Athens, Jerusalem, Mecca: Leo Strauss's "Muslim" Understanding of Greek Philosophy

Author(s): Rémi Brague

Source: Poetics Today, Vol. 19, No. 2, Hellenism and Hebraism Reconsidered: The Poetics of
Cultural Influence and Exchange II (Summer, 1998), pp. 235-259
Published by: Duke University Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1773441
Accessed: 27/09/2010 14:24

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless
you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you
may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.

Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at
http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=duke.

Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed
page of such transmission.

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Duke University Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Poetics Today.

http://www.jstor.org
Athens,Jerusalem,Mecca:
Leo Strauss's "Muslim" Understanding
of GreekPhilosophy
Remi Brague
Philosophy,Paris1

Abstract The contrast "Athensvs. Jerusalem" played a major part in the late work
of Leo Strauss (1899-1973). His scholarly career, from the outset, can be described
as a motion from Jerusalem (Spinoza, Maimonides) to Athens (Plato, Xenophon).
Nevertheless, a third city, Mecca, and what it stands for, unspokenly synthesizes
the first two. For instance, Strauss'sinterpretation of Plato is grounded on Farabi's
view of philosophical style. His rediscoveryof esotericism-that is, of the possibility
of a silent oral teaching-depends on an Islamic conception of Revelation, which
opposes the Christian one: Athens and Jerusalem meet in Mecca, but they are at
loggerheads in Rome.

The Athens and Jerusalem Theme

The second-century church father Tertullian may have been the first to de-
clare, What has Athens to do with Jerusalem?, but it was not until the Rus-
sian philosopher Leo Shestov used the two city names as the title of a book
(1951, posthumous) that they became a kind of catchword for the opposi-

Somewordson the labyrinthinehistoryof the presenttext:A firstversionwas preparedin

English and sent to a symposium that, for reasons of health, I could not attend. Its pro-
ceedings were due to be published but finally were not. My article was later translated into
French (Brague 1989a). The present version takes advantage of remarksby the late David R.
Lachterman (Lachterman 1991:238-45).

PoeticsToday19:2 (Summer 1998) Copyright ? 1998 by the Porter Institute for Poetics and
Semiotics.
236 PoeticsToday19:2

tion between Hellenism and Hebraism. Among the people who took up
Shestov's yoked pair, Leo Strauss must probably be given pride of place.
Leo Strauss (1899-1973) began his career in Germany as a student of
Jewish and Muslim philosophy. In the 1930s, he fled to France, Britain, and
finally settled in the United States, where he taught first in New York, then
in Chicago. He is famous for his attempt at reviving the idea of Natural
Right, to which he devoted one of his most well-known books, as well as
for his rediscovery of the classical philosophy of Plato and Aristotle, which
he contended to be still relevant for our time and age, if we read them as
they wanted to be read. Strauss put the theme of "Athensand Jerusalem"
at the very core of his later thought, from the late 1940s, hence, before he
could have read Shestov's book.
This theme is voiced at a relatively late date in Strauss's progress. But
the thing is present from the outset in his writings, if we take the phrase
in its broadest meaning-that is, the relationship between both cities that
stand for two "cultures,"two "worldviews,"and so on, whose conflict is
supposed to be the backbone of European history.' As for the formula,
the earliest occurrence I know of is a letter to Karl Lowith, dated from
August 15, 1946 (Strauss 1983a: 108, 1ll). It only announces a lecture by the
same title, to be held in November 1946. In 1951, Strauss wrote: "Classi-
cal authors bore witness to the fact that truly human life, life of science, is
the life that is devoted to knowledge and looking for it. From the vantage-
point of the Bible, the hen anagkaion[the only necessary thing] is totally
different. One reaches no plausible aim by covering up this contrast, by
denegating the tertiumnon datur.Every synthesis is in fact a choice either
for Jerusalem or for Athens" (Voegelin et al. 1993: 30).
The theme was first made public in 1952:"The issue of traditionalJuda-
ism versus philosophy is identical with the issue Jerusalem versus Athens"
(Strauss 1952: 20). On the content of this contrast, Strauss gives us brief
hints only. The same complex of ideas received a full treatment in a series
of lectures given in Chicago in 1952and partially published two years later,
in a Hebrew translation (Strauss 1979). But there the names of Athens and
Jerusalem are missing. They make their first, very stealthy appearance in
1954, on the occasion of a paper given in Jerusalem (!).2There the faithful
city stands for prophecy, and Athens for political philosophy. Finally, some
years before 1964, Strauss began a lecture on Thucydides with a statement
on Western tradition that may constitute the first full-fledged orchestration
of the theme:

1. See the quotation by Goethe in Strauss 1952: 5, probably alluded to in Strauss 1935: 28.
2. Strauss 1959: 9-1o, with a quotation without references to Isaiah 1: 26.
 Brague* LeoStrauss's"Muslim" of GreekPhilosophy
Understanding 237

[Western] tradition has two roots. It consists of two heterogeneous elements, of

two elements which are ultimately incompatible with each other-the Hebrew
element and the Greek element. We speak, and we speak rightly, of the an-
tagonism between Jerusalem and Athens, between faith and philosophy. Both
philosophy and the Bible assert that there is ultimately one thing, and one thing
only, needful for man. But the one thing needful proclaimed by the Bible is
the very opposite of the one thing needful proclaimed by Greek philosophy.
According to the Bible, the one thing needful is obedient love; according to phi-
losophy, the one thing needful is free inquiry.The whole history of the West can
be viewed as an ever repeated attempt to achieve a compromise or a synthesis
between the two antagonistic principles. But all these attempts have failed, and
necessarily so. ... The Western tradition does not allow of a synthesis of its two
elements, but only of their tension: this is the secret of the vitality of the West.
(Strauss 1989: 72-73)

Unfortunately, though, some lines afterwards, we read an important

qualification, not to say a recantation: Speaking of the Western tradition as
Strauss did is "impossible ... in the last analysis," and acceptable, nay nec-
essary, only "as long as we speak politically, i.e., crudely."3 By this token,
we cannot ascertain to what extent Strauss meant his own statements seri-
ously. The theme finally becomes central in 1967, on the occasion of the
publication of the proceedings of a conference given in the same year under
this very title (Strauss 1983b).4 Again, we are at a loss how to understand
a text that does not claim to be more than "preliminary reflections" and
whose content is highly cryptic. It has already puzzled several scholars,5 so
a frank avowal of perplexity might be the least dishonorable evasion.

Between Athens and Jerusalem: To and Fro

The main discovery that Strauss made, or claimed to have made, is a for-
gotten way of reading.6 Unfortunately for our present purpose, he rediscov-
ered an art of writing, too: Since "people write as they read" (Strauss 1952:
144), he wrote in the same way as the authors he studied are supposed to
have done, and he concealed what he believed to have found. Hence such
sentences as: "Let us then keep them (sc. Machiavelli's blasphemies) under

3. Strauss 1989: 72-73. On the date, see ibid.: xxxi-xxxii.

4. This text may be the same as the one referred to in Strauss 1983a. On the "classical
struggle in the Middle Ages," see ibid.: 165.
5. See Momigliano 1987: 197 n. 22, 198. A useful introduction appears in Sales i Coderch
and Montserrat i Molas 1991.
6. On Strauss's hermeneutics, see Brague 1991, which the present essay presupposes and
completes, and Rosen 1987: 107-38. On Strauss's thought in general, the best overview I
know of is Marshall 1985 (which has exceptionally rich footnotes).
238 PoeticsToday19:2

