I

The Politics of Talk on Perceptions: The Case for Theatricality

Mounir TRIKI GRAD Research Unit on Discourse Analysis, FLSH, Sfax

Thesis Statement:
I wish to submit the following claims:
1 Perceptions are always mediated by reports
This is warranted by the observation of the following dichotomies:
The discipline The relevant concepts
narratology point of of view vs narrative voice, focalisation
psychology public vs private selves
sociology Appearance vs reality (theatricality vs habitus)
pragmatics saying vs implying; saying vs doing; linguistic
meaning vs speaker’s intented meaning; overriding
context
cinematography dialogism: decentering self (I vs Me)
critical theory no more certainties on meaning and interpretation
+ polyphony + heteroglossia
historiography any historical account is necessarily mediated
media studies agenda setting and framing strategies
rhetoric Persuasion, manipulation, deception
stylistics slippage; écart, deviation
semantics Literal vs metaphorical meanings; all types of
ambiguity; all types of presuppositions
Feminism Gendered discourse vs biological sex

What these concepts show is that what is presented need not be taken at its face
value.
2 These dichotomies are possible because the various signifying systems
(linguistic, social, semiotic) have made them possible.
The paper attempts to read into the assumptions of a variety of influential
theories. It seems that despite their divergences and the disparity of their frames
of reference, there is a common thread which they all share and which I have
labeled the Tricky Hypothesis. We can only play games if we are properly
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equipped to do so.
3 Goffman’s dramaturgical model and Bakhtin’s ventriloquating concept
advocating the theatricality of our verbal interactions are quite appealing if we
want good insights into the mechanisms of perception.
4 Reporting on our perceptions of ourselves and of others is always political in
the sense of being goal-oriented.
Structure of the Paper:
To defend these claims I shall review linguistic literature with a view to showing
first the linguistic potential for Fowler’s Healthy Scepticism. Then evidence shall
be drawn respectively from Psychology, Critical Discourse Analysis, Sociology,
Narratology, Historiography and Cinematography. The paper ends by making a
case for the Tricky Hypothesis and suggesting a checklist for a close reading of
discourse reporting perceptions.
1. The Linguistic Potential for a Questioning of Literality and Transparency:
I wish to argue that, by reconsidering the work of established linguists like
Guillaume, Jakobson, Benvéniste, Lyons and Halliday and then moving to
pragmatics and critical discourse analysis, I shall be advocating a view of
grammar as carrying the potential for acting in the sense of encoding the
speaker’s management of impressions.
1.1. The Input of Established Linguists:
Acting is defined in the dictionary as the art or practice of representing a
character on stage or before cameras. In terms of the Tricky Hypothesis, it is the
consciousness of self in one’s relation to others. It is the art of creating and giving
impressions about oneself and about one’s definition of the other’s standing with
respect to ego. French Enunciative/speaker-centred linguistics sets a high
premium on this dimension of acting by foregrounding the centrality of the
speaking subject and his/her discursive strategies. The key notions of deixis and
modality, so central to this frame of reference, hinge on the speaker’s shifting in
or shifting out strategies (Greimas and Courtes, 1982).
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The legacy of Guillaume and Benvéniste, markedly indebted to Jakobson, lends

itself to a new reading as viewed from the Tricky Hypothesis. In particular,
Jakobson's model (1956) of shifters defines them as a special class of verbal
categories necessitating reference to the speech event and/or to the participants in
the speech event. However, I have argued elsewhere (Triki, 1989) that not to refer
to the speech event or to its participants is a structural impossibility. In fact, as
Gustave Guillaume has put it (quoted in Joly 1981:545):
Tous les actes d'expression - sans exception aucune - sont affectifs vu que
tous ont pour objet d'agir sur l'interlocuteur, de l'affecter. Il n'est pas de
phrase qui ne soit affective.
Parret (1983) claims that speakers could be said to have an affective competence
"compétence passionnelle" that inevitably marks their discourse. Therefore, it is
very difficult, if not virtually impossible, to stop the erosive effect of the
categories of shifters. It will be argued, together with Guespin (1976), that there
is no clearly defined borderline between shifters and non-shifters. A large and
ever growing shady area lies in between. However, what could be deduced from
Jakobson's argument is that grammatical (and particularly verbal) categories shift
differently, or, better still, linguistic forms belong to different kinds of shifters
and lend themselves to different degrees of transparency. In brief, there are
tendencies either towards shifting in [embrayage] where the subjective presence
of the speaker is more readily apparent, if not foregrounded (as is the case with
deictic categories), or towards shifting out [débrayage] where the presence of the
speaker is less readily available and a disjunction of the utterance from
I/here/now onto what is not-I/not-here/not-now takes place (tendency towards
objectivity). To use the terminology of Greimas and Courtès (1982), the
subjectivising tendency will be called «engagement» whereas the objectivising
tendency will be called «disengagement».

Instead of Jakobson's sharp distinction between shifters and non-shifters, a scale

or cline of gradations could be envisaged with "total" engagement or
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disengagement at either extremity. The linguistic forms could then be assigned

degree-of-shifting values ranging from the most minimal to the most maximal.
Consequently, the dichotomy between "subjective" and "objective" utterances
does not operate at the enunciation level since, by its very definition, an utterance
is the result of a subjective act of appropriating a linguistic system by a speaker.
In so far as there is a speaker latent to any conceivable speech event, then every
utterance could be said to be subjective. What warrants the dichotomy on the
other hand is that there is in an utterance a number of clues giving the
impressions either of subjectivity or of objectivity (Morot-Sir, 1982:128).

In the discursivisation process (Gréimas and Courtès, 1982) the speaker inscribes
in the utterance either an engaging egocentric force or else a disengaging
objectivising force. Thus, the import of the categories enumerated by Jakobson is
that, when used in discourse, they either tend to give the impressions of
subjectivity or at least to prompt the reader to take into account their shifting
reference (Jakobson's shifters called here overt shifters) or on the contrary give
impressions of objectivity by suppressing overt reference to the speech event and
its participants (Jakobson's "non-shifters" called here covert shifters). It is
important to bear in mind the fact that the notions of subjectivity and objectivity
are relative and set into relief the very problematic of indeterminacy in borderline
cases.

