The Twenty Verses

of Vasubandhu.
Translated by John Dunne.
[This is a provisional translation not intended for distribution outside of class.]

In the Great Vehicle, everything in the three realms is determined to be just cognitive
representation. In the såtras it says, ““Oh children of the Victor, everything in the three realms is
just cognitive representation.”” The following are synonyms: mind, mental faculty, awareness,
and cognitive representation. Here, ““mind”” is intended to include the conjunct mental events.
The word ““just”” is stated in order to refute any objective referent.

All this is just cognitive representation because unreal objects appear in the mind.
One sees unreal objects just as a person with cataracts sees hair-circles and so
on. //1//

Here, someone objects:

If a cognitive representations does not come from an objective referent, then

although a cognitive representation should be restricted to a particular time and
place, it would not be; and although it should not be restricted to just one mental
continuum, it would be; and although the object of the representation should
perform functions, it would not do so. //2//

What has been said here? An opponent says, ““You are saying that a cognitive representation
of form and so on occurs without form, which would be its objective referent; this means that the
cognitive representation does not come from an objective referent form. If that is the case, how
does a cognitive representation occur in a certain place and not everywhere? And why does it
occur only in that place at only some times and not all the time? And why does it occur in the
mental continuum of all those who are situated in that place and not just in the continuum of one
being? It should only appear in one person’’s mind, just as the appearance of hair occurs only in
the continuum of persons with cataracts, and not in other persons’’ continua. People with
cataracts see hairs; why do those hairs not perform the functions of hairs? And why is it not the
case that other things that are not illusions also do not perform their respective functions? In
dreams people see food, clothing, poison, weapons and so on; why do those dreamt things not
perform the functions of the actual things? And why do the actual things that are other than those
illusions perform those functions? The city of sprites does not perform the functions of a city
because it does not exist; this is not the case with actual cities that are other than illusory cities.
Therefore, if there is no objective referent, then restriction to a particular time and place, non-
restriction to a particular mental continuum, and the performance of functions would not make
sense.””
Vasubandhu’’s Twenty Verses Page 2

It is not the case that they do not make sense, since

it is proven that representations are restricted in time and place, as in a

dream. 3ab.1

Here, ““as in a dream”” means ““like a dream.”” How is this the case? Even without an
objective referent, when one dreams one sees things such as Bhramara bees, gardens, women,
and men in a particular place; one does not see them everywhere. And one sees them in that
place at a particular time, not always. Hence, it is proven that representations are restricted to a
particular time and place without an objective referent.

It is also proven that representations are not restricted to just one mental
continuum, as is the case with hungry ghosts 3b.1-c

The word ““proven”” is supplied from the previous line. ““Like hungry ghosts”” means ““as is
the case with hungry ghosts.”” How is it proven to be the same as the case of the hungry ghosts?

It is a parallel case in that they all see pus-rivers, and so on. //3d//

A ““pus-river”” is a river filled with pus, as in the word ““butter-jar.”” For all hungry ghosts are
in the same situation induced by the ripening of their karma; they thus all see rivers filled with
pus; it is not that just one sees it. ““And so on”” means that, just as they see rivers filled with pus,
they also see rivers filled with things such as urine and excrement and they see them to be
guarded by men holding bludgeons and swords. Thus, it is proven that representations are not
restricted to a single continuum, even though there is no objective referent.

And it is proven that functions are performed, just as one is overwhelmed in a

dream. //4a//

““It is proven that”” is understood here. For example, even without sexual union, there can be
emission of sperm in a dream, which is what is meant by being ““overwhelmed in a dream.”” Thus,
restriction to a certain time and place and the other three points are proven through various
examples.

And all four points are established in the hells, for example. //4bc//

The phrase ““is established”” is understood by context. ““In the hells, for example”” means ‘‘as
in the hells.’’ How is it established that these points apply to the hells?

They are established when the hell beings see the hell guardians and so on and
when they are afflicted by them. //4d//

