200 SOCIAL SCIENCE interest in groups. This seems to be an old story in social psychology: the study of individuals must be informed by a clear understanding of the matrices of social interdependence within which they function; the study of groups must comprehend the cognitive and ‘motivational processes of group members. The tension between these two focuses, in the long run, may be what keeps the field om its relatively straight track, in spite of temporary deviations in course. Edward E.Joes Lorry, Picton Unioersty Andrew M, Colman Univerty of Leicester References Allport, G. W. (1954) “The historical background of modeen ‘ecal prychology’, in G. . Lindaey ed) Handbook of Sel Pry, Ist edn, wo 1, Cambricge, MA, Asch, 8. F.(1956) ‘States of independence and conformity ‘2 minority of one against a unanimous majriy’, Prychaogial Momgaphs 70. Bem, D.J (1967) Self perception: an alternative incerpreta- tion of coynitve disonance phenomena’, Poetloyal Resin 14 Festinger, L. (1954) 8 theory of social comparison process’, “Haren Relations 7 (957) They of Copite Disonace, Evanston, I Fide, S. T-and Taylor, E. (1991) Soa! Caton, 200 eda, "New York Heider, F (1958) The Patol, of Inerpsnal Relations, New “York, Kelley, H. H. (1967) ‘Auribution theory in social prychotogy’, "Nebas Syraposam ot Motsatin 14 Lewin, K., Lippitt, R- and White, R. K. (1939) ‘Patterns of aggresive behavior in. experimentally created. “social imates"', Jernl of Sail Poly 1. Likert, R. (1932) A technique for the measurement of atic tudes, Aries of Pcolgy 140. Lindy, G.F. an Aronson, E- (ed) (1985) Hanon of Scie ‘Pauley, Sed edn, 2 vols, New York. MeDougall, W. (1908) stn’ Intec t» Saal Poche, Londen, Milgram, S. (1974) Obed t Autry: An Esperia View, New York, Nisbett, R-E.and Ross, L (1980) Haman Iefrue: Sates ‘and Storkomings of Social Fudgmnt Englewood Clif, NJ Roms EA, (1908) Sol Phony dn Ostend @ Sooce Bok, ‘New Yor Schneider, D. J. (1994) ‘tribution and socal eagition’ in ACM. Colman (ed) Gimpanion Enelpuia of Pehl, vl 2, London “Thibaat, JW. and Kelley, HH, (1959) The Saal Pcolgy 4f Gros, New York. Thorstone, LI. and Chave, “Ais, Chicago, IL. Zanoa, M. P (ed) (1990, 1991, 1992, 1908) Adbanes Experimental Saal Pycalgy, vols 236, San Diego, CA. B,J. (1929) The Measremen of Sw ale: agresion end ange; ls; cnfrm rp dynamics; noob comarca: norms: Pres Safeonept vation and pepo stereo social research methods see methods of social research social science ocial science ig the ambitious concept to define set of disciplines of scholarship which deal with aspe fof human society. The singular implies a commun ‘of method and approach which is now claimed few; thus the plural, social sciences, seems m appropriate. The social sciences include econore sociology (and anthropology) and political sciex AC their boundaries, the social sciences reach into study of the individual (socal psychology) and of nat (octal biology, social geography). Methodologic: they straddle normative (aw, socal philosophy, poit theory) and historical approaches (Gocial hist economic history). In terms of university departme the social sciences have split up into numerous a of teaching and research, including not only the cer disciplines, but also such subjects as industrial relati international relations, business studies and sc (public) administration ‘The term social sciences) does not sit casi the universe of scholarship, especially noc in Eng Sciences sociales and Socalissenscafien are some happier expressions, though they too have suffered { being interpreted either too widely oF too narre Frequently, social science is meant to define ei sociology, or synthetic social theory only: Everywt the implied analogy to the natural sciences has 1 contested, In 1982, the British government challet the name of the publicly financed Social Sci Research Council, arguing in alia that ‘social sta ‘would be a more appropriate description for discip of scholarship which cannot justly claim to be scien (The council is now called Economic and S Research Council) The history of the concept does not help muc Lying to make sense oft, Social sciences have grow ‘of moral philosophy (as the natural sciences eme from natural philosophy). It has often been obse that their separate identity owes much 10 the + revolutions of the eighteenth century, the Indu English) and the bourgeois (French) Revolut Among the Seattish moral philosophers of tha ime study of political economy was always coupled that of wider social issues (though not called s science). With the ascendancy of psitivism in thenineteenth century, especially in France, positive philosophy, or social science, took the place of moral Philosophy. Positivism, according to Auguste Comte (1830-42; 18445, emphasizes the factual as against the speculative, the useful as against the idle, the certain as against the indecisive, the precise as against the vague, the positive as against the 1 critical. Its thus both science inthe sense of rinetcenth- century materialism and prescription. Comte borrowed