It could be concluded thus that Jakobson's legacy has paved the way towards a
linguistics of enunciation where the speaking subject has a central place. The
problematic of shifters found a considerable boost in the work of Benvéniste on
linguistic subjectivity and the formal apparatus for enunciation (1965, 1966, 1970
in particular). The emptiness, but not meaninglessness, of these forms provides
the key feature of what is generally understood by shifters as construed in an
extended framework. Shifters are thus inexorably linked to the emergence of the
speaking subject within the utterance. It is because these empty forms lend
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themselves for appropriation by an individual speaker who by so doing

transforms what is conventional and codified into something personal and
idiosyncratic that they are called shifters. Hence, the study of shifters finds a
natural place as a vital integral part in the study of linguistic subjectivity
(Benvéniste, 1966:259-60). It is this process of appropriation of the linguistic
system by an individual speaker which defines the concept of enunciation. The
speaker by annexing for his own use the formal apparatus of a language
necessarily leaves traces of his presence as a speaker on the surface of his
utterance. The task of the linguist is thus to focus on the imprint (marks, traces,
cues, indices, clues...) of the process of enunciation in the utterance (Benvéniste,
1970:14; Kerbrat, 1980).

These cues are pervasive. Speech is so impregnated with subjective markers that
it is inconceivable to study its function without recourse to them (Bevéniste,
1966:261). The occurrence of such cues emanates from the relationship between
the speaker, the utterance and especially the other participants both in the speech
event and the narrated event. As Ducrot and Todorov (1981) have pointed out,
the presence of these cues in different degrees of intensity in every utterance is a
presence-indicator, revealing information on the speaking subject. It is from the
centrality of the speaker in his utterance that the linguistic indices of enunciation
stem (Benvéniste, 1970:14).

Expression is inseparable from expressivity (Joly, 1973, 1979, 1980,1995 ;

O’Kelly, 1995). That is, encoding a message is a complex process where
subjective elements infiltrate into the speaker's already culturally prestructured
initial project at different levels of the encoding process (Grèimas's
discursivisation process) so much so that the final product (the utterance) is a
necessarily modified version of an already subjective input (LeGoffic, 1980).
Consequently, the speaker is present everywhere in his utterance whether we as
addressees or overhearers perceive his presence as explicit or implicit.
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Every utterance is unique since it emanates from a unique enunciative act (Lyons,
1977:570). The importance of this feature is that it allows for the assumption that
every utterance (in its broad meaning of available product of a speech event,
whether oral or written) is reconstructable along the parameters of person, space
and time from which the affective parameter gradually comes into being. This
process of reconstruction by the reader will be called deictic contextualisation,
(Margolin, 1984), culminating in a complementary process which will be called
affective contextualisation.

In an unmarked canonical (Lyons, 1977:638) use of deixis, the speaker takes his
own ego as the deictic centre of the utterance. By equating the utterances's
deictic centre with his own latent deictic centre, the speaker embarks on an
engagement or shifting in process. However, under the influence of many
subjective factors not the least of which are the speaker's own discursive
strategies, speakers often resort to displaced uses of deixis where displacement is
conceived of, after Fowler (1986:89), as the capacity of human speech not only to
refer to things and events removed in space and time from the immediate context
of utterance but more importantly to use deictic tools to express affective ends.

When dealing with the concept of deictic anchorage (the categories of person,
place and time), Triki (1989, forthcoming) has shown that there is no one to one
correlation between the grammatical category of person and the objective reality
of people's gender and number out there in the world. Three major mediatory
factors are brought to bear. First, the ideology informing the social relations in
one given society necessarily colours the form chosen for reference to person.
Second, the speaker's own affective attitude towards the addressee(s) or
délocuté(s) operating on the parameters of proximity versus distance determine
many of the instances of displacement. Third, with a conscious manipulation of
forms pertaining to person, many subjective effects can be created. The major
effects emanate from the speaker's apparent engaging or disengaging orientation.
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At the level of space deixis, the centrality of physical and affective space in
human cognition must be emphasised. Deictic subjectivity is first and foremost
expressed in spatial terms. Ego is the sum total of deictic [i.e spatio-temporal]
location and affective [i.e attitudinal] force. Proximity to ego or distance from it
provides the underlying mechanism for all other affective effects. Affective
proximity or distance is expressed in spatial terms. However, when there is a
clash between the spatial and the affective parameters, affective considerations
take priority. The shifting identity of the speaker is a major source of deictic
ambiguity in egocentric space. The determining role of affectivity is another
source of ambiguity, called attitudinal ambiguity.

As to temporal deixis, three main points should be made. First, there is no one to
one correlation between the linguistic apparatus for time and real cosmic time.
Language embodies our perception of time rather than time per se. Second, the
mediatory impact of the speaker's perception of time on the selection of the
appropriate linguistic forms could be traced on two levels. At the deictic level,
there is the problem of the shifting identity of the deictic centre and how it relates
to ego. At the affective level, the speaker's modal attitude to the events tends to
override temporal requirements. Third, the speaker's mediation may result in two
tendencies allowing for various gradations in between, namely a subjectivising
phenomenal orientation or an objectivising "structural" perspective (Triki, 1989).

Similarly, with demonstratives, affective parameters are expressed in basic deictic

terms of proximity versus distance. However, when both deictic and affective
considerations are brought to bear in the choice of demonstratives, the affective
considerations take priority. Besides, determiners and intensifiers have strong
affinities with deixis and modality. Their determination of the nouns, adjectives,
and adverbs inscribes within the utterance the speaker's subjectivity.
The dependence of the choice of deixis on affective factors, on various
displacements, and especially on the potential multiplicity of deictic, perceptual
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and affective centres inevitably causes deictic expressions to be opaque and

relative in their reference. There are two main sources of ambiguity. First, it has
to be ascertained whether the use of deixis is canonical or displaced. If it is
displaced, what effect does this displacement produce? What information does it
convey on the speaker's attitude? Second, to which deictic and/or perceptual
and/or affective centre are these forms attached? It is important to attribute them
to their right centres.

