Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
DOI 10.1007/s11115-008-0061-8
Introduction
In the last several decades, a number of new forces have emerged in the environment
within which the public service functions. Forces including globalization and
information technologies have, to a large extent, “…transformed the way we think
about governance, the role of government and the work done by the public sector
institutions” (Bourgon 2005: 13). On the other hand, development challenges of a
twenty-first century developing country demand for a dynamic and vibrant public
personnel administration (Amin 1985: 1). Thus, there is a thriving need for an
efficient and effective public administration in Bangladesh.
F. Jahan
Department of Public Administration, University of Dhaka, Dhaka, Bangladesh
e-mail: jahan70@gmail.com
A. M. Shahan (*)
Institute of Governance Studies, BRAC University, Dhaka, Bangladesh
e-mail: asif.shahan@gmail.com
308 F. Jahan, A.M. Shahan
members of staff at the PSC. The ex-chair served his tenure during the autocratic
regime and out of the five members, two worked during the autocratic period and the
remaining three served their tenure during the democratic period. The IGS also
organized an international workshop with 41 participants to validate the findings of
the empirical study. The participants included academics, bureaucrats, activists,
media personnel and civil society members who either specialize in or are aware of
the activities and problems of the PSC.
Public service commission during the British and the Pakistani period
government and also to advise the President on any service matter on which the PSC was
to be consulted (Braibanti 1966a).
introduced and for the first time, the PSC achieved a formal role. Up to 1981, the
PSC’s annual reports attempted to create pressure on various ministries/divisions to
come up with a solid recruitment procedure which finally bore fruit with the
recruitment rules of 1981 (GoB 2004; Ahmed 1986).
The second martial law regime acknowledged the importance of the role played
by the PSC and prescribed certain measures to be adopted by the organization to
ensure its effective functioning. The Martial Law Commission on Organizational Set
Up, 1984 provided a detailed road map and the examination was conducted with
regular intervals. It is however true that during the martial law regime, the PSC was
not immune to political pressure, but at the same time, it was not as vulnerable as it
turned out to be with the restoration of democracy in 1991.
From the beginning of the democratic era, the recruitment examination conducted
by the PSC became an issue of controversy. The first allegation of leakage of
question of BCS examination was made during the first democratic regime (1991–
1996)1, the second democratic regime (1996–2001) was accused of giving an edge
to the party loyalists in the examination procedure, especially through the viva-voce
and allegation was raised that mark sheets were tampered to recruit certain
candidates (The New Age Xtra, February 16–22, 2007).2 These allegations became
rampant during the third democratic regime. Allegations of leakage of question
papers became quite normal as the PSC had to cancel the 24th BCS preliminary test
due to the alleged leakage of question papers (The Daily Star, August 11, 2003).
Later, the PSC decided to form a probe committee to investigate this leakage
incident. The probe committee found no evidence of question leakage at that time
and termed the whole incident as baseless. But, it is important to mention that the
then Chair decided not to make the report public (New Age, April 6, 2005).
However, during interview, an ex-member of the PSC stated the reason behind not
making the report public was that the committee had in fact found the proof of
question leakage.
The 24th BCS examination was not the only incident where allegation was made
regarding leakage of questions. Again, a strong allegation of leakage of the question
papers of 25th and 27th BCS examinations rocked the organization. According to a
recent study conducted by Transparency International Bangladesh, contractual
selection based on transaction of bribe had been quite unbridled. Even if a
candidate fails to make it to the merit list, they could find themselves selected for the
customs/tax cadre by paying an amount of Tk. 10–12 lakh (USD 14500–17500
approx.). Paying Tk. 8–10 lakh (USD 11500–14500 approx.) might lead them to be
selected for the administration/police cadre; Tk. 10–12 lakh (USD 4500–7000
approx.) was enough to be selected for the professional cadre. A candidate
succeeding to the merit list could choose his own cadre with a bribe (CGS 2006;
TIB 2007). A recent newspaper report claimed that a number of members were
directly involved in taking bribe from the candidates and thus awarded them undue
privilege in viva-voce examination (The Daily Shamokal, January 27, 2007). The
1
Though members serving at that time completely denied this allegation, the academics who have
conducted research on the PSC confirmed that indeed the incidence of question leakage did take place at
this period.