the veil under which he has hidden them" (Strauss 1959: 41).Therefore, in-
terpreting Strauss is an almost desperate task. One can never tell whether
one is probing the depths of his thought or merely blundering about and
sliding on its glittering surface. Our task is made all the more difficult by
the facts that Strauss, on the one hand, underwent an evolution as to his
style, and that the trend of this evolution, on the other hand, led him to an
avowedly esoteric style in which his real thought, if any, was deliberately
buried under either painstaking and fastidious analyses of texts, or moral
and/or political preaching. Strauss excelled in the art of window-dressing
and paying lip service to conservative and "square"opinions. His pleading
for Natural Right might belong to that kind of rhetoric, as well as other
theses the refutation of which always runs the risk of becoming an exercise
in shadow-boxing.
The "Athens and Jerusalem" theme furnishes us with a good example
of both dimensions of Strauss's thought, as well as of the predicament we
face when we try to interpret him. For we cannot tell to which layer of
thought this theme actually belonged: Is it Strauss'slast position on some
fundamental questions, or merely the ultimate, and most elaborate, way
of concealing an original and/or subversive standpoint under the mask of
a traditional formula?
I will here choose a safer way of inquiry, which consists in looking at
Strauss'scareer, as seen from the outside. It can be described as a journey
from Jerusalem to Athens: Whereas the first publications dealt with Jew-
ish thinkers like Maimonides-not to mention Mendelssohn, Hermann
Cohen, and so on-or Jewish in origin like Spinoza, the last ones, for the
most part, are commentaries on Greek philosophers and writers like Plato,
Aristotle, Xenophon, Thucydides, or Aristophanes. These interpretations
are the most famous and the most controversial.7Yet Strauss's interest
in the ancients is relatively late, since his first published text on a Greek
author is the 1939 essay on Xenophon (Strauss 1939b).When, in 1946, he
wrote a scathing critique of a book on Plato's political philosophy, he was
already in his late forties (Strauss 1946).
Initially, classical Greek thinkers were studied as sources, but Strauss's
main purpose was to explore medieval thought. See, for instance, the re-
search program Strauss drafted at the end of his 1936 French essay on
Maimonides' and Farabi'spolitical science. Plato is to be studied as Mai-
monides' source or inspirer: "One cannot avoid to ask the questions, cru-
cial to the understanding of Maimonides, as to the relation of the theology
of the Morehto the Platonic doctrine of the One, and the relation of the

7. See, for example, Burnyeat 1985 and the ensuing discussion.

 Brague * Leo Strauss's "Muslim"Understanding of Greek Philosophy 239

cosmology of the Moreh(that is, the discussion about the creation of the
world) to the doctrine of the Timaeus" (Strauss 1936c: 35).
Or we can point to the parallel thrust of his book on Hobbes: unveil-
ing the second book of Aristotle's Rhetorics(his "treatise on the passions"),
as well as Thucydides' PeloponnesianWar,as sources for the British philoso-
pher's thought (Strauss 1936b).

A Stop-Off in Mecca:Farabi

Nevertheless, this backward movement from medieval or modern thinkers

to their ancient forerunners or inspirers is not the only one. We can spot
another trend: reading the ancients with medieval eyes. Strauss, in my
opinion, did exactly that, and never ceased to do that, although he seldom
acknowledged it explicitly. Thus, the thesis I should like to defend in this
essay is that the pattern of reading Strauss applied to the Greeks is neither
ancient nor modern, but medieval-to be precise, Islamic-in origin. In
other words, Strauss read the Greeks from a point of view that is neither
Greek (Athenian) nor Jewish (Jerusalemite), but Muslim-"Meccan," if I
may coin the phrase.
This outlook seems to stem from a thinker who deeply influenced the
young Strauss, Nietzsche.8 An aphorism that Strauss, to the best of my
knowledge, never uses9 can be read as a program for Strauss, or at least
for his early work on the medievals.?1
The influence of Avicenna and Razi notwithstanding, the most impor-
tant source of Strauss's hermeneutics is probably Farabi. Especially im-
portant is the view of Plato that is to be found in the writings of this tenth-
century thinker (872-950). It is therefore apposite that we should pause in
order to examine briefly Strauss'srelationship to him. Strauss wrote three
articles on Farabi, the first two of which were not republished in book form.
In the first one, Strauss, who follows a suggestion by Moritz Stein-
schneider (Steinschneider 1869: 176-78, quoted in Strauss 1936a: 1oo n. 5),

8. See Brague 1991:104-5. Let me add some words on Nietzsche's influence on Strauss. Let
me first state that my intention never was to blame Strauss for that, nor to debunk him as a
crypto-Nietzschean (if the latter adjective had to be derogatory), let alone to expose him as
having copied Nietzsche. Second, it was pointed out to me that I overlooked Strauss's later
critique of Nietzsche. This argument supposes that this critique is to be taken seriously-
which is a more or less safe bet, but only a bet. Moreover, this leaves
open the possibility
that Strauss, while disagreeing with the cure, agreed with the general
diagnosis proposed by
Nietzsche-which is my hunch.
9. Nevertheless, Strauss himself points to the parallel drawn by Nietzsche between Plato
and Muhammad in The Will to Power(Strauss 1935: 62 n. i).
1o. TheDawn of Day, V, ? 496, in Nietzsche 1974 [1911]:346-47. See
Brague 1996.
240 Poetics Today 19:2

ascribes long fragments of Falqera'sReshitHokmahto a lost work by Farabi:

The third part of the Jewish author's compendium on philosophical sci-
ences excerpts Farabi's writing on Plato and Aristotle (ibid.: 100-104)."
Strauss invites the reader to reconsider the history of medieval philosophy
as a whole by giving Farabi the place that becomes him: the place of pri-
macy (ibid.: 105-6). The second essay (Strauss 1945) deals with the very
work that the first one tried to elicit from its Hebrew adaptation. The origi-
nal text had just been published in a critical edition by F. Rosenthal and
R. Walzer in 1943. Some pages of this article became part of the introduc-
tory essay to Strauss's main "hermeneutical" text (Strauss 1945: 371-72;
1952: 13-14). The third and last article is devoted to the analysis of a newly
published summary of the Laws (Strauss 1959 [1957]).
Strauss's Plato is basically the same as Farabi's. Let us quote some
salient points: According to Strauss'sand Farabi'scommon outlook, Plato
is first and foremost a political thinker. Aspects that transcend the politi-
cal realm are systematically given short shrift: the doctrine of "ideas,"the
soul and its immortality, the gods and religious aspects in general. The
views of Farabi's Socrates are distinguished from Plato's own views, not to
say criticized by the latter (Strauss 1945: 362 [politics], 364 [ideas], 371-72
[soul], 391; Strauss 1959: 134, 148, 153).
The question must arise as to whether Farabi was faithful to Plato.
Strauss supposes he was not: "He (Farabi) conceives of the Laws not, as
Plato himself had done, as a correction of the Republic,but as a supple-
ment to the Republic.... Farabi'sviews are closely akin to that of Cicero"
(Strauss 1945: 380 n. 55). A difficulty must then arise: If Farabi corrected
Plato, he must have understood him better than Plato himself had done.
Now, this is a modern hermeneutical rule, defended by Kant and Schleier-
macher-and a rule that Strauss never tired of exposing as inadequate
(Strauss 1991:25; 1946: 329; 1959: 66-68; 1936b: xv).
The important point is not our assessing Strauss'simportance or short-
comings in his interpretation of Farabi.What I want to emphasize is that
Strauss made use of Farabi as an interpretive key to unlock Plato's dia-
logues. For instance, we have good reasons for surmising that his under-
standing of the Republic,set forth in The CityandMan, stems from a para-
graph in Farabi'sPhilosophy of Plato.We read in this work:
Whenhe had done this,he afterwardsinvestigatedthe mannerand the method
by meansof whichthe citizensof citiesandnationsoughtto be instructedin this

11. Other fragments of Falqera's work, which Strauss tentatively ascribed to another work
by Farabi (see Strauss 1936a: 98, 1936c: 30 n. 3), could be identified as translations from the
hitherto lost Bookof Letters.See Farabi 1969b: ? 144, 152, 9-13; 1969: 151-52.
 Brague* LeoStrauss's"Muslim"Understanding
of GreekPhilosophy 241

science and their character formed by those ways of life, whether the method
ought to be the one used by Socrates or the one used by Thrasymachus. Here he
delineated once again Socrates' method for realizing his aim of making his own
people understand through scientific investigation the ignorance they were in.
He explained Thrasymachus' method and made it known that Thrasymachus
was more able than Socrates to form the character of the youth and instruct
the multitude; Socrates possessed only the ability to conduct a scientific inves-
tigation of justice and the virtues, and a power of love, but did not possess the
ability to form the character of the youth and the multitude; and the philoso-
pher, the prince, and the legislator ought to be able to use both methods: the
Socratic method with the elect, and Thrasymachus' method with the youth and
the multitude. (Farabi 1943: X, ? 30, 21-22, or 1969, X, ? 36, 66-67).12

