Uaw GM Umpire Decisions

UMPIRE DECISION A-1 Page 1 of 5
OFFICE OF THE UMPIRE
No. A-1
OCTOBER 28, 1940
Decision on Issue of Alternate Committeemen’s Preferential Right to Work
GRIEVANCES
Chevrolet Bay City—Case No. 1
"I request back wages from 11:30 A.M., July 11 to July 27. I should have worked as an alternate
committeeman during this time, as there were about 100 men working in my district."
"I request pay from July 3 to July 29 because there were 50 men in my district."
"I request pay for Saturday August 17. There were 65 employes working in my district. I was not
brought in as a committeeman."
Chevrolet Flint—Case No. 14
"Refused to allow committeeman 40 hours work for week of July 29 to August 3, 1940."
Chevrolet Gear & Axle—Case No. 17
"There were about 50 men working in my district last Thursday and some of them were production
men. I want to know why I was not let work? I think I should be paid for time lost."
"I have been discriminated against by not being allowed to work last week (40 hours a regular work
week) when there are 10 men in my district. This is a violation of the agreement between the Union
and the Company."

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"I was discriminated against by not being allowed to work last Thursday and Friday. This is a
violation of the Agreement. I request to be compensated for my lost time."
SUMMARY
These employees (Alternate Committeemen) were not called in when the District Committeeman
was called to work on overtime and extra work. The Union claimed that under the Agreement, the
Alternate has the same preferential right to work as the District Committeeman and that they should
be paid for time lost.
The UMPIRE ruled that:
There is no urgent need to call in both the Alternate and the Committeeman in order that one will
almost certainly be present. Most grievances do not call for attention "then and there." Many are not
taken up on the day they arise and a very large proportion of those that are could go over for a day
without injury. The Alternate does not have the same preferential right to work as is possessed by
the Committeeman. The claims for back pay are denied.
The verbatim decision of the UMPIRE is as follows:
In the Matter of:
William R. Campbell, Chevrolet Parts, Bay City (Case 1); Joseph M. Douponce, Chevrolet Parts,
Bay City (Case 2); William R. Campbell, Chevrolet Parts, Bay City (Case 4); Harvey M. Morton,
Chevrolet Motor Division, Flint (Case 14); P. Mahoney, Chevrolet Gear and Axle, Detroit (Case
17); Forrest S. Timmon, Chevrolet Gear and Axle, Detroit (Case 26); and Forrest S. Timmon,
Chevrolet Gear and Axle, Detroit (Case 27).
These several employees claim that on specified days they were denied a right to work given them
under the Agreement between the General Motors Corporation and the International Union United
Automobile Workers of America—C.I.O., and that they should be paid for time lost. All seven
cases involve the same issue and have therefore been joined for consideration and decision.
The issue is whether alternate committeemen have the same preference in overtime and extra work
when only a part of the plant is "running," as has been specifically provided for in the cases of
committeemen. The specific provision is found in Representation, Paragraph (3), page 7 of the
Agreement. It reads:
Whenever ten or more employees covered by this Agreement are working in a district the
committeeman for that district shall be allowed to work, provided there is work which he is capable
of doing, and he shall be paid the current rate of pay for such work.
The Union’s Interpretation of the Agreement and Its Contentions
Though there is no corresponding provision relating to alternate committeemen, the Union contends
that they and committeemen have the same preferential employment right. This contention is based
in part upon the fact that the two sets of representatives have the same seniority rights. "District and
alternate committeemen shall head the seniority lists in their respective districts" (Agreement,
General Provisions Regarding Seniority, Paragraph (16), page 23). In addition, the Agreement
provides that the duties of an alternate committeeman "shall be the same as those of the regular
committeeman for that district while he is absent from the plant" (Agreement, Representation,
Paragraph (2), page 7). The Union contends that for the alternate committeeman to be available as a
substitute for the committeeman when the latter is absent from the plant he, too, must be called in
on overtime and extra work. Grievances can be handled only by the one or the other. No substitute
can be selected and receive recognition without prior notification to management. A recognized
official should be available at all times.
These are the Union’s main contentions. In addition to these, it notes the importance of making the
position of alternate committeeman attractive in order that it will not be shunned because of the time
required outside of working hours, particularly in the collection of dues. It also calls attention to the
fact that while dues are collected outside of working hours and on the Corporation’s property, no
one not working on the particular day is admitted to the plant. Hence, were an alternate
committeeman not working for a continuous period of a couple of weeks or more, as in Cases No. 1
and No. 2, there would be no one present to collect dues in the usual manner from those members of
the Union who were working.
Finally, the Union asserts that inasmuch as the preferential right to work in question is conditioned
by ability to perform available work, sustaining its position "would not cost the Corporation a
penny." It is merely a question whether for a day or so now and then an alternate committeeman
rather than some one else will work. The alternate committeeman would earn somewhat more, the
others somewhat less, but this is said to be agreeable to the members of the U.A.W.
The Corporation’s Interpretation of the Agreement
The Corporation’s position is that none of these claims is justified by a proper interpretation of the
Agreement. Incidentally, it calls attention to the fact that in all of the cases except Case No. 4 the
committeeman was working and that in the exceptional case there was no work the alternate was
capable of doing. Under the same circumstances, a committeeman would have had no right to work
and would not be used on overtime or extra work. Also, at the conference held by the Umpire in
order to supplement and clarify the briefs submitted, the Corporation took the position that the
claims had been presented too late to require compensation were they held to have merit. Finally,
the Corporation expresses fear of loss in efficiency and of impaired morale. A worker may be less
efficient on available work he is able to perform than on the job to which he is regularly assigned.
As regards its main position, the Corporation contends that insofar as the Union’s case rests upon
the provision that "District and alternate committeemen shall head the seniority lists in their
respective districts" (Agreement, General Provisions Regarding Seniority, Paragraph (16), page 23),
it is without merit. Seniority has to do only with lay-off, which is not involved in any of these seven
cases. It has nothing to do with extra work; for such work selections are not made on the basis of
seniority.
Attention is called to the provision of the Agreement which relates specifically to committeemen—
that quoted above on page 1. Had it been agreed that committeemen and alternate committeemen
should have the same preferential right to work, that both of them should work when ten or more
employees were on extra work, the clause would have been differently worded. The words "and
alternate committeeman" would have been inserted after the word "committeeman." The
Agreement, the Corporation contends, is to be interpreted and applied as written. Changes and
additions can be made only by successful negotiation between the parties in interest.
Interpreting the Agreement as written, Mr. Tanner on July 17, 1940, issued a letter with reference to
alternate committeemen to all general managers of the plants covered by the Agreement, reading, in
part, as follows:
In cases where ten or more employees are working in a district on Saturdays or any other day when
the plant is shut down, the district committeeman shall be allowed to work, so as to represent the
employees, if there is work he is capable of doing. The alternate committeeman need not work
unless his regular job is operating or in case the district committeeman does not work.
It was upon the basis of this interpretation of the Agreement that the alternate committeemen filing
claims had not been used on extra work.
The Umpire’s Observations and Decision
The Umpire finds in these several cases no circumstance of past practice, no commitment, or other
reason for not following the words of the Agreement in making his decision. Of course it is
important to make arduous jobs of union representatives attractive and to make it convenient for
these representatives to function, but such matters can be taken care of in various ways. The
committeeman or the alternate will almost always be among those engaged on extra work without
both of them having a preferential right. There is no urgent need to call in both in order that one will
almost certainly be present, for except on very rare occasions the committeeman will be present
when he, say at the close of the preceding day, is expected, and expects, to be present. Moreover,
most grievances do not call for attention "then and there." Many of them are not taken up on the day
they arise and a very large proportion of those that are so taken up could go over for a day without
injury. Finally, were the Union’s position sustained, there might be some loss in efficiency in
concrete cases.
The Union’s interpretation of the Agreement, one which would give the alternate committeeman the
same preferential right to work as is possessed by the committeeman, is rejected. Insofar as the
evidence goes, the Corporation in applying the rule in these several cases, was acting within its
right. The claims of the several alternate committeemen are disallowed.
In ruling as he does on these several cases, the Umpire assumes that no technical question of late
presentation of a claim will be raised by management when delay in its presentation is due to the
absence of both committeeman and alternate committeeman at the time the grievance developed.

H. A. MILLIS
UMPIRE
October 28, 1940.
Present at the October 21 meeting referred to in this decision were Messrs. Du Brul and Coen of
General Motors, Messrs. Reuther, Livingston, and Johnstone of the Union, and the Umpire and his
secretary.
UMPIRE DECISION INDEX
No. A-28
MARCH 5, 1941
Claim for Plant-Wide Seniority
Claim of Discrimination
GRIEVANCE:
(Chevrolet Toledo—Cases Nos. 1 and 2)
"Due to the fact that there has been changes in products, methods and policies in Toledo-
Chevrolet plant, I am about to be permanently laid off, therefore I claim I should be given
plant-wide seniority according to the Agreement between the Corporation and the Union."
At the second step of the Grievance Procedure the claim of each employee was extended
to include a charge of discrimination.
SUMMARY
Two employees’ seniority was restored under Clause 9-e (SENIORITY). They were not
recalled to work and on October 11, 1938, they again lost their seniority due to the fact that
they had not been employed for a period of twenty-four months. The Union claimed that
they were entitled to plant-wide seniority due to the fact that additional work, which was a
change in product, had been taken into the plant and that the failure to recall them
represented discrimination in respect to tenure of employment prohibited under Paragraph
(3-a) (RECOGNITION).
1. The claim for plant-wide seniority has no merit whatsoever. The local
seniority arrangement is on a group basis. Clause 4 (SENIORITY) ordinarily
becomes effective when a job being performed by an employee becomes
obsolete and it certainly has no bearing in this case.
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2. The break in seniority of two men was not in conformance with the
requirements of Clause 3-a of the Recognition Section. Not later than March
24, 1941, these men are to be provided with work in their regular groups and
their seniority is restored.
In the Matter of:
United Automobile Workers of America—C.I.O.
and
General Motors Corporation, Chevrolet-Toledo Division, Case Nos. 1 and 2.
The grievances considered by this decision have been joined because of a marked
similarity in the facts and in the principles involved. As initially filed on Sept. 13, 1940, the
grievance in Case No. 1 reads:
"Due to the fact that there has been changes in products, methods
and policies in Toledo-Chevrolet plant, I am about to be
permanently laid off, therefore I claim I should be given plant-wide
seniority according to the Agreement between the Corporation and
the Union."
The grievance filed on Sept. 13, 1940 for Case No. 2 reads virtually the same. At the
second step of the grievance procedure the claim of each employee was extended to
include a charge of discrimination. This is recorded in the Statement of Unadjusted
Grievance as of Oct. 24, 1940. A hearing of this case was conducted at Toledo on Feb. 12,
1941.
Facts of the Case
Each of the employees had a seniority date of Nov. 4, 1931. One was listed in the
Production Group, the other in the Material Handling Group. Early in 1938, there was a lay-
off due to lack of work. Although the two men involved in the present case had less
seniority than others who were laid off, they were kept at work because of their preferential
status as Shop Committeemen. In October 1938, the two men were not reelected as Shop
Committeemen. Their names were accordingly removed from the preferential list and their
seniority dates of Nov. 4, 1931 determined their right to work. They were properly laid off
on Oct. 11, 1938 with seniority rights in their respective groups which was in accordance
with the local seniority agreement. These men were not employed at this plant during the
next twelve months and their seniority was broken on Oct. 11, 1939 in compliance with the
terms of the Agreement then in effect.
The present Agreement, signed on June 24, 1940, provides in Clause 9-e of the Seniority
Section that seniority shall be broken if a man "is laid off for twenty-four (24) consecutive
months. This provision shall be effective for all employees laid off since July 1, 1938." This
clause applied to the two men in question. Their seniority was restored but would again be
broken if they were continuously unemployed until Oct. 11, 1940.
On Sept. 13, 1940, the present grievances were filed in anticipation of another possible
break in seniority. The men claimed they were entitled to plant-wide seniority under Clause
4 of the Seniority Section which provides: "... When changes in methods, products or
policies would otherwise require the permanent laying off of employees, the seniority of the
displaced employees shall become plant-wide and they shall be transferred out of the
group in line with their seniority, to work they are capable of doing, as comparable to the
work they have been doing as may be available, at the rate for the job to which they have
been transferred." The Union contended that these men were, on Sept. 13, soon to be
permanently laid off because of a change in product and that they should, therefore, be
given plant-wide seniority. The "change in product", it was argued, occurred when
management started to produce a transfer case, never previously manufactured at this
plant. The Union stated that the two men would have been returned to work, before their
continuous lay-off totaled 24 consecutive months, were it not for the fact that management
could not get the production problems solved on the transfer case job. They were, the
Union claimed, about to lose their jobs because of a change in product.
Management contended that the two men had not been reemployed simply because there
was no work for them and denied their claim to plant-wide seniority. It was pointed out that
the "change of product" referred to by the Union was really the addition of new work, the
transfer case and army truck parts, which provided more and not less employment
opportunities. The management further maintained that the addition of this new work is
definitely not a change of product such as is contemplated by Clause 4 of the Seniority
Section.
Before this claim of the two men for plant-wide seniority had been considered at the
various steps of the Grievance Procedure, they were permanently laid off by management
and their seniority broken as of Oct. 11, 1940. Cognizance of this new circumstance was
taken at the second step of the Grievance Procedure and the Union added to the Notice of
Unadjusted Grievance a claim that these men were discriminated against because of their
Union activity. In support of this contention, the Union claimed that (1) Management had
clearly indicated to the Committee that these men would not be brought back to work
under any circumstances, (2) that no men were being hired, despite the working of
overtime, with the deliberate intention of allowing the seniority of these two men to lapse,
(3) the men who were not called back immediately after the summer lay-off "knew" they
would not get work until after the seniority of these two men were broken. The two men, it
is said, suggested at a Union meeting that they would waive their seniority rights in order to
help get the others back to work, (4) shortly after the seniority dates of these men were
broken, all others with seniority status were recalled to work as well as many former
employees who lacked seniority.
At the second and third steps of the Grievance Procedure, plant management and
Corporation representatives found no evidence of discrimination and held that the lay-off of
the men was strictly in accord with the local seniority agreement and the national
agreement. It was held that a granting of the request for plant-wide seniority would have
represented a violation of these agreements.
Union Contention
The Union contends in the first place that the two men were entitled to plant-wide seniority
as of the date of the original grievance, Sept. 13, 1940 since they were about to lose their
jobs permanently because of a change of product. In the second place, it is claimed that
these men’s seniority was not broken in a normal way but as a result of management’s
design which was so flagrant as to constitute Union discrimination. The Union seeks
redress for the alleged discrimination.
Corporation Position
The Corporation maintains that the men were not entitled to plant-wide seniority under the
original grievance because their continued lay-off was not caused by any change of
product within the meaning of Clause 4 of the Seniority Section. It is pointed out, moreover,
that the plant has long operated on a group seniority arrangement and the giving of plant-
wide seniority to the two men in question would violate this understanding. Management
contends that it has complied with the only pertinent provisions of the Agreement when it
restored the seniority of these men on June 24, 1940 and removed their names from the
seniority list on Oct. 11, 1940 in compliance with Clause 9-e of the Seniority Section.
The Corporation disclaims the discrimination charge advanced by the Union, stating that
the men’s seniority was broken simply because there was no work for them and that it is
under no obligation to employ men whose services are not needed just to prevent a break
in their seniority. Respecting the Union claim that there was an unwarranted lapse in new
hirings until the seniority of the two men was broken, management pointed out that men in
each group with greater seniority had not been called to work by Oct. 11, 1940. There
cannot be, it is claimed, any valid charge of discrimination against the two men under such
circumstances. There simply was no work to which they could be called, it is contended.
Analysis by Umpire and Decision
Two claims have been made by the Union, and they are so different in nature that they
must be considered separately.
Claim for Plant-Wide Seniority
As of Sept. 13, 1940, the Union claimed that the new work brought into the plant
represented a change of product, and that delays in getting the changed product into
regular operation was responsible for the permanent lay-off of two men. It is claimed by the
Union, that, under Clause 4 of the Seniority Section, the men were entitled to plant-wide
seniority.
This claim has no merit whatsoever. The local seniority arrangement is on a group basis.
The Clause 4 in question ordinarily becomes effective when a job being performed by an
employed man becomes obsolete, and it certainly has no bearing in this situation. The
Union claim for plant-wide seniority for these men cannot be recognized as valid.
Discrimination
The Union also claims that the break of seniority was caused by discrimination of the
management against these men rather than by lack of work for them. This claim is made
under Clause 3-a of the Recognition Section which provides that "The Corporation will not
interfere with, restrain or coerce employees because of membership or lawful activity in the
Union, nor will it by discrimination in respect to hire, tenure of employment or any term or
condition of employment, attempt to discourage membership in the Union." By the
specified terms of Clause 19 of the Grievance Procedure Section this claim of the Union is
subject to the jurisdiction of the Umpire.
In supporting its claim of discrimination, the Union submitted, in a general way, the
testimony that has been summarized previously. As announced at the hearing of this case,
the Umpire determined that such testimony could only be evaluated by reference to the
plant records. The results of the investigation that was made by the Umpire’s office has
been used in arriving at the conclusions in this case.
It is apparent from company records that the recall after the 1940 lay-off was virtually
completed during the week ending August 16 when only twenty-seven employees having
seniority remained unassigned to jobs. Twenty of these men were in the Production Group
and two were in the Material Handling Group. For five weeks beginning with September
30, 1940, eight hours of Saturday overtime was worked by a substantial number of
employees in the two departments. There were no further recalls from either of these two
groups, however, until October 8 when eight employees from the Production Group were
returned to work, leaving twelve men with seniority in the group still not assigned. After the
seniority of one man involved in this case was broken the remainder of the employees
having seniority in the production group were recalled in the following week. During the
next ensuing three weeks, 109 employees were hired in the production group from a list of
former employees who had no seniority status.
During the week beginning September 30, three material handlers each worked 8 hours
overtime on Saturday. The seniority of the material handler involved in this case was
broken on Friday, October 11, leaving one man in the group still unemployed. On
Saturday, October 12, seven other material handlers each worked 8 hours overtime. The
remaining man in the group was recalled on Tuesday, October 15, in a week when eleven
material handlers each worked 8 hours overtime. Three men were hired in the group
during the week beginning November 4 from a list of previous employees.
From the facts just outlined, it seems quite clear that the breaks in seniority do not appear
to be the result of a lack of work encountered in the normal course of business operations.
They appear, on the contrary, to have been the result of a management choice not to add
more employees even though production needs could be met only by the use of extensive
overtime work. This is more apparent from a closer analysis. On October 5, 1940, one
hundred and thirty men in the production group worked 8 hours overtime for a total of 1040
man hours. Only eight men were shortly thereafter recalled to the group. As matters turned
out, all the remaining twelve men holding seniority could well have been recalled on
October 8 because just four days later, or on Saturday, October 12, the management had
to work 191 men for 8 hours overtime. It was on Friday October 11, moreover, that
management chose to break the seniority of one of the men in question and chose not to
avail itself of the services of the twelve men still holding seniority rights. Shortly after the
one man’s seniority was broken, however, every other man with status in the department
was recalled and large numbers of men without seniority were hired.
A somewhat similar situation existed in the material handling group. Three men worked 8
hours overtime on October 5, 1940. At least one of the men who still held seniority in the
group might well have been called to work because, on the following Saturday, October 12,
seven material handlers were required to work overtime. Despite the impending overtime
that was in prospect, one man’s seniority in the group was broken on October 11 and the
only other man with seniority in the group was not called in until October 15. Eleven
material handlers had to work overtime on October 19 and it soon became necessary to
employ additional men in the group.
The facts disclosed by the investigation must be considered in the light of certain
surrounding circumstances. Management undoubtedly gave the Committee some reason
to believe that the two men would not get their jobs back, not simply because of their low
seniority in relation to available jobs but because they were not wanted. They were then
not hired when jobs were available and this fact cannot be obscured by reference to the
delay in hiring a relatively few other men. There were available jobs for all of them. While it
not directly pertinent, there is an indirect significance to that clause in the local seniority
agreement which reads: "When jobs are available for employees laid off, each employee is
to be placed on his regular job."
After careful analysis of the evidence in this case, the Umpire is of the firm conviction that
the seniority of the two men in question was broken under very unusual circumstances.
There is no validity to the management’s contention that a number of men with seniority
were not recalled simply because there was no work for them. On the contrary, they were
not recalled to jobs, despite the necessity of considerable overtime work, until the seniority
of two men were broken. Then a plentiful supply of jobs became available. The only
reasonable interpretation of these facts is that men were not called to available jobs in
order to insure that there would be the breaks in seniority that are under discussion.
Because the men involved had long been such active advocates of the Union, the break in
their seniority could scarcely fail to affect the status of the Union.
What of the Corporation contention that the actions of management were in strict accord
with the agreement? Management’s actions technically conformed with Clause 9 of the
Seniority section, but they were distinctly not in conformance with Clause 3-a of the
Recognition Section which prohibits discriminatory use of Clause 9-e, as well as others, "in
respect to hire, tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment." Having
certain seniority rights the two men in question were entitled by Clause 3-a of the
Recognition Section to consideration for jobs without any discrimination. In the judgment of
the Umpire this was not afforded them. They are unquestionably entitled to redress. The
Union has requested plant-wide seniority for them. This would not be proper under the
local seniority agreement which is based upon group seniority. The local seniority
agreement does provide, as previously noted, that "When jobs are available for employees
laid off, each employee is to be placed on his regular job." It is quite proper under this
clause to provide them with employment in their respective groups and to restore their
seniority. They are to be provided with work in their regular groups not later than March 24,
1941.
Decision
The break in seniority of two men was not in conformance with the requirements of Clause
3-a of the Recognition Section. Not later than March 24, 1941, these men are to be
provided with work in their regular groups and their seniority is restored.
George W. Taylor,
UMPIRE.
March 5, 1941.
No. A-89
June 9, 1941
Promotion
Alleged Discrimination
GRIEVANCE:
Chevrolet Muncie—Case No. 56.
"Grievance No. 79556, discrimination, coercion, refusing me a hammer, stating I am not

