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Legal Ethics

Code of Professional Responsibility


Canon 1
People of the Philippines vs Atty. Fe T. Tuanda
(A.M. No. 3360 January 30, 1990)
Facts: On 17 December 1983, respondent received from one Herminia A. Marquez several pieces of jewelry, with a total stated value of P36,000.00, for sale
on a commission basis, with the condition that the respondent would turn over the sales proceeds and return the unsold items to Ms. Marquez on or before 14
February 1984. Sometime in February 1984, respondent, instead of returning the unsold pieces of jewelry which then amounted to approximately P26,250.00,
issued three checks: (a) a check dated 16 February 1984 for the amount of P5,400.00; (b) a check dated 23 February 1984 also for the amount of P5,400.00;
and (c) a check dated 25 February 1984 for the amount of P15,450.00. Upon presentment for payment within ninety (90) days after their issuance, all three
(3) checks were dishonored by the drawee bank, Traders Royal Bank, for insufficiency of funds. Notwithstanding receipt of the notice of dishonor, respondent
made no arrangements with the bank concerning the honoring of checks which had bounced and made no effort to settle her obligations to Ms. Marquez.

The RTC convicted her in violation of B.P. 22, in which the Court considered it as a crime involving moral turpitude as this mischief creates not only a wrong to
the payee or holder, but also an injury to the public Respondent was suspended by the Court of Appeals. She went to the Supreme Court asking for the lifting
of the Order of suspension arguing that the issuance of bouncing checks does not relate to the exercise of her legal profession.

Issue: WON the suspension of Atty. Fe Tuanda be lifted.

Held: The Court Resolved to DENY the Motion to Lift Order of Suspension. Respondent shall remain suspended from the practice of law. We should add that
the crime of which respondent was convicted also import deceit and violation of her attorney’s oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility under both of
which she was bound to ‘obey the laws of the land’. Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude might not ( as in the instant case, violation of B.P. Blg. 22
does not) relate to the exercise of the profession of a lawyer; however it certainly relates to and affects the good moral character of a person convicted of
such offense. In Melendrez v. Decena, this Court stressed that: “the nature of the office of an attorney at law requires that she shall be a person of good
moral character. This qualification is not only a condition precedent to an admission to the practice of law; its continued possession is also essential for
remaining in the practice of law.”

SUSPENSION AFFIRMED
Canon 2
Pedro L. Linsangan vs Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino
(A.C. No. 6672, September 4, 2009)

Facts: This is a complaint for disbarment filed by Pedro Linsangan of the Linsangan Linsangan & Linsangan Law Office against Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino for
solicitation of clients and encroachment of professional services.

Complainant alleged that respondent, with the help of paralegal Fe Marie Labiano, convinced his clients to transfer legal representation. Respondent
promised them financial assistance and expeditious collection on their claims. To induce them to hire his services, he persistently called them and sent them
text messages.

To support his allegations, complainant presented the sworn affidavit of James Gregorio attesting that Labiano tried to prevail upon him to sever his lawyer-
client relations with complainant and utilize respondent’s services instead, in exchange for a loan of P50,000. Complainant also attached “respondent’s”
calling card:
Based on testimonial and documentary evidence, the CBD, in its report and recommendation, found that respondent had encroached on the professional
practice of complainant, violating XXX Rule 2.03 of the CPR which provides:

RULE 2.03. A LAWYER SHALL NOT DO OR PERMIT TO BE DONE ANY ACT DESIGNED PRIMARILY TO SOLICIT LEGAL BUSINESS.
Hence, lawyers are prohibited from soliciting cases for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers. Such actuation constitutes
malpractice, a ground for disbarment.

Rule 2.03 should be read in connection with Rule 1.03 of the CPR which provides:
RULE 1.03. A LAWYER SHALL NOT, FOR ANY CORRUPT MOTIVE OR INTEREST, ENCOURAGE ANY SUIT OR PROCEEDING OR DELAY ANY MAN’S CAUSE.

This rule proscribes “ambulance chasing” (the solicitation of almost any kind of legal business by an attorney, personally or through an agent in order to gain
employment) as a measure to protect the community from barratry and champerty.

Complainant presented substantial evidence (consisting of the sworn statements of the very same persons coaxed by Labiano and referred to respondent’s
office) to prove that respondent indeed solicited legal business as well as profited from referrals’ suits.

Although respondent initially denied knowing Labiano in his answer, he later admitted it during the mandatory hearing.

Through Labiano’s actions, respondent’s law practice was benefited. Hapless seamen were enticed to transfer representation on the strength of Labiano’s
word that respondent could produce a more favorable result.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino for violating Rules 1.03, 2.03, XXX of the Code of Professional Responsibility XXX is hereby SUSPENDED
from the practice of law for a period of one year effective immediately from receipt of this resolution. He is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or
similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.

Adelino H. Ledesma vs Hon. Rafael C. Climaco


(GR No. L-23815, June 28, 1974)

Facts: Petitioner, on October 13, 1964, was appointed Election Registrar for the Municipality of Cadiz, Province of Negros Occidental. Then and there, he
commenced to discharge its duties. As he was counsel de parte for one of the accused in a case pending in the sala of respondent Judge, he filed a motion to
withdraw as such. Not only did respondent Judge deny such motion, but he also appointed him counsel de oficio for the two defendants. Subsequently, on
November 3, 1964, petitioner filed an urgent motion to be allowed to withdraw as counsel de oficio, premised on the policy of the Commission on Elections to
require full time service as well as on the volume or pressure of work of petitioner, which could prevent him from handling adequately the defense.
Respondent Judge, in the challenged order of November 6, 1964, denied said motion. A motion for reconsideration having proved futile, he instituted this
certiorari proceeding.