In the hells, the hell beings see the hell-guardians and so on; their sight of the hell guardians
is established to be restricted in time and place. ““And so on”” means restriction in time and place
is also established when they see the hell-hounds, crows, and iron mountains moving to and fro.
All the hell beings see such things, not just one hell being. This is also proven to be the case
Vasubandhu’’s Twenty Verses Page 3

when they are beaten by the hell-guardians. Even though the hell-guardians do not exist, the hell
beings experience these things due to the influence of the same ripening of their karma. Just as
they are proven to apply the hells, so too one should know that all these -- the restriction in time
and place and the other three points -- are proven to apply to all other cases also.
Someone objects, ““Why are the hell-guardians, dogs and crows not asserted to be sentient
beings?””
Because it does not make sense. For it is not possible for them to be hell beings since they
do not experience the sufferings of the hell in the way that the hell beings do. If they did, one
would not be able to classify these beings, who are mutually torturing each other, by saying,
““These are hell-beings, but these are hell-guardians.”” Nor would there be such fear among those
of equal appearance, size and strength who are afflicting each other. And if the hell guardians
were sentient beings, they would not be able to bear the suffering of burning on the blazing iron
ground; experiencing this unbearable suffering, how could they torture others? Moreover, how
could beings that are not hell beings arise in hell?
Someone objects, ““Well, then how could animals arise in the heavens? They do occur, so in
that way it is possible for certain kinds of animals and hungry ghosts, who are the hell guardians,
to arise in hell.””

Animals do not arise in hell in the way that they do in heaven, nor do hungry
ghosts. They do not arise there because they do not experience the suffering that
occurs there. //5//

The animals that arise in heaven have arisen there due to the karma which produces the bliss
of that world. Having arisen there, they experience the pleasure that occurs in that world. But the
hell guardians and so on do not experience the suffering of the hells. Therefore, it does not make
sense for animals or hungry ghosts to arise there.
Someone objects, ““Then due to the karma of the hell beings, certain material elements that
are distinguished by certain colors, shapes, size and strength occur in the hells; these material
forms acquire the name, ““hell-guardians.”” So too, they change such that they are seen to be
performing various functions such as moving their hands in order to inspire fear. For example,
mountains in the shape of rams move back and forth; the thorns in the iron ÷àlmalã forest point
up and then point down. Thus, it is not the case that these things do not arise in hell.””

If you assert that there is the arisal and transformation of elemental matter there
due to the karma of those hell-beings, why do you not assert that there is the arisal
and transformation of consciousness there? //6//

Why do you not assert that there is not the arisal and transformation just of consciousness
there due to the karma of those hell-beings? Why do you instead conceptually fabricate
elemental matter as being that which arises and transforms there?
Moreover:

You suppose that the imprint left by karma is one place and the fruition of that
karma occurs in another; you do not assert that the effect occurs precisely where
Vasubandhu’’s Twenty Verses Page 4

the imprint occurs. What is the reason for this? //7//

You suppose that there is a certain kind of arisal and transformation of elemental matter
there due to the karma of the hell-beings. But the imprint of that karma is located in the mental
continua of those hell-beings; it is not somewhere else. Why then do you not assert that the
imprint’’s effect -- which is a certain kind of transformation of consciousness -- does not occur
exactly where the imprint is located. Instead, you suppose that the effect of the imprint occurs in
a locus where the imprint does not exist. What is the reason for this?
““The reason is scriptural. If consciousness itself takes on the appearance of form and so on
and there is thereby no objective referent such as form, then the Blessed One would not have said
that the extensions àyatana, such as the form extension, exist.””1
This is no reason.2 Since:

The Blessed one stated with a certain intention the existence of extensions, such
as form, for the sake of those people who needed to be disciplined with that kind
of idea.3 A similar case is the statement that there are beings who are born through
spontaneous generation. //8//

For example, the Blessed one said, ““There exist beings that are spontaneously generated. He
said this ““with a certain intention””; that is, he said this with the intention that mental continua do
not cease in the future.4 We know that this affirmation of the existence of beings is interpretable
because the Blessed One also said, ““Neither a being nor an essential self exists here; instead,

1
The extensions are usually discussed when one analyzes the way that awareness or consciousness arises. There are
twelve extensions, two for each of the six senses note that Buddhists add the mental sense to the other five senses.
For each sense, there is an internal and external extension. The external extension is the object or objective referent;
in the case of the ocular sense, the external extension would be a visible form. The internal extension is the sensory
faculty itself. The sensory faculty for the ocular sense is the eye. It is through the conjunction of external and
internal extension that a corresponding consciousness occurs. For example, the conjunction of a visible form and the
eye results in an ocular consciousness. Note that the senses are usually listed in a specific order: ocular, auditory,
olfactory, gustatory, tactile and mental.
2
V182a4: lung ‘‘di ni gzugs la sogs pa phyi rol yod par rab tu bsgrub pa’’i gtan tshigs ma yin te ““This scriptural
passage is not a reason which proves that form and so on exist externally””.
3
V182a4: gzugs la sogs pa bstan pas ‘‘dul ba’’i skye bo’’i ched du ““For the sake of persons who are to be disciplined
by teaching that there is form.””
4
Spontaneously generated beings are one of the four kinds of beings classified according to the way they are born.
In this quote, most Mahàyàna philosophers would not have difficulty with the notion of spontaneous generation, but
they would find it odd that the Buddha affirms, ““There exist beings.”” This is odd because elsewhere the Buddha
denies that beings actually exist. Hence the statement must be interpreted to have a hidden intention. In other words,
it is stated to a specific audience -- persons who deny the continuity of mental continua. The idea here is that an
argument based on the existence of spontaneously generated beings would convince such persons that the mental
continuum does not cease at death. First of all, a spontaneously generated being, such as a god, has no non-mental
cause, such as an egg, for its birth. Instead, its body is caused by its preceding mental continuum. But if the mental
continuum had completely ceased at death, then the body of the spontaneously generated being would be causeless.
Therefore, mental continua must transmigrate from one life to the next.
Vasubandhu’’s Twenty Verses Page 5