dependable and offering me an upsetter at 10c under rate, and if dependable on header—
on hammer."
SUMMARY
A was hired at this plant as a Screw Machine Operator on April 9, 1936, but was soon
transferred to a Heater job in the Forge Plant. On March 7, 1937, he was assigned to an
Upset Operation as a beginner. When A was rehired on September 26, 1938, after a shut-
down, he was again assigned to a Heater job.
On August 13, 1940, A filed a grievance when another employee was promoted to a
Header (Upset Operator), maintaining that his seniority entitled him to this job. This
grievance was settled when A agreed to go to a Heating job on a hammer instead of
continuing as Heater on the Upset Operation.
Toward the end of 1940, a vacancy occurred on a Hammer job. Management promoted a
temporary employee to this job and states this was because he had previous experience
on such work. On December 16, A filed a grievance protesting the placing of the "new man
on Hammer without seniority."
In answering the grievance, Management replied on December 31, 1940, that A "was not
given a chance to run the Hammer job because he is not dependable. He lays off quite
frequently and is often late when he does come to work."
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On January 11, 1941, the foreman asked A if he wanted a promotion to a 3-inch Upset job
which was open. The Union states the foreman initially told A the job would pay $1.15 per
hour, but came back about two hours later and informed A that the Superintendent had
ruled that the job would start at $1.05, or 10c under the rate, but that the full rate would be
paid within 30 days if A qualified as an Upset Operator. A declined to take the job on these
terms, stating he would rather remain on Heat at $.95 than go to Upset at $1.05. A states
he was reluctant to take this job because it was unfair to offer him a beginner’s rate on a 3-
inch head when he had formerly run 4-inch and 5-inch heads as a regular Upset Operator.
The Union claims Management discriminated against A, a Union man with experience and
seniority, when he was refused a Hammer job which was given to a temporary employe
who is not a Union man and lacks experience.
There are cases where both parties have erred. This seems to be one of those cases. The
Umpire is not at all impressed with the validity of A’s claims when they are made to stand
on their own. Was he entitled to a Hammer job? He had no experience on a Hammer and
his record was not superior. It was not at all unreasonable, under the Agreement clause
respecting promotions, for Management to decide not to promote him to the Hammer but
to recognize his "line of promotion" as leading from Heater on a Hammer to an Upset
Operation. A sought to short-circuit a reasonable line of promotion, as is indicated by his
refusal of the Upset job, on unsubstantial grounds. In short, the evidence of the case does
not indicate that A was deprived of something to which he was legitimately entitled when
he was not given the Hammer job by Management even though the foreman
recommended him for the job.
A’s claim secures status only because Management improperly advanced a temporary
employe to the Hammer job that is in question. A careful review of the evidence fails to
disclose any valid reason why it should have been made.
The promotion of the temporary employee to the Hammer job was at least contrary to
Section 3-e of the Local Seniority Agreement and has elements of Union discrimination.
Management is to be afforded an opportunity to "show cause" why this employee should
not be required to resume his former status in order to permit a promotion to the Hammer
job that cannot be construed as discriminatory.
A has no preferred claim for promotion to the Hammer job. In the event of vacancies
Management has the right to promote according to its own policy as long as no Union
discrimination is involved in its choice. Any possible Union discrimination in this case was
in the choice of the temporary worker and not in the failure to promote A.
In the Matter of:
and
General Motors Corporation—Chevrolet-Muncie
Division—Case No. 56.
The grievance that is before the Umpire in this case was filed by A. on January 23, 1941. It
reads: "Grievance No. 79556, Discrimination, coercion, refusing me a hammer, stating I
am not dependable and offering me an upsetter at 10c under rate, and if dependable on
header—on hammer." A hearing on the grievance was held in Muncie on May 13, 1941.
Nature of Case
A. was hired at this plant as a Screw Machine Operator on April 9, 1936 but was soon
transferred to a Heater job in the Forge Plant. On March 7, 1937, he was assigned to an
Upset operation as a beginner. When A. was rehired on September 26, 1938, after a shut-
down, he was again assigned to a Heater job.
On August 13, 1940, A. filed a grievance when another employee was promoted to a
Header (Upset Operator), maintaining that his seniority entitled him to this job. This
grievance was settled when A. agreed to go to a Heating job on a hammer instead of
continuing as Heater on the Upset Operation. It is now contended by the Union that this
shift was made specifically to enable A. to learn the hammer job. He was assigned for this
purpose, it is claimed, to a 1500 1b. Steam Hammer on Forks which the Union says is the
only Hammer or Header job in the entire shop with which A. is not familiar. A. complains
that, instead of giving him a chance to work on this job and to learn its operation, he was
then shifted around from one job to another. Management contends that A. was definitely
told at the time of this transfer that he would not be permitted to run the hammer and
further states it was necessary to move A. from one heating job to another because he
"was not able to get along or cooperate with the operators for whom he had to heat."
Toward the end of 1940, a vacancy occurred on a Hammer job. Management promoted a
temporary employee to this job and now states this was because he had previous
experience on such work. On December 16, A. filed a grievance protesting the placing of
the "new man on Hammer without seniority." It was then pointed out that the man who was
promoted was a temporary employee of only about two months’ standing, and the Union
insists that it has been unable to discover any evidence of previous experience on such a
job. In claiming that A. should have had the promotion, the Union contends that this was
required by the previous understanding respecting A.’s grievance of August 13 as well as
by Clause 3-e of the Local Seniority Agreement which reads: "Whenever possible, new
employees shall be started in the lower occupation and men already in that occupation
shall be moved upward progressively." It is emphasized by the Union that the ability of A.
to perform this hammer job should not have been open to question since, in his disposition
of this grievance, the foreman stated that A. "should have hammer and would like to see
him on Hammer, and that he did try to get him on."
In answering the grievance filed by A. on December 16, management replied on December

31, 1940 that A. "was not given a chance to run the Hammer job because he is not
dependable. He lays off quite frequently and is often late when he does come to work."
The Union states it then had no way of appraising the accuracy of this contention and
accepted it as correct. This grievance was not appealed. The charge of undependability
was supported by management at the hearing by the citation of several "outstanding"
instances as well as by a record of the man’s lateness and absences computed from clock
cards from January 7, 1939 to January 18, 1941. During this period he lost 6 days through
illness and 8 days for personal reasons or without advancing a reason. He was late on
eleven occasions and there are nine failures to ring his clock card.
On January 11, 1941, the foreman asked A. if he wanted a promotion to a 3-inch Upset job
which was open. The Union states the foreman initially told A. the job would pay $1.15 per
hour, but came back about two hours later and informed A. that the Superintendent had
ruled that the job would start at $1.05, or 10c under the rate, but that the full rate would be
paid within 30 days if A. qualified as an Upset Operator. A. declined to take the job on
these terms stating he would rather remain on Heat at $.95 than go to Upset at $1.05. A.
states he was reluctant to take this job because it was unfair to offer him a beginner’s rate
on a 3-inch head when he had formerly run 4-inch and 5-inch heads as a regular Upset
Operator. Upon consideration of this incident, two questions were raised by the Union:
(1) Since A.’s "bid" for the Hammer job was turned down on the ground of undependability,
didn’t the offer of the Upset job indicate the incorrectness of management’s sole reason for
denying him the Hammer job? Management sought to answer this question by saying that
A. had since become more dependable. This argument seems like a rather weak
rationalization in view of the short period of time that elapsed between management’s
decision on the hammer grievance on December 31 and the offer of the Upset job to A. on
January 11. (2) The Union claimed that Management was quite "out of order" in offering
the Upset job to A. contingent upon his acceptance of a $1.05 rate. The Shop Committee
held that the minimum rate for this job under the local wage agreement was $1.15 per hour
and that Management had no right to pay less. In this connection, the Union also referred
to a local understanding that an "employe will receive rate of job, first Monday he is on said
job." Management states, however, that this understanding does not apply in the Forge
Shop where "A man must be able to set up his own machine and maintain normal
production before he is entitled to the rate of the job."
Claim of Union
A. felt he had justifiable grievance as respects the two questions just considered and on
January 23 he filed the grievance in question making claims on the two matters. The Union
claims Management discriminated against A., a Union man with experience and seniority,
when he was refused a Hammer job which was given to a temporary employee who is not
a Union man and lacks experience.
The decision made by management on this grievance was that "with the expectation of 25
or 30 hammermen being required on the new Aluminum job, A. will be considered for a
hammerman job when these jobs open up." This disposition is not acceptable to the Union
which feels "that since A. is an experienced Forge Room man, and management has hired
new hammer men and placed them ahead of A. that he, A., should not have to wait until
new aluminum job opens up."
In support of its position that A. has no valid claim, the Corporation refers to Clause 3-c. of
the Recognition Section which states in part:
"The right... to promote... is the sole responsibility of the Corporation except that Union
members shall not be discriminated against as such." It is said that the operation of a
Hammer or an Upset machine requires considerable skill and among the principal
requirements is a need for steadiness and an ability to secure the full cooperation of the
heater in doing the work. In addition, the regular operation of the hammer is so essential
that a Hammerman must be regular in his attendance and work a full shift on the job. A.’s
record of tardiness and absences without explanation is said to have made it necessary for
management to pass him over in consideration for the hammer job in December. It is said
that he then started to show some responsibility and was more punctual so that he was
offered a promotion on January 11, 1941. He refused this job. Since management has
reserved the sole responsibility to make promotions, the Corporation denies that A. has
any proper claim simply because he was not selected for the hammer job.
Analysis of the Issues
The only part of the Agreement that is involved in the present case is that portion of Clause
3-c. of the Recognition Section which provides:
"The right... to promote... is the sole responsibility of the Corporation except that Union
members shall not be discriminated against as such." In considering the meaning of that
clause, one must recognize that reference is not to alleged discrimination of one man as
compared with another but solely to discrimination against an employee because he is a
Union member. The clause gives management a reserved right to make promotions as
long as Union members are not discriminated against as such.
Preference in Promotion to a Temporary Employee
In the first place, the present issue arises because a temporary employee was assigned to
a hammer job in December, 1940 in preference to promoting employees with seniority in
the Department. There is no evidence that the temporary employee had any previous
experience on the job. A. did have experience in the department and he also had the
recommendation of his foreman for promotion to the job. In addition, Clause 3-e. of the
Local Seniority Agreement is designed, according to management’s own contention in the
case considered by Umpire’s Decision A-88, to insure that "whenever possible" newly
hired employees will be assigned to the lowest paid classifications and the men already in
that classification will be promoted. It is also obvious that the man’s tardiness and
absences were no deterrent to a proposed promotion to an Upset job which was offered
within a relatively few days of management’s refusal to give the man a Hammer job. It
must be noted, however, that the Upset job was considerably less desirable than the
Hammer job.
Considering all the evidence, and even recognizing that A.’s employment record is not
unblemished, not a single convincing reason has been advanced by management to

explain its preference of the temporary employee over A. for the hammer job. The Union
suggests that the reason is that the temporary employee was and is not a member of the
Union while A. is a member of the Union.
The Umpire believes, however, that attention must also be directed to another aspect of
this case. The evidence indicates that, for understandable reasons, management may well
have been reluctant to promote A. to the hammer job for personal reasons entirely apart
from his Union affiliation. It would appear that A.’s attitude is far from cooperative. His
unrelenting insistence that he is a highly superior mechanic not only fails to convince but
raises a very real doubt about his abilities. The Umpire has no doubt that such personal
considerations accounted in a large measure for his failure to get the hammer job. There is
also a doubt as to whether, under a regular promotion procedure, A. was entitled to move
from Heater on Hammer to Hammer operator. There would seem to be good reason to
promote A. to Upset Operation and then later to Hammer Operation if his record made this
possible. Even though such a "progressive" move-up could not be made a hard and fast
rule, it would seem that management attention to this question might well be in order since
there is considerable confusion concerning management’s thinking in the matter.
The above line of reasoning may serve to explain why management chose not to promote
A. to the hammer job; and might also indicate that, at this time, A. was actually not entitled
to the hammer job especially since management has broad discretion in the making of
promotions. The resulting conclusion would have finally resolved the issue were it not for
the selection of the temporary employee for the job. How can he possibly be considered as
eligible for the job by any kind of reasonable standard? On the evidence at hand his
promotion appears to have been a violation of Clause 3-e. of the Local Seniority
Agreement which is admittedly designed to prevent the assignment of newly hired
employees to the better jobs. If A. was not entitled to the hammer job, and there are
reasons to support this point of view, how then can management reason that it should
properly go to the temporary employee?
The Rate Payable on the Upset Job
The Union attributes significance to the initial offer of $1.15 to A. for the Upset job that was
later changed to $1.05 for a period of thirty days or less. The lack of a clearly stated wage
policy applicable at this plant to such cases makes it utterly impossible to determine
whether or not the management program was proper. The evidence submitted to explain
the policy at this plant, respecting wage rates that are payable on transfers, is highly
confusing. The lack of clarity about what is the appropriate rate undoubtedly contributed to
the unnecessary complexity of this case.
There appears to be a local understanding that when employees are transferred, the
regular rate of the new job is payable to the employee beginning on the following Monday.
Both parties seem to agree, however, that this rule is for transfers from productive jobs to
productive jobs. The management argues that, even as respects such transfers, rates may
be below standard by a widely varying amount for 30 days in some cases and 60 days in
others. Such a modification is not accepted by the Union as proper. Reference is also
made by both parties to a "different" procedure when a man is transferred from
nonproductive work to productive work and management holds also that a different rule
has to be applied to certain Forge Shop jobs.
On considering the above testimony, one cannot but feel a sense of inescapable
confusion. It is impossible to decide whether the rate offer to A. on the Upset job was in
accordance with past practice or in conformance with a local understanding. There seems
to be some logical doubt about the propriety of management’s offer of the $1.05 rate for 30
days, however, since (1) the foreman originally offered $1.15 and he should have known
whether or not A. could do this job and (2) A. had previously been an Upset operator.
On the other hand, why did A. refuse this job? It was in a regular line of promotion for him
and if he thought the beginning rate was improper, the grievance procedure was open to
him to secure the proper rate. His conduct would indicate that he refused a proper
promotion in order to secure one for which he would have a claim solely because
management had promoted a temporary employee to the Hammer job.
Conclusion and Decision of the Umpire
There are cases where both parties have erred. This seems to be one of those cases. The
Umpire is not at all impressed with the validity of A.’s claims when they are made to stand
on their own. Was he entitled to a hammer job? He had no experience on a hammer and
his record was not superior. It was not at all unreasonable, under the Agreement clause
respecting promotions, for management to decide not to promote him to the hammer but to
recognize his "line of promotion" as leading from Heater on a Hammer to an Upset
operation. A. sought to short-circuit a reasonable line of promotion, as is indicated by his
refusal of the Upset job on unsubstantial grounds. In short, the evidence of the case does
not indicate that A. was deprived of something to which he was legitimately entitled when
he was not given the Hammer job by management even though the foreman
recommended him for the job.
A.’s claim secures status only because management improperly advanced a temporary
employee to the hammer job that is in question. On the evidence submitted, the promotion
of the temporary employee seems to have been based upon caprice, personal favoritism,
or an effort to show favoritism to non-Union employees. A careful review of the evidence
fails to disclose any valid reason why it should have been made. The most generous
appraisal of the assignment of the temporary employee is that it was in violation of Clause
3-e. of the Local Seniority Agreement which, as admitted by management, is designed to
prevent the assignment of newly hired employees to better paying operations as long as
employees with seniority may be promoted to them. In so applying the clause,
management automatically recognized that such an interpretation does not circumscribe its
free right to make promotions. The choice of who will be promoted still rests with
management.
The evidence shows that the assignment of the temporary employee to the hammer job
was not proper under the Local Seniority Agreement and was of such a nature as to
indicate a possible conclusion that Union discrimination was involved. There are reasons,
then, why the assignment of the temporary employee to the hammer job should be
rescinded because it represented an improper exercise of management’s right to promote.
Before issuing any effectuating decision in this matter, the Umpire feels that an opportunity
should be afforded management to "show cause" why the temporary employee should not
resume his former job.
Although a vacancy might occur on the hammer job as a result of action that may be taken
on assignment of the temporary employee, A. has no preferred claim to it. Selection of
employees for promotion is still the free right of management as long as Union
discrimination is not involved. If the assignment of the temporary employee is revoked, it is
to permit management to exercise its right to promote in a way that cannot be construed as
discriminatory. In such an event, the qualifications of A. would be weighed along with
others.
Decision
1. The promotion of the temporary employee to the hammer job was at least contrary to
Section 3-e. of the Local Seniority Agreement and has elements of Union discrimination.
Management is to be afforded an opportunity to "show cause" why this employee should
not be required to resume his former status in order to permit a promotion to the hammer
job, that cannot be construed as discriminatory.
2. A. has no preferred claim for promotion to the hammer job. In the event of vacancies
management has the right to promote according to its own policy as long as no Union
discrimination is involved in its choice. Any possible Union discrimination in this case was
in the choice of the temporary worker and not in the failure to promote A.
Signed GEORGE W. TAYLOR,
Umpire.
June 9, 1941.
No. A-118
June 30, 1941
Question Relating to Promotion Procedure
GRIEVANCES:
Fisher Flint No. 1 -- Case No. 83
"This man requests that he be placed in his former line of work and in his former
department which is Final Assembly. His seniority would be more effective in Final
Assembly than it is in the Trim Department."
"This man wished to be returned to Final Assembly which is his former department. He
states that his seniority would be more effective in Final Assembly than in the Trim
Department."
"This man’s seniority would be much more effective in Final Assembly than it is in the Trim
Department. Therefore, he requests that he be sent back to his former department."
SUMMARY
In February 1941, it became necessary to transfer several employees to the "Lower

Quarters" group in the Trim Department and to select for transfer employees who would
meet certain physical requirements of the jobs and who were otherwise qualified to
perform trim operations. Management states it also gave consideration to the fact that
some employees had made requests for promotion to better paying jobs.
The three claimants in the present case were selected for transfer from $1.00 jobs in Final
Assembly to $1.10 operations in the Trim Department. They have protested the transfer
because they claim they would "be better off" to remain on the $1.00 job where their
seniority would make it more likely that they would secure relatively full-time employment.
The consequent grievances of the three men were discussed by the Shop Committee and
Management on April 4, 1941. Management then stated the men would be returned to
Final Assembly because it was not considered desirable to have "the complainants work in
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the Trim Department against their will." It was emphasized by Management, however, that
it held the right to make such transfers, and that the return of the men to Assembly would
have to be "at the convenience of the company." The Committee expressed concern over
this approach to the matter and urged that the claimants be promptly placed back to Final
Assembly because "if the men were not placed back in their own department before sixty
(60) days were up they would lose their seniority standing in the department." The Union
now protests the Management position in the case.
The three claimants ask, in their grievances, to be transferred back to their old jobs in Final
Assembly. All are now back on their Assembly jobs so that answers to the basic questions
raised by the Union are not essential for a settlement of the claims as made in the filed
grievances.
Approval cannot be given, however, to the Union contention that all transfers or promotions
between occupational groups are prohibited by the terms of the Agreement of June 24,
1940 or by the local seniority agreement. On the contrary, such transfers are contemplated
by Clauses 7 and 8 of the Seniority Section.
The question of whether consideration to seniority in making transfers between

occupational groups requires preference to high or to low seniority employees is not ruled
upon in this case for obvious reasons.
In the Matter of:
and
General Motors Corporation, Fisher Body No. 1 -- Flint—Case No. 83.
On March 27, 1941, three grievances were presented in relation to the same matter. One,
submitted by F., reads: "This man requests that he be placed in his former line of work and
in his former department which is Final Assembly. His seniority would be more effective in
Final Assembly than it is in the Trim Department." A second grievance was filed by H. and
it reads: "This man wished to be returned to Final Assembly which is his former
department. He states that his seniority would be more effective in Final Assembly than in
the Trim Department." The third grievance was submitted by G. and reads: "This man’s
seniority would be much more effective in Final Assembly than it is in the Trim Department.
Therefore, he requests that he be sent back to his former department." A hearing on these
grievances was held in Flint on June 12, 1941.
Nature of Case
In February 1941, it became necessary to transfer several employees to the "Lower

