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Constitutional Law II

a. Accused is informed why he is


Bill of Rights proceeded against, and what charge he must
answer.
I. THE DUE PROCESS, EQUAL PROTECTION
AND CONTRACT CLAUSES AS LIMITATIONS b. Judgment of conviction is based
ON POLICE POWER, EMINENT DOMAIN AND on evidence that is not tainted by falsity, and
TAXATION after the defendant was heard.

Art. III, Sec. 1. No person shall If the prosecution produces the


be deprived of life, liberty, or property conviction based on untrue evidence, then it
without due process of law, nor shall is guilty of depriving the accused of due
any person be denied the equal process. Thus false testimony can be
protection of the laws. questioned by the accused regardless of the
time that lapsed.
Art. III, Sec. 10. No law impairing
the obligation of contracts shall be c. Judgment according to law
passed.
d. Tribunal with jurisdiction

LIMITATIONS OF SOVEREIGNTY
Administrative Due Process
Inherent in sovereignty, and therefore
not even required to be conferred by the In administrative proceedings, the
Constitution, are the police, eminent domain, elements were laid down in the case of Ang
and taxation powers. The Bill of Rights, Tibay v. CIR as the "seven cardinal primary
notably the due process, equal protection and rights" in justiciable cases before
non-impairment clauses, is a means of limiting administrative tribunals:
the exercise of these powers by imposing on
the State the obligation to protect individual a. There must be a hearing, where a
rights. The Bill of Rights is addressed to the party may present evidence in support of his
State, notably the government, telling it what it case.
cannot do to the individual. b. The tribunal must consider the
evidence presented by a party.
c. While the tribunal has no duty to
A. Due process - Procedural and decide the case correctly, its decision must
Substantive be supported by evidence.
d. The evidence supporting the
Civil Procedural Due Process decision must be substantial. Substantial
evidence is such relevant evidence as a
In civil cases, the SC laid down its reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
elements in the case of Banco Espanol Filipino support a conclusion.
v. Palanca: e. The evidence must have been
presented at the hearing or at least contained
a. Court with jurisdiction over the in the record and known to the parties affected.
subject matter. f. The tribunal must rely on its own
independent consideration of evidence, and
b. Court with jurisdiction over the not rely on the recommendation of a
party-defendant subordinate.
g. The decision must state the facts and
c. Judgement rendered according to the law in such a way that the parties can
law. know the issues involved and the reasons for
the decision.
d. Defendant given the oppotunity to
be heard (requirement on notice and hearing)
Substantive Due Process

Ynot vs. IAC, 148 SCRA 659 (1987)

Criminal Due Process F: Petitioners' 6 carabaos were


confiscated by the police for having been
In criminal cases, the elements were transported from Masbate to Iloilo in violation of
laid down in Vera v. People: EO 626-A. He brought an action for replevin,
Constitutional Law II

challenging the consitutionality of the EO. The abuse, and even corruption. One searches in
trial court sustained the confiscation of the vain for the usual standard and the reasonable
animals and declined to rule on the validity of guidelines, or better still, the limitations that
the law on the ground that it lacked authority to the said officers must observe when they make
do so. Its decision was affirmed by the IAC. their distribution. VV.
Hence this petition for review.

HELD: (1) Under the provision granting the SC B. Due Process and Police Power
jurisdiction to "review, revise, reverse, modify
or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or
rules of court may provide final judgments of Bautista v. Juinio, 127 SCRA 329 (1984)
lower courts" in all cases involving the
constitutionality of certain measures, lower Ban on Use of Heavy Cars on Week-ends and
courts can pass upon the validity of a statute in Holiday s Valid.
the first instance.
(2) There is no doubt that by banning F: LOI 689 banned the use of vehicles w/ A
the slaughter of these animals (except where and EH plates on week-ends and holidays in
there at least 7 yrs. old if male and 11 yrs old if view of the energy crisis. It excepted, however,
female upon the issuance of the necessary those classified as S (Service), T (Truck), DPL
permit) the EO will be conserving those still fit (Diplomatic), CC (Consular Corps), and TC
for farm work or breeding and preventing their (Tourist Cars). The resps., Min. of Public Works,
improvident depletion. We do not see, Transportation, issued memo. providing
however, how the prohibition of the penalties for viol. of the LOI, namely, fine,
interprovincial transport of carabaos can confiscation of vehicles, and cancellation of
prevent their indiscriminate slaughter, registration. The petitioners brought suit
considering that they can be killed any where, questioning the validity of the LOI on the
w/ no less difficulty in on province than in ground that it was discriminatory and a denial
another. Obviously, retaining the carabao in of due process. The resps. denied the
one province will not prevent their slaughter petitioner's allegations and argued that the suit
there, any more than moving them to another amounted to a request for advisory opinion.
province will make it easier to kill them there.
As for the carabeef, the prohibition is made to HELD: (1) Petitioners are owners of an 8
apply to it as otherwise, so says the EO, it could cylinder 1969 Buick and of a 6 cylinder Willy's
be easily circumsbcribed by simply killing the Kaiser Jeep. The enforcement of the LOI to
animal. Perhaps so. However, if the movement them would deprive them of prop. They,
of the live animals for the purpose of preventing therefore, have standing to challenge the
their slaughter cannot be prohibited, it should validity of the LOI.
follow that there is no reason either to prohibit (2) But the LOI cannot be declared void
their transfer as, not to be flippant, dead meat. on its face. It has behind it the presumption of
(3) In the instant case, the carabaos validity. The necessity for evidence to rebut
were arbitrarily confiscated by the police station such presumption is unavoidable. As
commander, were returned to the petitioner underlying the questions of fact may condition
only after he had filed a complaint for recovery the constitutionality of legislation the
and given a supersedeas bond w/c was ordered presumption of validity must prevail in the
confiscated upon his failure to produce the absence of some factual foundation of record
carabaos when ordered by the trial court. The overthrowing the statute. The LOI is an energy
EO defined the prohibition, convicted the conservation measure; it is an apporpriate
petitioner and immediately imposed response to a problem.
punishment, w/c was carried out forthright. The (3) Nor does the LOI deny equal
measures struck him at once and pounced upon protection to the petitioners. W/in the class to
the petitioner w/o giving him a chance to be w/c the petitioner belongs the LOI operate
heard, thus denying him elementary fair play. equally and uniformly. That the LOI does not
(4) It is there authorized that the include others does not render it invalid. The
seized prop. shall "be distributed to charitable govt is not required to adhere to a policy of "all
institutions and other similar institutions as the or none."
Chairman of the National Meat Inspection (4) To the extent that the Land
Commission may see fit, in the case of Transpo. Code does not authorize the
carabeef, and to deserving farmers through impounding of vehicles as a penalty, to that
dispersal as the Director of Animal Industry may extent the memo. of the resps. would be ultra
see fit in the case of carabaos." The phrase vires. VV.
may see fit is an extremely generous and
dangerous condition, if condition it is. It is
laden w/ perilous opportunities for partiality and
Constitutional Law II

Velasco v. Villegas, 120 SCRA (1983) compensation, and (3) upon observance of
due process.
Ordinance Prohibiting Barbershops from
Rendering Massage Services Valid. Article III, Sec. 9. Private property
shall not be take for public use without
F: The ordinance was enacted for a two- just compensation.
fold purpose: (1) To enable the City of Mla. to
collect a fee for operating massage clinics Article XII, Sec. 18. The State may,
separately from those operating barber ships in the interest of national welfare or
and (2) To prevent immorality w/c might defense, establish and operate vital
probably arise from the construction of separate industries and, upon payment of just
rooms. compensation, transfer to public
ownership utilities and other private
HELD: The SC has been most liberal in enterprises to be operated by the
sustaining ordinances based on general welfare government.
clause. VV.

Cruz v. Paras, 123 SCRA 569 (1983) 1. Taking either for public use or
public purpose.
F: The petitioners are operators or
nightclubs in Bocaue, Bulacan. they filed Public Use
prohibition suits to stop the Mun. of Bocaue
from enforcing an ordinance prohibiting the Public use is equivalent to public
operation of nightclubs, cabarets, and dance h purpose. It is not confined merely to use by the
alls in that mun. or the renewal of licenses to public at large (e.g. roads). It is enough that it
operate them. The CFI upheld the validity of serves a public purpose, even if it benefit a
the ordinance and dismissed the petition. large group of people short of the public in
Hence, this petition for certiorari. general (e.g. expropriating property for the
relocation of squatters).
HELD: A mun. corp. cannot prohibit the
operation of nightclubs. Nightclubs may be Heirs of Juancho Ardona v. Reyes 123 SCRA
regulated but not prevented from carrying on 220
their business. RA 938, as orginally enacted,
granted municipalities the power to regulate F: The Philippine Tourism Authority sought
the establishment, maintenance and operation the expropriation of 282 Ha of land in Barangay
of nightclubs and the like. While it is true that Malubog and Babag in Cebu City. upon deposit
on 5/21/54, the law was amended by RA 979 of an amount equivalent to 10% of the value of
w/c purported to give municipalities the power the property, the CFI authorized the PTA to take
not only to regulate but likewise to prohibit the immediate possession of the property. The
operation of nightclubs, the fact is that the title charter of the PTA authorizes it to acquire
of the law remained the same so that the power through condemnation proceedings lands for
granted to municipalities remains that of tourist zone development of a sports complex.
regulation, not prohibition. To construe the The petitioners who are occupants of the lands,
amendatory act as granting mun. corporations filed a petition for certiorari in the SC. They
the power to prohibit the operation of contended that (1) the taking was not for public
nightclubs would be to construe it in a way that use; (2) the land was covered by the land
it violates the constitutional provision that reform program; and (3) expropriation would
"every bill shall embrace only one subject which impair the obligation of contracts.
shall be expressed in the title thereof."
Moreover, the recentyly-enacted LGC (BP 337) HELD: The concept of public use is not limited
speaks simply of the power to regulate the to traditional purposes for the construction of
establishment, and operation of billiard pools, roads, bridges, and the like. The idea that
theatrical performances, circuses and other "public use" means "use by the public" has
forms of entertainment. Certiorari granted. been discarded. As long as the purpose of the
VV. taking is public, then the power of eminent
domain comes into play. It is accurate to state
then that at present whatever may be
C. Due Process and Eminent beneficially employed for the general welfare
Domain satisfies the requirement of public use. The
petititioners have not shown that the area being
The taking by the State of private developed is land reform area and that the
property in an expropriation proceeding must affected persons have been given emancipation
be: (1) for public use, (2) with just patents and certificates of land transfer. The
Constitutional Law II

contract clause has never been regarded as a Amigable cases, supra), and using the
barrier to the exercise of the police power and conversion rates at the time of taking
likewise eminent domain. VV. (because according to those cases, Art. 1250
of the Civil Code applied only to contractual
Sumulong v. Guerrero 154 SCRA 461 (1987) obligations).

F: On December 5, 1977, the National


Housing Authority filed a complaint for the EPZA v. Dulay 149 SCRA 305 (1987)
expropriation of 25 hectares of land in Antipolo,
Rizal pursuant to PD 1224 authorizing the F: The San Antonio Development
expropriation of private lands for socialized Corporation was the owner of a piece of land in
housing. Among those lands sought to be Lapu-Lapu City which the EPZA expropriated in
expropriated are the petitioners' lands. They 1979. The commissioners appointed by the trial
brought this suit in the SC challenging the court recommended that the San Antonio
constitutionality of PD 1224. Development Corp. be paid P15.00 per square
meter. EPZA filed a petition for certiorari,
HELD: Petitioners contend that socialized arguing that under PD 1533 the compensation
housing for the purpose of condemnation should be the fair and current market value
proceedings is not public use since it will benefit declared by the owner or the market value
only a handful of people. The "public use" determined by the assessor, whichever is lower.
requirement is an evolving concept influences
by changing conditions. Urban renewal or HELD: The method of ascertaining just
redevelopment and the construction of low-cost compensation under PD 1533 constitutes
housing is recognized as a public purpose, not impermissible encroachment on judicial
only because of the expanded concept of public prerogatives. Although the court technically
use but also because of specific provisions in would still have the power to determine the just
the Constitution. Shortage in housing is a compensation for the property, following the
matter of state concern since it directly and decree, its task would be relegated to simply
significantly affects public health, safety, the stating the lower value of the property as
environment and, in sum, the general welfare. declared either by the owner or the assessor.
Petitioners claim that there are vast areas of Just compensation means the value of the
lands in Rizal hundreds of hectares of which are property at the time of the taking. It means a
owned by a few landowners only. Why should fair and full equivalent for the loss sustained. All
the NHA pick their small lots? Expropriation is the facts as to the condition of the property and
not confined to landed estates. The test to be its surroundings, its improvements and
applied for a valid expropriation of private lands capabilities should be considered. In this case,
was the area of the land and not the number of the tax declarations used as basis for the just
people who stood to be benefitted. The State compensation were made long before the
acting through the NHA is vested with broad declaration of martial law when the land was
discretion to designate the property. The much cheaper. To peg the value of the lots on
property owner may not interpose objections the basis of those documents which are
merely because in their judgment some other outdated would be arbitrary and confiscatory.
property would have been more suitable. The VV.
provisions on just compensation found in PD
1224, 1259, and 1313 are the same provisions
which were declared unconstitutional in EPZA v. Manotok v. NHA 150 SCRA 89 (1987)
Dulay (1987) for being encroachments on
judicial prerogatives. VV. F: Petitioners are the owners of two large
estates known as the Tambunting Estate and
Sunog-Apog in Tondo, Manila, both of which
2. Just compensation must were declared expropriated in two decrees
be judicially determined issued by President Marcos, PD 1669 and PD
1670. The petitioners contend that the decrees
Just Compensation violate their constitutional right to due process
and equal protection since by their mere
Just compensation is the fair and passage their properties were automatically
reasonable equivalent of the loss sustained by expropriated and they were immediately
the owner of the property due to the taking; it deprived of the ownership and possession
is the fair market value of the property thereof without being given the chance to
measured at the time of the taking, no matter oppose such expropriation. The government on
how long ago it was taken (e.g. the time of the the other hand contends that the power of
taking was in the 1920's, the time of payment eminent domain is inherent in the State and
was in the 1960's, in the Ministerio and when the legislature or the President through
Constitutional Law II

his law-making powers exercises this power, the against the owners of Fernando Rein and Del
public use and public necessity of the Pan streets, among whom was petitioner.
expropriation and the fixing of the just
compensation become political in nature and HELD: The choice of Fernando Rein and Del Pan
the courts must respect the decision. streets is arbitrayr and should not receive
judicial aprpoval. The Human Settlements
HELD: The challenged decrees are unfair in the Commission concluded that the cost factor is so
procedures adopted and the powers given to minimal that it can be disregarded in making a
the NHA. The Tambunting subdivision is choice between the two lines. The factor of
summarily proclaimed a blighted area and functionality strongly militates against the
directly expropriated by decree without the choice of Fernando Rein and Del Pan streets,
slightest semblance of a hearing or any while the factor of social and economic impact
proceeding whatsoever. The expropriation is bears grievously on the residents of Cuneta
instant and automatic to take effect Avenue. While the issue would seem to boil
immediately upon the signing of the decree. No down to a choice between people, on one hand,
deposit before the taking is required. There is and progress and development, on the other, it
not provision for any interest to be paid upon is to be remembered that progress and
unpaid installments. Not only are the owners development are carried out for the benefit of
given absolutely no opportunity to contest the the people. VV.
expropriation, or question the amount of
payments fixed by the decree, but the decision
of the NHA are expressly declared beyond
judicial review. PD 1669 and 1670 are declared
unconstitutional.
Republic v. De Knecht, 182 SCRA 142
Teehankee, CJ, concurring: The judgment at bar (1990)
now learly overturns the majority ruling in JM
Tuason v. LTA that the power of Congress to F: De Knecht was one of the owners of
designate the particular property to be taken several properties along the Fernando Rein-Del
adn how much may be condemned thereof Pan streets which the Government sought to
must be duly recognized, leaving only as a expropriate to give way to the extension of
judicial question whether in the exercise of such EDSA and the construction of drainage facilities.
competence, the party adversely affected is the De Knecht filed a case to restrain the
victim of partiality and prejudice. The SC now Government from proceeding with the
rules that such singling out of properties does expropriation. Her prayer was denied by the
not foreclose judicial scrutiny as to whether lower court but upon certiorari, the SC reversed
such expropriation by legislative act the lower court decision and granted the relief
transgresses the due process and equal asked for by De Knecht ruling that the
protection and just compensation guarantees of expropriation was arbitrary. The case was
the Constitution. VV. remanded to the lower court.
No further action was taken despite
the SC decision until two years later, in 1983,
when the Government moved for the dismissal
3. Due process must be of the case on the ground that the Legislature
observed has since enacted BP 340 expropriating the
same properties for the same purpose. The
De Knecht v. Bautista 100 SCRA 660 lower court denied tthe motion. Appeal.
(1980)
RULING: While it is true that said final judgment
F: The plan to extend EDSA to Roxas of this Curt on the subject becomes the law of
Boulevard to be ultimately linked to the Cavite the case between the parties, it is equally true
Coastal Road Project, originally called for the that the right of petitioner to take private
expropriation of properties along Cuneta properties for public use upon payment of just
Avenue in Pasay City. Later on, however, the compensation is so provided in the Constitution
Ministry of Public Highways decided to make and the laws. Such expropriation proceeding
the proposed extension pass through Fernando may be undertaken by the petitioner not only
Rein and Del Pan Streets. Because of the by voluntary negotiation with the land owners
protests of residents of the latter, the but also by taking appropriate court action or by
Commission on Human Settlements legislation.
recommended the reversion to the original When BP 340 was passed, it appears
plan, but the Ministry argued the new route that it was based on supervening events that
withh save the government P2 million. The occured after the 1980 decision of the SC on
government filed expropriation proceedings the De Knecht case was rendered. The social
Constitutional Law II

impact factor which persuaded the Court to the expropriation. The price or value of the land
consider this extension to be arbitrary had and its character at the time of taking by the
disappeared. Govt. are the criteria for determining just
Moreover, the said decision is no cmpensation. Charo.
obstacle to the legislative arm of the
Government in thereafter making its own
independent assessment of the circumstances D. Equal Protection
then pravailing as to the propriety of
undertaking the expropriation of properties in Art. III, Sec. 1. No person shall be
question and thereafter by enacting the deprived of life, liberty or property
corresponding legislation as it did in this case. without due process of law, nor shall any
The Court agrees in the wisdom and necessity person be denied the equal protection of
of enacting BP 340. Thus the anterior decision the laws.
of the Court must yield to the subsequent
legislative fiat. Charo. Art. XIII, Sec. 1. The Congress
shall give highest priority to the
enactment of measure that protect and
enhance the right of all the people to
human dignity, reduce social, economic,
and political inequalities and remove
cultural inequities by equitably diffusing
NAPOCOR v. Gutierrez, 193 SCRA 1 (1991) wealth and political power for the common
good.
F: For the construction of its 230 KV To this end, the State shall
Mexico-Limay transmission lines, Napocor's regulate the acquisition, ownership, use,
lines have to pass the lands belonging to and disposition of property and its
respondents. Unsuccessful with its negotiations increments.
for the acquisition of the right of way
easements, Napocor was constrained to file
eminent domain proceedings. 1. Economic equality

ISSUE: W/N petitoner should be made to pay


simple easement fee or full compensation for Art. XIII, Sec. 2. The promotion of
the land traversed by its transmissin lines. social justice shall include the
commitment to create economic
RULING: In RP v. PLDT, the SC ruled that opportunities based on freedom of
"Normally, the power of eminent domain results initiative and self-reliance.
in the taking or appropriation of the title to, and
possession of, the expropriated property, but no Art. XIII, Sec. 3. The State shall
cogent reason appears why said power may not afford full protection to labor, local and
be availed of to impose only a burrden upon the overseas, organized and unorganized, and
owner of the condemned property, without loss promote full employment and equality of
of title or possession. It is unquestionable that employment opportunities for all.
real property may, through expropriation, be It shall guarantee the rights of all
subjected to an easement of right of way." In workers to self-organization, collective
this case, the easement is definitely a taking bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful
under the power of eminent domain. concerted activities, including the right to
Considering the nature and effect of the strike in accordance with law. They shall
installation of the transmission lines, the be entitle to security of tenure, humane
limitations imposed by the NPC against the use conditions of work, and living wage. They
of the land (that no plant higher than 3 meters shall also participate in policy and
is allowed below the lines) for an indefinite decision-making process affecting the
period deprives private respondents of ts rights and benefits as may be provided by
ordinary use. law.
For these reasons, the owner of the The State shall promote the
property expropriated is entitled to a just principle of shared responsibility between
compensation which should neither be more nor workers and employers and the
less, whenever it is possible to make the preferential use of voluntary modes in
assessment, than the money equivalent of said settling disputes including conciliation,
property. Just equiivalent has always been and shall enforce their mutual compliance
understood to be the just and complete therewith to foster industrial peace.
equivalent of the loss which the owner of the The State shall regulate the
thing expropriated has to suffer by reason of relations between workers and employers,
Constitutional Law II

recognizing the right of labor to its just There are areas of economic activity
share in the fruits of production and the which can be limited to Filipinos. The
right of enterprises to reasonable returns Constitution itself acknowledges this in various
on investments, and to expansion and places - exploitation of marine wealth (Art. XII,
growth. Sec. 2 par. 2), certain areas of investment (Art.
XII, Sec. 10), to name a few.

Art. XII, Sec. 10. The Congress In Ichong v. Hernandez, 201 Phil. 1155
shall, upon recommendation of the (1937), the SC upheld the validity of the law
economic and planning agency, when the which nationalized the retail trade. For the
national interest dictates, reserve to protection of the law can be observed by the
citizens of the Philippines or to national interest.
corporations or associations at least sixty
per centum of whose capital is owned by
such citizens, or such higher percentage
as Congress may prescribe, certain areas
of investments. The Congress shall enact
measures that will encourage the Ichong v. Hernandez, 201 Phil. 1155 (1937)
formation and operation enterprises
whose capital is wholly owned by Filipinos. But there are areas where aliens cannot
In the grant of rights, privileges be kept away for the simple reason that they
and concessions covering the national cannot be deprived of a common means of
economy and patrimony, the State shall livelihood, especially when they are admitted to
give preference to qualified Filipinos. the country as immigrants.
The State shall regulate and
exercise authority over foreign In Villegas v. Hiu Chiong Isai Po Ho, 86
investments within its national jurisdiction SCRA 270 (1978), the SC invalidated a city
and in accordance with its national goals ordinance imposing a P500 permit fee for aliens
and priorities. who wish to engage in the pursuit of an
occupation. The SC noted that this violated the
Id., Sec. 2. xxx uniformity of taxation, and deprived aliens of
The State shall protect the nation's the right to earn a common livelihood.
marine wealth in its archipelagic waters,
territorial sea, and exclusive economic Villegas v. Hiu Chiung Tsai Pao Ho 86 SCRA 270
zone, and reserve its use and enjoyment (1978)
exclusively to Filipino citizens.
F: An ordinance of the City of Manila
Art. III, Sec. 11. Free access to the prohibited the employment of aliens in any
courts and quasi-judicial bodies and occupation or business unless they first secured
adequate legal assistance shall not be a permit from the Mayor of Manila and paid a
denied to any person by reason of fee of P500. Respondent, an alien, employed in
poverty. Manila, brought suit and obtained judgment
from the CFI declaring the ordinance null and
Art. VIII, Sec. 5. The Supreme Court void.
shall have the following powers:
xxx HELD: The ordinance is a tax measure. In
(5) Promulgate rules concerning imposing a flat rate of P500, it failed to consider
the protection and enforcement of substantial differences in situations among
constitutional rights, pleading, practice, aliens and for that reason violates the rule on
and procedure in all courts, the admission uniformity of taxation. It also lays down no
to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, guide for granting/denying the permit and
and legal assistance to the therefore permits the arbitrary exercise of
underprivileged. Such rules shall provide discretion by the Mayor. Finally, the ordinance
a simplified and inexpensive procedure for denies aliens due process and the equal
the speedy disposition of cases, shall be protection of the laws. VV.
uniform for all courts of the same grade,
and shall not diminish, increase, or modify In Vera v. Cuevas, 90 SCRA 379 (1979),
substantive rights. Rights of procedure of Sec. 169 of the NIRC requiring manufacturers of
special courts and quasi-judicial bodies skimmed milk (non-fat) to put on its label the
shall remain effective unless disapproved warning that the milk is harmful for infants, was
by the Supreme Court. struck down as unconstitutional on the ground
that it did not require the same labeling in the
case of filled milk (coco-fat added)
Constitutional Law II

prohibition to enjoin enforcement of the law on


At that time of the decision thought, the the ground that it was contrary to the equal
law was already inoperative. protection and due process guarantee of the
Constitution.
Vera v. Cuevas 90 SCRA 379 (1979)
HELD: Dumlao has not been injured by the
F: Respondents are engaged in the application of the provision. No petition seeking
manufacture and sale of filled milk products. his disqualification has been filed against him.
They brought an action in the CFI for a His petition is a mere request for advisory
declaration of their rights in respect of section opinion. Nevertheless, because of public
169 of the Tax Code. This provision required interest, the question should be resolved. The
that "all condensed skimmed milk in whatever purpose of the law is to allow the emergence of
form, from which the fatty part has been younger blood in local governments and
removed totally or in part or put on sale in the therefore, not invalid. The retired employee in
Philippines shall be clearly and legibly marked effect declares himself tired and unavailable for
on its immediate containers with the words: the same government work. VV.
This milk is not suitable for nourishment for
infants less than one year of age.
In Igot v. Comelec, 95 SCRA 392 (1980),
HELD: Sec. 169 of the Tax Code has been however, the disqualification of candidates con-
repealed by RA 344. At any rate, Sec. 169 victed or simply charged with national security
applied only to skimmed milk and not to filled offenses was struck down as unconstitutional,
milk. Sec. 169 is being enforced only against for violating the presumption of innocence and
respondent manufacturers of filled milk but not thus ultimately the equal political protection.
against manufacturers of skimmed milk, thus
denying them the equal protection of the laws. Igot c. Comelec 95 SCRA 392 (1980)
VV.
F: Romeo Igot, as taxpayer, voter and
member of the bar, and Alfredo Salapantan Jr.,
2. Political equality as taxpayer and voter, sued for prohibition to
enjoin enforcement of BP 52, sec. 4 of which
provides for the disqualification as candidate of
Art. III, Sec. 18. (1) No person any person convicted of subversion,
shall be detained solely by reason of his insurrection or rebellion or similar offenses.
political beliefs and aspirations.
HELD: Neither petitioner has been convicted
Art. IX, C, Sec. 10. Bona fide nor charged with acts of disloyalty nor
candidates to public office shall be free disqualified from being candidates for local
from any form of harassment and elective positions. They have no personal or
discrimination. substantial interest at stake and therefore no
locus standi. Neither can they sue as taxpayers
because the statute does not involve
In Dumlao v. Comelec, 95 SCRA 392 disbursement of public funds. VV.
(1980), the SC upheld the validity of sec. 4 of
Batas Blg. 52 disqualifying retired elective local
officials who have received retirement benefits 3. Social equality
and would have been 65 years old at the start
of the term. It does not violate equal
protection, for it gives younger blood the Art. XIII, Sec. 1. The Congress shall
opportunity to run the local government. give highest priority to the enactment of
measure that protect and enhance the
Dumlao v. Comelec, 95 SCRA 392 (1980) right of all the people to human dignity,
reduce social, economic, and political
F: Sec. 4 of BP 52 provides in part that inequalities and remove cultural inequities
"any retired elective provincial, city ot by equitably diffusing wealth and political
municipal official who has received payment of power for the common good.
the retirement benefits to which he is entitled To this end, the State shall
under the law and who shall have been 65 regulate the acquisition, ownership, use,
years of age at the commencement of the term and disposition of property and its
of office to which he seeks to be elected, shall increments.
not be qualified to run for the same elective .
local office from which he has retired."
Petitioner, Governor of Nueva Vizcaya, sued for
Constitutional Law II

II. REQUIREMENTS OF FAIR PROCEDURE

Pasion vda. de Garcia v. Locsin, 65 Phil. 689,


A. Arrests, Searches and Seizures (1938)

Art. III, Sec. 2. The right of the F: This is a petition for mandamus
people to be secure in their persons, presented to secure the annulment of a search
houses, papers and effects against warrant (SW) & 2 orders of the resp. judge, &
unreasonable searches and seizures of the restoration of certain documents alleged to
whatever nature and for any purpose, have been illegally seized by an agent of the
shall be inviolable, and no search warrant Anti-Usury Board.
or warrant of arrest shall issue except Almeda, an agent of the Anti-Usury
upon probable cause to be determined Board, obtained from the justice of the peace of
personally by the judge after examination Tarlac, Tarlac, a SW, commanding any officer of
under oath or affirmation of the the law "to search the person, house or store of
complainant and the witnesses he may the petitioner for certain books, lists, chits,
produce, and particularly describing the receipts, documents & other papers relating to
place to be searched and the person or her activities as userer."
things to be seized. On the same date, Almeda,
accompanied by a captain of the PC, went to
Sec. 3. The privacy of the office of the petitioner, and after showing
communication and correspondence shall the SW to the petitioner's bookeeper, Salas, &
be inviolable, except upon lawful order of w/o the presence of the petitioner, who was ill
the court, or when public safety or order and confined at that time, proceeded w/ the
requires otherwise as prescribed by law. execution thereof. Two packages of records & a
Any evidence obtained in violation locked filing cabinet containing several papers
of this or the preceding section, shall be and documents were seized by Almeda and a
inadmissible for any purpose in any receipt thereof issued by him to Salas.
proceeding. Separate criminal cases were filed against
petitioner. Petitioner demanded the return of
the documents seized. Bu motion, pet.
1. Requirements for Search challenged the legality of the SW and the
Warrants devolution of the documents demanded. By
resolution, the resp. judge of CFI denied the
petitioner's motion for the reason that though
Yee Sue Kuy v. Almeda, 70 Phil. 141 (1940) the SW was illegal, there was a waiver on the
part of the petitioner.
F: By virtue of the sworn application of The resolution of 10/5/37 & the order
Almeda, the Chief agent of the Anti-Usury of 1/3/38 are sought, together w/ the SW, to be
Board, a SW was issued to search the store and nullified in these proceedings.
premises of the petitioner, accused of violating
the Anti-Usury Law. Receipt books, PNs and HELD: Freedom from unreasonable searches
other articles were seized and retained in the and seizures is declared a popular right and for
possession of the Anti-Usury Board. a SW to be valid, (1) it must be issued upon
probable cause; (2) the probable cause must
ISSUE: W/n the requirements for the issuance of be determined by the judge himself and not by
valid SW were complied with. the applicant or another; (3) in the
determination of probable cause, the judge
RULING: YES. The applicant, Almeda, in his must examine, under oath or affirmation, the
application, swore that "he made his own complainant and such witnesses as the latter
personal investigation and ascertained that may produce; & (4) the warrant issued must
petitioner is lending money without a license, particularly describe the place to be searched
charging usurious rates." The witness he and persons or things to be seized.
presentted testified before the judge and swore In the instant case, the existence of
that he knew that YEE was lending without a probable cause was determined not by the
license because he personally investigated the judge himself but by the applicant. All that the
victims who secured loans from the petitioner. judge did was to accept as true the affidavit
Their affidavits were sufficient for, thereunder, made by agent Almeda. It does not appear that
they could be held liable for perjury. The he examined the applicant and his witnesses, if
existence of probable cause has been any. Even accepting the description of the
determined by the justice of the peace before prop. to be seized to be sufficient and on the
issuing the warrant complained of, as shown in assumption that the receipt issued is sufficiently
the warrant itself. Charo. detailed w/in the meaning of the law, the prop.
Constitutional Law II

seized were not delivered to the court w/c believe that an offense has been committed
issued the warrant, as required by law. Instead, and that the objects sought in connection with
they were turned over to the resp. provincial the offense are in the place sought to be
fiscal & used by him in building up cases searched. When addressed to a newspaper
against petitioner. Considering that at the time publisher or editor, the application for a
the warrant was issued, there was no case warrant must contain a specification stating
pending against the petitioner, the averment with particularity the alleged subversive
that the warrant was issued primarily for materials he has published or intending to
exploration purposes is not w/o basis. publish. Broad statement in the application is a
mere conclusion of law and does not satisfy the
IS THERE A WAIVER? No express requirement of probable cause. Another factor
waiver. that makes the search warrants constitutionally
IS THERE AN IMPLIED WAIVER? None. objectionable is that they are in the nature of
general warrants. In Stanford v. State of Texas,
To constitute a waiver of constitutional the US SC declared this type of warrant void.
right, it must appear first that (1) the right VV.
exists; (2) that the person involved had
knowledge, actual or constructive, of the
existence of such right; (3) that said person Corro v. Lising 137 SCRA 341 (1985)
had an actual intention to relinquish the right.
It is true that the petitioner did not F: Respondent Judge issued a search
object to the legality of the search when it was warrant for the seizure of articles allegedly used
made. She could not have objected bec. she by petitioner in committing the crime of
was sick & was not present when the warrant sedition. Seized were printed copies of the
was served upon Salas. Certainly, the Philippine Times, newspaper dummies,
constitutional immunity from unreasonable typewriters, mimeographing machines and tape
searches and seizures, being a personal one, recorders, video machines and tapes. The
cannot be waived by anyone except by the petitioner moved to quash the warrant but his
person whose rights are invaded or one who is motion was denied.
expressly authorized to do so in his or her
behalf. The failure on the part of the petitioner HELD: The statements made in the affidavits
and her bookkeeper to resist or object to the are mere conclusions of law and do not satisfy
execution of the warrant does not constitute an the requirement of probable cause. The
implied waiver of the consti. right. It is but a language used is all embracing as to include all
submission to the authority of the law. The conceivable words and equipment of petitioner
delay in making the demand for the return of regardless of whether they are legal or illegal.
the documents seized is not such as to result im The search warrant under consideration was in
implied. waiver. RAM. the nature of a general warrant which is
objectionable. VV.

Burgos v. Chief of Staff 133 SCRA 800


(1984) Bache & Co. (Phil.) v. Ruiz, 37 SCRA 823 (1971)

Illegal search of newspaper offices and press F: The Com. of Internal Revenue through
freedom Rev. Examiner de Leon filed an application for a
SW against Bache & Co. and its pres.,
F: On the basis of two warrants issued by Seggerman for violation of the provisons of the
the RTC of QC, the offices of the Metropolitan NIRC. As Judge Ruiz was then conducting a
Mail and the We Forum were search and hearing, the deposition of de Leon and his
printing machines, paraphernalia, motor witness, Logronio, was taken by the Dep. Clerk
vehicles and other articles used in the printing, of Court. The deposition was later read to the
publication and distribution of the newspapers judge who asked the witness to take an oath as
as well as papers and other literature seized on to the truth of his statements. The judge then
the ground that they were used in the signed the SW and accordingly issued the same.
commission of the crime of subversion.
Petitioners brought and action to annul the ISSUE: W/n the requirements for the issuance of
warrants and compel the return of the things valid SW were complied with.
seized.
RULING: NO. The judge did not personally
HELD: Petitioners' thesis is impressed with examine the complainant and his witnesses.
merit. Probable cause for a search is defined as The judge did not have the opportunity to
such facts and circumstances which would lead observe tthe demeanor of the deponents and to
a reasonably discreet and prudent man to propound initial and follow-up questions which
Constitutional Law II

his judicial mind, on account of his training, was description of the offense as "illegal possession
in the best position to conceive. This is of firearms, etc." This suffices to cure the
important in arriving at a sound inference on defect.
the all-importatnt question of w/n there was The fact that the word "etc." was added
probable cause. Charo. to refer to ammunitions and explosives did not
violate the rule on single offense, for
notwithstanding that possession of firearms,
Prudente v. Dayrit, 180 SCRA 69 (1990) explosives and ammunitions are punished in
different sections of the PD, they are treated as
F: Judge Dayrit, upon applicatin of P/Maj. belonging to a single specie. An exception to
Dimagmaliw, supported by a "Deposition of the rule that a warant shall be issued for a
Witness," executed by P/Lt. Angeles, issued a single offense is when existing laws prescribe a
search warrant for the search and seizure of single punishment for various offenses. Charo.
arms, ammunitions and explosives in the
premises of the PUP which were supposed to be
in possession of Dr. Prudente. In enforcing the Olaes v. People, 155 SCRA 486 (1987)
warrant, 3 fragmentation grenades were found
in the bathroom of the office of Dr. Prudente. F: Petitioners claim that the SW issued by
resp. judge was invalid. They also question the
ISSUE: W/n the searrch warrant was valid. extrajudicial confession taken from them
without according them the right to assistance
RULING: NO. of a counsel. The articles seized by virtue of the
(1) The warant was not issued on the SW consisting of dried marijuana were admitted
basis of personal knowledge of the applicant as evidence for violation of RA 6425 or
and his witness. The probable cause required Dangerous Drugs Act.
under the Constitution for the issuance of a
search warrant must be in connection with one RULING: While it is true that the caption of the
specific offense, and the judge must, before SW states that it is in connection with "the
issuing the warrant, personally examine in the violation of RA 6425," it is clearly recited in the
form of searching questions and answers, in text thereof that "there is probable cause to
writing and under oath, the complainant and believe that Olaes of Olongapo City has in his
any witnesses he may produce, on facts possession and control, marijuana dried stalks
personally known to them and attach to the which are suject of the offense stated above."
record their sworn statements together with Although the specific section of the law is not
any affidavit submitted. However, in the case at stated, there is no question at all that the
bar, Dimagmaliw merely stated in his specific offense alleged to have been
application that his knowledge was based "on committed as basis for determining probable
gathered infrmation from verified sources." The cause is alleged. Furthermore, the SW
same holds true for the affidavit of Angeles. specifically described the place to be searched
Moreover, the judge did not examine and the things to be seized.
Angeles in the form of searching questions and
answers. What appears on the record are As to the extrajudicial confessions of the
leading questions answereable by yes or no. accused, the same are deemed inadmissible
against them. In People V. Galit, the Court
(2) As to the claim that the SW failed to declared that: " At the time the person is
particularly describe the place to be searched, arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting
the SC ruled that the description of the place to officer to inform him of the reason for the
be searched is sufficient if the officer with the arrrest and he must be shown the warrant of
warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain arrest, if any; he shall be informed of his
and identify the place intended to be searched. constitutional rights to remain silent and to
Here, the SW described the place as PUP, with counsel, and that any statement he might make
its address and specifically mentioned the could be used against him. The person arrested
offices of the "Dept. of Military Science and shall have the right to communicate with his
Tactics on the ground floor and the Office of lawyer, a relative, or anyone he chooses by the
the President at the 2nd floor and the other most expedient means - by telephone if
rooms in that floor." This is deemed sufficient. possible - or by letter or messenger. It shall be
the responsibility of the arresting officer to see
(3) There was also an issue as to w/n the to it that this is accomplished. No custodial
SW was issued for one specific offense. The investigation shall be conducted unless it be in
warrrant was issued for violation of PD 1866 the presence of counsel engaged by the person
which punishes several offenses. While there arrested, by any person on his behalf, or
was failure to state the particular provision of appointed by the court upon petition either of
the law violated, the warrant itself qualified the the detainee himself or by anyone on his behalf.
Constitutional Law II

The right to counsel may be waived but the Salazar v. Achacoso, 183 SCRA 145
wiaver shall not be valid unless made with the
assistance of counsel. Any statement obtained F: Pursuant to the powers vested by PD
in violation of the procedure herein laid down, 1920 and EO 1022, POEA Administrator
whether exculpatory or inculpatory, in whole or Achacoso ordered the closure of the
in part, shall be inadmissible in evidence." recruitment agency of Horty Salazar, having
verified that she had no license to operate a
These requirements were even made recruitment agency. He further ordered the
stricter under the 1987 Constitution which seizure of the documents and paraphernalias,
provides that the rights of a person under being used or intended to be used as the
custodial investigation cannot be waived except means of commiting illegal recruitment. This
when made in writing and in the presence of order was enforced on 26 January 1988.
counsel. Charo. Petitioner filed this suit for prohibition.