there are elements dharma which have causes.””5 So too, when the Blessed One said that
extensions such as form exist, he did so for the sake of those persons who are to be disciplined
by that idea; thus, this statement has a hidden intention.
““What is the hidden intention in this statement?””

From its seed, cognitive representation arises with a certain appearance such as
form. The Sage spoke of those two, the seed from which the representation arises
and the appearance which consciousness acquires, as the two kinds of extensions,
the internal and the external, respectively. //9//

What does this mean? A cognitive representation arises from its seed which has reached a
certain point of development; that cognitive representation arises with the appearance of form,
for example. When the Blessed One spoke of the seed and that of which the representation has
the appearance, he referred to them as that cognitive representation’’s eye and form extension,
respectively.6 Likewise, one applies this formula to all of the extensions up to the tactile
extension; thus, in the case of the tactile extension a cognitive representation arises from its seed
which has reached a certain point of development, and that representation has the appearance of
something tactile. The Blessed one spoke of the seed and that of which the representation has the
appearance as the body7 and tactile extension. This is the hidden intention of the statement that
extensions exist.
What comes of teaching things with hidden intentions?

For it is in this way that they to understand the essencelessness of persons. //10a//

Having been taught in this way, they will come to understand personal essencelessness. In other
words, those persons who are to be disciplined through the teaching of personal essencelessness will
come to understand personal essencelessness after understanding the following: ““The six types of
awareness occur through the conjunction of two things, the object and the sense faculty; there is no
single agent of visual perception, nor any single agent for everything up to mental perception.””

And teaching about persons and things in another way brings people to
understand the essencelessness of things. //10bc//

““In another way”” means that one teaches everything is just cognitive representation. How
does this bring people to understand the essencelessness of things? One begins to understand it
by understanding the following: there is just cognitive representation, and that cognitive
5
V182b2ff remarks:
““Someone objects, ‘‘Why is the former scriptural passage one with a hidden intent and the latter
one is not?’’ In response, we say the following. Since the essential self is permanent, it is not
something that is born through spontaneous generation. That is, something that is born through
spontaneous generation must be something that can be born. But if the essential self is permanent,
how can it be something that is suitable to be born?
6
The relative phrase in Sanskrit has been modified in English on order to avoid awkward wording.
7
The body is considered to be the faculty for the sense of touch. ““Tactile extension”” here refers to the object.
Vasubandhu’’s Twenty Verses Page 6

representation arises with the appearance of form and so on; there is no thing whatsoever that
actually has the characteristic of form, and so on.8
Someone objects, ““If things do not exist in any way at all, then this mere cognitive
representation also does not exist. That being the case, how can you posit cognitive
representation?””
It is not the case that one begins to understand the essencelessness of things by thinking,
““things do not exist in any way at all.”” Rather:

Things are essenceless in terms of their conceptually constructed essence. //10d//

Childish people conceptually construct a nature for things, such as the nature of being an
object or subject; those things are essenceless with regard to that conceptually constructed
essence. They are not essenceless in terms of the ineffable essence which is the object of the
Buddhas.9
In this way, one realizes that even a mere cognitive representation is essenceless in terms of
the essence that is conceptually constructed by other cognitive representations; therefore, through
the determination that all things are just mental representations, one comes to understand that all
things are essenceless.10 One does not come to this understanding by completely denying their