As for the concept of modal anchorage, construed here in an extended framework

(Hoey, 1997), modality in its various forms [whether canonical or oblique] seems
to be a constitutive ingredient of every utterance since it embodies the speaker's
attitude towards the message (in the case of epistemic and evaluative modalities)
and the addressee (for deontic modality).
First, in terms of epistemic modality, the speaker can show neutrality,
endorsement, or rejection of the reported propositions, whether this modal
commitment or lack of commitment is genuine or strategic. Second, in terms of
deontic modality, the speaker can express different social attitudes ranging from
the strongest degrees of obligation down to a mere permission. The
appropriateness of these forms to the real power relationship between the
participants in the speech event is something to be negotiated between them and
belongs thus to what Halliday (1985) calls «modulation» as opposed to modality.
Third, in terms of affective modality, the speaker can pass on different value
judgements on the proposition be they flattering or derogatory. The voicing of
these judgments can show a genuine attitude or can be strategic.

1.2 The Input of Pragmatics: Language Use as Social Action:

Another meaning of the word “acting” takes meaning assignments as social
behaviour, where speakers do something to affect their interlocutors one way or
another. As (Tymoczko, 1978, 32-33) has put:
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Our sophisticated verbal interchanges produce dramatic effects on our

behaviour and on our material environemt. If there is meaning to these verbal
interchanges, and if a meaning assignment can represent it, then the meaning
assignment must function in the overall behaviour patterns of language users.
Pragmatics has looked at this aspect of human interaction through language. Our
theory of what a language means is dependent upon our theory of what the
language users are doing with their language (Tymoczko, 1978, 38).
In line with Yu’s (2005) argument, a better understanding of cross-cultural
variation could be obtained by linking ways of speaking to broader patterns of
social and cultural organization. In addition to political belief, cultural norms
play an important role in determining language behaviour.

1.2.1 Saying vs Implying:

Grice is interested in the discrepancy between the “said meaning” of an utterance
(its sense), and its “implicated meaning” (or pragmatic force). His Cooperative
Principle instructs language users to make their conversational contribution such
as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction
of the talk exchange in which they are engaged. Speakers are required to obey
this principle through observance of a number of social maxims which vary in
importance in different social contexts. If they flout one or more of these maxims
they can convey various types of meaning in addition to the literal meaning of the
utterance, known as conversational implicatures. Such extra meanings can be
worked out by measuring the said meaning against the features of context.
However, there are a number of complications to the picture. Maxims often
conflict with one another so that some maxims are observed at the expense of
other maxims. Under contextual constraints some maxims will simply override
other maxims. In fact, as Leech (1983) has cogently pointed out, all the Gricean
maxims can be overridden by social maxims of politeness.
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Implicatures show how the three meanings of acting are at stake. By choosing to
flout the maxims whilst observing the cooperative principle, speakers are acting
in the first sense of deliberately giving the false impression of flouting them.
Their ploy is recognised as such because co-operation on the part of the hearers
requires their participation in the socially coded game of going through certain
motions (second sense of acting). Finally, this game is not innocent, it has its
intended effect (hence acting in the third sense).
1.2.2 Types of Meaning:
Pragmatics capitalises on the interaction between the various types of meaning
(Triki and Atari, 1993). Meaning assignments are relatively indeterminate and
expressed in contexts (Green, 1989; Tymoczko, 1978, 33-38). But, most
importantly, meaning assignments are relative to the speakers’ beliefs,
(Tymoczko, 1978, 39-41). The relativising of meaning assignments to speakers’
beliefs, perceptions and rhetorical plans could be accounted for in terms of the
three types of acting propounded in the Tricky Hypothesis. The lack of match
between the propositional meaning and the other types of meaning is due to
acting in the first sense of manipulating impressions. The fact that this
manoeuvring does not hinder communication and is often detected by hearers is
due to the second meaning of acting (as joining in a social game). The centrality
of intentionality sets the third dynamic sense of acting into relief.
1.2.3 Politeness Strategies
Politeness and face are among the central concerns of Ethnomethodology and
Pragmatics (Bates, 1976; Brown and Levinson, 1987; Lakoff, 1973 and 1977;
Leech, 1980). Whenever people engage in social interaction, these two concepts
are called into play. It so happens that many of the constraints on appropriate
formulae for given contexts are amenable to Politeness maxims that must be
observed. Many of the cases of misfiring of speech acts and discrepancies
between illocutionary acts and perlocutionary effects are in essence due to
flouting politeness maxims.
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Pragmatic research has shown that the principles governing conversation can be
extended beyond Grice’s Cooperative Principle by the addition of maxims of
politeness. For instance, Leech, (1980: 13) labels one of these maxims the Tact
Maxim which can be summed up in the injunction “Do not cause offense”1. It is
argued here that the determining factor in the selection of politeness formulae is
evaluative modality. The speaker inscribes in the utterance his or her point of
view through the smuggling of evaluation by means of these modals. Research
following Halliday’s legacy has systematically drawn attention to the various
modalities whereby speakers market bad or undesirable news (Fowler et al, 1979;
Kress and Hodge, 1979).
As Green (1989: 142) has put it:
As with many politeness techniques, the speaker is really only going through
the motions of offering options or showing respect for the addressee’s feelings.
The offer may be facade, the options nonviable, and the respect a sham. It is

1
In his turn, Leech (1983:page?) had another attempt at characterizing further universals. He formulated six politeness maxims as follows:

1. TACT MAXIM
a. minimize cost to other
b. maximize benefit to other

2. GENEROSITY MAXIM
a. minimize benefit to self
b. maximize cost to self

3. APPROBATION MAXIM
a. minimize dispraise of other
b. maximize praise of other

4. MODESTY MAXIM
a. minimize praise of self
b. maximize dispraise of self

5. AGREEMENT MAXIM
a. minimize disagreement between self and other
b. maximize agreement between self and other

6. SYMPATHY MAXIM
a. minimize antipathy between self and other
b. maximize sympathy between self and other.
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the fact that an effort was made to go through the motions at all that makes the
act an act of politeness.
In order to be polite speakers have to uphold pretences and keep up appearances.
In so doing they call into play the three dimensions of acting.

