Mindanao peace process timeline

By Al Jacinto

THE Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) is the vanguard of the Islamic movement in the Bangsamoro
homeland in Mindanao and the neighboring islands. The MILF was formed in 1977 when Sheikh Salamat
Hashim, supported by ethnic Maguindanao Muslims from Mindanao, split from the Moro National
Liberation Front (MNLF) of Nur Misuari, advocating a more moderate and conciliatory approach toward
the government.

When Hashim split from the MNLF, he took with him most of the group's more traditionally Islamic
leaders, including Rashid Lucman, Domacao Alonto, and Salipada Pendatun. The MILF has always
placed greater emphasis on Islam than the MNLF, and most of its leaders are Islamic scholars from
traditional aristocratic and religious backgrounds.

n January 1987, the MNLF signed an agreement relinquishing its goal of independence for
Muslim regions and accepting the government's offer of autonomy in September 1996.

The MILF originally seeks to establish an independent Islamic state similar to Iran, comprising
Mindanao island, Palawan, Basilan, Sulu archipelago, and neighboring islands. In support of
this aim, the organization has carried out a campaign of attacks against civilian and military
targets throughout the southern Philippines.

The MILF is believed to have 12,000 members, according to the Philippine military, but an MILF
plenum in Maguindanao province in May 2005 drew more than 2 million Muslims.

The following are significant dates, involving the Muslim separatists and the Philippine
government:

October 1972 -- The MNLF launches its separatist war in the southern Philippines. Misuari leads
the group; Hashim was in-charge for foreign relations.

December 1976 -- The MNLF and Manila sign the Tripoli Agreement, which provides for 13
Muslim areas of autonomy in the southern Philippines. In these areas, Muslims are allowed to
operate their own religious courts and schools, administrative and financial systems. Two
provisional autonomous regions were to be formed.

July 1978 -- Salamat splits with the MNLF to fight for a separate Islamic state in Mindanao. His
group comes to be called The Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF).

September 1986 -- President Corazon Aquino meets with Misuari in the Philippines after being
in exile in Libya and elsewhere since the 1970s.

October 1992 -- The first round of exploratory talks between the government of Fidel Ramos
and the MNLF was held in Tripoli, Libya.

October 1993 -- The first round of formal negotiations between Manila and the MNLF is held in
Jakarta, Indonesia. Officials sign an interim ceasefire agreement.

November 1995 -- Manila and the MNLF sign an interim peace agreement during the third round
of formal talks in Jakarta.

September 1996 -- Misuari signs a formal peace agreement with Manila that ends the 24-year
separatist rebellion. Misuari is elected governor of the Armm and becomes chairman of the
Southern Philippines Council for Peace and Development, which will oversee the development
of 14 mostly Christian provinces, including Armm's four provinces and nine cities.
July 1997 -- Manila signs a ceasefire agreement with the MILF, which now has about 14,000
members.

March to August 1998 -- The May Presidential elections caused the suspension of the peace
talks.

August 1998 -- Signed general framework agreement of intent between RP under President
Joseph Estrada and MILF in Sultan Kudarat, Maguindanao province;

March 1998 -- Agreement creating a quick response team signed in Sultan Kudarat,
Maguindanao;

February 1999 -- Joint acknowledgement of MILF camps signed in Sultan Kudarat,

Maguindanao; agreement to reaffirm pursuit of peace also signed;

October 1999 -- Agreement to hold the opening of the formal peace talks signed in Sultan
Kudarat, Maguindanao;

December 1999 -- Agreement on the rules and procedures on the conduct of the formal peace
talks;

December 1999 -- The signing of the joint statement of the formal opening of the peace talks;

October 1999 -- Second joint acknowledgement of MILF camps;

March 2000 -- Agreement on safety and security guarantees signed in Cotabato City;

April 2000 -- Signing of the aide memoir in Cotabato City; MILF unilaterally signs a suspension
of the peace talks memo;

June 2000 -- Military forces invaded main MILF headquarters Camp Abubakar As Siddique in
Maguindanao, and other major rebel camps after MILF fails to sign peace accord on
government deadline. Ceasefire broken and peace talks collapsed.