8
na tu råpàdilakùano dharmaþ ko ‘‘py astãti; this could also be translated, ““There is no thing whatsoever which is by
nature form and so on.”” The word lakùaõa can be taken either to mean a quality possessed by the thing or the
essential nature svaråpa of the thing; this latter interpretation is favored by V 183b7: sems las logs shig na gzugs la
sogs pa’’i rang bzhin chos gang yang med par ... ““There is no thing that, being separate from the mind, has the nature
of from and so on””.
9
V184a4ff:
Ordinary persons impute an essence defined as object or subject, to things; that imputation is the
essence -- the imputation of the characteristic of being an object or subject. Those things are
essenceless in terms of that essence. But it is not the case that the essence which is the ineffable
object of the Buddhas does not exist. That is, the nature of being object and subject that is imputed
onto things does not exist for those who see reality de kho na = tattva. But their dependent and
perfected nature is the object of a Tathàgata’’s wisdom; it is not the case that that object does not
exist. This is that is taught here.
In other words, the word ‘‘essencelessness’’ should not be construed to mean mere non-existence.
Rather, one should construe it as a qualifier for a locus. The word should be used in the following
way. The nature of the relative and the constructed is devoid of an essence, defined as being object
and subject; in that sense, they have no essence, and the abstract noun for this is ‘‘essencelessness.’’
In other words, the essencelessness of things is the absence of object and subject in things in terms
of the relative and perfect natures. Hence, what is taught here is that essencelessness applies to
mind and mental functions which are devoid of being object or subject. It is not that they are non-
existent.
Furthermore, the essencelessness of persons is not just the mere non-existence of persons;
rather, others conceptually construct a person within composite things -- that conceptually
constructed person does not exist . ‘‘In terms of the ineffable essence’’ means in terms of their
essence rang gi ngo bos = svaråpeõa which cannot be expressed.””
10
V184b2ff:
If one apprehends the essencelessness of things to be the absence of object and subject in them,
then one will realize that mind and mental events are devoid of an essence, which is to have the
nature of being an object or subject. Through this realization, one determines that that which is
Vasubandhu’’s Twenty Verses Page 7

existence. If this were not the case, one cognitive representation would be the objective referent
of another cognitive representation; that being the case, one could not prove that everything is
just cognitive representation because cognitive representations would have objective referents.11
Someone asks, ““But how is one to know that the Blessed One said that the extensions, such
as form, exist with the above mentioned hidden intention? In other words, how do we know that
he meant that those things which are taken individually as the objects of the cognitive
representation of form and so on do not exist?””
We know that this is the intention since:12

The object is not a unity of atoms, nor is it an atomic plurality, nor is it conjoined
atoms because atoms are not established. //11//

What does this mean? It has been claimed that form and other extensions are separately the
objects of the cognitive representation of form and so; such an object would either be a unity, as
is assumed by the Vai÷eùika, or a plurality on the atomic level, or the conjoined atoms
themselves.
First of all, a unity does not become the object because one does not apprehend anywhere a
form that is the whole separate from its parts. Nor is the object a plurality because one does not
apprehend the atoms individually.13 Nor are the conjoined atoms14 themselves the object because
an atom is not proven to be a unitary substance.
Why is it not proven to be a unitary substance? Because an atom would have six parts
because it would be simultaneously conjoined with six other atoms. That is, when each atom is

devoid of being an object or subject is just mind and mental events. And by determining that mind
and mental events are devoid of being object or subject, one comes to understand the
essencelessness of things.
11
V184b5:
If mind and mental events were not devoid of an essence, defined as objectivity or subjectivity,
constructed by other cognitive representations, then a cognitive representation would have to have
something other than itself as an objective referent. Therefore, it could not be proven to be just a
cognitive representation. Why is that? ‘‘Because cognitive representations would have objective
referents.’’ That is, if it had an objective referent, then it would not be a cognitive representation.
How then could one prove that it is just a cognitive representation? In other words, the phrase ‘‘just
cognitive representation’’ is construed to mean mind and mental events devoid of being objects or
subjects. But if something were to apprehend as its objects those mind and mental events, or if
they as subjects were to apprehend something else, then how could one prove that they are just
cognitive representations?
12
V 369a2ff makes it clear that a passage that can be literally interpreted -- which is a passage without a hidden intent --
must not be contradicted by reasoning.
13
When considered a plurality, the atoms surround each other with an intervening space. In such a case, the atoms
would have to be perceived individually, but the objector previously identified by V as a Sautràntika does not accept
that the senses can detect individual atoms. See V 185b3.
14
In this case, the atoms are assumed to be contiguous without interstice. They would thus form a perceptible object,
but this assumes that the atoms in such a configuration could be truly existent. In this case, to be truly existent they
must be unitary; otherwise, they would fail the test for true or ultimate existence proposed by the opponent: an
ultimate thing cannot be broken down into parts. See V 185b4ff and Ko÷a 6.3.
Vasubandhu’’s Twenty Verses Page 8