The SC found the petition without merit. As stated in the assailed order of the respondent judge, even before the petitioner accepted the appointment to the
Comelec, he knew that the case was going to resume on that day, that the case has been delayed eight times at the instance of the petitioner, and that his
work as an election registrar will not be in conflict with his serving as counsel de oficio for the said accused.
The high court described the petitioner as unmindful of his work as counsel de oficio and reminded him that membership in the bar is a privilege burdened
with conditions including that of being appointed counsel de oficio which makes even more manifest that law is indeed a profession dedicated to the ideal of
service and not a mere trade.

In the end, the Court challenged the petitioner to “exert himself sufficiently to perform his task as defense counsel with competence, if not with zeal, if only to
erase doubts as to his fitness to remain a member of the profession in good standing” and added that “the admonition is ever timely for those enrolled in the
ranks of legal practitioners that there are times, and this is one of them, when duty to court and to client takes precedence over the promptings of self-
interest.”

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Canon 3
Khan, Jr., vs Simbillo
August 19, 2003

Facts: Atty. Rizalino Simbillo publicized his legal services in the July 5, 2000 issue of the Philippine Daily Inquirer via a paid advertisement which read:
“Annulment of Marriage Specialist 532-4333/521-2667.” A staff member of the Public Information Office of the Supreme Court took notice and called the
number posing as an interested party. She spoke to Mrs. Simbillo, who said that her husband was an expert in handling annulment cases and can guarantee a
court decree within four to six months, and that the fee was P48,000. Further research by the Office of the Court Administrator and the Public Information
Office revealed that similar ads were published in the August 2 and 6, 2000 issues of the Manila Bulletin and August 5, 2000 issue of the Philippine Star. Atty.
Ismael Khan, Jr., in his capacity as Assistant Court Administrator and Chief of the Public Information Office filed an administrative complaint against Atty.
Simbillo for improper advertising and solicitation in violation of Rule 2.03 and Rule 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of
the Rules of Court. The case was referred to the IBP for investigation, report and recommendation. IBP found respondent guilty. Respondent filed an Urgent
Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied. Hence, this petition for certiorari

Issue: WON Atty. Rizalino Simbillo is guilty of violating Rule 2.03 and Rule 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of the
Rules of Court

Held: Yes, petitioner was suspended from the practice of law for one year and was sternly warned that a repetition of the same or similar offense will be dealt
with more severely.

Ratio: The practice of law is not a business. It is a profession in which duty to public service, not money is the primary consideration.

Reasoning
- Rule 2.03 - A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed primarily to solicit legal business.
- Rule 3.01 - A lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or
claim regarding his qualifications or legal services.
- Rule 138, Sec 27 of the Rules of Court states: Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefore.— A member of the bar may be
disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly
immoral conduct or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before the
admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience appearing as attorney for a party without authority to do so.
- The following elements distinguish legal profession from business:
1. A duty of public service
2. A relation as an “officer of the court” to the administration of justice involving thorough sincerity, integrity and reliability
3. A relation to clients in the highest degree of fiduciary
4. A relation to colleagues at the bar characterized by candor, fairness, and unwillingness to resort to current business methods of advertising and
encroachment on their practice, or dealing directly with their clients.
- Respondent advertised himself as an “Annulment Specialist,” and by this he undermined the stability and sanctity of marriage —encouraging people who
might have otherwise been disinclined and would have refrained form dissolving their marriage bonds, to do so.
- Solicitation of legal business is not altogether proscribed, however, for solicitation to be proper, it must be compatible with the dignity of the legal
profession.

Ulep vs Legal Clinic


June 17, 1993

Facts: Petitioner prays that respondent cease and desist from issuing ads similar to annexes A and B and to prohibit them from making ads pertaining to the
exercise of the law professions other than those allowed by law
- Annex A
SECRET MARRIAGE?
P560 for a valid marriage
Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE. ANNULMENT. VISA.
THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC.
Pls call: 5210767, 5217232, 5222041
8:30am-6pm
7F Victoria Bldg, UN Ave, Mla
- Annex B
GUAM DIVORCE
DON PARKINSON
An Atty in Guam, is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam Divorce thru the
Leg Clinic beg Mon-Fri during office hours Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage. Immigration Probs, Visa
ext. Quota/Non-quota Res and Special Retiree’s Visa.
Declaration of Absence. Remarriage to Filipina Fiancees.
Adoption. Investment in the Phil. US/Foreign Visa for Filipina
Sp/Shil. Call Marivic THE LEGAL CLINIC, etc

Petitioner’s Claim:
-Ads are unethical and demeaning of the law profession and destructive of the confidence of the community in the integrity of the members of the bar.
-As a member of the legal profession, he is ashamed and offended by the ads

Respondent’s Comment:
-They are not engaged in the practice of law but in the rendering of leg support services thru paralegals with the use of modern computers and electronic
machines
- Even if they are leg services, the act of advertising them should be allowed under Bates v. State bar of Arizona

Issues:
1. WON the services offered by The Legal Clinic constitutes practice of law?
2. WON their services can be advertised?