The whole background of the passage seems to be an exegesis of the

Clitophon, a dialogue whose Platonic authenticity is dubious (Slings 1981).
In this text, Clitophon, who is named here, as elsewhere (Plato, RepublicI,
34oa), as a friend of Thrasymachus, launches a violent attack on Socra-
tes, taunting him with one-sidedness in a way that reminds one of Hegel's
critique of subjective morality on behalf of objective Sittlichkeit.The Clito-
phon may have been interpreted on the basis of the Hellenistic ideal, as
expressed in Cicero, of the unity of the philosopher and the orator (Walzer
in Farabi 1985: xiii).
Be that as it may, the general thrust of Strauss's reading of the Republic
reminds one of Farabi's utterances. This fact has already been highlighted
(Benardete 1978: 9; Berrichon-Sedeyn 1987: xxix; Strauss 1964: 116, 123-
24, 134). The very way Strauss puts Thrasymachus at the center of his
interpretation, bringing into relief the importance of the friendship that
finally arises between him and Socrates, is borrowed from Farabi (Strauss
1945: 383; 1959: 153). On the other hand, the combination of "Socratic"
bold philosophizing and "Thrasymachean" cautious speech characterizes
Strauss's own art of writing.
Farabi is all the more interesting for us because we are dealing with
Athens and Jerusalem-in this context, with the relationship between
Greek philosophy and revealed, monotheistic religion. From the point of
view of the historian, Farabi's works happen to embody the passage from
the former to the latter. By this token, he may be the most perfect link be-
tween the two worlds. We possess a fragment by him which was handed
down to us by a Muslim biographer and doxographer and in which Farabi
explains how he received his training in Aristotelian philosophy (and above
all in higher logic and epistemology, through Aristotle's PosteriorAnalytics)

12. Another reference to Thrasymachus is in Farabi 1968: lno.

242 PoeticsToday19:2

from an uninterrupted chain of direct master-disciple transmission that

reaches back to the last scions of Greek philosophical schools. To be sure,
Farabi'stext is not devoid of any self-praise:He wants to appear as the last
heir of antique wisdom. Nevertheless, his account, barring some details,
has an authentic ring.'3
Now, this claim, which presumes the presence of a historical continuity
between later Greek (pagan) thought and Islam, raises still other ques-
tions: Can we speak of Farabi's interpretation of the Greeks as his own
achievement, or should we rather look at it as arising from Farabi's half-
critically taking over some Hellenistic and/or middle Platonic epitomizer
or commentator? This last approach was, broadly speaking, supported by
Richard Walzer. One often gets the impression that, according to Walzer,
to put it bluntly, Farabi "just cribbed the whole thing" from some second-
rate treatise of late Hellenistic origin, a view criticized by Strauss (Strauss
1945: 359, 377). In any case, Strauss's winding way from the Greeks and
back to them is not easy to assess from the vantage point of the historian
of ideas: Strauss read Plato from Farabi'spoint of view, but Farabi himself
may have taken up ideas from the Hellenistic (Stoic or middle Platonic)
interpretation of Plato.

EsotericStyle
In any event, putting on medieval spectacles in order better to look at
ancient texts is made possible by the (alleged?) rediscovery of a common
feature supposed to run through the whole history of philosophy up to the
Enlightenment: esoteric style. It is a matter of common knowledge that
the most important thing in Strauss's hermeneutics is his rediscovery of
esoteric writing. His book Persecution and theArt of Writingbears sufficient
witness to this. It gives a large harvest of facts in a field that still requires
detailed historical study-and has received little (see Holzhey and Zim-
merli 1977). Esotericism as a means of communicating dangerous truths
without endangering one's own security or civil peace is as old as philoso-
phy. For the danger to be coped with is itself as old as philosophy.
The possibility of an esoteric meaning, and hence of an esoteric inter-
pretation of texts, is not essentially linked to the idea of religious ortho-
doxy. We can spot traces of this basic attitude in the ancient world prior to
the emergence of monotheistic world religions. The danger is older than
they are-as the case of Socrates illustrates,viewed against the background

13. Ibn Abi Usaybi'a n.d.: 604-5. The classical study on the historical background is Meyer-
hof 1930. Discussion in S. Stroumsa 1991.
 Brague * Leo Strauss's "Muslim"Understanding of Greek Philosophy 243

of the various lawsuits for impiety leveled at Anaxagoras and others. Burn-
ing books was a very old way of eliminating heterodoxy, even in classical
antiquity, before the very idea of orthodoxy had even emerged.'4
More disquieting is the fact that philosophers themselves were reported
not to have had misgivings against such a practice. This is at least the case
if we are to trust Aristoxenos's report on Plato's proposal that Democri-
tus's books be burned.'5The reason alleged there-Plato wanted to hide
that he had stolen ideas from Democritus!--may be apocryphal and may
stem from the increasing trend of late antiquity toward personalizing the
history of philosophy. Nevertheless, some later philosophers toyed with
this idea: Proclus, according to his biographer, thought that every philo-
sophical book should be hidden from the youth, with the exception of the
ChaldeanOraclesand Plato's Timaeus(Marinos 1814:chap. 38).
Esoteric writing is traditionally admitted or simply discussed in con-
nection with phenomena belonging either to the medieval world (the so-
called Averroists,crypto-Jewish literature among Marranos, etc.) or to the
modern period (e.g., "enlightened"writers concealing their "Spinozism").
Since Strauss avowedly took his departure from their study and broadened
his ken to other thinkers, an easy objection is that he saw esotericism not
only where it is actually to be found but where it never was, too.'6
One point deserves to be heavily stressed: Strauss'shermeneutical origi-
nality does not lie in the claim that there is a difference between (a) levels
of readers, more or less gifted and acute, and (b) levels of meaning, more
or less superficial. Neither is this originality to be looked for in his assert-
ing that some texts are esoteric. For these can be explained, completed,
corrected, and the like orally by the master who wrote them, in living
communication. Written works can very well be meant to lure the reader
through their very aporetic character so as to drive him or her toward a
living encounter with their author. Some dialogues by Plato, for example,
may have had this function (Gaiser 1959). Normally, written texts are exo-
teric, whereas esotericism belongs to oral teaching, which takes place in
the inner circle of disciples. All those facts are relatively well-known.
On the other hand, Strauss'scentral assumption is the existence of eso-
teric writing, that is, written texts that are meant, in themselves and out of

14. See Diogenes Laertius on Protagoras (IX, 52). For examples in Rome, see Momi-
gliano 1980.
15. Aristoxenos, frgt. 131Wehrli = Diogenes Laertius IX, 40. See Spinoza, Letter56, end.
Other explanation in Bollack 1967.
16. See, for instance, the open-minded review in Belaval 1953 and Strauss's rejoinder in
Strauss 1959: 228-32. For an analogous but less fair attack on Strauss's method applied to
medievalfaldsifa, see, for instance, Leaman 1980.
244 Poetics Today 19:2

themselves, to convey their full meaning to the acute reader while keeping
it out of the reach of run-of-the-mill people. The paradox lies in the blend-
ing of orality and writing. Written esoteric communication makes possible
something like, if I may coin a bold formula, silent oral teaching. The
singularity of the kind of esotericism Strauss supposes is its capability of
establishing communication between philosophers in spite of their being
kept apart by centuries. It enables a philosopher A to "speak,"to convey
his oral teaching, to a hearer B still to be born, through a text written ac-
cording to definite rules.
Since such a text is planned to be accessible to men of future gen-
erations, when death will have definitely precluded the possibility of any
"living" communication, it is necessary that it should be completely self-
sufficient. Plato, for instance, must have written not only esoteric texts in
general also but self-sufficient esoteric texts. This may be the reason why
Strauss could not abide the idea of an oral teaching of Plato, at least if
this implies a definite doctrine, for example, Plato's alleged metaphysics
of numbers, such as it is reconstructed by the Tubingen school (Kramer
1982), not the discussions at the Academy, understood as a living inquiry
and communication (synusia)in philosophical leisure, without any definite
doctrine, let alone orthodoxy. Strauss agrees with Harold Cherniss's at-
tack on the former (Strauss 1946: 349-50).
Plato must be the author of books comparable to sacred books. They
must at least have been written with a view to a way of reading analogous
to the way sacred books are read. Strauss tacitly discards or downplays
the admission that external circumstances such as the adventure in Sicily,
inner Academic debates, or even death, that prevented Plato from giving
the Laws the last touch-up might have played their part in Plato's literary
activity (Strauss 1991: 25). Foremost among these external circumstances
is the very fact that the texts were transmitted to us or lost (e.g., Aristotle's
lost dialogues), the choice being made by later transmitterswith regard to
criteria that are not necessarily to be supposed identical with the author's
own tastes. The comparison with sacred books does not mean that these
books should be read as sacred, as a critique commonly leveled against
Strauss has it,'7that is, as absolutely true and free of contradictions. The
accent does not lie so much on "sacred"as on "books":Their being sacred
and their being books are two aspects of a single fact. They must be sacred
as books, in so far as their flawless composition unswervingly mirrors di-
vine perfection.'8