Quarters" group in the Trim Department and to select for transfer employees who would
meet certain physical requirements of the jobs and who were otherwise qualified to
perform trim operations. Management states it also gave consideration to the fact that
some employees had made requests for promotion to better paying jobs.
The three claimants in the present case were selected for transfer from $1.00 jobs in Final
Assembly to $1.10 operations in the Trim Department. They have protested the transfer
because they claim they would "be better off" to remain on the $1.00 job where their
seniority would make it more likely that they would secure relatively full-time employment.
In other words, their seniority dates would give them a relatively high position in Assembly
but a relatively low position in the Trim Department. The consequent grievances of the
three men were discussed by the Shop Committee and management on April 4, 1941.
Management then stated the men would be returned to Final Assembly because it was not
considered desirable to have "the complainants work in the Trim Department against their
will." It was emphasized by management, however, that it held the right to make such
transfers, and that the return of the men to Assembly would have to be "at the convenience
of the company." The committee expressed concern over this approach to the matter and
urged that the claimants be promptly placed back to Final Assembly because "if the men
were not placed back in their own department before sixty (60) days were up they would
lose their seniority standing in the department." The Union now protests the management
position in the case.
Union Claim
In supporting the claims of these three men, the Union contends that their transfer was
made in disregard of their wishes and was, moreover, contrary to the seniority agreement
at this plant. Reference is to the seniority grouping, established on November 3, 1938 for
the North Unit Trim Department, under which an A seniority grouping is listed as subsidiary
to three major occupational groupings. At the time of these transfers, however, there were
no employes at work in the subsidiary grouping in question. The Union contends,
nevertheless, that it was not proper to move these three men from Final Assembly to Trim
because these major departments have been negotiated in the Seniority Agreement as
non-inter-changeable occupational groups. In addition, it is claimed that management
erred in transferring these particular three men because management did so without giving
proper consideration to their seniority standing in the Assembly Group. This phase of the
Union claim raises the important question as to whether low or high seniority employees
should be first transferred from $1.00 to $1.10 jobs in cases where there are other relative
disadvantages connected with the higher paying jobs. The Union also charges that the
transfer of the three claimants violated Clauses 3 and 4 of the Seniority Section of the June
24, 1940 Agreement.
The claims of the Union add up to a request that "these men be placed back into the Final
Assembly Department with full group and department seniority."
It is contended by the Corporation that nothing in the National Agreement of June 24,
1940, or in the local seniority agreements, limits or restricts the action of management in
transferring employees from one non-interchangeable occupational group to another,
providing seniority is given reasonable consideration in the making of such transfers. The
Corporation points out that the vacancies in question in this case paid $1.10 per hour and
management determined to promote employees with seniority to these jobs rather than to
hire new employees for these higher rated jobs. Clause 3-c of the Recognition Section is
referred by the Corporation as giving management the sole right to select employees for
promotion.
Observations and Decision of the Umpire
The Union is in error in maintaining that Clauses 3 and 4 of the Seniority Section preclude
transfers or promotions between occupational groups. Those clauses essentially concern
the manner in which seniority lists are made up and the manner in which the seniority
rights of employees are placed on such lists; they do not preclude transfers or promotions
between occupational groups. Recognition that such transfers may be made is clearly
evidenced by Clause 7 of the Seniority Section which provides that "When an employee is
transferred from one occupational group to another for any reason, there shall be no loss
of seniority..." This can only mean there will be cases where transfers will be made
between occupational groups. Clause 8 further supports this conclusion since it provides
that "In transferring employees, seniority will be secondary to other qualifications but will be
given reasonable consideration..."
It is clear beyond any reasonable doubt that the establishment of seniority lists by
occupational groupings under Clauses 3 and 4 of the Seniority Section does not prevent
the transfer of employees between occupational groups particularly since such transfers
are specifically provided for by Clauses 7 and 8. It cannot be held that the transfers of the
three claimants violated Clauses 3 and 4 of the Seniority Section. As a matter of fact, if a
transfer between occupational groups could not have been made in the present case, new
employees would have been hired at $1.10 per hour while employees with seniority
remained on $1.00 jobs. Such a situation would not fail to give rise to grievances of a more
serious nature than those of the present case. It would be unthinkable to countenance a
general principle that would permit such a situation solely to find a reason for returning the
three claimants to Final Assembly. At any event, the establishment of such a general
principle is precluded by the very terms of the National Agreement.
The Union also claims that their seniority in the Assembly group was not given reasonable
consideration when the three employees were selected for transfers to Trim. This phase of
the argument could easily get at "sixes and sevens" because management insists that it
gave a very important consideration to the relatively long seniority record of these men in
"promoting" them and also sought to act upon their earlier expressed desire for promotion.
The trouble is that management apparently considered the transfer as a promotion
because it was a change from $1.00 to $1.10 jobs. The claimants seem to have
considered their transfer as in the nature of a demotion because of the greater likelihood of
lay-off in the Trim Department. It would seem to be quite shortsighted, however, for the
Union to contend that low seniority employees are invariably to be selected first for transfer
from $1.00 to $1.10 jobs when such transfer is between occupational groups. This seems
to have been a desired objective of the Union in this case. Again, it seems that a principle
has been advanced principally to support the claims of the present case without much
thought of its general implication. In this connection, the Union revised its position but
insisted that, once an employee has established his seniority in an occupational seniority
group, he then has a right to stay in that group, and management has no right to move him
against his will to another non-interchangeable group.
Although it is undesirable, as recognized by management in this case, to transfer or

promote an employee against his will the right of an employee to refuse a transfer is not
specifically given to him under the June 24, 1940 Agreement. This agreement does
recognize, moreover, the right of management to make such transfers under Clauses 7
and 8 of the Seniority Section and under Clause 3-c of the Recognition Section as long as
seniority is given reasonable consideration in transfers and as long as Union discrimination
is not involved in transfers or promotions.
The transfers in question cannot be considered as improper on the ground that they
represented transfers between occupational groups or because they failed to give
reasonable consideration to seniority. No claim has been made that Union discrimination
was involved. The case is that the transfers or promotions proved to be undesirable
because they were made against the will of the employees and management quickly saw
the necessity of moving the men back to their old jobs as soon as practicable.
It is to be noted that H. and G. were transferred to their former Final Assembly operations
on April 14, 1941 and that F. was transferred as of June 16, 1941. The claims of all these
employees, as stated in their filed grievances have been met. As respects the Union claim
that their transfer was improper under the Agreement this can be substantiated only if it
were shown that seniority was not given reasonable consideration or that Union
discrimination was involved. There is no evidence bearing on the later phase, and the
question raised as respects consideration to seniority cannot properly be appraised on the
basis of the evidence on hand. In view of the fact that the claims of each individual’s
grievance have been met and in view of the nature of the seniority question in this case, no
ruling will presently be made on this phase of the case.
Decision
1. The three claimants ask, in their grievances, to be transferred back to their

old jobs in Final Assembly. All are now back on their Assembly jobs so that
answers to the basic questions raised by the Union are not essential for a
settlement of the claims as made in the filed grievances.
2. Approval cannot be given, however, to the Union contention that all transfers
or promotions between occupational groups are prohibited by the terms of the
Agreement of June 24, 1940 or by the local seniority agreement. On the
contrary, such transfers are contemplated by Clauses 7 and 8 of the Seniority
Section.
3. The question of whether consideration to seniority in making transfers

between occupational groups requires preference to high or to low seniority
employees is not ruled upon in this case for obvious reasons.
Umpire.
June 30, 1941.
No. A-153
September 2, 1941
Appeal of the Record Made by Management
Concerning a Disciplinary Layoff
GRIEVANCE:
Chevrolet Flint—Case No. 289
"Request for back pay. C.G., 556064, asks for pay for 1-28-41 when he was penalized for
running scrap. Foreman has since stated to man and committeeman that a man must run
some scrap or repairs to be running enough production."
Umpire’s Decision:
1. Although the grievance is written as a protest of a layoff, the basic claim of

the employee was stated at the hearing as related to the reason for the
discipline that was placed on his employment record. The present grievance
can be properly considered by the Umpire only on this basis because it was
filed about three weeks after the layoff and because Clause 3 of the Section on
Disciplinary Layoffs and Discharges requires the filing of grievances on these
matters "within three days of the layoff or discharge."
2. There is no valid reason for assuming that G failed to follow the foreman’s
instructions respecting the proper operation of his job and the notation on his
record that he did fail to follow such instructions is to be removed.
3. Should G’s employment record indicate or infer, nevertheless, that he was

negligent in the performance of his job and responsible, therefore, for the
excessive scrap that was made? In the judgment of the Umpire, the way the
work was running did indicate the need for more than the usual inspection if a
really workmanlike job were to be performed. G. did not give this added
inspection but there is evidence that he was deterred from doing so because of
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the emphasis placed by Management at the time on the meeting of certain

disputed production standards.
4. In order to avoid any future misunderstanding over the responsibility for the
scrap that was made, it is ruled that this decision constitutes the record of the
matter to be placed on G’s employment card. (Entire Decision should be read)
In the Matter of:
and
General Motors Corporation—Chevrolet-Flint Division—Case No. 289.
The grievance in this case was presented by G. on February 23, 1941. It reads: "Request
for pay, C.G., 556064, asks for back pay for 1-28-41 when he was penalized for running
scrap. Foreman has since stated to man and committeeman that a man must run some
scrap or repairs to be running enough production." A hearing on the matter was held in
Flint on August 20, 1941.
Nature of Case and Claims of Parties
The claimant was hired by the Chevrolet Motor Company on April 13, 1927. While working
on finish grind and on bearing grind for the past six years, Employee G. has built up a
record as an efficient employee. He is presently assigned to the finish grind on front
bearing of camshafts.
On the morning of January 28, 1941, an inspector discovered a truck load of camshafts, on
which the front bearing had been ground undersize on a large number of shafts. At just
about the same time, employee G. discerned the same condition on his work. A careful
examination showed that about 26 of the 50 camshafts on the truck could not be salvaged
and had to be classed as scrap.
In the performance of his grinding operation, G. is required to measure the size of the front
bearing of each camshaft by use of an indicator on the machine. He is also instructed to
use a snap gauge on every 10 or 12 shafts to double check the size. When the above-
outlined difficulty was noted, the gauges were examined. The indicator on G.’s machine
was found to be defective because the set screw at the bottom of the indicator had
become loose. This was repaired. Supervision felt, however, that if G. had used the snap
gauge on every tenth or twelfth camshaft, in accordance with his instructions, he would
have found out that the camshafts were being ground undersize before so much scrap had
been made. It was felt that he was responsible for making excessive scrap and was given
a layoff for the balance of the shift "because he failed to obey the orders of supervision to
check every 10 or 12 pieces which resulted in his grinding 26 camshaft front bearings
undersize." The disciplinary layoff imposed upon G. totaled 5.7 hours.
The employee did not enter a formal grievance on this case until February 23 when he
protested the layoff imposed on January 28, 1941. The unusual delay is explained by him
on the ground that he did not originally intend to file a grievance when he was laid off "for
making scrap" but he was moved to protest as soon as he found that he was charged with
"failure to follow the foreman’s instructions." He claims that such a reason for his layoff was
not advanced by management until a later date at the time of a discussion on another
grievance filed by him relating to the production standard on the job. Such a notation is in
error, contends G., because he did follow the foreman’s instructions by gauging every
tenth piece. He insists that the scrap in question was made despite this double check.
Could G. have ground 26 of 50 camshafts undersize even though he inspected every tenth
piece by the snap gauge? Management felt such a result could not occur if double check
inspection had been given because (1) it reasons that the type of defect on the gauge
could only have resulted in a series of undersize camshafts and not in some shafts ground
to correct size interspersed with some that were undersize; (2) the entire 26 undersize
camshafts were said by management to have been found together on the truck preceded
and followed by shafts of the proper size. These factors are interpreted by management to
show that the undersize camshafts were made in sequence and that the required double
check by the snap gauge could not have failed to catch the trouble before so many
undersize shafts had been made.
The above-outlined analysis advanced by management is not supported by the evidence.

It would be valid only if the operator had repaired the gauge after twenty-six undersize
shafts had been made. There is no doubt, however, that the gauge was still defective after
the inspector discovered the trouble since it was then repaired. It must also be concluded,
on the evidence submitted, that the undersize shafts were found on the truck interspersed
with shafts ground to the proper size. They were apparently placed together after
inspection.
Management determined, however, that excessive scrap was made solely because G. did
not snap gauge every tenth camshaft as required under the instructions for doing his job.
For such alleged improper performance of his job, G. was given a disciplinary layoff and
management contends this was a proper exercise of its rights to act to maintain the
efficiency of employees under Clause 3-c of the Recognition Section.
The employee insists that his discipline was improper because he did inspect at least
every tenth camshaft as he was instructed to do. He believes, therefore, that the loose nut
on the gauge must have caused the gauge to vary from correct size to undersize so that
the pieces he inspected by the snap gauge happened to be the right size. The Union
contends that such a result was most likely in view of the nature of the defect of the gauge.
This version is substantiated, states the Union, by the fact that, entirely contrary to
management’s statement, the undersize camshafts on the truck were interspersed with
proper size shafts.
In presenting its case, the Union emphasized that the "arbitrary" discipline imposed upon
G. can only be explained in terms of the "overbearing attitude" that has long been
displayed by the foreman who imposed the discipline. He has also, contends the Union,
insisted upon such a high rate of production for the job in question as to make it impossible
for the employees to exercise the more than required precautions to maintain quality that
would have avoided making the excessive scrap that is under discussion.
Because of the above considerations, the employee insists that he did not fail to follow the
instructions of the foreman and that a notation to such an effect should not be entered
upon his record. The Union emphasizes G.’s long record of efficient workmanship and
maintains that the making of the scrap in question was not due to any negligence or poor
workmanship on the part of G. but was caused solely by a defective gauge. In
consequence, it is claimed by the Union, that G. cannot be held guilty of the act for which
he was disciplined and should receive back pay for the time he lost.
Findings and Decision of the Umpire
It was made clear at the Umpire hearing that the fundamental grievance of the employee
relates to the record of the incident that was made on his record. The grievance as written,
however, does imply a protest of the disciplinary layoff. A claim for back pay was also
made by the grievance as written. In properly appraising the status of the claim, it is
important to note that the grievance was not filed until about three weeks after the
disciplinary layoff. Clause 3 of the Section dealing with Disciplinary Layoffs and Discharges
states: "It is important that complaints regarding unjust or discriminating layoffs or
discharges be handled promptly according to the Grievance Procedure. Grievances must
be filed within three working days of the layoff or discharge..." If the claimant in this case
felt that his layoff was unjust and that back wages should be paid, he had an obligation to
appeal it in a prompt manner. Since the filing of the present grievance was delayed for
about three weeks, and in view of the above quoted Section of the Agreement the claim
under discussion can only properly be considered by the Umpire as a grievance
concerning the notation of the incident on the employee’s record rather than as an appeal
of the layoff as such. Such an approach is not only necessary in view of the limitation
imposed by the quoted term of the Agreement but it is also logical since the claimant has
made it clear that his actual grievance concerns the notation on his employment record.
This is clearly the matter that is now properly before the Umpire.
Alleged Failure to Follow Foreman’s Instructions.
In the judgment of the Umpire, it cannot properly be recorded that G. failed to follow the
foreman’s instructions to snap gauge every tenth camshaft. The employee’s direct
testimony that he did follow such instructions was convincing. It would have been quite
possible for G. to make such an inspection, and yet for the excessive scrap to be made,
since (1) the defect of the gauge on the machine did not mean that an uninterrupted run of
undersize camshafts would necessarily occur but it could have resulted in undersize shafts
being interspersed with those of correct size. (2) The evidence indicates most strongly that
the undersize shafts were not all together when they were placed on the truck but that they
were placed in that order only after inspection. There is no sound reason, therefore, for the
assumption that the employee failed to follow the foreman’s instructions in the performance
of his job and his record is to be adjusted accordingly.
Was G. Nevertheless Negligent in the Performance of his Job?
Even though G. was not responsible for disregarding a foreman’s instructions, is it proper
to indicate on his record that the production of the scrap resulted from his negligence or
poor workmanship? In ruling on this matter, it is important to note that, even on the
previous truckload of camshafts, the size was not running just right and G. himself admits
that he was "suspicious" of the size of the work. In view of this advance warning, good
workmanship would seem to involve more than the usual or required inspection in order
that the source of the evident difficulty could be eliminated before it became really serious.
If G. could be held responsible for the large amount of scrap that was made, it was only
because he failed to exercise more than the usual care and to make more than the usual
inspection when that was indicated as necessary. On the evidence that is available, it is
not clear whether the above responsibility can be placed upon G. The Union claims that
any unusual inspection could not possibly have been expected at the time because the
foreman was vigorously insisting upon attainment of a production standard that was
extremely "difficult to achieve." It is said by the Union that fear of the consequences of a
failure to meet the production standard deterred G. from taking the time to make the
indicated extra inspection. The fact remains that the production standard of the job was an
issue at the time and it is quite possible and even likely that G. was actually deterred from
spending any time on extra inspection because of the emphasis at the moment upon the
meeting of the production standards. On the basis of the evidence, the notation on G.’s
record should consist of the above statement since there can be no conclusive statement
that the making of the scrap was caused by G.’s negligence.
Decision
1. Although the grievance is written as a protest of a layoff, the basic claim of the employee
was stated at the hearing as related to the reason for the discipline that was placed on his
employment record. The present grievance can be properly considered by the Umpire only
on this basis because it was filed about three weeks after the layoff and because Clause 3
of the Section on Disciplinary Layoffs and Discharges requires the filing of grievances on
these matters "within three days of the layoff or discharge."
2. There is no valid reason for assuming that G. failed to follow the foreman’s instructions
respecting the proper operation of his job and the notation on his record that he did fail to
follow such instructions is to be removed.
3. Should G.’s employment record indicate or infer, nevertheless, that he was negligent in
the performance of his job and responsible, therefore, for the excessive scrap that was
made? In the judgment of the Umpire, the way the work was running did indicate the need
for more than the usual inspection if a really workmanlike job were to be performed. G. did
not give this added inspection but there is evidence that he was deterred from doing so
because of the emphasis placed by management at the time on the meeting of certain
disputed production standards.
4. In order to avoid any future misunderstanding over the responsibility for that scrap that
was made, it is ruled that this decision constitutes the record of the matter to be placed on
G.’s employment card.
Umpire.
September 2, 1941.
UMPIRE DECISION B-16 Page 1 of 5
No. B-16
October 10, 1941
Termination of Employment Because of Extended Absence
GRIEVANCE:
Linden -- Case No. 3
"I claim I was discharged without cause. Due to the fact that I had my wife phone the
company of my absence."
Umpire's Decision:
1. The notice of S's absence was undoubtedly defective but, in the judgment of the Umpire,
a "satisfactory reason" has been provided in explanation. It is held, therefore, that S's
seniority was not broken by application of Part (c) of Paragraph 64 of the Agreement of
June 3, 1941.
2. S's extended absence, without securing a Leave of Absence, was improper and
represented a violation of Shop Rules respecting regular attendance and a failure to meet
his responsibilities as an employee. For the consequent loss of employment from May 23,
1941 to October 20, 1941, S must bear full responsibility and such loss is construed as a
disciplinary layoff. This establishes no precedent, however, as respects appropriate
penalties for such cases.
3. S is reinstated on his regular job, without loss of seniority as of October 20, 1941. (Entire
Decision should be read)
In the Matter of:
United Automobile Workers of America -- C.I.O. Local 595

file://C:\Users\bobology\AppData\Local\Temp\Framework\b-016_13C006FA.htm 3/22/2011
and
General Motors Corporation -- Linden Division -- Case No. 3
On June 23, 1941, the following grievance was presented on behalf of S.: "I claim I was
discharged without cause. Due to the fact that I had my wife phone the company of my
absence." A hearing on the matter was held in Philadelphia on October 1, 1941.
Nature of Case
On April 25, 1941, S. was absent from work and no reason was given. He was again
absent on April 29 on which day his wife notified management that the absence was
because of a "sick brother." A second notification in explanation of S.'s continued absence
was given by S.'s wife on May 5 when she reported that an "uncle had died in
Pennsylvania" but that S. would report back to work in a week or so.
Because of the apparent inadequacy of these reasons, the Employment Department