December 2000 -- Bombings hit Manila, MILF, Jemaah Islamiya blamed.

January 2001 -- President Gloria Arroyo opens contacts with MILF.

March 2001 -- Arroyo signs ceasefire with MILF, and resume peace talks; agreement on the
general framework for the resumption of the RP and MILF peace talks signed in Kuala Lumpur;

June 2001 -- Agreement on peace between the RP and the MILF signed in Tripoli, Libya;

August 2001 -- Implementing guidelines/ceasefire on the security aspect of the RP and MILF
agreement on peace signed in Putrajaya, Malaysia;

May 2002 -- Implementing guidelines on the humanitarian, rehabilitation, and development

aspects of the Tripoli agreement on peace signed; signed a joint communiqué/creates ad hoc
joint action group of GRP and MILF (to run after terrorists, criminals in central Mindanao) in
Putrajaya, Malaysia;

February 2003 -- Truce broken anew after military forces attacked major MILF camp in Buliok in
Maguindanao province; ceasefire enforced three weeks later;
July 2003 -- Hashim dies from illness in Maguindanao;

July 13, 2003 -- Hashim's military deputy Murad Ibrahim takes over as new leader of the MILF,
continues peace talks with government;

October 2004 -- International truce observer arrives in Mindanao;

December 2004 -- Ad hoc joint action group formally implemented;

January 2005 -- Truce broken after MILF forces, led by Abdulrahman Binago, attacked troops,
ceasefire enforced weeks later;

February through December 2005 -- Exploratory talks on ancestral domain; breakthrough on

contentious issue of ancestral land achieved at peace talks in Malaysia between government
and MILF rebels;

February 2006 -- Talks resume in Malaysia, agreement reached on ancestral domain.

The Philippine has been plagued by insurgencies throughout the history. Defined as an
“organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use
of subversion and armed conflict:, insurgency is said to be a form of modern warfare.
Differences in ideology and faith, problems of underdevelopment and poverty, and social
dissatisfaction are some of the main issues that have given rise to insurrections in the
country.

The longest running insurgencies in the country are being waged by the Communist
Party of the Philippines - New People’s Army (CPP-NPA) and it’s affiliate groups that are
mainly based in the whole islands and the Southern Philippines Secessionist Movements
operating in Mindanao.

Through the Government has greatly diminished the numbers and arms of
insurgent groups through successful military campaigns, uprisings have not been completely
eradicated. Both insurgent groups continue to operate and engage in criminal and terrorist
activities that threaten the country’s internal security and hamper nation building.

How can successful military campaigns in history help in addressing insurgency in

the Philippines? What other strategies employed in the past by governments, in the
Philippines and abroad, can be adopted to address the present problem of insurgency in the
country? These are the questions that this article aims to answer. The article begins by
tracing the development of insurgency group in the Philippines, including their ideology,
cause, aims, and their means to realize those aims. The article will examine the military
strategies being used by the present Philippine Administration in countering contemporary
insurgency problems in the country. It will also look into the successful counterinsurgency
operations of past Philippine administrations, as well as of selected countries and examine
whether we can adopt those operations to address our present insurgency problem.

Communist Insurgency

The communist insurgency in the Philippine scan be traced to the peasant rebellions during
the late 19th century up to the early 20th century. Rural revolts among peasants became
common at the time due to issues on land tenancy and growing population pressures. The
agrarian unrest continued until the 1950s, covering mostly Central Luzon and Visayas,
which spurred the armed struggle of the combined forces of the Partido Komunista ng
Pilipinas, established in 1930, and the Hukbalahap war guerillas. The rebellion declined in
the 1950s but residuals of the old Huk army played significant roles in the establishment of
the New People’s Army.

