Dalits and Backward Classes India’s
‘Silent Revolution’. It is indeed a revolution in the sense that for the first time in Indian
history, the lower castes have been able to exercise political power by snatching it
from the upper castes, made possible through mobilising their numerical superiority in
a parliamentary democracy based on universal adult franchise. This revolution is
silent, as the whole process is incremental without much violence, even though caste
conflicts are very much in evidence. ‘India is therefore’, Jaffrelot (2003: 494) writes:
experimenting with a silent revolution. Power is being transferred, on the whole peace-
fully, from the upper caste elites to various subaltern groups…The relative calm of the
Indian experience is primarily due to the fact that the whole process is incremental.

A major consequence of this silent revolution has been the widening social base of
Indian democracy. It has been transformed largely from a political to a social dem-
ocracy, as Dalits and Backward Classes have increased their representation in gov-
ernment and political parties. Ethnicisation of caste, achieved by Dravidianism in the
Southern and Western parts of India and by the Mandal Commission in North India,
has completed the process of social democracy. Jaffrelot (2003) observes that the long-
standing contradiction between social and political democracy, to which Ambedkar
had earlier drawn attention (Constituent Assembly Debates, 1989: 979) is becoming
gradually reconciled through the socio-political awakening of Dalits and Backward
Classes in the post-Mandal phase.
Atul Kohli has changed his earlier perception of growing crisis of governability
(Kohli, 1990) to speak now of India’s successful democracy (Kohli, 2001), noting that
the social base of Indian democracy, and with it power sharing, has broadened.
Pushpendra (1999) also notes that India’s democratic institutions have acquired greater
legitimacy in this phase. Dalits and Backward Classes, constituting a substantial part
of the population, had till recently been captive voters of the Congress Party and their
political electoral role in Indian politics was defined by voting behaviour based on
patron-client relations. However, in the post-Mandal period, they have been able to
articulate their political interests through exclusive parties like the BSP in Uttar Pradesh
and the Rashtriya Janata Dal (RJD) in Bihar. Nadkarni (1997) prefers to call this a
‘broadening process’, whereby erstwhile marginalised sections of society become a
part of mainstream social, political and economic life. Khilnani (1999: 60) adds that
the idea of democracy has ‘irreversibly entered the Indian political imagination…A
return to the old order of castes…is inconceivable: the principle of authority in society
has been transformed’.
Kothari (1994) still prefers to study the Dalit and Backward Class upsurge in
the old-fashioned tradition-modernity framework. Seeing their invocation of caste
identity and use of numerical strength to obtain political power as a ‘secular upsurge’,
he argues that this caste-based mobilisation of Dalits and Backward Classes may
prove of great emancipatory value and lead to processes of social change. His other
important reading is that the Dalit upsurge also represents an alternative to other
social movements, given that liberal democratic and left-Marxist models have failed
to liberate them from the oppressive social system and to make much impact on their
socio-economic conditions.
Apart from understanding the political rise of Dalits and Backward Classes, the
contemporary discourse on caste and politics has to answer many new paradoxical
developments. It has been presumed for long that the upper castes are the oppressors
and exploiters of Dalits. But the emergence of new oppressors from the OBCs like
Yadavs and Jats shows a different reality. For example, what will explain the deep
political antagonism between the BSP and the Samajwadi Party in Uttar Pradesh,
between the RJD and the Samata Party, now the Janata Dal-U in Bihar? In other recent

developments, the Indian National Lok Dal of Om Prakash Chautala is competing

for political space at the Centre with Ajit Singh, both of them essentially Jat leaders.
Mulayam Singh Yadav and Laloo Prasad Yadav have different political alliances, and
the experimental coalition government of the BSP and the BJP in Uttar Pradesh and
now the Brahmin-Dalit social coalition that returned the BSP with a clear majority
in the 2007 assembly election in Uttar Pradesh. Even phenomena like the growing
Naxalite movement and violence in Bihar and Andhra Pradesh in the 1990s, despite
being ruled by Backward Class leaders during that period (Laloo and Rabri in Bihar
and Chandra Babu Naidu in Andhra Pradesh) have demanded new understandings
of caste, class and politics in India. The contemporary discourse has been trying to
find suitable explanations for these intriguing developments.
The Future of Caste and Social Science Debates