Moreover, pragmatic failure is not only caused by the speaker’s intended desire
to push the hearer for further interpretations. It is rather the imperative result of
differences in cultures or even differences between speech communities in their
assessment of the speaker's and hearer's social distance and social power, their
rights and obligations, and the degree of imposition involved in particular
communicative acts (Blum-Kulka and House 1989; Olshtain 1989; Takahashi
and Beebe 1993). Moreover, Fraser (1990) states in his 'conversational contract’
that the values of context factors are negotiable; they can change through the
dynamics of conversational interaction.

It is posited in research on politeness that people belonging to all cultures of the

world project a public "face" defined as a sense of positive identity and public
self-esteem (Goffman, 1981; 1983, 1986). When engaged in social interactions,
individuals strive to show that they have a number of virtues such as intelligence,
competence and dignity. At a time when face is incessantly ventured by
individuals, it is equally treated, handled or upheld by others. In verbal
interaction, our interlocutors continually engage in maintaining, protecting and
validating our public front (Morand, 1996). Following Goffman’s insights, it
could be argued that human interaction is essentially theatrical since individuals
work hard to engineer performances, while supporting one another in the joint
staging of performances (See the Tricky Hypothesis in Triki 2002 and Triki and
Sellami-Baklouti 2002).

However, this same interaction is beset with hazards since some events occurring
in the course of this interlocution might generate interpersonal tension or
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conflict. For instance, when we are subjected to criticism, disagreement,

instructions, rejections, embarrassments, our face may be threatened. However,
as Morand (1996) has put it, the manifold rules, norms, and conventions that
govern the generation of meaning in face-to-face encounter are often employed
in an automatic, unthinking fashion. Yet, in view of the tight nexus between
these rules and people’s sense of physical and psychological identity, their
violation can be extremely disorienting (Morand, 1996).

To remedy these possible hazards, people resort to a set of linguistic strategies,

or "politeness behaviours" in order to mitigate or defray interpersonal conflict
(Brown and Levinson, 1987). Thus, "linguistic indirection." consists in the
choice of a set of mitigated linguistic constructions that could be classified on a
single continuum ranging from very indirect to very direct and brusque (Morand
1996; Thomas 1996). Despite the common occurrence of such linguistic
behaviours, they remain vital constituents of social interaction as they mediate
friction and help establish cooperation and rapport. It becomes obvious in this
line of thinking that social interaction calls for continuous and fine-tuned
adjustment to nuances of social consideration in others (Leech 1983; Morand
1996). Yet, a word of caution is necessary. For one thing, the calibration of the
right dose of directness to the prevailing social norms is important (Meye 2000).
Moreover, the norms for the “right” degree of (in)directness vary from one
culture to another (Blum-Kulka 1982; Weirzbicka 1991). To this effect, Goffman
cautions against the mishandling or use of inappropriate amounts of politeness
resulting from membership in a different culture as they can result in a grave
affront, hurt feelings, even spoiled identity. While the pitfalls of using too little
politeness are obvious, the employment of excessive degrees of politeness proves
no solution to the problem of cross-cultural miscommunication, for the
ambiguity inherent in polite, indirect expressions itself gives rise to serious
communicative distortion and misunderstanding (Morand, 1996).
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What is of relevance to the present paper is the fact that there are no a priori,
universal rules for how much mitigation is necessary in a given situation, as
anthropologists argue that the amount of mitigation, or indirection, which is
considered "satisfactory" or normative in a culture can vary. Politeness
behaviours are highly choreographed, to use Morand’s (1996) wording,
according to the distinctive standards of each culture. Consequently, serious
problems are expected to arise when individuals employ discrepant "rules of
engagement" for the employment of politeness in face-to-face interchange. As is
well perceived by Morand (1996), some cultures exhibit a tendency for
indirectness and politeness whilst other cultures tend toward overall brusqueness
in speech. Given the critical role of politeness in mitigating interpersonal
friction, and in sustaining others' face, cross-cultural mismatches in norms for
politeness utilization can cause severe problems.

1.2.4 Saying vs Doing:

This distinction between Locution vs Illocution vs Perlocution is owed to (Searle,
1975; 1979). Important lessons could be drawn from this distinction. Texts do not
simply say but, by saying, they perform social acts. This means that the language
used in real life is a loaded weapon giving speakers power to effect changes in
their immediate environment but, at the same time, this weapon can backfire if
mishandled. What one intends is methodologically distinct from what is actually
understood; discrepancies should be expected between locution (said or literal
meaning) and illocution (intended meaning) on the one hand and between these
two and perlocution (actual meaning as received by the addressee) on the other.
The connections between these utterance acts are norm-and context-governed.
However, as is bound to happen whenever people deal with other people, possible
discrepancies may take place between the standardized illocutionary force and the
degree of its appropriateness to a given speech event. The speech acts can misfire,
leading to different Perlocutionary effects. The possibility of such mismatch has
already been foreshadowed by Halliday (1985).
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In terms of the Tricky Hypothesis, acting in the first sense obtains in the intricate
relationship and essential non-correlation between these three acts. The second
meaning of acting stems from the fact that the movement from one act to another
is only possible because people happen to share the tacit social codes governing
this complex transition. Finally, the potential discrepancy between illocution and
perlocution necessarily entails the third meaning of acting.
Pragmatics literature classifies speech acts according to the degree of their
explicitness or directness (Austin, 1962 ; Searle, 1969). Accordingly, direct
speech acts are those acts where the utterance explicitly abides by its felicity
conditions (especially the structural ones) whereas indirect acts rely more on
context in order to reconstruct the underlying speech act performed. Thus speech
acts could be placed on a continuum ranging from the most direct down to the
least direct act which may even be confused with a normal constative utterance.
In terms of the Tricky Hypothesis, the vexed question of the hazy borderline
between constatives and performatives shows clearly that people tend to perform
various speech acts whilst apparently denying that they are doing so. The trick
lies in leading the hearer through the literal interpretation of the utterance to
believe that one act is being performed whilst passing on implicitly and obliquely
other acts. The whole debate generated by the nature of speech acts hinges upon
the intricate relationship between what an utterance says versus what it does
(hence the first sense of acting), whether speech acts are predictable or
idiosyncratic (hence the second sense of acting) and measuring their effects or
uptake (the third sense of acting).