Internal schism due to ideological differences and party leadership rivalries within
the PKP resulted in the establishment of the Communist Party of the Philippines. The
organization was founded in 1968 by Jose Maria Sison and other young revolutionaries in
Central Luzon. Like Sison, most members of the political group were educated youths from
the middle class who were disgruntled with the government. The CPP’s ideology was largely
drawn from the Chinese communism of Mao Zedong and its model agrarian revolution,
unlike the Soviet-oriented PKP. Sison and his cadres criticized the subservient policy of the
Philippines to the United States, describing the country as “a semifeudal, semicolonial
society ‘ruthlessly exploited’ by United States imperialists, the ‘comprador big bourgeoisie,’
landlords, and bureaucratic capitalists.” Armed revolution was regarded as the only way to
overthrow the United States-sponsored government, free the people from their oppression,
and institute a people’s democratic revolution. The party sough to promote their ideology by
using the following causes: the land tenancy system and a peasant desire for agrarian
reform; unemployment and poor economic conditions, including an extremely inequitable
income distribution; and a lack of government credibility due to corruption and abuses.

The CPP encountered a main problem after its inception – it promoted a peasant-led
revolution and the party had no peasant base and no knowledge in guerilla warfare. The
problem was solved after a few months when the party found an ally in Bernabe Buscayno.
Buscayno, better known as Kumander Dante commanded a group of peasant guerillas,
which emerged from the past PKP-Huk actions in the late 1960s. Convinced by the party’s
ideological zeal, Buscayno submitted under the leadership of the Party. Hence, the CPP-New
People’s Army was born. The CPP-NPA operations concentrated on the agrarian reform in
the rural areas. The group engaged in banditry, extortion for revolutionary taxes and
bombing of important establishments in the areas, to advance their causes.

Southern Philippine Secessionist Groups

The Muslim secessionist movement in the Southern Philippines is rooted in the

centuries-old resistance of Muslim Filipinos against Spanish colonization. The destruction of
the traditional patterns of authority and communal autonomy, curtailment of individual
freedom, and the introduction of a new religion fueled the resistance of the Muslims in
Mindanao. Unlike their counterparts in Luzon and Visayas, the Muslims of Mindanao refused
to submit to Spanish authority. Such resistance has endured to this day. Whereas the
communist party aims to overthrow the government to establish a socialist state, Muslim
secessionist groups want to cede from the Philippines and form a separate Bangsamoro
(Islamic State).

The Muslim separatist sentiment is caused by the following main factors: first,
Muslim fear that their religious, cultural, and political traditions may be weakened or
destroyed by forced assimilation into a Catholic-dominated Philippine Republic. Second,
Muslims resent the influx of migrants from Luzon and Visayas, which dispossessed them of
their ancestral and communal lands and turned them into a minority in their own land.
Third, Muslims reject the economic underdevelopment and poverty of Mindanao. Rabasa
and Chalk notes that 15 of the Philippine’s poorest provinces are located in the region,
which also has the country’s lowest literacy rate (75 percent) and life expectancy (57
years). Moreover, most provinces have limited or no access to basic social services, such as
electricity and water supply, education, and health. Fourth, is the Mindanao tradition of
warlordism, banditry, and blood feuds among ethnic groups.

The Muslim Secessionist Movement is comprised of three groups. The (1) Moro
National Liberation Front (MNLF); (2) the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF); and the Abu
Sayyaf Group (ASG).

The Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) was founded by Nur Misuari, an
educated Tausug, in 1971. The MNLF believe that (1) the Moro people constitute a
distinct bangsa (nation) that has a specific Islamic historical and cultural identity; (2)
the bangsamoro (Islamic nation) has a legitimate right to self-determination; and (3) the
MNLF has a duty and obligation to wage a jihad against the Philippine State. As such, the
movement fought for due representation of Muslims in the Philippine political process. In
1996, peace talks between the Government and MNLF have resulted to the establishment of
the Zone of Peace and Development (ZOPAD) in Mindanao; the creation of Southern
Philippines Council for Peace and Development (SPCPD); and Misuari’s election as governor
of the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao, which gave the Muslims a stake in the
political process of the country. Thus, only the Moro Islamic Liberation Front and the Abu
Sayyaf remain in the Muslim secessionist movement at present.

The Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) is a breakaway group from the MNLF,
which left its parent organization in 1980.

Differences in the two group’s goals paved the way for such separation. The MILF
has a more religious orientation than the MNLF. Aside from pursuing nationalist objectives,
the group also aims to promote Islamic ideals in the country. Hashim Salamat, the group’s
leader states that their political objective is to create a separate Islamic State encompassing
provinces in Mindanao where Muslims are majority. The Shari’a (Islamic Law) will be
observed in all aspects of life in the said Islamic State. The MILF aims to attain such goal
thru da’wa(Islamic preaching) and jihad (holy war). As a revolutionary military force, MILF
does not practice indiscriminate violence against civilians. Its violent activities, mostly in the
form of orthodox guerilla warfare, are only aimed at the Philippine Military. However, the
also group uses terrorist-type tactics to extort revolutionary taxes.

The Abu Sayyaf Group (literally “Bearer of the Sword”), a fundamentalist

organization was founded in1989 and was originally named Mujahideen Commando
Freedom Fighters (MCFF), due to its link with the Mujahideen movement in Afghanistan. The
majority of the group’s members are Muslim youths, with many of the older cadres
reportedly veterans of the Afghan war. The Abu Sayyaf does not only want to establish a
separate Islamic state governed by the Shari’a. The group also wants this state to be
exclusive for Muslims. The Abu Sayyaf does not practice religious tolerance towards non-
Muslims. The activities of the group are terrorist in nature and are tied to the integrated
effort among Muslim fundamentalists in asserting the dominance of Islam in global politics.
The Abu Sayyaf Group received international attention when they abducted and hostaged
some foreigners in Sipadan, Malaysia.

Some Strategies Employed by the Government

The Philippine Government has changed its strategy in countering insurgency along
with the changes of administrations over the years. The government has employed both
peaceful and military means in its attempts to eliminate insurrection in the country. The
Aquino Administration engaged into peace talks with the National Democratic Front, which
touched on the issues of poverty alleviation, productive employment generation, equity and
social justice, and human rights promotion. The government proposal came under the
theme “Food and Freedom, Jobs and Justice” as the key to peace. However the peace talks
did not prosper as hostilities continued between Philippine government and rebel groups.

Similarly, the Ramos Government engaged the Moro National Liberation Front in
peace negotiation, as it focused on peace and security. The talks succeeded and resulted in
the establishment of the Zone of Peace and Development (ZOPAD) in Mindanao and
Southern Philippine Council for Peace and Development (SPCPD), which provided Muslims a
stake in the country’s political process and the right to shape the future of Muslim
Mindanao. In exchange of the MNLF’s return and adherence to the government, an amnesty
program was accorded to the group along with a socio-economic package for development
with the assistance of United States-funded Growth with Equity in Mindanao (GEM)
Program. The said program has since provided former MNLF members a means of livelihood
and developed poverty-stricken areas in Mindanao. Further, qualified combatants were
integrated to the AFP/PNP.

The Estrada Administration had initially pushed peace negotiations with the MILF,
which formally started on October 29, 1999. The peace talks’ initial aims were to re-
integrate the MILF to the mainstream society, attain lasting peace in Mindanao through a
meaningful autonomy program, and a consolidation of peace efforts. However, said talks
were aborted as the Estrada Government implemented an all-out war engaged policy
against militant Muslims.

What has the Philippines got to learn from other countries?

Insurgency is not a unique experience of the Philippines. Many countries, developed

or developing, have been beset by insurrections. However, the government of some of
these countries have already overcome or contained their local insurrections. The following
section will provide the experiences of selected countries, which succeeded in combating
local insurgencies.