Held:
1. Yes. The Practice of law involves any activity, in or out of the court, which requires the application of law, legal procedures, knowledge, training and
expertise
- To engage in the practice is to perform those acts which are characteristic of the profession; to give advice or render any kind of service that involves legal
knowledge/skill
- Not limited to the conduct of cases in court; includes legal advice and counsel and preparation of legal instruments and contracts by which legal rights are
secured regardless of WON they’re pending in court
3 types of legal profession activity:
1. legal advice and instructions to clients to inform them of their rights and obligations
2. preparation for clients of documents requiring knowledge of legal principles not possessed by ordinary layman
3. appearance for clients before public tribunals which possess power and authority to determine rights of life, liberty and property according to law, in order
to assist in proper inter and enforcement of law

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Respondent’s description of its services shows it falls within the practice of law:
Giving info by paralegals to laymen and lawyers thru the use of comps and modern info tech
- computerized legal research, document search, evidence gathering, locating parties/witnesses to a case, fact finding investigations, assistance to laymen in
need of services from agencies like birth, marriage, prop, bus registrations, etc.
*even if some of the services offered merely involve mechanical and technical know how like installing computer system for law offices, this doesn’t make it
an exception to the general rule
- gives out leg info to laymen and lawyersnot non-advisory and non-diagnostic
ex. foreign laws on marriage, divorce and adoption – have to explain to client the intricacies of the law and advise him on the proper course of action
- what its ads represent and what it will be paid for
- It doesn’t matter that they don’t represent clients in court since practice of law isn’t limited to ct appearances but also leg research, leg advice and drafting
contracts Phil Star Art – Rx for Leg Probs, int by proprietor Atty Nogales:
- Takes care of probs as complicated as the Cuneta-Concepcion domestic sit
- lawyers, who like drs, are specialists in various fields and can take care of it (taxation, crim law, medico-leg probs, labor, litigation, fam law)
- backed up by paralegals, counselors and attys
- caters to clients who can’t afford big firms
- can prepare a simple deed of sale or affidavit of loss and also those w/ more extensive treatment
-The fact that they employ paralegals to carry out its services doesn’t matter; what’s important is that it’s engaged in the
practice of law ‘cause of the nature of the services it renders, which brings it within the statutory prohibitions against ads only a person duly admitted as a
member of the bar and who’s in good and regular standing is entitled to the practice of law
- public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to those individuals found duly qualified in education and character to protect the public, court,
client and bar from incompetence/dishonesty of those unlicensed to the practice and not subject to the discipline of court

2.No. The Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer, in making known his legal services, shall use only true, honest, fair, dignified and
objective info/statement of facts
- not supposed to use any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement re his qualifications/legal services
- not supposed to pay representatives of the mass media in return for publicity to attract legal business
Canons of professional Ethics (before CPR) provides that lawyers shouldn’t resort to indirect ads for professional employment like furnishing newspaper
comments, publishing his pictures with causes the lawyer’s been engaged in, importance of his position and other self-laudation
Stands of legal profession condemn lawyer’s advertisement of his talents like a merchant does of his goods because of the fact that law is a profession.
The canons of profession tell us that the best advertising possible for a lawyer is a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust which
must be earned as the outcome of character and conduct
Good and efficient service to a client and the community has a way of publicizing itself and catching public attention; this shouldn’t be done thru propaganda

EXCEPTIONS:
1. expressly allowed – publication in reputable law lists of informative data that’s not misleading and may include only: name, professional assoc, adds, nos,
branches of law practiced, date and place of birth and admission to the bar, schools attended w/ dates of grad, degrees , public offices, posts of honor, legal
authorships, legal teaching positions, membership and offices in bar association, legal and scientific societies and legal fraternities, listings in other reputable
law lists, names and adds of references with written consent and clients regularly represented
- can’t be mere supplemental feature of paper, magazine, trade journal or periodical that’s published for other purposes
- never in a law list that are calculated or likely to deceive/injure the public/the bar or lower the dignity/standing of the profession
- ordinary simple professional card allowed – name, law firm, add, no and special branch of law practiced
- publication of simple announcement of the opening of a law firm or change in partnership, assoc, firm name or office add, for the convenience of the
profession
- have name listed in phone directory but not under designation of special branch of law
2. necessarily implied from the restrictions
Bates v. State Bar of Arizona: allowed lawyer to publish a statement of leg fees for an initial consultation or give, upon
request, a written schedule of fees or estimate for spec services as an exception to the prohibition against advertisements by lawyers
Canon 4
In the Matter of Attorney Lope E. Adriano, Member of the Philippine Bar.
People of the Philippines vs Remigio Estebia
(February 27, 1969, G.R. No. L-26868)
Facts: Remigio Estebia was convicted of rape by the Court of First Instance of Samar and was sentenced to suffer the capital punishment. On December,
Lope Adriano was appointed as Estebia’s counsel de oficio when his case came up before the Supreme Court on review. Adriano was required to prepare and
file his brief within 30 days from notice. On January 19,1967, Adriano sought a 30-day extention to file appellant’s brief in mimeograph form. On February 18,
Adriano again moved for a 20-day extension. A third extension was filed on March 8 for 15 days. On March 27 Adriano filed for another 15-day extension and
on April 11 he moved for a “last” extension of ten days. However, on April 21 he sought a special extension of five days. All of these motions for extension
were granted by the Court and the brief was due on April 26, 1967. However, no brief was filed. For failing to comply, the Supreme Court resolved to impose
upon Adriano a fine of P500 with a warning that a more drastic disciplinary action will be taken against him upon further non-compliance. On December 5,
1968, Adriano was ordered to show cause why he should not be suspended from the practice of law for gross misconduct and violation of his oath of office as
attorney. A resolution was personally served upon him on December 18, 1968 however Adriano ignored the said resolution.

Issue: Whether or not the conduct of Atty Lope E. Adriano as member of the bar deserve disciplinary action.