17. See the cartoon in Burnyeat 1985: 32-small people paying obeisance to dusty old folios.
18. Cf. the description of the "Jerusalemite" understanding of contradictions in a sacred
 Brague* LeoStrauss's"Muslim" of GreekPhilosophy
Understanding 245

The link between external circumstances and inner meaning is pro-

vided by the author's statement about his work and the way he wanted it
to be read. A general problem arises as to whether the author of an eso-
teric piece of writing has to confess that he is writing in an esoteric way:
"The case of the authors who explicitly say that they intentionally contra-
dict themselves in order to indicate a secret teaching to an elite among the
readers, is entirely different from that of authors who neither say nor indi-
cate anything of that kind" (Strauss 1959: 224).
It must be said somewhere: "This very work you are actually reading is
an esoteric work." Otherwise, readers may mistake their own fancies for
the elicitation of the secret meaning the author intended to veil/unveil in
his or her work. Hints are not enough. Therefore, the authors about whom
the use of esoteric style cannot be denied just let the cat out of the bag
without further ado about their making use of such a style. There are some
examples of such writers. Maimonides is among them, at least in the intro-
duction to the GuideforthePerplexed,as well as the anonymous authors of
the Encyclopedia of thePureBrethren,who wrote: "Know, brother, that in this
epistle we
(risala) have made clear what final end is sought. Do not think ill
of us and do not regard this epistle as an amusement of adolescents and as
an idle tale of the Brethren; for (according to) a habit we follow, we cover
up truths by words, expressions and indications in order that we should
not be (forced to abandon our present way of life)" (Ihwan as-Safa' 1983,
2:377).19
In view of such examples, we feel compelled to qualify the statement
according to which "it is essential to the success of this style that the fact
that an author is employing it should be communicated indirectly"(Mahdi
1957: 118).Now, to what extent are we allowed to interpret works in which
no such open statements occur as fraught with a secret meaning?

Esotericismand the ThreeMedievalReligions

Even if we may admit the existence of esoteric texts outside of religious
traditions, the use of esoteric style is more convenient when a religious
orthodoxy has seized power. Maimonides alludes to this fact: He quotes
Alexander of Aphrodisias's On thePrinciplesof the Wholeon the three main
causes of error (Badawi 1978 [19671: 276). He then adds that there now

book in Strauss 1979: 116with, on the other hand, Strauss 1981:19-20, where the Bible and
Plato's dialogues are played off against one another.
19. Translation in Pines 1980: 185-86. It should be noted, however, that the text of this
crucial passage is not entirely sound. In Dieterici's edition, we read words that are to be
translated otherwise. See Brague 1993b: 99.
246 Poetics Today 19:2

exists a fourth cause of difficulty in the attainment of truth that did not
exist in ancient times-habit and education. He means thereby, he ex-
plains, the existence of religions founded on texts whose authority should
not be challenged.20This crucial difference between medieval and Greek
thought should preclude any too harsh reasoning upward from the former
to the latter. At any rate, the question of the relationship between "Athens"
and "Jerusalem"could not be asked in a meaningful way before the latter
became powerful enough to match the former. We thus have to ask what
kind of relationship obtains between the Straussian enterprise and the
three main versions of monotheism.
The first one to come to the dock must be Judaism. A current image of
Strauss is that of a rabbi turned mad, of a perverse reading of philosophi-
cal texts as if they were the Talmud. This image, in my opinion, is radically
mistaken. The question at stake is not whether the man Strausswas Jewish
or not: He himself stated that he was (Strauss 1968: 260), and the ques-
tion of the worth of this statement, of the meaning of "Jewish,"and so on
must be left aside. The only question we have to face is the Jewish nature
of Strauss's enterprise.We thus have to ask, Is the Straussian idea of eso-
tericism a Jewish one? Now, the interpretation devices that are brought
to bear, insofar as they are technical, have nothing specifically Jewish or
"Greek" about them, nor any specificity whatsoever. Strauss may allude
somewhere to the Jewish way of dealing with words, to the utmost par-
ticular way of eliciting meaning from obscure texts (Strauss 1924: 295). But
what really matters is, in my opinion, his general view of the context of
esotericism. Strauss's discovery arose from the study of a Muslim (Farabi)
and of an outcast (Spinoza). Strauss repeatedly points toward a more gen-
eral medieval background, the basic assumptions of which were shared by
Jews and Muslims-although not by Christians. The idea of a secret doc-
trine may have been extant in some stages of Christian intellectual history,
but it was expelled at a relatively early date (G. Stroumsa 1986). Strauss,
we may surmise, was aware of the non-Jewish origin of esotericism as he
understood it. He often endeavored to enhance the non-Jewish character
of the phenomena he stumbled on. For instance, he is eager to underline
that a certain doctrine in Maimonides cannot be traced back to the Tal-
mud but comes from a Muslim source. He always looks for non-Jewish,
Islamic sources of Maimonides (Strauss 1935: 115n. 4; 1939a:455).
As a matter of fact, some dimensions of esotericism can be assessed

20. Maimonides 1929: I, 31, 44, 29-45, 16; Maimonides 1963: 66-67. Quoted or alluded to
in Strauss 1959: 164-65, and 1963: xx. See Brague forthcoming.
 Brague* LeoStrauss's"Muslim"Understanding
of GreekPhilosophy 247

more easily in the Islamic world, for historical reasons.2'A permission,

and in some extreme cases, a duty of dissimulation (taqiyya)is present in
Shi'ism, and especially in the Ismaeli circles with which thefaldsifa shared
some ideas.22Esotericism could link up philosophy with a more or less
political mysticism. As for the fact of esotericism in Islamic philosophers,
it is commonly admitted, we are at no pains for how to find examples.
The central witnesses in medieval times are, as is well-known, Ibn Tufayl's
preface to his Hayy ibn raqzan (1936: 1-16) and the suspicion leveled by
Averroes against al-Ghazali (1987 [1930]: I, ? 52, 30). Moreover, in recent
times, many medieval works on which Strauss never published, including
treatises by Avicenna (1969; see Gardet 1951),are commonly recognized as
meant for an elite only.
The fact of esotericism in Muslim thought is manifest. Hence, Straus-
sian hermeneutics takes its bearings from, and finds its stronghold in, the
historical exploration of this field, although some results of previous and,
for Strauss, paradigmatic research on Islamic esotericism have undergone
criticism. For instance, Paul Kraus, following suggestions by Saadia Gaon
and al-Biruni, had supposed that the Brahmins quoted by Islamic heretics
were sheer puppets on which they could foist their own critique of Reve-
lation (Kraus 1994: 167). Strauss had taken this procedure as a model of
esoteric communication (Strauss 1952: 125 n. 95). But in fact, the Islamic
writer probably relied upon sound historical evidence on Indian-Muslim
encounter.23
But even supposed that assumption of esotericism can be true by and
large, we should not content ourselves with mere fact. This means that
esotericism should not be considered as stemming from merely exterior
causes that the historian could assess without further ado. It corresponds
to inner features of the Islamic conception of Revelation, that is, to the
way it conceives of the basic relationship of man to the Absolute. First,
Revelation in Islam is a mere fact, afactum brutum.This is the way Strauss
conceives religious Revelation: "There is only one objection to Plato-
Aristotle: and that is the factum brutumof revelation, or of the 'personal'
God. I say:factumbrutum-for there is no argument whatsoever, theoretical,
practical, existential .. ., not even the argument of paradox (a paradox as
such, after all, canbecalledforby reason, as Kierkegaard shows all too well)

21. See Keddie 1963. The same method is applied to the study of modern thinkers of the
Arabic renascence in Keddie 1972. See Jadaane 1973: 26-32.
22. On the Shi'ite conception of taqiyya, see
Kohlberg 1975. On the idea of a progressive,
processual coming to light of truth, originally created by God, see Meyer 1980: 263.
23. The fatal blow against Kraus's thesis, after S. Pines, was given in S. Stroumsa 1985.
248 PoeticsToday19:2

from the agnoiatheou,which characterizes the genuine philosopher, to be-

lief" (Strauss 1983a: 108).
Second, its content is a text, a written text, a book. The phenomenon
of the Sacred Book24is far more peculiar to Islam than to Christianity. In
Islam, what is revealed by God is the Sacred Book itself. The latter is, liter-
ally speaking, the word of God, dictated to the Prophet (through the angel
Gabriel). Christianity possesses sacred books, too, one of which it shares
with Judaism. But what is revealed, properly speaking, is not so much a
book as a person. The Word of God is first and foremost Jesus Christ, and
only derivatively the written records of his teachings and life in the New
Testament. Judaism stands midway: Unlike Christianity and like Islam, it
does not admit an incarnation, and what is revealed is a law; unlike Islam,
however, its sacred writings are not immediately present but mediated
through the very process of their reception, discussion, and interpretation.