investigated and states it found that the employee was serving a 30-day jail sentence for
driving while under the influence of liquor. Management says that "on May 6, a release was
effected and another man hired to take S.'s place" on the ground that S. was absent for
more than three days without advancing a proper reason.
S. reported in person to the Employment Office on May 23 and at first failed to give the real
reason for his absence. Management states that S. was then informed "when he had failed
to give a satisfactory reason for his absence, he had been considered as having quit his
job and a release to that effect had been put through on May 6th." S. was told that there
was no work available at the time but that he would be considered for a job when a future
opening occurred. The grievance in this case was filed on behalf of S. by his district
committeeman, it being contended that management's action represented a discharge
without cause.
Position of Corporation
The Corporation points out that "when an employee is hired on a job, he assumes certain
responsibilities toward the conduct of such job... When it is necessary for an employee to
be absent from work for any reason, the employer has a right to expect notification
regarding the absence and the reason for same." It is further urged that "efficiency of
operations and production could not be maintained if employees were allowed to be absent
for indefinite periods without proper notification."
In the present case, S. had been absent for six consecutive working days when his tenure
was terminated. Although it received notice that he would be absent, management claims
that no satisfactory reason for the absence had been advanced and that there was no
proper notification as to how long the absence would continue. It is contended, therefore,
that S. lost his right to a job pursuant to Paragraph 64 (c) under which seniority is broken:
"If the employee is absent for three working days without properly notifying the
Management, unless a satisfactory reason is given."
Management maintains that a satisfactory reason for the absence was not given and that
the notice was not proper or correct. It is argued, therefore, that S.'s seniority was broken
when he was absent for more than three days. Had the employee submitted the proper
reason for the absence and asked for a Leave of Absence, management says,
"undoubtedly proper arrangements could have been made." Management says, however,
that "he chose subterfuge and, in so doing, his supervision had no chance to rearrange the
work or secure replacement without releasing him and hiring another man in his place."
Union Contention
The Union emphasizes that management was actually notified on several occasions that
S. would be unable to return to work and was aware of his unavailability for employment. It
is said in the Union brief that "Mrs. S. did not give the real reason for S.'s absence through
fear that, if management learned the true facts, it would jeopardize his standing with the
Corporation and because she was ashamed to admit that her husband was in jail."
The Union contends "that management imposed a penalty upon S. that was far too severe
under the circumstances." While admitting that S. was responsible for an irregularity which
cannot be condoned, the Union insists that management erred in applying Paragraph 64 to
cause an automatic break in S.'s seniority. This break in seniority was effected, stated the
Union, when management held S. responsible for "being absent from work without a
satisfactory reason." The Union maintains, however, that the "satisfactory reason" angle to
Paragraph 64 is not applicable to the present case but has been incorporated "for the
protection of those employees who might be absent for three or more days without
notifying management." This part of Paragraph 64 has no bearing on this case, claims the
Union, since S. arranged for notification to management of his absence within three days.
The Union admits that S. did not meet his obligation as an employee but maintains that his
action is not covered by Paragraph 64.
Opinion and Decision of the Umpire
Management states that the issue in this case "is the release of S. for being absent from
work without permission and without a satisfactory reason" as required by Paragraph 64 of
the June 3, 1941 Agreement.
Under Part (c) of Paragraph 64, an employee's seniority is broken if he is absent for three
working days without properly notifying the Management. An exception to the requirement
just stated is provided by the same clause when it states "unless a satisfactory reason is
given." Under this paragraph, an employee who is absent for three working days or more
assures retention of his seniority by notifying management on the third day of absence.
The required "proper notification" clearly includes a statement of the reason for the
absence and its likely duration. Both factors are important to management in the conduct
of the business. In the absence of proper notification as outlined, an employee's seniority is
nevertheless not broken if he later advances a "satisfactory reason" to explain his failure to
give such notice. This is the clear meaning of the clause as it is written and it is not proper
to extend the coverage of that clause.
In the present case, management was actually notified that S. would be absent. The
notification was clearly defective, however, as respects the reason advanced for the
absence and the likely duration of the absence. Under Paragraph 64, S.'s seniority would
therefore be broken because of the lack of proper notification "unless a satisfactory reason
is given" for this situation.
The defect in the notice of absence resulted because it was given by S.'s wife while S. was
not at liberty. She was obviously beset with unexpected and serious troubles. In the midst
of them, and not knowing how best to proceed, she gave a report to management that is
quite understandable under the circumstances. If she made a mistake, it was a very
human error. These circumstances, in the judgment of the Umpire, provide a "satisfactory
reason" for the defect in the notice. It is concluded, therefore, that the technical defect in
the notice of absence that was given does not result in a break of seniority under the terms
of Part (c) of Paragraph 64.
It is ruled, therefore, that S.'s seniority was not broken by application of Paragraph 64. This
does not mean that S. met his responsibilities in this case. By not seeing to it that someone
requested a leave of absence for him for the definite period when he would be unavailable,
S. failed to meet his obligation as an employee. Under Paragraph 101 it is provided that "a
leave of absence may be granted for personal reasons for a period not to exceed thirty
days..." By failing to proceed under this clause, the extended absence of S. constituted a
violation of Shop Rules regarding regular attendance. Such violation resulted from his own
negligence. It is held, therefore, that loss of employment by S. from May 23 to October 20,
1941 constitutes a disciplinary layoff for his contributory negligence which constitutes a
violation of Shop Rules. It is also held that S. is to be reinstated on his regular job without
loss of seniority as of October 20, 1941.
The time lost by S. is not to be construed as establishing any precedent as respects

appropriate penalties in such cases. Under all the circumstances of this particular case, the
contributory negligence of S. is considered by the Umpire to be of such a nature as to
require this employee to bear the mentioned loss of employment.
In reinstating S. to his job, the Umpire calls attention to certain fundamental aspects of this
case. S. did make a grave mistake as respects his personal conduct and has paid the
penalty exacted for his error. To deprive S. of his job on a technicality concerning the
giving of the notice of his absence would actually result in the imposition of a second and
much more severe penalty because of his personal shortcoming. Such pyramiding of
penalty is neither equitable nor realistic since S. still has to work for a living for himself and
his family. As a matter of fact, his employment is now the more important in order to assist
in getting him back onto the right track.
Under all these circumstances, the Umpire is of the firm conviction that while S. should
bear the responsibility for his loss of work because he failed to secure a leave of absence,
his seniority should not be considered broken since that could be effected only by a
technical and highly doubtful interpretation of Paragraph 64.
Decision
The notice of S.'s absence was undoubtedly defective but, in the judgment of
the Umpire, a "satisfactory reason" has been provided in explanation. It is held,
therefore, that S.'s seniority was not broken by application of Part (c) of
Paragraph 64 of the Agreement of June 3, 1941.
S.'s extended absence, without securing a Leave of Absence, was improper

and represented a violation of Shop Rules respecting regular attendance and a
failure to meet his responsibilities as an employee. For the consequent loss of
employment from May 23, 1941 to October 20, 1941, S. must bear full
responsibility and such loss is construed as a disciplinary layoff. This
establishes no precedent, however, as respects appropriate penalties for such
cases.
S. is reinstated on his regular job, without loss of seniority, as of October 20,

1941.
Signed GEORGE W. TAYLOR
UMPIRE
October 10, 1941.
B-17
OCTOBER 10, 1941
Job Transfers of Incapacitated Employees
GRIEVANCES:
Linden -- Case No. 12
"I charge T. Walker with discrimination. He is about to send me home because I cannot
keep up with my operation because I am injured. Yet he keeps other injured men on jobs
they can do."
"I hurt my hand two weeks ago. Two days ago the splints were taken off. Now Ted Walker
says if I cannot do my operation I must go home. I think this is hardly fair."
In the Matter of:
United Automobile Workers of America -- C.I.O. -- Local 595
and
General Motors Corporation -- Linden Division -- Case No. 12
On June 6, 1941, Employee M. filed the following grievance: "I charge T. Walker with
discrimination. He is about to send me home because I cannot keep up with my operation
because I am injured. Yet he keeps other injured men on jobs they can do." On July 19,
1941, a grievance presented by employee P. read: "I hurt my hand two weeks ago. Two
days ago the splints were taken off. Now Ted Walker says if I cannot do my operation I
must go home. I think this is hardly fair."
Both of the above cases were heard at the third step of the Grievance Procedure on July
25th and the discussion of both cases centered about the interpretation of Paragraph 72 of
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the Agreement of June 3, 1941. It was locally agreed that both issues would be combined
into one case and appealed to the Impartial Umpire as one issue, namely, "an
interpretation of Paragraph 72 of the Agreement as applied to cases such as the above."
The two employee grievances noted above show, states the Union, that management's
interpretation "does not follow either the spirit or the letter of the agreement." Management
contends, on the other hand, that it has properly interpreted the Paragraph in question in
holding that it is not applicable in such cases.
An Umpire hearing on this matter was held in Philadelphia on October 1, 1941.
Nature of Case
Despite the local agreement of the parties to combine the two individual grievances
mentioned above as an interpretation question, certain differences in facts necessitate a
separate statement of each case.
The M. Case
Employee M. injured his right hand on April 1, 1941. He was given medical treatment and
assigned to work other than his regular operation until June 4, 1941. In accordance with
the advice of the plant doctor, M. was instructed by his foreman to return to his regular
operation on June 6, 1941. The employee worked at his regular job but soon said that he
was unable to do this operation which involved considerable use of the right hand.
The employee's personal physician had recommended on June 5, 1941 that M. "be kept
on light work until the hand feels better." There is a difference of opinion as to whether M.'s
regular operation was such "light work." In this connection, the Union emphasizes that it
primarily required the use of the right hand; management emphasizes that it is light work.
At any event, the foreman told M. "that if he did not desire to do this operation he could go
home until such time as he felt he would be able to do so." The matter was then taken up
with the Personnel Director and the Union pointed out that there were several operators
capable of performing M.'s operation and all that was necessary to keep M. at work was to
switch the two men. The Personnel Director agreed to investigate the case but stated that
another job could not be immediately found and "unless the employee wanted to do his
regular operation for the balance of the day, he could go home until such time as another
job could be found for him."
Employe M. went home and lost about five hours' work.
As a result of the investigation by the Personnel Director, certain operations were

reassigned and, when M. returned on the next work day, he was given another operation,
other than his regular job, which he was capable of doing. The Union states that this was
the job which the committee had earlier suggested should be assigned to M. The later
assignment of M. to this job indicates to the Union that he should not have been assigned
to his regular operation on June 6 since he was considered by management on June 9 to
be still incapable of doing his regular work. The insistence of management that M. do his
regular job when M. felt unable to do so is considered by the Union as a violation of
Paragraph 72.
The P. Case
On June 2, 1941, Employee P. injured his hand which was placed in a splint. Shortly
thereafter he was assigned to work, other than his regular operation, which he was
capable of doing. The splints were removed on June 17 and, two days later, P. was told by
the foreman to resume his regular operation after this had been recommended by the plant
doctor. P. maintained he could not yet do his regular work and asked to remain on the
temporary job for about another day and a half "to finish the week out." The employee
states his doctor had told him, upon removal of the splints, not to exert a great pressure on
his hand for several days after the splints were removed so the numbness in the hand
could be worked out. He claims his regular job involved pressure on the hand.
Supervision states it "would be willing to assign him to other work in his group if he could
find an operation that he felt capable of doing." A job transfer was suggested by the
Committee but it would have required some instruction of P. The extent of training of P.
involved in the suggested transfer has been appraised differently by management and by
the Committee. Management nevertheless considered P. to be not capable of doing the
job in question because some instructions to him were required. P. was then sent home
"until such time as he felt he was able to perform his regular operation." He returned to his
regular job on July 23rd.
Union Claim
The Union contends that, in each of these cases, supervision insisted that an injured man
must work on his regular operation or go home even though the man felt unable to do his
regular job. It is argued that local management thereby failed "to comply with Paragraph 72
of the National Agreement, which provides that an employee injured at his regular job may
be employed in other work in the plant which he can do, without regard to any seniority
provisions of the Agreement."
The Union says it recognizes that the right to maintain efficiency is the sole responsibility of
the Corporation but claims that "if it is possible to keep injured employees at work on a
regular operation, without affecting the efficiency of the department, we believe a sincere
effort should be made to do so." The claim is made by the Union that M. and P. should now
be paid for the time they lost "for if supervision had shown the slightest desire to cooperate
with the Union, there would have been no need for these two men to lose any time."
In ruling on this question, the Umpire is requested to appraise the Union claim that
Paragraph 72 requires employment of injured employees under the circumstances of the
present case. It is the Union's contention that under Paragraph 72, management has an
obligation to see that injured employees are immediately placed on jobs they are capable
of doing.
Management submits that Paragraph 72 as written clearly specifies that the placement of
injured employees on work other than their regular operation is optional on the part of
management. It is noted that any employee injured in the plant is covered by Workmen's
Compensation and that Paragraph 72 states that such an employee may be given other
work. The Corporation insists it is not required by Paragraph 72 to change an operator
from job to job whenever, in the operator's opinion, he is temporarily unable to perform his
regular operation. In particular, management maintains that it has the sole responsibility for
making work assignments and if an employee cannot perform the job assigned to him, the
employe may be sent home.
Management believes, moreover, that Paragraph 72 is designed solely to provide work for
employees who have suffered an injury which results in some permanent disablement
requiring their permanent transfer to some other work. Management does not believe the
paragraph requires it to change operators from job to job whenever some injury makes it
temporarily impossible for an employee to work on his regular operation.
As respects the two employees involved in this case, management notes that during their
period of temporary partial disability they were placed on other work within their
department that they were capable of doing. It is contended that this is not required by
Paragraph 72 but was done to assist the employees. When the plant doctor determined
that their temporary disability had ceased, they were assigned to their regular operations.
Both employees refused the assignment, saying they were not physically capable of doing
it. They were then given the option of performing their regular work or of going home until
they felt able to do such work.
The Corporation insists that the above-noted procedure was not in violation of any
provision of the Agreement of June 3, 1941 and claims that the employees involved should
be denied any back pay for time lost as a result of going home on the days in question.
Meaning of Paragraph 72
The Paragraph 72 which is under discussion reads: "Any employee who has been
incapacitated at his regular work by injury or compensable occupational disease while
employed by the Corporation, may be employed in other work in the plant which he can do
without regard to any seniority provisions of this Agreement."
Two kinds of cases may arise under this Paragraph. An employee may receive an injury
which makes it permanently impossible for him to return to his regular work. In such
instances, Paragraph 72 clearly permits a transfer to another job, which the employee can
do, without regard to seniority provisions. The specifying of a procedure in such cases is of
primary importance in order to permit the job rehabilitation of an injured employee who can
no longer work at his regular operation.
The Corporation takes the position that Paragraph 72 applies only in the instance outlined
above and has no bearing on the second type of case in which an employee is injured and
is consequently unable temporarily to perform his regular operation. A reading of the
clause as written fails to disclose any restriction of its application as contended by
management. The Umpire concludes that Paragraph 72 is applicable when an employee,
because of certain injuries, is either permanently or temporarily unable to perform his
regular work.
The Union errs, however, in interpreting Paragraph 72 as making it mandatory that an

injured employee, incapable of doing his regular operation, must be immediately provided
with a job which he can do and without any loss of time whatsoever. The Paragraph simply
doesn't say that. It is a permissive paragraph and common sense requires that it remain
so. It would be absurd to require an injured employee to work on some job irrespective of
the extent of his injuries or to require management to place every injured employee at
some work. The injured employee may not desire to work for a period of time or the plant
doctor may properly conclude that some absence from work is essential to the injured
man's recovery. It cannot even be said that an employee temporarily incapacitated for his
regular work should have the choice of deciding whether or not he will take another job
since the employee cannot be expected to appraise all the limitations imposed by an injury.
There is no doubt that Paragraph 72 provides that an injured employee, permanently or

temporarily unable to perform his regular work, "may be employed in other work in the
plant which he can do without regard to any seniority provisions of the Agreement." It is not
a mandatory but a permissive paragraph which emphasizes that when an injured
employee is placed on a job, other than that he regularly performs, the assignment may be
made despite any seniority provisions of the agreement.
The question in the present case thus centers about when an injured employee may be
employed at other work. It would seem that such assignments by management are proper
when the plant doctor reports that an employee is unable to perform his regular job but is
capable of performing another job, which may be assigned to him if it does not interfere
with the efficiency of plant operations. By the very terms of Paragraph 72, management is
charged with the major responsibility for a common-sense application of the clause.
The Cases of M. and P.
The individual cases at issue actually do not involve the question of whether or not injured
employees, who are temporarily unable to perform their regular jobs, should be assigned
to other work. Both of the claimants, when injured, were given temporary assignments at
other than their regular work. The cases in question involve the question of how such
employees are reassigned to their regular work.
M. was given a temporary job for about two months. The plant doctor then felt he was able
to return to his regular work. M. tried to do his regular job and, despite the doctor's report,
felt that he could not keep up. He lost five hours of work while management found another
temporary job. Management's procedure was unquestionably not in violation of Paragraph
72. Management acted quite properly in reassigning M. to his regular job when the plant
doctor approved since neither management nor the employee can professionally answer
the question of when an employee was able to resume his regular duties. In the present
case, for instance, one cannot be certain whether M. could not do his regular job or did not
care to do so. Apparently management gave M. the benefit of the doubt and assigned him
to another temporary job. In the judgment of the Umpire, management did not violate
Paragraph 72 in this instance but fully met the spirit of that clause in going beyond any
contractual obligations in assigning M. to further temporary work.
P. was also assigned to his regular job when the plant doctor said he was ready for it. The
employee, however, disagreed with the plant doctor and insisted that he would not be able
to do his regular work until several days later. Under such conditions, management can
only rely upon the doctor's report. It went beyond any contractual obligations in seeking to
find another job that P. was capable of doing for the additional day and a half that he
requested. In order to provide such a short temporary job, management cannot also be
expected to instruct P. how to do the work even though the instructions would require but
an hour or two. An employee cannot be considered capable of doing a certain job for a day
and a half if he can do so only upon receiving instructions for an hour or two. That is not
applying common sense to the situation.
Conclusions
The cases of M. and P. relate to the termination of temporary jobs given to injured
employes. Such assignment to temporary work cannot provide an injured employe with a
"lease" on the temporary job that continues until he is willing to return to his regular work.
Management must depend upon the advice of the plant doctor in determining when such
employes should return to their regular jobs and cannot give such employes the right to
veto the plant doctor's recommendation. In the cases of M. and P. management
reassigned them to their regular jobs upon recommendation of the plant doctor. They were
unable or unwilling to do their regular work. Management then evidenced a willingness to
find other temporary work but properly insisted that it would have to be work they were
capable of doing without a learning period. M. was given another job after a loss of five
hours' work, but no job was found for P.
It is entirely unreasonable to charge that such procedure represents a violation by

management of Paragraph 72. On the contrary, the Umpire feels that management
cooperated in trying to find other jobs for these men after the plant doctor had certified that
they were ready to resume their regular jobs.
Decision
Paragraph 72 provides that an injured employee, permanently or temporarily

unable to perform his regular work, "may be employed in other work in the plant
which he can do." The Umpire cannot uphold the Corporation contention that
the application of this Paragraph is restricted to those permanently unable to
perform their regular work.
That Paragraph, however, does not make it mandatory for such an injured
employee to be assigned to another job; it permits the making of such an
assignment without regard to seniority provisions of the Agreement. The Union
is in error in claiming that an injured employee must be immediately assigned to
a job which he can do without any loss of time whatsoever. Paragraph 72
simply doesn't say that and the proposed interpretation of the Union is both
impractical and unreasonable.
The cases of M. and P. have been improperly appraised by both parties. They
involve the transfer of injured employees from a temporary assignment back to
their regular jobs. In basing such transfer upon the advice and recommendation
of the plant doctor, management acted reasonably and within its rights.
In the cases of M. and P., management procedure was not in violation of

Paragraph 72. On the contrary, management cooperated in an effort to find
other jobs for these men even though the plant doctor had certified that they
were ready to assume their regular operations.
Signed GEORGE W. TAYLOR
UMPIRE
October 10, 1941.
No. B-24
November 15, 1941
Request of Employee for Transfer
GRIEVANCE:
Chevrolet Oakland -- Case No. 2
"Man requests that he be transferred to repair department in place of new men being
hired."
Umpire's Decision:
Through paragraph 63 of the June 3, 1941, Agreement, Management reserves the sole
right to decide upon transfers of employees between jobs which carry the same rate of pay
as long as personal prejudice or Union discrimination is not involved. Since these factors
are not involved in the present case, the determination of a policy governing the transfer in
question is designated by the National Agreement as the sole responsibility of
Management. D's claim in the present case cannot, therefore, be upheld by the Umpire.
(Entire Decision should be read)
In the Matter of:
and
General Motors Corporation -- Chevrolet -- Oakland Division – Case No. 2
The grievance in this case was filed by D. on June 9, 1941. It reads: "Man requests that he
file://C:\Users\bobology\AppData\Local\Temp\Framework\b-024_13C01DD4.htm 3/22/2011
be transferred to repair department in place of new men being hired." A hearing on the
matter was held in Oakland on October 29, 1941.
Nature of Case
The claimant in this case has a seniority date of March 29, 1934 and is employed as an
assembler on the motor line in the truck plant at $1.10 per hour. On several occasions, D.
has requested a transfer to the repair department at a light repairman job where he feels
he would have a better opportunity for advancement. The negotiated rate for light
repairman is $1.10 per hour or the same rate that is paid the assemblers. During the past
year, a number of new employees have been hired in the repair department. The
availability of vacancies in the repair department has prompted the filing of the present
grievance.
Management has stated that D. was refused the transfer in question "because transfers of
this nature, which do not involve a promotion, require the breaking in of two employees,
whereas if a new employee is placed on the job it only involves the breaking in of one
employee." In addition, management emphasizes "there has been a flood of requests from
other employees on the assembly line to be transferred to the repair department and to the
new car conditioning department." It is noted that many of the requests have come from
employees with greater seniority than D. and all have been refused in order to avoid a dual
training program and because "transfers of this nature tend to disrupt departmental
seniority ratings particularly when an employee so transferred has greater seniority than
the employees of the group to which he is being transferred."
The Corporation contends that the transfer of employees is the sole responsibility of
management as outlined by paragraph 63 of the National Agreement of June 3, 1941. It is
maintained that in this case there has been no violation of the National Agreement and that
the employee has not been discriminated against by management's refusal to transfer D.
from the assembly line to the repair department.
Union Contention
The Union claims that D. is a qualified employee on the repair work and that his transfer as
requested would not, therefore, precipitate an additional training problem. Nor would his
transfer, according to the Union, result in a deluge of similar requests since many of the
men would not be capable of doing these jobs.
The Union also contends that Paragraph 63 does not give management the sole
responsibility in making transfers because it also states, in part, "when ability, merit and
capacity are equal, employees with the longest seniority will be given preference."
Comments and Decision of the Umpire
Paragraph 63 of the June 3, 1941 Agreement is applicable to the present issue. Its terms
are quite clear. In that paragraph it is initially stated that "the transferring of employees is
the sole responsibility of management." This responsibility must be exercised, however,
within the two limits specifically set forth by the succeeding parts of the paragraph. One of
these limits is that in the advancement of employees to higher paid jobs, "when ability,
merit and capacity are equal, employees with the longest seniority will be given
preference." Contrary to the Union contention, this part of the paragraph does not apply to
the present issue which concerns a requested transfer between two jobs paying the same
rate. The paragraph further provides that, as respects any transfers, "any claims of
personal prejudice or any claims of discrimination for Union activity in connection with
transfers may be taken up as grievances." No such claims of personal prejudice or of
Union discrimination have been made in the present case.
It is apparent that, under Paragraph 63, management has reserved the sole right to
determine the policy that is to be followed in the making of transfers such as the one that is
in question in the present issue where advancement to a higher rated job is not involved. A
contrary interpretation would substantially modify Paragraph 63 which, as written, clearly
reserves to management the sole responsibility for making transfers as long as the two
previously mentioned requirements are met. It is emphasized that such requirements are
not involved in this issue. Management cannot be denied the right, specifically reserved to
it by Paragraph 63, of deciding upon the transfer policy to be applied in the present case.
As stated at the hearing, the question at issue is actually an intra-plant personnel problem
rather than of alleged contract violation. Granting that the widespread transfer of
employees between jobs of the same rate is not conducive to efficient operations, it is also
evident that judicious transferring of employees, where desired by the employee, can have
beneficial results. Management seeks to fit the employee to the job and transfers can build
up a more versatile work force. It is emphasized, therefore, that this decision does not
preclude the transfers of employees between jobs that carry the same rate. A policy to be
followed in such cases is, however, a personnel matter that must be worked out to meet
the management needs in each plant.
Decision
Through Paragraph 63 of the June 3, 1941 Agreement, Management reserves the sole
right to decide upon transfers of employees between jobs which carry the same rate of pay
as long as personal prejudice or Union discrimination is not involved. Since these factors
are not involved in the present case, the determination of a policy governing the transfer in
question is designated by the National Agreement as the sole responsibility of
Management. D.'s claim in the present case cannot, therefore, be upheld by the Umpire.
UMPIRE.
November 15, 1941.
No. B-25
November 16, 1941
Request of Employee for Transfer
GRIEVANCE:
Chevrolet Oakland -- Case No. 3
"Why are we kept on lower paying job when in line with our seniority we wish to get off?"
Umpire's Decision:
1. Under Paragraph 63 of the June 3, 1941, Agreement, longer seniority entitles