simultaneously conjoined with six other atoms in the six directions, it follows that an atom has
six parts.15 This is so because it is not possible for one to be located in the place where another is
located. Otherwise, the composite mass (piõóa) would be only the size of an atom because all six
atoms conjoined to the seventh are in the same location. //12cd//
If the location of one of the atoms were the location of all six, then any composite mass
would be the size of an atom because all the conjoined atoms are in the same location.
Composite masses would only be that size because the atoms would not be excluded from the
space occupied by each other.
The Ka÷miri Vaibhàùikas object, ““Atoms are not conjoined in that way. So we are not
compelled to accept that our position is flawed. Instead, compounded atoms are conjoined.””
One should ask them whether an atomic compound is something other than the atoms
themselves.16

If the compound and the atoms are the same, then given that the atoms are not
[conjoined], when they are in compound, what is conjoined? //12//

The word ““conjoined”” is supplied by context.17

Nor should you say that their conjunction is not established because they do not
have parts. //13//

If the compounds are not mutually conjoined, then you should not say that the atoms are not
conjoined because they do not have parts. Why should we not say that? Because you do not
accept the conjunction of the compounds, which do have parts.18
Whether you assert or do not assert the conjunction of atoms, if something has different
directional parts,19 then it does not make sense for it to be a single thing.20//14ab//
The eastern part of an atom is something other than all the parts up to the bottom part.
Therefore, given that there are different directional parts, how could it make sense for an atom
which has such a nature to be a single thing? Or if one says that atoms do not have parts, how
could there be shade or concealment? //14c// That is, if an atom, being a single thing, did not

15
The theory proposed by some Buddhists is that each atom that is part of a gross form is surrounded by six other
atoms.
16
read, na và with RSTc55n.1 and Tib., corrected to gzhan nam See V 186b2.
17
Since the compound and the atoms are considered to be the same, if atoms are not conjoined, atomic compounds
are not conjoined. So when the atoms are compounded, how can one then conjoin the compounds?
18
In other words, a lack of parts cannot be used as a reason to prove that the atoms do not conjoin because even
things that have parts do not conjoin. See V 186b7-187a1.
19
Buddhist authors used the metaphor of the cardinal directions to refer to the different sides of an object. For
example, the part of the object that faces one would usually be called the ““east””; the part facing away from one is
thus called the ““west””; the right side is the ““northern”” part and the left is the ““southern””; two other directions, ““up””
top and ““down”” bottom are located along the top and bottom of a vertical axis drawn through the object.
20
A more literal translation is: ““It is not reasonable that that which has divisions into directional parts is a unity.””
For ease of understanding, I translated the relative phrase as a conditional.
Vasubandhu’’s Twenty Verses Page 9

have different directional parts, then when the sun rose, how could one part be shaded and the
other part be in the sunlight? The atom would not have any different part that would not be in the
sunlight.21
And if one does not accept that atoms have directional parts, how could one atom conceal
another atom? For one atom offers physical resistance to another atom because the latter atom
approaches a directional part of the first. But no atom has any part different than the parts in the
other directions toward which another atom could approach and thereby encounter resistance.
And if there is no mutual physical resistance, all atoms would occupy the same locus; therefore,
all compounds would be the same size as the atoms, as was mentioned earlier.
Someone suggests, ““Can we not claim that there is shade and concealment of composite
masses, and not of atoms?””
We respond: do you claim that there is a composite mass different than its atoms such that
the composite mass would be the thing of which there is shade and concealment? You do not
claim this, so if the composite mass is not different from the atoms, then those two do not happen
to it. //14d// In other words, if the composite mass is not accepted to be different than the atoms,
then it is proven that those two do not happen to it.
Someone objects, ““What is conceptualized here is a particular configuration of atoms. So if
you have not refuted the characteristic of form and so on, what is the good of all these ideas,
‘‘The form extension consists of atoms’’ or ‘‘the form extension consists of compounds.’’””
But what is the characteristic of the extensions?
““Their characteristic is to be the object of the ocular faculty, and so on; and their
characteristic is to be blue and so on.””
This should be analyzed as follows. You assert that the object of the eye faculty and so on is
the color blue, the color yellow, and so on. Is that object a single thing, or is it a plurality?
““What do you get from doing such an analysis?””
The problem with them being a plurality has already been discussed in verse 11.