Issue: May the POEA (or the Sec. of Labor)


Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force v. CA, validly issue warrants of serach and seizure (or
171 SCRA 348 (1989) arrest ) under Art. 38 of the Labor
Code?
F: The PASTF was created by virtue of PD
1936 to serve as the President's arm called HELD: NO.
upon to combat the vice of dollar salting or the The provisions of PD 1920 and EO 1022,
blackmarketing and salting of foreign exchange. now embodied in Art. 38 of the Labor Code, are
the dying vestiges of authoritarian rule in its
ISSUE: W/N the PASTF is "such other officer as twilights moments. Under Art. III, Sec 2 of the
may be authorized by law" to issue warrants 1987 Constitution, it is only judges and no
under the 1973 Constitition. other, who may issue warrants of arrest and
search. The exception is in cases of deportation
RULING: NO. The Court, in reviewing the powers of illegal and undesirable aliens, whom the
of the PASTF under its enabling law, sees President of the Commissioner of Immigration
nothing that will reveal a legislative may order arrested, following a final order of
intendement to confer upon the body, quasi- deportation, for the purpose of deportation.
judicial responsiibilities relative to offenses The Sec. of Labor , not being a judge. may no
punishable by PD 1883. Its undertaking is longer issue search or arrest warrants. Hence,
simply to determine w/n probable cause exists the authorities must go through the judicial
to warrant the filing of charges with the proper process. To that extent, we declare Art. 38,
court, meaning to say, to conduct an inquiry par. C of the Labor Code, unconstitutional and
preliminary to a judicial recourse, and to of no force and effect.
recommend action of appropriate authorities.
The Court agrees that PASTF exercises,
or was meant to exercise, prosecutorial powers, a. Existence of probable cause.
and on that ground, it cannot be said to be a
neutral and detached judge to determine the Probable cause is such facts and circum-
existence of probable cause for purposes of stances as would reasonably make a prudent
arrest or search. Unlike a magistrate, a man believe that a crime have been committed
prosecutor is naturally interested in the success and that the documents or things sought to be
of his case. Although his office "is to see to it searched and seized are in the possession of
that justice if done and not necessarily to the person against whom the warrant is
secure the conviction of the accused," he sought. Without probable cause, there can be
stands invariably, as the accused's adversary no valid search warrant.
and his accuser. To permit him to issue
warrrants and indeed, warrants of arrest, is to In Stonehill v. Diokno, 20
make him both judge and jury in his own right, SCRA 385 (1967), 42 search warrants were
when he is neither. This makes to our mind and issued for alleged violation of Central Bank
to that extent, PD 1636 as amended by PD Laws, the Tariff and Customs Code, the NIRC,
2002, unconstitutional. and the Revised Penal Code. The SC voided the
The "responsible officer" referred to warrants on the ground that it was impossible
under the Cosntitution is one not only for the judge to have found probable cause in
possessing the necessary skills and competence view of the number of laws alleged to have
but more significantly, the neutrality and been violated by the petitioner. How could he
independence comparable to the impartiality even know what particular provision of each law
presumed of a judicial officer. had been violated? If he did not know this, how
could it be determined if the person against
whom the warrant was issued was probably
Constitutional Law II

guilty thereof? In truth, this was a fishing Philippine Times were subversive were held to
expedition, which violated the sanctity of be not personal knowledge, and thus the search
domicile and privacy of communications. To warrant issued was not valid.
establish the requirement of probable cause,
the rule is: One crime, one warrant. e. The search warrant must describe
particularly describe the place to be
b. As determined by a judge searched and the things to be seized.

Under the 1987 Constitution, only a Failure to state with particularity the
judge can issue a warrant; the offensive and place to be searched and items to be seized
much abused phrase "and other responsible makes the warrant used for fishing evidence (a
officer as may be authorized by law" in the general warrant) which is void.
1973 Constitution has been removed
In Burgos v. Chief of Staff, the
c. After personally examining under oath description which read "subversive documents,
or affirmation the complainant and his leaflets, papers to promote the objective of the
witness. Movement for a Free Philippines, the Light a
Fire Movement, and the April 6 Movement"
The examination conducted by the were held not to be particular descriptions, thus
judge takes the form of searching questions. making the warrant a general warrant.

The requirement that the judge must In Corro v. Lising, the search and seizure
personally examine the complainant and his of "printed copies and dummies of Philippine
witnesses means that the actual examination Times, subversive documents, articles, printed
cannot be delegated to someone else, like the matters, handbills, leaflets, banners, and
clerk of court. typewriters, tape recorders, etc." was again
invalidated for the description was not at all
So said the Court in Bache and Co. (Phil) particular or specific, thus making the warrants
v. Ruiz, 37 SCRA 823 (1971). In this case, when general warrants.
the BIR agent and his witnesses arrived in court
in the middle of a hearing, the judge suspended When it comes to printed matters, the
the hearing and directed the branch clerk to offensive material need not be set out in full. It
examine and take the testimony of the is enough if it specifies the issues and the title
witnesses in his chambers. After he was of the articles. The instruction to seize
through with the hearing, he went back to his "subversive materials" is not valid because the
chambers and finding that the examination was determination of whether a material is
finished, asked the BIR agent and his witnesses subversive or not is not for the police officer to
if they affirmed what they what they testified decide; no unfettered discretion must be
to, after which he issued the search warrant in granted to him.
question.
The matter is different if goods were
d. On the basis of their personal searched and seized because of their intrinsic
knowledge of the facts that they are quality (as when they are stolen or smuggled),
testifying to. than if the goods were searched for the ideas
they contain (as when a "subversive newspaper
The determination of the is sought). In the latter case, a more detailed
reasonableness of the judicial warrant must be description of the physical features of the item
based on the affidavit of one who has personal is required to avoid delegating the appreciation
knowledge of the facts to which he testifies. of ideas, and thus threaten free expression.
The testimony cannot be based on mere belief.
Neither can it be based on a report. Otherwise, 2. When Search May Be Made without a
the warrant is void. Warrant

Thus, in Burgos v. Chief of Staff, 133 (a) When search is made of moving vehicles
SCRA 800 (1984), reiterating the 1937 case of
Rodriguez v. Villamiel, the testimony based on a The reason is the person may escape
military report that the newspaper We Forum easily if a warrant has to be applied for the
was used for subversive were held to be not a mean time. In the Tariff and Customs Code,
personal knowledge and so was inadmissible. customs agents are specifically authorized to
search and seize vehicles even without a
Likewise, in Corro v. Lising, 137 SCRA warrant.
541 (1985), the testimony based on
investigation reports that certain items in the
Constitutional Law II

Checkpoints are valid in some instances turn against the captor; and if the documents in
depending on the purpose (e.g. apprehend a the apartment were 2 blocks away, the search
suspected criminal) and the circumstances (e.g. would no longer be justified since there is no
probable cause that the criminal is inside the way for Roque to go back to the apartment and
car). There is no question that when a child has destroy the documents, having been arrested
been reported kidnapped in a community, the already.
police can stop all cars and check if the
detained child is in any one of them.
Nolasco v. Cruz Paño 139 SCRA 152 (1985)
(b) When search is an an incident to a
valid arrest. F: Milagros Aguilar-Roque was arrested
together with Cynthia Nolasco by the
Rule 126, Sec. 12. Search incident Constabulary Security Group. Milagrso had been
to lawful arrest.-- A person lawfully wanted as a high ranking officer of the CPP. The
arrested may be searched for dangerous arrest took place at 11:30 a.m. of August 6,
weapons or anything which may be used 1984. At noon of the same day, her premises
as proof of the commission of an offense, were searched and 428 documents, a portable
without a search warrant. (Rules of typewriter and 2 boxes were seized. Earlier that
Court.) day, Judge Cruz Paño issued a search warrant
for rebellion against Milagros. On the basis of
A person arrested may be searched for the documents seized, charges of subversion
dangerous weapons or anything that proves the and rebellion were filed but the fiscal's office
commission of the offense. It follows that the merely charged her and Nolasco with illegal
search can only be made within the area of possession of subversive materials. Milagros
control of the arrested person, and within the asked for suppression of the evidence on the
time of the arrest. ground that it was illegally obtained. The search
warrant described the things to be seized as
In Nolasco v. Cruz Pano, 139 SCRA 152 "Documents, papers and other records of the
(1985); Milagros Roque and Cynthia Nolasco CPP, NPA and NDF, xxx".
were arrested at the intersection of Mayon and
Margal Streets in QC at 11:30 a.m., having been HELD: The search warrant is void because it
wanted as high officers of the CPP. At 12:00 fails to describe with particularity the things to
noon, Roque's apartment located 2 blocks be seized. It does not specify what the
away, was searched and some documents subversive books and instructions are and what
seized. The SC at first held that the search was the manuals not otherwise available to the
valid even if the warrant issued was void for public contain to make them subversive. There
failing to describe with particularity the things is absent a definite guideline as to what items
to be seized, because it was an incident of a might lawfully be seized, thus giving the officers
valid arrest. discretion regarding what articles they should
seize. It is thus in the nature of a general
But after the EDSA revolution, the warrant. But the seizure of the articles could be
reconstituted SC granted the motion for justified as an incident of a valid arrest. It is a
reconsideration and held that just because general rule that, as an incident of an arrest,
there was a valid arrest did not mean that the the place of premises where the arrest was
search was likewise valid. To be valid, the made can also be searched without a search
search must be "incidental" to the arrest, that warrant.
is, not separated by time or place from the
arrest. If the basis for allowing incidental (c) When things seized are within plain
searches is looked into, one can see that this view of a searching party
situation is not one involving a valid incidental
search. Roan v. Gonzales, 145 SCRA 687 (1986)

The law allows the arresting officer to F: The challenged SW was issued by the
search a person validly arrested (by frisking him resp. judge on 5/10/84. The petitioner's house
for instance) because (a) a weapon held by the was searched 2 days later but none of the
arrested person may be turned against his articles listed in the warrant was discovered.
captor and (b) he may destroy the proof of the The officers conducting the search found 1 colt
crime, if the arrested officer has to first apply Magnum revolver & 18 live bullets w/c they
for a search warrant from a judge. confiscated. They are now the bases of the
charge against the petitioner.
If, in the Nolasco case, the search was
conducted 30 minutes after the arrest, there is
no longer any danger that the captured may
Constitutional Law II

RULING: Search warrant issued by resp. judge injudiciously omitted. Instead, the declaration
is hereby declared null and void and of the witnesses were readily accepted and the
accordingly set aside. warrant sought was issued forthwith.

The petitioner claims that no SOL-GEN ARGUES THAT THE PETITIONER


depositions were taken by the resp. judge in WAIVED WHATEVER DEFECT WHEN THE
accordance w/ Rule 126, Sec. 4 of the ROC, but PETITIONER VOLUNTARILY SUBMITTED TO THE
this is not entirely true. Depositions were taken SEARCH AND MANIFESTED HIS CONFORMITY IN
of the complainant's 2 witnesses in addition to WRITING.
the affidavit executed by them. It is correct to
say, however, that the complainant himself was We do not agree. What we see here is
not subjected to a similar interrogation. pressure exerted by the military authorities,
By his own accounts, all that resp. judge who practically coerced the petitioner to sign
did was question Capt. Quillosa on the contents the supposed waiver as guaranty against a
of his affidavit only "to ascertain among others, possible challenge later to the validity of the
if he knew and understood the same," and only search they were conducting.
bec. "the application was not yet subscribed
and sworn to." The suggestion is that he would Malum Prohibitum.-- It does not follow
not have asked any questions at all if the that bec. an offense is malum prohibitum, the
affidavit had already been completed when it subject thereof is necessarily illegal per se.
was submitted to him. In any case, he did not Motive is immaterial in mala prohibita, but the
ask his own searching questions. He limited subjects of this kind of offense may not be
himself to the contents of the affidavit. He did summarily seized simply bec. they are
not take the applicant's deposition in writing prohibited. A SW is still necessary.
and attach them to the record, together w/ the
affidavit presented to him. Such written Motion to Quash.-- Petitioner should
deposition is necessary in order that the Judge have, before coming to the SC, filed a motion to
may be able to properly determine the quash the search warrant by the resp. judge.
existence or non-existence of the probable But as we said and did in Burgos, "this
cause, to hold liable for perjury the person procedural flaw notwithstanding, we take
giving it if it will be found later that his cognizance of this petition in view of the
declarations are false. (Mata v. Bayona.) seriousness and urgency of the consitutional
The applicant was asking for the issues raised." RAM.
issuance of the SW on the basis of mere
hearsay and not of info. personally known to
him. His application, standing alone, was Pita v. CA, 178 SCRA 362 (1989)
insufficient to justify the issuance of the warrant
sought. It was, therefore, necessary for the F: Pursuant to the Anti-Smut Campaign of
witnesses themselves, by their own personal Mayor Ramon Bagatsng, policemen seized and
info., to establish the applicant's claims. confiscated from dealers, distributors,
Even assuming then that it would have newsstand owners and peddlers along Manila
suffied to take the deposition only of the sidewalks, magazines, publications and other
witnesses and not of the applicant himself, reading materials believed to be obscene,
there is still the question of the sufficiency of pornographic, and indecent and later burned
their depositions. the seized materials in public. Among the
A study of the deposition taken from publications seized and later burned was "Pinoy
witnesess Esmael Morada and Jesus Tohilida, Playboy" magazines published and co-edited by
who both claimed to be "intelligence informers," plaintiff Leo Pita. After his injunctive relief was
shows that they were in the main a mere dismissed by the RTC and his appeal rejected
restatement of their allegations in their by CA, he seeks review with SC, invoking the
affidavits, except that they were made in the guaranty against unreasonable searches and
form of answers to the questions put to them by seizure.
the resp. judge.
One may well wonder why it did not Issue: W/N the search and seizure was illegal
occur to the resp. judge to ask how the witness
could be so certain even as to the caliber of the
guns, or how far he was from the window, or HELD: YES.
whether it was on the first floor or second floor, It is basic that searches and seizure may
or why his presence was not noticed at all, or if be done only through a judicial warrant ,
the acts related were really done openly, in the otherwise, they become unreasonable and
full view of the witnesses, considering that subject to challenge. In Burgos v Chief of Staff
these acts were against the law. These would (133 SCRA 800) , the SC countermanded the
have been judicious questions but they were orders of the RTC authorizing the serach of the
Constitutional Law II

premises WE Forum and Metropolitan Mail, two HELD: From Sec. 5, R 113, ROC, it is clear that
Metro Manila Dailies, by reason of a defective an arrest w/o a warrant may be effected by a
warrant. There is a greater reason in this case peace officer or private person, among others,
to reprobate the questioned raid, in the when in his presence the person to be arrested
complete absence of a warrant, valid or invalid. has committed, is actually committing, or is
The fact that the instant case involves an attempting to commit an offense, or when an
obscenity rap makes it no different from offense has in fact, just been committed, & he
Burgos, a political case, because speech is has personal knowledge of the facts indicating
speech, whether political or "obscene". that the person arrested has committed it.
The authorities must apply for the At the time the peace officers identified
issuance of the a search warrant from the judge themselves and apprehended the petitioner as
, if in their opinion, an obscenity rap is in order. he attempted to flee, they did not know that he
They must convince the court that the materials had committed, or was actually committing, the
sought to be seized are "obscene" and pose a offense. They just suspected that he was hiding
clear and present danger of an evil substantive something in the buri bag. They did not know
enough to warrant State interference and what its contents were. The said circumstances
action. The judge must determine WON the did not justify an arrest w/o a warrant.
same are indeed "obscene": the question is to However, there are many instances
be resolved on a case-to-case basis and on the where a warrant & seizure can be effected w/o
judge's sound discretion. If probable cause necessarily being preceded by an arrest,
exist, a search warrant will issue. foremost of w/c is the 'stop & search' w/o a SW
at military or police checkpoints, the
constitutionality of w/c has been upheld by this
(d) Stop and Frisk Court in Valmonte v. de Villa.
As bet. a warrantless search and seizure
Posadas v. CA, 188 SCRA 288 (1990) (S & S) conducted at military or police
checkpoints and the search thereof in the case
F: Patrolmans Ungab and Umpar, both at bar, there is no question that, indeed, the
members of the INP of the Davao Metrodiscom latter is more reasonable considering that,
assigned w/ the Intelligence Task Force, were unlike in the former, it was effected on the basis
conducting a surveillance along Magallanes, St., of a probable cause. The probable cause is that
Davao City. While they were w/in the premises when the petitioner acted suspiciously and
of the Rizal Memorial Colleges, they spotted attempted to flee w/ the buri bag, there was a
petitioner carrying a "buri" bag & they noticed probable cause that he was concealing
him to be acting suspiciously. They approached something illegal in the bag and it was the right
the petitioner and identified themselves as and duty of the police officers to inspect the
members of the INP. Petitioner attempted to same.
flee but was stopped by the 2. They then It is too much indeed to require the
checked the "buri" bag of the petitioner where police officers to search the bag in the
they found 1 caliber .38 Smith & Wesson possession of the petitioner only after they shall
revolver, w/ 2 rounds of live ammunition for a . have obtained a SW for the purpose. Such an
38 cal. gun, a smoke grenade, & 2 live exercise may prove to be useless, futile and
ammunition for a .22 cal. gun. Petitioner was much too late.
brought to the police station for further As the Sol-Gen said:
investigation. He was prosecuted for illegal
possession of firearms and ammunitions in the "The assailed S & S
RTC of Davao City wherein after a plea of not may still be justified as akin to a
guilty, and trial on the merits, a decision was 'stop and frisk' situation whose
rendered finding petitioner guilty. The CA object is either to determine the
affirmed the appealed decision in toto. identity of suspicious individuals
or to maintain the status quo
Hence, the petition for review, the momentarily while the police
main thrust of w/c is that there being no lawful officers seeks to obtain more info.
arrest or search and seizure, the items w/c were ... The US SC held in Terry v.
confiscated from the possession of the Ohio that "a police officer may in
petitioner are inadmissible in evidence against appropriate circumstances & in
him. an appropriate manner approach
The Sol-Gen argues that under Sec. a person for the purpose of
12, R 136 of ROC, a person lawfully arrested investigating possible criminal
may be searched for dangerous weapons or behaviour even though there is
anything (w/c may be) used as proof of a no probable cause to make an
commission of an offense, w/o a SW. arrest." In such a situation, it is
reasonable for an officer rather
Constitutional Law II

than simply to shrug his shoulder person caught committing an offense in


and allow a crime to occur, to flagrante. The arrest that followed the hot-
stop a suspicious individual pursuit was valid. The seizure of the plastic bag
briefly in order to determine his was the result of the accused’s arrest inside the
identity or maintaing the status house. A contemporaneous search may be
quo while obtaining more info." conducted upon the person of the arrestee and
the immediate vicinity where the arrest was
PETITION DENIED. RAM. made.

ISSUE: Whether the documents signed by the


(e) When there is a valid express waiver accused during the investigation were
made voluntarily and intelligently. admissible in evidence.

Waiver cannot be implied from the fact RULING: NO. There was no showing that
that the person consented or did not object to accused was then assisted by counsel nor his
the search, for it many happen that he did so waiver thereto put into writing. (The rejection
only out of respect for the authorities. The of these evidence would not affect the
waiver must be expressly made. conviction of the accused in view of the
abundance of other evidence establishing his
guilt.) Bam.
People v. De lara

F: After a surveillance conducted, a buy- People v. de Gracia, 233 SCRA 716 (July 6,
bust operation was conducted by the police, as 1994)
a consequence of which, accused was arrested.
The accused already pocketed the marked F: The incidents involved in this case took
money and handed two foils to the police when place at the height of the coup d'etat staged in
he sensed the presence of police operatives. December, 1989. Accused-appellant Rolando
He tried to retrieve the two foils but he was de Gracia was charged in two separate
prevented from doing so. He tried to escape by informations for illegal possession of
running inside his house. The police pursued ammunition and explosives in furtherance of
him and were able to subdue him. The accused rebellion, and for attempted homicide.
admitted that he kept prohibited drugs in his Appellant was convicted for illegal possession of
house. He even showed the arresting officers a firearms in furtherance of rebellion, but was
blue plastic bag containing prohibited drugs. acquitted of attempted homicide.
The team, together with the accused, Surveillance was undertaken by the
proceeded to WPD headquarters for military along EDSA because of intelligence
investigation. During the investigation, accused reports about a coup.
was apprised of his constitutional rights to Members of the team were engaged by rebels
remain silent and to have the assistance of in gunfire killing one member of the team. A
counsel. When appellant was asked to give a searching team raided the Eurocar Sales Office.
written statement, he refused to do so pending They were able to find and confiscate six
arrival of his lawyer. Accused contends that his cartons of M-16 ammunition, five bundles of C-4
arrest and the seizure of the bag containing dynamites, M-shells of different calibers, and
prohibited drugs was null and void. He also "molotov" bombs inside one of the rooms
contends that he was not assisted by counsel belonging to a certain Col. Matillano. De Gracia
during custodial investigation, where he was was seen inside the office of Col. Matillano,
forced to sign the photocopy of the marked holding a C-4 and suspiciously peeping through
money, the Receipt of Property Seized, and the a door. The team arrested appellant. They were
Booking and Information Sheet. then made to sign an inventory, written in
Tagalog, of the explosives and ammunition
ISSUE: Whether or not the arrest of the confiscated by the raiding team. No search
accused and the seizure of the plastic bag were warrant was secured by the raiding team.
valid. Accused was found guilty of illegal possession
of firearms.
RULING: YES. The accused was caught in That judgment of conviction is now
flagrante as a result of a buy-bust operation. challenged before us in this appeal.
There was no need for a warrant. The
policemen were not only authorized but were Issue: Whether or not there was a valid search
also under obligation to apprehend the drug and seizure in this case.
pusher even without a warrant. The
policemen’s entry into the house of the accused Ruling: YES
without a search warrant was in hot-pursuit of a
Constitutional Law II

It is admitted that the military Double jeopardy in this case cannot be invoked
operatives who raided the Eurocar Sales Office because the first is an offense punished by a
were not armed with a search warrant at that special law while the second is a felony
time. The raid was actually precipitated by punished by the Revised Penal Code, 24 with
intelligence reports that said office was being variant elements.
used as headquarters by the RAM. Prior to the Presidential Decree No. 1866 imposes
raid, there was a surveillance conducted on the the death penalty where the illegal possession
premises wherein the surveillance team was of firearms and ammunition is committed in
fired at by a group of men coming from the furtherance of rebellion. At the time the offense
Eurocar building. When the military operatives charged in this case was committed under the
raided the place, the occupants thereof refused governance of that law, the imposition of the
to open the door despite requests for them to death penalty was proscribed by the
do so, thereby compelling the former to break Constitution. Consequently, appellant De Gracia
into the office. The Eurocar Sales Office is could only be sentenced to serve the penalty of
obviously not a gun store and it is definitely not reclusion perpetua which was correctly meted
an armory or arsenal which are the usual out by the trial court, albeit with an erroneous
depositories for explosives and ammunition. It recommendation in connection therewith.
is primarily and solely engaged in the sale of
automobiles. The presence of an unusual 3. Constitutionality of checkpoints and
quantity of high-powered firearms and "areal target zonings."
explosives could not be justifiably or even color-
ably explained. In addition, there was general Valmonte v. De Villa, 170 SCRA 256 (1989)
chaos and disorder at that time because of
simultaneous and intense firing within the F: On 1/20/87, the NCRDC was activated
vicinity of the office and in the nearby Camp w/ the mission of conducting security operations
Aguinaldo which was under attack by rebel w/in its area or responsibility and peripheral
forces. The courts in the surrounding areas areas, for the purpose of establishing an
were obviously closed and, for that matter, the effective territorial defense, maintaining peace
building and houses therein were deserted. and order, and providing an atmosphere
conducive to the social, economic and political
Under the foregoing circumstances, it is dev't of the NCR. As part of its duty to maitain
our considered opinion that the instant case peace and order, the NCRDC installed
falls under one of the exceptions to the checkpoints in various parts of Valenzuela and
prohibition against a warrantless search. In the MM.
first place, the military operatives, taking into Petitioners aver that, bec. of the
account the facts obtaining in this case, had institution of said checkpoints, the Valenzuela
reasonable ground to believe that a crime was residents are worried of being harassed and of
being committed. There was consequently more their safety being placed at the arbitrary,
than sufficient probable cause to warrant their capricious and whimsical disposition of the
action. Furthermore, under the situation then military manning the checkpoints, considering
prevailing, the raiding team had no opportunity that their cars and vehicles are being subjected
to apply for and secure a search warrant from to regular searches and check-ups, especially at
the courts. Under such urgency and exigency of night or at dawn, w/o a SW and/ or court order.
the moment, a search warrant could lawfully be Their alleged fear for their safety increased
dispensed with. when Benjamin Parpon, was gaunned down
There are two separate statutes allegedly in cold blood by members of the
penalizing different offenses with discrete NCRDC for ignoring and/ or continuing to speed
penalties. The Revised Penal Code treats off inspite of warning shots fired in the air.
rebellion as a crime apart from murder,
homicide, arson, or other offenses, such as HELD: Petitioner's concern for their safety and
illegal possession of firearms, that might apprehension at being harassed by the military
conceivably be committed in the course of a manning the checkpoints are not sufficient
rebellion. Presidential Decree No. 1866 defines grounds to declare the checkpoints per se,
and punishes, as a specific offense, the crime of illegal. No proof has been presented before the
illegal possession of firearms committed in the Court to show that, in the course of their routine
course or as part of a rebellion. checks, the military, indeed, committed specific
Subject to the presence of the requisite violations of petitioners' rights against unlawful
elements in each case, unlawful possession of search and seizure of other rights.
an unlicensed firearm in furtherance of rebellion The constitutional right against
may give rise to separate prosecutions for a unreasonable searches and seizures is a
violation of Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. personal right invocable only by those whose
1866, and also a violation of Articles 134 and rights have been infringed, or threatened to be
135 of the Revised Penal Code on rebellion. infringed.
Constitutional Law II

Not all searches and seizures are


prohibited. Those w/c are reasonable are not HELD: The Court believes it is highly probable
forbidden. that some violations were actually committed.
The setting up of the questioned This is so inspite of the alleged pleas of
checkpoints may be considered as a security barangay officials for the thousands of
measure to enable the NCRDC to pursue its residents"to submit themselves voluntarily for
mission of establishing effective territorial character and personal verification." However,
defense and maintaining peace and order for the remedy is not to stop all police actions,
the benfit of the public. Checkpoints may not including the essential and legitimate ones.
also be regarded as measures to thwart plots to We see nothing wrong in police making their
destabilize the govt, in the interest of public presence visibly felt in troubled areas. Police
security. cannot respond to riots or violent
Between the inherent right of the state demonstration if they do not move in sufficient
to protect its existence and promote public numbers. A show of force is sometimes
welfare and an individual's right against a necesary as long as the rights of the people are
warrantless search w/c is, however, reasonably protected and not violated. A blanket
conducted, the former should prevail. prohibition such as that sought by the
True, the manning of checkpoints by the petitioners would limit all police actions to one
military is susceptible of abuse by the military on one confrontation where search warrants
in the same manner that all governmental and warrants of arrest against specific
power is susceptible of abuse. But, at the cost individuals are easily procured. Anarchy may
of occasional inconveninece, discomfort and reign if the military and the police decide to sit
even irritation to the citizen, the checkpoints down in their offices bec. all concerted drives
during these abnormal times, when conducted where a show of force is present are totally
w/in reasonable limits, are part of the price we prohibited.
pay for an orderly society and a peaceful The remedy is not an original action for
community. prohibition brought through a TP's suit. Where
not one victim complains, and not one violator
is properly charged, the problem is not initially
Guazon v. De Villa, 181 SCRA 623 (1990) for the SC. It is basically one for the executive
departments and for the trial courts.
F: This is a petition for prohibition w/ prel. Under the circumstances of this TP's
inj. to prohibit the military and police officers suit, there is no erring soldier or policeman
represented by public respondents from whom we can order prosecuted. In the absence
conducting "areal target zonings" or "saturation of clear facts ascertained through an orderly
drives" in MM. procedure, no permanent relief can be given at
The 41 petitioners state that they are this time. Further investigation of the
all of legal age, bona fide residents of MM and petitioners' charges and a hard look by admin.
Taxpayers and leaders in their respective officials at the policy implications of the prayed
communities. for blanket prohibition are also warranted.
Accdg. to the petitioners, the "areal In the meantime, and in the face of a
target zonings" or "saturation drives" are in prima facie showing that some abuses were
critical areas pinpointed by the military and probably committed and could be committed
police as places where the subversives are during future police actions, we have to
hiding. Petitioners claim that the saturation temporarily restrain the alleged baning on
drives follow a common pattern of human rights walls, the kicking in of doors, the herding of
abuses. half-naked men to assembly areas for
Respondents stress 2 points. First, examination of tattoo marks, the violation of
the resps. have legal authority to conduct residences even if these are humble shanties of
saturation drives. And, second, they allege that squatters, and other alleged acts w/c are
the accusations of the petitioners about a shocking to the conscience.
deliberate disregard for human rights, are total
lies.
Resps. cite Art. VII, Sec. 17 of the 4. Wire Tapping
Const.:"The Pres. shall have control of all the
executive departments, bureaus and offices.
He shall ensure that the laws are faithfully Gaanan v. IAC, 145 SCRA 112 (1986)
executed."
They also cite sec. 18.:"The Pres. F: Complainant Atty. Pintor and Montebon
shall be the Commander-in-chief of all AFP and offered to withdraw the complaint for direct
whenever it becomes necessary, he may call assault they filed against Laconico after
out such armed forces to prevent or suppress demanding P8,000 from him. This demand was
lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. xxx heard by Atty. Gaanan through a telephone
Constitutional Law II

extension as requested by Laconico so as to (c) Used or intended to be used as


personally hear the proposed conditions for the a means of committing an offense. (Rules
settlement. Atty. Pintor was subsequently of Court.)
arrested in an entrapment operation upon
receipt of the money. Since Atty. Gaanan
listened to the telephone conversation without 6. Exclusionary Rule
complainant's consent, complainant charged
Gaanan and Laconico with violation of the Anti- Art. III, Sec. 3. xxx
Wiretapping Act (RA 4200). (2) Any evidence obtained in
violation of this (privacy of communication
ISSUE: W/N an extension telephone is among and correspondence) or the preceding
the prohibited devices in Sec. 1 of RA 4200 such section (unreasonable searches and
that iuts use to overhear a private conversation seizures) shall be inadmissible for any
would constitute an unlawful interception of purpose in any proceeding.
communication between 2 parties using a
telephone line. One of the remedies of one who was
victimized by an illegal search is to ask for the
HELD: NO suppression of the things seized and the
An extension tel. cannot be placed in evidence illegally taken.
the same category as a dictaphone, dictagraph,
or other devices enumerated in Sec. 1 of the The exclusionary rule prohibits the use
law as the use thereof cannot be considered as of any evidence obtained in violation of secs. 2
"tapping" the wire or cable of a telephone line. and 3 (1) of Art. III for "any purpose" and in
This section refers to instruments whose "any proceeding". The evidence is absolutely
installation or presence cannot be presumed by useless. This has not always been the case.
the party or parties being overheard because,
by their very nature, they are not of common In Moncado v. People's Court (1948), the
usage and their purpose is precisely for tapping, SC, following the U.S. case of Wolf V. Colorado,
intercepting, or recording a tel. conversation. rules that evidence illegally obtained is not
The tel. extension in this case was not installed necessarily excluded if is otherwise admissible
for that purpose. It just happened to be there under the rules of evidence. In such case, the
for ordinary office use. evidence admitted, without prejudice to any
Furthermore, it is a general rule that criminal, civil or administrative liability of the
penal statutes must be construed strictly in officer who illegally seized it. In other words,
favor of the accused. Thus in the case of doubt the admissibility of the evidence is not effected
as in this case, on WON an extension tel. is by the illegality of the means by which it was
included in the phrase "device or arrangement" acquired.
the penal statute must be construed as not
including an extension tel. It was in Stonehill v. Diokno, supra,
A perusal of the Senate Congressional following the U.S. case of Maop v. Ohio 1969,
Record shows that our lawmakers intended to when the exclusionary rule was first adopted in
discourage, through punishment, persons suchj the Philippines, the SC noting that the total
as government authorities or representatives suppression of the thing seized is the only
of organized groups from installing devices in effective means of ensuring the constitutional
order to gather evidence for use in court or to right which it seeks to preserve. The Court
intimidate, blackmail or gain some unwarranted noted, the insufficiency of the other remedies
advantage over the tel. users. Consequently, (e.g. action for damages, criminal punishment,
the mere act of listening , in order to be resistance), especially in the Philippines where
punishable must stricly be with the use of the violations were committed by those in power
enumerated devices in RA 4200 or others of and were thus equipped with the pardoning
similar nature. power to water down the gravity of the other
penalties imposed to violators of those
5. What may be seized constitutional rights.

Rule 126, sec. 2. Personal The victim may or may not get back the
property to be seized.-- A search warrant thing seized, depending on whether it is
may be issued for the search and seizure contraband or not. It the thing is contraband, it
of the following personal property: would not be returned, and only its suppression
(a) Subject matter of the offense; can be asked for. But if the thing is legal, the
(b) Stolen or embezzled and other party can ask for its return, even if no criminal
proceeds or fruits of the offense; and prosecution has yet been filed, as in the
Stonehill case.
Constitutional Law II

Stonehill v. Diokno, 20 SCRA 383 (1967) averments thereof w/ respect to the offense
committed were abstract. As a consequence, it
F: Upon application of the officers of the was impossible for the judges who issued the
govt (resp. prosecutors), several judges (resp. warrants to have found the existence of a
judges) issued a total of 42 search warrants probable cause, for the same presupposes the
against petitioners &/ or the corporations of w/c introduction of competent proof that the party
they were officers, directed to any peace against whom it is sought has performed
officer, to search the perons named and/ or the particular acts, or committed specific omissions,
premises of their offices, warehouses, and/ or violating a given provision of our criminal laws.
residences, and to seize several personal prop. General search warrants are outlawed
as the "subject of the offense; stolen or bec. they place the sanctity of the domicile and
embezelled or the fruits of the offense," or the privacy of communication and
"used or intended to be used as the means of correspondence at the mercy of the whims,
committing the offense" as violation of CB Laws, caprice or passion of peace officers.
Tariff and Customs Laws (TCC), NIRC and the The warrants sanctioned the seizure of
RPC." all records of the petitioners and the
Alleging that the aforementioned aforementioned corporations, whatever their
search warrants are null & void, said petitioners nature, thus openly contravening the explicit
filed w/ the SC this orig. action for certiorari, command of our Bill of Rights-- that the things
prohibition, mandamus & injunction. The writ to be seized be particularly described-- as well
was partially lifted or dissolved, insofar as the as tending to defeat its major objective: the
papers, documents, and things seized from the elimination of general warrants. RAM.
officers of the corporations; but the injunction
was maintained as regards those found & 7. Civil Action for Damages
seized in the residences of petitioners.
A civil case for damages can also be
ISSUES: (1) With respect to those found & filed pursuant to Article 32 of the Civil Code.
seized in the offices of the corporations, w/n
petitioners have cause of action to assail the In Aberca v. Ver, the SC held that even if
validity of the contested warrants. the privilege of the writ is suspended, the court
(2) In connection w/ those found & can nevertheless entertain an action not only
seized in the residences of petitioners, w/n the against the task force but even against the top
search warrants in question and the searches ranking officials who ordered the seizure, to
and seizures made under the authority thereof recover damages for the illegal searches and
are valid. seizures made in a despotic manner. By so
(3) If the answer in no. 2 is no, w/n doing, one can indirectly inquire into the validity
said documents, papers and things may be of the suspension of the privilege.
used in evidence against petitioners.