2
Through interview with ex-members of the PSC, it was found that these allegations were indeed true.
Politics–Bureaucracy Relationship in Bangladesh: Consequences... 315
The degree of effectiveness of the PSC remained more or less same throughout
the history of Bangladesh. The PSC failed to conduct a fair competitive
examination when the form of government was democratic. The first democratic
government had accepted candidates into the administrative realm whose most
important qualification was the loyalty to the ruling party. Even the Chairs did
not hesitate to follow the guidelines provided by the ruling party.3 The
subsequent democratic governments paved the way for introducing various forms
of corruption in the examination procedure—tampering the marks sheet of BCS
examination, awarding civil service posts in exchange of money, accepting party
loyalists etc. It is, however, not true that the examination procedure was perfect
during the autocratic regime. Allegations existed but their forms were different.
Besides, then commission was quite efficient to nip the allegations in the bud.
One interviewee who served during the autocratic regime recalled that when there
was allegation regarding the involvement of a member in corruption, a probe
committee was formed immediately to find out the validity of the allegations. On
the contrary, the democratic regime saw Members with party affiliation and
involvement in corruption rise to a new level. As one interviewee recalled that s/
he personally talked to the Chair regarding the corruption of a particular member
of the commission and the chair said that s/he also heard about these allegations
but there was nothing s/he could do.
The PSC often fell victim to the control of political actors, be it government in
whatever form or a specific political party in power. In fact, control on the PSC’s
activities dated back to the British era. When the Simon Commission for
administrative reform was appointed in 1927, then Chair of the PSC, Sir Ross
Barker submitted a memorandum to the commission pointing out the problems he
faced due to the government’s control over the recruitment process.
The intention of the Lee commission was to make the PSC insulated from the
domain of politics and thereby its recommendations attempted to build a PSC which
would enjoy extensive power in case of recruitment. Though during the British
period, the PSC was an attached division of the Home Ministry; however, a
convention was followed where advice of the PSC were generally accepted (Amin
1985; Ahmed 1990).
3
During interview, an ex-member recalled that an ex-Chair, for no reason at all, decided to form a single
interview board. The members suspected that the reason was to provide good marks in viva-voce to the
candidates loyal to the ruling party.
316 F. Jahan, A.M. Shahan
During the Pakistani era, the PSC’s authority was limited. Due to political turmoil
during the early years of combined Pakistan, it was difficult for the PSC to work as
an independent body, free from all executive influence. Moreover, the short-lived
democratic regime made the matter worse for the institution. Though the 1962
constitution inserted a provision that while taking decision regarding the methods of
recruitment, promotion, transfer, disciplinary matters and matters affecting terms and
conditions of the service, the president was required to consult the PSC, “…in
practice, this authority is not so extensive as it may appear, for the president may, by
order made after consulting the commission, remove any of these matters from the
commission’s jurisdiction. Moreover …there is no obligation to accept the
commission’s advice” (Braibanti 1966a:120). However, despite all these limitations,
the post-1956 Pakistan saw an effective PSC, in terms of appointing persons on
merit into the civil service. The situation became worse after the independence. It
almost became a custom for the government not to pay attention to the
recommendations of the PSC. For instance, it took the PSC 10 years to make the
government understand the importance of a simple modification of the quota
reservation policy (Ali 2004).
The central problem regarding the PSC as reflected in existing literature is the
appointment procedure to appoint the chair and members of the PSC. It is well
known that in the PSC, the most significant role is played by the Chair. It is the
Chair, who deals with administrative matters, who is in charge of budget
preparation and in reality, sets the tone for the institution (IGS 2007). Therefore,
the appointment of the Chair, i.e., his/her qualifications, eminence, capability and
integrity is of utmost importance. Since the British period and up to 1971, successive
governments tried to appoint members and chairs with proven capability, with good
academic background and the persons so appointed were persons of the highest
integrity. Quite interestingly, this tradition was first ignored just after independence
when a democratic government assumed power. The Chair appointed at the time
lacked competence in managing the public personnel system and a number of
members had loyalty to the party in power. During the two successive military
regimes, though the members and chairs were deliberately picked by the military
dictators, in their activities, they showed enthusiasm to bring about change in the
institution, the ability to ignore requests made by the government, the capability to
get their jobs done despite limited resources and vast ranges of experience to make
the recruitment procedure a meaningful one (Ahmed 1990; IGS 2007). However, the
post-90s democratic government intentionally moved away from the convention of
appointing a person of highest integrity and capability as the Chair of the institution.