If it were singular, then there would be no gradual movement, nor would one
simultaneously apprehend some aspects of an object and not apprehend other
aspects of the same object. Nor could distinct objects occur in the same locus. Nor
would it be the case that one does not see minute objects. //15//

If one asserts that the object of the eye is indivisible and not plural; that is, if one asserts that
it is a single substance, then one could not move gradually over the ground. ““Movement”” means
going. One would go everywhere with a single step. Nor would it be the case that one
simultaneously apprehends the near side of an object and does not apprehend the far side of an
object. It would not make sense for it to be both apprehended and not apprehended at that time.
Also, distinct, non-singular things, such as an elephant and a horse, could not occur in the
same place. One would be exactly where the other one was. How could one claim that they are

21
In other words, it would not have a part that, being different than the part in the sunlight, would thereby be in the
shade.
Vasubandhu’’s Twenty Verses Page 10

distinct?22 Or if one somehow claims that they are in different places but appearing in the same
perception, then how could the ground that is trod by them and the ground that is not trod by
them be the same ground? One cannot claim that it is the same because one apprehends an empty
space between them.23
Also, minute, water-borne beings would be the same size as gross things; hence, they would
not be invisible to the naked eye.
One would be forced to accept the problems cited above if one supposes that substances are
different only on the basis of a difference in characteristic. One does not incur these faults if one
thinks of the differences in substance in another way.24
Therefore, one must think that there is atomic differentiation. And atoms are not proven to
be singular or unitary. And given that an atom is not proven to be a single, unitary substance,
form and so on are not proven to be the objects of the eye and so on. Hence, it is proven that the
objects of sensory perception are just cognitive representations.
Some people, especially the Sautràntika, object, ““One determines through an instrument of
knowledge what does and does not exist. And of all instruments, the most important is direct
awareness. But if there is no objective referent, how can one have an awareness which thinks,
““This is directly perceived by me.””

Even without an objective referent one has direct awareness as in a dream, and so
on. //16a//

One must add the phrase ““even without an objective referent.”” This point was demonstrated
earlier.

And when one has a direct awareness, the objective referent is not seen; how can
one consider it to be a direct awareness? //16//

And when one has a direct awareness, thinking, ““this is directly perceived by me,”” at that
time the objective referent is not seen because one determines that one is aware of a directly
perceptible object just through mental awareness and because the ocular consciousness has
ceased at that point. So how can the objective referent be considered directly perceptible? In
particular, how could a momentary object be considered directly perceptible? At that time the
form, or taste and so on has ceased, which means that the directly perceptible object has already

22
V 188B7ff says that if the ground which appears in perception is a single substance, then all loci on the ground are
essentially the same. Therefore, an elephant and a horse would be in the same place because the ““place”” is a single,
seamless substance.
23
See RST for a particularly lucid exposition based on V 189a2ff. In short, the perceived ground could be the same
only if the elephant and horse are standing on all the ground equally. In other words, the elephant must be standing
on the same ground that the elephant is on, and vice versa. But if this were the case, they would also have to be
standing on the empty ground which is between them. Since one sees that that ground is empty, the ground cannot
all be the same.
24
According to V 189a7-189b1, ““another way”” refers to the identification of different things in dependence on a
difference in locus, cause, or time.
Vasubandhu’’s Twenty Verses Page 11

gone out of existence.25

The objectors continue, ““A previously experienced objective referent is remembered by
mental awareness. Therefore, one must experience an objective referent. Seeing or smelling and
so on is what we mean by experience. Thus, form and so on, the objects of seeing and so on, are
considered to be directly perceptible.””
It is not proven that there is memory of an experienced objective referent because we have
already stated the way in which the objective referent’’s appearance is cognitive representation.
//17a// That is, we have already stated the way in which cognitive representation, such as ocular
awareness and so on, arises with the appearance of an objective referent, even without any
objective referent. And memory comes from that. //17b// In other words, from that cognitive
representation arises a cognitive representation which is a mental awareness; that mental
awareness occurs with memory, and as the conceptualization of form and so on, it has the
appearance of an objective referent. Therefore, the occurrence of memory does not prove the
experience of an objective referent.
Then the objectors say, ““if cognitive representation has an unreal objective referent object in
the waking state as it does in dreams, then worldly people should likewise recognize on their
own that the objective referent does not exist. But that is not the case; therefore, all perceptions
of objective referents are not, as in dreams, devoid of an objective referent.””
This is no proof because a person who is not yet awake does not recognize that the visual
objects in his dream do not exist. //17cd// Likewise, the general public has been put to sleep by
the torpor of the cognitive imprints that arise from being conditioned by incorrect conceptuality;
worldly people see unreal objective referents as if in a dream, and not yet being awake, they do
not correctly understand that those objective referents do not exist. But when they obtain the
torpor’’s antidote, the transcendent non-conceptual wisdom,26 they wake up; at that time, due to
the manifestation of the subsequently obtained pure mundane wisdom,27 they correctly
understand that objects do not exist. In this sense, sleep and waking are the same.
Someone objects, ““If cognitive representations occur to sentient beings due to particular
developments of their mental continua -- and not due to particular objective referents -- then how
can one prove that beings have certain restricted cognitive representations due to meeting with