Held: Yes, by specific authority, this Court may assign an attorney to render professional aid to a destitute appellant in a criminal case who is unable to
employ an attorney. Correspondingly, a duty is imposed upon the lawyer so assigned "to render the required service." A lawyer so appointed "as counsel for
an indigent prisoner", our Canons of Professional Ethics demand, "should always exert his best efforts" in the indigent's behalf.
No excuse at all has been offered for non-presentation of appellant's brief. And yet, between December 20, 1966, when he received notice of his
appointment, and December 5, 1968, when the last show cause order was issued by this Court, more than sufficient time was afforded counsel to prepare
and file his brief de oficio.

In the face of the fact that no brief has ever been filed, counsel's statements in his motions for extension have gone down to the level of empty and
meaningless words; at best, have dubious claim to veracity.
Adriano’s pattern of conduct reveals a propensity to benumb appreciation of his obligation as counsel de oficio and of the courtesy and respect that should be
accorded this Court.

For the reasons given Attorney Lope E. Adriano was suspended from the practice of law throughout the Philippines for a period of one (1) year.

People of the Philippines vs Roscoe Daban y Ganzon, Sixto P. Demaisip


(G.R. No. L-31429, January 31, 1972)
Facts: Respondent, Attorney Sixto P. Demaisip, started as counsel de parte of appellant. On October 24, 1970, he filed a motion for extension of time of 30
days within which to file appellant's brief. It was granted. So were subsequent motions for extension. On May 25, 1971, after having obtained 13 extensions in
all, he filed a motion asking that in view of the father of appellant being unable to raise money for printing expenses, he be allowed to retire as counsel de
parte and be appointed as counsel de oficio instead to enable him to file a typewritten brief, a draft of which, according to him, he had by then finished. This
Court, in a resolution of June 2, 1971, granted his prayer to be appointed counsel de oficio, but required him to file a mimeographed rather than a typewritten
brief. In the light of his own representation, there was reason to expect that such a brief would be duly forthcoming. It did not turn out to be the case at all,
for respondent Demaisip, this time as counsel de oficio, kept on filing motions for postponement, four in number, likewise granted by this Tribunal in a spirit
of generosity. All in all, he had seventeen extensions. Still there was no appellant's brief.
It was only then that on October 11, 1971 this Court issued a resolution requiring Atty. Sixto P. Demaisip to explain, within ten (10) days why disciplinary

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action should not be taken against him. What passed for an explanation for appellant's persistent failure to file appellant's brief was submitted on November
25, 1971, worded thus: "[Comes now] the accused-appellant, by and thru the undersigned counsel de oficio, unto this Honorable Supreme Court most
respectfully manifests and explains that, in the opinion of the undersigned lawyer, grounded on settled jurisprudence, the escape of the prisoner
automatically makes the appeal useless and unnecessary because it is considered abandoned." It is his prayer, therefore, that the above be considered a
satisfactory explanation.
Held: Doctrine: “There is need anew in this disciplinary proceeding to lay stress on the fundamental postulate that membership in the bar carries with it a
responsibility to live up to its exacting standard. The law is a profession, not a trade or a craft. Those enrolled in its ranks are called upon to aid in the
performance of one of the basic purposes of the State, the administration of justice. To avoid any frustration thereof, especially in the case of an indigent
defendant, a lawyer may be required to act as counsel de oficio. The fact that his services are rendered without remuneration should not occasion a
diminution in his zeal. Rather the contrary. This is not, of course, to ignore that other pressing matters do compete for his attention. After all, he has his
practice to attend to. That circumstance possesses a high degree of relevance since a lawyer has to live; certainly he cannot afford either to neglect his
paying cases. Nonetheless, what is incumbent upon him as counsel de oficio must be fulfilled”
Nothing can be clearer, therefore, than that respondent Demaisip, by such gross neglect of duty, notwithstanding the many extensions granted him, was
recreant to the trust reposed in him as counsel de oficio.
Respondent Demaisip ought to have known better. His explanation disregards the facts and betrays ignorance of the law. It is true there was a notice on June
23, 1971 from the then Acting Director Vicente R. Raval of the Bureau of Prisons that on June 15 of that year appellant Roscoe Daban y Ganzon did escape. As
far back as May 13, 1971, however, respondent Demaisip, according to his motion of that date filed on May 25, 1971, wherein he prayed that he be appointed
counsel de oficio and permitted to submit a mimeographed brief, had assured this Court that he had already prepared a draft. If he were not careless of the
truth, then there was no excuse why prior to June 15, 1971 he was unable to submit such a brief to this Court. It is not to be ignored either that as of that date
he had already secured thirteen extensions, ordinarily many more than any counsel is entitled to but nonetheless granted him, because the sentence
imposed was one of death.
The liability incurred by respondent Demaisip is thus unavoidable. He had failed to fulfill his responsibility as defense counsel. Whether as counsel de parte or
a counsel de oficio, he was indeed truly remiss in the discharge of a responsibility which, as a member of the Bar, he cannot evade. It is by such notorious
conduct of neglect and indifference on the part of counsel that a court's docket becomes unnecessarily clogged. His transgression is indisputable; what
remains is the imposition of an appropriate penalty.
WHEREFORE, until further orders of this Court, respondent Sixto P. Demaisip is hereby suspended from the practice of the law in all courts of the Philippines,
except for the sole purpose of filing the brief for appellant Roscoe Daban y Ganzon with this Court within a period of twenty days from receipt of this
resolution. Let a copy of this resolution be spread upon his record.
Canon 5
Juan Dulalia, Jr., vs Atty. Pablo C. Cruz
(A.C. No, 6854, April 25, 2007 [Formerly CBD Case No. 04-1380])
Facts: Atty. Pablo C. Cruz, Municipal Legal Officer of Meycauayan, Bulacan (respondent), is charged by Juan Dulalia, Jr. (complainant) of violation of the Code
of Professional Responsibility.