HELD: (1) No. Petitioners have no cause of 8. Search and Seizure by Private Persons
action to assail the legality of the contested
warrants and the seizure made in pursuance People v. Marti, 193 SCRA 57 (1991)
thereof bec. said corporations have their
respective personalities, separate and distinct F: Before delivery of appellant's box to the
from the personality of petitioners. The legality Bureau of Customs and/ or Bureau of Posts, Mr.
of a seizure can be contested only by the party Job Reyes (proprietor) & husband of Anita
whose rights have been impaired thereby and Reyes, following standard operating procedure,
that the objection to an unlawful search and opened the boxes for final inspection. When he
seizure is purely personal and cannot be avalied opened appellant's box, a peculiar order
of by 3rd parties. emitted therefrom. His curiosity aroused, he
squeezed one of the bundles allegedly
(2) No. Two points must be stressed in containing gloves and felt dried leaves inside.
connection w/ Art. III, Sec. 2 of the Consti: (a) Opening one of the bundles, he pulled out a
that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cellophane wrapper protruding from the
cause to be determined by the judge in the opening of one of the gloves. He made an
manner set forth therein; & (b) that the warrant opening on one of the cellophane wrappers and
shall particularly describe the things to be took several grams of the contents thereof.
seized. Job Reyes reported the incident to the
None of these requirements has been NBI and requested a laboratory examination of
complied w/. It was stated that the natural and the samples he extracted from the cellophane
juridical persons has committed a violation of wrapper.
CB laws, TCC, NIRC & RPC. No specific offense It turned out that the dried leaves
had been alleged in said applications. The were marijuana flowering tops as certified by
Constitutional Law II

the forensic chemist of the Narcotics Section of That the Bill of Rights embodied in the
the NBI. Consti. is not meant to be invoked against acts
Thereafter, an information was filed of private individuals finds support in the
against appellant for violation of RA 6425. deliberations of the Con Com.: " xxx The Bill of
Rights governs the relationship between the
APPELANT CONTENDS that the evidence subject individual and the state. Its concern is not the
of the imputed offense had been obtained in relation between individuals, between a private
violation of his consti. rights against individual and other individuals. xxx"
unreasonable searches and seizures and (Sponsorship speech of Commissioner Bernas.)
privacy of communication and therefore argues The constitutional proscription against
that the same should be held inadmissible in unlawful S & S therefore applies as a restraint
evidence. directed only against the govt and its agencies
tasked w/ the enforcement of the law. Thus, it
The case at bar assumes a peculiar could only be invoked against the State to
character since the evidence sought to be whom the restraint against arbitrary and
excluded was primarily discovered and obtained unreasonable exercise of power is imposed.
by a private person, acting in a private capacity It the search is made at the behest or
and w/o the intervention and participation of inititiation of the proprietor of a private
state authorities. establishment for its own and private purposes,
as in the case at bar, and w/o the intervention
ISSUE: May an act of a private individual, of police authorities, the right against
allegedly in violation of appellant's unreasonable S & S cannot be invoked for only
constitutional rights, be invoked against the the act of private individuals, not law enforcers,
state? is involved. In sum, the protection against
unreasonable S & S cannot be extended to acts
HELD: We hold in the negative. In the absence committed by private individuals so as to bring
of governmental interference, the liberties it w/in the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by
guaranteed by the Consti. cannot be invoked the govt.
against the State. This constitutional right
refers to the immunity of one's person, whether 9. In the issuance of warrants of ARREST,
citizen or alien, from interference by govt. xxx as distinguished from SEARCH warrants,
(Villanueva v. Querubin.) the judge may rely simply on fiscal's
The contraband in the case at bar certification as to probable cause
having come into possession of the govt w/o the
latter transgressing appellant's rights against Compare Rule 112, Sec. 6 (on warrants of
unreasonable searches and seizures (S & S), the arrest) with Rule 126, Sec. 4 (on search
Court sees no cogent reason why the same warrants.)
should not be admitted against him.
Appellant, however, would like this Rule 112, Sec. 6. When warrant of
Court to believe that NBI agents made an illegal arrest may issue.-- (a) By the Regional
search and seizure of the evidence later on Trial Court.-- Upon the filing of an
used in prosecuting the case. The arguments of information, the Regional Trial Court may
appellant stands to fall on its own weight, or the issue a warrant for the arrest of the
lack of it. accused.
First, the factual considerations of the (b) By the Municipal Trial Court.--
case at bar readily foreclose the proposition If the municipal trial judge conducting the
that NBI agents conducted an illegal S & S of preliminary investigation is satisfied after
the prohibited merchandise. Records of the an examination in writing and under oath
case clearly indicate that it was Mr. Job Reyes, of the complainant and his witnesses in
the proprietor of the forwarding agency, who the form of searching questions and
made the search/ inspection. Such inspection answers, that a probable cause exists and
was reasonable and a SOP on the part of Mr. that there is a necessity of placing the
Reyes as a precautionary measure bef. delivery respondent under immediate custody in
of packages to the Bureau of Customs or order not to frustrate the ends of justice,
Bureau of Posts. he shall issue a warrant of arrest. (Rules
Second, the mere presence of the NBI of Court.)
agents did not convert the reasonable search
effected by Reyes into a warrantless S & S
proscribed by the Consti. Merely to observe Rule 126, Sec. 4. Examination of
and look at that w/c is plain sight is not search. complainant; record.-- The judge must,
Having observed that w/c is open, where no before issuing the warrant, personally
trespass has been committed in aid thereof, is examine in the form of searching
not search. questions and answers, in writing and
Constitutional Law II

under oath the complainant and any a PI, that there exists prima facie evidence that
witnesses he may produce on facts the accused commited the crime charged.
personally known to them and attach to
the records their sworn statements HELD: THE PURPOSE OF A PRELIMINARY
together with any affidavits submitted. INVESTIGATION DOES NOT CONTEMPLATE THE
The requirement in the case of warrants of ISSUANCE OF A WA BY THE INVESTIGATING
arrest is relaxed in that the judge can rely on JUDGE OR OFFICER.
the certification of the fiscal that the latter has
conducted the preliminary investigation and has Under Rule 112 of the 1985 ROC, a PI is
found probable cause on the part of the conducted on the basis of affidavits to
accused. The judge can issue the warrant on determine whether or not there is sufficient
the basis of the information filed by the fiscal ground to hold the accused for trial. To
and the certification of probable cause. determine whether a WA should issue, the
investigating judge must have examined in
The SC has allowed this practice in
writing and under oath the complainant and his
Amarga v. Abbas, 98 Phil. 739 (1956), noting
wirtnesses by searching questions and answers;
that it has been practice long settled and that a
he must be satisfied that a probable cause
judge can issue an order to arrest on the basis
exists; and there must be a need to place the
of the certificate.
accused under immediate custody in order not
Of course, if the judge is in doubt, he to frustrate the ends of justice. It is not
can always ask the fiscal to submit the records obligatory, but merely discretionary, upon the
of the preliminary investigation, so he could investigating judge to issue a WA, for the
determine for himself if, on the basis of the determination of whether it is necessary to
affidavits, there exists probable cause. It he is arrest the accused in order not to frustrate the
satisfied with the affidavits, he need not ends of justice, is left to his sound judgment or
summon the affiants. discretion.
The fiscal should, instead, have filed an
Amarga v. Abbas, 98 Phil. 739 (1956) information immediately so that the RTC may
issue a warrant for the arrest of the accused.
F: Municipal Judge Samulde conducted a Bam.
preliminary investigation (PI) of Arangale upon a
complaint for robbery filed by complainant
Magbanua, alleging that Arangale harvested Beltran v. Makasiar, 167 SCRA 393 (1988)
palay from a portion of her land directly
adjoining Arangale’s land. After the PI, Samulde F: The Pres. of the Phils. filed a complaint
transmitted the records of the case to Provincial for libel against the petitioners, who were
Fiscal Salvani with his finding that “there is publisher and columnist of the Philippine Star,
prima facie evidence of robbery as charged in based on the following statement in Beltran's
the complaint”. Fiscal Salvani returned the column of Oct. 12, 1987 entitled "The Nervous
Officials of the Aquino Administration:" "If you
records to Judge Samulde on the ground that
will recall, during the Aug. 29 coup attempt, the
the transmittal of the records was “premature”
Pres. hid under her bed, while the firing was
because Judge Samulde failed to include the
going on-- perhaps the first Commander-in-
warrant of arrest (WA) against the accused.
Chief of the AFP to have to do so."
Judge Samulde sent the records back to Fiscal
Instead of submitting his counter-
Salvani stating that although he found that a affidavit, Beltran moved to dismiss the
probable cause existed, he did not believe that complaint. The fiscal deniend his motion after
Arangale should be arrested. finding a prima facie case against the
Fiscal Salvani filed a mandamus case petitioners and filed the case in court w/c
against Judge Samulde to compel him to issue a thereafter issued warrants of arrest against the
WA. RTC dismissed the petition on the ground petitioners. The petitioners filed a petition for
that the fiscal had not shown that he has a certiorari and prohibition.
clear, legal right to the performance of the act
to be required of the judge and that the latter HELD: The addition of the word "personally"
had an imperative duty to perform it. after the word "determined" (Art. III, Sec. 2) and
Neverhteless, Judge Samulde was ordered to the deletion of the grant of authority by the
issue a WA in accordance with Sec. 5, Rule 112 1973 Consti. to issue warrants to "other
of the 1985 Rules of Court. responsible officer as may be authorized by
law," has apparently convinced petitioner
ISSUE: Whether it is mandatory for the Beltran that the Consti. now requires the judge
investigating judge to issue a WA of the to personally examine the complainant and his
accused in view of his finding, after conducting witnesses in his determination of probable
Constitutional Law II

cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest. The key element in the first case is that
This is not an accurate interpretation. What the the offense was committed "in his presence".
Consti. underscores is the exclusive and The key element in the second case is that he
personal responsibility of the issuing judge to has "personal knowledge".
satisfy himself of the existence of probable
cause. In satisfying himself of the existence of Thus, in People v. Burgos, 144 SCRA 1
probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of (1986), the arrest made by the constabulary
arrest, the judge is not required to personally without a warrant of a farmer on the basis of
examine the complainant and his witnesses. information that he was a subversive was held
Following established doctrine and procedure, unconstitutional, since there was no personal
he shall: (1) personally evaluate the report and knowledge of the offense itself.
the supporting documents submitted by the
fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause The gun and subversive documents
and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of found by the officer and admitted by the former
arrest; or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds no to be his were likewise held inadmissible
probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's because the admission violated the Miranda
report and require the submission of supporting rule.
affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a
conclusion as to the existence of probable a. Strict enforcement of rule
cause. Sound policy dictates this procedure,
otherwise judges would be unduly laden w/ the People v. Burgos, 144 SCRA 1 (1986)
preliminary examination and investigation of
criminal complaints instead of concentrating on F: On the basis of info. given by Cesar
hearing and deciding cases filed before their Masamlok, the appellant was arrested while
courts. plowing his farm in Tiguman, Davao del Sur, on
xxx May 13, 1982, on charges of illegal possession
of firearm in furtherance of subversion. A .38
10. When arrest may be made without a caliber revolver was found buried under his
warrant house. Subversive documents were also seized
from a place near his house. Two arresting
Rule 113, Sec. 5. Arrest without officers testified that the appellant had readily
warrant; when lawful.-- A peace officer or admitted ownership of the gun and the
a private person may, without a warrant, documents. The appellant was found guilty of
arrest a person: the charge and sentenced to 20 years of
(a) When, in his presence, the reclusion temporal, as minimum, to reclusion
person to be arrested has committed, is perpetua, as maximum, and the gun and
actually committing, or is attempting to documents were ordered confiscated.
commit an offense;
(b) When an offense, has in fact HELD: (1) Under R 113, Sec. 5 (a), the
just been committed, and he has personal arresting officer must have personal knowledge
knowledge of facts indicating that the that the crime has been committed, is being
person to be arrested has committed it; committed, or is about to be committed, in
(c) When the person to be order to justify an arrest w/o a warrant. The
arrested is a prisoner who has escaped offense must also be committed in his presence
from a penal establishment of place where or w/in his view. There is no such personal
he is serving final judgment or temporarily knowledge in this case. Hence the arrest of the
confined while his case is pending, or has appellant was illegal.
escaped while being transferred from one (2) Consequently, the incidental search
confinement to another. and seizure were likewise illegal and the firearm
In cases falling under paragraphs and document are inadmissible in evidence.
(a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested (3) The prosecution argues that the
without a warrant shall be forthwith appellant admitted ownership of the gun and
delivered to the nearest police station or claims that it was he who pointed to the place
jail, and he shall be proceeded against in where the subversive documents were hidden.
accordance with Rule 112, Section. 7. However, as the appellant was not informed of
(Rules of Court.) his constitutional rights at that time, his
admission is inadmissible under [Art. III, Sec. 12
(1).] It is true that 6 days later he executed a
Rule 113, sec. 5 talks of "citizen confession before the fiscal w/ the assistance of
arrests", cases where an arrest can be made counsel, but it was then already too late.
either by the peace officer or a private person (4) As the remaining evidence against
without need of a warrant. the appellant is the testimony of Cesar M. and it
is uncorroborated and unreliable, the appellant
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should be acquitted, but the gun and the


subversive documents must be confiscated. Having caught the appellant in flagrante
as a result of the buy-bust operation, the
People v. Rodriguez, 232 SCRA 498 (April policemen were not only authorized but were
25, 1989) also under obligation to apprehend the drug
pusher even without a warrant of arrest. The
F: Pat. Marvin Pajilan received a phone call police officers were tipped off by an informer
from the desk officer of Sub-Station I, namely, about the illegal trade of the accused. The
Michael Orbeta, who informed him that a person exact location where this trading in drugs was
named 'Alyas Allan' was selling marijuana at No. taking place was given to them. The 'suspicious
8199 Constancia St., Makati, Metro Manila and stuff' taken from the accused were confirmed to
requested that said person be apprehended. be marijuana after tests were conducted on
Acting on this phone call of desk officer Michael them. The attendant circumstances taking
Orbeta, a team of policemen posted themselves place before their eyes led the police officers to
about 10 to 15 meters from the house located reasonably conclude that an offense was actu-
at 8199 Constancia St., Makati. They saw a ally being committed.
tricycle with 3 persons on board, a driver and 2
passengers, stop in front of the house at 8199
Constancia St. They also saw a male person b. Exceptions to strict enforcement
come out of the said house and approach and
talk to the driver of the tricycle. After a while (1) "Continuous" crimes of subversion
they saw the male person go back to the house
and a little later come back and hand to the Umil v. Ramos, 187 SCRA 311 (1990)
tricycle driver 'a suspicious stuff of a cigarette,
a marijuana cigarette', they further saw the These are 8 petitions for habeas corpus
tricycle driver in turn give something to the (HC) filed bef. the Court. The Court finds that
male person. Pat. Pajilan together with his the persons detained have not been illegally
companions approached the male person and arrested nor arbitrarily deprived of their
the tricycle driver and after introducing constitutional right to liberty and that the
themselves as police officers, they asked the circumstances attending these cases do not
male person, the tricycle driver and his 2 warrant their release on HC.
passengers to bring out the contents of their An arrest w/o a warrant, under Sec. 5,
pockets, which the male person, the driver and pars. (a) and (b) of Rule 113, ROC, as amended
the passengers of the tricycle did. The male is justified when the person arrested is caught
person brought out from his pockets 2 small in flagrante delicto, viz., in the act of
plastic bags containing suspected marijuana committing an offense; or when an offense has
leaves. The tricycle driver brought out from his just been committed and the person making the
right front pocket 3 sticks of suspected arrest has personal knowledge of the facts
marijuana cigarettes. Nothing illegal was found indicating that the person arrested has
in the pockets of the 2 passengers of the committed it.
tricycle. The persons in whose behalf these
The appellant contends that the petitions for HC have been filed had freshly
police officers had no personal knowledge that committed or were actually committing an
he was indeed handing marijuana to Enrico offense, when apprehended, so that their
Bacod as they were 10-15 meters away from arrests, w/o warrant were clearly justified, and
the alleged sale transaction. The arrest that they are, further detained by virtue of valid
therefore was not valid as the requirements for informations filed against them in court.
a warrantless arrest were not complied with.
I
Issue: Was the warantless arrest valid?
In Umil v. Ramos, RIOU-CAPCOM
Ruling: YES. received confidential info. about a member of
The warrantless arrest made by the law the NPA-Sparrow unit being treated for a
enforcers was valid since it falls under the gunshot wound at the St. Agnes Hospital in
provisions of Rule 113, Sec. 5(a) of the Rules of Roosevelt Ave., Q.C. It was found that the
Court which provides: wounded person, who was listed in the hospital
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when records as Ronnie Javelon, is actually Rolando
lawful. A peace officer or a private person may, Dural, a member of the NPA liquidation squad,
without a warrant, arrest a person: responsible for the killing of 2 CAPCOM soldiers
(a) When, in his presence, the person to the day before. Dural was then transferred to
be arrested has committed, is actually the Regional Medical Services of the CAPCOM.
committing, or is attempting to commit an of- Upon positive identification by an
fense; eyewitness, Dural was referred to the Caloocan
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City Fiscal who conducted an inquest and When questioned, he refused to give a written
thereafter filed w/ the RTC-Caloocan City an statement, although he admitted that he was a
info. charging Dural w/ the crime of "Double staff member of the executive of the NUFC and
Murder w/ Assault upon agents of persons in a ranking member of the International Dept. of
authority." the CPP.
The petition for HC, insofar as Umil & At about 8 PM, same day, Buenaobra
Villanueva are concerned, is now moot and arrived at RC's house. When arrested, he
academic and is accordingly dismissed, since readily submitted to the military agents that he
the writ does not lie in favor of an accused in a is a regular member of the CPP/ NPA and that
crim. case, who has been released on bail. he went to the place to deliver letters to "Ka
As to Dural, he was not arrested while in Mong," referring to RC and other members of
the act of shooting the 2 soldiers. Nor was he the rebel group. Also found in Buenaobra's
arrested after the commission of said offense possession was a piece of paper containing the
for his arrest came a day after the shooting jumbled tel. no. of Florida Roque, sister of
incident. However, Dural was arrested for being Amelia Roque, aka. "Ka Nelia." They went to
a member of the NPA, an outlawed subversive the address on 8/13/88 and arrived at the place
organization. Subversion being a continuing about 11 AM. After identifying themselves as
offense, the arrest of Dural w/o warrant is military agents and after seeking permission to
justified as it can be said that he was search the place, w/c was granted, the military
committing an offense when arrested. agents conducted a search in the presence of
The arrest of persons involved in the occupants of the house and the barangay
rebellion whether as its fighting armed captain of the place.
elements, or for committing non-violent acts The military found the place to be
but in furtherance of rebellion, is more an act of another safehouse of the NUFC/ CPP. They
capturing them in the course of an armed found firearms, subversive documents, ledgers,
conflict, to quell the rebellion, than for the journals, vouchers, among others. Amelia
purpose of immediately prosecuting them in admitted ownership of the documents seized.
court for a statutory offense. The arrest, Roque was brought to the Caloocan City
therefore, need not follow the usual procedure Fiscal for inquest after w/c an info. charging her
in the prosecution of offenses w/c requires the w/ viol. of PD 1866 was filed. Another info. for
determination by a judge of the existence of viol. of the Anti-Subversion Act was filed against
probable cause bef. the issuance of a judicial Roque and also to Buenaobra.
warrant and the granting of bail if the offense is A petition for HC was filed bef. this Court
bailable. Obviously, the absence of a judicial on behalf of Roque and Buenaobra. At the
warrant is no legal impediment to arresting or hearing, Buenaobra manifested his desire to
capturing persons committing overt acts of stay in the PC-INP stockade at Camp Crame,
violence against govt forces, or any other Q.C. Accordingly, the petition for HC on his
milder acts but equally in pursuance of the behalf is now moot and academic.
rebellious movement. xxx (Garcia-Padilla v.
Enrile.) III
Dural was found guilty of the charge and
is now serving the sentence imposed upon him Anonuevo v. Ramos.
by the trial court. Thus, the writ of HC is no
longer available The arrest of Domingo Anonuevo (A)
and Ramon Casiple (C) w/o warrant is justified.
II At about 7:30 PM on 8/13/88, A and C
arrived at the house of RC w/c was still under
The arrest of Amelia Roque and Wilfredo surveillance. The military noticed bulging
Buenaobra, w/o warrant is also justified. objects on their waist lines. When frisked, the
agents found them to be loaded guns. They
In view of the revelations made by were asked to show their permit or license to
Rogelio Ramos, a former NPA, the Constantino possess or carry firearms and ammunitions but
house in Marikina Heights was placed under they could not produce any. Hence, they were
military surveillance and on 8/12/88, pursuant brought to PC HQ for investigation.
to a search warrant , a search of the house was At the PC stockade, A was identified as
conducted at 5 PM by CISC-NCD & CSG. In the "Ka Ted," and C as "Ka Totoy" of the CPP by
course of the search were found several their former comrades.
firearms, regular power supply, antennae, On 8/15/88, an info. charging them w/
speaker and subversive documents. viol. of PD 1866 was filed bef. RTC-Pasig. On
When confronted, R. Constantino (RC) 8/24/88, a petition for HC was filed bef. this
could not produce any permit or authority to Court.
possess the firearms, ammunition, radio, etc.
He was brought to CIS HQ for investigation.
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HELD: The petitioner's claim that they were As pointed out by the Sol-Gen, the
unlawfully arrested bec. there was no previous arrest of the petitioners is not a product of a
warrant, is w/o merit. The records show that witch hunt or a fishing expedition, but the result
they were carrying unlicensed firearms and of an in-depth surveillance of NPA safehouses
ammunitions in their person when pointed no less than by former comrades of the
apprehended. petitioners.
There is also no merit in the contention VI
that the info. filed against them are null and
void for want of prel. inv. The filing of an info., Espiritu v. Lim.
w/o a prel. inv., having been first conducted, is
sanctioned by Rule 112, Sec. 7, ROC. Deogracias Espititu is the Gen. Sec. of
Petitioners refused to sign a waiver of PISTON. Petitioner claims that at about 5 AM of
the provisions of Art. 125, RPC. Nor did 11/23/88, while he was sleeping in his home
petitioners ask for prel. inv. after the located at Sta. Mesa, Mla., he was awakened by
informations had been filed against them in his sister who told him that a group of persons
court. wanted to hire his jeepney. When he went
down to talk to them, he was immediately put
IV under arrest. When he asked for the warrant,
the men bodily lifted him and placed him in
Ocaya v. Aguirre. their owner type jeepney. He demanded that
his sister be allowed to accompany him, but the
On 5/12/88, agents of the PC men did not accede to his request.
Intelligence and Investigation Division of Rizal An info. charging him w/ viol. of Art.
PC-INP Command, armed w/ a search warrant, 142, RPC (Inciting to sedition) was filed against
conducted a search of a house located at him.
Marikina Green Heights, believed to be In the afternoon of 11/22/88, during a
occupied by Benito Tiamson, head of the CPP- press-con at the NPC "Deogracias E. through tri-
NPA. In the course of the search, Ocaya media was heard urging all drivers and
arrived in a car driven by Danny Rivera. operators to go on nationwide strike on
Subversive documents and several rounds of 11/23/88 xxx."
ammunitions for a .45 cal. pistol were found in Policemen waited for petitioners outside
Vicky Ocaya's car. They were brought to the PC the NPC in order to investigate him, but he gave
HQ for investigation, when O. could not produce the lawmen his slip. He was next seen at about
any permit or authorization to possess the 5 PM at a gathering of drivers and
ammunition, an info. charging her w/ viol. of PD sympathizers, where he was heard as saying,
1866 was filed w/ RTC-Pasig. Rivera was "Bukas tuloy and welga natin ...
released from custody. hanggang sa magkagulo na."
On 5/17/88, a petition for HC was filed Since the arrest of the petitioner w/o
on behalf of these 2. warrant was in accordance w/ the provisions of
R 113, Sec. 5 (b), ROC, and the petitioner is
HELD: Vicky O. was arrested in flagrante detained by virtue of a valid info. filed w/ the
delicto so that her arrest w/o warrant is competent court, he may not be released on
justified. No. prel. inv. was conducted bec. she HC.
was arrested w/o a warrant and she refused to
waive the provisions of Art. 125 of the RPC, VII
pursuant to R112, Sec. 7, ROC.
Nazareno v. Station Commander.
V
At about 8:30 AM of 12/14/88, one
The petitioners Ocaya, Anonuevo, Romulo Bunye II was killed by a group of men in
Casiple and Roque claim that the firearms, Alabang, Muntinglupa, MM. One of the suspects
ammunitions and subversive documents alleged in the killing was Ramil Regala who was
to have been found in their possession, when arrested by the police on 12/28/88. Upon
arrested, did not belong to them, but were questioning, Regala pointed to Nazareno as one
planted by the military to justify their illegal of his companions in the killing of Bunye II. In
arrest. view thereof, the officers, w/o warrant, picked
The petitioners, however, have not up Nazareno and brought him to the police HQ
introduced any evidence to support their claim. for questioning.
On the other hand, no evil motive or ill will on xxx
the part of the arresting officers that could On 2/1/89, the presiding judge of the
cause the said officers in these cases to accuse RTC-Binan, Laguna, issued a resolution denying
the petitioners falsely, has been shown. the petition for HC, it appearing that said
Narciso Nazareno is in the custody of the
Constitutional Law II

respondents by reason of an info. filed against PETITION SEEKING SEPARATE MOTIONS FOR
him w/ the RTC-Mkti., MM. RECONSIDERATION FROM THE COURT'S
DECISION PROMULGATED ON 9 JULY 1990
HELD: The arrest of Nazareno was effected by
the police w/o warrant pursuant to Sec. 5 (b), R The decision (on July 9, 1990) did not
113, ROC, after he was positively implicated by rule that mere suspicion that one is a CPP or
his co-accused; and after investigation by the NPA is a valid ground for his arrest w/o warrant.
police.
The obligation of an agent of authority We find no merit in the motions for
to make an arrest by reason of a crime, does reconsideration.
not presuppose as a necessary requisite for the
fulfillment thereof, the indubitable existence of Rolando Dural.-- His arrest w/o warrant
a crime. For the detention to be perfectly legal, is justified as it can be said that, w/in the
it is sufficient that the agent or person in contemplation of Sec. 5 (a), R 113, ROC, he was
authority making the arrest has reasonably committing an offense, when arrested, bec.
sufficient grounds to believe the existence of an Dural was arrested for being a member of the
act having the characteristic of a crime and that NPA, an outlawed org., where membership is
the same grounds exist to beleive that the penalized, and for subversion w/c, like rebellion
person sought to be detained participated is, under Garcia v. Padilla, a continuing crime.
therein." (Peo. v. Ancheta.) Dural did not cease to be, or become
less of a subversive, FOR PURPOSES OF
ARREST, simply bec. he was, at the time of
arrest, confined in the St. Agnes Hospital. Dural
was identified as one of several persons who,
VIII the day before his arrest, w/o warrant, had shot
2 CAPCOM policemen in their patrol car. Dural,
In all the petitions here considered, given another opportunity, would have shot or
criminal charges have been filed in the proper would shoot other policemen, anywhere as
courts against the petitioners. The rule is that if agents or representative of an organized govt.
a person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is It is in this sense that subversion and rebellion
in the custody of an officer under process are anchored on an ideological base w/c
issued by a court or judge, and that the court or compels the repetition of the same acts of
judge had jurisdiction to issue the process or lawlessness and violence until the overriding
make the order, or if such person is charged objective of overthrowing organized govt is
before any court, the writ of HC will not be attained.
allowed. (Sec. 4, R 102, ROC.) His arrest was based on "probable
cause."
On the Ilagan Doctrine. Sec. 5, R 113, ROC, requires 2
conditions for a valid arrest w/o warrant: (1)
As the Court sees it, re-examination or the person to be arrested has just committed an
re-appraisal, w/ a view to its abandonment, of offense and (2) the person arresting has
the Ilagan case doctrine is not the answer. The personal knowledge of facts indicating that the
answer and the better practice would be, not to person to be arrested is the one who committed
limit the function of HC to a mere inquiry as to the offense.
w/n the court w/c issued the process, It has been ruled that personal
judgement or order of commitment, or bef. knowledge of facts in arrests w/o warrant
whom the detained person is charged, had must be based upon probable cause, w/c
jurisdiction or not to issue the process, means on actual belief or reasonable grounds
judgment or order or to take cognizance of the of suspicion.
case, but rahter, as the court itself stated in The grounds of suspicion are reasonable
Morales, Jr. v. Enrile, in all petitions for HC, the when, in the absence of actual belief of the
court must inquire into every phase and aspect arresting officers, the suspicion that the person
of petitioner's detention-- "from the moment to be arrested is probably guilty of committing
petitioner was taken into custody up to the the offense, is based on actual facts, i.e.,
moment the court passes upon the merits of supported by circumstances sufficiently strong
the petition;" and "only after such a scrutiny in themselves to create the probable cause of
can the court satisfy itself that the due process guilt of the person to be arrested. A reasonable
clause of our Constitution in fact has been suspicion therefore must be founded on
satisfied." probable cause, coupled w/ good faith on the
part of the peace officers making the arrest.
Said confidential info. received by the
Umil v. Ramos, 202 SCRA 251 arresting officers, to the effect that an NPA was
being treated for a gunshot wound was based
Constitutional Law II

on actual facts and supported by circumstances ammunitions, and/ or subversive documents,


sufficiently to engender a belief that an NPA and they admitted ownership thereof as well as
member was truly in said hospital. The actual their membership in the CPP/ NPA. And then
facts supported by circumstances are: (1) the shortyly after their arrests, they were positively
day bef., or on 1/31/88, 2 CAPCOM soldiers were identified by their former comrades as CPP/ NPA
actually killed in Bagong Bo., Caloocan City by 5 members.
"sparrows" including Dural; (2) a wounded An arrest is in the nature of an
person listed in the hospital records as "Ronnie administrative measure. The power to arrest
Javelon" was actually then being treated in said w/o warrant is w/o limitation as long as the
hospital for for a gunshot wound; (3) "Ronnie requirements of Sec. 5, R 113 are met. This
Javelon" and his address entered in the hospital rule is founded on an overwhelming public
records were fictitious and the wounded man interest in peace and order in our community.
was in reality Dural. "xxx The legality of the detention does
not depend upon the fact of the crime, but xxx
On good faith.-- The peace officers who upon the nature of the deed, wherefrom such
arrested Dural are deemed to have conducted characterization may reasonably be inferred by
the same in good faith, considering that law the officer or functionary to whom the law at
enforcers are presumed to regularly perform the moment leaves the decision for the urgent
their official duties. purpose of suspending the liberty of the
A few days after Dural's arrest, an info. citizen." (US v. Sanchez.)
charging him w/ Double murder w/ assault
against agents of persons in authority was filed ESPIRITU was arrested w/o warrant, not
in RTC-Caloocan City. He was placed under for subversive or any "continuing offense," but
judicial custody. On 8/31/88, he was convicted for uttering the words "Bukas tuloy ang welga
and sentenced to reclusion perpetua. natin xxx hanggang sa magkagulo na" w/c in
the perception of the arresting officers, was
As to A. Roque., W. Buenaobra, D. inciting to sedition.
Anonuevo, R.. Casiple & V. Ocaya, their arrests,
w/o warrant, are also justified. They were Many persons differ as to the validity of
searched pursuant to a warrant issued by a such perception and regard the language as
court of law and were found w/ unlicensed falling w/in free speech guaranteed by the
firearms, explosives and/ or ammunitions on Consti. But, the authority of the peace officers
their persons. They were, therefore, caught in to make the arrest, w/o warrant, at the time the
flagrante delicto w/c justified their outright words were uttered, or soon thereafter, is still
arrest w/o warrant under Sec. 5 (a), R113, ROC. another thing. In the balancing of authority and
A few days after their arrests, informations were freedom, w/o obviously becomes difficult at
filed in court against said petitioners placing times, the court, has in this case, tilted the
them w/in judicial custody and disposition. scale in favor of authority but only for purposes
Buenaobra's petition is moot bec. he had of the arrest (not conviction.)
chosen to remain in detention.
The reason which compelled the military Supervening events made this case
agents to make the arrests w/o warrant was the moot and academic. for E. had bef.
info. given to the military that 2 safehouses arraignment asked the court a quo for re-
(one occupied by RC and the other by Benito investigation, the peace officers did not
Tiamson) were being used by the CPP/ NPA for appear. Case against E. has been provisionally
their operations, w/ info. as to their exact dismissed and his bail cancelled.
location and the names of RC and BT as
residents and occupants thereof. NAZARENO'S ARREST.-- Although the
And at the time of the actual arrests, killing of Bunye II occured on 12/14/88, while
the following circumstances surrounded said Nazareno's arrest w/o warrant was made only
arrests (of Roque, Buenaobra, Anonuevo and on 12/28/88 or 14 days later, teh arrest falls
Casiple), w/c confirmed the belief of the military under Sec. 5 (b), R113, since it was only on
that the info. they had received was true and 12/28/88 that the police authorities came to
the persons to be arrested were probably guilty know that Nazareno was probably one of those
of the commission of certain crimes: first, the guilty in the killing of Bunye II and the arrest
search warrant was duly issued to effect the had to be made promptly, even w/o a warrant
search of the Constantino safehouse; second, (after the police were alerted) and despite the
found in the safehouse was a person named RC, lapse of 14 days to prevent possible flight.
who admitted that he was a ranking member of Nazareno has since been convicted by
the CPP, and found in his possession were the court a quo for murder and sentenced to
unlicensed firearms and communist equipment; reclusion perpetua.
third, at the time of their arrests, in their
possession were unlicensed firearms, ADMISSIBLITY OF EXTRA-JUDICIAL ADMISSION.
Constitutional Law II

have performed their official duties in a regular


These admissions strengthen the Court's manner. Their task of apprehending persons
perception that truly the grounds upon w/c the engaged in the deadly drug trade is difficult
arresting officers based their arrests w/o enough without legal and procedural
warrant, are supported by probable cause, i.e., technicalities to make it doubly so.
that the persons arrested were probably guilty
of the commission of certain offenses, in
compliance w/ Sec. 5, R 113, ROC. To note 11. Immunity from arrest of
these admissions, on the other hand, is not to members of Congress
rule that the persons arrested are already guilty
of the offenses upon w/c their warrantless Art. VI, Sec. 11. A Senator or
arrests were predicated. The task of Member of the House shall, in all offenses
determining the guilt or innocence of persons punishable by not more than six (6) years
arrested w/o warrant is not proper in a petition imprisonment (prision correcional), be
for HC. It pertains to the trial of the case on the privileged from arrest while Congress is in
merits. session. xxx

(2) Illegal Possession of guns or drugs B. Rights of Persons under


custodial interrogation

People v. Linsangan, 195 SCRA 784 Art. III, Sec. 12. (1) Any person
under custodial investigation for the
F: Accused Linsangan was arrested after a commission of an offense, shall have the
“buy-bust” operation. The two marked ten-peso right to be informed of his right to remain
bill were retrieved from him. He was asked to silent and to have competent and
sign his name on the two marked bills. The ten independent counsel preferably of his own
handrolled cigarette sticks confiscated from the choice. If the person cannot afford the
accused were submitted for examination. After services of counsel, he must be provided
finding these positive for marijuana, a case was with one. These rights cannot be waived
filed for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Law. except in writing and in the presence of
Linsangan denied the charge. The trial court counsel.
found Linsangan guilty. Upon appeal, one of (2) No torture, force, violence,
the assertions of Linsangan was that the trial threat, intimidation, or any other means
court erred in not holding that when the which vitiate the free will shall be used
policemen required him to initial the marked against him. Secret detention places,
bills, they violated his constitutional right to solitary, incommunicado, or other similar
counsel, to remain silent, and not to incriminate forms of detention are prohibited.
himself while under custodial investigation. (3) Any confession or admission
obtained in violation of this or sec. 17
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THERE WAS A hereof, shall be inadmissible in evidence
VIOLATION OF THE ACCUSED’S against him.
(4) The law shall provide for penal
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS WHEN HE WAS MADE
and civil sanctions for violations of this
TO SIGN THE MARKED BILLS.
section, as well as compensation to and
rehabilitation of victims of torture or
HELD: Although the accused was not assisted
similar practices, and their families.
by counsel when he initialed the P10-bills that
the police found tucked in his waist, his right
against self-incrimination was not violated for Source: Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
his possession of the marked bills did not (1966)
constitute a crime; the subject of the
prosecution was his act of selling marijuana According to Chief Justice Warren, when
cigarettes. His conviction was not based on the a defendant is thrust into an unfamiliar
presence of his initials on the marked bills, but atmosphere and run through menacing police
on the fact that the trial court believed the interrogation procedures, where compulsion is
testimony of the policemen that they arrested forcefully potential and his will is likely to be
him while he was actually engaged in the subjugated, the officers must undertake to
selling marijuana cigarettes to a member of the afford proper safeguards by the reading of the
arresting party. The trial court gave more "Miranda rights" at the outset of the
credence to their categorical declarations than investigation to ensure that the statements
to the appellant’s denials. That is as it should made are truly the product of free choice.
be for as law enforcers, they are presumed to
Constitutional Law II

Any person under custodial or police rule is not yet applicable; otherwise, people who
investigation has the right to be informed of the could otherwise explain their innocence would
following rights: be arrested.

1. Right to remain silent 2) "Custodial investigation" - when the


investigation now focuses on the guilt of a
a) To make him aware of it. person such that he is no longer allowed to
b) To overcome the inherent pressure leave the premise. It is at this stage that the
of the interrogating atmosphere Miranda ruling is necessary, since the purpose
c) To show the individual that his of the interrogation is to evince evidence that
interrogators are prepared to recognize his can be used to prosecute the person.
privilege should he choose to invoke his right.
For instance, when A, a policeman, sees
2. Right to be reminded that if he waives his X running with a stained knife away from an
right to remain silent, anything he says can and apparently dead man, he can rung after X and
will be used against him. having grabbed him, ask him for an explanation
as to what he saw without reading his Miranda
a) To warn him of the consequences of rights. But once A arrests X and starts
waiving his right to remain silent. interrogating him in the police precinct, then his
b) To make him aware that this is an rights must now be read, for there can only be
adversary system, and that the police are not one purpose to the questioning, and that is to
acting in his interest. elicit evidence to be used to prosecute him.

3. Right to counsel before and during the Mendoza, The Right to Counsel During Custodial
interrogation Investigations, 2 Law Rev. No. 10, 2 (1988); 61
Phil. LJ 409
a) To mitigate the dangers of
untrustworthiness in his testimony, since the I. RIGHT TO COUNSEL WAS DEVELOPED AS
inherent pressures initially overcome by the PART OF PROTECTION AGAINST INVOLUNTARY
right to remain silent may again run unless CONFESSIONS.
coupled with the right to counsel.
b) To lessen the possibility of coercion Since the introduction of the American
by the police. accusatorial system of criminal procedure in the
Phils., the rule has been that involuntary
4. Right to be reminded that if he cannot afford confessions are inadmissible in evidence
counsel, then one will be provided for him by against the accused.
the state. The question is on whom the burden of
proof is placed. The early rule placed the
a) To inform him that if he does not burden of proving that the confession was
have counsel or cannot afford one, he does not voluntary and, therefore, admissible in
have to defend himself alone. evidence, on the prosecution. (Sec. 4, Act No.
b) To inform him that his poverty is no 619.) It was held that a confession not shown
reason why he should lose his right to counsel. to have been voluntarily given could be
objected to at any stage of the proceedings,
(The reading of these rights is no less even for the first time on appeal in the SC.
indispensable even if the person arrested is a Act No. 619 was later repealed by the
prominent Constitutional lawyer. Although he Admin. code of 1916, w/c placed the burden of
may already know these rights, the purpose is proof on the accused to show that his
not so much to inform him, as to assure him confession was involuntary. Under the new
that his interrogators are willing to respect his rule, it was sufficient that the confession was
rights amidst the pressure of custodial given under conditions w/c accredit prima facie
investigation.) its admissibility.
In 1953, a further change took place
The reading of these rights is required when the SC held in Peo. v. de los Santos that
during "custodial investigation". "A confession, to be repudiated, must not only
be proved to have been obtained by force and
A police investigation consists of 2 stages: violence, but also that it is false or untrue, for
the law rejects the confession when, by force or
1) "General exploratory investigation" - violence or intimidation, the accused is
when the investigation consists merely of compelled against his will to tell a falsehood,
general questions to find out who might be the not even when such force and violence he is
culprit, but without being directed at anyone's compelled to tell the truth. In the later case of
guilt in particular. At this stage, the Miranda Peo. v. Villanueva, the Court stated "the
Constitutional Law II

admissibility of that kind of evidence depends to incriminate himself, to overcome the


not on the supposed illegal manner in w/c it is inherent pressures of the interrogation
obtained but on the truth or falsity of the facts atmosphere, and to assure the individual that
or admission contained therein. his interrogators are prepared to recognize his
The illegality of the means used in privilege, should he choose to exercise it.
obtaining evidence does not affect its 2. The person in custody must be
admissibility (Moncado v. People's Court.) warned that anything he will say can and wilol
be used against him. This warning is intended
THE EFFECT OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE IN to make him aware not only of the privilege but
SEARCH AND SEIZURE CASES also of the consequences of foregoing it.
3. Since the circumstances surrounding
The adoption in 1967 of the in-custody interrogation can operate very
exclusionary rule in search and seizure cases quickly to overbear the will of one merely made
(Stonehill v. Diokno) worked a parallel in the law aware of his privilege by his interrogators, it is
of confession. W/o expressly overruling its indispensable that he has the assistance of
decision in de los Santos and Villanueva, the counsel.
Court, in Peo. v. Urro, went back to the former
rule that involuntary or coerced confessions,
regardless of their truth, are null and void. xxx THE CUSTODIAL PHASE OF INTERROGATION
Involuntary or coerced confessions obtained by
law, w/c proscribes the use of such cruel and At what stage of the police interrogation
inhuman methods to secure confessions. xxx must the warnings be given? The Consti. does
Indeed, in the US, it is said that an not state at what stage of the interrogation
"unconstitutional coercion will render process they must be made. but in Miranda,
inadmissible even the most unquestionably true the court specified that it is only at the custodial
inculpatory statements." xxx This is not bec. phase of the interrogation that its ruling
such confessions are unlikely to be true but bec. applied. As the Court indicated in Escobedo v.
the methods used to extract them offend an Illinois, it is only after the investigation ceases
underlying principle in the enforcement of our to be a general inquiry into an unsolved crime
criminal law: that ours is an accusatorial and and begins to focus on a particular suspect, the
not an inquisitorial system -- a system in w/c suspect is taken into custody, and the police
the State must establish guilt by evidence carries out a process of interrogation that leads
independently and freely secured and not by itself to eliciting incriminating statements that
coercion prove its charge against an accused the rule begins to operate.
out of his own mouth xxx." (Rogers v.
Richmond, J. Frankfurter.) In Gamboa v. Cruz, the accused was
arrested, w/o a warrant, for vagrancy. He was
THE MIRANDA RULE taken to police precint no. 2 in Mla. The next
day, he was included in a police line-up of 5
The prosecution may not use detainees and was pointed to by the
statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, complainant as a complanion of the main
stemming from custodial interrogation of the suspect on the basis of w/c the accused was
def. unless it demonstrates the use of ordered to stay and sit in front of the
procedural safeguards effective to secure the complainant, while the latter was interrogated.
privilege against self-incrimination. By The accused was then charged w/ robbery. The
custodial interrogation, we mean questioning accused moved to dismiss the case against him
initiated by law enforcement officers after a on the ground that he had been denied the
person has been taken to custody or otherwise assistance of counsel during the line-up. His
deprived of his freedom of action in any motion was denied. Hence, this petition for
significant way. xxx certiorari.

