IMELDA MARBELLA-BOBIS vs. ISAGANI BOBIS GR No.

138509

FACTS:

On October 21, 1985, respondent Isagani Bobis contracted a first marriage with Ma. Dulce
Javier. With said marriage not yet annulled, nullified nor terminated, he contracted a second
marriage with herein petitioner Imelda Marbella (on Jan. 25, 1996), and a third marriage with
certain Julia Hernandez, thereafter.

Petitioner then filed a case of bigamy against respondent on Feb. 25, 1998, at the RTC of Quezon
City. Thereafter, respondent initiated a civil action for the declaration of absolute nullity of his
first marriage license. He then filed a motion to suspend the criminal proceeding for bigamy
invoking the civil case for nullity of the first marriage as a prejudicial question to the criminal
case. The RTC granted the motion, while petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the subsequent filing of a civil action for declaration of nullity of a
previous marriage constitutes a prejudicial question to a criminal case for bigamy.

HELD:

Any decision in the civil case the fact that respondent entered into a second marriage
during the subsistence of a first marriage. Thus, a decision in the civil case is not essential to the
determination of the criminal charge. It is therefore not a prejudicial question. Respondent
cannot be permitted to use his malfeasance to defeat the criminal action against him.

A prejudicial question is one which arises in a case the resolution of which is a

logical antecedent of the issue involved therein. It is a question based on a fact distinct and
separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or
innocence of the accused. It must appear not only that the civil case involves facts upon which
the criminal action is based, but also that the resolution of the issues raised in the civil action
would necessarily be determinative of the civil case. Consequently, the defense must involve an
issue similar or intimately related to the same issue raised in the criminal action and its resolution
determinative of whether or not the latter action may proceed. Its two essential elements are (a)
the civil action involves an issue raised in the criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue
determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.

In the case at bar, the respondent’s clear intent is to obtain a judicial declaration of
nullity of his first marriage and thereafter to invoke that very same judgment to prevent his
prosecution for bigamy. He cannot have his cake and eat it too. Otherwise, all that an
adventurous bigamist has to do is disregard Article 40 of the Family Code, contract a subsequent
marriage and escape a bigamy charge by simply claiming that the first marriage is void and the
subsequent marriage is equally void for lack of a prior judicial declaration of nullity of the first.
A party may even enter into a marriage aware of the absence of a requisite—usually the marriage
license—and thereafter contract a subsequent marriage without obtaining a declaration of nullity
of the first on the assumption that the first marriage is void. Such scenario would render
nugatory the provisions on bigamy. As succinctly held in Landicho v. Relova, 22 SCRA
731(1968):

Parties to a marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, [as]
only competent courts have such authority. Prior to such declaration of nullity of the first
marriage is beyond question. A party who contracts a second marriage then assumes the risk of
being prosecuted for bigamy.

A prejudicial question does not conclusively resolve the guilt or innocence of the
accused but simply tests the sufficiency of the allegations in the information in order to sustain
the further prosecution of the criminal case. A party who raises a prejudicial question is deemed
to have hypothetically admitted that all the essential elements of a crime have been adequately
alleged in the information, considering that the prosecution has not yet presented single evidence
on the indictment or may not yet have rested its case. A challenge of the allegations in the
information on the ground of prejudicial question is in effect a question on the merits of the
criminal charge through a non-criminal suit.

Ignorance of the existence of Article 40 of the Family Code cannot be successfully

invoked as an excuse. The contracting of a marriage knowing that the requirements of the law
have not been complied with or that the marriage is in disregard of a legal impediment is an act
penalized by the Revised Penal Code. The legality of a marriage is a matter of law and every
person is presumed to know the law. As respondent did not obtain the judicial declaration of
nullity when he entered into the second marriage, why should he be allowed to belatedly obtain
that judicial declaration in order to delay his criminal prosecution and subsequently defeat it by
his own disobedience of the law? If he wants to raise the nullity of the previous marriage, he can
do it as a matter of defense when he presents his evidence during the trial proper in the criminal
case.