the term, sciewe social, from Charles Fourier (1808) to describe the supreme synthetic discipline of the edifice of science. At the same time, he had no doubt that the method of social science (which he also called social physics} was in no way different from that of the natural sciences, Five developments either stemming from Comte, or ‘encouraged by different traditions, have helped confuse the methodological picture of the social sciences. First, many of those who took the analogy to the natural sciences seriously engaged in social research The great factual surveys of Charles Booth in Britain, and of the Chicago School in the USA, bear witness to this trend, Frederic Le Play had started a similar tradi- tion in France. In Germany, the Veen fr Socialpolise adopted the same research techniques. Such often large-scale descriptive enterprises are the precursors of modern (‘empirical’) social research and analysis: Second, science, of course, is more than fact-finding, Thus a natural science notion of theoretical social science has informed at least two of the heroes of soci ‘ology, Emile Durkheim (1895) and Vilfredo Pareto (1916), Durkheim in particular was impressed by the heed to study ‘social fact’, whereas Pareto stimulated both metatheoretical insights and specific theories. ‘They have had few followers. ‘Third, by the turn of the century, a methodological dichotomy was born which gave rise to another aspect, fr notion, of social science. Against the ambitions of those who tried to emulate the natural sciences in the study of social phenomena, the German School of thought gained ground, according to which social phenomena do not lend themselves to such rigid Analysis, but require a different approach, one of Vertehn, of empathy and understanding Max Weber (1921) straddles different approaches, but introduced into social science what were later called ‘hermencutic” ‘or ‘phenomenological’ perspectives, Fourth, it will readily be seen that all rec approaches mentioned so far are most closely associated with the subject of sociology and its history. Indeed, eon- fomics soon began to go its own way. Ever since the decline of the German historical (romantic’) schoot of economists, it developed as the discipline which of all the social sciences most nearly deserves the tame, Science. Economic knowledge is to a considerable SOCIAL SCIENCE 001 extent cumulative; theories are developed and tested, if not alvays against realty then at last against modes itd the” asumptions Vestdnde economic, even descriptive economic, have become the exception. Finally Max Weber also insted on another distinc tion wih defines the fith aspect of socal scene, that between. knowledge, however gained, and velies rseription and description or theory). belong to deren unr of deeoure "The deincon was exploive atthe time (Werte, and continues to te that, although politcal theory, moral philosophy, and jurspridenoe Fave gone ther own way, and the Study of social policy has shied from the preserve tothe analytical Those then are the diporate methodological cements of social science: empirical socal science, descriptive in character if not in intendon, increasingly sophisticated in its techniques which are themselves manifold; rare atempts at developing theories in the Strict sense, attempt which are, nether universally recognized nor cumulative, ecldnde Stich pethaps best described asthe historical analysis ofthe Preset, oe fill ofempital data as wel a atterapis Et explanation, the bull of social science; economics and explicitly prescriptive socal theory, often political in substance and inten Locking athe el sciences ata whol this is quite a pellmell, and is perceived as such. Howeven, all attempis to produce a new syuhesis have fad. The tmowt ambitous examples are shoe by Kar. Popper {1945; 1959 (1934)) and Taleo Parsons (1987; 19915 1956) Popper init that dhre i one loge of slentiic inguiry Nis te logilof progres by fakiication} we advance hypotheses theors.and progress by reting Accepted hypotheses through research, that by tral tnd erroe Popper Gid not primarily have the socal science in mind but itis here that is language has created havoc. Everybody now ‘hypothesizes, though few such project are cren capable of fshatun More importany. Popper’ loge if misinterpreted a5 practical advice to scholar, leds to an ard notion of Sholay actviny especialy fn the socal ackncet. IF Iypothctico- deductive progres is all there Boon 99 per cent ofall social sence i useles, Popper’ log Of sclendBec emniry provides but te. erasure Of tavancement, ts nota litmus test for distinguishing teween whi and what snot sock science Indeed Popper bined? has write important wort of socal rat any rate socal pilosophic, analysis Talcott Parson's axtempted synthesis even more ambitious in that its aldressed t0 the theoretical substance of socal scence, Throughout his numerous fhatact anaes, Parsons has argued thatthe tultance of soil sience 1s one, socal action, and that even the incarnations of soc action stm from