an employee to preference in advancements to a higher rated job "when ability,
merit and capacity are equal." In the present case, the capacity of the claimant
to do the higher rated job is in question.
2. In seeking the advancement of T, the Union fails to recognize that his

capacity has been legally found by the Industrial Accident Commission to be
permanently impaired as respects his ability to perform the jobs to which he
seeks advancement. Under such circumstances, his seniority alone does not
entitle him to advancement under Paragraph 63.
3. If the mentioned incapacity has actually been eliminated, the employee has
an obligation to have the findings of the Industrial Accident Commission
amended to recognize the change in his status. Then he could be considered
competent to perform the job in question and would be eligible for consideration
to receive the rights he seeks under Paragraph 63. (Entire Decision should be
read)
In the Matter of:

file://C:\Users\bobology\AppData\Local\Temp\Framework\b-025_13C027E2.htm 3/22/2011
and
General Motors Corporation -- Chevrolet -- Oakland Division – Case No. 3
This case arose when Employees T. and C. filed a grievance, on June 6, 1941, which
reads: "Why are we kept on lower paying job when in line with our seniority we wish to get
off?" A hearing was held in Oakland on October 29, 1941, at which time the Union
withdrew the claim made by Employee C. The issue as submitted for decision, therefore,
relates to the claim of T. that he be transferred to another job.
Nature of Case
The claimant, with a seniority date of December 6, 1932, is classified under "Drivers --
Unlicensed Cars" which pays a rate of $.90 per hour. T. was assigned to this classification
after being injured while at work in the plant. He now feels he is entitled to a better rated
job.
T. sustained a knee injury on March 11, 1935, while he was working as an assembler. On
November 18, 1935, he returned to the assembly line on a job comparable to the one he
performed prior to the accident, but he continued to receive medical treatment. The knee
developed a tendency to "get out of place," however, which prevented T. from doing this
job. In an effort to find another job for T., which would permit him to work without a
constant weight on the injured leg, the employee was assigned to truck driving on March 7,
1938. He has since been employed on this job.
On May 18, 1938, T.'s compensation case resulting from the knee injury was closed when
the Industrial Accident Commission gave him a permanent disability rating of 12 3/4% total
disability or compensation equal to 51 weeks at disability payments at the rate of $18.24
per week. This resulted in a lump payment to T. on May 31, 1938.
T. now claims a virtually complete recovery from the knee injury and seeks an assignment
to a job on the assembly line. He claims his seniority entitles him to such a job.
The Corporation maintains that T. "has been given a proper job assignment taking into
consideration his permanent disability". On the basis of his most recent examination, the
plant doctor reports: "Although Mr. T.'s injured knee was apparently sound in December
1940, there is presumable susceptibility to re-injure which makes it advisable that this
patient not be allowed to work at occupations which would throw strain or excessive use on
the knee... I believe that Mr. T.'s present job, driving trucks between the two plants, allows
about as little likelihood of injury to the left knee as any general plant occupation, except
sedentary work".
Management feels that it has a very real obligation to make a work assignment for T. that
is in conformance with the doctor's report. This is particularly so, states the Corporation,
since the Industrial Accident Commission records show that T. is permanently disabled
because of the knee injury. It is emphasized by management that the permanent disability
rating was made after T. had contended he could not perform his regular work because of
a knee injury which was then legally adjudged to be permanent. In view of this legal record
and of the doctor's report, management feels that assignment of T. to an assembly job
would represent an undue risk not only to the employee but also to the Corporation which
could readily be adjudged negligent if a further knee injury developed while the claimant
was on assembly work. Management feels that if the knee injury has in reality been
completely cleared up, such a recovery should be attested by a competent doctor and the
records of the Industrial Accident Commission should be amended accordingly. Then,
states management, consideration could properly be given to T.'s claim for an assembly
job without any complications.
Union Contention
The Union feels that T. is capable of performing plant operations at a higher rate of pay
than he presently receives and which have been available in recent months. It is
emphasized that a new type of treatment has shown such good results that the knee injury
has been finally cleared up to such a degree that his family doctor has pronounced him
physically fit to perform operations inside the plant.
Under the above-mentioned circumstances, the Union contends that it is contrary to

Paragraph 63 to keep T. on a lower rated job while less competent employees with less
seniority are transferred to higher rated jobs. Reference is made by the Union to that part
of Paragraph 63 which reads: "In the advancement of employees to higher paid jobs when
ability, merit and capacity are equal, employees with the longest seniority will be given
preference." Under this paragraph, the Union claims that T. is entitled to transfer since
many higher rated jobs were filled by temporary employees who had to be trained in the
work for which they were hired.
There is no doubt that if T. is physically capable of performing a higher rated job, he is

entitled to preference in assignment to such a job over employees with less seniority if his
ability, merit and capacity are at least equal to such employees. The question in the
present case, however, concerns his capacity to perform a higher rated job in view of the
knee injury he sustained some years ago.
One cannot fail to recognize that the Industrial Accident Commission legally adjudged T. to
be permanently incompetent to perform an assembly job when it classed his knee injury as
a permanent incapacity. Management would be remiss if it ignored such findings in making

work assignments for T. and has taken an entirely reasonable position in this matter. To
assign T. to a factory job, despite the above-mentioned finding of the Commission, could
easily open management to the charge of negligence in the event of another accident.
There is reason and merit to the Corporation position that, if the knee injury has been
found to be not a permanent injury, there should be an appropriate amendment to the legal
record of the Industrial Accident Commission. Then consideration could properly be given
to the claim of T. for an assembly job.
In such cases, it is also evident that the parties are not in a position to declare whether or
not an employee with a physical defect can nevertheless work at certain jobs without
undue risk to himself and to fellow employees or without exposing management to the
charge that an injured employee has not been given a proper job. The parties and the
employee can only depend upon professional medical advice in such cases. In the present
case, the plant doctor has made certain recommendations in good faith that cannot
properly be ignored by plant management, particularly in view of the previously mentioned
findings of the Industrial Accident Commission.
As the present issue now stands, it has been determined by the plant doctor and by the
Industrial Accident Commission that T. lacks the capacity to perform the jobs to which he
seeks transfers. Lacking such capacity, his seniority does not give him the right to such a
transfer under Paragraph 63 which specifically mentions capacity as one of the factors to
be taken into account in the making of promotions. T.'s claim to a transfer to a better job
under Paragraph 63 would arise, however, if later medical examination disclosed that the
incapacity had been removed, as he claims, and if he were then to be declared competent
to perform the work in question by the Industrial Accident Commission.
Decision
1. Under Paragraph 63 of the June 3, 1941 Agreement, longer seniority entitles

an employee to preference in advancements to a higher rated job "when ability,
merit and capacity are equal". In the present case, the capacity of the claimant
to do the higher rated job is in question.
2. In seeking the advancement of T., the Union fails to recognize that his
capacity has been legally found by the Industrial Accident Commission to be
permanently impaired as respects his ability to perform the jobs to which he
seeks advancement. Under such circumstances, his seniority alone does not
entitle him to advancement under Paragraph 63.
3. If the mentioned incapacity has actually been eliminated, the employee has
an obligation to have the findings of the Industrial Accident Commission
amended to recognize the change in his status. Then he could be considered
competent to perform the job in question and would be eligible for consideration
to receive the rights he seeks under Paragraph 63.
UMPIRE.
November 16, 1941.
No. B-39
December 8, 1941
Disciplinary Layoff
GRIEVANCE:
Pontiac Motor -- Case B-8
"Laid off one week because I laid off July 2 and 3, 1941 and after the foreman promised
me those days off. I ask pay for the time off."
Umpire's Decision
1. It was understood by the foreman and W. on June 26 that the employee

would be permitted to be off on July 2nd and 3rd.
2. The later revocation of this leave by the foreman was not proper since it was
by arbitrary order made at the last minute and in disregard of the foreman's
prior commitment as well as of the plans already made by the employee on the
basis of the understanding. In short, the leave of absence was not properly
revoked.
3. W.'s responsibility in the matter is confined to a technical violation of a

foreman's instructions, and to a failure to file a grievance or notify his
committeeman of the position of the foreman, made clear on July 1, that a
failure to report on July 2 and 3 would be construed as a violation of the Shop
Rules. Only the absence of such procedure on W.'s part lends substance to the
claim that he arbitrarily failed to follow a foreman's instructions.
4. The penalty to be imposed upon W. is not to exceed a one day layoff. He is

to be reimbursed with the wages he lost as a result of the disciplinary layoff
except for the first day of that layoff. Such a decision appears necessary
because the one-week layoff was entirely disproportionate to the violation of
shop rules that is involved. (Entire Decision should be read)
In the Matter of:
United Automobile Workers of America -- C.I.O. -- Local No. 653

file://C:\Users\bobology\AppData\Local\Temp\Framework\b-039_13C0326C.htm 3/22/2011
and
General Motors Corporation -- Pontiac Motors Division -- Case No. 8-B.
The grievance in this case was presented on July 7, 1941 and reads:
"Laid off one week because I laid off July 2 and 3, 1941 and after
the foreman promised me those days off. I ask pay for the time off."
A hearing on the matter was held in Detroit on November 25, 1941.
Nature of Case
The claimant, employee W., is classified as a Pipe Fitter in the Maintenance Department.
There are 13 pipe-fitters on W.'s shift, 10 of whom had definite assignments as floormen.
The other 3 employees, including W., did not have definite assignments but were given
miscellaneous pipe-fitting jobs and were also used to replace any of the 10 pipe-fitters
operating as floormen who might be absent or on leave.
On June 26, 1941, W. asked his foreman for permission to be away from work on July 2
and 3, 1941. Management says "the foreman at that time told employee W. that he thought
it could be arranged but he did not make a definite promise." The Union contends that "W.
had been promised by the foreman to be allowed time off on July 2nd and 3rd" and,
therefore, made definite arrangements for a trip.
On June 29, 1941, one of the pipe-fitters, who is regularly assigned to floor work, was
given permission to take time off because of a serious illness of his mother. One of the
group of 3 pipe-fitters used for miscellaneous work was assigned to the temporary
vacancy, thus reducing the number of men available for miscellaneous or emergency pipe-
fitting work.
In view of the above-outlined situation, the foreman discussed the matter with W. on
Monday, June 30. The foreman states he then told W. "that it would not be possible to
grant him the leave which he had requested on June 26 to be away from work on July 2
and 3." Employee W. insists that, on the contrary, the foreman merely asked him on June
30 "to see whether or not he could cancel his trip and make other arrangements." The
Union emphasizes that on June 30 the foreman did not definitely instruct W. to come to
work on the 2nd and 3rd and that W. had no reason to believe the foreman intended to
revoke the leave. W. did check into the possibility of making other arrangements as
requested, states the Union, and found that they could not readily be changed. When he
came to work on July 1, therefore, the Union says that W. had every reason to believe he
would be off on the 2nd and the 3rd.
The Union states that on Tuesday, July 1, toward the end of the night shift, the foreman
again raised the question of whether or not W. would report to work on July 2nd and 3rd.
Management reports that W. says "he had been granted permission to be off on July 2 and
3 and that he was going regardless of what the foreman said at this time." The Union
states that the insistence of W. was natural since he could not possibly cancel his
arrangements for his trip at the last moment. At any event, the foreman then told W. that
his failure to report on July 2 and 3 would result in a disciplinary penalty upon a return to
work. Management states that W. then "repeated his statement that he was going and
continued by saying he would see whether or not he would be disciplined when he
returned to work on Monday, July 7." W. did not take up the matter with his committeeman
nor did he file a grievance even though the foreman had made his position very clear.
Employee W. did not report for work on either July 2 or 3 and, when he returned to work on
July 7, he was given a disciplinary layoff of one week "for not reporting to work as
instructed by his foreman." In the present case, the employee and the Union appeal this
layoff.
Management contends that employee W. was properly instructed by his foreman to report
for work on July 2 and 3, 1941, and W. nevertheless chose not to report on these days. His
actions, claims the Corporation, constitute insubordination and violation of the shop rules.
This matter is considered by management to be particularly serious because his services
were necessary. The Corporation refers to Umpire Decision A-63 for support of its
contention that "employees should follow the instructions of their foreman and may appeal
decisions which are felt to be infringements of their personal rights rather than decide the
matter for themselves."
In disciplining employee W., the Corporation contends that Pontiac Motor Division was
properly exercising its responsibility under Paragraph 8 of the June 3, 1941 Agreement
which reserves to management the right to "discipline for cause."
Union Contention
The Union contends that "this is not a simple case of an employee refusing to obey a
foreman's order." On the contrary, the Union feels that the incident represents an
unjustified revocation of a leave, made by the foreman at the last moment, so that the
employee was not able to change the plans he had made. A definite permission for W. to
take off was given, states the Union, by the foreman on June 26. This fact is substantiated,
according to the Union, (a) by the foreman's asking W. on June 30 "to see if he could make
other arrangements" and (b) by the foreman's request of W. to be back by July 7 to take
another man's place. The Union feels it is only reasonable to conclude that W. had definite
permission for the leave.
It is the position of the Union "that the foreman, having made the promise, should live up to
the promise unless the employee was willing to make other arrangements." In view of the
personal commitments made by W., the Union feels that management was entirely
arbitrary in ignoring its responsibilities in the matter as well as the necessities of the
employee. This seems particularly the case to the Union in view of its belief that W.'s
services were no more necessary on July 2 and 3 than on other days when less men were
working in the group. The Union also emphasizes that the penalty in question was wholly
unreasonable in view of the fact that, prior to this incident, W. had only been off work no
more than several days in seven years.
The Union request that W. be paid back pay for time lost as a result of the disciplinary
layoff in question.
A review of the evidence leads to the conclusion that, on July 26, the foreman definitely
agreed to W.'s request for time off on July 2 and 3. The real question at issue is whether or
not management later had a right to revoke the leave which had been granted. Common
sense indicates that management action to revoke such a leave should not be by the
summary issuance of an arbitrary order at the last minute but by a mutual consideration of
mutual problems. This is particularly true of the present case in which a minimum of notice
was given to the employee and where a lack of consideration was given by management
to the employee's problem. He had made extensive plans on the basis of a leave granted
by management. It is the opinion of the Umpire that management did not seek clearly to
revoke the leave until July 1. This means that W. cannot be held responsible for failing to
use the established grievance procedure, prior to July 1, in order to handle his case in an
orderly manner.
The Umpire feels that, in a technical sense, W. did not follow the foreman's instructions in
the present case. On the other hand, the foreman's conduct of this case was exceedingly
ill-advised. If he felt it necessary to have W. report for work on July 2 and 3, after having
previously given him permission to be off, one would logically expect that a matter of some
urgency in the plant was involved. In the judgment of the Umpire, the unforeseen absence
of another pipe-fitter did not justify the revocation of W.'s leave by the simple issuance of
an order that failed to take W.'s commitments into account and which ignored the
foreman's earlier promise. One cannot fail to be impressed with the arbitrariness of the
foreman's approach. This is particularly evident since the department was not faced with a
highly unusual method of operation, because of the absence of two men, since three men
are regularly employed for filling in on absences and for emergencies.
By the terms of Paragraph 47 of the June 3, 1941 Agreement "the Corporation delegates
to the Umpire full discretion in cases of violation of shop rules." In the present case, W.
was given a one-week disciplinary layoff on the ground that he violated a Shop Rule in
failing to follow the instructions of a foreman. It is the judgment of the Umpire that W.'s
failure to follow the instructions in question did represent a technical violation of the Shop
Rules. Under the unusual circumstances of this case, however, the layoff of one week was
wholly unreasonable and failed to take into account either the foreman's part in creating
the incident or the foreman's arbitrary handling of the case. It is held that W.'s responsibility
in the matter was confined to a failure to file a grievance or to notify his committeeman of
the foreman's statement on July 1 of an intent to impose a disciplinary layoff.
Such a procedure would have permitted discussions on the question of whether or not
violation of a foreman's orders was involved. It is the absence of this procedure on W.'s
part that lends some substance to the claim that he arbitrarily ignored a foreman's order.
An evaluation of the various factors of the case, however, leads to a conclusion that the
layoff penalty imposed on W. should not equitably exceed one day. He is, therefore, to be
reimbursed with back wages for all the time lost by him as a result of the disciplinary layoff
except for the first day of that layoff. This decision is necessary since management's
handling of the case was ill-advised and because the one-week layoff penalty was so
unduly disproportionate to the violation of Shop Rules that was in question.
Decision
1. It was understood by the foreman and W. on June 26 that the employee

would be permitted to be off on July 2nd and 3rd.
2. The later revocation of this leave by the foreman was not proper since it was
by arbitrary order made at the last minute and in disregard of the foreman's
prior commitment as well as of the plans already made by the employee on the
basis of the understanding. In short, the leave of absence was not properly
revoked.
3. W.'s responsibility in the matter is confined to a technical violation of a

foreman's instructions, and to a failure to file a grievance or notify his
committeeman of the position of the foreman, made clear on July 1, that a
failure to report on July 2 and 3 would be construed as a violation of the Shop
Rules. Only the absence of such procedure on W.'s part lends substance to the
claim that he arbitrarily failed to follow a foreman's instructions.
4. The penalty to be imposed upon W. is not to exceed a one day layoff. He is

to be reimbursed with the wages he lost as a result of the disciplinary layoff
except for the first day of that layoff. Such a decision appears necessary
because the one-week layoff was entirely disproportionate to the violation of
Shop Rules that is involved.
UMPIRE
December 8, 1941
No. B-44
December 5, 1941
Discharge of Employee
GRIEVANCE:
Saginaw Steering Gear -- Case B-4
"That I have been unjustly discharged and am asking to be returned to my job with pay for
time lost."
Umpire's Decision:
1. Since he is a Committeeman representing the Union, B.'s irregular

attendance record including unnecessary absences and lateness for personal
reasons is a matter for Union concern. It is highly improper for Committeemen
to seek to use their Union position to secure personal privileges that may tend
to make them undesirable employees.
2. B.'s attendance record is bad. He was, however, given a warning on July 15,
1941 that provided a reasonable opportunity for him to meet the requirements
of steady attendance. Since that time, it is found that his record has been
markedly improved. This factor must be taken into account in the present case.
3. The Umpire cannot absolve B. of all responsibility for his irregular attendance
in September 1941. There is a real doubt as respects the legitimacy of one
absence, or possibly two absences, and he was careless in reporting very late
on one occasion. These irregularities cannot be lightly treated in view of his
previous record and previous warnings.
4. In view of the above-outlined circumstances, it is ruled that B. is to be

reinstated on his regular job, without loss of seniority, as of December 15,
1941. The time lost by him is considered as a proper disciplinary layoff for his
irregularity of attendance.
5. B.'s continued employment naturally requires that he develop an attendance

record that is compatible with efficient workmanship and that irregularities for
unnecessary personal reasons be eliminated. The International Union is urged
file://C:\Users\bobology\AppData\Local\Temp\Framework\b-044_13C03F0A.htm 3/22/2011
to see that B. learns how properly to perform his Union duties without
unnecessary interference with the performance of his job. (Entire Decision
should be read)
In the Matter of:
and
General Motors Corporation -- Saginaw Steering Gear Division – Case No. B-4.
On September 23, 1941, a grievance was filed by B. which read: "That I have been
unjustly discharged and am asking to be returned to my job with pay for time lost." A
hearing on the matter was held in Detroit on November 26, 1941.
Nature of Case and Basis of Disciplinary Action
Employee B. was classified as "Automatic Screw Machine Operator—Second Class" and

received a rate of $1.15 per hour. He was hired on October 27, 1936 and was discharged
on September 22, 1941 with the following notation on his release slip: "Undependable
employee. Absent and late an unreasonable number of times."
In support of its discharge of B., management submitted a detailed record of B.'s

irregularity in attendance for the full period of his employment. No amount of explanation
by the Union can make B.'s record acceptable. The Union notes, however, that B. has
been a committeeman and claims that performance of his various Union duties largely
account for his irregularities. Such a claim lacks real merit. It is the primary responsibility of
committeemen properly to perform their Union business while still meeting their primary
obligations as an employee. Even when allowance is made for these irregular attendance
entries which might be related to Union business, the record of B. still remains highly
unsatisfactory. It is to be noted that whenever B. reported he was on "Union Business," his
record was so marked and such items were not included as an attendance irregularity.
The failure of B. to be reasonably regular in his attendance resulted in his being taken to
the Personnel Office on several occasions in 1939 when he was warned that his services
were unsatisfactory. In July 1939, he was given a disciplinary layoff and warned that
"continuation of this carelessness on your part can only result in further disciplinary layoff."
Later warnings were given in November 1940. that "if he reported late again he would not
be allowed to go to work." This was followed by the same pattern of irregular attendance
and repeated warnings.
On July 15, 1941, B. was given a second disciplinary layoff of one week on the basis of
"Unsatisfactory and Undependable Attendance." He filed a grievance on that penalty. In its

disposition of the grievance at the Appeal hearing, management stated: "We also wish at
this time to formally advise Mr. B. and the U.A.W. Shop Committee (of which Mr. B. is a
member) in the interest of good collective bargaining that unless Mr. B. shows an
immediate and complete improvement in his attendance and attitude toward his work, the
next disciplinary action must of necessity be a complete separation."
The above outlined warning was given on July 15, 1941. B.'s record then apparently
improved because it discloses no irregularities in attendance until August 28, 1941. From
that date until September 20, B. was absent on five occasions when he was reported sick
and was also late on one occasion. On September 19, Mrs. B. phoned the plant at 11:45
P.M. and stated "that Mr. B. would not be in to work at midnight as he was sick." A member
of the Personnel Department, who was sent to Mr. B.'s home, reports that "although he
rapped on the door several times he was unable to get a response." A further check-up at
1:30 P.M. is said to have showed "Mr. B.'s car in the driveway and the lights in the house
turned on."
Management discharged B. as of September 22, 1941 on the ground that he was an