II. IN TURN, MIRANDA WARNINGS WERE HELD: The right to counsel attaches only upon
DEVISED AS MEANS OF SECURING THE RIGHT the start of an interrogation, when the police
TO COUNSEL. officer starts to ask questions designed to elicit
info. and/ or confessions or admissions from the
Miranda v. Arizona requires certain accused. As the police line-up in this case was
warnings to be given by police interrogators not part of the custodial inquest, the petitioner
bef. a person in custody may be interrogated, was not entitled to counsel xxx.
w/c have been adopted by the Phil. SC:
1. The person in custody must be
informed in clear and unequivocal terms that he III. WAIVER OF RIGHTS.
has a right to remain silent. The purpose is to
apprise him of his privilege not to be compelled
Constitutional Law II

It is important to distinguish bet. the


waiver of rights and the waiver of warnings. The phrase "for any purpose in any
The first can be made provided that the waiver proceeding" conveys the idea that the rule
is "voluntary, knowing and intelligent" but the excluding evidence illegally obtained is
second cannot. As the warnings are the means absolute. No similar phraseology is used in the
of insuring that the suspect is apprised of his exclusionary rule implementing the Miranda
rights so that any subsequent waiver of his rule. Does this mean there can be instances,
rights can be "voluntary, knowing and where uncounselled statements may
intelligent," it is obvious that there can be no nevertheless be admissible in evidence, albeit,
valid waiver of the warnings. A waiver of rights for a limited purpose?
will not be presumed.
In Harris v. US, it was held that although
1. With respect to confessions obtained a confession obtained w/o complying w/ the
bef. Jan. 17, 1973, the rule that the suspect Miranda rule was inadmissible for the purpose
must be warned that he has a right to remain of establishing in chief the confessor's guilt, it
silent and to have the assistance of counsel may nevertheless be presented in evidence to
does not apply. such confessions, even though impeach his credit. Petitioner, as a def., in a
presented in evidence in a trial after the prosecution for selling heroin, claimed that what
effectivity of the 1973 Consti., are admissible, he had sold to a police officer was baking
provided they are voluntary, using the powder, as part of the scheme to defraud the
traditional test of voluntariness. purchaser xxx The shield provided by Miranda
cannot be perverted into a license to use
2. With respect to confessions obtained perjury by way of a defense, free from the risk
after Jan. 17, 1973, but before March 20, 1985, of confrontation w/ prior inconsistent utterance
when the decision of Peo. v. Galit was handed
down, the rule is that the voluntariness of a In New York v. Quarles, the SC created a
waiver of the rights to silence and to counsel "public safety" exception to the Miranda rule.
must be determined on a case-to-case basis, xxx. "There is public safety exception to the
taking into account the circumstances under requirement that Miranda warnings be given
w/c the waiver was made. before a suspect's answers may be admitted in
evidence." It held that the warnings were not
3. With regard to confessions obtained themselves Constitutional rights but merely
after March 20, 1985 but before Feb. 2, 1987, "prophylactic" measures to insure the right
when the present Consti. took effect, the rule is against self-incrimination. The Court noted the
that a waiver of the rights to remain silent and cost imposed on the public by the rule, namely,
to the assistance of counsel, to be valid, must that the giving of warnings might deter
be made w/ the assistance of counsel. suspects from answering questions and this
might lead in turn to fewer convictions. It then
4. With regard to confessions given ruled that the social cost is higher when the
after Feb. 2, 1987, the present Consti. requires giving of warnings might deter suspects from
that the waiver to be valid, must be in writing answering questions than are necessary to
and w/ the assistance of counsel. avert an immediate threat to public safety.
When answers are not actually coerced, this
IX. THE EXLUSIONARY RULE. social cost outweights the need for Miranda
safeguards. In such exigent circumstances,
Any confession or admission obtained in police officers must not be made to choose bet.
violation of this or Sec. 17 hereof shall be giving the warnings at the risk that public safety
inadmissible in evidence against him, the will be endangered and withholding the
Consti. says. No distinction is made bet. warnings at the risk that probative evidence will
confession or admission. Although the previous be excluded.
Consti. spoke of confessions only, I have argued
that it was not so limited but that it also
embraced uncounselled statements. For "if a People v. Bolanos, 211 SCRA 262
statement made wore in fact exculpatory, it
could ... never be used by the prosecution, in F: Bolanos was convicted for Murder. The
fact, statements merely intended to be victim, Pagdalian was found dead, sustaining
exculpatory by the defendant are often used to stab wounds. When the policemen inquired
impeach his testimony at trial or to about the circumstances of the incident, they
demonstrate untruths in the statement given were informed that the deceased was with two
under interrogation and thus to prove guilt by companions, on the previous night. The accused
implication." was apprehended. In the vehicle where the
accused boarded, on his way to the Police
EXCEPTIONS TO THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
Constitutional Law II

Station, Bolanos allegedly admitted that he used against the accused. Certainly,
killed Pagdalian because he was abusive. these are blatant violations of of Sec. 12,
Art III of the 1987 Constitution which
ISSUE: Whether or not the admission in the protects the rights of the accused during
jeep was admissible in evidence. custodial investigation. Suzette.

HELD: The trial court, in admitting the extra- 1. Miranda rule not applicable to
judicial confession of the accused in evidence, confessions executed before January 17,
violated his Constitutional right to be informed, 1973
to remain silent and to have a counsel of his
choice, while already in police custody. Since
the extra-judicial confession was the only basis 2. Not applicable to res gestae statements
for the conviction of the accused, the trial
coust’s judgment was reversed. Bam. People v. Dy, 158 SCRA 111 (1988)
Res gestae (a Latin phrase meaning "things
done") is an exception to the rule against
People v. Bandula, 232 SCRA 566 Hearsay evidence. Res gestae is based on the
belief that because certain statements are
F: After he and his wife were made naturally, spontaneously and without
individually hogtied and their house deliberation during the course of an event, they
ransacked, Atty. Garay was found dead leave little room for
with 3 gunshot wounds . For his death misunderstanding/misinterpretation upon
and the loss of their things on the hearing by someone else( i.e. by the witness
occasion thereof, Bandula, Sidigo, who will later repeat the statement to the court)
Dionanao, and Ejan were charged in court and thus the courts believe that such
for robbery with homicide. On the basis of statements carry a high degree of credibility.
the extrajudicial confessions (EJC) Evidence which can be admitted into evidence
allegedly made by Bandula and Dionanao as Res gestae fall into three headings:
during their custodial investigation which
the court found to "have all the qualities Words or phrases which either form part of, or
and have complied with all the explain a physical act,
requirements of an admissible confession, Exclamations which are so spontaneous as to
it appearing from the confession that belie concoction, and
acussed were informed of their rights Statements which are evidence as to someone's
under the law regarding custodial state of mind.
investigation and were duly represented
by Counsel (Atty. Zerna)", it disregarded 3. Not applicable to statements given in
the defenses interposed by the accused administrative investigations
and convicted Bandula. The 3 other
accused were acquitted for "insufficiency People v. Ayson, 175 SCRA 216 (1989)
of evidence".
It should at once be apparent that
Issue: W/N the extrajudicial confession there are two (2) rights, or sets of rights,
of Bandula conformed with the dealt with in the section, namely:
constitutional requisites for its validity,
hence admissible in evidence. 1) the right against self-incrimination
i.e., the right of a person not to be compelled to
HELD: NO be a witness against himself set out in the first
From the records, it can be sentence, which is a verbatim reproduction of
gleaned that when accused Bandula and Section 18, Article III of the 1935 Constitution,
Dionanao were investigated immediately and is similar to that accorded by the Fifth
after their arrest, they had no counsel Amendment of the American Constitution, and
present. If at all, counsel came in only a 2) the right of a person in custodial
day after the custodial investigation with interrogation, i.e., the rights of every suspect
respect to Dionanao, and 2 weeks later "under investigation for the commission of an
with respect to Bandula. And counsel who offense."
supposedly assisted both accused was
Atty. Zerna, the Municipal Attorney of Parenthetically, the 1987 Constitution
Tanjay, whose interest is admittedly indicates much more clearly the individuality
adverse to the accused and who is not an and disparateness of these rights. It has placed
independent counsel. On top of this, the rights in separate sections. The right
there are telltale signs that violence was against self- incrimination, "No person shall be
compelled to be a witness against himself," is
Constitutional Law II

now embodied in Section 17, Article III of the 1) he shall have the right to remain
1987 Constitution. The rights of a person in silent and to counsel, and to be informed of
custodial interrogation, which have been made such right,
more explicit, are now contained in Section 12 2) no force, violence, threat,
of the same Article III. intimidation, or any other means which vitiates
the free will shall be used against him; and
Right Against Self-Incrimination 3) any confession obtained in violation
of these rights shall be inadmissible in
The first right, against self-incrimination, evidence.
mentioned in Section 20, Article IV of the 1973
Constitution, is accorded to every person who Miranda rights
gives evidence, whether voluntarily or under
compulsion of subpoena, in any civil, criminal, He must be warned prior to any
or administrative proceeding. The right is NOT questioning that he has the right to remain
to "be compelled to be a witness against silent, that anything he says can be used
himself." It prescribes an "option of refusal to against him in a court of law, that he has the
answer incriminating questions and not a right to the presence of an attorney, and that if
prohibition of inquiry." It simply secures to a he cannot afford an attorney one will be
witness, whether he be a party or not, the right appointed for him prior to any questioning if he
to refuse to answer any particular incriminatory so desires. Opportunity to exercise those rights
question, i.e., one the answer to which has a must be afforded to him throughout the
tendency to incriminate him for some crime. interrogation. After such warnings have been
However, the right can be claimed only when given, such opportunity afforded him, the
the specific question, incriminatory in character, individual may knowingly and intelligently
is actually put to the witness. It cannot be waive these rights and agree to answer or make
claimed at any other time. It does not give a a statement. But unless and until such warnings
witness the right to disregard a subpoena, to and waiver are demonstrated by the
decline to appear before the court at the time prosecution at the trial, no evidence obtained
appointed. as a result of interrogation can be used against
him.
The right against self-incrimination is
not self-executing or automatically operational. The objective is to prohibit
It must be claimed. It follows that the right may "incommunicado interrogation of individuals in
be waived, expressly, or impliedly, as by a a police-dominated atmosphere, resulting in
failure to claim it at the appropriate time. self- incriminating statement without full
warnings of constitutional rights."
Rights in Custodial Interrogation
The rights above specified, to repeat,
Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 exist only in "custodial interrogations," or "in-
Constitution also treats of a second right, or custody interrogation of accused persons."
better said, group of rights. These rights apply And, as this Court has already stated, by
to persons "under investigation for the custodial interrogation is meant "questioning
commission of an offense," i.e., "suspects" initiated by law enforcement officers after a
under investigation by police authorities; and person has been taken into custody or
this is what makes these rights different from otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in
that embodied in the first sentence, that any significant way."
against self-incrimination which, as aforestated,
indiscriminately applies to any person testifying Rights of Defendant in Criminal Case As
in any proceeding, civil, criminal, or Regards Giving of Testimony
administrative.
In fine, a person suspected of having
This provision granting explicit rights to committed a crime and subsequently charged
persons under investigation for an offense was with its commission in court, has the following
not in the 1935 Constitution. It is avowedly rights in the matter of his testifying or
derived from the decision of the U.S. Supreme producing evidence, to wit:
Court in Miranda v. Arizona, a decision
described as an "earthquake in the world of law 1) BEFORE THE CASE IS FILED IN
enforcement." COURT (or with the public prosecutor, for
preliminary investigation), but after having
Section 20 states that whenever any been taken into custody or otherwise deprived
person is "under investigation for the of his liberty in some significant way, and on
commission of an offense"-- being interrogated by the police: the continuing
right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be
Constitutional Law II

informed thereof, not to be subjected to force, describing the latter as a "mestizo." Two days
violence, threat, intimidation or any other later, Ongue was invited by the police to
means which vitiates the free will; and to have identify the suspect in a police line- up. Hatton
evidence obtained in violation of these rights was pointed by Ongue as the assailant. Hatton
rejected; and alleges that at the time that he was made to
stand in the police line-up, he was not assisted
2) AFTER THE CASE IS FILED IN by counsel. Hence, his identification therein by
COURT Ongue is inadmissble.

a) to refuse to be a witness; RULING: When the suspect was brought to the


b) not to have any prejudice police station for indentification, technically, he
whatsoever result to him by such was not yet under custodial investigation. Thus,
refusal; the right to counsel does not yet apply.
c) to testify in his own behalf, However, there is every reason to doubt
subject to cross-examination by the the regularity of the identification of the suspect
prosecution; by the witness. During the proceedings in the
d) WHILE TESTIFYING, to refuse police station, Ongue identified Hatton not
to answer a specific question which because he was certain that Hatton was really
tends to incriminate him for some crime the assailant but because he was the only
other than that for which he is then mestizo in the station and because he was
prosecuted. pointed by the police as the suspect. This
cannot be considered as positive identification
It is clear from the undisputed facts of of the accused by the witness.
this case that Felipe Ramos was not in any
sense under custodial interrogation, as the term 5. Tests of Validity of Waiver of Miranda
should be properly understood, prior to and Rights
during the administrative inquiry into the
discovered irregularities in ticket sales in which
he appeared to have had a hand. The No valid waiver.
constitutional rights of a person under custodial
interrogation under Section 20, Article IV of the People v. Caguioa 95 SCRA 2 (1980)
1973 Constitution did not therefore come into
play, were of no relevance to the inquiry. Right to counsel may be waived provided the
waiver is voluntary, knowing and intelligent
4. Custodial Phase of Investigation
F: Respondent Paquito Yupo was accused
Police Lineups of murder in the CFI of Bulacan. The prosecution
presented Corporal Conrado Roca of the
Gamboa v. Cruz June 27, 1988 Meycauayan Police who identified a statement
of the accused during a police interrogation and
Police line-up not part of custodial inquest his alleged waiver of the right to remain silent
and to counsel. When Roca was questioned on
F: Petitioner was arrested for vagrancy in the incriminating answers in the statement, the
Manila. The following day, he was included in a defense objected, contending that Yupo's
police line-up and was identified as one of the statement was given without the assistance of
suspects in a robbery case. He was later counsel. Respondent Judge sustained the
charged with robbery and charged. He moved objection on the ground that the right to
to dismiss the case on the ground that the counsel cannot be waived.
conduct of the line-up, without the assistance of
counsel, was unconstitutional. HELD: The right to counsel during custodial
interrogation may be waived provided the
HELD: The police line-up was not part of the waiver is made intelligently and voluntarily,
custodial inquest, hence, petitioner was not yet with full understanding of its consequences. In
entitled, at such stage, to counsel. VV. this case, the statement made only a
perfunctory opening question, after informing
the suspect that he was under investigation,
US v. Wade, 388 US 218 (1967) that he had a right to counsel and that anything
he said could be used for or against him and
People v. Hatton, 210 SCRA 1 after asking whether he was willing to answer
questions and he answered "yes." The
F: Algrame was stabbed at the back while statement was in Tagalog which the defendant,
walking with several companions including a native of Samar, had not been shown to be
Ongue who vaguely recognized the assailant, fully acquainted with. The date of execution of
Constitutional Law II

the statement before the municipal court was


not indicated. The separate statement signed HELD: It is doubtful, given the tenor of the
by the defendant stating he was made to read question whether there was a definite waiver by
the opening statement containing the Miranda the suspect of his right to counsel. His answer
warnings and that they were explained to him was categorical enough, to be sure, but the
all the more engenders doubt as to whether the question itself was not since it spoke of a waiver
defendant was properly informed of his right. only "for the moment." As worded, the question
suggested a tentativeness that belied the
People v. Tampus 96 SCRA 624 (1980) suspect's supposed permanent foregoing of his
right to counsel, if indeed there was any waiver
Public trial; waiver of right to counsel at all. Moreover, he was told that he could hire
a lawyer but not that one could be provided for
F: Jose Tampus and Rodolfo Avila were him for free. VV.
prisoners at the National Penitentiary in
Muntinlupa, Rizal. On June 14, 1976, they Since Royo's conviction for murder was
attacked and killed Celso Saminado, another based on a written confession showing that he
prisoner. Afterwards, they surrendered to the was apprised of his right not only by the police
prison guard, saying "surrender po kami. but also by the fiscal, but that he waived these
Gumanti lang po kami." Two days later, they rights, then the waiver found to be voluntary,
gave extrajudicial confessions admitting the knowing and intelligent and thus admissible.
killing. They were accused of murder and
pleaded guilty. They took the witness stand and
affirmed their confessions. Tampus was b. The Galit Rule (March 20, 1985 to Feb.
sentenced to death while Avila to reclusion 2, 1987)
temporal. Trial took place at the Penitentiary.
On review, it was contended that Tampus was It is not enough that the confession is
denied the right to a public trial and to counsel. voluntary, knowing and intelligent. The waiver
must be made in the presence of counsel.
HELD: The record does not show that the public Waiver of the right to counsel must be made
was actually excluded from the place where the with the assistance of counsel. This rule applied
trial was held or that the accused was from March 20, 1985 to February 2, 1987.
prejudiced by the holding of the trial there.
Anyway, the right to public trial may be waived. In People v. Galit, 135 SCRA 485 (1985),
In another case where Avila was also a the SC, reiterating a dictum in Morales v. Enrile,
defendant, the SC directed that, for security 121 SCRA 538 (1983), ruled that no custodial
reasons, Avila's trial be held in the National investigation should be conducted unless it be
Penitentiary. The accused was warned in in the presence of counsel, and that although
Tagalog that he had a right to remain silent and the right to counsel may be waived, the waiver
to counsel but despite this, he was willing to should not be valid unless made with the
answer questions of the police. There is no assistance of counsel.
doubt that the confession was voluntarily made.
The truth is that shortly after the killing, In the Galit case, however, the adoption
Tampus and Avila admitted their guilt. That of the Morales obiter was also an obiter. The
spontaneous statement, elicited without confession in this case was traditionally
interrogation, was part of the res gestae and at involuntary, and so the SC did not need the
the same time was a voluntary confession of Morales obiter in order to disallow the
guilt. By means of that statement given freely confession.
on the spur of the moment without any urging
or suggestion, the two waived their right to Under the facts of the case, the accused
remain silent and to counsel. Galit was convicted of robbery with homicide on
the basis of his confession, which was obtained
People v. Poyos 143 SCRA 543 (1986) through torture. The NBI investigators covered
Galit's face with a rag and then pushed it into a
No valid waiver of right to counsel and to toilet bowl full of human waste. It was only
silence after they had broken his will that he signed the
confession and posed for pictures for re-
F: Poyos was convicted of the murder of a enactment as directed by the investigators.
77-year-old woman and sentence to death. His
conviction was based solely on his extrajudicial
confession which he disowned in court. The People v. Galit 135 SCRA 465 (1985)
confession was given to the police and
subscribed before the clerk of court and F: Defendant was convicted of robbery
contains a waiver. with homicide by the Circuit Criminal Court. The
Constitutional Law II

principal prosecution witness testified that he F: Jocelyn de Asis was accused of


heard the defendant and his wife, who was the subversion. At the trial, the Fiscal offered as
mother of the witness' wife, quarrelling the evidence an extrajudicial confession given by
morning after the crime. He said the defendant her in the hospital. In that confession, she
wanted to leave their house because he and his admitted, through a leading question that she
companions had robbed "Aling Nene." The was a member of the NPA. The trial court
prosecution also presented the extrajudicial excluded the confession on the ground that the
confession of the defendant. waiver of Miranda rights was made without the
assistance of counsel. The prosecution contends
HELD: The confession of the defendant is that the ruling in Morales v. Ponce Enrile that
inadmissible because it was obtained through the right to counsel may be waived only with
torture. The NBI investigators covered the the assistance of counsel, was only a dictum.
defendant's face with a rag and then pushed in
into a toilet bowl full of human waste. It was HELD: In the case of People v. Galit, which was
only after they had broken his will that the decided en banc and concurred in by all Justices
defendant signed the confession and posed for except one who took no part, the SC put to rest
pictures for reenactment as directed by the all doubts regarding the ruling in Morales v.
investigators. The defendant is from Samar and Ponce Enrile and Moncupa v. Enrile.
there is no showing that he understood Tagalog.
It was two weeks after he executed the
salaysay that his relatives were permitted to
visit him. His statement does not contain any People v. Lim, 196 SCRA 809 (1991)
waiver or right to counsel and yet during the
investigation he was not assisted by one. These In People v. Nabaluna, 142 SCRA 446
constitute gross violations of his right. The SC (1986), Nabaluna et. al. were convicted of
cited the case of Morales v. Ponce Enrile where robbery with homicide on the basis, among
it laid the procedure in custodial investigations: others, of extrajudicial confessions taken in
No custodial investigation shall be conducted 1977. The confessions and the special counsel
unless it be in the precense of counsel engaged before whom the confessions were signed prove
by the person arrested, or by any person on his that the Miranda warnings were given, but
behalf, or appointed by the court upon petition these were not made in the presence of
either of the detainee himself or of anyone on counsel. The SC, in allowing the confession,
his behalf. The right to counsel may be waived ruled that the GAlit ruling could not have a
but the waiver shall not be valid unless made retroactive effect, especially since in this case
with the assistance of counsel. Any statement the trial court decision was already rendered
obtained in violation of this, whether before the SC pronouncement.
exculpatory or inculpatory, in whole or in part,
shall be inadmissible in evidence.

People v. Lasac 148 SCRA 624 (1987)


Whatever doubt as to the validity of the
Galit rule, however, was laid to rest by the SC in F: Appellant was convicted of parricide on
People v. Sison, 142 SCRA 219 (1986). The the basis of a confession and circumstantial
Court held that in People v. Galit, which was evidence which the trial court found substantial
decided en banc and concurred in by all the to establish guilt.
Justices except one who took no part, the Court
was out to rest all doubts regarding the ruling in HELD: The waiver by the appellant of his right
Morales v. Enrile, and embraced its ruling. to counsel was made without the assistance of
a counsel. The SC has held in Morales v. Ponce
In this case, the prosecution sought to Enrile, People v. Galit and People v. Sison
prove its charge of subversion against Asis by (1986) that this requirement is mandatory. Any
means of her confession given in the hospital, in statement obtained in violation of this
which she admitted through a leading question, procedure shall be inadmissible in evidence.
that she was a member of the NPA and that she VV.
was wounded in the encounter. The SC upheld
the trial court's decision excluding the c. New rule on waiver (Feb. 2, 1987)
confession on the ground that the waiver of the
Miranda rights was made without the assistance Art. III, Sec. 12 (1): Waiver must be in writing
of counsel. and made in the presence of counsel

Art. III, Sec. 12. (1) Any person


People v. Sison 142 SCRA 219 (1986) under investigation for the commission of
an offense shall have the right to be
Constitutional Law II

informed of his right to remain silent and


to have competent and independent HELD: The stereotyped "advice" of the Miranda
counsel preferably of his choice. If the rights appearing in practically all extrajudicial
person cannot afford the services of confessions which are later repudiated assumed
counsel, he must be provided with one. the nature of a legal form or model. Its tired,
These rights cannot be waived except in punctilious, fixed and artificial style does not
writing and in the presence of counsel. create an impression of voluntariness or even
understanding on the part of the accused. The
showing of a spontaneous, free and
Under the new Constitution, any waiver unconstrained giving up of a right is missing.
must now be made (1) in writing, and (2) in the Whenever a protection given by the
presence of counsel. Constitution is waived by the person entitled to
that protection, the presumption is always
6. The burden of proving voluntariness of against the waiver. Consequently, the
waivers is on the prosecution prosecution must prove with strong, convincing
evidence that indeed the accused willingly and
The burden to prove that there was a voluntarily submitted his confession and
valid waiver of the Miranda warning devolves knowingly and deliberately manifested that he
upon the one seeking to present the confession, was not interested in having a lawyer assist him
that is, on the prosecution. This rule applies during the taking of that confession. That proof
whether in the pre-Galit, Galit, or 1987 rule. is missing in this case.

In People v. Jara, 144 SCRA 516 (1986), 7. What may be waived: The right to
the SC noted that the stereotype "advice" remain silent and to counsel, but not the
appearing in practically all extrajudicial right to be given "Miranda warnings"
confessions which are later repudiated has
assumed the nature of a legal form. The right to remain silent and to
Investigators automatically type it together with counsel, which are the effectuations of the
"opo" as the answer, or ask the accused to sign Miranda rights, can be waived.
it or even copy it in their handwriting. Its tired
punctilious, fixed and artificially stately style What cannot be waived are:
does not create an impression of voluntariness
or even understanding on the part of the 1. The right to be given the Miranda
accused. warnings. (For how can one waive what one
does not know?)
Whenever a Constitutional protection is
waived by one entitled to that protection, the 2. The right to counsel when making
presumption is always against the waiver. the waiver of the right to remain silent or to
Thus, the prosecution must prove with strongly counsel.
convincing evidence that indeed the accused
willingly and voluntarily submitted his
confession, and knowingly and deliberately 8. Exclusionary rule
manifested that he was not interested in having
a lawyer assist him during the taking of that Art. III, Sec. 12. xxx
confession. (3) Any confession or admission
obtained in violation of this or Section 17
hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence
People v. Jara, 144 SCRA 516 (1986) against him.

F: Appellants were found guilty of robbery


with homicide for the killing and robbery of Note than under [Art. III, Sec. 3(2)] the
Ampara vda. de Bantigue on June 9, 1978. In exclusionary rule reads: (any evidence obtained
another case, two of the appellants were found in violation of this or the preceding section shall
guilty of homicide for the killing on the same be inadmissible "for any purpose in any
date of Luisa Jara while Felicisimo Jara, the proceeding."
husband of the deceased, was found guilty of There are two exceptions to the
parricide. Two of the appellants, Raymundo exclusionary rule. One, to impeach the
Vergara and Bernardo Bernadas, made credibility of the accused. Two, public safety.
extrajudicial confessions implicating Jara as the
mastermind. The confessions were taken while Impeach the credibility
the two were held incommunicado in the
presence of five policemen and after two weeks The unwarned or uncounselled
of detention. confession is not totally without use. While it is
Constitutional Law II

not admissible to prove the guilt of the accused, evidence in the subsequent criminal
it may be used against him to impeach his prosecution.
credibility by showing that he is lying in court,
so ruled the U.S. Supreme Court in Harris v.
New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971). C. Right to bail

Art. III, Sec. 13. All persons, except


Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971) those charged with offenses punishable by
reclusion perpetua when the evidence of
In this case, Harris was arrested for guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be
twice selling heroin to an undercover police bailable by sufficient sureties, or be
agent. He confessed to the crime during the released on recognizance as may be
police interrogation, but the confession was provided by law. the right to bail shall not
uncounselled, and so it was held as be impaired even when the privilege of
inadmissible in evidence. But when Harris took the writ of habeas corpus is suspended.
the witness stand, he testified that what he sold Excessive bail shall not be required.
was baking powder in order to defraud the
police agent. The SC allowed the prosecution to 1. When right may be invoked
introduce the uncounselled statment to show
that he was lying. The right to bail is available from the
very moment of arrest (which may be before or
In justifying the admission of the after the filing of formal charges in court) up to
testimony, Justice Burger said that it is one the time of conviction by final judgement (which
thing to say that the government cannot make means after appeal).
an affirmative use of the evidence unlawfully
obtained, and quite another to say that the No charge need be filed formally before
defendant can turn the illegal method by which one can file for bail, so long as one is under
the evidence in the possession of the arrest. So ruled the SC in Heras Teehankee v.
government was obtained to his own Rovica. 75 Phil.634 (1945).
advantage, providing himself with a shield
against perjury and the contradiction of his The case was unique in that after the
untruths. war, the People's Court Act amended Art. 125 of
the RPC to allow for a longer time to detain
The reason, continued the Court is that persons because of the impossibility of filing
the shield provided by the Miranda rights charges within the reglementary period due to
cannot be perverted into a license to use the number of indictees.
perjury by way of a defense, free from the risk
of confrontation with prior inconsistent Bail and Habeas Corpus
utterances.
In the case of bail, there is an implicit
Public Safety recognition that the arrest and detention, are
valid, or that even if they were initially illegal,
Public Safety may justify the police in such illegality was cured by the subsequent
taking confessions without prior warning. Thus filing of a case in court. Thus, the prayer in bail
ruled the U.S. Supreme Court in New York v. is that one be released temporarily from such
Quarles, 104 S. Ct. 2626 (1984). valid detention, and this can be made anytime
after arrest.

In habeas corpus, the assumption is


New York v. Quarles, 104 S. Ct. 2626 precisely that the arrest and detention are
(1984). illegal, so that the prayer is to be released
permanently from such illegal detention. When
In the case, the Court excused the the privilege of the writ is suspended, the arrest
giving of the Miranda warning because the and detention remain illegal, but the remedy
public safety required that the weapon had to afforded by law to the victim is not available.
be located before it could be used by the Under the 1987 Constitution, though the effect
accused against those in the supermarket. of the suspension has been considerably
lessened to the need to file a case within 72
The criticism hurled against this ruling is hours from the illegal arrest, otherwise the
that while the police may be justified in forcing detainee is to be released.
the assailant to say where the weapon is
located, he is not justified to present this in The Constitution now provides,
overruling Morales v. Enrile, that the suspension
Constitutional Law II

of the privilege of the writ does not carry with it (f) The weight of the evidence
the suspension of the right to bail. Habeas against the accused;
Corpus refers to illegal detention, while bail (g) Probability of the accused
refers to legal detention, or even detention that appearing in trial;
started as illegal but was cured by the filing of a (h) Forfeiture of other bonds;
case in court. (i) The fact that accused was a
fugitive from justice when arrested; and
2. When bail is a matter of right, when it (j) The pendency of other cases in
is a matter of discretion which the accused is under bond.
Excessive bail shall not be
Bail is a matter of right in all cases not required.
punishable by reclusion perpetua.

It is a matter of discretion in case the Where the right to bail exists, it should
evidence of guilt is strong. In such a case, not be rendered nugatory be requiring a sum
according to People v. San Diego, 26 SCRA 522 that is excessive, otherwise, it becomes "a
(1966), the court's discretion to grant bail must promise to the ear to be broken to the hope, a
be exercised in the light of a summary of the teasing illusion like a munificent bequest in a
evidence presented by the prosecution. Thus, pauper's will" (Jackson). Thus, said the SC in De
the order granting or refusing bail must contain la Camara v. Enage, 41 SCRA 1 (1971).
a summary of the evidence for the prosecution
followed by the conclusion on whether or not In this case, a bail of P1.195 million
the evidence of guilt is strong. imposed against Mayor Camara for charges of
12 murders and 12 frustrated murder was found
The only time bail may be denied is excessive.
when (a) the offense is punishable by reclusion
perpetua, and (b) the evidence of guilt is The SC laid down the following
strong. guidelines in fixing the amount of bail in
Villasenor v. Abano, 21 SCRA 312 (1967), later
With the abolition of the death penalty contained in sec. 6 of Rule 114.
(III, 20), and the automatic commutation of a
death sentence to reclusion perpetua, it is 1. Ability of the accused to give the
contended that when the 1987 Constitution bail.
denies the right to bail in offenses punishable 2. Nature of the offense.
by reclusion perpetua, it is meant to apply only 3. Penalty for the offense charged.
to those crimes which were once punishable by 4. Character and reputation of the
death. For if it includeds even those crimes accused
which before and now are really punishable by 5. Health of the accused.
reclusion perpetua, it would go against the very 6. Character and strength of the
spirit of the Constitution. evidence.
7. Probability of the accused appearing
People v. Donato, 196 SCRA 130 (1991) in trial.
8. Forfeiture of other bonds.
3. Bail in courts-martial 9. Whether the accused was a fugitive
from justice when arrested.
Commendador v. De Villa, 200 SCRA 80 (1991) 10. If the accused is under bond for
appearance at trial in other cases.
4. Standards for fixing bail
Even when the accused has previously
Rule 114, Sec. 6. Amount of bail; jumped bail, still he cannot be denied bail. the
guidelines.-- The judge who issed the remedy in this case is to increase the amount
warrant or granted the application shall of the bail (Siquiam v. Amparo).
fix a reasonable amount of bail
considering primarily, but not limited to 5. Right to bail and right to travel
the following guidelines: abroad
(a) Financial ability of the accused
to give bail; Art. III, Sec. 6. The liberty of abode
(b) Nature and circumstances of and of changing the same within the limits
the offense; prescribed by law shall not be impaired
(c) Penalty of the offense charged; except upon lawful order of the court.
(d) Character and reputation of Neither shall the right to travel be
the accused; impaired except in the interest of national
(e) Age and health of the accused;
Constitutional Law II

security, public safety, or public health, as


may be provided by law. D. Rights during trial

Art. III, Sec. 14. (1) No person


In Manotoc v. Court of Appeals, 142 shall be held to answer for a criminal
SCRA 149 (1986), the SC disallowed a person offense without due process of law.
released on bail to travel abroad for a business In all criminal prosecutions, the
trip. The Court gave 2 reasons why bail accused shall be presumed innocent until
operates only within the country. the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the
right to be heard by himself and counsel,
One, the accused may be placed beyond to be informed of the nature and cause of
the jurisdiction of the court if he were allowed the accusation against him, to have a
to leave the Philippines without sufficient speedy, impartial and public trial, to meet
reason, thus affecting one of the conditions in the witnesses face to face, and to have
the grant of bail, namely to have the accused compulsory process to secure the
available whenever the court requires his attendance of witnesses and the
presence. production of evidence in his behalf.
However, after arraignment, trial may
Two, implicit in the bail is the proceed notwithstanding the absence of
agreement between the State and the surety the accused provided that he has been
that the State will do nothing to make it difficult duly notified and his failure to appear is
for the surety to arrest the defendant upon unjustifiable.
order of the court. If the court thus allows his to
leave, then the State loses its right to order the
forfeiture of the bond because it itself has 1. Presumption of innocence
breached its obligation to the surety.
In People v. Dramayo, 42 SCRA 69
The case leaves the question of allowing (1971), the SC noted that the requirement of
an accused under bail to go abroad for proof beyond reasonable doubt is a necessary
humanitarian reasons open-ended. This reason corollary of the constitutional right to be
was not foreclosed by the Court, which hinted presumed innocent.
that the accused could be allowed to leave if he
had "sufficient reason". What the Court found
insufficient was the business trip. In Igot v. Comelec, 95 SCRA 392 (1980),
a law disqualifying candidates charged with
national security offences was struck down as
Manotoc v. CA, 142 SCRA 149 (1986) unconstitutional, for violating the presumption
against innocence.
F: Petitioner is a principal stockholder of
two corporations, in one of which he was the
president. The firms were placed under a In Alejandro v. Pepito, 96 SCRA 322
management committee by the SEC and (1980), a judge who allowed the accused to
petitioner was placed "on hold" by the present his evidence ahead of the prosecution,
Commission of Immigration. Petitioner was over the objection of the prosecution, after the
charged with estafa. He later asked for acused admitted the killing but invoked self-
permission to leave the country for business defense, was reversed by the SC on the ground
reasons, but his request was denied by the that this change in the order of trial violated the
courts. He filed a petition for certiorari but his constitutional presumption of innocence which
petition was also dismissed for lack of merit. He places the burden proof on the prosecution.
appealed to the SC.
This ruling was modified by Rule 119,
HELD: The condition imposed by Rule 114, sec. sec. 3 (e) of the 1985 Rules of Criminal
1 upon the accused to make himself available Procedure which now reverses the order of trial
whenever the court requires his presence, when the defendant admits the act but invokes
operates as a valid restriction on his right to a justifying or exempting circumstance.
travel. The constitutional right to travel is not
absolute, but is subject to lawful orders of the
court. VV. People v. de Guzman, 231 SCRA 739

F: De Guzman, Castro and Catap


6. Waiver of the Right to Bail were charged with murder for the killing
of an unidentified person on Nov. 16,
People v. Donato, 198 SCRA 130 (1991) 1994. Only De Guzman and Castro were
Constitutional Law II

arrested and both pleaded not guilty.


They were convicted by the court mainly F: Appellant Frisco Holgado was charged in
on the basis of the testimony of Adelia the court of First Instance of Romblon with
Angeles. She positively identified the 2 slight illegal detention because he did
accused as the persons who were with "feloniously and without justifiable motive,
Catap who maltreated an unidentified kidnap and detain one Artemia Fabreag in the
person whom they had tied to an ipil-ipil house of Antero Holgado for about eight hours
tree and upon seeing her, she testified thereby depriving said Artemia Fabreag of her
that they untied the man and brought personal liberty." Accused, unaided by counsel,
him towards the direction of the Pasig pleaded guilty and said that he was instructed
river which was only 3 houses away. This by Mr. Ocampo to do so.
was further strengthened by the Accused was convicted of a capital
extrajudicial confession (EJC) of accused offense.
Castro to Police Corporal Dominador Since the accused-appellant pleaded
Cunanan that it was Catap who killed the guilty and no evidence appears to have been
victim and that he and de Guzman acted presented by either party, the trial judge must
only as look-outs. have deduced the capital offense from the facts
pleaded in the information.
Issue: W/N the constitutional
presumption of innocenec of the accused Ruling: Under the circumstances, particularly
has been overcome. the qualified plea given by the accused who
was unaided by counsel, it was not prudent, to
HELD: YES say the least, for the trial court to render such a
Though there is no direct evidence serious judgment finding the accused guilty of a
to link the 3 accused to the killing of the capital offense, and imposing upon him such a
unknown victim, the circumstantial heavy penalty as ten years and one day of
evidence presented satisfied Sec. 4, Rule prision mayor to twenty years, without absolute
133 ROC namely: (1) there is more than any evidence to determine and clarify the true
one circumstance; (2) the facts from facts of the case.
which the inferences are derived are The proceedings in the trial court are
proven; and (3) the combination of all the irregular from the beginning. It is expressly
circumstances is such as to produce provided in our rules of Court, Rule 112, section
conviction beyond resonable doubt. 3 (now Rule 116, Sec. 6), that:
With regard to the EJC of Accused Castro
to Police Cpl. Cunanan, there is no evidence If the defendant appears without
that Cunanan had any motive to falsely testify attorney, he must be informed by the court that
against accused. While it is true that accused's it is his right to have attorney before being
EJC was made without the advice and arraigned., and must be asked if he desires the
assistance of counsel, hence inadmissible as aid of attorney, the Court must assign attorney
evidence, it could be treated as a verbal de oficio to defend him. A reasonable time must
admission of the accused established through be allowed for procuring attorney.
the testimonies of persons who heard it or who
conducted the investigatiuon of the accused Not one of these duties had been
(Peo v Molas 218 SCRA 473). Moreover in Peo complied with by the trial court.
v Alvarez, the court ruled that an extrajudicial One of the great principles of justice
confession is admissible against a co-accused guaranteed by our Constitution is that "no
when it is used as a circumstantial evidence to person shall be held to answer for a criminal
show the probability of the participation of said offense without due process of law", and that all
co-accused in the crime committed. accused "shall enjoy the right to be heard by
himself and counsel." In criminal cases there
2. Right to be heard personally or by can be no fair hearing unless the accused be
counsel given the opportunity to be heard by counsel.
The right to be heard would be of little avail if it
Adequate legal assistance shall not be does not include the right to be heard by
denied to any person by reason of poverty (Art. counsel. Even the most intelligent or educated
III, Sec. 11.) No matter how educated one may man may have no skill in the science of the law,
be, he may not know how to establsih his particularly in the rules of procedure, and,
innocence for the simple reason that he does without counsel, he may be convicted not
not know the rules of evidence said the SC in because he is guilty but because he does not
People v. Holgado, 85 Phil 752 (1952). know how to establish his innocence. And this
can happen more easily to persons who are
ignorant or uneducated. It is for this reason that
People v. Holgado, 85 Phil 752 (1952) the right to be assisted by counsel is deemed so
Constitutional Law II

important that it has become a constitutional


right and it is so implemented that under our Ruling: The accused should be allowed to
rules of procedure it is not enough for the Court present evidence.
to apprise an accused of his right to have an
attorney, it is not enough to ask him whether he 1. The refusal of Judge Moscoso to allow
desires the aid of an attorney, but it is essential the accused-petitioner to present proofs in his
that the court should assign one de oficio if he defense after the denial of his motion for
so desires and he is poor grant him a dismissal was a palpable error which resulted in
reasonable time to procure an attorney of his denying to the said accused the due process of
own. law guaranteed in the Bill of Rights embodied in
the Constitution, it being provided in Article II,
section 1 (17), of the Constitution that in all
Q: What happens if the accused files a criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy
demurrer to the evidence of the prosecution (on the right to be heard by himself and counsel
the ground that the prosecution failed to tender and to have compulsory process to secure the
a case) and this motion is denied -- could the attendance of witnesses in his behalf. There is
defense still present its own evidence? no law nor "procedural practice" under which
the accused may ever be denied the right to be
In Abriol v. Homeres, 84 Phil 525, heard before being sentenced.
(1949), the SC ruled in the affirmative, Now that the Government cannot appeal
contending that the right of the accused to in criminal cases if the defendant would be
present his evidence is a constitutional right placed thereby in double jeopardy (sec. 2, Rule
which cannot be defeated by the dismissal of 118), the dismissal of the case for insufficiency
the motion of demurrer. of the evidence after the prosecution has rested
terminates the case then and there. But if the
Filing of demurrer to evidence is a motion for dismissal is denied, the court should
WAIVER of right to be heard (Rule 119, proceed to hear the evidence for the defense
Sec. 15.) before entering judgment regardless of whether
or not the defense had reserved its right to
Abriol v. Homeres, 84 Phil 525, (1949) present evidence in the event its motion for
dismissal be denied. The reason is that it is the
F: Fidel Abriol, together with six other constitutional right of the accused to be heard
persons, was accused of illegal possession of in his defense before sentence is pronounced
firearms and ammunition. After the prosecution on him. Of course if the accused has no
had presented its evidence and rested its case, evidence to present or expressly waives the
counsel for the defense moved to dismiss the right to present it, the court has no alternative
case on the ground of insufficiency of the but to decide the case upon the evidence
evidence to prove the guilt of the accused. After presented by the prosecution alone.
hearing the arguments for and against the
motion for dismissal, the court held the proofs 2. The main question to decide is
sufficient to convict and denied said motion, whether the writ of habeas corpus lies in a case
whereupon counsel for the defense offered to like the present.
present evidence for the accused. The We have already shown that there is no
provincial fiscal opposed the presentation of law or precedent which could be invoked to
evidence by the defense, contending that the place in doubt the right of the accused to be
present procedural practice and laws precluded heard or to present evidence in his defense
the defense in criminal cases from presenting before being sentenced. On the contrary, the
any evidence after it had presented a motion provisions of the Constitution hereinabove cited
for dismissal with or without reservation and expressly and clearly guarantee to him that
after said motion had been denied, and citing right. Such constitutional right is inviolate. No
as authority the case of United States vs. De la court of justice under our system of government
Cruz, 28 Phil., 279. His Honor Judge S. C. has the power to deprive him of that right. If the
Moscoso sustained the opposition of the accused does not waive his right to be heard
provincial fiscal and, without allowing the but on the contrary as in the instant case
accused to present evidence in their defense, invokes that rough, and the court denies it to
convicted all of them and sentenced the herein him, that court no longer has jurisdiction to
petitioner to suffer seven years of imprisonment proceed; it has no power to sentence the
and to pay a fine of P2,000. accused without hearing him in his defense; and
the sentence thus pronounced is void and may
Issue: Whether the accused should be allowed be collaterally attacked in a habeas corpus
to present evidence after the denial of their proceeding.
motion to dismiss on the ground of insufficiency Although the sentence against the
of evidence of the prosecution petitioner is void for the reasons hereinabove
Constitutional Law II

stated, he may be held under the custody of the


law by being detained or admitted to bail until People v. Rio, 201 SCRA 702 (1991)
the case against him is finally and lawfully
decided. The process against him in criminal F: On 29 December 1989, the accused-
case No. 1472 may stand should be resumed appellant Ricardo Rio, in two (2) letters dated
from the stage at which it was vitiated by the 14 December 1989, addressed to Division Clerk
trial court's denial of his constitutional right to of Court Fermin J. Garma and to Assistant Clerk
be heard. Up to the point when the prosecution of Court Tomasita M. Dris, manifested his
rested, the proceedings were valid and should intention to withdraw the appeal due to his
be resumed from there. poverty.