Complainant’s wife Susan Soriano Dulalia filed an application for building permit for the construction of a warehouse. Despite compliance with all the
requirements for the purpose, she failed to secure a permit, she attributing the same to the opposition of respondents who wrote a September 13, 2004 letter
to Carlos J. Abacan, Municipal Engineer and concurrent Building Official of Meycauayan saying that unbearable nuisances that the construction creates and its
adverse effects particularly the imminent danger and damage to their properties, health and safety of the neighbours adjoining the site.

By complainant’s claim, respondent opposed the application for building permit because of a personal grudge against his wife Susan who objected to
respondent’s marrying her first cousin Imelda Soriano on September 17, 1989 while respondent’s marriage with Carolina Agaton which was solemnized on
December 17, 1967, is still subsisting.

Respondent married Imelda Soriano on September 17, 1989 at the Clark County, Nevada, USA,21 when the Family Code of the Philippines had already taken
effect.22 He invokes good faith, however, he claiming to have had the impression that the applicable provision at the time was Article 83 of the Civil Code.23
For while Article 256 of the Family Code provides that the Code shall have retroactive application, there is a qualification thereunder that it should not
prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.
In respondent’s case, he being out of the country since 1986, he can be given the benefit of the doubt on his claim that Article 83 of the Civil Code was the
applicable provision when he contracted the second marriage abroad. From 1985 when allegedly his first wife abandoned him, an allegation which was not
refuted, until his marriage in 1989 with Imelda Soriano, there is no showing that he was romantically involved with any woman. And, it is undisputed that his
first wife has remained an absentee even during the pendency of this case.

Respondent’s misimpression that it was the Civil Code provisions which applied at the time he contracted his second marriage and the seemingly unmindful
attitude of his residential community towards his second marriage notwithstanding, respondent may not go scotfree.

Held: Respondent violated Canon 5 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides:
CANON 5 – A lawyer shall keep abreast of legal developments, participate in continuing legal education programs, support efforts to achieve high standards in
law schools as well as in the practical training of law students and assist in disseminating information regarding the law and jurisprudence.
Respondent’s claim that he was not aware that the Family Code already took effect on August 3, 1988 as he was in the United States from 1986 and stayed
there until he came back to the Philippines together with his second wife on October 9, 1990 does not lie, as "ignorance of the law excuses no one from
compliance therewith."

It must be emphasized that the primary duty of lawyers is to obey the laws of the land and promote respect for the law and legal processes. They are
expected to be in the forefront in the observance and maintenance of the rule of law. This duty carries with it the obligation to be well-informed of the
existing laws and to keep abreast with legal developments, recent enactments and jurisprudence. It is imperative that they be conversant with basic legal
principles. Unless they faithfully comply with such duty, they may not be able to discharge competently and diligently their obligations as members of the
bar. Worse, they may become susceptible to committing mistakes.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Pablo C. Cruz is guilty of violating Canon 5 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and is SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for one year. He is WARNED that a similar infraction will be dealt with more severely.
Jonar Santiago vs Atty. Edison V. Rafanan
(A.C. No. 6252, October 5, 2004)
Facts: Jonar Santiago, an employee of the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology (BJMP), filed a complaint for the disbarment of Atty. Edison V. Rafanan
with the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on January 16, 2001. It charged Atty. Rafanan with deceit;
malpractice or other gross misconduct in office under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court; and violation of Canons 1.01, 1.02 and 1.03, Canon 5, and
Canons 12.07 and 12.08 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).
Complainant alleged, among others, that Respondent in notarizing several documents on different dates failed and/or refused to: a)make the proper notation
regarding the cedula or community tax certificate of the affiants; b) enter the details of the notarized documents in the notarial register; and c) make and
execute the certification and enter his PTR and IBP numbers in the documents he had notarized, all in violation of the notarial provisions of the Revised
Administrative Code.
Complainant likewise alleged that Respondent executed an Affidavit in favor of his client and offered the same as evidence in the case wherein he was
actively representing his client. Finally, Complainant alleges that on a certain date, Respondent accompanied by several persons waited for Complainant after
the hearing and after confronting the latter disarmed him of his sidearm and thereafter uttered insulting words and veiled threats.
On March 23, 2001, pursuant to the January 19, 2001 Order of the CBD, Atty. Rafanan filed his verified Answer. He admitted having administered the oath to
the affiants whose Affidavits were attached to the verified Complaint. He believed, however, that the non-notation of their Residence Certificates in the
Affidavits and the Counter-affidavits was allowed.
He opined that the notation of residence certificates applied only to documents acknowledged by a notary public and was not mandatory for affidavits related
to cases pending before courts and other government offices. He pointed out that in the latter, the affidavits, which were sworn to before government
prosecutors, did not have to indicate the residence certificates of the affiants. Neither did other notaries public in Nueva Ecija -- some of whom were older