1.2.5 Leech’s Goal-Oriented Model of Discourse and Green’s Plan Theory

Green (1989) argues that for communication to be successful, the hearer/reader
must be able to recognize the speaker's intentions. These are fulfilled or carried
out by means of a plan. Each plan consists of an ultimate goal and a number of
mediating goals. Understanding a speaker's intention in saying what he said in
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the manner he said it is tantamount to inferring the speaker's plan. The movement
from mediating to ultimate goals involves a great deal of acting in the sense of
manoeuvring and manipulating.
Similarly, Leech’s (1983) typology of goals into dynamic versus regulative,
subordinate versus supra-ordinate, long-term versus short-term, and major versus
minor goals corroborates this acting dimension. His perception of the possibility
of co-existing goals which could be in different degrees of harmony, competition
or conflict also shows how acts could be performed by means of other acts.

1.3. CDA and Media Studies:

1.3.1 Work on intertextuality:
Following Bakhtin’s legacy, CDA puts special emphasis on intertextuality (Allen
2001). Allusion is one major realisation of this function. According to Lennon
(2004) the main characteristic of allusion is the existence of an 'echo' between
one unit of language in praesentia (the alluding unit) and another unit in absentia
(the target). Thus, this device has a primary reference to the present text and a
secondary reference to an absent text. Owing to this property, allusion yields a
double meaning: "a primary, textual meaning in accord with the context and co-
text of the manifest text, and a secondary associational meaning, suggested by the
remembered context and co-text of the source text" (p. 5). As such, it is a cover
term for a number of language-use phenomena which cannot be described solely
with regard to their form. They must also be described with respect to their
pragmatic and functional characteristics.
1.3.2 Agenda Setting and Framing Strategies:
Triki and Mallouli (2009)
1.3.3 Fairclough’s Model
1.4 Cognitive Approaches
There has been an increasingly growing body of research on the ideological
manipulation of metaphors for political reasons reviewed in (Maalej, 1997),
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following the pioneering work of Lakoff and Johnson (1980). The

metaphorisation processes uncovered in Cognitive Stylistics show how dominant
ideologies justify existing practices and values. Their implicitness serves as a
convenient means of smuggling these values and evaluations without being
noticed or questioned. The trick lies in not appearing to say anything directly but
in having a doublespeak strategy, with one message taken at its propositional
value and another working at the basic metaphorical level.

1.5 Synthesis of the linguistics of Acting:

To sum up, an attempt has been made to show that the tenor of the contribution of
linguistics lies in capitalising on the intricate and complex relations between
intention at the enunciating/«enonciation» level and impression at the
«énonce»/utterance level. There simply is no one-to- one correlation between
these two levels of analysis. In terms of the Tricky Hypothesis propounded here,
this orientation in linguistic thinking takes enunciating as acting in the sense of
the art of creating and giving impressions. In other words, within this framework,
enunciating means manipulating impressions and strategically laying them on the
surface of the utterance.
2 Evidence from Psycholoy:

Research on Identity has shown how complex the notion of self can be. The best
illustration of this complexity is what is referred to in the literature as the Johari
Window devised by two men called Joseph and Harry. It is a useful way of
understanding something of how our self may be divided into four parts that we
and others may or may not see.

The Basic Johari Window

Below is a diagram of the standard Johari Window, showing the four different
selves and how the awareness or otherwise of these aspects of our self by others
and ourselves leads to these four categories.
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What you see in What you do not see

me in me

The Private (or

What I see in me The Public Self
hidden) Self

What I do not see The Undiscovered

The Blind Self
in me Self

The Public Self

The Public Self is the part of ourselves that we are happy to share with others and
discuss openly. Thus you and I both see and can talk openly about this 'me' and
gain a common view of who I am in this element.

The Private Self

There are often parts of our selves that are too private to share with others. We hide
these away and refuse to discuss them with other people or even expose them in
any way. Private elements may be embarrassing or shameful in some way. They
may also be fearful or seek to avoid being discussed for reasons of vulnerability.
Between the public and private selves, there are partly private, partly public aspects
of our selves that we are prepared to share only with trusted others.

The Blind Self

We often assume that the public and private selves are all that we are. However, the
views that others have of us may be different from those we have of ourselves. For
example people who consider themselves as intelligent may be viewed as arrogant
 I

and socially ignorant by others. Our blind self may remain blind because others
will not discuss this part of us for a range of reasons. Perhaps they realize that we
would be unable to accept what they see. Perhaps they have tried to discuss this and
we have been so blind that we assume their views are invalid. They may also
withhold this information as it gives them power over us.

The Undiscovered Self

Finally, the fourth self is one which neither us or nor other people see. This
undiscovered self may include both good and bad things that may remain forever
undiscovered or may one day be discovered, entering the private, blind or maybe
even public selves. Between the Blind and Undiscovered Selves, are partly hidden
selves that only some people see. Psychologists and those who are more empathic,
for example, may well see more than the average person.

Four personas

Associated with the Johari Window, we can define four different personas, based
on the largest 'self'.

The Open Persona

Someone with an open persona is both very self-aware (with a small blind self) and
is quite happy to expose their self to others (a small private self). The Open person
is usually the most 'together' and relaxed of the personas. They are so comfortable
with themselves they are not ashamed or troubled with the notion of other people
seeing themselves are they really are. With a small Blind Self, they make less
social errors and cause less embarrassment. They are also in a more powerful
position in negotiations, where they have fewer weaknesses to be exploited.
Becoming an Open Persona usually takes people much time and effort, unless they
were blessed with a wonderful childhood and grew up well-adjusted from the
beginning. It can require courage to accept others’ honest views and also to share
 I

your deeper self and plumb the depths of the undiscovered self. The weaker side of
the Open Persona is where they understand and share themselves, but do not
understand others. They may thus dump embarrassing information from their
Private Selves onto others who are not ready to accept it.