From that period, the persons’ appointed were university professors without prior
knowledge of administrative procedure and with visible leaning towards the party in
power (TIB 2007; IGS 2007).
Regarding the PSC, academic knowledge of a chair can provide the guideline
however, the practical experience of its inner working remains quite outside his/her
domain. According to the empirical research conducted by the IGS, the academic
background of the academics was not sufficient to provide them with the knowledge
Politics–Bureaucracy Relationship in Bangladesh: Consequences... 317
surrounding administrative procedures, rules and regulations. Out of the four Chairs,
three were natural science faculty members of universities without having any proof of
their administrative capability with all of them holding strong political affiliation with
the ruling parties. It may not be a hasty conclusion that they were handpicked by the
democratic governments intentionally, knowing that it would be easier to exercise
influence upon them.4 The PSC recently received a career bureaucrat as its chair in
2007 and this appointment was made under an undemocratic regime. Democratic
governments’ denial to appoint a civil servant as the PSC chair may be a reflection of
political parties’ distrust of the civil service.
4
In Dhaka University, the teachers are divided into two panels—the white panel is considered as Pro-BNP
and the Blue Panel as Pro-AL. The first PSC Chair during the democratic regime is known as founder of
the Pro-BNP wing of the Teacher’s Associations. Parties who came into power later preferred to appoint
academics from their own panel.
318 F. Jahan, A.M. Shahan
The problems of the PSC that are shown in the literature, as well as found through
our study, may be divided into two parts—problems attained through inheritance and
the problems created after independence (Table 1). Problems like narrow scope of
operations, inadequate resources and the extent of governmental control are not new.
These problems were quite common during the Pakistani period. On the other hand,
though much attention has been drawn to the political appointment of the members
and chairs of the PSC, interestingly, it is not a recent phenomenon but rather an
emergence since the independence of Bangladesh. What the existing literature fails
to answer is—why the PSC was able to recruit competent civil servants during the
Pakistani period even though the analysis of problems remained almost the same? A
possible answer may be non-partisan appointment of members and chair. In contrast,
if the political appointment of the members and chair of the PSC was the seed of all
evils, the question remains—why the PSC did not become a gateway for ruling party
activists to the civil service of Bangladesh up to 1990?
Table 2 shows that during the democratic regimes, the appointments of the PSC
chairs were based on political affiliation; the MoE’s control over the PSC was
significant; the examination procedure was corrupt and appointment of party
Problems Period
British period Pakistani Bangladesh Bangladesh Bangladesh
(1926–1947; period (1947– (1972–1975; (1976–1990; (1991–present;
colonial) 1971; democratic) autocratic) democratic)
autocratic)
Appointment of X X √ –a √
members and Chair
based on political
leaning
Narrow scope of X √ √ √ √
operations of the PSC
Inadequacy of facilities √ √ √ √ √
and resources
Governmental control –a √ √ √ √
over the functions of
the PSC
Corruption in X X √ X √
Examination procedure
loyalists to civil service was evident. Thus, there exists a definite relationship
between the nature and type of regime and the performance of the PSC. The PSC
performed better under the autocratic regimes. On the other hand it failed to meet
the expectations during the democratic regimes. Now, we will attempt to explain this
paradox using the theoretical framework discussed in “Politicization of bureaucracy:
a theoretical framework”.