The Thai Experience

Thailand has experienced the same insurgency problems as the Philippines, which
date back to the establishment of the Communist party of Thailand in the 1920s. Since
then, communist insurgency had been a national concern that had beset a number of Thai
Governments and dominated military and police activities for more than twenty years. From
a peek strength of about 12,000 armed insurgents in the late 1970s, the number of armed
guerillas and separatists had declined to 600 in 1987. Observers in Thai politics downplay
the importance of the communist ideology to the local insurgency. Local insurrections
emerged out of people’s discontent with the government, which only concentrated in the
capital. The neglect of the peripheral areas of the country has alienated many rural
inhabitants and ethnic minorities. This resulted to the resentment that steadily grew in the
1960s and 1970s, which communist ideologues were able to exploit. However, the Thai
government has successfully downplayed communist insurgency in the country by the late
1980s. The government employed “coordinated government efforts combining military and
police actions with social and economic policies”, which effectively reduced the level of
insurgency. Credit is also due to the extensive military aid and technical assistance that the
United States had provided to the counterinsurgency program in 1950s.

The 1970s signaled the Thai government’s resolve to put an end to the communist
insurgency, by increasing the effectiveness of its counterinsurgency operations. In 1974,
the government established the Internal Security Operational Command (ISOC) under the
military’s Supreme Command to coordinate and integrate the counterinsurgency efforts of
various government agencies. In the early 1980s, the government reoriented their
counterinsurgency programs to focus more on neutralizing the communists’ tactics than
simply killing the insurgents. The said approach led to an increased coordination among
civilian, police, and military agencies. Prime Minister Prem Tinsulanonda took over as
director of a reorganized ISOC in 1987, indicating an increased emphasis on the political
rather than the military aspect of the government’s counterinsurgency programs.

The government also crafted a new policy that addressed the political and social
aspects of insurgency problem. The policy offered amnesty to all insurgents and included
measures to improve social and economic conditions that give rise to the insurgency. At the
same time, the Thai military conducted selective but aggressive and effective operations
against insurgent and guerilla bases in the remote mountainous areas. The government’s
approach resulted in the weakening of the communist movements and the increased
surrender of more insurgents, which led to the elimination of insurgency in the country.

The British Experience

 The United Kingdom’s insurgency problem in Northern Ireland can be compared to
that of the Philippines in Mindanao. The conflict and insurgency problem in the territory has
both political and religious underpinnings. The conflict is brought about by the continuous
power struggle between the Unionists, who would like to maintain the territory’s union with
Great Britain and Nationalists, who would like to cede the union to establish a separate
state or to reunite with Ireland. The struggle is further exacerbated as the religious
dimension set in. Most, if not all, Unionists are Protestants who have the monopoly of
political power in the process.

Historically, Irish Catholics have been subjected to all kinds of political, social and
economic discrimination, as they were perceived to be disloyal to the Crown. Catholics were
not accorded the right to suffrage until the early 20th century. They were not allowed to run
for office or hold government position. Moreover, they were also not accorded equal work
opportunities with their Protestant counterparts. The political and religious tensions further
increased due to lack of contact between the two conflicting groups.

When the Northern Ireland government was not able to contain violence between
Protestants and Catholic extremist groups, Great Britain decided to intervene in the territory
in 1969, after successfully quelling counterinsurgencies in Malaya (present Malaysia),
Kenya, Muscat, Oman and Cyprus. Great Britain’s counterinsurgency strategy in Northern
Ireland has been described only as Military Aid to the Civil Authorities (MACA). The said
approach involved a “political/military strategy which coordinates governmental, judicial,
economic, social and psychological agencies and dimensions, and aimed at containing,
isolating and destroying identifiable resistance.” British counterinsurgency operations has
five important elements: the identification of the enemy and its reasons for existence; the
coordination of all government resources to eliminate the insurgency; the containment and
the tactical attrition of the enemy; the political and military isolation and frustration of the
insurgents; and the enemy’s total destruction.