Paraphrasing Mr. Justice Malcolm, "Two


People v. Donesa, 49 SCRA 281 (1973) (2) of the basic privileges of the accused in a
criminal prosecution are the right to the
Grant of demurrer is equivalent to an acquittal assistance of counsel and the right to a
preliminary examination. President Mckinley
F: After prosecution presented its made the first a part of the Organic Law in his
witnesses, the defense moved for dismissal of Instructions to the Commission by imposing the
the case on the ground of insufficiency of inviolable rule that in all criminal prosecutions
evidence. The judge granted the motion. the accused 'shall enjoy the right ... to have
assistance of counsel for the defense' ". Today
Issue: Did such dismissal operate as an said right is enshrined in the 1987 Constitution
acquittal of the accused? for, as Judge Cooley says, this is "perhaps the
privilege most important to the person accused
Ruling: YES of crime."
A dismissal ordered after the "In criminal cases there can be no fair
termination of the presentation of the evidence hearing unless the accused be given an
for the prosecution has the force and effect of opportunity to be heard by counsel. The right to
an acquittal. Since there is a failure to prove the be heard would be of little meaning if it does
guilt of the accused, the case must be not include the right to be heard by counsel.
dismissed, and it will be a bar to another Even the most intelligent or educated man may
prosecution for the same offense even though it have no skill in the science of the law, particu-
was ordered by the Court upon motion or with larly in the rules of procedure, and, without
the express consent of the defendant, in exactly counsel, he may be convicted not because he is
the same way as a judgment of guilty but because he does not know how to
acquittal. establish his innocence. And this can happen
more easily to persons who are ignorant or
Rule 119, Sec. 15. Demurrer to uneducated. It is for this reason that the right
evidence.-- After the prosecution has to be assisted by counsel is deemed so
rested its case, the court may dismiss the important that it has become a constitutional
case on the ground of insufficiency of right and it is so implemented that under our
evidence: (1) ont its own intitiative after rules of procedure it is not enough for the Court
givint the prosecution an opportunity to to apprise an accused of his right to have an
be heard; or (2) on motion of the accused attorney, it is not enough to ask him whether he
filed with proper leave of court. desires the aid of an attorney, but it is essential
If the court denies the motion for that the court should assign one de oficio for
dismissal, the accused may adduce him if he so desires and he is poor, or grant him
evidence in his defense. When the a reasonable time to procure an attorney of his
accused files such motion to dismiss own."
without express leave of court, he waives This right to a counsel de oficio does not
the right to present evidence and submits cease upon the conviction of an accused by a
the case for judgment on the basis of the trial court. It continues, even during appeal,
evidence for the prosecution. (Rules of such that the duty of the court to assign a
Court.) counsel de oficio persists where an accused
interposes an intent to appeal. Even in a case,
3. Right to free legal assistance such as the one at bar, where the accused had
signified his intent to withdraw his appeal, the
Art. III, Sec. 11. Free access to the court is required to inquire into the reason for
courts and quasi-judicial bodies and the withdrawal. Where it finds the sole reason
adequate legal assistance shall not be for the withdrawal to be poverty, as in this case,
denied to any person by reason of the court must assign a counsel de oficio, for
poverty. despite such withdrawal, the duty to protect the
rights of the accused subsists and perhaps, with
Constitutional Law II

greater reason. After all, "those who have less had sexual intercourse with her on 24 March
in life must have more in law." Justice should 1984. It was stressed by counsel de oficio that
never be limited to those who have the means. the rape occurred on 24 March 1984 and that,
It is for everyone, whether rich or poor. Its allegedly, it was the fourth time accused had
scales should always be balanced and should abused complainant. This allegation as well as
never equivocate or cogitate in order to favor the fact that complainant failed to lock the door
one party over another. to the bathroom could only have been due to
It is with this thought in mind that we the fact that there was consent. The charge was
charge clerks of court of trial courts to be more filed, according to defense counsel de oficio,
circumspect with the duty imposed on them by only because the complainant's mother caught
law (Section 13, Rule 122 of the Rules of Court) them.
so that courts will be above reproach and that This theory of the defense on appeal
never (if possible) will an innocent person be that there had been consent from the
sentenced for a crime he has not committed nor complainant, fails to generate doubt as to the
the guilty allowed to go scot-free. accused's guilt, for it would be an incredulous
In this spirit, the Court ordered the situation indeed to believe that one, so young
appointment of a counsel de oficio for the and as yet uninitiated to the ways of the world,
accused-appellant and for said counsel and the would permit the occurrence of an incestuous
Solicitor General to file their respective briefs, relationship with an uncle, a brother of her very
upon submission of which the case would be own mother. The Court notes the sudden swift
deemed submitted for decision. in the theory of the defense from one of total
denial of the incident in question, by way of
From the records of the case, it is alibi, to one of participation, that is, with the
established that the accused- appellant was alleged consent of the complainant. This new
charged with the crime of rape in a verified version could only be attributed by the Court to
complaint filed by complainant Wilma Phua Rio, the fact that counsel on appeal is different from
duly subscribed before 3rd Assistant Fiscal the counsel in the trial court. Although the
Rodolfo M. Alejandro of the province of Rizal, Solicitor General has suggested that this
which reads as follows: sudden shift be interpreted as an afterthought
That on or about the 24th day of by the accused or a desperate effort to get
March, 1984, in the Municipality of Muntinlupa, himself acquitted, the Court deems it more
Metro Manila, Philippines, a place within the likely that this shift was caused by counsel de
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above- oficio's preparation of the appellant's brief
named accused, by means of force and without examining the entire records of the
intimidation did then and there wilfully, case. If the appointed counsel for the accused,
unlawfully and feloniously have carnal on appeal, had read the records and transcripts
knowledge of the undersigned Wilma Phua of the case thoroughly, he would not have
against her will. changed the theory of the defense for such a
On 26 June 1985, at the arraignment, shift can never speak well of the credibility of
the accused-appellant, assisted by Atty. Leonido the defense. Moreover, the rule in civil
Manalo of the Makati CLAO office, as counsel de procedure, which applies equally in criminal
oficio, entered a plea of not guilty to the offense cases, is that a party may not shift his theory on
charged. appeal. If the counsel de oficio had been more
xxx conscientious, he would have known that the
The trial court found the accused- sudden shift would be violative of
appellant guilty of the crime of rape. aforementioned procedural rule and detrimental
to the cause of the accused-appellant (his
The theory of the defense at the trial client).
level was grounded on alibi. The accused The Court hereby admonishes members
claimed that at the time of the alleged com- of the Bar to be more conscious of their duties
mission of the crime of rape he was in Romblon. as advocates of their clients' causes, whether
This claim was corroborated by the accused's acting de parte or de oficio, for "public interest
brother, Amado Rio. However, this claim was, as requires that an attorney exert his best efforts
aforestated, rebutted by the prosecution's and ability in the prosecution or defense of his
submission of the voter's affidavit executed by client's cause." Lawyers are an indispensable
the accused in Muntinlupa, Metro Manila on 31 part of the whole system of administering jus-
March 1984 when appellant claimed he was in tice in this jurisdiction. And a lawyer who
Romblon. performs that duty with diligence and candor
not only protects the interests of his client; he
HELD: On appeal, appellant's counsel de oficio also serves the ends of justice, does honor to
changed the theory of the defense. The new the Bar and helps maintain the respect of the
theory presented by counsel de oficio is that community to the legal profession. This is so
Wilma Phua consented when accused-appellant because the entrusted privilege to practice law
Constitutional Law II

carries with it correlative duties not only to the The right to a speedy trial means one
client but also to the court, to the bar and to that is free from vexatious and oppressive
the public. delays. Its objective is to free the innocent
While a lawyer is not supposed to know person from anxiety and expense of a court
all the laws, he is expected to take such litigation, or otherwise, to have his guilt
reasonable precaution in the discharge of his determined within the shortest possible time,
duty to his client and for his professional compatible with the presentation and
guidance as will not make him, who is sworn to consideration of whatever legitimate defense
uphold the law, a transgressor of its precepts. the accused may interpose.
The fact that he merely volunteered his
services or the circumstance that he was a While reasonable delay may be allowed
counsel de oficio neither diminishes nor alters as determined on a case to case basis, an
the degree of professional responsibility owed unreasonable delay on the part of the
to his client. The ethics of the profession prosecution to present its case, thereby causing
require that counsel display warm zeal and the threat of penal liability to remain hanging
great dedication to duty irrespective of the over the head of the accused for an extended
client's capacity to pay him his fees. Any period of time, violates the right of the accused
attempted presentation of a case without to a speedy trial.
adequate preparation distracts the
administration of justice and discredits the Bar. The remedy of the accused in this case
is habeas corpus if he has been restrained of his
4. Right to be informed of nature and liberty, or certiorari, prohibition or mandamus
cause of accusation for the final dismissal of the case; and dismissal
based on the denial of the right to speedy trial
The arraignment in criminal prosecution amounts to an acquittal.
is precisely intended to comply with the right of
the accused to be informed of the nature and So said the SC in Acevedo v. Sarmiento,
cause of the accusation against him. As noted 36 SCRA 247 (1970), a case involving the
in Vera v. People, procedural due process prosecution for damage to property through
requires that the accused must be informed reckless imprudence which had been pending
why he is being prosecuted and what charge for 6 years, the last step taken being the start
he must meet. of the cross-examination of the complaining
witness, who did not appear thereafter. The SC
Borja v. Mendoza, 77 SCRA 422 (1977) ordered the case dismissed with prejudice, thus
acquitting the accused.
No valid trial in absentia without arraignment
(2) Public Trial
F: Petitioner was accused of slight physical
injuries in the City Court of Cebu. After one A public trial does not require that the
postponement due to petitioner's failure to entire public can witness the trial. It is enough
appear, the case was reset. Again, petitioner if it is conducted at a place where one's
failed to appear, despite notice to his relatives and friends can be accommodated and
bondsman. The court then allowed the the public may know what is going on.
prosecution to present evidence despite the
fact that petitioner had not been arraigned. The right is not absolute. The court can
After the offended party had testified and order the public out of the trial room in the
presented documentary evidence, the court interest of morality and order.
found petitioner guilty. The CFI affirmed the
decision. Hence, this petition for certiorari. In Garcia v. Domingo, 52 SCRA 143
(1970), the SC dismissed the contention of one
HELD: Respondent Judge committed a grave party that the trial was conducted inside the
abuse of discretion and his decision is void. chamber of the judge on the ground that the
Because petitioner was not arraigned, he was objection came too late (the party only
not informed of the nature and cause of complained after the 14th hearing) and that the
accusation against him. Arraignment is an place was agreed upon by the parties for their
indispensable requirement in any criminal mutual convenience (the judge's room was air
proceeding. conditioned).

5. Right to speedy, impartial and public


trial Garcia v. Domingo, 52 SCRA 143 (1970)

(1) Speedy Trial The pivotal question in this petition for


certiorari and prohibition, one which thus far
Constitutional Law II

has remained unresolved, is the meaning to be Then, too, reference may also be made
accorded the constitutional right to public trial. to the undisputed fact at least fourteen
hearings had been held in chambers of the city
Issue: Is the holding of trial in the chambers of court Judge, without objection on the part of
the judge violative of the right to a public trial? respondent policemen. xxx

Ruling: NO (3) Impartial trial


The defendants in this case agreed that
the hearings be held in the chambers. On One aspect of an impartial trial is a
fourteen separate occasions this was the case neutral magistrate who exercises cold
and there was no objection on their part. There impartiality.
was no evidence to substantiate the claim that
any other person was excluded from the In Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927),
chambers. It is thus evident that what took it was held that a town mayor who was paid on
place in the chambers of the city court judge the basis of the fine he imposes for every
was devoid of haste or intentional secrecy. conviction for violation of the drinking laws,
The trial must be public. It possesses could not be an impartial judge. Under such a
that character when anyone interested in situation, he would be interested in convicting
observing the manner a judge conducts the those he tries so he would earn more.
proceedings in his courtroom may do so. There
is to be no ban on such attendance. His being a Another aspect of an impartial trial is an
stranger to the litigants is of no moment. No impartial tribunal bound by the Bill of Rights
relationship to the parties need be shown. The and the strict rules of evidence and procedure.
thought that lies behind this safeguard is the
belief that thereby the accused is afforded In Olaguer v. Military Commission, 150
further protection, that his trial is likely to be SCRA 144 (1987), the SC held that a civilian
conducted with regularity and not tainted with cannot be tried by a military court (in
any impropriety. It is not amiss to recall that connection with the Light a Fire Movement) so
Delegate Laurel in his terse summation the long as the civil courts are open and operating,
importance of this right singled out its being a even during Martial Law.
deterrence to arbitrariness. It is thus
understandable why such a right is deemed 6. Right to confront witness
embraced in procedural due process. Where a
trial takes place, as is quite usual, in the The purpose of this right is to enable the
courtroom and a calendar of what cases are to accused to test the credibility of the witness.
be heard is posted, no problem arises. It the The best means of confrontation is the process
usual course of events that individuals desirous of cross-examination.
of being present are free to do so. There is the
well recognized exception though that warrants 7. Right to secure attendance of
the exclusion of the public where the evidence witnesses (and the production of evidence
may be characterized as "offensive to decency in his behalf)
or public morals."
What did occasion difficulty in this suit There are various means available to
was that for the convenience of the parties, and the parties to compel the attendance of
of the city court Judge, it was in the latter's air- witnesses and the production of documents and
conditioned chambers that the trial was held. things needed in the prosecution or defense of
Did that suffice to investigate the proceedings a case in an adversarial manner: subpoena and
as violative of this right? The answer must be in subpoena duces tecum: depositions and other
the negative. There is no showing that the modes of discovery; perpetuation of
public was thereby excluded. It is to be testimonies.
admitted that the size of the room allotted the
Judge would reduce the number of those who 8. Trial in Absentia
could be present. Such a fact though is not
indicative of any transgression of this right. Although the right to be present is not
Courtrooms are not of uniform dimensions. explicit in the provision, it is inferrable from the
Some are smaller than others. Moreover, as phrase "trial may proceed notwithstanding the
admitted by Justice Black in his masterly In re absence of the accused"
Oliver opinion, it suffices to satisfy the
requirement of a trial being public if the This right to be present may, however,
accused could "have his friends, relatives and be waived by the accused. Rule 115, sec, 1(c),
counsel present, no matter with what offense talks of 3 ways that the waiver may take place:
he may be charged." (a) express waiver pursuant to the stipulations
set forth in his bail bond, unless his presence is
Constitutional Law II

specifically ordered by the court for purposes of F: Mario Abong was originally charged with
identification; (b) implied waiver when the homicide in the CFI Cebu but before he could be
accused without any justifiable cause is absent arraigned, the case was reinvestigated on
at the trial on a particular date of which he had motion of the prosecution. As a result of the
notice; and (c) implied waiver when the accused reinvestigation, an amended information was
under custody who had been notified of the filed, with no bail recommended, to which he
date of trial escapes. pleaded not guilty. Trial commenced but while it
In cases in which there have been a was in progress, the prisoner took advantage of
waiver of the right to be present, whether the first information filed and succeeded in
expressed or implied, the trial may be held "in deceiving the city court of Cebu into granting
absentia". The requisites of a valid trial in him bail and ordering his release. The
absentia are: (i) the accused has been respondent Judge, learning of the trickery,
arraigned; (ii) he was duly notified of the cancelled the illegal bail bond and ordered
hearing; and (iii) his failure to attend the trial is Abong's re-arrest. But he was gone.
unjustified. Nonetheless, the prosecution moved that the
hearing continue in accordance with the
There can be no valid trial in absentia constitutional provision authorizing trial in
unless the accused has been arraigned, ruled absentia. The respondent Judge denied the
the SC in Boria v. Mendoza, 77 SCRA 422 motion and suspended all proceedings until the
(1977), a case involving a charge for slight return of the accused. Hence, this petition.
physical injuries where the accused failed to
appear and so the trial court allowed the HELD: The doctrine laid down in People v.
prosecution to present its evidence even if the Avanceña has been modified by Art. IV, sec. 19
accused has not yet been arraigned. [now Art. III, sec. 14(2) of the 1987 Constitution]
Arraignment is crucial because it informs the which allows trial in absentia. The prisoner
accued of the nature and cause of the cannot by simply escaping thwart his continued
accusation against him. Conviction without prosecution and possible eventual conviction
arraignment violates due process and ousts the provided only that (a) he has been arraigned;
court of its jurisdiction. (b) he has been duly notified of the trial; and (c)
his failure to appear is unjustified. The right to
Boria v. Mendoza, 77 SCRA 422 (1977), supra. be present at one's trial may now be waived
except only at that stage where the prosecution
HELD: The subsequent trial in absentia intends to present witnesses who will identify
deprived petitioner of his right to be heard by the accused. The defendant's escape will be
himself and counsel. The indispensable considered a waiver of this right and the
requirement for trial in absentia is that it should inability of the court to notify him of the
come after arraignment. VV. subsequent hearings will not prevent it from
continuing with his trial. VV.

Waiver of the right to be present implies


also waiver of the right to present evidence. Trial in absentia was introduced only in
Thus, if the accused fails to attend trial (which the 1973 Constitution to remedy a situation in
presupposes arraignment), without any which criminal prosecution could not move
justifiable cause, the prosecution can proceed because the accused has either escaped or
with the presentation of the evidence, and jumped bail.
thereupon, the court may consider the case
submitted for decision. The court will decide In People v. Prieto, 84 SCRA 198 (1978),
the case on the basis only of the prosecution's the SC ruled that trial in absentia does not
evidence. This does not violate the justify the accused to jump bail. Just because th
constitutional presumption of innocence Constitution allows trial in absentia does not
because it does not mean that the judgment of mean that the accused is now free to waive his
the trial court will result in conviction. right to be present during the trial. If he does,
he runds the risk of having his bail bond
So ruled the SC in People v. Salas, 143 forfeited.
SCRA 163 (1986), which further ruled that trial
in absentia applies even to capital cases. Provision for trial in absentia not a justification
for jumping bail

People v. Salas 143 SCRA 163 (1986) F: For repeated failure of the accused
Dario Gamayon to appear, respondent Judge
Trial in absentia applies even to capital cases declared the bail bond forfeited and required
the bondsmen to produce the accused within
thirty days and to show cause why no judgment
Constitutional Law II

should be rendered against them. However, on 1. Generally, the accused has the right
motion of defense counsel, who invoked the last to be present at all stages the trial (from
sentence of Art. IV, section 19 [now Art. III, sec. arraignment to rendition of judgment).
14(2)] on trial in absentia, respondent Judge
reconsidered his order. He argued that "if trial 2. If the accused is in the custody of the
could be conducted after the accused has been law, his presence during the trial is a duty only
arraigned and identified, the conclusion is if the court orders his presence to enable the
inescapable that issuing an order of forfeiture of prosecution witnesses to identify him. (People
the bail bond is premature." The prosecution v. Salas, infra. reiterating Aquino v. Military
filed a petition for certiorari. Commiission, infra. modifying People v.
Avancena, infra.)
HELD: The innovation introduced by the
present Constitution goes no further than to 3. Although the accused is not in the
enable a judge to continue with the trial even if custody of the law (and more so if he is in the
the accused is not present under the conditions custody of the law), his presence is required in
therein specified. It does not give the accused the following cases:
the right to jump bail. VV.
a) Arraignment, regardless of
Gimenez v. Nazareno, 160 SCRA 1 (1988) the offense;

In trial in absentia accused waives the right to b) Entering a plea, regardless of


present evidence and confront witnesses whether the plea is guilty or not guilty.

F: Teodoro dela Vega Jr., together with five c) Promulgation of judgment,


others, was charged with murder. After except that when the judgment is for a
arraignment, during which he pleaded not light offense, he may be represented by
guilty, the case was set for hearing on Sept. 18, his counsel or a personal emissary.
1973 but he escaped. He was tried in absentia.
The trial court rendered judgment dismissing
the case against his co-accused but it held in
abeyance the proceedings against him in order a. Arraignment and plea,
to give him the chance to cross examine the whether of innocence or of guilt
witnesses against him and present evidence.
Hence, this petition for certiorari. Rule 116, Sec. 1. Arraignment and
plea; how made.--
HELD: Was the jurisdiction lost when the xxx
accused escaped from the custody of the law (b) The accused must be present
and failed to appear during the trial? No. As we at the arraignment and must personally
have consistently ruled, jurisdiction once enter his plea. Both arraignment and plea
acquired is not lost upon the instance of parties shall be made of record, but a failure to
but continues until the case is terminated. The enter of record shall not affect the
lower court was correct in proceeding with the validity of the proceedings.
reception of evidence but it erred when is
suspended the proceedings as to the
respondent. The court need not wait for the b. During trial, for identification
time until the accused finally decides to appear.
To allow this delay is to render ineffective the People v. Salas, 143 SCRA 163 (1986), supra.
constitutional provision on trial in absentia.
HELD: The right to be present at one's
9. When presence of the accused is a trial may now be waived except only at
DUTY that stage where the prosecution intends
to present witnesses who will identify the
In People v. Avancena, 32 O.G. 713, the accused.
SC held that (a) the accused has the right to be
present during trial; (b) if he is in the custody c. Promulgation of sentence, unless it is for a
of the law, presence in all stage is likewise a light offense, in which case accused may
duty during (i) arraignment, (ii) entering a plea, appear by counsel, or a representative (Rule
and (iii) promulgation of judgment. This rule 120, Sec. 6.)
however has been modified.
E. Priviledge against self incrimination
As things stand, the following are the rules:
Art. III, Sec. 17. No person shall be
compelled to be a witness against himself.
Constitutional Law II

authority and the result showed that the


Any confession or admission obtained in defendant was suffering from said disease. As
violation of section 17 hereof shall be was suggested by Judge Lobingier, had the
inadmissible in evidence against him. [Art. III, defendant been found with stolen property
Sec. 12 (3)] upon his person, there certainly could have
been no question had the stolen property been
1. Scope of privilege: taken for the purpose of using the same as
Compulsory Testimonial self-incrimination evidence against him. So also if the clothing
which he wore, by reason of blood stains or
The privilege covers only testimonial otherwise, had furnished evidence of the
incrimination obtained compulsorily. It refers commission of a crime, there certainly could
therefore to the use of the mental process and have been no objection to taking such for the
the communicative faculties, and not to a purpose of using the same as proof. No one
merely physical activity. If the act is physical or would think of even suggesting that stolen
mechanical, the accused can be compelled to property and the clothing in the case indicated,
allow or perform the act, and the result can be taken from the defendant, could not be used
used in evidence against him. against him as evidence, without violating the
rule that a person shall not be required to give
Thus the accused can be required to testimony against himself.
allow a sample of a substance taken from his But the prohibition of compelling a man
body (U.S. v. Tan Teng. 23, Phil. 145 (1912)). in a criminal court to be a witness against
himself, is a prohibition of the use of physical or
F: This defendant was charged with the moral compulsion, to extort communications
crime of rape. He was found guilty of the from him, not an exclusion of his body as
charge. He appeals the decision on the ground evidence, when it may be material. The
that the lower court erred in admitting the objection, in principle, would forbid a jury
testimony of the physicians about having taken (court) to look at a person and compare his
a certain substance from the body of the features with a photograph in proof. Moreover
accused while he was confined in jail and we are not considering how far a court would go
regarding the chemical analysis made of the in compelling a man to exhibit himself, for when
substance to demonstrate the physical he is exhibited, whether voluntarily or by order,
condition of the accused with reference to a even if the order goes too far, the evidence if
venereal disease. It was discovered that the material, is competent.
rape victim was infected by venereal disease so The prohibition contained in section 5 of
that the finding of venereal disease in the the Philippine Bill that a person shall not be
accused was material to his conviction. compelled to be a witness against himself, is
Upon this information the defendant simply a prohibition against legal process to
was arrested and taken to the police station and extract from the defendant's own lips, against
stripped of his clothing and examined. The his will, an admission of his guilt.
policeman who examined the defendant swore Mr. Wigmore, in his valuable work on
from the venereal disease known as gonorrhea. evidence, in discussing the question before us,
The policeman took a portion of the substance said:
emitting from the body of the defendant and If, in other words, it (the rule) created
turned it over to the Bureau of Science for the inviolability not only for his [physical control] in
purpose of having a scientific analysis made of whatever form exercised, then it would be
the same. The result of the examination showed possible for a guilty person to shut himself up in
that the defendant was suffering from his house, with all the tools and indicia of his
gonorrhea. crime, and defy the authority of the law to
employ in evidence anything that might be
Issue: Whether or not the information that the obtained by forcibly overthrowing his
accused has gonorrhea may be used against possession and compelling the surrender of the
him evidential articles a clear reductio ad
absurdum. In other words, it is not merely
Ruling: YES. The accused was not compelled to compulsion that is the kernel of the privilege, . .
make any admissions or answer any questions, . but testimonial compulsion. (4 Wigmore, sec.
and the mere fact that an object found on his 2263.)
person was examined: seems no more to The main purpose of the provision of the
infringe the rule invoked, than would the Philippine Bill is to prohibit compulsory oral
introduction in evidence of stolen property examination of prisoners before trial. or upon
taken from the person of a thief. trial, for the purpose of extorting unwilling
The substance was taken from the body confessions or declarations implicating them in
of the defendant without his objection, the the commission of a crime. (People vs. Gardner,
examination was made by competent medical 144 N. Y., 119.)
Constitutional Law II

The doctrine contended for by appellant F: The facts are not dispute. In a criminal
would prohibit courts from looking at the fact of case pending before the Court of First Instance
a defendant even, for the purpose of disclosing of the city of Manila, Emeteria Villaflor and
his identity. Such an application of the Florentino Souingco are charged with the crime
prohibition under discussion certainly could not of adultery. The court ordered the defendant
be permitted. Such an inspection of the bodily Emeteria Villaflor, to submit her body to the
features by the court or by witnesses, can not examination of one or two competent doctors to
violate the privilege granted under the determine if she was pregnant or not. The
Philippine Bill, because it does not call upon the accused refused to obey the order on the
accused as a witness it does not call upon the ground that such examination of her person
defendant for his testimonial responsibility. Mr. was a violation of the constitutional provision
Wigmore says that evidence obtained in this relating to self-incrimination. Thereupon she
way from the accused, is not testimony but his was found in contempt of court and was
body his body itself. ordered to be committed to Bilibid Prison until
she should permit the medical examination
required by the court.
The accused can be ordered to expel
the morphine from his mouth (U.S. v. Ong Sio Issue: Whether the compelling of a woman to
Hong 36 Phil 735, (1917)). permit her body to be examined by physicians
to determine if she is pregnant, violates that
U.S. v. Ong Sio Hong 36 Phil 735, (1917) portion of the Philippine Bill of Rights

Counsel for appellant raises the Ruling: The constitutional guaranty, that no
constitutional question that the accused was person shall be compelled in any criminal case
compelled to be a witness against himself. The to be a witness against himself, is limited to a
contention is that this was the result of forcing prohibition against compulsory testimonial self-
the accused to discharge the morphine from his incrimination. The corollary to the proposition is
mouth. To force a prohibited drug from the that, an ocular inspection of the body of the
person of an accused is along the same line as accused is permissible. The proviso is that
requiring him to exhibit himself before the torture of force shall be avoided. Whether facts
court; or putting in evidence papers and other fall within or without the rule with its corollary
articles taken from the room of an accused in and proviso must, of course, be decided as
his absence; or, as in the Tan Teng case, taking cases arise.
a substance from the body of the accused to be It is a reasonable presumption that in an
used in proving his guilt. It would be a forced examination by reputable and disinterested
construction of the paragraph of the Philippine physicians due care will be taken not to use
Bill of Rights in question to hold that any article, violence and not to embarass the patient any
substance, or thing taken from a person more than is absolutely necessary. Indeed, no
accused of crime could not be given in objection to the physical examination being
evidence. The main purpose of this made by the family doctor of the accused or by
constitutional provision is to prohibit testimonial doctor of the same sex can be seen.
compulsion by oral examination in order to
extort unwilling confessions from prisoners The taking of footprint sample to see if it
implicating them in the commission of a crime. matches the ones found in the scene of the
(Harris vs. Coats [1885], 75 Ga., 415.) crime is allowed (People v. Salas and People v.
Sara).

The accused can be made to take off However, making the accused take
her garments and shoes and be photographed. dictation to get a specimen of her handwriting
(People v. Otadura, 96 Phil 244 (1950)). is not allowed, for this involves the use of the
mental process. [Bermudez v. Castillo, 64 Phil.
485 (1937).]
A woman accused of adultery can be
compelled to show her body for physical Bermudez v. Castillo, 64 Phil. 485 (1937)
investigation to see if she is pregnant (Villaflor
v. Summers, 41 Phil. 62 (1920)). Viewed F: In connection with this administrative
against present standards, however, it is case, said respondent filed, six letters which, for
possible that this method of determining purposes of identification, were marked as
pregnancy would violate due process as being Exhibits 32, 34, 35, 36 and 37. He contends that
too barbaric. said six letters are the complainant's, but the
latter denied it while she was testifying as a
Villaflor v. Summers, 41 Phil. 62 (1920) witness in rebuttal.
Constitutional Law II

Respondent required complainant to F: Villarojo, Cademas and Sorela were


copy the letters in her own handwriting in the convicted in the lower court of murder for the
presence of the investigator. The complainant, death of Bagon. Olvis, the alleged principal by
refused invoking her right not to incriminate inducement, was acquitted. The three accused
herself. The investigator, upholding the were convicted on the basis of the extrajudicial
complainant, did not compel her to submit to confessions executed by them in the presence
the trial required, thereby denying the of a counsel summoned by the NBI to handle
respondent's petition. appellants' case, and the reenactment done by
them of the circumstances surrounding the
Issue: Whether or not the complainant may be killing.
forced to make a copy of the letters in her own
handwriting RULING: The extrajudicial confessions are
inadmissible. They were made in the presence
Ruling: No. It would violate her right against of a counsel summoned by the NBI and not of
self- incrimination. appellants' own choice. He cannot therefore be
The constitution provides: "No person said to have been acting on behalf of the
shall be compelled to be a witness against accused when he lent his presence at the
himself." It should be noted that before it was confession proceedings.
attempted to require the complainant to copy But the accused were denied their right
the six documents above-stated, she had sworn to counsel not once but twice when they were
to tell the truth before the investigator forced to re-enact the crime. Forced re-
authorized to receive statements under oath, enactments like uncounselled and coerced
and under said oath she asserted that the confessions come within the ban against self-
documents in question had not been written by incrimination. This constitutional privilege has
her. Were she compelled to write and were it been defined as a protection against testimonial
proven by means of what she might write later compulsion but this has since been extended to
that said documents had really been written by any evidence communicative in nature acquired
her, it would be impossible for her to evade under circumstances of duress. Essentially, the
prosecution for perjury. right is meant to avoid and prohibit positively
The reason for the privilege appears the repetition and recurrence of the certainly
evident. The purpose thereof is positively to inhuman procedure of compelling a person, in a
avoid and prohibit thereby the repetition and criminal or any other case, to furnish the
recurrence of the certainly inhuman procedure missing evidence necessary for his conviction.
of compelling a person, in a criminal or any
other case, to furnish the missing evidence People v. Go, 237 SCRA 73
necessary for his conviction. If such is its
purpose, then the evidence must be sought F: After a buy-bust operation accused were
elsewhere; and if it is desired to discover arrested by the police. Upon the presentation
evidence in the person himself, then he must be of a search warrant, the house of the accused
promised and assured at least absolute was searched, and several prohibited drugs
immunity by one authorized to do so legally, or were seized. They were charged with and
he should be asked, one for all, to furnish such convicted of violation of the Dangerous Drugs
evidence voluntarily without any condition. This law. They contended that they had not been
court is of the opinion that in order that the shown a search warrant. In concluding that a
constitutional provision under consideration search warrant had been presented to the
may prove to be a real protection and not a accused prior to the search, the trial court relied
dead letter, it must be given a liberal and broad on a document entitiled “Certificate of Re-
interpretation favorable to the person invoking conduct of Search”, signed by the accused.
it.
In view of the foregoing consideration ISSUE: Whether or not such document is
and holding, as it is hereby held, that the admissible in evidence.
complainant is perfectly entitled to the privilege
invoked by her, the respondent's petition is RULING: IT CANNOT BE ADMITTED IN ITS
denied. ENTIRETY.
The second paragraph of the
Also requiring the accused to reenact Certification amounts to an implied admission
the crime is not allowed, for this also involves that shabu, the marked money, and shabu
the mental process. papaphernalia had been found by the police
authorities at the residence of the Go spouses
and therefore, subject to the control and
People v. Olvis, 154 SCRA 525 custody of the accused (the spouses) and
necessarily in their possession. To this extent,
the “Certification” is a declaration against the
Constitutional Law II

interest and tacit admission of the crime he could secure a restraining order from a
charged. The second paragraph of the competent authority.
Certification is a self-incriminatory statment A decision was rendered by the lower
made at a time when the spouses were not court on August 2, 1965, finding the claim of
assisted by counsel and under circumstances petitioner-appellee to be well-founded and
(in the course of or immediately after the prohibiting respondent Board "from compelling
search of the residence and seizure of the petitioner to act and testify as a witness for
quantities of shabu) which render intelligent the complainant in said investigation without
waiver of their right against self-incrimination his consent and against himself."
open to serious doubt.
The Court considers that there is HELD: Petitioner could suffer the revocation of
nothing to prevent admission of the his license as a medical practitioner, for some
“Certification” to substantiate the fact that a an even greater deprivation.
search warrant issued by a judge had been Why it should be thus is not difficult to
brought to the attention of the spouses in the discern. The constitutional guarantee, along
course of the raid or buy-bust operation carried with other rights granted an accused, stands for
out at their residence and that in the course a belief that while crime should not go
thereof, no force or intimidation had been unpunished and that the truth must be
exercised upon the spouses. revealed, such desirable objectives should not
Notwithstanding such, the accused were be accomplished according to means or
convicted of the crime charged against them. methods offensive to the high sense of respect
accorded the human personality. More and
2. In what proceedings available more in line with the democratic creed, the
deference accorded an individual even those
The privilege is available in any suspected of the most heinous crimes is given
proceedings, even outside the court, for they due weight. To quote from Chief Justice Warren,
may eventually lead to a criminal prosecution. "the constitutional foundation underlying the
privilege is the respect a government ... must
In Pascual v. Board of Medical accord to the dignity and integrity of its
Examiners, 28 SCRA 344 (1969), the SC held citizens."
that the privilege against self-incrimination Thus according to Justice Douglas: "The
extends to administrative proceedings which Fifth Amendment in its Self-Incrimination clause
possess a criminal or penal aspect. In this case, enables the citizen to create a zone of privacy
it was held that a doctor who was being which government may not force to surrender
investigated by a medical board for alleged to his detriment." So also with the observation
malpractice and would lose his license if found of the late Judge Frank who spoke of "a right to
guilty, could not be compelled to take the a private enclave where he may lead a private
witness stand without his consent. life. That right is the hallmark of our
democracy." In the light of the above, it could
Pascual v. Board of Medical Examiners, 28 SCRA thus clearly appear that no possible objection
344 (1969) could be legitimately raised against the
correctness of the decision now on appeal. We
F: Arsenio Pascual, Jr., petitioner-appellee, hold that in an administrative hearing against a
filed on February 1, 1965 with the Court of First medical practitioner for alleged malpractice,
Instance of Manila an action for prohibition with respondent Board of Medical Examiners cannot,
prayer for preliminary injunction against the consistently with the self-incrimination clause,
Board of Medical Examiners, now respondent- compel the person proceeded against to take
appellant. It was alleged therein that at the the witness stand without his consent.
initial hearing of an administrative case for
alleged immorality, counsel for complainants In Galman v. Pamaran, infra, the
announced that he would present as his first privilege was held to extend to fact-finding
witness herein petitioner- appellee, who was the investigation by an adhoc body.
respondent in such malpractice charge.
Thereupon, petitioner-appellee, through
counsel, made of record his objection, relying Galman v. Pamaran, 138 SCRA 274 (1985)
on the constitutional right to be exempt from
being a witness against himself. Respondent- A person can be compelled to testify provided
appellant, the Board of Examiners, took note of he is given immunity co-extensive with the
such a plea, at the same time stating that at the privilege against self- incrimination
next scheduled hearing, on February 12, 1965,
petitioner-appellee would be called upon to F: The respondents led by General Fabian
testify as such witness, unless in the meantime Ver and Major General Prospero Olivas testified
before the Agrava Board looking into the killing
Constitutional Law II

of former Senator Benigno Aquino. They were of a witness. The problem concerns the extent
subsequently accused of murder in two cases of immunity that the State must grant in order
for the killing of Sen. Aquino and Rolando to protect the privilege against self-
Galman. They were charged as accessories in incrimination.
both. The prosecution offered in evidence the
testimony of Ver and Olivas before the Agrava Transactional Immunity
Board, but on the latter's objections, the
Sandiganbayan excluded the testimony. The In a transactional immunity, a person is
private and public prosecutions filed petitions given immunity from prosecution of the crime in
for certiorari. connection with which he gave his testimony.
The immunity is from the prosecution, not
HELD: The persons summoned to testify before merely from the use of the testimony. Thus,
the Agrava Board were "under investigation for even if the guilt of the person testifying can be
the commission of the offense" within the proven by independent means, he can not be
meaning of Art. III, sec. 12. It is to be noted that prosecuted anymore.
the framers of the Constitution did not adopt
the Miranda reference to "custodial Use and Fruit Immunity
investigation." The subject matter dealt with
and the questioning before the Agrava Board In a use and fruit immunity, a person is
indubitably evinced purposes other than merely exempted from the use of his testimony as well
determining the surrounding facts and as the leads (fruits) that the testimony opened
circumstances of the assassination. The up in a criminal prosecution arising from what
respondents were called to determine their he testified on. The immunity in this case is
probable involvement in the crime. Yet they from the testimony given. Thus, if the state can
were not informed or at the very least warned procure evidence, independent of the testimony
of their right to remain silent and that any and its fruits, it can prosecute the person
statement given by them may be used against testifying nevertheless.
them. The first portion of Sec. 5 of PD 1886
denied them the right to remain silent, and
gave power to the Board to punish refusal to History in the United States
testify. The SC said it is not satisfied that when
they testified they waived their constitutional In Councilman v. Hitchcock (1892), the
right not be compelled to be a witness against SC ruled that the only way to respect the right
themselves, much less their right to remain against self-incrimination is to give
silent. The SC also said it cannot be contended transactional immunity; anything less violates
that the privilege against self- incrimination the constitutional right.
applies only to criminal prosecutions. Art. III,
sec. 17 of the Const. provides that "No person Thus, Congress in 1893 passed the
shall be compelled to be a witness against Compulsory Testimony Act, providing for
himself." transactional immunity.