Table 2 The relationship between ‘who is the PSC chair’ and ‘problems faced by the PSC’
Issues Regime
Democratic Autocratic
1972–1975 1991–1996 1996–2001 2001–2006 1976–1981 1981–1990
a
During this period, two university professors served as PSC Chair and both came from the Department of
Soil Science, Dhaka University
b
The Chair appointed during the previous regime was allowed to serve his tenure and after him, the then
democratic government appointed another academic as Chair who prior to appointment was a Professor of
Department of Political Science, Dhaka University
c
In 2001, a new democratic government came into power and after the tenure of the previous Chair came
to an end, another Professor of Department of Botany, Dhaka University was appointed as Chair
320 F. Jahan, A.M. Shahan
If we look into the nature of the bureaucracy of Bangladesh, we find that it bears a
colonial legacy in its public administration system (Huque 1997). During the British
period, the ultimate aim of the bureaucracy was to serve imperial interests of the
empire and that is why, “…it was designed to be administered by a handful of
administrators at its apex who would rule or govern” (Laporte 1981: 581). Even,
when the Government of India Act, 1935 was framed in the expectation that the
ministers would be Indians, it enabled the civil servants to bypass the ministers. In
fact, the bureaucratic system was framed in such a manner that it would curb the
development of indigenous political institutions (Khan and Zafarullah 1991). Thus,
there was no question of partisan selection of personnel rather attempts were taken to
select the best among the good men (Syed 1971: 168; Laporte 1981: 581).
The Pakistani period presented a different scenario for the bureaucracy. Until
1958, the political turmoil helped the bureaucracy (i.e., the CSP) to take control over
the politicians. The extent of this control was, in some cases so strong that the
bureaucrats made even a number of political decisions, like the dismissal and
appointment of the Prime Ministers, the dismissal of Constituent Assembly of
Pakistan etc. (Ziring 1962: 117–118). After the military take over in 1958, the
bureaucracy found itself in a difficult position as the autocratic regime started to
criticize the CSP for the condition of the country. However, the situation changed
soon when Ayub Khan decided to implement the Basic Democracies Order of 1959.
In order to implement the program, he needed an effective and efficient bureaucratic
machinery, which was contentedly supplied by the CSP. Thus, a partnership was
built between the army and the bureaucracy. Burki (1969) describes:
“The Basic Democracies Order of 1959 has given the civil servants working in
the divisions and districts “controlling power” over the new local bodies. Under
the system created by the Order, CSP Commissioners preside over the
Divisional Councils and CSP (or Provincial Civil Service) Deputy Commis-
sioners are the Chairmen of the District Councils. It is not surprising, therefore,
that the CSP displayed such enthusiasm in setting up the local bodies under the
system of Basic Democracies. The system of Basic Democracies stopped the
erosion of the power of the CSP; by being the undisputed leaders of the local
communities, the civil servants commanded authority not as the agents of a law
and order administration but as the representatives of an avowed welfare state”
(Burki 1969: 250).
This partnership helped the CSP to gain its elite status back and also prevented
the government from taking “undue initiative” to control public personnel
management system. This partnership was further strengthened due to Ayub’s
distrust towards political leaders and thus helped the CSP to consider itself as the
government and equate the national interest with its own (Syed 1971). Thus, the
PSC did not face any undue politicization in recruiting the best candidate following
the colonial tradition during this period.
Politics–Bureaucracy Relationship in Bangladesh: Consequences... 321
Because of the CSP dominance during the Pakistani regime, the CSPs became the
main target of political hatred after the independence of Bangladesh. There are
number of reasons behind this. First of all, the CSPs always made efforts to preserve
imperial heritage which would allow them to accumulate key positions in the
bureaucracy. Second, “they manifested a negative attitude toward politicians on the
one hand, and a paternalistic attitude towards the common man, on the other” (Khan
and Zafarullah 1991: 653). As a result, both the politicians and the citizens held an
anti-CSP attitude and the ruling political party promised to build an administration
free from elite and isolated attitude. Ahamed describes, “Bureaucracy was in fact a
much hated word in the political lexicon of Bangladesh. Sheikh Mujib often became
livid with anger when he denounced bureaucracy. Moulana Bhasani, another
prominent Bengali leader, did not complete a public speech without making a
stinging attack on the bureaucracy” (Ahamed 2004:106). Moreover, after the
liberation, the bureaucracy was divided into two groups and engaged in a ‘war’
within itself. In the one side were the bureaucrats who remained in Bangladesh
during the liberation war and on the other side were the bureaucrats who worked
with the government-in-exile. Therefore, the environment tempted the political
leaders to violate the standing convention of political non-interference in recruitment
and routine civil service management. Instead, they started to politicize the
bureaucracy to establish control over bureaucrats.