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practitioners -- indicate the affiants residence certificates on the documents they notarized, or have entries in their notarial register for these documents.
As to his alleged failure to comply with the certification required by Section 3 of Rule 112 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, respondent explained that as
counsel of the affiants, he had the option to comply or not with the certification. To nullify the Affidavits, it was complainant who was duty-bound to bring the
said noncompliance to the attention of the prosecutor conducting the preliminary investigation.
On September 27, 2003, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XVI-2003-172 approving and adopting the Investigating Commissioners Report that
respondent had violated specific requirements of the Notarial Law on the execution of a certification, the entry of such certification in the notarial register,
and the indication of the affiants residence certificate. The IBP Board of Governors found his excuse for the violations unacceptable.
Held: Section 3 of Rule 112 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure expressly requires respondent as notary -- in the absence of any fiscal, state prosecutor or
government official authorized to administer the oath -- to certify that he has personally examined the affiants and that he is satisfied that they voluntarily
executed and understood their affidavits. Respondent failed to do so with respect to the subject Affidavits and Counter-Affidavits in the belief that -- as
counsel for the affiants -- he was not required to comply with the certification requirement.
It must be emphasized that the primary duty of lawyers is to obey the laws of the land and promote respect for the law and legal processes.
They are expected to be in the forefront in the observance and maintenance of the rule of law. This duty carries with it the obligation to be well-informed of
the existing laws and to keep abreast with legal developments, recent enactments and jurisprudence. It is imperative that they be conversant with basic legal
principles. Unless they faithfully comply with such duty, they may not be able to discharge competently and diligently their obligations as members of the
bar. Worse, they may become susceptible to committing mistakes.
Having undertaken the defense of the accused, respondent, as defense counsel, was thus expected to spare no effort to save his clients from a wrong
conviction. He had the duty to present -- by all fair and honorable means -- every defense and mitigating circumstance that the law permitted, to the end that
his clients would not be deprived of life, liberty or property, except by due process of law.
The Affidavit executed by Atty. Rafanan was clearly necessary for the defense of his clients, since it pointed out the fact that on the alleged date and time of
the incident, his clients were at his residence and could not have possibly committed the crime charged against them. Notably, in his Affidavit, complainant
does not dispute the statements of respondent or suggest the falsity of its contents.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Edison V. Rafanan is found guilty of violating the Notarial Law and Canon 5 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and is hereby FINED
P3,000 with a warning that similar infractions in the future will be dealt with more severely.
Canon 6
Huyssen vs. Guttierez
(A.C. No. 6707, March 24, 2006)

Facts: In 1995, the complainant and her three sons, all American citizens, applied for Philippine Visas. The respondent who was then connected with the
Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID) informed them that they needed to deposit a certain amount of money in order that their visa applications will
be approved. Complainant then deposited with respondent on six different occasions from April 1995 to April 1996 the total amount of US $20,000. However,
the respondent refused to issue copies of official receipts despite the demand of the complainant. After one year, complainant demanded from respondent
the return of US $20,000 who assured her that said amount would be returned. Instead of returning the money, the respondent issued postdated checks
which were dishonored. After respondent made several unfulfilled promises to return the said amount, a complaint for disbarment was filed in the
Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.

Issue: Whether or not Atty. Guttierez should be disbarred for the act complained of in the case

Held: The respondent was DISBARRED from the practice of law and ordered to return the amount he received from the complainant with legal interest from
his receipt of the money until payment. Respondent’s acts of asking money from complainant in consideration of the latter’s pending application for visas is
violative of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which prohibits members of the Bar from engaging or participating in any unlawful, dishonest,
or deceitful acts. Moreover, said acts also constitute a breach of Rule 6.02 of the Code which bars lawyers in government service from promoting their private
interests. Promotion of private interests includes soliciting gifts or anything of monetary value in any transaction requiring the approval of his office or which
may be affected by the functions of his office. As a lawyer, who was also a public officer, respondent miserably failed to cope with strict demands and high
standards of the legal profession.

Vitriolo vs. Dasig


(A.C. No. 4984, April 1, 2003)

Facts: The complainants, all high ranking officials of the Commission on Higher Education (CHED), filed an administrative case for disbarment against Atty.
Felina S. Dasig, also an official of the CHED. The charge involves gross misconduct of respondent in violation of the Attorney’s Oath for having used her public
office to secure financial spoils to the detriment of the dignity and reputation of the CHED. The complainants allege that during her tenure as OIC of the Legal
Affairs Service of the CHED, she attempted to extort from four different people sums of money as consideration for her favorable action on their pending
applications or requests before her office.

Issue: Whether or not respondent should be disbarred for the acts she committed during her tenure

Held: The respondent was DISBARRED for violation of the Attorney’s Oath as well as of Rule 1.01 and 1.03 of Canon 1 and Rule 6.02 of Canon 6 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility for acts of dishonesty and gross misconduct as OIC of Legal Services. Respondent’s attempts to extort money from persons with
applications or requests pending before her office are violative of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which prohibits members of the Bar
from engaging or participating in any unlawful, dishonest, or deceitful acts. Said acts also constitute a breach of Rule 6.02 of the Code which bars lawyers in
government service from promoting their private interests. Promotion of private interests includes soliciting gifts or anything of monetary value in any
transaction requiring the approval of his office or which may be affected by the functions of his office.

Canon 7

Atty. Bonifacio Barandon, Jr vs Atty. Edwin Ferrer, Sr


(A.C. No. 5768, March 26, 2010)

Facts: Atty. Barandon filed a complaint-affidavit with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) seeking the disbarment,
suspension from the practice of law, or imposition of appropriate disciplinary actions against Atty. Ferrer. One of the grounds for the prayer for disbarment or
other disciplinary actions against Ferrer was his conduct and the words he uttered at the courtroom of Municipal Trial Court – Daet before the start of hearing.
Such conduct of Atty. Ferrer was confirmed by disinterested persons who witnessed the incident. In the said incident, Atty. Ferrer was drunk when he uttered
the words: “Laban kung laban, patayan kung patayan, kasama ang lahat ng pamilya. Wala na palang magaling na abogado sa Camarines Norte, ang abogado
na rito ay mga taga-Camarines Sur, umuwi na kayo sa Camarines Sur, hindi kayo taga-rito.”

Issue: Whether or not Atty. Ferrer violated Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility?