In 1964, the U.S. SC in Murphy v.


Waterfront Commission of New York hinted that
Compare People v. Ayson, 175 SCRA 216 it was not really necessary to give transactional
(1989), supra. immunity in order to protect the right against
self incrimination.
3. "Use and Fruit Immunity" v.
"Transactional Immunity" This gave the U.S. Congress the cue to
revise the Compulsory Testimony Act and
When the State requires testimony to be provide for a "use and fruit immunity".
made before a board or body, it has to grant
immunity by means of law to the persons With the validity of this limited immunity
testifying, so as not to violate their right against was raised, the SC in Castigas v. U.S. and
self-incriminatrion. This is the only way to Zicarelli v. U.S. ruled that the right is amply
reconcile two conflicting values; public interest protected by the use and fruit immunity.
to get certain relevant information, say, to
legislation, that can only be supplied by the
testimony of certain persons and the highly In the Philippines
primed constitutional right not to make a
person a witness against himself. There is no fixed rule in the Philippines.
"Transactional immunity" can be found in the
Through an immunity statute, the state following:
in effect exchanges immunity for the testimony
Constitutional Law II

Art. XIII, Sec. 18. The Commission Board, but not immunity from prosecution by
on Human Rights shall have the following reason or on the basis thereof. VV
powers and functions
xxx
(8) Grant immunity from 4. Exclusionary rule
prosecution to any person whose
testimony or possession of documents or Art. III, Sec. 12. xxx
other evidence is necessary or convenient (3) Any confession or admission
to determine the truth in any investigation obtained in violationof this or Section 17
conducted by it or under its authority. hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence
against him.
Use and Fruit Immunity
The paradigmatic application of the
On the other hand, "use and fruit exclusionary rule is a traditionally coerced
immunity can be found in P.D. 1886, which confession, and not so much on uncounselled
created the Agrava Fact Finding Board, and statement. A fortiori, testimony forced out of a
which was the subject-matter of Galman v. person cannot be used in evidence against that
Pamaran, 138 SCRA 274 (1985). person.

In this case, Ver and other high-ranking 5. Effect of denial of the privilege by
AFP officials were made to testify before the court
Agrava Board investigating the double murder
of Sen. Aquino and Galman. Under P.D.1886, When the privilege against self-
every person summoned by the Board has to incrimination is violated outside of court, say,
appear and testify on pain of being held in by the police, then the testimony, as already
contempt. Any testimony made, in turn, was noted, is not admissible under the exclusionary
exempted from being "used" in a criminal rule.
prosecution. Despite this however, a case was
file against Ver in the Sandiganbayan, and one When the privilege is violated by the
of the evidence presented was the testimony he court itself, that is, by the judge, the court is
made before the Board. When objected to, the ousted of its jurisdiction, all its proceedings are
Sandiganbayan sustained the objection. And so null and void, and it is as if no judgment has
the matter was raised to the SC on certiorari. been rendered. A classic case is Chavez v.
Court of Appeals, 34 SCRA 663 (1968).
The SC held that the testimony could Chavez v. Court of Appeals, 34 SCRA 663 (1968)
not be used in a subsequent proceeding. it
hinted that were it not for the provision in the F: The thrust of petitioner's case presented
decree conmpelling attendance and testimony in his original and supplementary petitions
on pain of being held in contempt, the accused invoking jurisdiction of this Court is that he is
could have invoked the right against self- entitled, on habeas corpus, to be freed from
incrimination. But since the state needed the imprisonment upon the ground that in the trial
testimony, it gave them immunity and so now, which resulted in his conviction he was denied
the State must honor its obligation and disallow his constitutional right not to be compelled to
the use of the testimony in the criminal testify against himself. There is his prayer, too,
prosecution. that, should he fail in this, he be granted the
alternative remedies of certiorari to strike down
Galman v. Pamaran, 138 SCRA 274 (1985), the two resolutions of the Court of Appeals
supra. dismissing his appeal for failure to file brief, and
of mandamus to direct the said court to forward
HELD: Immunity statutes may be generally his appeal to this Court for the reason that he
classified into two: one, which grants "use was raising purely questions of law.
immunity" and the other, which grants what is Accused Chavez was made to testify
known as "transactional immunity." The as a witness for the prosecution without him
distinction between the two is: "Use immunity" being considered a state witness inspite of
prohibits use of a witness' compelled testimony objections by his counsel.
and its fruits in any manner in connection with Roger Chavez was found guilty. The
the criminal prosecution of the witness. On the court had this to say: "Roger Chavez does not
other hand, "transactional immunity" grants offer any defense. As a matter of fact, his
immunity to the witness from prosecution for an testimony as witness for the prosecution
offense to which his compelled testimony establishes his guilt beyond reasonable doubt."
relates. PD 1886, sec. 5 grants merely immunity The trial court branded him "a self- confessed
from use of any statement given before the culprit".
Constitutional Law II

Issue: Whether or not Chavez right against self- counted against him. His testimony is not of his
incrimination was violated own choice. To him it was a case of compelled
submission. He was a cowed participant in
Ruling: YES proceedings before a judge who possessed the
The right agianst self-incrimination is power to put him under contempt had he
"not merely a formal technical rule the chosen to remain silent. Nor could he escape
enforcement of which is left to the discretion of testifying. The court made it abundantly clear
the court"; it is mandatory; it secures to a that his testimony at least on direct
defendant a valuable and substantive right; it examination would be taken right then and
is fundamental to our scheme of justice. thereon the first day of the trial.
The constitutional proscription was The course which petitioner takes is
established on broad grounds of public policy correct. Habeas corpus is a high prerogative
and humanity; of policy because it would place writ. It is traditionally considered as an
the witness against the strongest temptation to exceptional remedy to release a person whose
commit perjury, and of humanity because it liberty is illegally restrained such as when the
would be to extort a confession of truth by a accused's constitutional rights are disregarded.
kind of duress every species and degree of Such defect results in the absence or loss of
which the law abhors. jurisdiction and therefore invalidates the trial
Therefore, the court may not extract and the consequent conviction of the accused
from a defendant's own lips and against his will whose fundamental right was violated. That
an admission of his guilt. Nor may a court as void judgment of conviction may be challenged
much as resort to compulsory disclosure, by collateral attack, which precisely is the
directly or indirectly, of facts usable against him function of habeas corpus. Habeas corpus is
as a confession of the crime or the tendency of proper to challenge a conviction where the
which is to prove the commission of a crime. consitutional rights of the accused were
Because, it is his right to forego testimony, to violated.
remain silent, unless he chooses to take the A court which denies the accused of his
witness stand with undiluted, unfettered constitutional rights is ousted of its jurisdiction.
exercise of his own free, genuine will. The judgment of conviction pronounced by a
Compulsion as it is understood here court without jurisdiction is void, and one
does not necessarily connote the use of imprisoned thereunder may obtain release of
violence; it may be the product of unintentional habeas corpus.
statements. Pressure which operates to
overbear his will, disable him from making a Notes on the case: In this case, the
free and rational choice, or impair his capacity accused Chavez was compelled by the judge
for rational judgment would in our opinion be with the threat of being held in contempt to
sufficient. So is moral coercion "tending to force take the witness stand, in spite of his objection
testimony from the unwilling lips of the that he had the right to remain silent and not to
defendant." be a witness against himself. And so he took
Petitioner, as accused, occupies a the witness stand and was convicted by
different tier of protection from an ordinary qualified theft. He appealed but the lawyer
witness. Whereas an ordinary witness may be failed to file the appellant's brief and so the
compelled to take the witness stand and claim appeal was dismissed, the judgment became
the privilege as each question requiring an final and executory, and he served his
incriminating answer is shot at him, and sentence. Years later, Chavez went to the SC
accused may altogether refuse to take the on habeas corpus, contending that his
witness stand and refuse to answer any and all convictioin was void because it was rendered on
questions. For, in reality, the purpose of calling the basis of evidence obtained in the violation
an accused as a witness for the People would be of his right against self- incrimination. The SC
to incriminate him. granted the petition and released him.
Habeas Corpus, as shown by this case,
xxx With all these, we have no is an extraordinary post-conviction, mid-
hesitancy in saying that petitioner was forced to sentence, remedy. The petition for habeas
testify to incriminate himself, in full breach of corpus is such that it inquires into all questions
his constitutional right to remain silent. It of illegal detention. When the judge compelled
cannot be said now that he has waived his right. the accused to take the witness stand, he was
He did not volunteer to take the stand and in ousted of his jurisdiction and all subsequent
his own defense; he did not offer himself as a proceedings became void. Ultimately, the
witness; on the contrary, he claimed the right judgment of conviction and even the sentence
upon being called to testify. If petitioner were likewise void, thus making the detention
nevertheless answered the questions inspite of of Chavez illegal, and thus actionable by
his fear of being accused of perjury or being put habeas corpus.
under contempt, this circumstance cannot be
Constitutional Law II

The case also illustrates the difference ordered tried together with 19 civilians accused
between the ordinary witness and the accused. before a civil court. It is also clear from the
A witness can be conmpelled to take the stand; records that the acts for which Sgt. Animas was
he can only object to the questions as they charged had nothing to do with the
come, invoking his right against self- performance of official duty.
incrimination. The crime for which the petitioners were
But in the case of the accused, he charged was committed on November 10, 1971
cannot even be made to take the witness stand, long before the proclamation of martial law.
for the only purpose of such is to incriminate There was no question about the case being
him. prosecuted by civilian fiscals and tried by civil
Of course, the moment the accused courts at the time. Now that it is already late
agrees to take the stand, he is deemed to have 1986, and martial law is a thing of the past,
waived his right, and must now thus submit hopefully never more to return, there is no
himself to cross-examination. more reason why a murder committed in 1971
should still be retained, at this time, by a
E. Right to an impartial tribunal and trial military tribunal.
of civilians by military courts

Animas v. Minister of National Defense, 146 Olaguer v. Military Commission No. 34,
SCRA 406 (1986) 150 SCRA 144

F: This petition challenges the Military trial of civilians void even under Martial
jurisdiction of a military tribunal to try twelve Law if the civil courts are open
accused persons, only one of whom is in the
military, for the offense devoid of any national F: Petitioners were found guilty of
security or political complexion and committed subversion by the respondent military
long before the proclamation of martial law, commission and sentenced to death. They filed
The petitioners were charged with a petition for habeas corpus, certiorari,
murder in connection with the alleged killing of prohibition and mandamus before the SC,
Yanson, a political leader,during the November questioning the jurisdiction of the military
11 elections. tribunal.
The accused were arrested almost a
year later, on September 21, 1972 after martial HELD: In Aquino v. Military Commission (1975),
law was proclaimed. It was only in 1974 that a the SC held that "Martial law creates and
"summary preliminary investigation" was exception to the general rules of exclusive
conducted by a PC captain belonging to the jurisdiction, and renders offenses against the
Judge Advocate General Service. The petitioners laws of war as well as those of a civil character,
were recommended for prosecution before the triable by military tribunals.xxx" Due process,
Military Tribunal, considering that one of them, however demands that in all criminal cases
petitioner Sgt. Rodolfo Animas is a military prosecutions, the accused shall be entitled to,
personnel. Thereafter, the Judge Advocate among others, a trial. As explained by Justice
General filed the corresponding charge sheet, Teehankee in his dissenting opinion in Aquino v.
but he modified the crime charged from Military Commission supra: "Judicial power is
"Murder" to "Violation of Section 878 of the vested by the Constitution exclusively in the SC
Revised Administrative Code" in Relation to and insuch inferior courts as are established by
Section 2692 of the same Code and Presidential law. Judicial power exists only in the courts
Decree No. 9, " Illegal Possession of Firearms which have the exlcusive power to hear and
with Murder." determine those matters which affect the life or
On February 16, 1978, the Minister of liberty or property of a citizen." Since we are
National Defense referred the case to the not an enemy occupied territory and even on
Military Tribunal's Branch of the Judge Advocate the premise that martial continues in force, the
General's Office (JAGO) which in turn assigned military tribunals cannot try and exercise
the same to respondent Military Commission jurisdiction over civilians for civil offenses
No. 27. committed by them which are properly
cognizable by the civil courts.
Issue: Whether or not Military Commission No. xxx
27 is without jurisdiction over the criminal case "The presiding officer at a court martial
is not a judge whose objectivity and
Ruling: The military court is without jurisdiction. independence are protected by tenure and
We apply the rule in Rolando A. de undiminshed salary and nurtured by the judicial
Guzman v. Hon. Alejandro R. Leopando, et al, tradition, but is a military officer. Substantially
(G.R. No. 62798, December 22, 1983 and March different rules of evidence and procedure apply
13, 1984) where the lone military personnel was in military trials. Apart from these differences,
Constitutional Law II

the suggestion of the possibility of influence on which time the petitioners may apply for bail for
the actions of the court-martial by the officer their temporary release.
who convenes it, selects its members and the The Solicitor General not unreasonably
counsel on both sides, and who usually has anticipates questions to arise as to the
direct command and authority over its availability of certain defenses to the petitioners
members is a pervasive one in military laws, upon their prosecution before the civil courts. It
despite strenuous efforts to eliminate the seems evident, however, that no breach of the
danger. VV. constitutional prohibition against twice putting
an accused in jeopardy of punishment for the
same offense would result from the retrial of
the petitioners" cases, for the simple reason
that the absence of jurisdiction of the courts
Cruz v. Ponce-Enrile, 160 SCRA 702 (1988) martial to try and convict the petitioners
prevented the first jeopardy from attaching.
F: Habeas corpus proceedings were Valid previous proceedings are required in order
commenced in this Court on October 1, 1986 to that the defense of double jeopardy can be
test the legality of the continued detention of raised by the accused in the second
some 217 so-called "political detainees prosecution.
arrested in the nine-year span of official martial
rule and committed to the New Bilibid Prisons in G. Bills of attainder-- Legislative
Muntinlupa. All had been made to stand trial for adjudication of guilt
common crimes before various courts martial;
if any of these offenses had any political color, Bill of Attainder
this had neither been pleaded nor proved.
Of the 217 prisoners, 157 are A "bill of attainder" is a law which
civilians, and only 26 confirmed as military substitutes the legislative determination of guilt
personnel. for a judicial determination. Through a statute,
the legislature finds individuals or groups guilty,
Issue: Whether or not military courts have without the benefit of being proven so in court.
jurisdiction over civilians
A bill of attainder is of two kinds: (i) bill
Ruling: No of attainder proper (legislative imposition of the
As held in Olaguer: A military death penalty) and (ii) bill of pains and
jurisdiction or tribunal cannot try and exercise penalties (imposition of a lesser penalty).
jurisdiction, even during the period of martial
law, over civilians for offenses allegedly In People v. Ferrer, 48 SCRA 382 (1972),
committed by them as long as the civil courts the Anti-Subversion Law (RA 1700) which
are open and functioning, and that any declared the Communist Party of the Philippines
judgment rendered by such body relating to a a clear and present danger to Philippine
civilian is null and void for lack of jurisdiction on security, and thus prohibited membership in
the part of the military tribunal concerned such organization, was contended to be a bill of
The fact cannot be ignored, however, attainder. The SC, however, dismissed the
that crimes appear to have been committed, contention, holding that although the law
and there are accusations against herein mentions the CPP in particular, its purpose is
petitioners for those offenses. Olaguer cannot not to define a crime but only to lay a basis or
and does not operate to absolve the petitioners to justify the legislative determination that
of these charges, or establish that the same are membership in such organization is a crime
baseless, so as to entitle them to immediate because of the clear and present danger to
release from detention. It is not to be forgotten national security.
that the victims in offenses ascribed to the
petitioners have as much interest as the State
has to prosecute the alleged authors of the People v. Ferrer, 48 SCRA 382 (1972)
misdeeds. Justice will be better served if the
detention of such of the petitioners as are not F: Posed in issue in these two cases is the
hereby ordered released or excepted, is constitutionality of the Anti-Subversion Act,
continued until their cases are transferred to which outlaws the Communist Party and other
the ordinary courts having jurisdiction, and the "subversive associations", and punishes any
necessary informations have been filed against person who "knowingly, willfully and by overt
them therein, as has already been done in the acts affiliates himself, with, becomes or remains
case of petitioners Imperial D. Usman and Samu a member," of the Party and of any other
Gumal. The State should be given a reasonable similar "subversive" organization.
period of time to accomplish this transfer, at
ISSUE: W/N this law is a bill of attainder.
Constitutional Law II

of the case for decision which is the date of


HELD: NO filing of the last pleading [Art. VIII, Sec. 15 (1).]
A bill of attainder is a legislative act III. SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS UNDER THE DUE
which inflicts punishment without trial. Its PROCESS CLAUSE
essence is the substitution of a legislative for a
judicial determination of guilt. The
constitutional ban against bill of attainder A. What acts cannot be criminalized
serves to implement the principle of separation
of powers by confining legislatures to rule- 1. Mere beliefs and aspirations
making and thereby forestalling legislative
usurpation of the judicial function. Art. III, Sec. 18. (1) No person
When the Act is viewed in its actual shall be detained solely by reason of his
operation, it will be seen that it does not specify political beliefs and aspirations.
the Communist Party of the Phils (CPP) of the
members thereof for the purpose of
punishment. What it does is simply to declare 2. Debts and civil obligations
the Party to an organized conspiracy for the
overthrow of the Government for the purposes Art. III. Sec. 20. No person shall be
of the prohibition against membersip in the imprisoned for debt or non-payment of a
outlawed organization. The term "CPP" is used poll tax.
solely for definition purposes. In fact the Act
applies not only to the CPP but to "any other
organizatuiion having the same purposes and What the law prohibits is imprisonment
their successors". Its focus is not on individuals for non-payment of a contractual obligation.
but on conduct.
Indeed, were the Anti-Subversion Act a When one is convicted of estafa and
bill of attainder, it would be totally unnecessary sent to prison, the imprisonment is not for the
to charge Communists in court, as the law non- payment of debt but for the deceit or
alone, without more would suffice to secure abuse of confidence employed by the convict.
their punishement. But the undeniable fact is
that their guilt still has to be judicially Thus, in Lozano v. Martinez, 146 SCRA
established. The Government has yet to prove 123 (1986), the SC again upheld Batas Blg. 22
at the trial that the accused joined the Party (Bouncing Checks Law) as not unconsitutional
knowingly, willfully and by overt acts, and that for being violative of the rule against non-
they joined with the specific intent to further its imprisonment for debt. It is true that under this
basic objectives. law deceit is not necessary. It is, however, a
valid exercise of the State of its power to
H. Right to a speedy disposition of cases determine what acts constitute a crime.

Art. III, Sec. 16. All persons shall What the Consitution further prohibits is
have the right to a speedy disposition of imprisonment for non-payment of poll tax,
their cases before all judicial, quasi- which is a tax imposed on certain persons
judicial, or administrative bodies. regardless of their property or business. The
prohibition does not apply to non-payment of
property taxes and taxes on privilege.

The right to a speedy disposition of


cases complements the right to a speedy trial. Lozano v. Martinez, 146 SCRA 323 (1986)
After the case has been submitted for decision,
so that technically the trial stage is terminated, F: BP 22 punishes any person "who
the Constitution mandates that the judicial, makes or draws and issues any check on
quasi- judicial or administrative body or tribunal account or for value, knowing at the time
must decide the case consistent with the right of issue that he does not have sufficient
of the accused to a speedy disposition of his funds in or credit with the drawee bank for
case. the payment of said check in full upon
presentment, which check is subsequently
To carry out this mandate, the dishonored by the drawee bank for
Constitution in several other places provides insufficiency of funds xxx" Petitioners
periods for deciding a case: challenged the constitutionality of BP 22
on the following grounds: 1) It offends the
The Supreme Court has to decide cases constitutional provision prohibiting
within 24 months from the date of submission imprisonment for debt; 2) it impairs
freedom of contract; 3) it contravenes the
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equal protection clause; 4) it unduly 3. Changes the punishment and inflicts


delegates legislative and executive a greater punishment than the law annexed to
powers; and 5) its enactment is flawed the crime when committed;
because the Interim Batasan prohibited 4. Alters the legal rules of evidence,
amendment of the bill on 3rd reading. and authorizes conviction upon less or different
testimony than the law required at the time of
HELD: The gravamen of the offense the commission of the offense;
punished in BP 22 is the act of making and 5. Assuming to regulate civil rights and
issuing a worthless check or a check that remedies only, in effect imposes penalty or
is dishonored upon its presentation for deprivation of a right for something which when
payment. It is not the non- payment of an done was lawful; and
obligation which the law punishes. The 6. Deprives a person accused of a crime
law punishes the act not as an offense of some lawful protection to which he has
against property but as an offense against become entitled, such as the protection of a
public order. Recent statistics show that former conviction or acquittal, or a
one third of the entire money supply of proclamation of amnesty. [Quoting Mekin v.
the country consists of currency in Wolfe, 2 Phil. 74 (1902)]
circulation. These demand deposits in the This constitutional prohibition refers
banks constitute the funds against which only to criminal laws which are given
commercial papers are drawn. The retroactive effect.
amount concerned justifies the legitimate While it is true that Sec. 18 penalizes a
concern of the state in preserving the violation of any provisin of RA 6132 including
integrity of the banking system. Sec. 8(a) thereof, the penalty is imposed only
for acts committed after the approval of the law
3. Acts which when done were innocent and not those perpetrated prior thereto. There
is nothing in the law that remotely insinuates
Art. III, Sec. 22. No ex post facto that its provisions shall apply to acts carried
law or bill of attainder shall be enacted. out prior to its approval.

Ex Post Facto Law B. What punishments cannot be imposed

An "ex post facto law" is a law that seeks 1. Involuntary servitude


to punish an act which, when committed, was
not yet a crime or was not as heavily punished. Art. III, Sec. 18 (2) No involuntary
It is a law that retroacts to the day of the act so sevitudes in any form shall exist, except
as to cause prejudice to the person performing as a punishment for a crime whereof the
the act. Its unfairness consists in the fact that party shall have been convicted.
the person could not have known the act was
criminal, and thus could not have avoided the
crime. When a law is more favorable to the 2. Excessive fines
accused, however, it is allowed to retroact.
Art. III, Sec. 19. (1) Excessive
In re Kay Villegas Kami, Inc., 35 SCRA 428 fines shall not be imposed. nor cruel,
degrading or inhuman punishment
F: This petition for declaratory was filed by inflicted. Neither shall the death penalty
Kay Villegas Kami Inc., claiming to be a duly be imposed, unless for compelling reasons
recognized non-stock and non-profit corporation involving heinous crimes, the Congress
created under the laws of the land, and praying hereafter provides for it. Any death
for the detremination of the validity of Sec. 8, penalty already imposed shall be reduced
RA 6132 and a declaration of petitioner's right s to reclusion perpetua.
and duties thereunder. Petitioner claims that
the challenged provision constitutes an ex post
facto law. 3. Cruel, degrading and inhuman
punishments
ISSUE: W/N it is an ex post facto law.
Art. III, Sec. 19. (1) Excessive
HELD: NO fines shall not be imposed. nor cruel,
An ex post facto law is one which: degrading or inhuman punishment
1. Makes criminal an act done before inflicted. Neither shall the death penalty
the passage of the law which was innocent be imposed, unless for compelling reasons
when done, and punishes such an act; involving heinous crimes, the Congress
2. Aggravates a crime , or makes it hereafter provides for it. Any death
greater than it was, when committed;
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penalty already imposed shall be reduced


to reclusion perpetua.
Id., Sec. 12. xxx People v. Munoz, 170 SCRA 107 (1989)
(2) No torture, force, violence,
threat, intimidation, or any other means F: The accused are four of the 11
which vitiate the free will shall be used bodyguards of a mayor who killed three persons
against him. Secret detention places, on suspicion that they were cattle rustlers. They
solitary, incommunicado, or other similar were found guilty of murder. Three appealed to
forms of detention are prohibited. the SC which found them equally liable for the
killing. The penalty for murder under the RPC is
reclusion temporal to death. The question
Assuming that judgment has been concerns the penalty to be imposed in view of
rendered and the accused has been convicted Art. III, sec. 19 which provides that "Neither
the Constitution now further prescribes certain shall the death penalty be imposed, unless for
standards as to the punishment that can be compelling reasons involving heinous crimes,
meted out. After all, due process prohibits Congress provides for it. Any death penalty
barbaric and disproportionate penalties. already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion
perpetua."
The employment of physical,
psychological or degrading punishment against HELD: Art. III, section 19 does not change the
any prisoner or detainee, or the use of periods of the penalty prescribed by Art. 248 of
substandard or inadequate penal facilities the RPC except insofar as it prohibits the
under subhuman conditions, shall be dealt with imposition of the death penalty adn reduces it
by law. [Art. III, Sec. 19 (2).] to reclusion perpetua. The range of medium and
minimum penalties remain the same. VV.
In 1935, the prohibition was against
"cruel and unusual" penalty, in 1973; it was
against "cruel or unusual " penalty; in 1987, the People v. Lubreo, 200 SCRA 11 (1991)
prohibition is against "cruel, degrading or
inhuman" punishment. The purpose in F: A complaint for homicide was filed with
changing the phraseology is to allow for MTC of Del Carmen, Surigao del Norte, charging
experimentation, and not to fix the concept of Remelito Lubreo along with crime of Homicide
what is cruel to the standards of the present in connection with the killing of Mamerto
civilization, or those of antiquity. This notion is Sanico. Judge Gorgolon of said court conducted
supposed to expand and grow, so that what both the preliminary investigation and
today is considered as acceptable may in the preliminary examination. Thereafter, he
next generation be deemed as cruel penalty. forwarded the records of the case to the Office
of Provincial Fiscal. The fiscal conducted his
Whether the cruelty of a punishment own PI and on the basis thereof, he filed an
depends on its form or whether it depends on information for murder not only against remelito
its severity has been ambivalently answered by but also against Lucresio Lubreo. Trial Court
the SC: find them guilty of the crime charged.

In People v. dela Cruz, 92 Phil. 900 ISSUE: W/N the constituional presumption of
(1953) the SC ruled that it was the form of innocence in favor of Lucrecio has been
punishment as fixed in antiquity (pillory overturned by the prosecution
desembowelment, etc.) and not its severity,
that constituted "cruel and unusual" penalty HELD: NO.
under the 1935 Constitution. Thus a An accused is presumed innocent until
disproportionate penalty (10 years the contrary is proved. The burden of proof is
imprisonment for theft) is not cruel or unusual upon the prosecution and until such burden is
because it is only a matter of severity of an sufficiently discharged , the accused continues
acceptable form of punishment (imprisonment). to enjoy the presumption of innocence. In the
instant case, the lower court convicted Lucrecio
The SC spoke in a different way in on the basis of its conclusion that he was
People v. Borja 91 SCRA 340 (1979), Borja was positively identified by witnesses Nenita Monter
sentenced and he served at the national and Epifanio Pangatungan as one of the
penitentiary for 20 years before the case came assailants, and that therefore, his defense of
to the SC. The Court said that Borja had been alibi would not prosper. Unfortunately, the
living in the shadow of death. Although the testimonies of the abovementioned witnesses
sentence was initially valid, it had become cruel did not categorically stated or proved that
by the lapse of time. And yet, this was a form Lucrecio took part in hacking the victim.
of penalty that was neither cruel nor unusual.
Constitutional Law II

Though Monter categorically stated in (1) Court of competent jurisdiction;


her direct examination that she saw the (2) A Complaint or Information
accused Lucresio hacking the victim, in the "re- sufficient in form and substance to sustain a
enactmment", she however candidly informed conviction;
the court Lucresio was just standing by and she (3) Arraignment and plea by the
could not remmenber as to who actually hacked Accused;
the victim. From her version, the participation (4) Conviction, acquittal, or dismissal of
of Lucrecio is at one enveloped inserious doubt. the case without the express consent, of
It is worse in the case of Pangatungan. While the accused.
he stated that "Lucrecio abetted in hacking as if
they will come one after the other in hacking Subsequent prosecution is barred for the
his mind (sic) and the neck", he never following:
elaborated as to what "abetted in hacking "
means. He could not even specify the part of (1) Same offense
the body of Mamerto which was hit by (2) Attempt of the same offense
Lucrecio. (3) Frustration of the same offense
There is evidently insufficient evidence (4) Offense necessarily included in the
to show the actual participation of Lucresio in 1st offense (All the elements of the 2nd
teh crime. There being no evidence of constitute some of the elements of the 1st
conspiracy, he cannot be held for the acts of his offense)
co- appellant. (5) Offense that necessarily includes the
1st offense (All the elements of the 1st
4. Secret detention places, solitary, constitute some of the elements of the 2nd
incommunicado and other forms of offense)
detention and the use of substandard or
inadequate penal facilities Exceptions to no. 5:

(1) The graver offense developed die to


Art. III, Sec. 12. xxx "supervening facts" arising from the same act
(2) No torture, force, violence, or omission constituting the former charged.
threat, intimidation, or any other means
which vitiate the free will shall be used Thus, in Melo v. People, 85 Phils. 766
against him. Secret detention places, (1950), the SC allowed the amnedment of the
solitary, incommunicado, or other similar information from its original cahrge of
forms of detention are prohibited. frustrated homicide, because after the filing of
the information, the victim died.
Id., Sec. 19. xxx
(2) The employment of physical, (2) The facts constituting the graver
psychological, or degrading punishment charge became known or were discovered only
against any prisoner or detainee or the after the filing of the former complaint or
use of substandard or inadequate penal information.
facilities under subhuman conditions shall
be dealt with by law. This overrules People v. Yorac, where
the SC disallowed the amendment of the
5. Indefinite Imprisonments information from slight physical injuries to
frustrated murder after the prosecution
People v. Dacuycuy, 173 SCRA 90 (1989), subjected the victim to another medical
supra. examination and found a wound, that it was the
fault of the prosecution if they had an
C. The protection against double jeopardy incompetent medical examination.

Art. III, Sec. 21. No person shall be (3) The plea of guilty to the lesser
twice put in jeopardy of punishment for offense was made without the consent of the
the same offense. If an act is punished by fiscal and the offended party.
a law and an ordinance, conviction or
acquittal under either shall constitute a Identity of offenses and identity of act
bar to another prosecution for the same
act. When an act gives rise to two or more
offense which are punished by the same
authority, and an individual is convicted,
Elements of double jeopardy, (Rule 117, Sec 7; acquitted, or the case dismissed without his
People v. Obsania, 23 SCRA 249 (1968): consent, of one of these offense (Crime A),
there is no double jeopardy if he is charged of
Constitutional Law II

another offfense (Crime B) flowing from the court of summarily dismissing a criminal case
same act. Double jeopardy arises only when he for theft on the ground that it merely involved a
is again charged of that same offense (Crime question of ownership deprived the prosecution
A). Thus, this is called double jeopardy by of due process by denying it the chance to
"identity of offenses". introduce its evidence. This ousted the court of
its juridsiction.
But when an act which give rise to two
or more offenses is punished by two different In Galman v. Sandiganbayan, 144 SCRA
authorities (a law and an ordinance), then if an 43 (1986), the SC declared the criminal
individual is convicted, acquitted, or the case prosecution of the 26 accused in the Aquino-
dismissed without his consent, of any of these Galman double murder case a "mistrial" after
offenses punished by one authority (Crime A by the SC commission found that the
law), even if he is charged of another offense Sandiganbayan justices and the Tanodbayan
which is punished by the other auhtority (Crime prosecutors had been summoned by the
B by ordinance), there is double jeopardy, President and instructed on how to conduct the
because both offenses, one punished by a law trial. Due process is a right not only of the
and the other punished by an ordinance, flowed accused but also of the State. Once the court
from the same act. Thus, this is called double deprives either party, which in this case is the
jeopardy by "identity of act." State, of a fighting chance, then it is ousted
from its jurisdiction, and double jeopardy would
Sum: If only a law in involved, there is not apply. Thus, the accused were ordered
double jeopardy only when there is an identity retried.
of offenses. But is a law and an ordinance are
involved, there is double jeopardy when there is 1. Two situations contemplated
an identity of act.
People v. Relova 148 SCRA 292 (1987)
Identity of Offenses:
F: Manuel Opulencia was charged wiht
If a married man maintains as violation of Ordinance No. 1 series of 1974 of
concubine a married woman not his wife, the Batangas City prohibiting the installation of
man is guilty of both concubinage and electric wiring devices without authority from
adultery. From the same act (cohabiting with the city government. He admitted installing the
the married woman), two offenses arise. And electric wiring devices found by the police in
yet he can be prosecuted for both because, the order to decrease the readings of electric
two offenses coming from the same authority, current. The case was however dismissed on
there is no identity of offenses. the ground that the offense had prescribed.
Fourteen days later, the City Fiscal filed another
Identity of Act: case for theft against him. The court also
dismissed this case on the ground of double
People v. Relova, 48 SCRA 292 (1987), jeopardy. The prosecution appealed contending
Relova was prosecuted under an ordinance of the offense was different.
Batangas City for the use of wiring to tap
electricity without permission from the local HELD: The contention has no merit. The first
authorities, but the case was dismissed because sentence of Art. III, sec. 21 states the general
the crime has prescribed. So the fiscal filed a rule: the constitutional protection against
case for theft of electricity under the RPC. The double jeopardy is not available where the
SC ruled there was double jeopardy already, second prosecution is for an offense that is
and so the second case could no longer be different from the offense charged in the first or
filed. For although the offenses were different, prior prosecution, although both may be based
both flowed from the same act. And in this from the same facts. The second sentence
case, the act was punished by a law and an provides an exception: that the protection
ordinance. against double jeopardy is available although
the prior offense charged under an ordinance
Loss of Jurisdiction: No double jeopardy be different from the offense charged
subsequently under the national statute such as
If the court has no jurisdiction, or was the RPC provided that both offenses spring from
ousted of its jurisdiction beccause it violated the the same act or set of acts. VV.
right to due process of the parties, the decision
is null and void, the accused may again be
charged. People v. City Court of Manila, Branch VI, 154
SCRA 175 (1987)
In People v. Bocar, 138 SCRA 166
(1985), the SC, held that the move by the trial
Constitutional Law II

F: Agapito Gonzales, together with Roberto malum in se, which criminal intent is an
Pangilinan, was accused of violating Sec.7, in indispensable ingredient. Suzette.
relation to Sec. 11 RA 3060 and Art. 201(3) of
the RPC, in two separate informations filed with
the City Court of Manila. Upon arraignment, 2. Rules of Court provisions
accused Gonzales pleaded not guilty to both
charges. The other accused, Pangilinan, was Rule 117, Sec. 7. Former
not arraigned as he is still at large. Gonzales conviction of acquittal; double jeopardy.--
filed a motion to quash the informations in the 2 When an accused has been convicted or
cases on the ground that said informations did acquitted, or the case against him
not charge an offense. Motion denied. Later, dismissed or otherwise terminated
he again moved to quash the information in one without his express consent by a court of
of the Criminal case on the ground of duble compentent jurisdiction, upon a valid
jeopardy, as there was according to him, also complaint or information or other formal
pending aginst him another criminal case, charge sufficient in form and substance to
where the informatin allegedly contain the sustain a conviction and after the accused
same allegations as the information in the first had pleaded to the charge, the conviction
criminal case. Court granted the motion. or acquittal of the accused or the
dismissal of the case shall be a bar to
ISSUE: W/N there is double jeopardy. another prosecution for the offense
charged, or for any attempt to commit the
HELD: NO same or frustration thereof, or for any
It is a settled rule that to raise the offense which necessarily includes or is
defense of double jeopardy, 3 requisites must necessarily included in the offense in the
be present: (1) a first jeopardy must have former complaint of information.
attached prior to the second; (2) the first However, the conviction of the
jeopardy must have been validly terminated; accused shall not be a bar to another
and (3) the second jeopardy must be for teh prosecution for an offense which
same offense, or the second offense includes or necessarily includes the offense charged
is necessarily included in the offense charged in in the former complaint or information
the first information, or is an attempt to commit under any of the following instances:
the same or a frustration thereof. All these (a) the graver offense developed
requisites do not exist in this case, due to supervening facts arising from the
The 2 informations with which the same act or omission consituting the
accused was charged , do not make only one former charge;
offense, contrary to private repondent's (b) the facts constituting the
allegation. In other words, the offense defined graver charge became known or were
in Sec. 7 of the RA 3060 punishing the discovered only after the filing of the
exhibition of motion pictures not duly passed former complaint or information; or
by the Board of Censors for Motion Pictures (c) the plea of guilty to the lesser
does not include or is not included inthe offense was made without the consent of
offense defined in Art 201 (3) of the RPC the fiscal and of the offended party.
punishing the exhibition of indecent and In any of the foregoing cases,
immoral motin pictures. where the accused satisfied or serves in
The elements of the 2 offenses are whole or in part the judgement, he shall
different. The gravamen of the offense be credited with the same in the event of
defined in RA 3060 is the public exhibition of conviction for the graver offense.
any motion pictures which has not been
previously passed by the Board of Censors for
Motion Pictures. The motion picture may be Melo v. People, 85 P 776 (1950)
indecent or immoral but if it has not been
previously approved by the Board, its public F: Conrado Melo was charged in the CFI,
showing constitutes a crimnal offense. On the Rizal with frustrated homicide , for having
other hand, the offense punished in Art 201(3) allegedly inflicted upon Obillo, with a kitchen
of the RPC is the public showing os indecent or knife and with intent to kill, several serious
immoral plays, scenes, acts, or shows, not just wounds on different parts of the body, requiring
motion pictures. medical attendance for a period of more than
The nature of both offenses also differs. 30 days, and incapacitating him from
The crime punished in RA 3060 is malum performing his habitual labor for the same
prohibitum in wh criminal intent need not ber period of time. On Dec. 29, 1949, at 8 am,
proved because it is presumed, while the accused pleaded not guilty to the offense
offense punished in Art. 201(3) of the RPC is chargde. At 10:15 am of the same day, Obillo
died from his wounds. An amended information
Constitutional Law II

was filed charging accused with consummated prosecuted subsequently for homicide thru
homicide. Accused filed a motion to quash the reckless imprudence if the offended party dies
amended information alleging double jeopardy. as a result of the same injuries.
Motion denied.
HELD: YES
ISSUE: W/N there is double jeopardy. Well settled is the rule that one who has
been charged with an offense cannot be
HELD: NO charged again with the same or identical
Double jeopardy means that when a offense though the latter be lesser or greater
person is charged with an offense and the case than the former. However as held in the MELO
is terminated either by acquittal or conviction or case, the rule of identity does not apply when
in any other manner without the consent of the the second offense was not in existence at the
accused, the latter cannot again be charged time of teh first prosecution , for the reason that
with the same or identical offense. The phrase in such case there is no possibility for the
"the same offense" has always been construed accused during the first prosecution, to be
to mean not only that the second offense convicted for an offense that was inexistent.
charged is exactly the same as the one alleged The victim Diolito de la Cruz died on the
in the first information, but also that the two day the information was filed , and the accused
offenses are identical. There is identity was arraigned 2 days after or on October 20,
between the two offenses when the evidence to 1972 . When the information for homicide thru
support a conviction for one offense would be reckless imprudence was, therefore, filed on
sufficient to warrant a conviction for the other. October 24, 1972, the accused was already in
This rule of identity however does not doubly jeopardy. Suzette.
apply, however, when the second offense was
not in existence at the time of the first
prosecution, for the simple reason that in such People v. Yorac, 42 SCRA 230 (1971)
case there is no possibility for the accused,
during the first prosecution, to be convicted for F: Accused Yorac was charged with slight
an offense that was then inesistent. Thus, physical injuries before the City Court of
where the accused was charged with physical Bacolod, the offended party being Lam
injuries and after conviction the accused dies, Hock who, according to the medical cerificate
the charge for homicide against the same issued by Dr. Rogelio Zulueta, was confined
accused does not put him twice in jeopardy. since April 8 1968 up to the present time for
Accordingly, an offense may be said to head injury in Occidental Negros Provincial
necessarily include or to be necessarily included Hspital. Accused pleaded guilty on April 16,
in another offense, for the purpose of 1968 resulting in his being penalized to suffer
detremining the existence of double jeopardy, 10 days for arresto menor. On April 18, 1968,
when both offenses were in existence during the provincial fiscal filed an information
the pendency of the first prosecution, for charging the same defendant with frustrated
otherwise, if the second offense was then murder arising from the same act against the
inexistent, no jeopardy could attach therefor aforesaid victim Lam Hock for upon further
during the first prosecution, and consequently a diagnosis, the healing period for the injuries
subsequent charge for the same cannot caused to accused was found to be longer. A
constitute a second jeopardy. Suzette. motion to quash was filed by the accused on
the ground of double jeopardy.