However, within a few years, the bureaucracy managed to regain its position. Reform
plans were shelved and the government found it necessary to rely on the bureaucratic
machinery (Carino 1991). The pace of this reliance received a momentum during the
post-75 scenario where, due to the colonial heritage, distrust towards political leaders
and paternalistic attitude to the citizen on the part of the bureaucracy, an effective
partnership was built between the bureaucrats and the military government. Thus,
according to Carino’s analysis as described in “Politicization of bureaucracy: a
theoretical framework”, during the autocratic regime, the interaction between the
bureaucracy and the government can be termed as ‘Authoritarianism and Bureaucratic
Coprimacy’, where civil bureaucrats and military power contrived in ruling the
country. At the same time, the experience of this relationship left a lasting imprint
upon the attitude of the bureaucrats.
Putnam in his classic study of 1973 on attitudes of senior civil servants of Britain,
Germany and Italy, has classified the bureaucrats in two types—the classical
bureaucrat and the political bureaucrat. According to his analysis, the classical
bureaucrats prefer to resolve public issues in terms of objective standard of justice,
legality or technical practicality and ignore the socio-political aspect. As a result, the
classical bureaucrats have nothing but distrust towards the institutions of politics and
to them the activities of politicians are “at best senseless, at worst positively inimical
to the permanent interests of the state”. And the impact is, as Putnam describes it,
“…such a bureaucrat may well find the ideas of pluralist democracy less congenial
than the quieter, more ordered, less conflict-ridden world of benevolent autocracy”
(Putnam 1973: 259–260). On the other hand, the political bureaucrats have a
different point of view. They acknowledge public interest as a pluralistic concept and
also are aware of political realities and political influences on policy making.
322 F. Jahan, A.M. Shahan
Contrary to the view of classical bureaucrats, the political bureaucrats consider the
politicians “…as a participant in a common game, one whose skills and immediate
concerns may differ from his own, but whose ultimate values and objectives are
similar” (Putnam 1973: 260).
Based on this classification, a study conducted by Jamil (2002) has revealed the
fact that bureaucrats of Bangladesh are mostly classical, i.e., they perceive politics as
a tool of gaining narrow interest, prefer to be non-partisan and moreover, expect
politics to be constrained (Jamil 2002). Consequently, Huque and Rahman point out
that the bureaucracy has always found itself in a comfortable position in case of
working with the autocratic regime (Huque and Rahman 2003). Khan and Zafarullah
(1991) explains it in the following way—
The military–bureaucracy relationship has been mutually advantageous for both
groups. The bureaucrats have all along manifested an aversion for politicians.
They seem to be allergic to political control and accountability. On the other
hand, they are comfortable in a work environment that is impersonal, formal,
and legal-rational and where the value system of political structures does not
impede bureaucratic norms (Khan and Zafarullah 1991: 658–659)
The military regime was not interested in taking any initiative that may hinder this
relationship. In order to perform in an effective manner, the martial law regime
required a civil service which was effective, efficient, capable and competent, thus it
did not want to jeopardize the whole recruitment process.5 The possible outcome of
which was non-interference in the civil service recruitment process.
Moving towards a democratic system, in fact, redefined the relationship
between the bureaucrats and the politicians. Looking back at Carino’s analysis,
two issues become pertinent here. First, the vulnerability of the bureaucracy
during regime change and second, the relation between the commitment to
democracy of the party in power and its interaction with the bureaucracy. The
restoration of democracy indeed placed the bureaucracy in a vulnerable position.
With its classical outlook towards the politicians, soon it became the target of
attack. At the same time, according to Carino’s theory, if the political parties that
assumed power possessed strong commitment towards democratization, they
might eventually move forward towards achieving the ‘Complementarity’ model.
Unfortunately, that was not the case.
In its 16 years’ life-span (1991–2006), the nascent democracy of the country
suffered a setback as the parties that came into power attempted to strengthen
executive control at the expense of legislature and the judiciary. The centralization
5
One interviewee commented, “Well, the autocratic governments do not represent any particular political
party. Thereby, it is not necessary for them to sacrifice the efficiency of the civil servant at the price of
appointing their party loyalists.”