Basic Conceptsof Esotericism

We can lend some probability to our hypothesis about the Muslim origin
of Strauss's conception of esotericism by examining the basic concepts it
involves.

Historicity
In a very interesting article, Aviezer Ravitzky (1981:108-9, 110o-1 n. 95,
111) has shown that Strauss's reading of Maimonides was anticipated by
some medieval commentators to the Guide.To begin with, this is espe-
cially the case with Samuel ben Judah ibn Tibbon, the very translator of
the Guide:Some quotations can't help but remind us with an outstanding
clarity of Strauss'shermeneutics, a point Ravitzky himself underlines-for
example, on Solomon (considered as the author of Qohelet),on repetition of
contradictory teachings, or on our having to pick up the rarest statement
as expressing the author's view. On the other hand, Ravitzky underlines
elsewhere that there are momentous differences between Strauss and the
medieval commentators. In particular, their views about the content of
the hidden doctrine is that the hidden teaching of the Bible is identical to
Aristotelian physics and metaphysics; Strauss'sview, on the other hand, is
that what Maimonides endeavors to conceal from the common reader is
that the two cannot be reconciled (Ravitzky 1990: 178-82).
As for the idea of history, Ravitzky mentions, "Ibn Tibbon's intrigu-

24. See the implications of the text by Machiavelli (Discorsi,II, 5) quoted in Strauss 1983b:
226.
 Brague* LeoStrauss's"Muslim" of GreekPhilosophy
Understanding 249

ing notion of the dynamic nature of the spiritual history of Israel and the
gradual purification of the religious concept of the community through-
out the ages" (1981:111).He quotes fascinating statements by Ibn Tibbon
according to which esotericism is a necessity under certain circumstances
only and, consequently, may vary according to them. A greater or lesser
degree of esotericism can be apposite in certain times. The general trend
is toward progress: Enlightenment increases steadily.25The issue at stake
is the provisional character of esotericism or its definitive necessity. Mai-
monides' early commentators viewed esoteric communication as a device
whose usefulness varies according to the more or less widespread enlight-
enment of their contemporaries.
Strauss'soutlook, on the other hand, apparently denies progress in quite
a radical way. His view of history is a static one. On this point, too, he
is a follower of Maimonides. Therefore, esotericism cannot be provisory;
no Enlightenment whatsoever will ever be able to bridge the gap between
the elite and the vulgar: "They believed that the gulf separating 'the wise'
and 'the vulgar' was a basic fact of human nature which could not be
influenced by any progress of popular education: philosophy, or science,
was essentially a privilege of 'the few'" (Strauss 1952: 34). This is more
in keeping with Muslim than with Jewish views. According to the former,
Revelation (in philosophical terms: man's relationship to the Absolute)
does not take place throughhistory--although it does take place in history,
because of man's historical nature; therefore no idea of a salvation history
is available (Falaturi1977),and consequently, no secularization of this idea
is "progress":"It is characteristic that the believers in progress are found
largely among the sectarians and those not in good standing with ortho-
doxy" (von Grunebaum 1961:71)-for example, Razi (1939: 301).

TheIdeaof Elite
Strauss'sesotericist hermeneutics supposes that philosophical writings are
genuinely addressed to elite readers to whom their real purpose is dis-
closed, whereas common people are paid lip service and consolidated in
their unfounded but socially useful opinions by edifying speeches. The
elite may consist of one individual. Since Socrates always addressed a
single man, esoteric writing is "Socratic"(Strauss 1939b: 535; 1983b: 172).
This idea has clear antecedents in later Greek philosophy, for instance in
Galen.26The same holds true for the idea of a "philosophy of the elite."27

25. See in particular the last pages of Moses ibn Tibbon 1837: 172-75 and Moses of Nar-
bonne 1852: 34a (both quoted by Ravitzky 1981:115).
26. See De dif.puls., III, 3 (VIII, 656 Kuehn), quoted in Walzer 1949: 39.
27. See Porphyry 1856: Prologue. The title "Philosophy of the Elite" occurs in the so-called
250 PoeticsToday19:2

The constitution of an elite is quite a common feature of all religious

or scientific systems. Yet, a further step is taken when the existence of an
elite is thematized. As a rule, this happens in the elite itself and through
its reflection on its own status. This leads to the coining of a special word,
something like the "rest"of the Prophets. Such a word is not extant before
medieval Judaism. Jewish esotericism is rooted in the Talmud.The Sages
considered themselves as representatives of Israel, which stands for man-
kind: "Rabbinical Judaism understood itself as a vicarious elite, which
means that a group separates itself inside of an over-archingbond. The iso-
lation of rabbinical Judaism was not primarily socially motivated, but its
roots were in the theological idea of Israel's isolation vis-a-vis the nations
of the world, in the inner isolation of Israel that was rendered necessary by
that, and which the rabbis used to represent" (Wevers 1975: 193, and see
203, my translation). The idea of representation is the central one: There
is no knowledge reserved to a select elite, since the elite itself is meant to
function as a substitute for the vulgar. The elite is not an end in itself. Its
role is a vicarious one. Therefore, it is not self-centered but responsible for
the rest of the community to which it belongs.
On the other hand, if an elite is conceived of as radically severed from
the rest of mankind, for which it does not stand and toward which it bears
no responsibility, the gap that separates it cannot be bridged. Its separa-
tion must then be definitive, whereas a representative, hence responsible,
elite is but provisionally separated from mankind. Islamic conceptions of
the elite may vary (Beg 1978). But "the philosophers restricted the elite
most, and had no hope of bringing the masses up to elite status, as the
other groups [shi'a, sufis] might" (Keddie 1963: 59). An extreme example
of the philosophic attitude is to be found in Farabi's identification of the
elite, absolutely speaking, with the philosopher who is a philosopher in
the absolute meaning of the term (1969b: III, 19, ? 113,p. 133). In another
work, the same author appears to have a more balanced stance toward the
rest of the city:
We [philosophers]are politicalin nature.It is incumbentto us thereforeto (a)
live in harmonywith the public,love them and preferdoing what is usefulto
them and redoundsto the improvementof theircondition(just as it is incum-
bent on them to do the same in our regard).(b) Associatethem in the good
whose care is entrustedto us (just as it is incumbenton them to associateus
in the good thingswhosecare is entrustedto them)by showingthem the truth
concerningthe opinionsthey hold in theirreligions;for when they sharewith

Theologyof Aristotle,IV, ? 61, in Badawi 1977 [1955]: 61; English in "Theology of Aristotle"
1959: 2: 381. See Brague 1997.
 Brague? LeoStrauss's"Muslim" of GreekPhilosophy
Understanding 251