Social science debate in India has not yet written caste off, even though considerable
opinion has developed that the system has lost many of its traditional ideological,
political, economic and even social roles. This view has been countered by the per-
spective that even if caste may have lost appeal for many of its old functions, it has
acquired a new lease of life from its modern secular roles as liberator of oppressed
castes, through democratisation of politics and substantiation of Indian democracy,
and as an index for the measurement of socio-economic backwardness. The exponents
of the former view have made their points by theorising caste in terms of class formation
and have amassed vast data to substantiate their grounds. The prominent argument
of the opposite school is that the essence of caste has survived attacks of all kinds of
transforming forces and caste has metamorphosed and remains useful to some as a
category.
What has been surprisingly missing in the debate for a long time is that scholars
of all persuasions have avoided prognosticating on the future of caste in India. Those
who subscribe to the ‘classisation of caste/class formation view’ have taken it for
granted that modern political and economic forces would make or already have made
caste redundant in contemporary society and that modern forces, in course of time,
would dismantle its remaining vestiges. Hence, the future of caste is inversely linked
to the progress of modernisation, industrialisation, urbanisation and democratisation
of politics.
Therefore, the task to prophesise on the future of caste rests with those who subscribe
to the view that caste is not disappearing. Shah (1985) who led the frontal attack on
caste becoming class theory has argued that unless and until an ideological battle is
launched against caste, it would not easily disappear from the Indian scenario, for
caste has survived more in terms of consciousness than in terms of traditional pollution/
purity concepts or caste-based division of labour.
Bhambhri (1999) was neither impressed by a purely ideological attack on caste
nor by purely materialistic arguments. For him, since caste has survived in dialectical

relations between ideology of caste and caste-based agrarian modes of production,

it has to be attacked through dialectical logic. The structure of caste-based agrarian
modes of production has to be knocked down first to dismantle its superstructure,
the ideology of caste and caste consciousness. If that logic were not followed, caste
would remain present, not only in the mind.
In his final ‘obituary on caste as a system’, Srinivas (2003: 455) saw these complex
developments towards a phasing out of caste emerging in contemporary India when
he observed that ‘the localised system of production of foodgrains and other ne-
cessities…based on a caste-wise division of labour is fast breaking down all over rural
India, and is likely to disappear in the near future’, while ‘[t]he lineaments of the new
social order—if it can indeed be called an order—are already visible’. Thus, so virtually
the last words from Srinivas (2003: 459), shortly before his death:
A massive assault on mass poverty plus rapid economic growth will be the best dissolvers
of caste identities. Membership of the middle class seems to provide a solvent to the
caste divisiveness…The situation may be summed up by saying that a variety of forces
are bringing about the destruction of the caste-based system of production in the villages
and at the local level…On the other hand, individual castes are competing with each
other for access to secular benefits. The conflict is likely to become sharper. India’s
revolution seems destined to be a slow, bleeding one, largely unrecognised by the middle
classes in urban areas….The moral to be drawn is that an ideological attack on caste
which is not backed up or underpinned by a mode of social production ignoring or
violating caste-based division of labour, is totally inadequate. A combination of wholly
new technologies, institutions, based on new principles, and a new ideology which
includes democracy, equality and the idea of human dignity and self-respect has to be
in operation for a considerable time in order to uproot the caste system.
Ideological challenges and socio-economic change, thus have to go hand in hand and
no single method of getting rid of ‘caste’ and the various types of consciousness re-
lated to it are feasible. But as Srinivas (2003) also pointedly notes throughout, pol-
iticians are likely to exploit caste consciousness. Thus, do we blame political scientists
for the ‘cultivation’ of caste?
The role of social science discourse as an interdisciplinary enterprise comes in
precisely here. Complex interdisciplinary research is required to define new paradigms
of public-political life to de-legitimise old ones. Unfortunately, social science debates
on caste, class and politics in India have so far not been able to displace caste from
the centre-stage of public-political life, while opinions remain divided over caste-
based reservation policy and caste-based politics. Desai’s (1984) frontal attack on
caste-based reservation policy degenerated into a highly politicised caste-class debate
and therefore could not make much progress. More importantly, the 1990 decision
of the V.P. Singh Government to implement caste-based reservations in government