"Undependable Employee." In the present grievance, B. appeals the discharge.
Union Claim
While readily admitting that B.'s attendance record has been unsatisfactory, the Union
feels there has been "a studied attempt to make the record more damaging than the facts
known to management would warrant." Certain questionable entries on the record were
referred to by the Union in this connection. It is also contended that some of the entries
used to show unjustified irregularity in attendance were undoubtedly for Union business. It
is said that, prior to the June 3, 1941 Agreement, Committeemen were not required to
notify management in writing of tardiness, absences, or leaving early for Union business
and necessary arrangements were customarily made verbally, sometimes by telephone.
The Union submits corroborative statements of other committeemen to substantiate this
contention. Since B. worked on the "C" shift and since the Personnel Department closes at
5:00 P.M., this committeeman is said to have been frequently unable to give proper notice.
The Union says B. would work on Union activities during the day and would, therefore,
often be unable to report at midnight. It is also said that he was sometimes called to Detroit
for early morning meetings which would necessitate his leaving work prior to the end of his
shift.
The Union expresses a belief that management "has taken advantage of this situation to
build up a case against Mr. B. in regard to being tardy and sent when it has been
necessary to fulfill the duties placed upon him by the U.A.W.-C.I.O." It is also suggested by
the Union that "management discriminated against Mr. B. due to the fact that the records of
the other shop committeemen in regard to being tardy and absent are comparable to Mr.
B.'s and they have never received any warning and the management has never given said
committee members any discriminatory layoffs."
As respects the present discharge, the Union states that B.'s record showed a decided
improvement since July 15, 1941. It is said that from August 28 until September 20, B.
experienced unusual troubles because of his own illness and because of illness in his
family which made it absolutely necessary for him to stay away from work, on a number of
occasions, after first reporting such situations to management. It appears from B.'s
appearance at First Aid, as well as from testimony supplied by B.'s physician, that all
members of B.'s family suffered from influenza during this period. B. contends that on
September 19, while visiting, he suffered a recurrence of the influenza symptoms. He says
his wife called the plant and that he managed to get home by about 12:30 and says "I
immediately went to bed and was only in bed for several minutes when my wife stated a
car had driven up in front of the house. She said she had gone to the door and turned on
the porch light and the car immediately drove away." B. now says the call was presumably
from a member of the Personnel Department staff.
The Union also protests the manner of B.'s discharge. On September 22, 1941, B. was met
outside the gate by his foreman who said "I have your check in full and your clearance
papers here, and I want your badge." B. says his request for a committeeman was denied
because the foreman claimed there was none in the plant and because he had been fired.
The Union maintains that management violated the agreement by adopting an arbitrary
procedure to circumvent collective bargaining on its proposed disciplinary action. It is
urged that such a procedure made it impossible for B. to tell his side of the story and
meant that management had taken action without being aware of all the facts of the case.
The Union now contends that B.'s discharge was not proper and protests management's
alleged refusal to bargain collectively on the matter at the time the penalty was imposed or
to discuss the case at the various steps of the Grievance Procedure. In its brief, the Union
requests "a penalty commensurate with the circumstances" which it is contended "should
not exceed a disciplinary layoff of 60 days." It is claimed that Mr. B. should be
compensated for all time lost in excess of such a layoff.
Management submits "it to be self-evident that this or any other plant could not operate if
such an attendance record, as detailed above, was maintained by even a minority of its
employee s." B.'s irregular attendance was particularly detrimental to efficient operations,
states management, because he was assigned to operate three automatic screw
machines. His irregularities have constantly upset the planning of this entire department
and the Corporation has too frequently suffered the loss of use of valuable equipment.
It is contended that the discharge of B. was proper and necessary for the efficient
operation of the plant and that management exercised its responsibility in accordance with
the provisions of Paragraph 8 of the June 3, 1941 Agreement.
As a committeeman representing the Union, B.'s attendance record unfortunately reflects

no credit upon his organization. Such a representative can best set an example of interest
in and loyalty to the Union purposes by combining zeal for Union business with a meeting
of his obligations as an employee. It is the Umpire's considered opinion that, over a period
of time, B. had sought to use his Union position to assume privileges that are not
compatible with the proper meeting of his obligations as an employee of the company. One
must recognize that the normal duties of a committeeman necessarily entail absences from
work and some irregularities of working time. There is no intention of curtailing the proper
performance of such necessary duties. On the other hand, B. has unquestionably gone
entirely too far in assuming the right to work as he wills. Such conduct cannot be
condoned. It is suggested that the International Union might well instruct its committeemen
as to proper policy in this regard.
The Umpire is impressed with the fact that B.'s record was particularly bad prior to July 15,
1941, on which date he received a warning that he would be discharged unless his
attendance showed an immediate and complete improvement. It is important that,
immediately following this warning, B.'s attendance record did show a decided
improvement. There were no entries at all until August 28, when B. was absent because
First Aid recommended it. He was also apparently absent for several days in September
because of illness.
If all of B.'s absences in September were actually justifiable because of illness, this
employee must realize that management's patience with him was understandably
exhausted as a result of his past record. There is a real doubt in the mind of the Umpire,
moreover, as to whether the absences on September 18 and 20 were necessary. On the
face of it, it appeared that B. might have merely developed a new type of excuse for his
irregularities.
It is necessary to realize, however, that after the July 15, 1941 warning, B. was entitled, by
management's own terms, to a fair opportunity to fulfill the requirements of regular
attendance. In appraising whether or not he met such requirements, he cannot be held
accountable for illness which made it impossible for him to work. When this factor is taken
into account, it must be concluded that B.'s attendance record since July 15, 1941 has
been markedly improved. This is to his credit. The Umpire believes that this improvement
of record was not fully taken into account by management which was simply exasperated
with B. After having displayed much patience in the handling of the case, management
then lost all patience. This resulted in B.'s discharge in a questionable manner. Employees
are not fired out on the street and B.'s story might well have been heard by the Personnel
Department which is expected to show almost infinite patience.
The Umpire cannot absolve B. of all responsibility for his irregular attendance in
September 1941. There is a doubt as respects the legitimacy of two of his absences and
no doubt that he was careless in reporting 45 minutes late for work on September 19.
These irregularities are not to be lightly treated in view of his previous record and
warnings. On the other hand, he is to be credited with a decided improvement in his
attendance record after July 15, 1941.
In view of these circumstances, the Umpire feels that a disciplinary layoff was in order but
that the discharge penalty should not have been invoked at this time. B. is to be reinstated
as of December 15, 1941 without loss of seniority. The working time lost by him is to be
considered as a disciplinary layoff occasioned by his irregularity in attendance. His
continued employment naturally requires that B. develop an attendance record that is
compatible with efficient operations and that irregularities for unnecessary personal
reasons be eliminated. The International Union is urged to assume the responsibility for
seeing to it that B. learns properly how to perform his Union duties without unnecessary
interference with the performance of his job.
Decision
1. Since he is a Committeeman representing the Union, B.'s irregular

attendance record including unnecessary absences and lateness for personal
reasons is a matter for Union concern. It is highly improper for Committeemen
to seek to use their Union position to secure personal privileges that may tend
to make them undesirable employes.
2. B.'s attendance record is bad. He was, however, given a warning on July 15,
1941 that provided a reasonable opportunity for him to meet the requirements
of steady attendance. Since that time, it is found that his record has been
markedly improved. This factor must be taken into account in the present case.
3. The Umpire cannot absolve B. of all responsibility for his irregular attendance
in September 1941. There is a real doubt as respects the legitimacy of one
absence, or possibly two absences, and he was careless in reporting very late
on one occasion. These irregularities cannot be lightly treated in view of his
previous record and previous warnings.
4. In view of the above-outlined circumstances, it is ruled that B. is to be

reinstated on his regular job, without loss of seniority, as of December 15,
1941. The time lost by him is considered as a proper disciplinary layoff for his
irregularity of attendance.
5. B.'s continued employment naturally requires that he develop an attendance

record that is compatible with efficient workmanship and that irregularities for
unnecessary personal reasons be eliminated. The International Union is urged
to see that B. learns how properly to perform his Union duties without
unnecessary interference with the performance of his job.
UMPIRE.
December 5, 1941.
No. B-45
december 4, 1941
Disciplinary Layoff
GRIEVANCE:
Saginaw Malleable -- Case B-1
"Unfair penalty -- I ask that I be paid for two days I was unfairly penalized."
Umpire's Decision:
1. The two day disciplinary layoff imposed upon P. represented a rigid application of the
Shop Rule that failed to give proper weight to the extenuating circumstances of the case. It
is ruled that the disciplinary layoff is to be reduced from two days to one day.
2. P. is to be provided with extra work, before his next seniority layoff or within six months,
equivalent to that lost by him on the second day of his disciplinary layoff. If such work is not
provided within six months of the issuance date of this decision, P. shall receive back
wages for the day in question. (Entire Decision should be read)
In the Matter of:
United Automobile Workers of America -- C.I.O. -- Local No. 455.
and
General Motors Corporation -- Saginaw Malleable Iron Division – Case No. 1-B.
Employee P. presented the following grievance on August 20, 1941: "Unfair penalty -- I ask
that I be paid for two days that I was unfairly penalized." A hearing on the matter was held
in Detroit on November 26, 1941.
Nature of Case and Claims of the Parties
The disciplinary lay-off in this case was imposed because of an employee's failure to
report, in a timely manner, his inability to get to work. Operations at this plant are on a
continuous basis. In years past, employee absences were too numerous. This resulted in
an undue loss of production and in excessive losses in employment to other employees.
Management and the Shop Committee agreed, therefore, that a two day lay-off penalty
would be imposed upon any employee who failed to report by his lunch period that he
would be unable to come to work. Management states this rule has been effective in
meeting the above-described problem. It is also stated that reason has been exercised in
the imposition of the mentioned penalty. Allowances have been made in cases where it
has later been shown to have been impossible for the required notice to be given.
Employee P. works in the core-cleaning department on a shift which begins at 6:30 A.M.
and which has a lunch period from 10:45 A.M. to 11:24 A.M. Under the above-mentioned
understanding, which forms the basis of Shop Rule No. 8, an absence of P. should be
reported no later than 11:24 A.M.
On Monday August 11, 1941, P. called the plant at 12:20 P.M. and reported that he would
be unable to come to work because the wires in his car were wet and the car would not
start. The Union notes that this condition of his car was discovered when P. started for
work at the regular time. It is said that P. "lives several miles out in the country" and that
there was no available means of notifying the plant until the car had been repaired and
used by P. to get to a telephone. The Union says the car was gotten in running order about
11:30 A.M. or 12:00 Noon when P., and his brother, immediately drove into town and
phoned the plant at about 12:20 P.M.
Management contends that the delay in calling the plant represents negligence on P.'s part
since there are numerous telephones available within a short distance of P.'s home.
Management feels that "any man living within eight miles of the plant, if he thought very
much of his job, could certainly notify us within five hours." It is urged that proper
compliance with Shop Rule No. 8 was actually quite feasible and that P.'s negligence in
failing to comply with it represented a violation.
It appears that, after calling the plant, P. had teeth extracted. On August 12 he reported to
the Personnel Department in person and stated that, because of the extraction of his upper
teeth, he would be off for several more days. When he returned to work on Friday, August
15, 1941 he was given two days disciplinary lay-off for not reporting his absence on
Monday, August 11, 1941 by lunch time on his shift. This failure was construed by
Management as a violation of Shop Rule No. 8 which reads:
"Failure to call in or report by lunch time of shift on which absence

occurs. (Two days to discharge)"
Management contends that P. violated the rule and that the disciplinary lay-off was a
proper penalty to be imposed by management by virtue of its rights under Paragraph 8 of
The Union maintains that the lay-off of P. was inequitable because "he made an honest
effort to comply with the rule and that the rule itself, which was originally designed to
correct a particular situation in the foundry, should not be enforced when the evidence
shows that a sincere attempt at observance has been made." The Union notes that the
claimant in this case called at 12:20 for himself and for his brother who also works at the
Malleable Iron Plant. The application of the rule meant that the claimant was penalized
while his brother was not "because his lunch hours on occasions extended past 12:20
P.M."
Contrary to a Management contention, the Union does not feel that the basic principle
embodied in the rule is being challenged in the present case. The Union contends,
however, that good judgment must be exercised in applying the rule. It calls attention to the
fact "that this rule has been in force since the summer of 1937 and that, until the last four
months, good judgment has been used in enforcing it." The Union goes on to say "prior to
that time only one lay-off was protested by the Shop Committee although a number of
people had been given time off for not making a reasonable effort to notify the plant when
absent."
In the present case, the Union maintains that P. made a sincere effort to comply with the
rule and should not have been penalized. The Union emphasizes that reasonable excuses
have resulted in a modification of the penalty under discussion and that Management erred
in not recognizing P.'s excuse as a reasonable explanation. It is requested that P. be
compensated for all lost time and that the rule be modified so that a reasonable excuse will
be accepted in the future.
The Shop Rule in question has unquestionably been applied, not in a rigid manner, but in
recognition of the fact that circumstances may make it impossible for an absent employee
to notify the plant strictly as required. In such cases, the prescribed penalty has been
modified by Management.
Management feels strongly that it was by no means impossible for P. who lived within eight
miles of the plant, to get word of his absence to the plant within five hours. It is said there
are numerous phones available in the neighborhood. There is no doubt that P. did not go
out of his way to get word to the plant.
On the other hand, P. did not entirely disregard his obligations to notify the plant since he
did call the plant from the first public telephone to which he had access after his car had
been repaired. He violated the shop rule in notifying the plant at the first convenient
opportunity rather than at the earliest possible opportunity.
The Umpire is of the opinion that the penalty imposed upon P. was at least partially related
to his later absences that were incident to dental care, a fact that was not clearly brought
out in certain earlier consideration to the case. With such absences adequately accounted
for, it does not seem that P. should have been subjected to the same kind of a penalty that
would have been imposed had he ignored the Shop Rule completely and failed to take any
steps at all to notify the plant. His error was that the notification was about one hour late.
It is concluded, then, that the two day disciplinary lay-off represented a rigid application of
the Shop Rule without taking into account any of the extenuating circumstances of the
case. On the other hand, the employee did not make as complete an effort to notify the
plant as would be required in order to effect entire compliance with the Shop Rule. In view
of these factors, the Umpire holds that the disciplinary lay-off penalty should be reduced
from two days to one day. It is also held that before his next seniority layoff and within six
months, P. shall be given extra work equivalent to that lost on the second day of his
disciplinary lay-off. If such work is not provided within six months, P. shall receive back
wages for the day in question.
Decision
1. The two day disciplinary lay-off imposed upon P. represented a rigid

application of the Shop Rule that failed to give proper weight to the extenuating
circumstances of the case. It is ruled that the disciplinary lay-off is to be
reduced from two days to one day.
2. P. is to be provided with extra work, before his next seniority lay-off or within
six months, equivalent to that lost by him on the second day of his disciplinary
lay-off. If such work is not provided within six months of the issuance date of
this decision, P. shall receive back wages for the day in question.
UMPIRE.
December 4, 1941.
No. B-52
December 30, 1941
Transfer Under Paragraph 63
GRIEVANCE:
Chevrolet Gear & Axle -- Case B-79
"I charge Company with violation of National Agreement P.P. 63 by rating No. 130416 as
reliefman when he does not have the seniority I do and I too have been rated as a
reliefman and can do the work."
Umpire's Decision:
1. In order to give meaning to Paragraph 63 as written, and in order to preclude

the nullification of the seniority factor mentioned in it, the following procedure
may well be followed:
(a) An outstanding employee, "head and shoulders"

above others in ability, merit and capacity, is entitled to
promotion irrespective of seniority considerations. If
necessary, Management should have no difficulty in
pointing out the factors that account for his superior
qualifications.
(b) When such an outstanding employee is not available,

Management may select several employees whose
"ability, merit and capacity" are adjudged by
Management to be approximately equal. The individual
in the group with greatest seniority may then be selected
for the promotion. Such an approach reserves to
Management the right to make selections for promotion
while giving proper weight to the seniority factor
mentioned in Paragraph 63.
file://C:\Users\bobology\AppData\Local\Temp\Framework\b-052_13C053F0.htm 3/22/2011
2. In the present case, the evidence does not support a conclusion that T. was
the one employee with superior ability, merit and capacity to perform the job in
question.
3. Since the relief job in question is not now in operation, it is ruled that it should
be considered a vacancy when it is resumed. It is then to be filled in
conformance with the principles developed by this decision.
4. It is emphasized that the procedure outlined by this decision is but one of the
ways in which Paragraph 63 as written may be effectuated. This procedure
cannot be applied retroactively, nor is it the only procedure that is to be
followed in cases of future promotions. It is set forth, not to establish an
inflexible precedent in such cases, but as one of the ways by which Paragraph
63 may be applied in a practical and equitable manner. (Entire Decision should
be read)
In the Matter of:
and
General Motors Corporation -- Chevrolet Gear & Axle Division -- Detroit -- Case B-79.
This case concerns a grievance, presented by Employee M. on August 15, 1941, which
reads:
"I charge Company with violation of National Agreement P.P. 63 by

rating No. 130416 as reliefman when he does not have the seniority
I do and I too have been rated as reliefman and can do the work."
A hearing on the matter was held in Detroit on December 8, 1941.
Nature of Case
On August 4, 1941, a reliefman vacancy occurred on the first shift of Plant No. 3 in Group
No. 20 which includes the Spring Housing job and the King Pin Support job. Employee T.
was selected to fill the vacancy. The present grievance represents a claim of Employee M.
that, in accordance with Paragraph 63, his seniority and previous experience entitle him to
the reliefman's job in question.
Management notes that the Spring Housing and the King Pin Support jobs have not been
in regular production since 1938 and are now operated in order to supply service parts.
Employees are used interchangeably between the two operations and the reliefman is also
required to be able to work on both types of work. The relief job in question was not in
operation at the time of the discussions of the case in the earlier steps of the grievance
procedure, but the Union "requests that M. be placed in line for the job so that when work
is resumed he will be made the reliefman."
The previous experience of T. on this work includes service as a reliefman on the King Pin
Support job when it was in production as a separate job. He has had other service as a
reliefman in Group No. 20 but no significant experience as a reliefman on the Spring
Housing job. Altogether T. has had about twenty months' experience as a reliefman and he
has a seniority date of 11/21/30.
The claimant in this case, Employee M., served as a reliefman on the Spring Housing job
when it was in regular production but has apparently had no experience as a reliefman on
the King Pin Support job. His experience as a reliefman totals approximately eleven
months and his seniority date is 3/12/24.
Management is of the opinion that T. has better qualifications than M. to fill the reliefman
vacancy. Of the 16 machines included in the King Pin Support job, T. is said to have set up
14 and to have operated all sixteen. Of the 17 operations on the Spring Housing job, T.
has set up 15 and has operated 16 of them. Management has weighed T.'s experience
which is said to provide him with better qualifications as compared to M. who, it is claimed,
has not set up any of the sixteen machines in the King Pin Support job and has only
operated eight of them. Of the Spring Housing machines, management reports that M. has
had set-up experience on ten and operating experience on thirteen of them.
The selection of an employee for transfer to the vacancy in question had to take into
account, states management, the necessity for interchanging employees between two
types of work. It is said, therefore, that the best qualified candidate for the reliefman's job
would be the one who was most familiar with the various jobs. T.'s longer and wider
experience as a reliefman on both the King Pin Support job and later in Group No. 20 is
appraised by management as giving him superior qualifications, as compared to M., for the
job to which he was promoted. The selection of T., contends management, was a proper
exercise of management's responsibility as outlined in Paragraph 63 of the June 3, 1941
Agreement.
Union Contention
The Union, in its brief, recognized that the relief job in question requires a considerable
versatility to do various operations and that only a few men have such all-around
experience because the jobs are for past model service rather than for current model
production.
It is contended by the Union, however, that M. was not only better qualified to fill the
reliefman's vacancy but had greater seniority than T. In its brief, the Union expresses its
belief that, under Paragraph 63, "when a promotion is to be made, the agreement implies
that the employee with the longest seniority shall be the first considered and in the event
he can do the job adequately, he is to be given the promotion without the personality
comparisons usually made in promoting men."
The Union contends, then, that M. was entitled to selection for the reliefman's vacancy and
that he should "be placed in line for the job so that when work resumed he will be made the
reliefman."
Paragraph 63 of the June 3, 1941 Agreement provides, in part, "The transferring of