us the truth,it will be possiblefor them, to the extent of their ability,to asso-
ciate with philosophersin the happinessof philosophy.(c) Move them away
fromthings-arguments, opinions,laws-in whichwe find they are not right.
(Kitabal-Jadal,English translation cited in Mahd, 1986: 112-13)28
The best thing that the philosopher can do toward the vulgar is to cor-
rect their opinions. Basically, however, the philosopher has no responsi-
bility whatsoever toward nonphilosophers, but only toward potential phi-
losophers. The nonphilosophical mob must be kept at bay. It is cared for
only insofar as its existence and well-being secures the existence of a society
in which philosophy is possible. The vulgar are always a means, never an
end. Esotericism could be justified, and actually was, as a means of pro-
tecting the faith of the weak (see, for instance, 1 Corinthians 8: 9-13). For
the philosopher, it does not protect anything but the philosopher's knowl-
edge. For even "respect,"if any, for the faith of the weaker ones is a way of
avoiding rioting among the rabble, of preserving social order, and hence of
allowing the philosopher to go on pursuing his own goal, contemplation.
In later Jewish thought, the idea of an elite does occur. The question
is to which of the two models of the "elite" we have just briefly outlined
this idea belongs, when it is handled by Jewish authors. Now, everything
remains ambiguous. To quote only Maimonides' forerunners, the under-
lying model in Saadia is probably the "vicarious"one: The benefits result-
ing from the choice of an individual (khass,same root as khassa)are ori-
ented toward the well-being of the community.29In Bahya, the idea of an
elite is undoubtedly present but has as balance-weights, on the one hand,
the general consideration according to which every privilege involves an
enforced responsibility, and, on the other hand, the traditional warning
against standing apart from tradition and community.30In Jehuda Halevi's
Kuzari,the idea of an elite, or "substance,"or "heart"(safwa/ Ibn Tibbon:
segula)of mankind, transmitted from Adam to the Patriarchs,and so on, is
well-known. But its ultimate origin should be most probably looked for in
the Muslim world, more precisely in Shi'ism (Pines 1980: 167-72).
It looks as though Maimonides' idea of an elite is the second, "philo-
sophical" one, which originates in pagan or Islamic cultural surroundings
(Heinemann 1926: 70 n. 2). But his elitism did not remain unchallenged;
for example, Gersonides polemicizes against Maimonides' taste for eso-
teric communication and the devices he makes use of-lack of order,

28. The ms. translated is now published, for instance in Farabi 1987: 1:382, 1-6 (I omit to
signal two textual emendations by Mahdi).
29. Saadia 1970: III, 116;1948: 137, and see III, ? 2; Saadia 1970: 121; 1948: 143.
30. Bahya b. Paquda 1912:III, 6, 156-58; III, 3, n? 7, 139-40; VIII, 2; V, 5, 241, 1-2.
252 PoeticsToday19:2

obscure phrases, and so forth. The duty of communicating one's results,

which behooves the scholar, is deduced from an ontology that Gersonides,
in his introduction to the Warsof the Lord,grounds on a theory of ema-
nation: the well-known Neoplatonic or Bonaventurian bonumdifusivumsui
(Gersonides 1569: 3ab and 2d; 1866: 8, 6-30, and 5, 33-36, 2; 1984; 1:1oo-
lol; see Strauss 1935: 79-86).

Christianityas a ThirdCity
It looks like that for Strauss the real alternative to "Athens" and "Jeru-
salem" (as Strauss understands the latter's fundamental stance) is Chris-
tianity. Strauss expresses this idea in a text that, in my opinion, is particu-
larly instrumental to our understanding of what is at stake with the "Athens
and Jerusalem" theme, his 1936 French essay on Farabi'sand Maimonides'
political science. We read at the beginning:
What lead to the breakwith ancient thoughtwas neither the Bible nor the
Koran,but perhapsthe New Testament,and doubtlessReformationand mod-
ern philosophy.The leadingideauponwhichGreeksandJews agreeis precisely
the idea of divine Law as of a uniqueand all-encompassinglaw that is at the
same time a religiouslaw, a civil law and a moral law.And actually,a Greek
philosophyof divineLaw lies at the groundof Jewishand Muslimphilosophy
of Torahor of shari'ah:accordingto Avicenna,Plato'sLawsare the standard
work on prophecy and shari'ah. (Strauss 1936c: 2; on Reformation, Strauss
1946: 338)
We can find other statements to the same effect. For example, "Islamic
and Jewish philosophers of the Middle Ages are more 'primitive' than
modern philosophers, because they are not led, as these are, by the deriva-
tive idea of natural right, but by the original, ancient idea of Law as of
a unified, total order of human life. In other words: because they are dis-
ciples of Plato and not disciples of Christians"(Strauss 1935: 62). Or again:
"Judaism and Islam on the one hand and Christianity on the other." As
against Christianity, the Islamic-Jewish world is said to resemble classical
Greece (Strauss 1952: 9, 18-19, 21).
We can elicit from these statements a basic idea: A deep harmony ob-
tains between "Athens" and "Jerusalem"when the latter is understood
from what we could call a "Meccan" vantage; this harmony is dispelled
when both are seen from the point of view of Christianity (perhaps "Rome"
could do). Nietzsche's critique of culture, if we are to trust Strauss, "strove
downwards to the depths of pre-'Christian' Jewish as well as Greco-
European mind" (Strauss 1923: 241a). If Christianity is seen as a shallow
 Brague * Leo Strauss's "Muslim"Understanding of Greek Philosophy 253

phenomenon that underlies and conceals the deeper truth of both Athens
and Jerusalem, it is little wonder that Strauss should not simply forget
(Beneton 1987: 79-80), but should systematically neglect, every Christian
element in Western history. Silence is for Strauss the best way to indicate
that a subject does not deserve interest (Strauss 1958: 30). What is more,
we read under his pen phrases like "the whole kingdom of darkness with
Thomas Aquinas at its head" (Strauss 1968: 213).
We could complement Strauss's explicit contrast of Athens and Jeru-
salem by our giving names to their possible coming together, on the one
hand, and to their greatest divergence, on the other hand. I should like to
take advantage of the meaningful character of the names of some other
cities and propose the following schema:

[Rome]

Athens J\erusalem

[Mecca]

At the bottom of this more or less explicit structure lies the (very ex-
plicitly emphasized) idea of Law. "Revelation, as understood by Jews and
Muslims, had the form of Law" (Strauss 1937: 97). This statement is an
obvious truth. Strauss generalizes it and supposes that the content of any
Revelation must be a law (Strauss 1983b: 234, 244). Christianity does not
present itself as a Law, not even as a "New Law,"so the characterization of
Christianity-even by its own supporters-as a "New Law" should not be
taken for granted, as it commonly is. The phrase "new law" (kainosnomos),
which occurs in some Christian writers,31is utterly absent from the New
Testament. What does exist there is the idea of a "New Covenant" or, in
John's Gospel, "new commandment." It does not seem that Strauss has
reflected on the parallel between the passage from the Old Covenant to
the New, that is, from the law to Jesus Christ as the man on the one hand,
and the Socratic revolution, seen as the passage from the cosmos to the
human soul, on the other hand. Still more remarkable is the fact that, ac-
cording to Strauss, the same idea of Law holds true for the "world."Both
"Athens"(the cosmos) and "Jerusalem"(revealed Law) are basically laws.
Strauss draws a parallel between cosmos and Law: "The Torah is, like
the world, as 'world,' before philosophy" (Strauss 1935: 86). By so doing,

31. See, for example, Bernard of Clairvaux 1963 [1145?]:418 (Jesus as a legislator); Aqui-
nas's treatise on the laws in Summatheologica,Ia IIae, q. 90-108, esp. q. 106.
254 Poetics Today 19:2

Strauss reminds us of- strange bedfellows- Schelling, who wrote: "Juda-

ism and Paganism, though they differ in other respects, have in common
that both are under the Law" (Schelling 1857:57).
On the other hand, one could perhaps look at the antithesis between
Athens and Jerusalem from a non-"Meccan," nay "Roman,"point of view.
One would have then to see to what extent the very antithesis between
Athens and Jerusalem owes its survival and its permanent fruitfulness
in Western culture to the "Roman" character of the latter. But that is
another story.32

Conclusion
Be that as it may, we may conclude, as for Strauss himself, that his herme-
neutics arose from a study of medieval thought, more especially of its Jew-
ish version, and later on extended to the study of classical Greek thought.
But the Jewish philosophical writers from whom he took his bearings were
precisely those upon which the influence of Islamic thought patterns pre-
vailed. At any rate, his understanding of the Greeks betrays unmistakable
"Muslim"features. This holds true, on the one hand, because of the obvi-
ous influence of the faldsifa, whom we may safely call Muslims since they
lived in a Muslim surrounding, although, according to Strauss, they were
hardly devout believers (or even if, like Razi, they were outspoken free-
thinkers). On the other hand, we should acknowledge the more discreet
presence of some basic "Islamic" assumptions as to the nature of Revela-
tion and "religion." Strauss'sinterpretation of the ancients, on the face of
things a Jewish one, bears witness of the deep influence Islam exercised on
the way in which medieval Judaism had to formulate its basic tenets. If we
want to understand him more deeply, we should complement the "que-
relle des anciens et des modernes" by an older, medieval quarrel among
the three religions that claim a share in Abraham's heritage.