The elements of bigamy are (1) the offender has been legally married; (2) that the first
marriage has not been legally dissolved, or in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse
has not been judicially declared presumptively dead; (3) that he contracts a subsequent marriage;
and (4) the subsequent marriage would have been valid had it not been for the existence of the
first. The exceptions to prosecution for bigamy are those covered by Article 41 of the Family
Code and by PD 1083 otherwise known as the Code of Muslim Personal Laws.

Susan Nicdao Cariño vs. Susan Yee Cariño GR No. 132529

FACTS:

SPO4 Santiago CAriño married petitioner Susan Nicdao on June 20, 1969, with whom
he had two children, Sahlee and Sandee. On November 10, 1982, SPO4 Cariño also married
respondent Susan Yee. In 1988, SPO4 Cariño became bedridden due to diabetes and
tuberculosis, and died on November 23, 1992, under the care of Susan Yee who spent for his
medical and burial expenses. Both Susans filed claims for monetary benefits and financial
assistance from various government agencies pertaining to the deceased. Nicdao was able to
collect P146,000 from MBAI, PCCVI, commutation, NAPOLCOM and Pag-ibig, while Yee
received a total of P21,000 from GSIS burial and SSS burial insurance.

On December 14, 1993, Yee filed for collection of money against NIcdao, praying that
Nicdao be ordered to return to her at least one-half of the P146,000 NIcdao had collected. For
failing to file her answer, NIcdao was declared in default.

Yee admitted that her marriage to the deceased took place during the subsistence of
and without first obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity of the marriage between Nicdao and
Cariño. But she claimed good faith, having no knowledge of the previous marriage until at the
funeral where she met Nicdao who introduced herself as the wife of the deceased. Yee
submitted that Cariño’s marriage to Nicdao was void because it was solemnized without the
required marriage license.

ISSUES: (1) Whether or not the subsequent marriage is null and void;

(2) Whether or not, if yes to above, the wife of the deceased is entitled to collect the
death benefits from government agencies despite the nullity of their marriage.

HELD:

Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the nullity of a previous marriage may be
invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such
marriage void. Meaning, where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be
invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law, for said
projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity, is a final judgment declaring the previous
marriage void. However, for purposes other than remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to
declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to the
determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution
of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of
marriage even after the death of the parties thereto, and even in a suit not directly instituted to
question the validity of said marriage, so long as it is essential to the determination of the case.

Under the Civil Code which was the law in force when the marriage of petitioner and
the deceased was solemnized in 1969, a valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage, and the
absence therof, subject to certain exceptions, renders the marriage void ab initio.

It does not follow, however, that since the marriage of Nicdao and the deceased was
void ab initio, the death benefits would now be awarded to Yee. To reiterate, under Article 40 of
the Family Code, for purposes of remarriage, there must be a prior judicial declaration of the
nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a second marriage;
otherwise, the second marriage would also be void.
 One of the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage is the separation of the
property.

NAVARRO VS. DOMAGTOY

259 SCRA 129

July 19, 1996

FACTS:

Complainant Mayor Rodolfo Navarro of Dapa, Surigao del Norte filed this case to the
Supreme Court against respondent Judge Henando Domagtoy of MCTC of Monica-Burgos,
Surigao del Norte, for gross misconduct as well as inefficiency and ignorance of the law.

First, on Sept. 24, 1994, Judge Domagtoy solemnized the marriage of Gaspar Tagadan
and Arlyn Borja despite his knowledge that Tagadan was merely separated from his wife.
Second, her performed a marriage ceremony between Floriano Sumaylo and Gemma del Rosario
in October 1994 at respondent judge’s residence in Dapa, SDN. As to the first, Domagtoy
contended that he merely relied on the affidavit issued by the RTC Judge of Bassey, Samar,
which stated that Tagadan and his wife have not seen each other for almost seven years.
However, the certified true copy of the marriage contract between Tagadan and Borja showed
that his civil status was “separated”.

ISSUE:

(1) Whether or not a court may solemnize another marriage of a husband who was merely
separated from his wife for almost seven years.

(2) Whether or not a Judge may solemnize a marriage at his residence.