People v. City Court of Manila, Branch XI, 121 ISSUE: W/N the defendant, who had already
SCRA 637 (1983) been convicted of slight physical injuries for
injuries inflicted on Lam Hock , and had served
F: This is a petition to review the order of sentence therefor, may be prosecuted anew for
the City Court of Manila Branch XI, dismissing frustrated murder for the same act committed
the information for homicide thru reckless against the same person
imprudence filed against Gapay, in a criminal
case on the ground of double jeopardy. HELD: NO.
Respondent court held that the accused having In order not to violate the constitutional
been previously tried and convicted of serious prohibition on double jeopardy, there is the
physical injuries thru reckless imprudence for indispensable requirement of the existence of a
the resulting death of the victim would place new fact which supervenes for which the
the accused in double jeopardy. defendant is responsible changing the character
of the crime imputed to him and together with
ISSUE: W/N a person who has been prosecuted the facts existing previously constituting a new
for serious physical injuries thru reckless and distinct offense.
imprudence and convicted thereof may be
Constitutional Law II

In this case, there is no supervening fact Philippines to due process of law. The SC
which occurred to justify the non-existence of dismissed. Meanwhile, the Sandiganbayan
double jeopardy. The wound causing the delay rendered its decision acquitting all the accused
in the healing of the injuries caused to the of the crime charged. Respondents submitted
victim was already in existence at the time of that in view of the SB decision, the case has
the first examination of the doctor. Said delay become moot and academic. Petitioners filed a
was caused by the very superficial and motion for reconsideration of the SC ruling. The
inconclusive examination then made resulting SC created the Vasquez Commisssion to look
to a later finding of fracture. Suzette. into petitioners' allegations.

Barlongay: When defense of double RULING: The report of the Commission revealed
jeopardy available.-- (1) Dismissal based on that Pres. Marcos used the overwhelming
isufficiency of evidence; (2) dismissal bec. of resources of the Government and his
denial of accused's right to speedy trial; (3) authoritarian powers to corrupt and make a
accused is discharged to be a state witness. mockery of the judicial process in this case. The
unwholly scenario for the acquittal of the
When defense of double jeopardy not accused after the rigged trial would accomplish
available.-- When the case is dismissed other the two principal objectives of satisfying the
than on the merits upon motion of the accused public clamor for the suspected killers to be
personally, or through counsel, such dismissal is charged in court and of giviing them, through
regarded as w/ express consent of the accused, their acquittal, the legal shield of double
who is therefore deemed to have waived the jepardy.
right to plea double jeopardy. However, double jeopardy does not
attach where a criminal trial was a sham. A
Yap v. Lutero, April 30, 1959 dictated, coerced and scripted verdict of
acquittal such as in this case is a void
F: Yap was charged with reckless driving in judgment. In legal contemplation, it is no
violation of a city ordinance. Later he was judgment. It neither binds nor bars anyone. The
charged again in another criminal case in the criminal collusion as to the handling and
same court with serious physical injuries treatment of the cases by public respondents
through reckless imprudence. Yap moved to completely disqualified them and voided ab
quash the latter information. Meanwhile, initio the SB verdict. DJ cannot be invoked
petitioner was acquitted in the first case. where the prosecution, which represents the
sovereign people in crimnal cases is denied due
ISSUE: W/N there was double jeopardy. process.

RULING: YES. From the viewpoint of Criminal


Law, as distinguished from Constitutional or People v. Obsania, 23 SCRA 249
Political Law - the offenses with which petitioner
was charged constitute, strictly different F: The information filed by the fiscal
offenses, although, under certain conditions, alleged that through violence and intimidation,
one offense may include the other, and Obsania had carnal knowledge of one Erlinda
accordingly, once placed in jeopardy for one, Dollente against the latter's will. Later, the fiscal
the plea of double jeopardy may be in order as amended the complaint to allege therein that
regards the other. the offense was committed with lewd designs.
Thus, if the injuries mentioned in the The accused after pleading not guilty moved for
second information were not established by the the dismissal of the case on the ground that the
evidence, petitioner could be convicted in the first information was fatally defective for failing
first case of the very same violation of to allege "lewd desiigns," and that the amended
municipal ordinance charged in the first case, information did not cure the jurisdictional
unless he pleaded double jeopardy. Charo. infirmity. The motion of the defense was
sustained by the judge. Hence this appeal by
the fiscal.
Galman v. Sandiganbayan, 144 SCRA 43
RULING: The failure of the prosecution to allege
F: The petitioners filed an action to nullify "lewd designs" in the first information does not
the proceedings on the trial of the Aquino- affect the sufficiency in substance of the
Galman duble murder case alleging that information, for unchaste motives are deemed
respondents Tanodbayan and Sandiganbayan inherent in the very act of rape itself. In any
committed serious irregularities constituting case, the lower court erred in dismissing the
mistrial and resulting in miscarriage of justice case by failing to distinguish between the
and gross violation of the constitutional rights of concept of jurisdiction and insufficiency in
the petitioners and the sovereign people of the substance of an indictment.
Constitutional Law II

As to the question of double jeopardy, commanding him to produce the body of the
the following requisites must have been detainee at a designated time and place, and to
obtained to invoke the constitutional protection show cause why he should continue to be
against it: detained.
(1) a valid complaint or information;
(2) a court of competent jurisdiction; The "privilege of the writ" is the right to
(3) the defendant had pleaded to the have the immediate determination of the
charge; and legality of the deprivation of physical liberty.
(4) the defendant was acquitted, or
convicted, or the case against him was What is suspended is the privilege of the
dismissed or otherwise terminated without his writ, and not the writ itself. The writ will always
express consent. issue as a matter of course. But when the
privilege of the writ is suspended, all the
The only remaining and decisive issue in detaining office needs to do when he receives
this case seems to be as to whether or not the the writ of habeas corpus is to show to the court
case was dismissed without the prior consent of that the detainee is being detained for an
the accused. offense covered by the suspension, and the
The SC ruled that as a general rule, court cannot inquire any further to find out if
when the case is dismissed, other than on the the detention is legal. Under the Conmstitution,
merits, upon motion of the accused, such this is so only for 3 days. After 3 days, the
dismissal is to be ragarded as with the express Court can now require the detaining officer to
consent of the accused and consequently he is produce the body of the detainees and show
deemed to have waived his right to plead cause why he should not be released.
double jeopardy and/or he is estopped from
claiming such defense on appeal by the The suspension of the privilege of the
Government or in another indictment for the writ applied only to crimes related to invasion or
same offense. rebellion. An extensive discussion was made
The exception to this is where the under the Commander-in- Chief clause of the
dismissal is sought by the accused on the President, supra. This rest of the section will be
ground that they were denied their right to a confined to habeas corpus as a remedy in all
speedy trial and that the government failed to other offenses.
prosecute; in which case double jeopardy will
set in. The case of herein accused falls under In general as already noted above, the
the general rule. privilege of the writ is an extraordinary remedy
to question the illegality of the arrest or
D. The privilege of the writ of habeas detention, or any other restraint to liberty.
corpus When all else is lost, it is the last recourse to
get someone out of his illegal detention.
Art. III, Sec. 15. The privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus shall not be 1. Functions of the writ
suspended except in cases of invasion or
rebellion, when the public safety requires Villavicencio v. Lukban, 39 P 778 (1919)
it.
Habeas corpus is available not only for
those who are in actual detention but even for
In case of invasion or rebellion, when those whose liberty is merely restrained. Thus,
the public safety requires it, the President may, in Moncupa v. Enrile, 141 SCRA 233 (1986), the
for a period not exceeding 60 days, suspend the SC granted habeas corpus to petitioner who,
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus... though temporarily released, could not travel
outside Metro Manila, could not change his
The suspension of the privilege of the residence, could not be interviewed by media,
writ shall apply only to persons judicially and had to report to the military.
charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or
directly connected with invasion.
2. The writ of habeas corpus as a post-
During the suspension of the privilege of conviction remedy
the writ, any person thus arrested or detained
shall be judicially charged within 3 days,
otherwise he shall be released. (Art. VII, Sec. In Chavez v. Court of Appeals, supra,
18.) habeas corpus was the remedy of one whose
confinement was the result of a void judgnment
A "writ of heabeas corpus" is a writ of conviction arrived at after the judge violated
directed to the person detaining another,
Constitutional Law II

due process by compelling him to take the IV. FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION


stand and testify against himself.

Chavez v. Court of Appeals, 24 SCRA 633 Art. III, Sec. 4. No law shall be
(1986), supra. passed abridging the freedom of speech,
of expression, or of the press, or the right
of the people peaceably to assemble and
In Gumabon v. Director of Prison, 37 petition the Government for redress of
SCRA 420 (1971), some persons who were grievance.
charged with the complex crime of rebellion
with homicide, rape, or other common crimes, Id., Sec. 18. (1) No person shall be
did not appeal their conviction and so were detained solely by reason of his political
sentenced accordingly. The other accused, beliefs and aspirations.
however, appealed their conviction, resulting in xxx
a new ruling in People v. Hernandez to the
effect that there can be no complex crim of A. Philosophical Basis of Guarantees
rebellion with homicide, rape, etc., for these
common crimes are absorbed by rebellion. As a Free Market Place of Ideas
result, while those who appealed were now free,
those who did not remained in jail. The SC 1. For the discovery of political truth
ruled that those who conrtinued to languish in
jail could avail of habeas corpus to question the When men have realized that time has
legality of their continued detention pursuant to upset many fighting faiths, they may come to
the ruling in People v. Hernandez. believe even more than they believe the very
foundations of their own conduct that the
3. Suspension of the privilege ultimate good desired is better reached by free
trade in ideas-- that the best test of truth is the
Art. VII, Sec. 18. power of the thought to get itself accepted in
Lansang v. Garcia, 42 SCRA 488 (1971) the competition of the market, and the truth is
the only ground upon which their wishes safely
E. Affirmative rights can be carried out. (Justice Holmes, Abrams v.
United States, 250 U.S. 616. (1919)
1. Free access to the courts
The theory behind freedom of
Art. III, Sec. 11. Free access to the expression is the principle that ours is a
courts and quasi-judicial bodies and democratic society, and so the only way to rule
adequate legal assistance shall not be ultimately is by, means of public opinion, which
denied to any person by reason of is possible only when everyone can speak their
poverty. minds out and compete in the free market place
of ideas.
2. Protection and enforcement of constitutional
rights 2. For self government

Art. III, Sec. 12. xxx United States v. Bustos, 37 P 731 (1918)
(4) The law shall provide for penal
and civil sanctionsfor violations of this
section as well as compensation to and Burgos v. Chief of Staff, 133 SCRA 800
rehabilitation of victims of torture or (1984), supra
similar practices, and their families.
HELD: As a consequence of the search and
3. Compensation to, and rehabilitation of, seizure, the premises of the "Metropolitan Mail"
victims of tortures and "We Forum" were padlocked and sealed,
with the further result that the printing and
Art. III, Sec. 12. xxx publication of said newspapers were
(4) The law shall provide for penal discontinued. Such closure is in the nature of
and civil sanctions for violations of this previous restraint or censorship abhorrent to
section as well as compensation to and the freedom of the press guaranteed under the
rehabilitation of victims of torture or fundamental law and constitutes a virtual denial
similar practices, and their families. of petitioner's freedom to express themselves in
print. This state of being is patenly anathematic
to a democratic framework where a free, alert
and even militant press is essential for the
Constitutional Law II

political enlightenment and growth of the speech), the prosecution cannot even prove
citizenry. malice-in-fact.

New York Times v. Sullivan, 380 US 51 (1964) If the communication is only qualifiedly
privileged (Art. 354 enumerates the 2
3. For individual protection instances: fair and true reporting of an official
proceeding; legal moral or social duty), the
B. Prior Restraints burden is shifted on the prosecution to prove
malice-in-fact, which the defense can overcome
Thus any system of prior restraints of by proving the truth of the defamatory
expression comes to the Court bearing a heavy statement (which in the case of public officials
presumption against its constitutionality, giving may or may not constitute a crime, so long as
the government a heavy burden to show related to the conduct of his office) and good
justification for the imposition of such restraint. motive.
(New York v. United States (1971); also in New
York Times v. Pentagon and Bantam Books v. C. Content-Based Restrictions
Publication of Pentagon Papers).
1. Test of validity of content-based
restrictions
Sanidad v. COMELEC, 181 SCRA 529 (1990)
The U.S. Supreme Court and, by
Subsequent Punishment haphazard imitation, the Philippine Supreme
Court, have evolved certain tests to regulate
And even subsequent punishment is the contents of speech.
tempered by the greater interest of promoting
free public opinion. The most significant Dangerous Tendency Test: When the
expression is the law on libel. legislative body has determined generally, in
the exercise of its discretion, that utterances of
We consider this case against the a certain kind involve such danger of a
background of a profound national commitment substantive evil that they may be punished, the
to debate on public issues being uninhibited, question whether any specific utterance coming
robust and wide-open, and that it may well within the prohibited class is likely, in and itself,
include vehement, caustic, and sometimes to bring the substantive evils, is not open to
unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and consideration. In such cases, the general
public officials. The falsity of some of the provision of the statute may be constitutionally
factual statements and alleged defamations do applied to the specific utterance if its natural
not qualify the role. And just as factual error and probable effect was to bring about the
afforded no warrant for repressing speech that substantive evil which the legislative body
would otherwise be free, the same is true of might prohibit. [Gitlow v. New York, 268 US 652
injury to official reputation. (New York Times v. (1925).]
Sullivan, 380 U.S. 51 (1964)
Example: Art. 142. Inciting to sedition.
The interest of society and good When the legislature has decided that one who
government demands a full discussion of public advocates a certain conduct is guilty of a crime,
affairs. Whether the law is wisely or badly the court cannot intrude. As it evolved, this test
enforced is a fit subject for proper comment. was supposed to apply when there is a statute,
Public policy, welfare of society, and the orderly in contrast to the clear and present danger rule
administration of government have demanded which applies when the speech is not prohibited
protection for public opinion. The inevitable by statute.
and incontestable result has been the
development and adoption of the doctrine of Clear and Present Danger Test: The
privilege. [Justice Malcom, United States v. question in every case is whether the words
Bustos, 731 (1918).] used are used in such circumstances and are of
such a nature as to create a clear and present
While, uncer the Revised Penal Code, danger that they will bring about the
any defamatory statement is presumed to be substantive evils that Congress has a right to
malicious (malice-in-law), when the defense prevent. It is a question of proximity and
proves that the communication is privileged, degree. [Schenck v. United States, 249 US 47
such a presumption of malice does not arise (1919).]
because of the greater public interest involved.
The emphasis of the test is the nature of
If the communication is absolutely the circumstances under which it is uttered.
privileged (as in parliamentary freedom of The speech itself may not be dangerous. As
Constitutional Law II

Holmes said: "Many things that might be said speech or political activity, (2) the availability
in time of peace are such a hindrance to its of more moderate controls than those the State
effort that their utterance will not be endured so has imposed, and perhaps (3) the specific intent
long as men fight." Or saying "Fire" in a with which the speech is launched. (Freund,
crowded movie house. quoted in Dennis v. United States in the
concurring opinion of Justice Frankfurter).
Grave-but-improbable danger: Whether
the gravity of the evil, discounted by its
improbability, justifies such an invasion of free 2. Applications of tests in various
speech as is necessary to avoid the danger. contexts
[Dennis v. United States, 341 US 494 (1951),
quoting Judge Learned Hand.] a. Freedom of expression and national security

This test was meant to supplant the Babst v. National Intelligence Board 132
clear and present danger. They both SCRA 316 (1984)
emphasize the circumstances of the speech, but
this latter test consider the weighing of values. F: Petitioners are journalists and
columnists. On different dates in July 1980, they
Direct Incitement Test: The were summoned by military authorities for
consitutional guarantees of free speech and interrogation regarding their work, feelings,
press do not permit a State to forbid or sentiments, beliefs, associations and even
proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law private lives. In addition, one of them was
violation, except where such advocacy or peech charged with libel by a General who sought to
is directed to inciting or producing imminent recover P10 million in damages. They brought
lawless action, and is likely to incite or produce an action for prohibition to stop the NIB from
such action. [Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. questioning them and from filing libel suits on
444 (1969), cited in Salonga v. Cruz Pano, 134 matters that had been the subject of inquiry by
SCRA 438 (1985).] the NIB.

The test emphasizes the very words HELD: The petition has become moot and
uttered: (a) What words did he utter? (b) academic. Be that as it may, it is not idle to
What is the likely result of such utterance? It note that, while ordinarily, an invitation to
criticizes the clear and present danger test for attend a hearing and answer some questions is
being top dependent on the circumstances. not illegal or constitutionally objectionable,
Speaker may, when tested show no incitement under certain circumstances, however, such an
but you know the speaker is inciting to sedition. invitation can easily assume a different
appearance as when it comes from a powerful
Balancing of Interest Test: The court group composed predominantly of ranking
must undertake the delicate and difficult task of military officers and the designate interrogation
weighing the circumstances and appraising the site is a military camp.
substantiality of the reasons advanced in
support of the regulation of the free enjoyment b. Freedom of expression and criticism of
of rights. [American Communication Ass'n v. official conduct: The Test of "Actual Malice"
Douds, 339 US 383 cited in Gonzales v.
COMELEC, 27 SCRA 835 (1969A)] Read Revised Penal Code, Articles 353-
354 and 361-362
The test applied when two legitimate
values not involving national secuirty crimes Freedom of expression and libel
compete. Involves an appoint of the competing
interest. (Gonzales v. Comelec) Freedom of speech versus right to
reputation. Libel is the most common form of
In Aver v. Capulong and Enrile, for subsequent punishment. Although one cannot
instance, it is a question of balancing the be prevented from saying something before he
freedom of expression of the producer and the actually says it, one can be held liable for what
right to privacy of Enrile. one has said if it causes damage to the rights of
others.
(not in VV's revised outline)
Balancing of Factors Test: The truth is
theat the clear-and-present danger test is over- Soliven v. Makasiar; Beltran v. Makasiar, 167
simplified judgement unless it takes into SCRA 393 (1988)
account also a number of other factors: (1) the
relative seriousness of the danger in F: The President of the Philippines filed a
comparison with the value of the occasion for complaint for libel against the petitioners, who
Constitutional Law II

were the publisher and columnist of the newspaper, could have by himself caused the
Philippine Star, based on the following publication. It does not appear either that the
statement in Beltran's column of Oct. 12, 1987 report was paid for like an advertisement. At
totle "The Nervous Officials of the Aquino any rate, the news item is a true and fair report
Administration": "If you recall, during the of a judicial proceeding, made in good faith and
August 29 coup attempt, the President hid without comments or remarks. VV.
under her bed while the firing was going on -
perhaps the first Commander-in-Chief to do so."
Beltran did not submit a counter affidavit and Newsweek Inc. v. IAC 142 SCRA 171 (1986)
instead, moved to dismiss the complaint. The
fiscal denied his motion. Thus, this petition for F: Petitioner was sued for libel in
certiorari. connection with the publication in the Feb. 23,
1981 issue of Newsweek of the article "An
HELD: xxx Island of Fear." The plaintiffs, sugar planters of
(3) As regards the contention of Bacolod, complained that the article portrayed
petitioner Beltran that he could not be held them as exploiters of sugar workers. Petitioner
liable for libel bec. of the privileged character of moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground
the publication, the Court reiterates that it is that the article was not libelous since it did not
not a trier of facts and that such a defense is single any particular individual. The trial court
best left to the trial court to appreciate after denied the motion and petitioner filed a petition
receiving the evidence of the parties. As to for certiorari in the IAC which was dismissed.
petitioner Beltran's claim that to allow the libel Thus, this appeal to the SC.
case to proceed would produce a "chilling
effect" on the press freedom, the Court finds no HELD: Where the defamation is alleged to have
basis at this stage to rule on the point. VV. been directed at a group or class, it is essential
that the statement must be so sweeping or all-
Manuel v. Cruz-Pano, 172 SCRA 225 (1989) embracing as to apply to every individual in
that group or class, or sufficiently specific so
Libel suits based on official criticisms should be that each individual in the class or group can
dismissed outright unless made in bad faith prove that the defamatory statement
specifically pointed to him, so that he can bring
F: Petitioner wrote the Chairman of the the action separately if need be. The disputed
Anti-Smuggling Action Center denouncing portion which refers to plaintiff Sola never
abuses allegedly committed by ASAC agents singled out Sola. The news report merely stated
against petitioner's clients. Petitioner said the that the victim had been arrested by members
agents subjected Ng Woo Hay to indignities and of a special police unit brought into the area by
took her necklace and bracelet and her son's Sola, the mayor. Hence, the report referring as
wristwatch plus HK$ 70. But the agents were it does to an official act is within the realm of
exonerated so petitioner filed criminal charges privileged and is protected by the constitutional
of robbery. Petitioner found prosecutors guarantees of free speech and press. VV.
unsympathetic so he filed a civil action for
damages against the agents. Later, the Bulletin Notes: Since the Newsweek artciles
Today published a news item based on "Island of fear in the Visayas" did not specify
petitioner's letter to ASAC. This became the any individual, it cannot be libelous. An article
basis of an action for libel brought against must be sufficiently, specific or at least
petitioner and his clients. Petitioner moved to sweeping as to apply to all members of a group,
quash the case but his motion was denied. in order to be deemed libelous.

HELD: From the viewpoint of procedural and Lopez v. Court of Appeals, 34 SCRA 116 (1970)
substantive law, the charge is defective. The
letter constitutes privileged communication. It The pictures of a former mayor was
was sent by petitioner in his capacity as lawyer inadvertently published and mistaken for
in the discharge of his legal duty to his clients. another man who was a sanitary inspector and
He could also invke his civic duty as a private fooled the authorities about the Babuyan
individual to expose anomalies in the public Islands, claiming of murders there, so they
service. The complaint was addressed to the could go and he could be rescued. An erratum
official who had authority over them and could was published by the This Week magazine. The
impose proper disciplinary sanctions. As an SC, quoting Quisumbing v. Lopez, however,
index of good faith, the letter was sent found for plaintiff, but with reduced damages,
privately, directly to the addressee without any since the error in in this case could have been
funfare nor publicity. As for the news report, it checked consideringing that this was a weekly
is difficult to believe that the petitioner, an magazine and not a daily.
ordinary citizen without known ties to
Constitutional Law II

Quisumbing v. Fernando, 96 Phil 510 (1955) pictures," in consideration of P20,000.


Petitioner paid P5,000 but as he failed to pay
Newspapers should be given leeway and the balance agreed upon, he was sued.
tolerance to enable them to courageously and Judgement was rendered against him by the
effectively perform their important role in our trial court, w/c was affirmed by the CA.
democracy. In the preparation of stories, press Petitioner appealed to the SC contending that
reporters and editors usually have to race to he was forced to enter into the agreement only
their deadlines; and consistently with good faith to avoid financial loss caused by delay in the
and reasonable care, they should not be held to showing of the movie and the relatives of
account, to a point of suppression, for honest Padilla did not have a property right in the life
mistakes or imperfection in the choice of words. of M. Padilla since Padilla was a public figure.
.
HELD: Petitioner's averment is not well taken.
Mercado v. CFI of Rizal 116 SCRA 93 (1982) Being a public figure does not automatically
destroy in toto a person's right to privacy. The
F: Petitioner was accused of libel on the right to invade a person's privacy to
basis of a telegram which he sent to the disseminate public information does not extend
Secretary of Public Works requesting to fictional or novelized representation of a
investigation of Mrs. Virginia Mercado of the person, no matter how a public figure he or she
Public Service Commission "as we have reason may be. In the case at bar, while it is true that
to believe that she has enriched herself thru petitioner exerted efforts to present the true-to-
corrupt practices xxx." He filed a motion to life story of Moises Padilla, petitioner admits
dismiss on the ground that his communication that he included a little romance in the film bec.
was privileged, but his motion was denied. He w/o it, it would be a drab story of torture and
filed another motion which was also denied. brutality.
Thus, this petition for certiorari, mandamus and Freedom of expression, indeed,
prohibition in the SC. occupies a preferred position in the hierarchy of
civil liberties. It is not, however, w/o
HELD: US v. Bustos is a landmark decision limitations. In the particular circumstances
antedating by forty years a similar decision of presented and considering the obligations
the US Supreme Court to the effect that a libel assumed by petitioner under the agreement,
prosecution must survive the test of whether or the validity of such agreement will have to be
not the offending publication is within the upheld particular bec. the limits of freedom of
guarantees of free speech and free press. expression are reached when expression
However, Justice Malcolm in US v. Bustos was touches upon matters of private concern. [In
careful to point out that qualified privilege and the agreement signed by him, petitioner
this is one instance may be "lost by proof of admitted that in the picture produced, he had
malice." What casts doubt on the good faith of "exploited the life story of Moises Padilla for
petitioner is his conduct, vis-à-vis private pecuniary gain, and other profit motives, and
respondent. The tenacity with which petitioner (had) encroached upon the privacy of Moises
had pursued a course of conduct on its face Padilla's immediate family, and (had) in fact
would seem to indicate that a doubt could included, in the PICTURE's case, persons
reasonably be entertained as the bona fides of portraying some of MOISES PADILLA's kin..."]
petitioner. The prosecution should be given a
chance to prove malice.
Ayer Productions Pty. Ltd. v. Capulong April 29,
c. Freedom of expression and the right to 1988
privacy
F: Pivate respondent Juan Ponce Enrile
Lagunzad v. Gonzales, 92 SCRA 476 (1979) filed an action in the RTC of Makati to enjoin the
petitioners from producing the movie "The Four
F: Lagunzad filmed the Moises Padilla Day Revolution," a documentary of the EDSA
story based on a book written by Rodriguez. Revolution in 1986 on the ground that it
xxx Nelly Amane who was a half-sister of violated his right to privacy. Petitioners
Padilla objected to the movie on the ground contended that the movie would not involve his
that it contained a portrayal of Padilla's private private life not that of his family. But the trial
and family life, including scenes about his court issued a writ of preliminary injunction and
mother, Maria Soto vda. de Gonzales, and a ordered petitioners to desist from making the
certain "Auring" as Padilla's girl friend. movie making reference whatsoever to Ponce
Subsequently, Nelly Amante, together w/ her Enrile. This, this action for certiorari.
sister and mother, agreed to allow petitioner to
"exploit, use and develope the life story of HELD: Freedom of speech and expression
Moises Padilla for purposes of producing the includes freedom to produce motion pictures
Constitutional Law II

and to exhibit them. What is involved is a prior


restraint by the Judge upon the exercise of People v. Alarcon, 60 Phil 265 (1939)
speech and of expression by petitioners.
Because of the preferred character of speech A person can be held liable for making
and of expression, a weighty presumption of comments on a pending case (sub judice) which
invalidity vitiates measures of prior restraint. have the tendency to impair or obstruct the
The Judge should have stayed his hand orderly administration of justistice. But if the
considering that the movie was yet case is not pending, such comment is a valid
uncompleted and therefore there was no "clear exercise of the freedom of expression.
and present danger." The subject matter of the
movie does not relate to the private life of e. Symbolic Expression-- The Flag-
Ponce Enrile. The intrusion is no more than burning case
necessary to keep the film a truthful historical
account. He is, after all, a public figure. The Flag burning when done to express
line of equilibrium in the specific context of the dissent is protected speech.
instant case between freedom of speech and of
expression and the right of privacy may be F: Respondent Johnson participated in a
marked out in terms of a requirement that the political demonstration where he burned an
proposed motion picture must be fairly truthful American flag while protesters chanted. No one
and historical in its presentation of facts. There was physically injured or threatened with injury,
must be no showing of a reckless disregard of although several witnesses were seriously
truth. offended by the flag burning. Johnson was
convicted of desecration of a venerated object
Notes: Ayer sought to produce a movie in violation of a Texas statute which (1)
on the 4-day revolution. Enrile, who had prohibited the desecration of, among other
previously been asked for the use of his things, a state or national flag, and (2) defined
character in the movie and had refused the desecration as the physical mistreatment of
offer, sued to enjoin the filming because he did such objects in a way which the actor knows will
not want any mention of his and his family's seriously offend one or more persons likely to
name. The SC lifted the injunction issued by observe or discover the act. A state court of
the lower court on the ground that it amounted appeals affirmed. The Court of Criminal
to prior restraint, which is no better if imposed Appeals of Texas reversed, holding that the
by the courts than if imposed by administrative desecration statute as applied violated the
bodies or by ecclesiatical officials. defendant's right to freedom of speech under
the Federal Constitution's First Amendment,
In Ayer, the reference to Enrile is because the statute (1) was too broad for First
unavoidable because his name is part of history Amendment purposes as it related to breaches
and this cannot be changed or altered; thus his of the peace, and (2) was not adequately
name can be used so long as only his public life supported by the state's purported interest in
is dwelled only. But in Lagunzad, although preserving a symbol of unity.
Moises Padilla was also a public figure, the
movie dealth with both the public and private ISSUE: Whether the flag desecration statute is
lives of Moises Padilla. unconstitutional

d. Freedom of expression and administration of HELD: YES. Decision Affirmed.


justice (contempt of court) Johnson's conviction was inconsistent
with the First Amendment under the particular
In re Ramon Tulfo, AM NO. 90-4-1545-0, April circumstances because (1) Johnson's conduct
17. 1990 was sufficiently imbued with elements of
communication to implicate the First
Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan, 170 SCRA 1 (1989) Amendment, given that this flag burning was
the culmination of a political demonstration and
Cabansag v. Fernandez, 102 Phil 152 (1957) that the state conceded that the protester's
conduct was expressive; (2) the state's interest
A contempt imposed by the court on the in preventing breaches of the peace was not
party who sent a letter to the Presidential implicated on the record in this case, since (a)
Action Committee complaining about the delay no disturbance of the peace actually occurred
in the disposition of the agrarian case, was or threatened to occur because of the flag
lifted by the SC. It held that although such a burning, (b) it cannot be presumed that an
letter should have been sent to the SC and not audience which takes serious offense at a
the PAC, it was nevertheless a valid exercise of particular expression is necessarily likely to
speech which did not significantly destroy, the disturb the peace, and (c) the flag burning does
orderly administration of justice. not fall within the small class of "fighting words"
Constitutional Law II

that are likely to provoke the average person to erotically dancing naked and kissing and
retaliation and thereby cause a breach of the caressing each other like lesbians. VV.
peace; and (3) the state's asserted interest in
preserving the flag as a symbol of nationhood
and national unity does not justify the Notes: The movie involved in this case
conviction, since (a) the attempted restriction was "Kapit sa Patalim" which the censors
on expression is content-based, and thus wanted to cut in some part and to label "For
subject to the most exacting scrutiny, given Adults". The SC rules that movies are within
that the flag desecration statute is aimed not at the constitutional protection of freedom of
protecting the physical integrity of the flag in all expression, so that censorship is presumed to
circumstances, but only against impairments be valid as constituting prior restraint. The only
that would cause serious offenses to others and case whe the Board of Censors can order a
is aimed at protecting onlookers from being deletion is when there is a clear and present
offended by the ideas expressed by the danger of a substantive evil against national
prohibited activity, and (b) although the state security or public morals or other public
has a legitimate interest in encouraging proper interest. In all other cases, the Board can only
treatment of the flag, it may not foster its own classify.
view of the flag by prohibiting expressive
conduct relating to it and by criminally But a different standard must be
punishing a person for burning the flag as a followed in television because of the pervasive
means of political protest. and intrusive influence of the medium on
people who watch its programs without having
f. Movies Censorship to pay anything.

While prior restraint is the general rule, On the issue of obscenity, the SC held
censorship in the movies is tolerated because that sex along is not necessarily obscenity, the
by the nature of the medium, it has a greater test being whether, using contemporary
impact on the audience and produces instant community standards, the dominant appeal us
reaction for the ideas it presents, unlike to the prurient interest. (Miller v. California).
newspapers which are read by people Thus on this score, it found abuse of discretion
separated by walls. of the part of the Board for subjecting the
producer to difficulty and for entertaining a
narrow view of obscenity, but it lacked the
Gonzales v. Katigbak, 137 SCRA 356 (1985) votes to rules that the abuse was grave.

F: Petitioner was the producer of the movie Tests of obscenity:


Kapit sa Patalim which the Board of Review for (1) Whether the average person,
Motion Pictures and Televisions allowed on applying contemporary community standards,
condition that certain deletions were made and would find that the work, taken as a whole,
that it was shown on adults only. The petitioner appeals to the prurient interest.
brought an action, claiming violation of their (2) Whether the work depicts or
freedom of expression. describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual
conduct specifically defined by the applicable
HELD: Motion pictures are important both as a law.
method for the communication of ideas and the (3) Whether the work, taken as a whole,
expression of the artistic impulse. The power of lacks serious literary, artistic, political or
the Board is limited to the classification of films. scientific value. (Miller v. California, 37 L. Ed.
For freedom of expression is the rule and 2d 419.)
restrictions the exception. The power to impose
prior restraint is not to be presumed, rather the g. Radio Broadcast
presumption is against its validity. Censorship is
allowable only under the clearest proof of a In Eastern Broadcasting Corp. v. Dans, 137
clear and present danger of a substantive evil SCRA 647, the SC held that radio broadcast also
to public safety, public morals, public health or enjoys the protection of the freedom of
any other legitimate public interest. The Board expression. If closed down, the owners enjoy
committed an abuse of discretion in subjecting the rights to due process according to the
petitioner to difficulty and travail before the standards set in Ang Tibay v. CIR.
movie was classified as "For adults only"
without deletion. However there is not enough But radio deserves greater regulation
votes to consider the abuse of discretion grave than newspapers because it could invade the
as it explained that there were reasons for its privacy of everyone for no fee, and it is such
action because of the scenes showing women that one is likely to listen to what is being said.
Constitutional Law II

guaranteed. But it is subject to reasonable


Eastern Broadcasting Corp. (DYRE) V. Dans, 137 conditions by the custodian of the records.
SCRA 647 (1985)

F: The petitioners filed this action to Garcia v. BOI, 177 SCRA 374 (1989)
compel respondent government officials to
allow the reopening of Radio Station DYRE after
it had been closed for allegedly having been D. Content-Neutral Restrictions
used to incite the people to sedition. The
petitioner contended that it was denied due O'brien test: A government regulation is
process because no hearing was held and no sufficiently justified if it is within the
proof was submitted to establish a factual basis constitutional power of the government; if it
for the closure. However, before the Court could furthers an important or substantial
promulgate its decision the petitioner filed a governmental interest; if the governmental
motion to withdraw its action on the ground interest is unrelated to the suppression of free
that it had sold the radio station to Manuel expression; and if the incidental restriction on
Pastrana and that the National alleged freedom of expression is no greater
Telecommunications Commission had than is essential to the furtherance of that
expressed its willingness to grant the requisite interest. [US v. O'brien, 391 US 367 (1968),
license. adopted in Adiong v. COMELEC, 207 SCRA 712
(1992)]
HELD: The case has been moot and academic.
However, for the guidance of the inferior courts 1. Regulation of political campaign
and administrative bodies, the following
guidelines must be observed: 1) The cardinal National Press Club v. COMELEC, 207 SCRA 1
primary requirements in administrative (1992)
proceedings as laid down in Ang Tibay v. CIR
should be followed before a broadcast station F: Petitioners herein were representatives
may be closed; 2) All forms of communication of mass media which were prevented from
are entitled to the broad protection of the selling and donating space or air time for
freedom of expression clause. Necessarily, the political advertisements under RA 6646.
freedom of television and radio broadcasting is
somewhat lesser in scope than the freedom ISSUE: Whether or not RA 6646 constitutes a
accorded to newspapers and print media. This violation of the constitutional right to freedom
limitation derives from the fact the broadcast of expression.
media have a uniquely pervasive presence in
the lives of all Filipinos; 3) The government has RULING: NO. The Comelec has been expressly
a right to be protected against broadcasts authorized by the Constitution to supervise or
which incite listeners to violently overthrow it; regulate the enjoyment or utilization of the
and 4) Broadcast stations deserve the special franchises or permits for the operation f media
protection given to all forms of media by the of communication and information. The
due process and freedom of expression clauses fundamental purposes of such power are to
of the Constitution. ensure "equal opportunity, time, and space, and
the right to reply," as well as uniform and
h. Freedom of Information reasonable rates of charges for the use of such
media facilities, in connection with "public
Art. III, Sec. 7. The right of the information campaigns and forums among
people to information on matters of public candidates."
concern shall be recognized. Access to Of course, the law limits the right of free
official records, and to documents and speech and of access to mass media of the
papers pertaining to, official acts, candidates themselves. The limitation however,
transactions, or decisions, as well as to bears a clear and reasonable connection with
government research data used as basis the objective set out in the Constitution. For it is
for policy development, shall be afforded precisely in the unlimited purchase of print
the citizen, subject to such limitations as space and radio and television time that the
may be provided by law. resources of the financially affluent candidates
are likely to make a crucial difference.
Baldoza v. Dimaano, 71 SCRA 14 (1976)
Adiong v. COMELEC, 207 SCRA 712 (1992)
Access of official records (the docket
book) for any lawful purpose (to look into the F: Petitoner, Adiong, a 1992 senatorial
criminal cases for a report on the peace and candidate, assails Comelec Resolution No. 2347
order situation of the municipality) is insofar as it prohibits the posting of decals and
Constitutional Law II

stickers on mobile places, public or private, and The written application is filed with the
limits their location or publication to authorized Office of the Mayor. Acknowledgemet is given
posting areas. of its receipt. If the Mayor refuses to accept the
application, then it is enough for filing purposes
ISSUE: Whether or not the resolution is if a copy is posted in the premises.
constitutional.
The Mayor has 2 working days to act on
RULING: NO. The prohibition unduly infringes on the application. If he does not act, it is deemed
the citizen's fundamental right of free speech. granted.
There is no public interest substantial enough to
warrant the kind of restriction involved in this But if he thinks that the rally creates a
case. The posting of decals amd stickers in "clear and present danger" to public peace,
mobile places does not endanger any order, health, etc., and he has proof of this, he
substantial government or public interest. should not deny the application right away. He
Under the clear and present danger rule, not should hold a hearing during which the
only must the danger be patently clear and applicant can be heard. If after hearing he is
pressingly present but the evil sought to be still not satisfied that no danger exists, then he
avoided, must be so substantive as to justify a can deny the application.
clamp over one's mouth or a writing instrument
to be stilled. The applicant can then go to any court
Significantly, the freedom of expression other than the Supreme Court for the review of
curtailed by the prohibition is not so much that the decision of denial of the mayor. The courts
of the candidate or the political party. The have 24 hours to act on the petition. If the
regulation strikes at the freedoom of an judgment is a reversal of the denial, or in any
individual to express his preference and, by case if the applicant is satisfied with the
displaying it on his car, to convince others to decision, the judgment becomes final and
agree with him. A sticker may be furnished by a executory immediately, and no appeal can be
candidate but once the car owner agrees to taken by the local authorities anymore.
have it placed on his private vehichle, the
expression becomes a statement by the owner, But if the decision is not satisfactory to
primarily his own and not of anybody else. the applicant, then he has 48 hours from receipt
Morever, The restriction is so broad that to appeal to the SC.
it encompasses even the citizen's private
property, which in this case is a privately owned During the rally, the police must be
vehicle. In consequence of this prohibition, limited to maintaining peace and order and so
another cardinal right guaranteed under the must stay away by 100 meters from the
Constitution is violated which is that no person rallyists. They must be in full uniform, with
shall be deprived of his property without due their names visibly written. They can carry no
proocess of law. firearm except a nighstick, but they are allowed
protective devices.
2. Freedom of Assembly
If they anticipate trouble, the police
Public Assembly Act of 1985 (Batas Blg. 580) must call the attention of the leader of the
rallyists. When trouble actually erupts, the
A permit to hold a rally must be filed police must not disperse the crowd right away
with the Office of the Mayor at least, five but first give a warning. If violence persists,
working days before the day of the rally. they must give a second warning. If still
violence continues, only then can they fight
But no permit from the mayor is back.
required in case the rally is going to be held in
(i) freedom parks, (ii) inside a private property If a rally does not have a permit, the
(provide with consent of the owner), and (iii) police can disperse the crowd, but they cannot
campuses of state universities (which are left to use violence. Penalty is imposed only on the
university authorities) leaders and organizers.

