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It is rare when a pivotal political controversy with global reach can last sixty or
more years, becoming more convoluted and menacing over time rather than less, without
reaching a resolution either through war, coercion, or cooperation. But as the Cold War
revealed, swift and definitive solutions can become nearly impossible as the fates of
should breed cooperation and suppress competition, power struggles between nations
of all existing nuclear weapons and a ban on the future development of them—has been a
global point of concern since World War II. It can be analyzed in terms of the Prisoner’s
Dilemma Game (PDG), a model developed within game theory to explain and predict
zero sum game between groups rather than individuals. But if this real-world issue fits
into a behavior-predicting model, why has a solution not occurred or even been predicted?
In addition to laying out the elements of nuclear disarmament that can be analyzed through
the PDG, this paper will also examine some of the ways in which the realpolitiks of
nuclear technology and the chaos of real life convolute what would otherwise be a
The deployment of nuclear weapons by the United States at the end of World War
II changed the nature of war, politics, and diplomacy forever. When the Soviet Union
acquired nuclear capabilities shortly thereafter, every nation in the world suddenly and
irrevocably felt the weight of the doctrine of mutually assured destruction (MAD). Since
then, nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament have become integral topics in global
politics. The elimination of atomic weapons, and all weaponry capable of mass
destruction, was a founding goal of the United Nations, included in the General
Assembly’s first resolution in 1946 (Duarte 2009). In the 21st century, these issues can no
longer be pushed aside. The many effects of globalization are causing the materials and
fear in the United States of terrorist organizations acquiring nuclear weapons. The actions
of Iran and North Korea are being scrutinized and reported on constantly and with an
alarming sense of urgency. Developing nations have begun to demand rights and a voice.
Of the multitude of summits, treaties, organizations, resolutions, and sanctions that have
emerged, possibly the most significant is the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
The Non-Proliferation Treaty was created in 1968 with three overarching goals—
non-proliferation, disarmament, and the right to use nuclear technology peacefully (UN
2002). Currently 189 nations are party to the treaty, including the five official possessors
of nuclear weapons (the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, and China).
Israel, India, Pakistan, and North Korea represent the only four recognized states that
aren’t party to the treaty. The latter three have openly claimed and demonstrated their
The Prisoner’s Dilemma is, most commonly and at its simplest, a specifically
structured game involving two players with two possible “moves” each, and a particular
composition of pay-offs (the values may vary, but the proportions and incentives remain
intact). The structure of the outcomes, or pay-offs, can be described as zero-sum; in which
one player’s “win” constitutes another’s “loss.” However, there are a number of variations
that can result by altering the basic structure of the game. The figure below illustrates the
pay-off matrix for the standard PDG as well as three distinct and widely applicable
modifications.
Before examining the specific structure the PDG takes in relation to nuclear disarmament,
it’s necessary to identify the players (A and B), the possible “moves” or actions (X and Y),
and what the pay-off values represent. These won’t change even as the dynamics of the
game change.
Although every nation in the world is necessarily involved to some degree in this
affect the entire world, not all nations are in a position to make moves. Many developing
countries, for example, probably have no interest in acquiring nuclear weapons, little fear
of being targeted by them, and loose enough ties to the major power so that loyalty isn’t a
incentives, standing, and/or goals. The nature of the standard PDG can be summarized as
follows,
These two categories of communication, tacit and explicit, can both be found within the
nuclear disarmament process. The following example from Schelling illustrates tacit
bargaining; “…diplomatic bargaining that would be embarrassing to both sides if
overheard by other countries may be less than fully articulate.” He concludes,
In these cases, while speech may be part of the bargaining process, actions are also
part of it, and the game is one of ‘maneuver’ rather than just talk. Furthermore, if
there are moves available to the players, so that it is an advantage to get on with the
maneuver even while negotiating, and particularly if some maneuvers become
visible to the other player only after a time lag, there is no reason to suppose that an
instantaneous moratorium on maneuver will reign from the outset; in that case, the
game progresses while the talk is going on. (Schelling 1958)
These maneuvers can have three important effects on the game, as described by
Schelling. They can reveal information about the other player’s value system or the
choices of action available to them, they allow a player to commit himself to
certain actions when speech can’t, and they progress at a speed that is determined
unilaterally, “not dependent on formalities of agreement at a conference”.
Schelling describes these types of bargaining games as a dynamic process of
mutual accommodation, in contrast to pure explicit communication culminating in
crystallized agreement. In other words, tacit communication sends signals to
players that can, over time, allow them to better understand each other’s nature—
their incentives, values, goals, etc. A better understanding of the other’s rationality
aids players in making their own strategic, rational choices. It is important to note,
though, that these signals are not guaranteed to be truthful and they can also make
mutual understanding more difficult. In addition, maneuvers can make the game
dynamic, so that its nature changes over time.
Maneuvers seem especially important when it comes to nuclear technology,
as in the case with Iran. The United States doesn’t believe Iran’s claims that their
nuclear development programs are intended only for developing energy sources
(David 2008). Since the U.S. doesn’t trust Iran’s explicit claims, their perception
of Iran’s “values” must, therefore, depend largely on observable actions.