It is important to note Britain’s emphasis on psychological warfare operations to

defeat the IRA insurgency. Kitson, Britain’s premier military strategist, who authored the
counterinsurgency bible “Low Intensity Conflict”, believed that “it is in men’s minds that
wars of subversion have to be fought and decided”. Thus, British counterinsurgency
strategists concentrated on influencing and conditioning the mindset of the people on how
they saw the problem in the North. Also part of the psychological warfare, Britain
demonstrated the full strength of the state by implementing laws and regulations to quell
the insurgency.

Through IRA has continued to operate in the country, The British and Northern Irish
Governments were able to reach a ceasefire agreement with the insurgency group.
Moreover, the Belfast Agreement was signed by the involved parties in 1998, which included
the devolution of autonomy to the territory, a power-sharing scheme between the Unionist
and Nationalist parties, and the promotion of equal rights between Catholics and
Protestants. The prospect of peace in the country is further maintained with IRA’s latest
pronouncements of decommissioning its weapons and implementation of the 1998 Belfast
Agreement.

Lessons Learned

Counterinsurgencies “require an interconnecting system of actions – political,

economic, psychological, and military – that aim at the [insurgents’ intended] overthrow of
the established authority in a country and its replacement by another regime.” Thus far,
efforts of the Philippine Government to combat insurgencies in the country have remained
to be a partial success. While the successful military offensives have continued to reduce
the number of insurgents over the years, said insurgent movements still and will continue to
operate in the country, until the deep-seated factors of insurgency and terrorism are dealt
with by the government. The absence of a holistic and a comprehensive approach by the
Philippine Government in addressing insurgency and its underlying causes continues to be a
setback in the government’s counterinsurgency strategy. The non-continuance of the
government’s counterinsurgency policies, which tend to change along with the country’s
change of leadership, has also become an obstacle in the total elimination of rebel groups.

Military operation is only part of the counterinsurgency equation and only offers a
short-term solution to insurgency. The complete eradication of insurgency will only be
attained by the total elimination of its underlying causes. As such, a comprehensive and a
holistic approach must be employed.

Since insurgencies are primarily political in nature, the Philippine Government must
develop solutions that would address the political grievances of insurgents.

The government must continue its amnesty program towards the rebels and work
towards the rebels and work towards their reintegration to the Philippine society. Justice
and reconciliation must be properly balanced. The government must encourage the
democratic participation through the proper means and processes. Estrada’s double policy of
engaging MILF insurgents in peace talks and then waging an all-out war against them has
destroyed whatever confidence base the government has created with the dissidents. As
such, new trust and confidence-building activities are needed to put insurgents in the
negotiation table. Moreover, the government must also ensure to deliver whatever promise
they would make to the former dissidents.

Poverty and underdevelopment have been pointed out as one of the main causes of
rebellion. Most analysts agree that the best way in combating insurgency and rebellion “lies
with implementing a sustained economic development program”, as this would not only
undermine the civilian support base of the insurgents, but also would remove both
groups’ raison d’être.

Psychological warfare operations, which include intelligence-gathering and

propaganda play an important role in winning the war against insurgency. The government
must win the support of the rest of the population especially those residing near the
insurgent-infested provinces so as to prevent them from supporting the rebels. Knowledge
on one’s enemy increases the probability of defeating such enemy. The creation of an
independent government organization with the power to coordinate military and non-
military actions is crucial in addressing the country’s communist and secessionist
insurgencies. Such organization can provide the continuity and the consistency of the
approaches and strategies that will be used to quell insurgencies and terrorist activities. The
Philippine Government may get ideas from the strategies that the Thai and British
Governments had utilized in solving their local insurgencies. However, the employment of
these strategies does not guarantee full success. The nature and causes of insurgency is not
static. They change as they adapt to the new political, social, and economic environments.
Differences of the time frame and the social and political landscapes of the country may
affect the results of implementing the said strategies, despite seemingly striking similarities.
A successful counterinsurgency must employ approaches and strategies that are specifically
accustomed to the political, social, and economic conditions of the Philippines.