HELD:

(1) Article 41 of the Family Code expressly provides that a marriage contracted by any
person during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the
celebration of the subsequent marriage the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive
years and the spouse present had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead.
In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the
provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.

For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph,
the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in the Code for the
declaration of presumptive death. Absent this judicial declaration, he remains to be married to
Peñaranda. Wittingly or unwittingly, it was manifest error on the part of respondent judge to
have accepted the joind affidavit submitted by Tagadan. Such neglect or ignorance of the law
has resulted in a bigamous and therefore void marriage.

(2) Art. 7. A marriage may be solemnized by (1) any incumbent member of the
judiciary within the court’s jurisdiction xxx . Article 8, however, states that marriages shall be
solemnized publicly in the chambers of the judge or in open court, in the church, chapel or
temple, or in the office of the consul-general, consul or vice consul, as the case may be, and not
elsewhere, except in cases of marriages contracted on the point of death or in remote places in
accordance with Art. 29 of the Family Code, or where both parties in which case the marriage
may be solemnized at a house or place designated by them in a sworn statement to that effect.

There is no pretense that either Sumaylo or del Rosario was at the point of death or in a
remote place. Moreover, the written request presented addressed to the respondent judge is the
“authority of the solemnizing officer”. Under Art. 8, which is only a discretionary provision,
refers only to the venue of the marriage ceremony and does not alter or qualify the authority of
the solemnizing officer as provided in the preceding provision. Non-compliance herewith will
not invalidate the marriage.

Judges who are appointed to specific jurisdiction may officiate in marriages only
within said areas and not beyond. Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his court’s
jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in Article 3 which
while it may not affect the validity of the marriage, may subject the officiating official to
administrative liability.

Judge Domagtoy was suspended for six months for demonstrating gross ignorance of
the law.

LLORENTE vs COURT OF APPEALS

345 SCRA 592 (November 23, 2000)

FACTS:

Petitioner Paula Llorente was married to a US Navy enlisted serviceman Lorenzo

Llorente, in Nabua, Camarines Sur, on February 22, 1937. Before the outbreak of war, Lorenzo
departed for the US and Paula stayed in the conjugal home in Nabua. Lorenzo became an
American citizen on November 30, 1943. Upon the liberation of the Philippines (1945), Lorenzo
was granted by the US Navy to visit his wife in the Philippines and found out that Paula was
living in with Lorenzo’s brother Ceferino. In December 1945, Paula gave birth to Crisologo
with the birth certificate saying that the child was illegitimate, and the father’s name was left
blank.

On February 2, 1946, Paula and Lorenzo had a written agreement, dissolving their
marital union, suspending his support upon her, and waiving his authority to file a case of
adultery against her. Lorenzo returned to the US and filed for a divorce in 1951 which was
granted in 1952.

On January 16, 1958, Lorenzo married Alicia Fortuno, in the Philippines; afterwhich,
they bore three children: Raul, Luz, and Beverly. In 1981, Lorenzo executed a will, bequeathing
all his property to Alicia and three children. Before the proceeding could be terminated, Lorenzo
died in 1985.

On Sept. 4, 1985, Paula filed with the RTC of Iriga a petition for letters of
administration over Lorenzo’s estate, contending that she was Lorenzo’s surviving spouse.

In 1987, the RTC granted her petition, stating that Lorenzo’s divorce decree was void and
inapplicable in the Philippines and therefore his marriage to Alicia was void. The RTC entitled
Paula to one-half of their conjugal properties, and one-third of the estate – the two-thirds would
be divided equally among the illegitimate children. Paula was appointed as legal administratix of
the estate.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Paula Llorente was entitled to inherit from the estate of Lorenzo
Llorente.

HELD:

Since Lorenzo was an American citizen, issues arising from the case are governed by
foreign law. The CA and RTC called to the fore the renvoi doctrine, where the case was referred
back to the law of the decedent’s domicile, in this case, the Philippine law. Most US laws follow
the domiciliary theory. Thus, the Philippine law applies when determinging the validity of
Lorenzo’s will.

The case was remanded to the RTC for the ruling on the intrinsic validity of the will of
the deceased.