services for the OBCs, as recommended by the Mandal Commission and its legal-
judicial endorsement by the Supreme Court seems to have settled the debate further
in favour of the ‘caste equals class’ approach.
Whatever may be the merits of the caste-based reservation policy and its theoretical
version, caste-based political modernisation and democratisation of politics through
caste remain inherently flawed, encouraging retrograde processes and discouraging
progressive routes of modernisation and democratisation. For example, caste-politics
has not allowed Indian democracy to move sufficiently towards a policy-based, goal-
oriented politics and has also discouraged articulation of secular interests through
politics. Issues of governance and economic development have not acquired enough
prominence in electoral politics. This is also one major reason that the economic
reforms of the 1990s were not introduced through open democratic politics but
‘through stealth’ (Jenkins, 1999).
Suri (2004) argues that the issue of economic reforms has little impact on electoral
verdicts. Similarly, caste-based reservation policy and its politicisation robbed the
Backward Class movements of many positive agenda. Even the Mandal Commission
Report was reduced to reservation policy, though it had many positive things (like
land reforms) for the Backward Classes in store. Dalit and Backward Class movements,
which should have become a vehicle for total social, political and economic upliftment
of Dalits and Backward Classes, would not be able to utilise their transforming
potentialities as long as they remain narrowly focussed on identity and representative
politics. The limits of caste-based reservation politics and dangers of sectarian promises
appear exemplified by the violent conflicts in summer 2007 between OBC Gujjars
and ST Meenas in Rajasthan, the former agitating to obtain ST status and the latter
protesting against inclusion of Gujjars into the ST list. So long as it remains desirable
for some to argue for ‘more backward’ status, such problems will raise their head.
Hence, the prospects for full debate at present seem restricted. Contemporary
social science discourse on caste, class and politics in India faces the challenge to set
positive agenda for change by moving beyond caste-class debates and by defining
new paradigms of public policy and new instruments of politics in the wider public
interest of a nation composed of many competing elements. Social and political move-
ments in contemporary India have failed to articulate comprehensive secular models
of change and have not moved much beyond traditional symbols and goals. It appears
that social and political movements have to borrow and adapt programmes of action
from other social science discourses. In Western societies, many progressive movements
have been fired from the ideological canons of the intelligentsia. In our own history
of renaissance and freedom struggle, ideological battles were launched first. In the
contemporary Indian society, the intelligentsia seem to follow the path of social and
political leaders. The process needs to be reversed. This is the broader challenge, a
major ongoing task for social science discourse in contemporary India.

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South Asia Research

Engaging with Discourse on Caste, Class and Politics in India

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ENGAGING WITH DISCOURSE ON

ABSTRACT This article maps the changing profile of pre-Mandal

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Table 1 Changing Discourse on Caste, Class and Politics in India

1. Influenced by theories of political No longer inspired by modernisation

3. Conditioned by political stability, Conditioned by volatile politics, increasing

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The Debates of the Pre-Mandal Phase

Indian Tradition-Modernity Debates

South Asia Research Vol. 27 (3): 333–353

The modernity-tradition debate as articulated through caste-politics relations has

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Debates about Caste and Class

South Asia Research Vol. 27 (3): 333–353

Caste and Politics in the Pre-Mandal Phase

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of the latter to the former? Is caste/tradition a constraint to democratic politics and

Vertical mobilization is the marshaling of political support by traditional notables in

Debates of the Post-Mandal Period

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The Caste-Class Debate on a New Plank

South Asia Research Vol. 27 (3): 333–353

Second, according to Desai (1984: 1111):

His other resentment of caste-based reservation policy is its potentiality to transfer

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by occupational position, educational background, lifestyle, consumption pattern

South Asia Research Vol. 27 (3): 333–353

Therefore, class is not formed simply by interest-conscious unities, but it has to be

The Rise of a New Middle Class

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I, therefore, view classisation as a twofold process: (a) releasing of individual members

The observable formation of a middle class is a major derivative of his classisation of

South Asia Research Vol. 27 (3): 333–353

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Bhambri’s first proposition that caste is still an instrument of economic exploitation

South Asia Research Vol. 27 (3): 333–353

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developments, the Indian National Lok Dal of Om Prakash Chautala is competing

The Future of Caste and Social Science Debates

South Asia Research Vol. 27 (3): 333–353

relations between ideology of caste and caste-based agrarian modes of production,

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South Asia Research Vol. 27 (3): 333–353

Downloaded from http://sar.sagepub.com by sourit bhattacharya on April 28, 2009

Dr Ashok K. Pankaj is a Senior Fellow, Institute for Human Development, NIDM

South Asia Research Vol. 27 (3): 333–353

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