employees is the sole responsibility of the management. In the advancement of employees
to higher paid jobs when ability, merit and capacity are equal, employees with the longest
seniority will be given preference."
There have been marked difficulties in the effort satisfactorily to apply this clause. It is
difficult to define, let alone evaluate, such intangible factors as "merit and capacity." The
Union certainly errs in its present argument, however, that the clause specifies preference
to the employee with most seniority and gives him a right to promotion "in the event he can
do the job adequately." Since such an interpretation would give importance to seniority
irrespective of relative "ability and capacity," the approach of the local Union is obviously
not in accordance with Paragraph 63 as written.
Under Paragraph 63 seniority becomes the determining factor in a selection for promotion
only as between employees whose "ability, merit and capacity are equal." In order to
attribute a reasonable meaning to the clause, it must be recognized that (1) the relative
ability, merit and capacity of individual employees cannot be precisely evaluated; (2) these
factors in one employee's work will be differently rated by different supervisors because
their appraisal involves personal judgment; (3) seniority is, however, a definite factor that
can readily be measured; (4) in making a selection for certain promotions, under this
clause, management may properly proceed by designating several men whose ability,
merit and capacity are considered by management to be equal. The seniority factor can
then be applied in making the choice of the individual who is to be promoted.
In considering employees for promotion under Paragraph 63, it may be that an employee's
record is so outstanding that he is "head and shoulders" above any other possible
candidate. In such cases, he is entitled to promotion irrespective of seniority and, if
necessary, management should have no difficulty in pointing out his superior qualifications.
Unless such an individual is available for promotion, Paragraph 63 can properly be
effectuated by management's selection of several employees who are competent to fill the
job and whose "ability, merit and capacity" are considered by management to be
approximately equal. From the several candidates adjudged by management to be
approximately equal in "ability, merit and capacity," it would then become possible to
effectuate Paragraph 63 by selecting for promotion that individual in the group who has the
greatest seniority.
Such a procedure follows Paragraph 63 in recognizing that qualifications of several

employees are often approximately equal and in recognizing the compelling importance of
seniority in such cases. The Umpire must assume that the parties sought to give
compelling importance to seniority as respects certain promotions or Paragraph 63 would
have been written in different terms. It is emphasized that, under such a procedure,
management retains the sole responsibility for designating the employees who are to be
promoted.
How would such a procedure be applied to the facts of the present case? Management
has made its choice as between T. and M. principally on the basis of the relative number of
machines on the relief job, that had been previously operated by each of these men: To be
sure, this is a factor that is important because of the nature of the job. The relative ability of
these men in operating such jobs is, however, a considerably different factor and the
mentioned experience has little to do with merit and capacity. It is the opinion of the
Umpire that the evidence does not show that T. had the outstanding "ability, merit and
capacity" for the job in question.
It is to be noted that the reliefman job is not now being operated. This provides an
opportunity to apply the above-outlined procedure when it resumes operation. At that time,
the job should again be considered as a vacancy. If a review of the qualifications of the
candidates for the job shows that one is "head and shoulders" above all others, not only in
experience but in ability, merit and capacity, it is in conformance with Paragraph 63 for
management to assign him to the job. If such an individual is not available, management
may designate two or three employees who are competent to take the assignment and
who are considered by management as being approximately equal as respects ability,
merit and capacity. The individual assigned to the vacancy should be the one in the group
who holds the greatest seniority.
Decision
1. In order to give meaning to Paragraph 63 as written, and in order to preclude

the nullification of the seniority factor mentioned in it, the following procedure
may well be followed:
(a) An outstanding employee, "head and shoulders"

above others in ability, merit and capacity, is entitled to
promotion irrespective of seniority considerations. If
necessary, management should have no difficulty in
pointing out the factors that account for his superior
qualifications.
(b) When such an outstanding employee is not available,

management may select several employees whose
"ability, merit and capacity" are adjudged by
management to be approximately equal. The individual
in the group with greatest seniority may then be selected
for the promotion. Such an approach reserves to
management the right to make selections for promotion
while giving proper weight to the seniority factor
mentioned in Paragraph 63.
2. In the present case, the evidence does not support a conclusion that T. was
the one employee with superior ability, merit and capacity to perform the job in
question.
3. Since the relief job in question is not now in operation, it is ruled that it should
be considered a vacancy when it is resumed. It is then to be filled in
conformance with the principles developed by this decision.
4. It is emphasized that the procedure outlined by this decision is but one of the
ways in which Paragraph 63 as written may be effectuated. This procedure
cannot be applied retroactively, nor is it the only procedure that is to be
followed in cases of future promotions. It is set forth, not to establish an
inflexible precedent in such cases, but as one of the ways by which Paragraph
63 may be applied in a practical and equitable manner.
UMPIRE.
December 30, 1941.
No. B-55
December 31, 1941
Transfer of Employee Under Paragraph 63
GRIEVANCE:
"At least five (5) men in 791 want the opportunity of having the job of die-setter in 791-A3. They are breaking
in a press operator from another Dept. (790) on this job."
Umpire's Decision:
1. The promotion of C. was not improper solely because it was an inter-department transfer.
Such transfers are not prohibited by Paragraphs 8 and 63; but are specifically contemplated by
Paragraph 62. Nor are such transfers precluded by past practice at this plant which is that inter-
department promotions will be made as far as practicable.
2. Paragraph 63 cannot interfere with Management's exercise of its sole responsibility to select
and to train supervisors and foremen, the proper performance of which is a vital necessity for
the efficient operation of the plant. In selecting employees for assignment to jobs specifically for
such training, as in the present case, Management's evaluation of the "ability, merit and
capacity" of the employees has a compelling status.
3. In view of the above, the Umpire cannot approve the Union claim that C. be returned to
Department 790 and that J. be assigned to the die setting job. This would represent an
unwarranted interference with Management's program for the training of foremen. (Entire
In the Matter of:
and
General Motors Corporation -- Pontiac Motors Division -- Case B-24
file://C:\Users\bobology\AppData\Local\Temp\Framework\b-055_13C05E7B.htm 3/22/2011
The following employee grievance was presented by J. on August 20, 1941: "At least five (5) men in 791
want the opportunity of having the job of die-setter in 791-A3. They are breaking in a press operator from
another Dept. (790) on this job." A hearing on the matter was held in Detroit on December 9, 1941.
A vacancy on the die-setter job in Department 791-A3 of the Sheet Metal Plant was filled on August 17, 1941
by the transfer of Employee C. who had been a punch press operator in Department 790 and who holds a
seniority date of March 9, 1934. The grievance in the present case was filed by Employee J. whose seniority
date is July 10, 1933. None of the other employees in Department 791-A3 have greater seniority than C.; this
is admitted in the Union Statement of Unadjusted Grievance.
Management explains the assignment of C. to the die-setter's job by noting that for the past two years this
employee has worked with the die-setters and, in the absence of one of them, has often set dies himself. It is
said that "in this work he showed interest, initiative and adaptability superior to that of employee J. who had
no experience in die-setting." Management takes that position that "Employees who are selected as die-
setters must have several qualifications beside the ability to break in as a die-setter. As practically all
foremen in the sheet metal plant are selected from the die-setter group, consideration is given by
supervision, before a die-setter is selected, as to whether or not he has the potential qualifications of a
foreman." Under Paragraph 63, it is contended, management has the sole right to judge such qualifications.
Before assigning C. to the vacancy in question, management states the ability, capacity and merit of all
employees in Department 791 were reviewed and compared with the resultant conclusion "that no one in
Department 791, including J. was qualified to fill the vacancy." Although J.'s seniority date is earlier than that
of C. management notes that Paragraph 63 makes seniority a determining factor in advancement only if
ability, merit and capacity are equal. In line with its conclusion that C.'s qualifications re superior to those of
J., management maintains that J.'s seniority has no bearing on the case. The Corporation contends that C.'s
promotion was in conformance with Paragraphs 8 and 63 of the June 3, 1941 Agreement.
The Union maintains that, at this plant, it has been the practice to make promotions from within a department.
In the present case, it is insisted that since any one of a number of employees in Department 791 was fully
capable of taking the die-setting job, there was no need to deviate from established practice. It is said that
some of the men in the group have had experience as Die Setter Helpers. Although the Union maintained
that the promotion of C. was improper under Paragraph 63, an examination of the case shows that this
particular contention was somewhat subsidiary to the principal claim that the transfer was out of order
because it was inter-departmental. In this regard, the Union claims "the oldest capable man in 791 should
have been offered the job." The Union notes it would not complain if an experienced Die Setter had been
transferred from another department to Department 791, but feels it is inequitable so to transfer an
inexperienced man to the higher rated job who has less experience on the machine in the department than
those there employed.
If management felt that it was necessary to go outside the department, however, the Union contends other
qualified employees with greater seniority than C. should have received the assignment under Paragraph 63.
It is emphasized by the Union that management actually selected C. for the job principally because most of
the supervision is selected from the Die Setters group. This would imply that the advancement of employees
to die setting jobs is subject to the same considerations as are involved in the selection of foremen. In the
opinion of the Union, such a basis for promotion to die-setting vacancies is contrary to the terms of
Paragraph 63 which specifies other qualifications as being important in the making of promotions. The use of
different measures means, says the Union, that other employees were not being given the consideration to
which they were entitled under Paragraph 63 of the Agreement and in line with past practice. The Union
requests "that C. be returned to Department 790 and that J. as the next qualified man in Department 791 be
given the job of Die Setter." It is emphasized that J. not only has a greater seniority than C. but has worked in
the department since 1934, has had some Die Setter Helper experience, and has worked on practically all
the machines and presses in the department.
Inter-Departmental Transfer
The principal claim of the grievance, evident from negotiations at earlier steps of the grievance procedure, is
that the promotion of C. violated an established practice of making promotions on an intra-departmental basis
as far as practical. The inter-department transfer which is involved in this case may properly be considered
as an exception to the general rule, encompassed within the rule, and does not, therefore, institute any
change in the existing procedure. The practice to which the Union refers cannot possibly be interpreted as
prohibiting each and every inter-departmental transfer.
The Umpire cannot revoke the promotion of C. on the ground that it was improper solely because it was an
inter-department transfer.
"Ability, Merit, and Capacity"
The second claim made by the Union is that employee J. had greater qualifications, as defined by Paragraph
63, and was entitled to the promotion in preference to C. It is contended that such qualifications of J. were
improperly evaluated because C. was selected on other grounds entirely. In appraising this contention, the
Umpire is impressed with the fact that management did make the transfer in question as a phase of training
an employee for foremanship responsibilities. The job to be filled, therefore, was not just a diesetter's job but
a die-setter's job that would contribute to the training of a supervisor.
An important management function is to train supervisors and foremen. This task must be properly performed
if the business of the Corporation is to be efficiently operated. It is evident that a prospective foreman must
ordinarily be given training on various production jobs. In the present case, management has stated that "the
employee selected is not to remain as a die-setter, this job being assigned as a step in his training for
eventual foremanship." Management cannot be denied the right to train foremen by a reasonable program
and in the ordinary manner. This is a vital part of the proper management of a business. When transfers of
employees are directly related to this training process, full recognition must be accorded that part of
Paragraph 8 which provides, in part, "The right to... promote... and to maintain... efficiency of employees is
the sole responsibility of the Corporation... the methods, processes and means of manufacturing are solely
and exclusively the responsibility of the Corporation."
Management must train supervisors and foremen and in carrying out this responsibility it has no alternative
but to assign them to various jobs as a part of the training program. The necessary transfers cannot possibly
be affected by Paragraph 63 since, in such cases, management must be accorded the right to make its own
evaluation of the "ability, merit and capacity" of employees eligible to be transferred to such a training job as
distinct from a regular production job. On this basis, it is held that J. cannot be given consideration as having
equal or greater qualifications than C., as outlined in Paragraph 63.
While fully recognizing management's right to select and to train its supervisors and foremen, it would be
unreasonable to conclude that promotions to every die-setting vacancy in the department in question should
be related to the selection of a potential foreman. Such a policy would not only close an important avenue to
promotion to employees not considered as "foremanship material" but it would give an impermanence to
assignments to the die-setters which seems to be incompatible with the importance of this work. In other
words, every die-setter is not a foreman in the making. The present decision is not to be construed, therefore,
as establishing a precedence for the future filling of each and every die-setting vacancy.
Decision
1. The promotion of C. was not improper solely because it was an inter-department transfer.
Such transfers are not prohibited by Paragraphs 8 and 63; but are specifically contemplated by
Paragraph 62. Nor are such transfers precluded by past practice at this plant which is that inter-
department promotions will be made as far as practicable.
2. Paragraph 63 cannot interfere with management's exercise of its sole responsibility to select
and to train supervisors and foremen, the proper performance of which is a vital necessity for
the efficient operation of the plant. In selecting employees for assignment to jobs specifically for
such training, as in the present case, management's evaluation of the "ability, merit and
capacity" of the employees has a compelling status.
3. In view of the above, the Umpire cannot approve the Union claim that C. be returned to
Department 790 and that J. be assigned to the die-setting job. This would represent an
unwarranted interference with management's program for the training of foremen.
UMPIRE.
December 31, 1941.
No. B-68
JANUARY 12, 1942
Employee Transfer Under Paragraph 63
GRIEVANCE:
Guide Lamp -- Case B-1
"P.C. -- 390015. Hired in Production 9-9-35. Apprentice -- 4-29-36. Die Repair -- 12-8-40.
This man was made lathe leader regardless of qualifications of others."
Umpire's Decision:
1. Management erred in depriving F.F. of consideration for promotion to the

leader job. He was entitled to such consideration under Paragraph 63 and did
not waive his rights in this particular as is claimed by Management.
2. It follows, therefore, that F. C.'s promotion was not proper under Paragraph
73 and it cannot be recognized. To approve it would signify that neither relative
qualifications nor relative seniority had any bearing on promotions which is not
the case under Paragraph 63.
3. The leader job in question is declared to be vacant as of January 25, 1942.
4. In filling the leader vacancy, due consideration must be given by

Management to F. F.'s qualifications and to filling the job in conformance with
Paragraph 63. (Entire Decision should be read)
In the Matter of:

and
General Motors Corporation -- Guide Lamp Division -- Case B-1.
A grievance signed by Employee F., dated August 5, 1941, reads as follows:
"P.C. -- 390015. Hired in Production 9-9-35. Apprentice -- 4-29-36. Die Repair -- 12-8-40.
This man was made a lathe leader regardless of qualifications of others." A hearing on this
grievance was held in Indianapolis on December 17, 1941.
Nature of Case
On August 4, 1941, Management promoted Employee F. C. from a job of die repairman to

that of a Lathe Leader. The promotion was to the second shift in the tool and die room and
to a job which Management claims did not exist prior to August 4, 1941 when there was
not a sufficient number of lathe operators to require the appointment of a leader.
Employee F. C. had considerably less seniority than a number of lathe operators and it
was felt by the Union that these other men also possessed greater qualifications for the
leader job. The Union singles out Employee F. F. as having exceptional qualifications for
the promotion because, the Union avers, he had previously been acting as the Leader of
the second shift lathe operators and had been tacitly recognized as such by the workers
and by supervision. The Union, therefore, protests the promotion of Employee F. C. and
contends that Employee F. F. should have been advanced to the Leader job.
Union Claim
The Union claims that, in order to conform with Paragraph 63 of the June 3, 1941
Agreement, an employee in the lathe classification with the necessary skill and experience
should have been promoted to the opening of Lathe Leader rather than a Die Repairman
who had little skill and experience as a lathe operator. The Union holds that the man who
received the promotion did not possess nearly the ability, merit and capacity of Employee
F. F. who has actually had considerable experience in performing the job in question.
F. F. not only acted as leader for the group for approximately five years, contends the
Union, but he also operated a lathe. Since he was only paid the operator's rate, and
because the dual job represented too great a responsibility, F. F. recently requested that
he be relieved of his responsibility as a leader. There is no reason for concluding, says the
Union, that F. F. does not wish to be a leader; his mentioned reaction is said to have been
motivated by a desire to receive either the classification and rate of a Leader, or to be
considered only as a lathe operator.
The Union further emphasizes that Employee F. C., who received the promotion, had
never had any experience in a tool room prior to serving his apprenticeship and that his
experience on lathe work was limited to approximately two months which he served during
the course of his apprenticeship. The Union points out that at the time of his promotion,
Employee F. C. was classified as a die repairman and was receiving the minimum rate for
that classification. His experience is so limited, the Union claims, that he is unable to
instruct workers who have been upgraded from production to toolroom lathe operation. A
further contention of the Union is that Employee F. C. received much of his training during
his apprenticeship from the men who have since been placed under his leadership. In the
Union's opinion this state of affairs does not lend itself to a fully cooperative attitude
between the operators and their leader.
The Union claims that heretofore Management has stressed experience in the matter of
promotion but in this instance it has used less tangible factors as a means of supporting its
selection. The considerations used by Management in rating the various men who were
eligible for the promotion, in the Union's opinion, are in too many instances irrelevant and
outside the provisions of Paragraph 63 of the Agreement. The Union concludes that
experience has been given far too little weight in this promotion.
For the reasons cited, the Union holds that Management was entirely illogical in its
promotion of Employee F. C. and that in keeping with Paragraph 63 of the Agreement
dated June 3, 1941, should have promoted Employee F. F. The Union, therefore, requests
the Umpire to advance Employee F. F. to the classification of a Lathe Leader.
The Corporation holds that the promotion of Employee F. C. followed Management's

careful consideration of the seniority, merit, ability and capacity of all the lathe operators
and other men in the tool room. It was only after careful investigation, Management claims,
that Employee F. C. was determined "to have more ability, merit and capacity to instruct
and lead other men than any lathe operator with more seniority." Management contends
that Employee F. C. had advanced rapidly over a short period of time and, in its opinion,
"possessed the most potential value."
Management has presented an appraisal of various employees in order to show why it

rated other lathe operators as having less ability, merit and capacity than F. C. As respects
Employee F. F., Management stressed the fact that he was not considered for the
promotion because he had previously requested his Foreman "to relieve him of all
responsibility other than that of lathe work." Management claims, however, that it had
never considered Employee F.F., as a Lathe Leader although supervision and the lathe
operators on the second shift admittedly considered him as the "Number One" lathe
operator.
Management, in making its decision on this promotion, was quite satisfied with the
experience of Employee F. C. on lathe operation during the time that he worked as a die
repairman. Management claims that in this promotion, experience could not be given much
weight because there were so few men with experience to fill the job. It was for this reason,
Management states, that other factors had to be given considerable importance in making
the choice for promotion. In the Corporation's opinion, the choice of Employee F. C. was
entirely within the provisions of Paragraph 63 of the Agreement dated June 3, 1941.
Management has readily admitted that claimant F.F. was not considered as a possible
candidate for the leader job because "he had previously requested to be relieved of such
responsibilities." It appears to the Umpire, however, that Management thereby erroneously
interpreted F. F.'s attitude toward leader responsibilities. This employee had been acting
as a leader of a relatively small group of employees but had also been required to operate
a lathe. There is no doubt, moreover, that he did a pretty good job. As the number of lathe
operators increased, however, F. F. understandably felt that he could not properly be held
responsible for leading while still operating a lathe and while receiving an operator's rate.
His protest against such a job assignment cannot reasonably be considered as a waiver of
his claim for promotion. Management's seizure of his statement as a means of excluding F.
F. from consideration for promotion was not reasonable since it completely disregarded F.
F.'s long experience in acting as a leader, his acceptance by the employees and by
supervision as a leader, and his cooperative attitude in past years in assuming leadership
responsibilities without any added compensation.
In contrast to F.F.'s evident qualifications for the job in question, F. C. was quite
inexperienced as a lathe operator or as a leader. Even if he did seem to Management to
possess "potential," his ability and displayed capacity was unquestionably inferior to F. F.
Although Paragraph 63 gives Management the sole responsibility for transferring

employees, it specifically provides that in exercising this responsibility in the advancement
of employees to higher paid jobs "when ability, merit and capacity are equal, employees
with the longest seniority will be given preference." This part of Paragraph 63 would be
entirely meaningless if it were to be held that F. C.'s promotion to a higher paid job was
proper and that F. F. could be excluded from consideration on the basis mentioned above.
It is all too apparent that F. F.'s qualifications were not taken into account simply because
Management did not consider him as a possible candidate for the job in question.
It is the conviction of the Umpire that F. F. should not be deprived of consideration for the
vacancy in question and that Management erred in filling the vacancy without
consideration of F. F.'s qualifications. It is ruled, therefore, that the promotion of F. C. was
not in compliance with Paragraph 63 because it was not made with regard for F. F.'s rights
under that part of the Paragraph which provides that "in the advancement of employees to
higher paid jobs when ability, merit and capacity are equal, employees with the longest
seniority will be given preference." The facts do not show that F. C. had greater
qualifications that F. F. At most it could only be determined that they had approximately
equal qualifications as respects "ability, merit and capacity." In such a case, F. F.'s greater
seniority would entitle him to the promotion. There can be no reasonable doubt on the
point that F. C.'s promotion was not proper under Paragraph 63 and it cannot be approved.
Such an approval would signify that neither relative qualifications nor relative seniority had
any bearing on promotions under Paragraph 63.
Decision
1. Management erred in depriving F. F. of consideration for promotion to the
leader job. He was entitled to such consideration under Paragraph 63 and did
not waive his rights in this particular as is claimed by Management.
2. It follows, therefore, that F. C.'s promotion was not proper under Paragraph
63 and it cannot be recognized. To approve it would signify that neither relative
qualifications nor relative seniority had any bearing on promotions which is not
the case under Paragraph 63.
3. The leader job in question is declared to be vacant as of January 25, 1942.
4. In filling the leader vacancy, due consideration must be given by