The Naive Persona

The Naive person has a large Blind Self that others can see. They thus may make
significant social gaffes and not even realize what they have done or how others see
them. They hide little about themselves and are typically considered as harmless by
others, who either treat them in kind and perhaps patronizing ways (that go
unnoticed) or take unkind advantage of their naivety. The Naive Persona may also
be something of a bull in a china shop, for example using aggression without
realizing the damage that it does, and can thus be disliked or feared. They may also
wear their heart on their sleeves and lack the emotional intelligence to see how
others see them.

The Secret Persona

When a person has a large Private Self, they may appear distant and secretive to
others. They talk little about themselves and may spend a significant amount of
time ensconced in their own private world. In conversations they say little and, as a
result, may not pay a great deal of attention to others. Having a smaller Blind Self
(often because they give little away), the Secret Persona may well be aware of their
introverted tendencies, but are seldom troubled about this. Where they are troubled,
their introversion is often as a result of personal traumas that have led them to
retreat from the world.

The Mysterious Persona

Sometimes people are a mystery to themselves as well as to other people. They act
in strange ways and do not notice it. They may be very solitary, yet not introverted.
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As the Mysterious Persona knows relatively little about themselves, they may be of
low intelligence, not being able to relate either to themselves or to others. They
may also just prefer to live in the moment, taking each day as it comes and not
seeking self-awareness. Some forms of esoteric self-developments seek to rid
oneself of concerns about the self in order to achieve a higher state of being. They
may deliberately enter states of non-thinking and revel in such intuitive paradoxes
as knowing through not knowing.

3 Evidence from Sociology & Ethnomethodology:

3.1. Goffman’s Concept of the Self:

Goffman wants to show how even the most innocuous or apparently authentic of
our social acts can be calculated to show the actor to his or her audience in a
favorable light.

Source: Gouldner (1970):

Goffman's is a sociology of "co-presence," of what happens when people are in

one another's presence. It is a social theory that dwells upon the episodic and sees
life only as it is lived in a narrow interpersonal circumference, a-historical and
non-institutional, an existence beyond history and society, and one which comes
alive only in the fluid, transient "encounter."

There is communicated a sense of the precariousness of the world and, at the

same time, of zest in managing oneself in it. Rather than conceiving of activities
as a set of interlocking functions, Goffman's dramaturgical model advances a
view in which social Life is systematically regarded as an elaborate form of
drama and in which-as in the theater-men are all striving to project a convincing
image of self to others. Here men are not viewed as trying to do something but as
trying to be something.
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Goffman thus declares a moratorium on the conventional distinction between

make-believe and reality, or between the cynical and the sincere. Human conduct
is seen as essentially concerned with fostering and maintaining a specific
conception of self before others. The outcome of this effort, moreover, is not seen
as depending on what men "really" do in the world, on their social functions, or
on their worth, but on their ability skillfully to mobilize convincing props,
settings, fronts, or manner.

Problems with Goffman’s framework: Source: Gouldner (1970):

In modern and large-scale organizations, the management of impressions is a

strategy of survival more likely to be emphasized by persons whose assumptions
remain individualistic and competitive, but who are now dependent upon large-
scale organizations.

In short, the moral code shaping social relationships has become less fully
internalized in them; while remaining a fact of social reality, it tends to become a
set of instrumentally manageable "rules of the game" rather than deeply felt
moral obligations.;;;For Goffman, what counts is not whether men are moral but
whether they seem moral to others; it is not morality as a deeply internalized
feeling of duty or obligation that holds things together, in Goffman's view, but
rather as conventional rules required to sustain interaction and treated much as
men do the rules of a game. As performers we are merchants of morality.
Dramaturgy reaches into and expresses the nature of the self as pure commodity,
utterly devoid of any necessary use-value: it is the sociology of soul-selling.

Goffman's sociology corresponds to the new exigencies of a middle class whose

faith in both utility and morality has been gravely undermined. … Once
established hierarchies of value and worth are shaken, the sacred and profane are
now mingled in grotesque juxtapositions. The new middle class seeks to cope
with the attenuation of its conventional standards of utility and morality by
 I

retreating from both and by seeking to fix its perspective in aesthetic standards, in
the appearances of things.
3.2. Bourdieu’s Concept of Habitus:
Source: St. Clair et al (2005) Habitus and Communication Theory

Social Habitus

What Bourdieu (1993, 1984, 1977) wants to do is to create a theory

based on practice…. He wants to account for a grammar of
practice. His books are an outline of that theory (Bourdieu, 1977).
Cultural Fields and Cultural Capital:
There are many cultural fields in society. Science, for example, is a culture;
literature is another. Each field has its own games. It has its own rules and has
its own challenges. Hence, different fields involve different games. They have
different interests about what is at stake. Being successful in a field is important
because it provides an individual with cultural capital…One is rewarded for
success in many ways. ..Hence, prestige and status are important forms of
cultural capital. Only those who have cultural capital can play the games in their
cultural field. The accumulation of wealth alone will not enable a person to play
the game unless that capital was the result of playing the game successfully
within a cultural field.
Social Script Theory (St. Clair, Williams, and Su, 2005).
The significance of social frames and how they constitute episodic
interactions is a major area of investigation by St. Clair (2005). It is
argued that humans interact in terms of social recipes, scenarios, and
frames and this insight is the basis upon which they are developing a
cognitive model of social theory. What this social script outlines is
the fact that human behaviour is structured and that routines can be
further articulated into subsections. The tacit knowledge of the
restaurant scene provides the Habitus for the social script of dining
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out. Events occur within an ordered sequence. The players in this

scene have roles to follow and those that work in the restaurant also
have their roles. What is important about social scripts is that
everyone in the restaurant knows the script of the customer. They all
perform it tacitly or even consciously, but they know that a script
occurs.