25
According to V 190a2ff, one makes the determination, ““This is directly perceived by me,”” in the third moment.
Presumably, he means the third moment after the initial sensation. In any case, when one conceptually determines
that one is having a direct awareness of an object, the direct awareness of the object has already ceased. This must
be the case because the Sautràntikas, to whom this verse is addressed, maintain that direct awareness is non-
conceptual. Sautràntikas might attempt to respond that the same object remains existent in subsequent moments such
that a subsequent direct awareness could perceive it. But they cannot maintain this because they claim that all things
last for only an instant.
26
V 191a1: ““... it is transcendent because it does not conform to worldly conventions; it is nonconceptual because it
does not have the conceptions of object and subject.””
27
V 191b2ff:
It is subsequent to the transcendent wisdom; ‘‘subsequent’’ should be construed to mean ‘‘arising
due to its influence’’; the compound is a karmadhàrya: it is subsequently attained and it is pure
mundane wisdom; it is pure because one has eliminated all the imprints for the compulsive
assumption of object and subject; it is mundane because the images of object and subject occur,
even though one does not compulsively assume those images to be real.
Vasubandhu’’s Twenty Verses Page 12

sinful or virtuous friends or due to listening to true or false teachings? How can on prove this
when neither meeting with good or bad friends nor the teaching of good or bad doctrines
exist?””28

Cognitive representations are mutually determined and restricted due to mutual

influence. //18ab//

Due to the mutual influence of cognitive representations, the cognitive representations of all
beings are mutually determined and restricted, as is appropriate. ““Mutually”” means
““reciprocally.”” Therefore, due to a particular cognitive representation in one mental continuum, a
particular cognitive representation occurs in another mental continuum. Particular cognitive
representations do not occur due to particular objective referents.29
An objector says, ““If cognitive representations in the waking state have no objective
referents, like the dream state, then when one performs virtuous or non-virtuous deeds when
dreaming and awake, why are the desirable and undesirable results of that activity not the same,
regardless of whether one has done the act in a dream or while awake?””

Because the mind in a dream is overcome by torpor, the result is not the same.
//18//

This is the reason for the inequality of moral results; the existence of an objective referent is
not the reason.
The objector says: ““If all this is just cognitive representation, then no one has any body at
all, nor voice; when people such as shepherds are slaughtering sheep, how would the sheep die?
And if they do not make the sheep die, how could the shepherds and so on incur the sin of taking
life?””

Death occurs due to another’’s particular cognitive representation, just as mental

changes, such as memory loss, occur to others due to the mental influence of
ghosts and so on. //19//

Due to the mental influence of ghosts and so on, others experience mental changes such as
memory loss, dream-visions, demonic capture and possession. This also happens due to the
mental influence of those who have spiritual powers; for example, due to Mahàkatyàyana’’s
inspiration, Sàraõa had a vision in a dream. And due to the anger of the forest dwelling sages,
Vemacitra was defeated. Likewise, due to the influence of another’’s particular cognitive
representation, some change occurs to others that inhibits their life-force, due to which occurs

28
V 191b4 clarifies what the specific cognitive representations could be. From meeting with sinful or virtuous friends,
one has cognitive representations of virtuous or non-virtuous bodily activity, respectively. Listening to true or false
teachings leads one to virtuous or non-virtuous cognitive representations of speech.
29
V 192a6:
In all interactions involving living beings, particular cognitive representations, such as moving and
speaking, occur in one mental continuum due to particular cognitive representations, such as the
intention to move or intention to speak, in another mental continuum.
Vasubandhu’’s Twenty Verses Page 13

death -- the interruption of a continuum in which former and latter moments are similar.

Otherwise, how could the sage’’s ire have emptied the Daõóaka forest? //20ab//

If one does not accept that beings die due to the influence of another’’s particular cognitive
representation, then consider the following account: the Blessed one asked the householder
Upàli, ““O householder, I believe you have heard who emptied and cleansed the Daõóaka,
Màtaïga and Kaliïga forests?”” And the householder said, ““I have heard, good Gautama, that it
was done by the sages’’ anger.””