References
Averroes
1987 [1930] Tahafotat-Tahafot.L'incoherence Textearabeetablipar M. Bouyges
de l'incoherence,
(Beirut: Dar el-Machreq).
Avicenna
1969 Epistolasulla vitafutura,edited by F. Lucchetta (Padua: Antenore).
Badawi, Abdurrahman
1977 [1955] PlotinusapudArabes(Kuwait: Wakalat al-matbu'at).
1978 [1947] AristotelesapudArabes(Kuwait: Wakalat al-matba'at).

32. I tried to sketch such a story in Brague 1993a. For an English summary, see Brague n.d.
 Brague * Leo Strauss's "Muslim"Understanding of Greek Philosophy 255

1983 [1973] Platonenpays d'islam(Beirut: Dar al-Andaloss).

Bahya b. Paquda
1912Kitdbal-Hiddyaildfara'idal-qulub,edited by A. S. Yahuda (Leyde: Brill).
Beg, M. A. J.
1978 "Al-khassawa-l-'amma," Encyclopedia of Islam,t. 4, col. lo98a-llooa.
Belaval, Yvon
1953 "Pour une sociologie de la philosophie," Critique9: 852-66.
Benardete, Seth
1978 "Leo Strauss: The City and Man," PoliticalScienceReviewer8: 1-20.
Beneton, Philippe
1987 Introduction a la politiquemoderne.Democratieliberaleet totalitarisme(Paris: Hachette).
Bernard of Clairvaux
1963 [1145?]"De consideratione," in Tractatuset opuscula,edited byJ. Leclercq and H. M.
Rochais, Opera, vol. 3, 393-493 (Rome: Editiones Cistercienses)
Berrichon-Sedeyn, Olivier
1987 "Presentation"to his French translation of La citeet l'homme,i-xxxi (Paris:Agora).
Bollack, Jean
1967 "Un silence de Platon [ ... ]," Revuede Philologie41: 242-46.
Brague, R6mi
1989a "Ath&nes,Jerusalem, La Mecque. La lecture 'musulmane' de la philosophie
grecque par Leo Strauss," French translation by B. Vergely, Revuede Metaphysique et de
Morale,309-36.
1989b Review of Jolivet and Rached 1984, RevuedeMetaphysique et deMorale,415-17.
1991 "Leo Strauss and Maimonides," English translation by C. J. Sheldon in Leo Strauss'
Thought:Towarda CriticalEngagement,edited by A. Udoff, 93-114 (Boulder, CO: Lynn
Rienner).
1993a Europe,la voieromaine(Paris: Criterion).
1993b Review of A. Giese (transl.), Ikhwan as-Safa', Mensch und Tier vor dem Konig
der Dschinnen, BulletinCritiquedesAnnalesIslamologiques, lo: 96-99.
1996 "Eorumpraeclaraingenia:Conscience de la nouveaut6 et pretention a la continuit6
chez Farabi et Maimonide," in Etudesde Philosophie Arabe,Actesdu Colloque,Bordeaux,17-
19juin 1994, edited by D. Mallet, Bulletind'EtudesOrientales1996: 87-102.
1997 "La philosophie dans la 'Theologie dAristote.' Pour un inventaire,"Documentie studi
sulla tradizione
filosoficamedievale
8: 365-87.
forthcoming "Averroeset la Republique," in Imagesde Platonet lecturesde ses oeuvres:La trans-
formationdePlatond traversles siecles,edited by A. Neschke (Louvain: Peeters).
n.d. "Is Western Culture a 'Tale of Two Cities'?" Unpublished lecture.
Burnyeat, Miles F.
1985 "Sphynx without a Secret," New rorkReviewof Books,May 30: 30-36.
Falaturi, Abdoljawad
1977 "Das Fehlen einer Heilsgeschichte im Islam," MiscellaneaMediaevalia,11:Die Macht
des Guten und Bosen, 72-80.
Farabi
1943 Alfarabius, De Platonisphilosophia,edited by F. Rosenthal and R. Walzer (Plato
arabus, vol. 2) (London: Warburg Institute).
1968 UtterancesEmployedin Logic (Arabic text), edited with introduction and notes by
M. Mahdi (Beirut: Dar el-Machreq).
1969a Afarabi'sPhilosophyof Plato andAristotle,translated with an introduction by Muhsin
Mahdi (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press).
1969b Bookof Letters,edited by M. Mahdi (Beirut: Dar el-Machreq).
1985 Farabi'sIdealState,edited by R. Walzer (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
1987 Al-Mantiqiyyatli-al-Farabi,edited by M. T. Danesh-Pajuh (Qum: Maktabat Ayay
Allah al-Uzma al-Marashi al-Najafi).
256 Poetics Today 19:2

Gaiser, Konrad
1959 ProtreptikundParanesebeiPlaton(Stuttgart: Kohlhammer).
Gardet, Louis
1951"Un cas typique de l'6sot6risme avicennien: sa doctrine de la r6surrection des corps,"
Revuedu Caire,n? 14 (141):68-94.
Gersonides
1569 Milhamotha-Shem(Riva di Trento).
1866 Milhamotha-Shem(Leipzig: Carl B. Lorck).
1984 Warsof theLord,translated by S. Feldman, vol. 1 (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication
Society of America).
Heinemann, Isaak
1926 Die Lehrevon derZweckbestimmung Altertumund im
des Menschenim griechisch-rdmischen
jiidischenMittelalter.Berichtdesjiidisch-theologischen
Seminars[. 1 (Breslau: Schatzky).
Holzhey, Helmut, and Walter Christoph Zimmerli, eds.
1977 Esoterikund Exoterikder Philosophie:Beitrdgezur Geschichteund zum Sinnphilosophischer
Selbstbestimmung(Basel: Schwabe).
Ibn Abi Usaybi'a
n.d. 'Uyunal-anba'fitabaqdtal-atibb' (Beirut: Dar maktabat al-Hayah).
Ibn Tufayl
1936 HayybenYaqdhdn. Roman philosophique d'Ibn Thofail, edited by L. Gauthier, 2d ed.
(Beyrouth: Imprimerie Catholique).
Ihwan as-Safa'
1983 Rasd'il,edited by B. Bustani (Beyrouth: Dar Bayrut li-'l-taba'a wa 'n-nasr).
Jadaane, Fehmi
1973 "Les conditions socio-culturelles de la philosophie islamique," StudiaIslamica38: 5-
6o.
Jolivet, Jean, and Roshdi Rashed, eds.
1984 EtudessurAvicenne(Paris: Les Belles Lettres).
Keddie, Nikkie R.
1963 "Symbol and Sincerity in Islam," StudiaIslamica19: 27-63.
1972 SayyidJamalad-Din al-Afghani:A PoliticalBiography(Berkeley: University of Califor-
nia Press).
Kohlberg, Etan
1975 "Some Imami-Shi'i Views on taqiyya,"Journalof theAmericanOrientalSociety95: 395-
402.
Kramer, Hans-Joachim
1982 Platonee ifondamentidellametafisica.Saggiosulla teoriadeiprincipie sulledottrinenonscritte
di Platone[... J, translated by G. Reale (Milan: Vita e Pensiero).
Kraus, Paul
1994 Alchemie,Ketzerei,Apokryphen imfriihen Islam. Gesammelte Aufsatze, herausgegeben
und eingeleitet von R. Brague (Hildesheim: Olms).
Lachterman, David R.
1991"Strauss Read from France,"Reviewof Politics,224-45.
Leaman, Oliver
1980 "Does the Interpretation of Islamic Philosophy Rest on a Mistake?" International
Journalof MiddleEast Studies12:525-38.
Lerner, Ralph, and Muhsin Mahdi, eds.
1963 MedievalPoliticalPhilosophy:A Sourcebook (Chicago: University of Chicago Press).
Mahdi, Muhsin S.
1957 Ibn Khaldun'sPhilosophyof History:A Studyin the PhilosophicFoundationof the Scienceof
Culture(London: G. Allen & Unwin).
1986 "Man and His Universe in Medieval Arabic Philosophy," in L'Hommeet son univers
au moyenage:Actesdu septiemecongresinternational dephilosophiemedievale[.. ., edited by
C. Wenin, i: 112-13(Louvain la Neuve: Editions de l'Institut Superieur de Philosophie).
 Brague * Leo Strauss's "Muslim"Understanding of Greek Philosophy 257