4 Evidence from Narratology:

This section is based on a series of earlier publications of mine (Triki, 1989,
1991, 2002; Triki and Bahloul 2001; Triki and Sellami-Baklouti 2002). The tenor
of this contribution is that, in congruence with Collins (2001), reporting is
anchored in the two pragmatic factors of intention (a term carefully defined so as
to account for even subconscious orientations) and perception. Reports are
constructs; i.e. they are mediated by mental representations both at the production
and reception poles and only obliquely relate to the represented speech event.
They are inherently mediated by and subordinated to the will and illocutionary
goals of the enframing discourse producer. This mediation informs both the form
and content of what is to be reported. The varieties of RS present a continuum
with indeterminate boundaries between the individual types and with many
instances of deliberate slippage from one form to another.
The phenomenon of reporting is much more complex than could be explained by
pure structural rules. There must be other important discursive and pragmatic
factors at work. Reporting is construed as an act of mediation involving a
confrontation of two selves, namely the reporting self and the reported self. The
speaker's perception of the reported person's deictic anchorage as viewed against
his/hers and of the reported person's modal investment as against his/hers will be
taken to be among the most important considerations. This selection necessarily
reveals the reporter's value judgements and his/her rhetorical strategies. No
reporting is innocent or value-free. 'Objective' reporting is simply an impression
 I

consciously given out by speakers as part of their self image building rhetorical
strategy.
Reporting is a discourse act in its own right seeking to influence targeted
addressees one way or another. By means of reporting and smuggling evaluation,
the speaker hopes to achieve certain social ends that could be reconstructed from
the very act of reporting. Thus, the reporter's discursive strategy is an over-riding
factor which accounts for all sorts of apparent 'abnormalities' in reporting. The
superior intention of the reporter as an over-riding factor responsible for deciding
what and how much information to select and the narratorial mode of reporting it
must be acknowledged. This point was systematically argued by (Triki, 1989,
1991, 1998a, 1998b, 2000, 2001, forthcominga, forthcoming b; Triki and Bahloul
2001) to the effect that the various levels of embedding entail a functional
hierarchy of centres in the genesis of the narrative. A power relationship exists
between them. They are to be seen in terms of superiority versus inferiority,
control versus subservience. This in turn entails a whole spectrum of degrees of
interference exercised by the superior (super-ordinate) centre on the liberty of
expression of the subordinate centre leading thus to tension.
What is at stake is the Discourse Structure (Short 1996) of the reporting process:
who is represented as reporting what to whom about whom in which context and
for what purposes? Layering means that we have many SELVES competing for
expression (this is the essence of heteroglossia) (Triki, 1989, 1991, 1998a, 1998b,
2000, 2001, forthcominga, forthcoming b; Triki and Bahloul 2001). SELF is
realised in narrative in the form of a Deictic Centre, a Perceptual or Sentient
Centre, a Cognitive or Ideological Centre or any combination of these centres.
Reporting is an exercise of some degree of intervention by the reporter in the
speech and thought of the represented persons (including the reporter's own self
as part of the reported story). Measuring this degree of intervention is a complex
process since, if we take the three previously mentioned centres as constitutive of
SELF and the act of reporting as necessarily bringing about some confrontation
 I

of these SELVES, then the various possibilities for the interaction between the I-
sayer and the 'not-I' could be classified along a cline ranging from total
distinction to total overlap.

The complexity stems from the various possibilities potentially emanating from
this confrontation. Total or partial or nil overlap can be obtained at all, some
or none of any of these parameters. What adds to the complexity of this process is
the fact that deictic mediation (at the levels of person, place and time) can be
partial, that is limited to one or two of these co-ordinates. Similarly, at the level
of perception, not all the five senses are necessarily equally relevant all the time
in the narrator's report. Indeed, sometimes, the narrator can choose to remain
totally silent about perception. The same is true for cognitive/ideological
mediation which can be partial. The more complex the layering, the more Selves
compete for expression, the more complex the reporting process gets. A typology
of narratives should be based on all these possibilities emanating from this basic
mechanism.
The relevance of this review to the present paper is the due emphasis on the
theatrical and game-like nature of the whole process of reporting. According to
this view, all reporting techniques are make-belief strategies going through the
motion of giving calculated impressions of deference to the interpreter or
interference by the reporter. All strategies, whether they are speaker-based or
hearer-based, are calculated moves that are part and parcel of what Caffi and
Janney (1994) call emotive or strategic involvement.

5 Other Related work:

Research on the concepts of theatricality, dialogism, negative perceptions of self
is quite pertinent in this respect.
First, Anderson (????) traces the history and heritage of theatricality back to
classical Greek theatre, through Shakespeare, Horace and Seneca and Cervante
 I

till Modern sociology and communication science (Burns, 1972; Goffman,

1959,1981; Mangham and Overington, 1983; Riggens, 1993; Turner, 1982). He
outlines two conceptual approaches to theatricality linked to the idea of the world
as socially constructed: dramatism and dramaturgy. Dramatism illustrates the
world by showing it as a stage (Burns, 1992; Burke, 1972) and attempts to
provide a “Grammar of Motives” seeking to foster a sense of detached critical
awareness of social interaction (Boje, 2002), whilst dramaturgy demonstrates the
world as it is staged emphasising the world as stage and our roles as social
actors (Goffman, 1981). Each of us performs a range of roles. Goffman’s
categorisations of roles allow us to realise such things as audience complicity,
how they may conspire with the actor to sustain his role and even emphasise the
moral obligations of doing so (Welsh, 2002).
Second, Ruck & Slunecko (????) outline their notion of dialogism in the
following angles:
- Fragmentation of SELF: In a dialogical self, we do not find a single
centralized story-teller at work. DS theory retains James’ (1890) view of the
self as consisting of different constituents: I and Me. The I refers to the
reflexive parts of the self (the self as subject, knower, thinker, etc.),
whereas the Me is described as the sum of everything someone can be said
to own (the self as object, as known, thought, etc.). The dialogical self
amounts to a ‘narrative translation’ of James’ distinction. Each Me,
however, is endowed with a voice to tell its own story.
- Heterogeneity of SELF: Hermans and Kempen (1993) develop the conception
of the self as a multitude of different I-positions fluctuating within the imaginal
landscape of the mind (Hermans, 2001b), which is reminiscent of the Bakhtinian
(1929) concept of ventriloquation to the effect that individual speakers always
speak in the social languages of their time; thereby expressing the position of the
group they belong to.
- Culture and voice: Hermans, Kempen, and van Loon (1992) endorse the
 I