Held: Yes, Atty. Ferrer violated Canon 7, particularly rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Ferrer uttered the invectives against Barandon with
intent to annoy, humiliate, incriminate, and discredit the former. A lawyer’s language should always be dignified and respectful, befitting the dignity of the
legal profession. The use of intemperate language and unkind ascriptions has no place in the dignity of judicial forum. Atty. Ferrer ought to have realized that
such kind of public behavior can only bring down the legal profession in the public estimation and erode public respect for it. The Supreme Court affirmed the
suspension of Atty. Ferrer for one year as ordered by the IBP-CBD.

Wilfredo Catu vs Atty. Vicente Rellosa


(A.C. No. 5738, February 19, 2008)

Facts: Respondent was the Punong Barangay of Barangay 723, Manila. Respondent, as punong barangay, presided over the conciliation proceedings between

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petitioner and Antonio Pastor as regards a contested property. The parties to the conciliation proceedings failed to arrive at an amicable settlement.
Respondent issued a certification for the filing of the appropriate action in court. Regina Catu and Antonio Catu, the mother and brother of the complainant,
filed a complaint for ejectment against Pastor before the Metropolitan Trial Court. Respondent entered his appearance as counsel for the defendant in that
case.

Issue: Whether or not respondent acted in contravention of Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility?

Held: Yes, respondent acted in contravention of the rules established by Canon 7, particularly rule 7.03, of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Respondent violated the provision stated in Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules which prohibits public officer or employee from engaging
directly in any private business, vocation or profession unless such public officer or employee is granted permission to engage in such activities by the head
of the Department in which they belong. As punong barangay, respondent was not forbidden to practice his profession. However, respondent should have
obtained the prior written permission of the Secretary of Interior and Local Government before he entered his appearance as counsel for Elizabeth and Pastor.
A lawyer who disobeys the law disrespects it. In so doing, he disregards legal ethics and disgraces the dignity of the legal profession. Public confidence in the
law and in lawyers may be eroded by the irresponsible and improper conduct of a member of the bar. Every lawyer should act and comport himself in a
manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity of the legal profession. Respondent was suspended from the practice of law for a period of six
months.
Canon 8
Camacho vs. Pangulayan
(328 SCRA 631, March 22, 2000)
Facts: Atty. Manuel N. Camacho, the hired counsel of some expelled students from the AMA Computer College, filed a complaint against the lawyers of
Pangulayan and Associates Law Offices (Atty. Pangulayan, et al.) for having procured and effected on separate occasions, without his knowledge, compromise
agreements ("Re-Admission Agreements") with four of his clients which, in effect, required them to waive all kinds of claims they might have had against
AMACC, the principal defendant, and to terminate all civil, criminal and administrative proceedings filed against it. Complainant averred that such an act of
respondents was unbecoming of any member of the legal profession warranting either disbarment or suspension from the practice of law.

The students, members of the Editorial Board of the school paper, were expelled by the school as recommended by the Student Disciplinary tribunal for
publishing some objectionable features or articles. They were found guilty of using indecent language and unauthorized use of student publication funds.
Atty. Pangulayan admits that he only participated in the formulation and execution of the various Re-Admission agreements complained of and alleges that
the agreements had nothing to do with the civil case but were purely administrative.

Issue: WON Atty. Pagulayan act in accordance with ethical standards for procuring said agreements.

Held: No, the IBP found that Atty. Pangulayan was aware that when the letters of apology and Re-Admission agreements were formalized, the complainant
was already the counsel for the students in the civil case. However, he still proceeded to negotiate with the students and their parents without
communicating the matter to their lawyer. His failure is an inexcusable violation of the canons of professional responsibility and an utter disregard of the
duty he owes to his colleague. His defense that the agreements were purely administrative does not hold because the manifestation stated that the students
shall drop all civil, criminal and administrative proceedings against AMA. The IBP recommended a 6-month suspension but the SC found it too harsh and
ruled only a 3-month suspension.

Laput vs. Remotigue


(6 SCRA 45 September 29, 1962)

Facts: Atty. Casiano U. Laput was the former counsel of one Nieves vda. De Barrera, the administrator of the estate of Macario Barrera, regarding the testate
of the latter. He charged respondents Atty. Remotigue and Atty. Patalinghug with unprofessional and unethical conduct in soliciting cases and intriguing
against another lawyer. Complainant alleges that weeks after his client refused to countersign several pleadings that he prepared, he found out that
respondent Atty. Patalinghug was the new counsel of Mrs. Barrera so he voluntarily asked the court to be relieved as counsel for Mrs. Barrera. After that, the
other respondent Atty. Remotigue entered his appearance. Complainant says that the respondents nursed the desire of his former client to replace him and
also made Mrs. Barrera sign documents sent to corporations which have stocks owned by Macario Barrera revoking his power of attorney. He further alleges
that the motive of the respondents was to embarrass him to the officials, lawyers and employees of those companies picturing him as a dishonest lawyer and
no longer trusted by his client.

Issue: WON respondents were guilty of unethical and unprofessional conduct

Held: No, the solicitor-general found that before respondents filed their appearance, Mrs. Barrera had already filed with the court, a pleading discharging the
complainant. The fact that complainant was not able to get a copy was not the fault of the respondents. Also, it was found that Mrs. Barrera dismissed Atty.
Laput because she no longer trusted him after finding out that some checks were sent to the complainant instead of her and that several withdrawals were
made by complainant in her account without her permission. There is no irregularity in the appearance of respondents as counsel. The revocation of power
of attorney prepared by respondent was done without malice and was made only to safeguard his client. Charges DISMISSED.

Canon 9
Office of the Court Administrator vs Atty. Misael M. Ladaga
(A.M. No. P-99-1287 January 26, 2001)
Facts: Atty. Misael Ladaga, Branch Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, appeared as counsel for and in behalf of his cousin, Narcisa Naldoza
Ladaga, an accused in Criminal Case No. 84-885 for “Falsification of Public Documents” before the METC of Quezon City. It is also denied that the appearance
of said respondent in said case was without the previous permission of the Court.