Maimonides
1929 Daldlatal-Hd'irnn,edited by I. Joel (Jerusalem: Junovitch).
1963 The Guideof thePerplexed,translated with an introduction and notes by S. Pines (Chi-
cago: University of Chicago Press).
Marinos
1814 VitaProcli,edited by I. F. Boissonade (Leipzig: Weigel).
Marshall, Terence
1985 "Leo Strauss, la philosophie et la science politique," RevueFranfaisede SciencePolitique
35: 605-38, 801-39.
Marx, Alexander
1935 "Texts by or about Maimonides," Jewish Quarterly Review25(4): 371-428.
Meyer, Egbert
1980 "AnlaBund Anwendung der taqyya,"Der Islam57(2): 246-80.
Meyerhof, Max
1930 "Von Alexandrien nach Bagdad. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des philosophischen
und medizinischen Unterrichts bei den Arabern," Sitzungsberichte der PreufischenAka-
demieder Wissenschaften, Philologisch-historische Klasse: 389-429.
Momigliano, Arnaldo
1980 "The Historians of the Classical World and their Audiences," in Sestocontributo alla
storiadeglistudiclassicie delmondoantico,361-76 (Rome: Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura).
1987 "Ermeneutica e pensiero politico in Leo Strauss," in Pagineebraiche,a curadi Silvia
Berti, 189-98 (Turin: Einaudi).
Moses Ibn Tibbon
1837 Ma'amarYiqqawuham-Mayim,edited by M. L. Bisseliches (Presburg).
Moses of Narbonne
1852 Der Commentar desRabbiMosesJNarbonensis [. .] zu dem WerkeMoreNebuchimdesMai-
monides,edited by J. Goldenthal (Vienna).
Nietzsche, Friedrich
1974 [1911]TheDawn ofDay, translated byJ. M. Kennedy, in The CompleteWorksof Friedrich
Nietzsche(New York: Gordon Press).
Pines, Shlomo
1980 "Shi'ite Terms and Conceptions in Judah Halevi's Kuzari," JerusalemStudiesin Ara-
bicandIslam2: 165-251.
Porphyry
1856 De philosophiaex oraculishauriendalibrorumreliquiae,edited by G. Wolff (Berlin).
Ravitzky, Aviezer
1981"Samuel ibn Tibbon and the Esoteric Character of the Guide of the Perplexed," AJS
Review6: 87-123.
1990 "The Secrets of the Guide to the Perplexed: Between the Thirteenth and Twentieth
Centuries," in Studieson Maimonides,edited by I. Twersky, 159-207 (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press).
Razi, Abu Bakr
1939 Abi Bakr Mohammadi filii Zachariae Raghensis (Razi), OperaPhilosophicafragmen-
taquequaesupersunt,edited by P. Kraus (Cairo).
Rosen, Stanley
1987 Hermeneutics as Politics(Oxford: Oxford University Press).
Saadia Gaon
1948 TheBookof Beliefsand Opinions,translated by S. Rosenblatt (New Haven, CT: Yale
University Press).
1970 Seferha-nibkharbe-emunoth u-we-de'oth,Maqorwe-targum,edited by J. Qafih (Jerusa-
lem: Sura).
Sales i Coderch, Jordi, and Josep Montserrat i Molas
1991 "Introducci6 a la lectura de Leo Strauss,"in L. Strauss, Jerusalemi Atenes,edited by
Sales i Coderch and Montserrat i Molas, 7-62 (Barcelona: Barcelonesa d'edicions).
258 Poetics Today 19:2

Schelling, F. W.
1857 PhilosophiederOffenbarung (Stuttgart: Cotta).
Shestov, Leo
1951Afinyi Ierusalim(Paris: YMCA Press).
Slings, S. R.
1981A Commentary of thePlatonicClitophon(Amsterdam: Academische Pers).
Steinschneider, Moritz
1869 Al-Farabi(Alpharabius), desarabischen LebenundSchriften[... J (Saint Peters-
Philosophen
burg).
Strauss, Leo
1923 "Das Heilige," DerJude (Berlin) 7: 240-42.
1924 "Cohens Analyse der Bibelwissenschaft Spinozas," Derjude (Berlin), 8: 295-314.
1935 Philosophieund Gesetz.Beitragezum Verstdndnis Maimunisund seiner Vorldufer (Berlin:
Schocken).
1936a "Eine vermisste Schrift Farabis," Monatsschrift fir Geschichteund Wissenschaftdes
Judentums80: 96-106.
1936b ThePoliticalPhilosophyof Hobbes:Its Basis andIts Genesis(Oxford: Clarendon Press).
1936c "Quelques remarques sur la science politique de Maimonide et de Farabi," Revue
desEtudesJuives100: 1-37.
1937 "On Abravanel's Philosophical Tendency and Political Teaching," in IsaacAbravanel,
edited byJ. B. Trend and H. Loewe, 93-129 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
1939a Review of Maimonides, The Mishneh Torah, Book 1, edited by M. Hyamson, Re-
viewof Religion,3: 448-56.
1939b "The Spirit of Sparta or the Taste of Xenophon," SocialResearch6: 502-36.
1945 "Farabi'sPlato," LouisGinzberg JubileeVolume,357-93 (New York:American Academy
for Jewish Research).
1946 "On a New Interpretation of Plato's Political Philosophy," SocialResearch13:326-67.
1952 PersecutionandtheArt of Writing(Glencoe, IL: Free Press).
1957 "How Farabi Read Plato's Laws," MelangesLouis Massignon,3: 319-44 (Damascus:
Institut Francais de Damas), reprinted in Strauss 1959, 134-54.
1958 ThoughtsonMachiavelli(Seattle: University of Washington Press).
1959 WhatIs PoliticalPhilosophy? and OtherStudies(Glencoe, IL: Free Press).
1963 "How to Begin to Study the 'Guide of the Perplexed,"' in Moses Maimonides,
The Guideof the Perplexed,translated by S. Pines, xi-lvi (Chicago: University of Chi-
cago Press).
1964 The CityandMan (Chicago: Rand McNally).
1966 SocratesandAristophanes (New York: Basic Books).
1968 Liberalism AncientandModern(New York:Basic Books).
1970 "A Giving of Accounts," The College(Annapolis and Santa Fe) 22 (1): 1-5.
1975 TheArgumentandActionof Plato'sLaws (Chicago: University of Chicago Press).
1979 "The Mutual Influence of Theology and Philosophy,"Independent Journalof Philosophy
3: 111-18.
1981"On the Interpretation of Genesis," L'Homme21: 5-36.
1983a Correspondence with Karl Lowith concerning modernity, Independent Journalof Phi-
losophy4: 105-19.
1983b Studiesin PlatonicPoliticalPhilosophy(Chicago: University of Chicago Press).
1989 The Rebirthof ClassicalPoliticalRationalism.An Introductionto the Thoughtof Leo Strauss,
Essaysand Lecturesby Leo Strauss,selected and introduced by Thomas L. Pangle (Chi-
cago: University of Chicago Press).
1991 On 7yranny,revised and expanded edition, edited by V. Gourevitch and M. S. Roth
(New York: Free Press).
Stroumsa, Guy G.
1986 "Paradosis: Traditions 6sot6riques dans le Christianisme des premiers siecles,"
 Brague * Leo Strauss's "Muslim"Understanding of Greek Philosophy 259

Ecole pratique des Hautes Etudes, 5th section, Colloquedu Centenaire,3, Les litteratures
apocryphes,Paris, September 22-25, 1986, Communications, 91-108.
Stroumsa, Sarah
1985 "The Barahima in Early Kalam," JerusalemStudiesonArabicandIslam6: 229-41.
1991"Al-Farabiand Maimonides on the Christian Philosophical Tradition: A Reevalua-
tion," Der Islam68: 263-87.
"Theology of Aristotle"
1959 English translation by G. Lewis, Plotini Opera,edited by Schwyzer and Henry, vol. 2
(Brussels: L'edition universelle).
Thomas Aquinas, Saint
1927 Summatheologica (Rome: Forzani).
Voegelin, Eric, Alfred Schutz, Leo Strauss, and Aron Gurwitsch
1993 Briefwechseliiber "Die neue Wissenschaftder Politik,"edited by Peter J. Opitz (Frei-
burg: Alber).
von Grunebaum, Gustav E.
1961Islam:Essaysin theNatureand Growthof a CulturalTradition,2d ed. (London: Routledge
and Kegan Paul).
Walzer, Richard
1949 GalenonJews and Christians(Oxford: Oxford University Press).
Wevers, Gerd
1975 GeheimnisundGeheimhaltung im rabbinischen
Judentum(Berlin: De Gruyter).