view that ‘Western’ culture, with its individualistic and rationalistic ideals of
selfhood, influences the entire organization of dialogical selves, restricting its
full potential and resulting in centralistically organized selves dominated by
one or few voices. The dominant conception of culture in DS theory today,
however, stresses the existence of self and culture as a “multiplicity of
positions among which dialogical relationships can develop.” (Hermans,
2001a, p. 243). In this conception, culture is a voice that may speak for
itself or speak through another position.
Third, research on the effect of negative perceptions of self on the consumer’s
behaviour shows other relevant dimensions. In fact, Buchanan-Oliver (????) has
recognized that consumption is more convoluted than a mere response to need,
want, or desire as people are also motivated by negative emotions (Bourdieu
1984; Miller 1997; Wilk 1997). It was those feared selves that were experience-
based that played a greater role in impacting consumers’ behaviour. Renamed
as the escaping self, to differentiate it from the conceptualised feared self,
experience-based feared selves appear more powerful as indicators of negative
consumption. Denoted by flights from both past and current selves considered
unfavourable or undesirable by the respondent, the escaping self differed from
that of a conceptual feared self because respondents became more involved in
its suppression. Furthermore, it appeared that the undesired other, or a negative
product-user stereotype, emitted the greatest influence on negative
consumption. Respondents commonly associated their avoided products with
negative images of the typical product-user. It was discovered that the negative
image of appearing as someone that they are not, or someone perceived to have
lesser qualities than themselves is, for these individuals, more fearful.

6 Synthesis: The Tricky Hypothesis:

In a series of publications, Triki (:::::::) has presented a generalisation of this
argument into a hypothesis about all human interaction that he labels the 'Tricky
 I

Hypothesis' to the effect that language use is a form of social acting. The pun on
the term 'social acting' capitalises on its three most important meanings. First,
acting is theatrically defined as the art of creating and giving impressions.
Second, acting could be construed in the sense of conforming to canonised social
or discursive norms where speakers and hearers are called upon to participate in a
coded game which has its rituals. Finally, acting is defined in terms of acting on
people; that is affecting their lives and beliefs. In terms of the Tricky Hypothesis,
each meaning of acting borrows the tools of the other meanings of the word.
Acting on people (sense 3) involves going through certain motions (sense 1)
according to pre-established rituals (sense 2).
Schematically, this hypothesis could be represented as follows:

The Tricky Hypothesis :

Four Maxims :

1. The Verbal Interaction as Game Maxim: Every act of verbal

interaction is part and parcel of a calculated game.

2. The Dissimulation Maxim: The game is realised through the

wearing of appropriate/convenient masks.

3. The relevance Maxim: This play on masks is governed by the

principle of relevance.

4. The Stakes Maxim: Relevance is relative to the stakes of verbal

interaction as perceived by the speaker engaged in a well defined

social context.
First sense of acting: Second sense of Third sense of acting:
management and acting : a strategic Acting on the other in
manipulation of degree of observation terms of performed
impressions of some social rituals speech acts
The global effect: The complexity emanating from the interaction of
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different types of action

In particular, the following table enumerates the dramaturgical indices in a

hopefully useful checklist:

Proposed Checklist for dramaturgical indices

Type of Mode of realisation Relevant questions
Indices
Linguistic Lexis - Whose value judgments are
Indices expressed?
- Lexical presuppositions: what
aspects of reality do they take for
granted?
- Which genre is it appropriate
for?
- What degree of formality does it
presuppose?
Grammar -
Logical Indisputably true Inclusion vs exclusion; generalisation;
Indices algorhythms causality; exception; contrast
Discursive Frames Topic; Field
Coherence Relevance of premises to the initial
Indices
frame
Generic The distinctive features - What are the presuppositions of
Indices of any genre these features in terms of assumptions
and rituals stored in our collective
schemata?
-
Contextual Context of Utterance - Who is speaking to whom about
Indices whom where and when?
- Which aspects of context are
available/salient?
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- Any paralinguistic features?

Context of Reference Frames + distinctive features of any
genre
Context of Culture Social roles; modes of address;
honorifics; social deixis; footing
Encyclopedic Context Our state of knowledge
Dissimulation For Persuasive purposes - How can argumentative
Indices strategies enhance the position of the
speaker?
- How successful are these
strategies in impacting the addressee?
- How durable and effective is
this impact?
For social action - Which speech acts have been
performed?
- How direct are these speech
acts?
- How canonical are these speech
acts?
- What social consequences do
they have?
For the marketing of - How is self marketed?
SELF and the OTHER - How is the addressee marketed?
- How are the third parties
marketed?
- Any signs of glorification?
- Any signs of demonisation?
- Any signs of inclusion vs
exclusion?
For politeness & face
considerations
For deception purposes - Is there any malicious intent?
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- Are there any harmful

presuppositions?
- Any mystification strategies?
- Any signs of misrepresentation?
Idiosyncratic The psychological - Which facets of self are made
subconscious dimension ostensible and which ones are hidden?
- Any indicators of proximity vs
distance?
- Any indicators of salience vs
marginalisation?
- Any desires or fears?
- Any indicators of identification
vs distance?
Social The sociological - How is footing managed?
subconscious dimension - Which modes of address have
been used? How appropriate are they?
- How is power negotiated?
- How is social solidarity or
harmony achieved?
- How is conflict managed?
Collective The ideological - What constitutes a culture’s
subconscious dimension ideology: Beliefs; stereotypes;
categorisations?
- Which rituals best embody &
exemplify that ideology?
- Whose interests are best served
by the observance of these rituals?
- How does discourse consecrate
or subvert existing states of affairs?