Maneuvers thus acquire crucial importance, as they can completely alter the way
players will rationally interact. The following statement from an Economist article
titled “Banning the Bomb” illustrates the nature of tacit communication—“North
Korea let off some kind of bomb in 2006, and nobody is certain that it will honour
a later promise to disarm” (David 2008). It’s possible that North Korea didn’t
intend for the bomb testing to be a symbolic action to other players, and that they
simply had to test it and the world noticed (it’s difficult to conceal an exploding
bomb). However, as a rational actor North Korea necessarily had to take into
account the fact that other nations would witness the bomb testing. How did they
anticipate this action would affect the credibility of their promise to disarm? There
is no way of knowing. Furthermore, the fact that the type of bomb is not clear
could have been intentional. One possibility is that North Korea didn’t possess
nuclear arms but wanted to send the signal that they did. There are simply too
many ways this action, and North Korea’s intentions, can be interpreted. In the
long-run, iterated process that constitutes human history, though, nations can
observe many such maneuvers and claims over time and begin to synthesize a
perception of the other’s value system.
Explicit communication forms can broadly be grouped into commitments and threats.
Although they are explicit, “The dependence of the two players on conveying their
intentions to each other and perceiving the intentions of each other, of behaving in
predictable patterns and acquiescing in rules or limits, is much the same as before [under
tacit communication]” (Schelling 1958). The rules of rationality still apply—how is any
player to know the other is telling the truth, or will follow through on a commitment or a
threat? What’s more, how could a player convey a genuine, authentic truth without being
doubted? These difficulties are not guaranteed to be solvable in every case; uncertainty is
the rule and certainty the exception that can occur when special cases can apply. The
special case that allows commitments to be trustworthy is if the committing player can
enforce it against himself. A legal or contractual binding would take the commitment out
of the realm of “communication” and into the arena of “moves.” Thus, the player must
make an irreversible maneuver that reduces his own freedom of choice (Schelling 1958).
As Schelling points out, this is equivalent to a first move.
The question arises of whether there are any useful commitments that can be made
and self-enforced by either side of the nuclear arms dilemma. It seems that there aren’t. If
the United States wanted to make an irreversible commitment to eliminating nuclear arms,
the only way to self-enforce it would be to actually do it. That would no longer be simply
a commitment, though, but would become their “move,” represented by X. The United
States won’t make this move, though, until after the other parties choose X. Put simply,
the United States won’t abolish their weapon stockpiles until the dissenting nations do and
have an enforceable promise not to develop new ones. There isn’t a viable commitment
for the other group of nations to make, either. They have no interest in committing to X,
but don’t need to convey a commitment to Y. Their possible commitment to Y is the
source of conflict.
The second form that explicit communication can take is threats. Schelling describes
the basic components of threats as follows.
The distinctive character of a threat is that one asserts that he will do, in a
contingency, what he would manifestly prefer not to do if the contingency
occurred. The motive behind the threat is to coerce or to deter, to constrain
the other player's choice of action. It works by altering the other player's
expectation of how the threatening player would react; it is an attempt to alter
the threatener's own incentives as they are seen by the party threatened.
He goes on to point out that players threaten retaliation not because the retaliation itself
would benefit them, but rather in the hope that creating the risk of retaliation will prevent
the contingent action from occurring (Schelling 1958). Although threats and commitments
are similar insofar as they are a renunciation of choice, they differ in their applicability. As
mentioned above, the commitment is equivalent to a first move. Thus, it is used when first
move is an advantage. The threat is essentially a second move, since it requires the other
player to commit an action first. Thus, it is used when the second move is advantageous.
As before, there don’t appear to be any useful threats open to either player. The
sanctions that have been made are insufficient; they have not been a forceful enough threat
to induce any action (David 2008). If the United States told Iran “Destroy your nuclear
weapons or we will bomb you,” their response is likely to be anything but disarmament.
The countries resisting weapons control don’t have any inherent incentive to induce the
other powers to choose disarmament or weapons building. Thus, explicit communication
through commitments or threats finds no effective role in this particular dilemma.
The most formidable obstacle facing nuclear disarmament is that it actually
constitutes a game-within-a-game. It’s one thing to reach a multilateral agreement about
nuclear disarmament, but it’s another entirely for every nation to actually destroy their
weapons stockpiles. Even then, the option remains for the future development of weapons.
Returning to Schelling,
Agreements are unenforcible if no outside authority exists to enforce them or
if non-compliance would be inherently undetectable. The problem arises,
then, of finding forms of agreement, or terms to agree on, that provide no
incentive to cheat or that make non-compliance automatically visible or that
incur the penalties on which the possibility of enforcement rests.
(Schelling 1958)
The closest thing to an “outside authority” in this case would be the UN, or an
enforcement arm of the NPT. But neither can act with absolute authority and there
exists no body with the power of enforcement. This means that even if an
agreement was reached (meaning the first game reached a conclusion) actually
destroying stockpiles (the second game) presents it’s own, more difficult problem.
Specifically, no nations will want to “move” first. If Iran complied and destroyed
their weapons, what would stop other powers from cheating and keeping their
weapons (secretly or publicly)? Iran would have lost all of their bargaining power
and would effectively be at the mercy of the cheating countries. Unfortunately, this
seems to reflect the history of the nuclear disarmament process.
There is no reason to give up hope, though. Schelling allows room for
optimism in the case of unenforceable agreements.
Trust is often achieved simply by the continuity of the relationship between
parties and the recognition by each that what he might gain by cheating in a
given instance is outweighed by the value of the tradition of trust that makes
possible a long sequence of future agreement.
If nations can learn to find common ground above and beyond particular disputes
(even if they are as momentous as nuclear weapons), trust can be established. A
tradition of such trust could turn these dilemmas into resolvable issues.
References
Scodel, Alvin and J. Sayer Minas, Philburn Ratoosh, Milton Lipetz. “Some
Descriptive Aspects of Two-Person Non-Zero-Sum Games.” The Journal of
Conflict Resolution, Vol. 3, No. 2 (Jun 1959).