Politics–Bureaucracy Relationship in Bangladesh: Consequences... 323
Situation Situation
Partnership
Presence of classical
Loyalists to autocratic
bureaucrats in
regime
administrative machinery
Solution Solution
Measures Measures
Outcome
PSC’s independence in
discharging duties
As shown in the above picture, the presence of the classical bureaucrats in the
administrative arena helped the autocratic regime to build a partnership which is
later carried out between the bureaucrats and the loyalists to the autocratic regime.
The effective functioning of the government demanded two sets of solution—first,
to ensure a fair recruitment procedure and second, to continue recruitment on an
ad-hoc basis. As a result, the authoritarian regime, at one end, circumscribed the
authority of the PSC to allow the practice of ad-hocization (Ahmed 1990) and on
the other end, refrained itself from interfering at the entry-level recruitment process.
For its own sake, the government required competent personnel at the right place
and the recruitment of competent personnel demanded a fair examination procedure.
The final outcome was a semi-independent PSC, which carried out its duty
effectively.
Politics–Bureaucracy Relationship in Bangladesh: Consequences... 325
On the other hand, since the beginning of the democratic regime, the politicians
‘successfully’ captured the public institutions and rather than using these institutions
for delivering service to the people, they utilized them for private gain (CGS 2006).
In order to increase the pace of this ‘state capture’ attitude, the two major political
parties that reined the political arena during 1991–2006 depended largely on
politicization of public sphere. At the same time, the inherent distrust towards the
classical bureaucrats compelled them to devise a mechanism through which the
functioning of the bureaucracy could be controlled. Consequently, they developed
their very own understanding of administrative reality where the performance of the
civil servants was evaluated through their political bias. At the initial stage, instead
of merit or efficiency, devotion to the party became the most important criteria in
promoting or transferring the civil servants. From that, the political parties
concentrated on recruiting their party activists in the service and interference in the
PSC’s activities became a common phenomenon.
The following figure makes it clear (Fig. 2):
Situation Solution
Measures
Outcome
An ineffective PSC
According to the figure, the scepticism regarding the intention of the classical
bureaucrats and the existence of a pre-mature democracy tempted the ruling political
party to politicize the recruitment process to impose the ‘democratic control’ over
the bureaucracy (Jahan 2006). The bureaucracy, being in a vulnerable position,
initially failed to resist the politicization and later accepted it (Huque and Rahman
2003). People with political affiliation were appointed as members and chairs in the
PSC. Subsequently, the examination procedure was tampered to recruit party
loyalists in the civil service. This ‘solution’ of the democracy resulted in the failure
of the PSC in recruiting competent bureaucrats.
Conclusion
work, making it responsive and responsible. The problem is, in the name of
democracy, what we have seen until 2006 is a “democratic malfunctioning” model
which takes little account of the existing social, political or economic structure of the
state. Democracy has always remained rhetoric to us. And, this has its impact on the
functioning of almost all the public institutions, including the PSC. If the democracy
that we have had in the last 16 years continues, there remains a possibility that the
reforms undertaken so far, in the long run, may fail to bring about the desired
qualitative change in the functioning of the PSC. The existing positive atmosphere
for change may fade away quite quickly, if the political parties fall short in
determining their mode of interaction with the civil service.1
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Dr. Ferdous Jahan : Dr. Jahan is an Associate Professor of Public Administration at the University of
Dhaka, Bangladesh. She has part time affiliation with BRAC Development Institute, BRAC University.
Dr. Jahan is also a post-doctoral fellow of the Jerry Lee Center of Criminology, University of
Pennsylvania, USA. Her current academic interests and research include: governance; corruption; legal
empowerment of the poor; women’s empowerment issues in developing societies; how the state may affect
women’s empowerment through public policies and laws; and other development related issues.
Asif Mohammad Shahan : Mr. Asif Mohammad Shahan is a Research Associate/Lecturer at the Institute
of Governance Studies, BRAC University. He completed his Masters Degree in 2007 in Public
Administration from the University of Dhaka. His research interests are public management, governance,
bureaucratic politics and politicization of the bureaucracy, local government.