During the occasions that the respondent appeared as such counsel before the METC of Quezon City, he was on official leave of absence. Moreover, his
Presiding Judge, Judge Napoleon Inoturan was aware of the case he was handling. Respondent appeared as pro bono counsel for his cousin-client Narcisa
Ladaga. Respondent did not receive a single centavo from her. Helpless as she was and respondent being the only lawyer in the family, he agreed to
represent her out of his compassion and high regard for her.

This is the first time that respondent ever handled a case for a member of his family who is like a big sister to him. He appeared for free and for the purpose
of settling the case amicably. Furthermore, his Presiding Judge was aware of his appearance as counsel for his cousin. On top of this, during all the years that
he has been in government service, he has maintained his integrity and independence.

He failed to obtain a prior permission from the head of the Department. The presiding judge of the court to which respondent is assigned is not the head of
the Department contemplated by law.

Issue: WON Atty. Ladaga, upon such several appearances, was engages into private practice? NO

Held: Respondent is charged under Sec. 7(b)(2) of the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees which prohibits civil servants
from engaging in the private practice of their profession. A similar prohibition is found under Sec. 35, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court which disallows
certain attorneys from engaging in the private practice of their profession.

THERE WAS NO PRIVATE PRACTICE:

In People vs. Villanueva: Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary action, a succession of acts of the same kind.
In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise (State vs. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, N.S. 768). Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of
statute has been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one’s self out to the public, as a lawyer and demanding payment for such services (State vs.

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Bryan, 4 S. E. 522, 98 N. C. 644, 647). The appearance as counsel on one occasion, is not conclusive as determinative of engagement in the private practice
of law.

Based on the foregoing, it is evident that the isolated instances when respondent appeared as pro bono counsel of his cousin in Criminal Case No. 84885 does
not constitute the “private practice” of the law profession contemplated by law.

DECISION: Reprimanded.

Donna Marie S. Aguirre vs. Edwin L. Rana


(B.M. No. 1036. June 10, 2003)

Facts: Respondent Edwin L. Rana ("respondent") was among those who passed the 2000 Bar Examinations. On 21 May 2001, one day before the scheduled
mass oath-taking of successful bar examinees as members of the Philippine Bar, complainant Donna Marie Aguirre ("complainant") filed against respondent a
Petition for Denial of Admission to the Bar. Complainant charged respondent with unauthorized practice of law, grave misconduct, violation of law, and grave
misrepresentation.

The Court allowed respondent to take his oath as a member of the Bar during the scheduled oath-taking on 22 May 2001 at the Philippine International
Convention Center. However, the Court ruled that respondent could not sign the Roll of Attorneys pending the resolution of the charge against him. Thus,
respondent took the lawyer's oath on the scheduled date but has not signed the Roll of Attorneys up to now.

Complainant charges respondent for unauthorized practice of law and grave misconduct. Complainant alleges that respondent, while not yet a lawyer,
appeared as counsel for a candidate in the May 2001 elections before the Municipal Board of Election Canvassers ("MBEC") of Mandaon, Masbate.
Complainant further alleges that respondent filed with the MBEC a pleading dated 19 May 2001 entitled Formal Objection to the Inclusion in the Canvassing of
Votes in Some Precincts for the Office of Vice-Mayor. In this pleading, respondent represented himself as "counsel for and in behalf of Vice Mayoralty
Candidate, George Bunan," and signed the pleading as counsel for George Bunan ("Bunan").

In his Comment, respondent admits that Bunan sought his "specific assistance" to represent him before the MBEC. Respondent claims that "he decided to
assist and advice Bunan, not as a lawyer but as a person who knows the law." Respondent admits signing the 19 May 2001 pleading that objected to the
inclusion of certain votes in the canvassing. He explains, however, that he did not sign the pleading as a lawyer or represented himself as an "attorney" in the
pleading.

Issue: Whether respondent is engaged in unauthorized practice of law.

Held: Yes, We agree with the findings and conclusions of the OBC that respondent engaged in the unauthorized practice of law and thus does not deserve
admission to the Philippine Bar. Respondent took his oath as lawyer on 22 May 2001. However, the records show that respondent appeared as counsel for
Bunan prior to 22 May 2001, before respondent took the lawyer's oath.

Verily, respondent was engaged in the practice of law when he appeared in the proceedings before the MBEC and filed various pleadings, without license to
do so. Evidence clearly supports the charge of unauthorized practice of law. Respondent called himself "counsel" knowing fully well that he was not a member
of the Bar. Having held himself out as "counsel" knowing that he had no authority to practice law, respondent has shown moral unfitness to be a member of
the Philippine Bar.

The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is a privilege. It is limited to persons of good moral character with special qualifications
duly ascertained and certified. The exercise of this privilege presupposes possession of integrity, legal knowledge, educational attainment, and even public
trust since a lawyer is an officer of the court. A bar candidate does not acquire the right to practice law simply by passing the bar examinations. The practice
of law is a privilege that can be withheld even from one who has passed the bar examinations, if the person seeking admission had practiced law without a
license.

True, respondent here passed the 2000 Bar Examinations and took the lawyer's oath. However, it is the signing in the Roll of Attorneys that finally makes one
a full-fledged lawyer. The fact that respondent passed the bar examinations is immaterial. Passing the bar is not the only qualification to become an attorney-
at-law. Respondent should know that two essential requisites for becoming a lawyer still had to be performed, namely: his lawyer's oath to be administered
by this Court and his signature in the Roll of Attorneys.

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