How could that answer have proved that mental sin is very reprehensible? //20cd//

One might think, ““The non-human spirits who had been propitiated by those sages destroyed
the beings who dwelt there; they did not die due to the anger of the sages.”” If one were to think
this, then how could the sages’’ deed prove that mental sin is more reprehensible than physical or
vocal sin? One cannot prove it if one thinks such things; rather, it is proven because so many
beings died just by the sages’’ anger.
The objector says, ““If everything is just cognitive representation, then do other-mind-
knowers know others’’ minds, or not?””
Why do you ask?
““If they do not know others’’ minds, how can they be other-mind-knowers? If they do know
them, then:
How is it that other-mind-knowers have incorrect knowledge?””30

We respond that their knowledge of others’’ minds is incorrect just as an ordinary

being’’s knowledge of its own mind is incorrect.31//21a-c//

““How is it that the knowledge of its own mind is also incorrect?””

Because such people do not know minds in the way that those minds are the
Buddha’’s object. //21/

Ordinary people and yogis do not know their own minds or others’’ minds, respectively in
the way that those minds are the Buddhas’’ object; in what way are those minds the objects of the
Buddhas? They are the Buddhas’’ object in terms of those minds’’ inexpressible essence.
Therefore, both ordinary people’’s knowledge of their own minds and yogis’’ knowledge of

30
The idea is that only advanced adepts attain such powers, but when they know others’’ minds, they would have the
conception of subject and object. In short the objector sees a contradiction here: advanced meditators should see
reality as it is, but if they know others’’ minds, then they are apprehending others’’ minds as objects over against their
own minds. In such a case, they could not be seeing reality as it is because they are perceiving an object/subject
duality. See V 194a6.
31
V 194a7:
The author accepts that it is not correct, and to give an example of the way in which it is not
correct, he says, ““Just as the knowledge of one’’s own mind is incorrect.”” For example, beings
knowledge of the past and future moments of their minds is incorrect;
Vasubandhu’’s Twenty Verses Page 14

others’’ are incorrect. They are incorrect because their knowledge involves false appearances; and
those false appearances arise because they have not abandoned the conception of object and
subject.32
Mere cognitive representation is deep and profound due to the endless investigation required
for understanding its aspects; that being the case,

I have composed this proof of mere cognitive representation in accord with my

abilities; but it is not entirely conceivable for ordinary beings33. //22a-c//

People such as myself are not able to think of it in all of its aspects because it is not the
object of reasoning. Whose object then is it?

It is the object of the Buddhas. //22d//

It is in all its aspects the object of the blessed Buddhas, for they are unobstructed in their
knowledge of all aspects of all knowable things.34

32
All the parenthetical phrases in this section of the commentary are based on V 194b4ff, without whose commentary
the passage would be quite obscure. V also comments:
Why do ordinary beings and Yogis not know their own and others’’ minds in terms of those minds’’
inexpressible essence? To answer this he says, ‘‘because of false appearances.’’ That is to say, their
minds have the appearance of object and subject; therefore, that appearance is false. In other
words, their minds are ultimately devoid of being object and subject. That being the case, it is
false for the mind, whose nature is non-dual, to have a dualistic appearance. Therefore, since they
are obscured by the objective aspect of their cognitions, ordinary beings and yogis do not know
the nature of their own and others’’ minds in terms of the inexpressible essence of their own and
others’’ minds. When they understand the objective aspect of a cognitive representation of the
mind as if it were their own or another’’s mind, they have the cognition, ‘‘I am knowing my own or
another’’s mind.’’ But they do not know the nature of their own or others’’ minds in ultimate terms.
For example, when ordinary beings see a ewer that has been covered with a cloth that is similar in
color to the ewer, they think, ‘‘I am seeing a ewer,’’ even though they are seeing a cloth. One
should understand that the above discussed manner in which Yogis and ordinary beings know
minds is like the way ordinary beings think they see the ewer when they are actually seeing the
cloth.
Note that the order of reasons given at the end seems a bit odd, but V insists on this reading. The more natural reading
might be, ‘‘those false appearances arise because those persons have not abandoned the conception of object and subject;
and they have not abandoned this conception due to false appearances.’’ But this reading does not make much sense.
33
V 195a5 supplies ““for ordinary beings.””
34
V 195b3: ““That is to say, the Buddhas directly apprehend all things, whether transcendent or mundane.””