The application must be in writing and Among the duties of the rallyists are: (a)
must include: (1) names of the organizers and to inform the members of their duty under the
leaders, (2) date and time, place and street, (3) law, (b) to police their own rank, and (c) to
size (4)manner of the use of the street, (5) cooperate with local authorities in maintaining
sound system to be used (6)purpose. It must peace and order.
also have a statement of the duties of the
rallyists.
Constitutional Law II

Notes: The freedom to use public places to control, govern, and to restrain but cannot be
to peaceably assemble is best expressed thus: construed as synonymous with "suppress" or
"Wherever the title or steets and parks may "prohibit."
rest, they have immemorially been held in trust The Court quoted with approval the
for the use of the public and, time out of time decision in the American case Cox v. State of
have been used for purposes of assembly, New Hampshire, " a statute requiring persons
communicating thought betwee citizens, and using public streets for a parade or procession
discussing public questions." (Justice Roberts. to procure a special license therefor from the
Hague v. CIO) local authorities is not an unconstitutional
abridgement of the rights of assembly or of
Although under a "permit system", freedom of speech and press, where, as the
before one can use a public place, one must statute is construed by the state courts, the
first obtain prior permit from the proper licensing authorities are strictly limited, in the
authorities, the principle has always been that issuance of licenses, to a consideration of the
one has the right to a permit, subject only to time, place, and manner of the parade or
reasonable regulation. The validity of the procession, with a view to conserving the public
permit system has been upheld by the Court, convenience and of affording an opportunity to
provided, (a) it is concered only with the time, provide proper policing, and are not invested
place and manner of assembly ad (b) it does with arbitrary discretion to issue or refuse
not vest on the licensing authority unfettered license..."
discretion in choosing the groups which could
use the public place and discriminate others.
But under the same ordinance, the SC,
As held by the SC in Primicias vs in Navarro v. Villegas, 31 SCRA 730 (1970),
Fugoso, 80 Phil. 71, the City Ordinance of upheld the mayor's refusal to grant permit to a
Manila giving authority to the Mayor to issue group during weekdays, on a finding that
permits for parades should be construed to be everytime there was an announced rally, stores
limited to the time, place, and manner of the closed and business was gravely affected
parades socially to secure public order, because of violent incidents. It found the policy
convenience and welfare. Thus, denying the of the mayor to allow rallies only during
Nacionalista Party a permit to hold a rally at the weekends to be reasonable.
Plaza Miranda on the ground that passions
raised by the recent national election were still
high and a rally to protest election anomalies Navarro v. Villegas, 31 SCRA 730 (1970)
could only exacerbate the matter, was
overturned by the court. F: The petitioner, acting in behalf of the
Movement for a Democratic Philippines (MDP),
an association of students, workers and
Primicias vs Fugoso, 80 Phil. 71 peasants, applied for a permit from the Mayor
of Manila to hold a rally at Plaza Miranda.
F: This is an action for mandamus Respondent Mayor denied the application to
instituted by petitioner Primicias, campaign hold the rally on the date and time specified by
manager of the Coalesced Minority Parties, to petitioners in view of the events that transpired
compel Mayor Fugoso of the City of Manila to during the last demonstration held by them
issue a permit for the holding of a peaceful which ended in the destruction of public and
public meeting at Plaza Miranda for the purpose private property, loss of a few lives, injuries to a
of petitioning the government for redress of score of other persons and the closing down of
grievances. The Mayor denied the application schools, offices and many stores. The Mayor
on the ground that passions still run high due to suggested that the MDP utilize the Sunken
the recent election, and a rally to protest Gardens near Intramuros for its rally and that
election anomalies might threaten breaches of the rally be held during weekends and earlier
the peace and disruption of public order. during the day so that it may end before dark.
Petitioner challenged the action of the
ISSUE: W/n the Mayor can refuse to grant the Mayor on the ground that the same constitutes
permit. a violation of their right to freedom of assembly.
Petitioner contended that the right of the
RULING: NO. The police power granted to the people to peaceful assembly and to petition the
Mayor under the Ordinance enacted by the government for redress of grievances may be
Municipal Board pursuant to its authority under exercised without the prior necessity of
the Revised Administrative Code which securing a permit from the government and
pertains to the use of streets and public places, that such right cannot be fully enjoyed without
can be construed only to mean the power to the corresponding right to use public places for
regulate, which means and includes the power that purpose.
Constitutional Law II

U.S. Embassy. It affirmed the general rule that


ISSUE: Whether or not the Mayor`s denial to the use of streets is free to all. It found the fear
issue a permit amounted to a violation of entertained by city authorities that the rallyists
petitioner`s right to freedom of assembly. might be agirated by provocateurs to be
unfounded, given the report of the NPD that
HELD: NO. adequate security measures were provided by
The respondent Mayor has not denied the police.
nor absolutely refused the permit sought by
petitioner. He has expressed willingness to The Court did not rule on the validity of
grant the permit for the peaceful assembly the ordinance of Manila prohibiting any rally
during certain days and time, and at a place within 200 meters from any foreign embassy as
when they would not disrupt the normal a means of complying with the Geneva
activities of the community. Convention that requires the host country to
The respondent mayor possesses protect the premises and personnel of the
reasonable discretion to determine or specify embassy.
the streets or public places to be used for the
assembly in order to secure convenient use Then it gave guidelines for the issuance
thereof by others and provide adequate and of permits (now in BP 9801 (i) any group which
proper policing to minimize the risks of disorder applies must do so within a sufficient time so
and maintain public safety and order. the authority can have time to act: (ii) if a
Petitioner has failed to show a clear disagreement arises over a denial of a permit,
specific legal duty on the part of respondent the applicant can question the denial in the
Mayor to grant their application for a permit lower court, which can try questions of fact and
unconditionally. Experience in connection with law, and (iii) appeal can be made to the SC on
present assemblies and demonstrations have an expedited procedure.
shown that they pose a clear and imminent
danger of public disorders, breaches of the J.B.L. Reyes v. Bagatsing, 125 SCRA 553 (1983)
peace, criminal acts, and even bloodshed as an
aftermath of such assemblies, which, petitioner F: Retired Justice JBL Reyes, on behalf of
has manifested, it has no means of preventing. the Anti-Bases Coalition, sought a permit from
Charo. the City of Manila to hold a peaceful march and
rally on Oct. 26, 1983 starting 2 p.m. from
Luneta to the gates of the US Embassy. He filed
In Ignacio v. Ela, 99 Phil. 346 (1956), the this petition because as of Oct. 20, there was
majority upheld the mayor's denial of permit to yet no action on his request to hold a rally.
members of the Jehovah's Witnesses sect for
the use of a klosk within the town plaza in order HELD: Free speech, like free press, may be
to avoid any untoward incident with members identified with the liberty to discuss publicly and
of the Roman Catholic Church, whose tenets are truthfully any matter of public concern without
opposed to those of the petitioners, and whose censorship or punishment. There is to be no
church is very near the klosk. previous retraint whether in the form of libel
suits, prosecution for damages, or contempt
proceedings unless there is a "clear and present
danger of a substantive evil that the State has a
Ignacio v. Ela, 99 Phil. 346 (1956) right to prevent." There can be no legal
objection, absent the existence of a clear and
F: The Mayor denied a permit to the present danger of a substantive evil to the
members of the Jehovah's Witnesses to use the holding of a peaceful rally at Luneta. Neither
kiosk in the town plaza for the purpose of can there be objection to the use of the streets
holding a public lecture on the ground that the up to gates of the US Embassy. A statute
permit, if granted, may give rise to disturbance requiring persons to secure a special license to
of the religious ceremonies being performed by use public streets for a procession is not
the Catholic Church which was said to be within unconstitutional. The licensing of authorities are
hearing distance from the kiosk and which strictly limited to the consideration of the time,
might lead to any untoward incident with place and manner and the authorities are not
members of the rival denomination. invested with arbitrary discretion to issue or
refuse a permit.
ISSUE: W/N the denial is valid.
In German v. Barangan, 135 SCRA 514
In J.B.L. Reyes v. Bagatsing, 125 SCRA (1985), the SC upheld the power of the city
553 (1983), the SC found no basis for the denial authorities to close JP Laurel Street fronting
of permit to the Anti-Bases Coalition to hold a Malacanang from all rallies as a form of "area
march from Luneta to the street fronting the restriction", in order to protect the President
Constitutional Law II

and his family, based on the incident in the holding an illegal assembly and oral
early 70s when the gates of the palace were defamation. They were suspended for one
almost stormed. The rallyists in this case academic year. They filed a petition for
purported to merely worship at St. Jude's. certiorari in the SC.

In case a rally is held in a private place, HELD: The petititon may be considered moot
no permit from the mayor is required. and academic considering that the TRO issued
However, the consent of the owner of the place by the SC allowed the students to enroll. But
must be acquired. there is a need to pass squarely on the
constitutional question. Respect for the
German v. Barangan 35 SCRA 514 (1985) constitutional rights of peaceable assembly and
free speech calls for the setting aside of the
F: On Oct. 2, 1984 the petitioners who order of suspension. Suspending them for one
were businessmen, students and employees, year is out of proportion considering that the
met on JP Laurel Street in Manila for the vigorous presentation of views was expected.
ostensible purpose of hearing mass at the St. The excitement of the occasion, the propensity
Jude Chapel which adjoins the Malacañang of speakers to exaggerate and the exuberance
grounds. They wore yellow T-shirts and, with of the youth should be taken into consideration.
clenched fists, marched on the street and
shouted anti-government invectives. They were
stopped from proceeding to the chapel by the Arreza v. GAUP, 13 SCRA 94 (1985)
Presidential Security Command. They brought
an action for mandamus. F: Petitioners were officers and members
of the Student Council of the Gregorio Araneta
HELD: The yellow T-shirts worn by some of the University Foundation. They were refused
marchers, their fists clenched and chants of enrollment for having led a rally on Sept. 28,
anti-government investives support the 1982.
government's claim that the petitioners purpose
was not really to worship at the chapel but to HELD: As held in Malabanan v. Ramento: "If in
hold an anti-government demonstration close to the course of such demonstration, with an
the residence of the President. The restricted enthusiastic audience goading them on,
use of JP Laurel Street is justified. The need to utterances, extremely critical, at times even
secure the safety of heads of states cannot be vitriolic, were let loose, that is quite
overemphasized. The threat to their lives is understandable. They would be ineffective if
constant and felt throughout the world. The during the rally they speak in the guarded and
petitioners were not restrained in their freedom judicious language of the academe. At any rate,
of religion but only in the manner by which they even a sympathetic audience is not disposed to
had attempted to translate the same into accord full credence to their fiery exhortations.
action. They take into account the excitement of the
In Malabanan v. Ramento, 129 SCRA occasion, the propensity of speakers to
359 (1984) and Arreza v. GAUP, 13 SCRA 94 exaggerate, the exuberance of youth. xxx" The
(1985), the SC upheld the right to expression of refusal of the university to enroll the students is
students who held a rally in a private a highly disproportionate penalty.
university. But since they held it beyond the Notes: Note that while the permit
time granted in a place other than the one system is not allowed in the case of publication,
allowed by the administration, their suspension it is allowed in the case of assembly. In
was condoned. publication, censorship is presumptively
unconstitutional. There is very little possibility
Malabanan v. Ramento, 129 SCRA 359 (1984) or justification for the regulation of news. The
remedy in this case is prosecution or
F: Petitioners were officers of the Supreme subsequent punishment.
Student Council of the Gregorio Araneta But in assembly regulation is allowed
University Foundation. They were granted a because it is needed by the very nature of the
permit to hold a meeting to protest the merger expression, when people use streets, they may
of two units of the university. On the scheduled deprive other groups which want to use the
date, the students continued their meeting streets too. So as long as only the incidents of
beyond the scheduled time and held it in a speech are regulated, the measure is
different place from that indicated in the constitutionally acceptable.
permit. They expressed in a vehement
language their opposition to the merger and as
a result, classes and office work was disturbed. Nestle Phils. Inc. v. Sanchez 154 SCRA 541
Petitioners were placed under preventive (1987)
suspension. On appeal, they were found guilt of
Constitutional Law II

F: While these cases were pending in the Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss
SC, the labor unions involved intensified the the complaint for lack of jurisdiction, w/c motion
pickets they had been conducting in front of the was denied. The restraining order w/c was
Padre Faura gate of the Court and set up picket previously issued was converted into an
quarters, at times obstructing access to and injunction after finding the strike illegal.
egress from the Court's premises. When Petitioners appealed the case to the CA. The
required to show cause why they should not be latter held that since the employees of SSS are
held in contempt of court, their lawyer govt employees, they are not allowed to
apologized and assured that the above incident strike.
would not be repeated.
HELD: Employees in the Civil Service may not
HELD: The Court will not hesitate in future resort to strikes, walkouts and other temporary
similar situations to apply the full force of the work stoppages, like workers in the private
law and punish for contempt those who attempt sector, in order to pressure the Govt. to accede
to pressure the Court into acting one way or the to their demands. As now provided under Sec.
other in any case pending before it. Grievances 4, Rule III of the Rules and Regulations to
must be ventilated in the proper channels, i.e. Govern the Exercise of the Right of Govt. EEs to
through appropriate petitions or pleadings in Self-Organization which took effect after the
keeping with the respect due the courts as initial dispute arose, the terms and conditions of
impartial administrators of justice. Moreover, employment in the Govt, including any political
"parties have a constitutional right to have the subdivision or instrumentality thereof and govt.
causes tried fairly in court by an impartial owned and controlled corporations with original
tribunal, uninfluenced by publication or public charters, are governed by law and employees
clamor xxx" The acts of respondents are not therein shall not strike for the purpose of secur-
only an affront to the dignity of this Court but ing changes thereof.
equally a violation of the above-stated right of The statement of the court in Alliance of
the adverse parties and the citizenry at large. Govt Workers v. Minister of Labor and
Employment (124 SCRA 1) is relevant as it
3. Freedom of Association and the right to furnishes the rationale for distinguishing bet.
strike in the public sector workers in the private sector and govt
employees w/ regard to the right to strike?
Art. III, Sec. 8. The right of the
people, including those employed in the Since the terms and conditions of
public and private sectors, to form unions, govt. employment are fixed by
associations, or societies for purposes not law, govt. workers cannot use the
contrary to law shall not be abridged. same weapons employed by
workers in the private sector to
The inclusion of the right to unionize in secure concessions from their
this article is ill-advised because while the right employers. The principle behind
to unionize is an economic and labor right, the labor unionism in private industry
right to association in general is a civil- political is that industrial peace cannot be
right. secured through compulsion of
Discussed elsewhere is the argument law. Relations bet. private
why public employees cannot engage in employers and their employees
collective bargaining and strike. rest on an essentially voluntary
basis. Subject to the minimum
requirements of wage laws and
SSS Employees Assn vs CA, 175 SCRA 686 other labor and welfare
(1989) legislation, the terms and
conditions of employment in the
F: SSS filed w/ the RTC-QC a complaint for unionized private sector are
damages w/ a prayer for a writ of prel inj. settled through the process of
against petitioners SSSEA, alleging that the collective bargaining. In govt
officers and members of the latter staged an employment, however, it is the
illegal strike and barricaded the entrances to legislature and, where properly
the SSS building preventing non-striking given delegated power, the
employees from reporting to work and SSS administrative heads of govt w/c
members from transacting business w/ SSS. fix the terms and conditions of
The Public Sector Labor-Management Council employment. And this is effected
ordered the strikers to return to work but the through statutes or
strikers refused to do so. The SSSEA went on administrative circulars, rules,
strike bec. SSS failed to act on the union's and regulations, not through
demands. CBA's
Constitutional Law II

be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may


E. Academic Freedom be admitted to study.
For the above reason, mandamus is not
Garcia v. Faculty of Admission, 68 SCRA 277 available for the petitioner. There is no duty on
(1975) the part of the School to admit her to study
since the School clearly has the discretion to
F: The FAC of the Loyola School of turn down even qualified applicants due to
Theology refused to readmit petitioner, Garcia, limitations of space, facilities, professors and
in its M.A. program because they felt that "her optimum classroom size and component
frequent questions and difficulties were not considerations. There are standards to meet
always pertinent and had the effect of slowing and policies to pursue. What a student
down the progress of the class;" that it would possesses is a privilege rather than a right.
be "to the best interest (of the petitioner) to
work with a faculty that is more compatible with UP v. Ayson, 176 SCRA 647 (1989)
her orientation. Garcia assailled her expulsion
for being unreasonable; that the reasons given F: In 1972, the UP BOR approved the
therefor were invalid for nowhere did it appear establishment of the UPCB Highshool to serve,
that her conduct constituted a violation of the among others, "as a laboratory and
school's regulations and grave misconduct. demonstration school for prospective teachers -
provided that UPCBHS must be self-supporting."
ISSUE: Whether or not the FAC can be However, the Dept of Professional Education in
compelled by mandamus to readmit petitioner. Baguio was never organized. So, the BOR
decided to phase out UPCBHS for failing to
RULING: NO. The Constitution recognizes the attain the conditions for its creation. The
enjoyment by institutions of higher learning of UPCBHS Foundation Inc. sought to restrain the
the right to academic freedom. The school University from phasing out the UPCBHS.
decides for itself its aims and objectives and
how best to attain them. It is free from outside ISSUE: Is secondary public education
coercion or interference save possibly when the demandable in an institution of higher learning
overriding public welfare calls for some such as the UP?
restraint. It has a wide sphere of autonomy
certainly extending to the choice of the RULING: NO. UP invokes its exercise of
students. academic freedom. Private respondent invokes
The collective liberty of an organization the right to quality education and to free
is by no means the same thing as the freedom secondary education.
of the individual members within it. In The rights invoked by private
considering the problems of academic freedom, respondent may be asserted only as against the
one must distinguish between autonomy of the Government through the DECS. UP was created
university, as a corporate body, and the under its charter to provide advanced tertiary
freedom of the individual university teacher. education. An institute of higher learning cannot
The personal aspect of the freedom be compelled to provide for secondary
consists of the right of each university teacher education.
to seek and express the truth as he personally It is beyond cavil that UP as an
sees it, both in his academic work and in his institution of higher learning enjoys academic
capacity as a private citizen. This status of the freedom. UPCBHS was established subject to a
individual teacher is as important as the status number of conditionalities. Failing on such
of the institution to which he belongs and conditions, UP can order its abolition on
through which he disseminates learning. academic grounds. Charo.
On other hand, the internal conditions
for academic freedom in a university are that
the academic staff should have de facto control UP v. CA, Feb. 9, 1993
of the following functions: (a) admission and
examination of students; (b) curricula for F: Former PANAMIN Minister Manuel
courses of study; (c) appointment and tenure of Elizalde and the Tasaday representative filed a
office of academic staff; and (d) allocation of complaint for damages and declaratory relief
income among the different categories of against UP Professors Jerome Bailen and Zeus
expenditure. It is the business of a university to Salazar who disputed the authenticity of the
proviide that atmosphere which is most Tasaday find and made a proposition in various
conducive to speculation, experiment and conferences attended by them that Elizalde
creation. It is an atmosphere in which the four merely fabricated the discovery of the
essential freedoms of a university prevail - to Tasadays.
determine for itself who may teach, what may UP intervened, aaserting its duty to
protect the respondents as faculty members for
Constitutional Law II

acts and utterances made in the exercise of It is likewise violated if the State favors
academic freedom. The lower court denied UP's all religions, for there may be atheists who are
motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of not so favored.
action. Hence this petition.
1. Operation of sectarian schools
RULING: With respect to the prayer of the
complaint for "judgment declaring the Tasadays While the ownership, creation and
to be a distinct ethnic community, the lower management of educational institutions must
court is cautioned that the same is akin to a be in the hands of Filipinos or 60% Filipino-
prayer for a judicial declaration of Philippine owned corporations, sectarian schools and
citizenship which may not be granted in a those run by religious groups and missions
petition for declaratory relief. The complaint board are exempted from these requirements,
was filed mainly to vindicate plaintiff's dignity provided the administration is in the hands of
and honor. Filipinos, who could be sectarian. [Art. XIV, Sec.
Indeed, it is beyond the province of the 4(2).]
court to make pronouncements on matters
beyond its ken and expertise. To be sure, in
resolving the complaint for damages, the court 2. Religious instruction in public schools
may find congruence in what is justiciable and
what falls within the field of the sciences. Still, it
is best to keep in mind that its proper role and Provided it is upon the written petition
function is the determination of legal issues. of the parents and it is at no cost to the State
(although this is not entirely possible, because
V. FREEDOM OF RELIGION the use of classrooms and electricity are costs
in the State), religious instruction in public
Art. III, Sec. 5. No law shall be elementary and secondary schools during class
made respecting an establishment of hours, by one approved by the authorities of the
religion; or prohibiting the free exercise religion of the child or ward is allowed. [Art.
thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment XIV, Sec. 3(3).] Religion can even be integrated
of religious profession and worship, in the school curriculum. [Civ. Code, 359 (1).]
without discrimination or preference, shall
forever be allowed. No religious test shall 3. Anti-evolution laws
be required for the exercise of civil or
political rights. In Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97
(1968), the SC held that the teaching of the
A. Non-Establishment Clause Darwinian theory of evolution cannot be
prohibited from public shools by parents whose
The clause prohibits excessive religions finds the theory offensive.
government entanglement with, endorsement
or disapproval of religion [Vicoriano v. Elizalde 4. Prayer and Bible-reading in public schools
Rope Workers Union, 59 SCRA 54 (1974); Lynch
v. Donnelly, 465 US 668 (1984) (O'Connor, J., In Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1967),
concurring); Allegheny County v. Greater the SC disallowed the conducting of an
Pittsburg ACLU, 492 US 574 (1989).] interdenominational prayer before the start of
classes in public schools as, violative of the
The clause prohibits the State from Non- Establishment clause.
establishing a religion. In assessing the validity
of the law, the questions to be asked are: Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1967)
a. Is the purpose of the law religious,
or is it secular? F: The respondent Board of Education upon
b. Does it or does it not inhibit or the recommendation of the State Board of
advance religion? Regents, directed the School's District principal
c. Is its effect to promote or to avoid an to cause the recitation in public schools of a
excessive entaglement between the State and brief, denominationally neutral prayer. Its
religious matters in religion? observance on the part of the students was
voluntary.
The Non-Establishment clause is
violated when the State gives any manifest RULING: The Court ruled that the State of New
support to any one religion, even if nothing is York, by using its public school system to
done against the individual. encourage the recitation of the Regent's prayer
has adopted a practice wholly inconsistent with
the Establishment Clause. The prayer was
composed by govt officials as part of a
Constitutional Law II

governmental program to further religious Establishment clause which withdraws all


beliefs. The constitutional prohibition against legislative power respecting religious belief or
laws respecting an establishment of religion the expression thereof, is the PURPOSE and the
means at least that it is not part of the business PRIMARY EFFECT of the enactment. If either is
of the government to compose official prayers the advancement or inhibition of religion, then
for any group to recite as part of a religious the enactment exceeds the scope of legislative
program carried on by the govt. power as circumscribed by the First
The clauses of the 1st Amendment Amendment. To withstand the strictures of the
which prohibit laws respecting an establishment establishment clause, there must be a secular
of religion and abridging the free exercise legislative purpose and a primary effect that
thereof, although overlapping in certain neither advances nor inhibits religion.
instances, forbids two diff kinds of The place of the Bible as an instrument
governmental encroachment upon religious of religion cannot be gainsaid. This is
freedom. The stablishment clause, unlike the particularly so where the State's recognition of
free exercise clause, does not depend upon any the pervading religious character of the
showing of direct governmental compulsion and exercise is evident from the rule's specific
is violated by the enactment of laws which permission of the alternative use of the Catholic
establish an official religion, whether or not Douay version of the Bible as well as from a
those laws operate directly to coerce non- recent amendment permitting non-attendance
observing individuals. It rests on the belief that at the exercises, none of those factors being
a union of govt and religion tends to destroy consistent with the contention that the Bible is
govt and to degrade religion, and upon an used either as an instrument for non-religious
awareness of the historical fact that moral inspiration or as a reference for the
governmentally established religion and teaching of secular subjects.
religious persecutions go hand in hand.
5. Tax exemption
In Abington School District v. Schemp,
374 U.S. 203 (1963), it likewise disallowed the Art. VI, Sec. 28. xxx
reading of a passage from the bible without (3) Charitable institutions,
comment in public schools as contrary to the churches, parsonages or convents
Non- Establishment clause. appurtenant thereto, mosques, non-profit
cemeteries, and all lands, buildings and
Abington School District v. Schemp, 374 U.S. improvements, actually, directly, and
203 (1963) exclusively used for religious, charitable
or educational purposes shall be exempt
The issue was whether the establishment clause from taxation.
was violated by a Pennsylvania Statute or a rule
of the Board of Commissioners of Baltimore
adopted pursuant to statutory authority The ruling in Bishop of Nueva Segovia v.
requiring the reading without comment, at the Provincial Board, 51 Phil. 352 (1927) is
opening of each school day, of verses from the modified to the extent now that the property
Bible and the recitation of the Lord's prayer by must be "actually, directly and exclusively"
the students in unison. The students and used for religious purposes to be exempt.
parents may refuse to participate in the school
exercises. These exercises were prescribed as If not for religious purposes, educational
part of the curricular activities of students who purposes.
are required by law to attend school and held in
school buildings under the supervision and Bishop of Nueva Segovia v. Provincial Board, 51
participation of teachers employed in those Phil. 352 (1927)
schools.
F: The plaintiff, the Roman Catholic
RULING: YES, the establishment clause was Apostolic Church, represented by the Bishop of
violated. Nueva Segovia, is the owner and occupant of a
The establishment clause prohibits a parcel of land in San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte. On
state from placing official support behind the the south siide is a part of the church yard, the
tenets of one or all orthodoxies and the free convent and an adjacent lot used as vegetable
exercise clause guarantees the right of every garden. In the center is the remainder of the
person to freely choose his own course with churchyard and the church. On the north side is
reference to religious training, teaching and an old cemetery and the base of what was once
observance, free from any compulsion from the a tower. The Prov. Board imposed a tax on the
State. whole land.
The test in determining whether a
legislative enactment violates the ISSUE: Whether or not the taxation is legal.
Constitutional Law II

Constitutional provision that no public money or


RULING: NO. The exemption in the payment of property shall be appropriated for the use,
the land tax mandated in the Constitution in benefit or support of any sect or religion.
favor of the religious entities refers to the home
of the priest who presides over the church and ISSUE: W/N petitioner's contention is tenable.
who has to take care of himself in order to
discharge his duties. It therefore must include RULING: NO. Act 4052 contemplated no
not only the land actually occupied by the religious purpose in view. What it gave the
church but also the adjacent ground destined Director of Posts was the discretionary power to
for the ordinary incidental uses of man. determine when the issuance of special postage
Except in large cities where the density stamps would be advantageous to the
of the population and the development of government.
commerce require the use of large tracts of The purpose in issuing the stamps was
land for buildings, a vegetable garden belongs to advertise the Philippines and attract more
to a house and, in the case of a convent, its use tourists to this country. The officials concerned
is limited to the necessities of the priest. merely took advantage of an event considered
Therefore, which comes under the tax of international importance to give publicity to
exemption. the country and its people. The stamp
As to the lot which was formerly the contained a map of the Philippines and the
cemetery, while it is no longer used as such, location of Manila, and an inscription as follows:
neither is it used for commercial purposes and, "Seat XXXIII International Eucharistic Crusade."
accdg to the evidence, is now being used as a What was emphasized was not the event but
lodging house by the people who participate in Manila.
religious festivities. The same constitutes an It was obvious that while the stamps
incidental use in religious functions. It also may be said to be inseparably linked with an
comes within the exemption. event of a religious character, the resulting
propaganda received by the Roman Catholic
6. Public aid to religion Church was merely incidental and was not the
aim and purpose of the government.
The payment or use of public money or
property for any religious institution or clergy is In Ignacio v. Ela, supra, the dissenting
not allowed; except in those cases provided in opinion of Justice Concepcion pointed out that
the Constitution: priests assigned in the AFP, the mayor disapproved the application for a
penal institution, government orphanage, or permit not so much because he was afraid that
leprosarium. [Art. VI, Sec. 29 (2)] breach of peace would ensue but because he
wrongly though the kiosk should be used for
But in Aglipay v. Ruiz, 64 Phil. 201 public purposes only and not for religious
(1937), the SC held that the stamp printed by purposes. When the Jehovah's Witness
the government showing the map of the members use the public squares, they are no
Philippines with a rosary to commemorate the different from ordinary pedestrians or
33rd International Eucharistic Congress to be promenaders who use the street: that they are
held in Manila did not violate the Non- performing religious acts is only incidental. So
Establishment clause because its main purpose, long as the use of public property is only
was to call the world's attention to Manila as the incidentalally and temporarilly for religious
site of an international congress, and whatever purposes and so long as the use is such as to be
benefit it gave the Catholic Church was only reasonably compatible with the use to which
incidental. other members of the community are similarly
entitled, then the non-establishment clause is
not violated. The tests then are (1) Is the use
of the public facility compatible with general
use? (2) Is the resulting benefit to the religious
Aglipay v. Ruiz, 64 Phil. 201 (1937) group only incidental.

F: The petitioner, Mons. Aglipay, Head of B. Free Exercise Clause


the Phil. Ind. Church, sought to restrain
respondent Director of Posts from issuing and 1. Flag Salute
selling postage stamps commemorative of the
33rd International Eucharistic Congress. The Ebranilag v. Division Superindentent of Schools
Director issued the stamps under the provisions of Cebu, 219 SCRA 256 (1993)
of Act 4052 which appropriates public funds for
the cost of the plates and printing of the Conscientious Objectors cannot be compelled to
stamps. Petitioner alleged that the issuance of salute the flag.
the stamps was done in violation of the
Constitutional Law II

F: All the ptetitioners in these cases were


expelled from their classes by the public school
authorities in Cebu for refusing to salute the Compare West V. Board of Education v.
flag, since the national anthem and recite the Barnette, 319 US 624 (1943)
patriotic pledge as required by RA 1265 and by
Dept. Order No. 8 dated July 21, 1955 of the F: The State Board required public school
DECS making the flag ceremony compulsory in pupils to salute the flag of the United States
all educational institutions. while reciting a pledge of allegiance under
penalty of expulsion entailing liability of both
ISSUE: W/N school children who are members pupil and parents to be proceeded against for
of a religious sect known as Jehovah's unlawful absence. Appellees, members of the
Witnesses may be expelled from school (both Jehovah's Witnesses, consider the flag as a
private and public), for refusing, on account of graven image which they are forbidden to
their religious beliefs, to take part in the flag salute under their religious beliefs. The State
ceremony which includes playing (by a band) or asserts the power to condition access to public
singing the Phil. National Anthem, saluting the education.
Phil. flag and reciting the patriotic pledge.
ISSUE: W/N the compulsory flag salute is valid.
HELD: NO.
The idea that one may be compelled to RULING: NO.
salute the flag, sing the national anthem, and In connection with pledges, the flag
recite the patriotice pledge, during a flag salute is a form of utterance. It requires an
ceremony on pain of being dismissed from affirmation of a belief and an attitude of mind. It
one's job or of being expelled from school, is is now a commonplace that censorship or
alien to the conscience of the present suppression of expression of opinion is tolerated
generation of Filipinos who cut their teeth on by the Constitution only when the expression
the Bill of Rights w/c guarantees their rights to presents a clear and present danger of action of
free speech and the free exercise of religious a kind the State is empowered to prevent and
profession and worship. punish. Here the power of compulsion is
xxx invoked without any allegation that remaining
xxx Forcing a small religious group, passive during a flag salute ritual creates a
through the iron hand of the law, to participate clear and present danger that would justify an
in a ceremony that violates their religious effort even to muffle expression.
beliefs, will hardly be conducive to love of To sustain the compulsory flag salute,
country or respect for duly constituted we are required to say that a Bill of Rights
authorities. which guards the individual's right to speak his
xxx mind left it open to public authorities to compel
The sole justification for a prior restraint him to utter what is not in his mind.
or limitation on the exercise of religious The Court applies the limitations of the
freedom is the existence of a grave and present Constitution with no fear that freedom to be
danger of a character both grave and imminent, intellectually and spiritually diverse or even
of a serious evil to public safety, moral, health contrary will disintegrate the social
or any other legitimate public interest, that the organization. To believe that patriotism will not
state has a right and duty to prevent. Absent flourish if patriotic ceremonies are voluntary
such a threat to public safety, the expulsion of and spontaneous instead of a compulsory
the pets. from the schools is not justified. routine is to make an unflattering estimate of
xxx the appeal of our institutions to free minds.
Although petitioners do not participate
in the compulsory flag ceremony, they do not 2. Freedom to propagate religious doctrines
engage in external acts or behavior that would
offend their countrymen who believe in American Bible Society v. City of Manila, 101 P
exercising their love of country through the 386 (1957)
observance of the flag ceremony. They quietly
stand at attention during the ceremony to show F: Plaintiff is engaged in the distribution
their respect for the right of those who choose and sale of bibles and religious articles. The City
to participate in the solemn proceedings. As Treasurer of Manila informed the plaintiff that it
there is no disruption, expulsion is was conducting the business of general
unwarranted. merchandise without securing the necessary
However, if they should commit license and paying the requisite fee in violation
breaches of peace by action that offend the of the City ordinance. Plaintiff protested against
sensibilities, both religious and patriotic, of this requirement as constituting a restraint
other persons, the school authorities have the upon the exercise of religion. It claimed that it
power to discipline them. is not engaged in business which necessitates
Constitutional Law II

the securing of a license as it never made any


profit from the sale of its bibles. Pamil v. Teleron 86 SCRA 413 (1978)

ISSUE: Whether or not the ordinance as applied F: In 1971, Fr. Margarito Gonzaga was
to petitioner is unconstutional for being in elected mayor of Albuquerque, Bohol. A petition
restraint of petitioner's right to free exercise of was filed against him on the basis of section
religion. 2175 of the Revised Administrative Code
providing that "in nocase shall there be elected
HELD: YES. The power to tax the exercise of the or appointed to a municipal office ecclesiastics,
privilege is the power to control or suppress its soldiers in active service, persons receiving
enjoyment. Those who can tax the exercise of salaries from provincial funds, or contractors for
religious practice can make its exercise so public works." The CFI dismissed the petition on
costly as to deprive it of the resources the ground that the ineligibility has been
necessary for its maintenance. It is true that the impliedly repealed by section 23 of the 1971
price asked for the religious articles was in Election Code.
some instances a little bit higher than the
actual cost of the same, but this cannot mean HELD: The voting of the SC was inconclusive.
that plaintiff was engaged in the business or Seven justices held that section 2175 is no
occupation of selling said "merchandise" for longer operative. Justice Fernando held that
profit. The mark up can only be treated as section 2175 imposed a religious test on the
contributions by the faithfuls to the religious exercise of the right to run for public office
cause. The Ordinance CANNOT be applied to contrary to Art. III of the 1935 Constitution.
plaintiff society, for in so doing, it would impair Justice Teehankee held that section 2175 had
its free exercise and enjoyment of its religious been repealed by the Election Code. Five
profession and worship, as well as its right to justices held that section 2175 is constitutional.
disseminate religious beliefs.

3. Exemtion from union shop VI. LIBERTY OF ABODE AND OF TRAVEL

Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers Union, 59 Art. III, Sec. 6. The liberty of abode
SCRA 54 (1974) and of changing the same within the limits
prescribed by law shall not be impaired
F: Benjamin Victoriano is an employee of except upon lawful order of the court.
the Elizalde Rope Factory. In 1962, he resigned Neither shall the right to travel be
from the respondent labor union on the ground impaired except in the interest of national
that the Iglesia ni Kristo of which he is a security, public safety, or public health, as
member prohibits union membership. As the may be provided by law.
union demanded his dismissal from
employment pursuant to a closed shop
agreement, Victoriano brought this action for Salonga v. Hermoso 97 SCRA 121 (1980)
injunction. The CFI ruled in his favor exempting
from the closed-shop contracts members of Right to travel
religious sects which prohibit affiliation of their
members in any labor organization. The union This is not the first time petitioner Jovito
appealed. Salonga came to the SC by way of a mandamus
proceeding to compel the issuance to him of a
HELD: The statute does not violate the rights of certificate of eligibility to travel. In the first
association. It does not impair the obligation of case, Salonga v. Madella, the case became
contracts for not only are existing laws read into moot and academic. The present petition is
contracts in order to fix the obligation of the likewise moot and academic. In the motion to
parties but the reservation of essential dismiss filed by the Solicitor General, it was
attributes of sovereign power is also read into stated that the certificate of eligibility to travel
such contracts. Neither does the law constitute had been granted petitioner.
an establishment of religion. It has been held Nonetheless, in view of the likelihood
that in order to withstand objections based on that this Court may be faced again with the
this ground, the statute musr have a secular same situation, it is desirable that respondent
purpose and that purpose must not directly Travel Processing Center should exercise the
advance or diminish the interest of any religion. utmost care to avoid the impression that certain
Congress acted merely to relieve persons of the citizens desirous of exercising their
burden imposed by union security agreements. constitutional right to travel could be subjected
to inconvenience or annoyance. The freedom to
4. Disqualification from local government travel is one of the most cherished. xxx
office
Constitutional Law II

Marcos v. Manglapus, 177 SCRA 668 & 178


SCRA 760 (1989)

F: This petition for mandamus and


prohibition asks the Court to order the
respondents to issue travel documents to Mr.
Marcos and the immediate members of his
family and to enjoin the implementation of the
President's decision to bar their return to the
Philippines. The case for petitioners is founded
on the assertion that the right of the Marcoses
to return to the Philippines is guaranteed under
the provisions of the Constitution respecting
one's liberty of abode and right to travel.
Respondents argue the primacy of the right of
the State to national security over individual
rights.

RULING: The right involved in this case is not


the right to travel from the Philippines to other
countries or within the Philippines. Essentially,
the right involved is the right to return to one's
country, a totally distinct right under
international law, independent from although
related to the right to travel.
The right to return to one's country is
not among the rights specifically guaranteed in
the Bill of Rights, which treats only of the liberty
of abode and the right to travel, but it is the
Court's well considered view that the right to
return may be considered as a generally
accepted principle of international law, and
under our Constitution, is part of the law of the
land. However, it is distinct and separate from
the right to travel and enjoys a different
protection under the Intl. Covenant of Civil and
Political Rights, i.e. against being arbitrarily
deprived thereof.
The request or demand of the Marcoses
to be allowed to return to the Philippines cannot
be considered in the light solely of the
constitutional provisions guaranteeing liberty of
abode and the right to travel. It must be treated
as a matter that is appropriately addressed to
those residual unstated powers of the President
which are implicit in and correlative to the
paramount duty residing in that office to
safeguard and protect general welfare. In that
context, such request or demand should submit
to the exercise of a broader discretion on the
part of the President to determine whether it
must be granted or not.