Management to F. F.'s qualifications and to filling the job in conformance with
Paragraph 63.
UMPIRE.
January 12, 1942.
No. B-83
January 27, 1942
Disciplinary Layoff
GRIEVANCE:
Fisher Tarrytown -- Case B-12
"Man suspended unjustifiably. Requests to be returned to work. Claim discrimination also

intimidation, back pay for every day he is kept out. Foreman A. at fault."
Umpire's Decision:
The layoff of F. was not in any way intimidating nor discriminatory. It is determined to have
been a disciplinary layoff, but the length of such layoff is held to be in error because it was
based on the alleged violation of three shop rules, only one of which was violated by this
employee. The layoff of F. is, therefore, reduced to two days and he is to receive back
wages for the remainder of the layoff which is held to have been unjustified disciplinary
action by Management. (Entire Decision should be read)
In the Matter of:
and
General Motors Corporation -- Fisher Body -- Tarrytown Division -- Case B-12
On September 23, 1941, Employee F. presented a grievance which reads: "Man

suspended unjustifiably. Requests to be returned to work. Claim discrimination also
file://C:\Users\bobology\AppData\Local\Temp\Framework\b-083_13C075D2.htm 3/22/2011
intimidation, back pay for every day he is kept out. Foreman A. at fault." A hearing was
held on this matter at New York on January 7, 1942.
Nature of Case
Employee F. on the Trim Line at the Fisher Body -- Tarrytown Division, on September 23,
1941 was asked by his foreman if he knew that a certain job had gone down the line
without being completed. The employee answered in the affirmative and stated that on the
previous model run it had been the custom to let jobs go down the line if no stock had been
placed in them. A discussion followed during which the foreman instructed this employee
not to permit any more jobs to go down the line incomplete, but to call the Foreman if it
was impossible to complete a job because of the lack of stock.
After a brief interval the Foreman noticed this employee was talking to his partner; the
Foreman maintains that while this talking was taking place, F. was not working. The Union
claims that the employee was working and that he was merely telling his partner the result
of his previous discussion with the Foreman. The Foreman then told F. he should stop
talking and try to get his job back in position. A rather heated argument followed in which
F. used certain language that was felt by the Foreman to be abusive, and to show a lack of
respect for supervision. F. was told to leave his job and was laid off for an indeterminate
period; this layoff occurred on September 23, 1941. A few days later, in answer to the
grievance filed by this employee, Management stated F. would be returned to work on
October 1, 1941. This case arose out of the Union's objection to the disciplinary layoff that
was invoked by Management.
In its original reply to the instant grievance, Management merely stated that it did not feel
that the layoff involved either discrimination or intimidation. At the second step in the
grievance procedure, Management listed three shop rules which it claims were broken by
F. The breaking of these rules, Management maintains, was sufficient cause for the
disciplinary layoff invoked in this case. The shop rules cited by Management as allegedly
broken by this employee, are as follows:
Rule No. 13 -- "Refused to obey orders of foreman or other supervisors. (From one day
layoff to discharge.)
Rule No. 27 -- "Deliberately restricting output. (From one week layoff to discharge.)
Rule No. 29 -- "Use of abusive or profane language to fellow employees or supervision.

(From reprimand to discharge.)"
Management holds that F. violated Rule No. 13 because, when he was told to stop talking
and start to work, he failed to do so and instead started an argument. Rule No. 27 was
violated by this employee, Management maintains, because "the job on which F. was
working was considerably out of position when his Foreman requested that he stop talking
and get back to work." Management states that Rule No. 29 was clearly violated by the
employee's admitted use of strong language directed at the Foreman.
The Union charges of discrimination and intimidation in connection with this layoff are
denied by Management. The latter holds that there was no attempt by the Foreman and
Superintendent "to scare the operators into dropping their just complaints," in connection
with some trouble on the line, "by taking a man to the office and suspending him." No
discrimination because of Union membership or activity has been shown in this case,
contends Management, and therefore the charge of discrimination "was not a proper
charge to be made." The discipline invoked in this instance is felt by Management to have
been in full accord with Paragraph 8 of the June 3, 1941 Agreement which gives to
Management the sole responsibility to "discharge or discipline for cause; and to maintain
discipline... except that Union members shall not be discriminated against as such."
Union Position
The Union claims that the layoff of F. was originally invoked only on the basis of an
incident arising out of a question put to him by his partner as respects his first conversation
with the Foreman. The Union notes that while this first conversation was being conducted,
F. was not able to do his work and his next job was going down the line; in the Union's
opinion, this did not represent restriction of output but was merely orderly conducting of
collective bargaining. The second discussion which followed the Foreman's order to stop
talking and get back to work did lead to an argument, the Union admits, but it claims that
the Foreman also used strong language. The use of such language by both the employee
and the Foreman is claimed by the Union to be ordinary "shop talk" in which both sides
often indulge. Finally, the Union maintains that F. did not refuse to carry out an order of the
Foreman but merely answered him when the Foreman objected to the talking between F.
and his partner. For these reasons, the Union claims that F. did not violate any of the shop
rules cited by the Management, and holds that the disciplinary layoff was really
discriminatory in nature.
The Union offers as support for its charge of discrimination the fact that this employee's
partner, and many other operators on the line, were out of position but received no layoff.
Intimidation is charged by the Union on the grounds that Management enforced this
disciplinary action when faced with a series of other complaints on the same line, which in
the Union's opinion, represented an attempt "to scare other operators into maintaining
position on line." Because of its contention that the layoff was not for cause, but was
discriminatory in nature, the Union requests that F. be paid for the time lost from
September 23, 1941 to September 30, 1941 inclusive.
The claim against the discipline invoked by Management in this instance must be
appraised on the basis of Paragraph 8 of the Agreement dated June 3, 1941. This
paragraph reads in part as follows: "The right to... discipline for cause; and to maintain
discipline... of employees, is the sole responsibility of the Corporation except that Union
members shall not be discriminated against as such." The Union's claim that the layoff of
F. represented intimidation has not been supported with any real facts, and must therefore
be disregarded by the Umpire. In like manner the claim of discrimination for Union activity
is not proven on the grounds that one Union member is laid off for a series of acts for
which he is allegedly responsible, while other Union members receive no discipline for
single acts of which they are not accused by Management.
Management has claimed that it had cause for the enforcement of the disciplinary layoff of
F. because of its claim that he violated three shop rules. It must be assumed, therefore,
that the length of the layoff was set by Management on its own weighing of the importance
of the breach of all three of the shop rules, i.e., that the number of days of the layoff
represented the sum total invoked for the alleged violation of all three of the shop rules. To
be sustained in whole, therefore, the layoff must be found to have resulted from the
violation of all three of the rules cited by Management; to be sustained in any part it must
be found to have resulted from the violation of at least one of the shop rules.
It is quite clear that F. violated Shop Rule No. 29 in using strong language in a manner that
was undoubtedly abusive to his foreman. If the sort of remark made by F. in this instance
would result in no disciplinary action, it is doubtful if any discipline could be maintained in
his department. It follows that the part of the layoff that resulted from this action by F. is
entirely his responsibility and he must bear the consequences.
Violation of the Shop Rule No. 27, as cited by Management, is not proven by the facts.
While it is true that F. was out of position when the two discussions with his Foreman took
place, and that the discussions caused him to go further out of position, it cannot be said
that he was "deliberately restricting output." Other employees were out of line and many
problems arose on the line in question on the particular day involved, all of which
contributed to F. being out of position. The first discussion he had with his Foreman was a
reasonable attempt to obtain an explanation over a shop problem. Management was
entirely incorrect in labeling any action by F. as deliberate restriction of output.
The contention that F. refused to obey an order is likewise not supported by the facts. The
first discussions with his Foreman led F. to accept the order and to pass on the information
to his partner not to let any more jobs go down the line incomplete because of the lack of
stock. The second discussion, which became an argument, led to the use of abusive
language, but it did not represent failure to abide by an order from the Foreman. While the
argument took place it is quite likely that F. stopped work and then, as a result of the
argument, he wasn't permitted to continue work. The employee was wrong for arguing and
using abusive language, but any stoppage of work during the argument was incidental and
did not represent a refusal to carry out an order of the Foreman.
The claim in the instant case is that F. was not guilty of the violations charged to him by
Management and that his layoff should be revoked entirely with back pay for all time lost.
The Umpire finds that F. did violate the Shop rule concerning abusive language, but did not
violate the two other shop rules as claimed by Management. The penalty imposed by
Management for the alleged violation of all three shop rules is therefore held to be too
severe for the actual violation of a single shop rule. Under the circumstances involved in
this case, then, the Umpire holds that the layoff imposed on F. shall be reduced to two
days, and he shall receive make-up pay for the remainder of the time lost between
September 23, 1941 and September 30, 1941, because of such layoff.
Decision
The layoff of F. was not in any way intimidating nor discriminatory. It is determined to have
been a disciplinary layoff, but the length of such layoff is held to be in error because it was
based on the alleged violation of three shop rules, only one of which was violated by this
employee. The layoff of F. is, therefore, reduced to two days and he is to receive back
wages for the remainder of the layoff which is held to have been unjustified disciplinary
action by Management.
Signed G. ALLAN DASH, JR.,
UMPIRE.
January 27, 1942.
No. B-100
February 6, 1942
GRIEVANCE:
Buick Motor -- Case B-11
"Man with less service than I have has been called back to work on job which I am capable
of doing. Request back pay for all time lost."
Umpire's Decision:
1. The factors of ability, merit and capacity were not compelling determinants in
the selection of T. for promotion to die welding.
2. The promotion of T. was not in conformance with the terms of Paragraph 63

of the June 3, 1941 Agreement and is, therefore, held to have been improperly
effectuated.
3. Since this job will shortly be discontinued, it shall be considered vacant as of

February 16, 1942, and when the die welding is resumed, it shall then be filled
in a manner complying with Paragraph 63 of the Agreement dated June 3,
1941. (Entire Decision should be read)
In the Matter of:
and
General Motors Corporation -- Buick Motor Division -- Case B-11.

file://C:\Users\bobology\AppData\Local\Temp\Framework\b-100_13C0800F.htm 3/22/2011
Employee C. on August 18, 1941, presented a grievance which reads: "Man with less
service than I have has been called back to work on job which I am capable of doing.
Request back pay for all time lost." A hearing was held on this matter at Flint on January
15, 1942.
Nature of Case
Early in July 1941, Management felt it necessary to have temporary help on welding in the
Die Room of the Sheet Metal Plant. The foreman of the Die Room had no available
welders and requested the foreman of the fender repair welding to furnish any available
welder that would be suitable in this work. When the latter foreman suggested that
Employee T., who was on fender repair welding, should be able to do the operation, he
was given the temporary work over a period of approximately one month. Employee C.,
who filed this grievance, had also been working on the fender repair welding work and had
eleven months' seniority over T. Employee C. complained to his foreman about not
receiving the temporary work in the Die Room and, as a result, his foreman checked the
records of both T. and C., as Management states, "to determine exactly what previous
work they had done." This examination apparently convinced the foreman that T. was the
better man for the job and he was therefore retained on the temporary welding work in the
Die Room.
On July 30, 1941, production was closed down for the model changeover and both T. and
C. were laid off from their respective welding jobs. Shortly thereafter the die work
increased and another permanent welder was needed in the Die Room. The two foremen
again conferred and agreed that T. was the proper man to fill the job. When the transfer of
T. was completed on August 16, 1941, C. filed the present grievance claiming that he
should have been given the promotion.
Union Contention
The Union contends that C. was entitled to the welding job in the Die Room because it
represented a promotion, and C. had greater seniority, more experience as a die welder,
and was more capable than the man who received the promotion. The Union notes that C.
had worked for some time in Plant No. O3 as a die welder on the third shift, and had done
very satisfactory work. On the other hand, the Union notes that T.'s experience in die
welding was limited to the short period he spent on it on a temporary basis. The Union
claims further that C. was a more efficient fender repair welder than T., and that he was
exceptionally fast at his work. Finally, the Union claims that friendship was a distinct
determinant in the promotion of T., and that Management violated Paragraph 63 of the
June 3, 1941 Agreement by failing to give consideration to the relative ability, merit and
capacity, of the two men available for the promotion.
The Corporation maintains that in selecting T. for the permanent job as welder in the Die
Room of the Sheet Metal Plant, "Management selected the employee with the most ability,
merit and capacity for the available job." Management notes that, "The opinion of
Management as to the ability, merit and capacity of Employee T. is confirmed by the

opinion of Mr. S. for whom Employ T. had worked in Factory 12, and by the opinion of Mr.
H. for whom Employee T. had done temporary welding in the Die Room."
Management contends that the seniority of C. was considered, but that C. did not have the
same ability, merit and capacity as Employee T. It is further contended by Management
that T. did better fender repair welding than did C., and that the attitude of C. at his work
and the number of times he was found off the job, "made C. less attractive to
Management." Management claims also that C.'s experience in die welding had been
limited to a rough type of welding, while T.'s work gave him needed experience for the
exact type of work required in the new operation. It is concluded by Management,
therefore, that the promotion of T. was not in violation of Paragraph 63 of the National
Agreement dated June 3, 1941.
The question concerned in this case must be considered according to Paragraph 63 of the
Agreement dated June 3, 1941. This paragraph reads in part as follows:
"(63) The transferring of employees is the sole responsibility of the

Management. In the advancement of employees to higher paid jobs
when ability, merit, and capacity are equal, employees with the
longest seniority will be given preference."
The classification held by both T. and C., before the promotion in question, was noted in
the local wage agreement as: "Welding, Acetylene -- Rough and Heavy--Range $1.05 to
$1.20." The operation to which T. was transferred is classified as "Welder -- Die -- Range
$1.20 to $1.35." The highest bracket in the range of T.'s old job was equaled by the lowest
bracket in the range of the new job. It is obvious, therefore, that the transfer of T.
represented a promotion. As such, since it has been questioned, the promotion of T. must
show clear evidence of a consideration by Management of the factors of ability, merit and
capacity, if it is to be sustained.
The foremen of the two departments concerned apparently conferred together on the
temporary transfer of an employee and agreed upon T. There is little evidence at this stage
that any careful consideration was given to an actual weighing of the factors of ability,
merit, and capacity of all of the available employees. A cursory consideration of T. and C.
was evidently made, but there is no evidence of a careful weighing of the necessary
factors for all of the employees who were available for the job. The fact of the matter is that
most of the consideration given the question of the choice, was after C. complained about
the use of T. on temporary work. Compelling support for this conclusion is shown by
Management's statement that after C. complained about the temporary transfer, "Mr. H.
checked the records of both employees C. and T. to determine exactly what previous work
they had done."
When the promotion to the permanent job was made, another brief conference between
the two foremen seems to have been all that was needed to decide upon T. as the final
choice. Evidence of this fact is shown by the statement of Management which reads: "Mr.
H. thereupon asked Mr. S. about securing employee T. for a permanent job as a welder.
Both Mr. S. and Mr. H. agreed that T. would be the proper man for the job." Here, again,
there is an evident lack of any conclusive consideration of the factors of ability, merit and
capacity in choosing T. for the promotion.
Management notes that because of the agreement of the two foremen that T. was the
proper man for the job, "because he had satisfactorily done the work on a temporary
basis," and because "Management felt he had more ability, merit and capacity for the job,"
he was given the promotion. It should be noted here that a factor which apparently
weighed heavily in the selection of T. for the promotion, was his temporary experience at
the job. It is not within the spirit of Paragraph 63 of the Agreement to make a temporary
promotion, and then give great weight to the resulting experience as a determinant of
relative ability, merit and capacity for a permanent promotion. Further more, Management's
statement that it "felt he had more ability, merit and capacity," finds no compelling support;
it must be considered to be in the form of an opinion that was based mainly on the
conclusion that had been reached by the two foremen.
From all of the available evidence, the Umpire is of the opinion that proper consideration
was not given to the factors of ability, merit and capacity, in the choice of T. for the die
welding job. It is evident that T. did not stand "head and shoulders" above the employees
available for the job. At best it can only be said that T. had "ability, merit and capacity"
equivalent to at least one employe, and perhaps several others. The Umpire has no
authority to determine that C. was entitled to the promotion rather than T., because the
element of choice rests with Management. In the present instance Paragraph 63 can well
be effectuated, as has been suggested in several recent decisions, by the selection by
Management of several men who it feels are capable of fulfilling the job, and whose
"ability, merit and capacity" are considered by Management to be approximately equal.
From this group Management can then select the individual with the greatest seniority to
fulfill exactly the provisions of Paragraph 63 of the Agreement.
In conclusion, it is held that the promotion of T. to the die welding job, was not in
compliance with the terms of Paragraph 63 of the June 3, 1941 Agreement. Since this job
is momentarily expected to shut down, it is held that it should be considered a vacancy on
February 16, 1942 and when the work is resumed, it shall be filled in a manner to conform
with Paragraph 63 of the Agreement dated June 3, 1941.
Decision
1. The factors of ability, merit and capacity were not compelling determinants in
the selection of T. for promotion to die welding.
2. The promotion of T. was not in conformance with the terms of Paragraph 63

of the June 3, 1941 Agreement and is, therefore, held to have been improperly
effectuated.
3. Since this job will shortly be discontinued, it shall be considered vacant as of

February 16, 1942, and when the die welding is resumed, it shall then be filled
in a manner complying with Paragraph 63 of the Agreement dated June 3,
1941.
UMPIRE.
February 6, 1942.
No. B-116
MARCH 9, 1942
Promotion Procedure
GRIEVANCE:
Chevrolet Norwood -- Cases B2-9
"We charge the Management with breaking the agreement (Par. 63) and are asking for
back pay from this date."
Umpire's Decision:
1. Promotion at this plant has been along the lines of departmental or seniority
groups, and has only varied there from when no employees were thus available
who were qualified to fill job openings.
2. Management's promotion of four men within the limits of the Light and Heavy
Repair Department represented conformance with previous practice, and with
Paragraph 63 of the June 3, 1941 Agreement.
3. The eight men whose grievances have been combined for consideration in
this decision are held to have had no rights to promotion to the four openings in
the Light and Heavy Repair Department, and their claims to back pay for failure
to receive such promotions are denied. (Entire Decision should be read)
In the Matter of:
and
file://C:\Users\bobology\AppData\Local\Temp\Framework\b-116_13C08A4C.htm 3/22/2011
General Motors Corporation -- Chevrolet-Norwood Division -- Cases B-2 to B-9.
On October 3, 1941, eight grievances were presented which read in common as follows:
"We charge the management with breaking the agreement (Par. 63) and are asking for
back pay from this date." A hearing was held on these combined grievances at
Indianapolis on February 26, 1942.
Nature of Case
The eight employees involved in the combined grievance herein considered, were
employed in the new Car Conditioning Department (No. 81) at the Chevrolet-Norwood
plant at the time the grievance was filed. The Light and Heavy Repair Department (No. 71)
was in the same building as the New Car Conditioning Department, but was a separate
department and a separate seniority group. Part of the work of the Light and Heavy Repair
Department was to mount Cargo and Commercial bodies. On certain government work of
this latter nature, increased schedules required additional men to mount cargo and
commercial bodies in September, 1941. Four additional men were needed for this work
and Management selected the four men in the Light and Heavy Repair Department who it
considered were most worthy of promotion to higher paid jobs in their seniority group on
the basis of their respective ability, merit, capacity, and seniority. The Union objects to the
promotions, and claims that the eight men who signed the instant grievance were entitled
to receive the promotions granted to the four men, as well as to other jobs made available
subsequent to the date of the instant grievance.
Union Claim
The Union seeks to support its position that the men concerned in this grievance should
have received promotions on two premises, only one of which is a part of the June 3, 1941
Agreement. In the first place it claims that an "understanding" existed between the Shop
Committee and Management that if any higher rated jobs opened up, men in the New Car
Conditioning Department would be given the first opportunity for promotion, after which
men in certain other departments would be given the opportunity provided by the higher
paid jobs. The Union maintains that most of the men in the New Car Conditioning
Department were hired as mechanics, but had become sidetracked in a job that did not
carry a very high rate. It was this reason, the Union claims, that caused the two parties to
agree to move these men into higher paid operations at the first opportunity.
The second premise on which the Union maintained the right to promotion of the eight men
here concerned, is based on Provision 2 of the so-called O.P.M. agreement, dated October
2, 1941, and signed by representatives of the Union and Corporation. Provision 2 of that
agreement reads, in part, as follows:
"Transfer of employees from non-defense to defense work in each

local bargaining unit shall be in line with agreements regarding the
transfer of employees. Employees fully qualified for skilled and
semi-skilled jobs on the basis of past experience and training shall

be transferred in line with their seniority."
The Union maintains that the eight men who signed the instant grievance wanted to be
shifted to defense work, had the mechanical ability to perform the work, and had the
greatest seniority of those available for such work.
The jobs to which the Union feels these men were entitled were paid at the rate of $1.10
per hour. Because they did not receive these jobs, the Union claims they should be
reimbursed for the difference between their own rates and the rates they would have
earned on the defense jobs, for the total hours they would have received had they been on
such defense jobs. The Union notes finally, that while only four jobs were open in the Light
and Heavy Repair Department just prior to the date of the instant grievance, additional jobs
developed in the department shortly thereafter that should have properly been filled by the
eight men who signed this grievance.
The Corporation maintains that it has been the recognized practice at this plant to give the
first opportunities for advancement to openings on higher rated jobs, to employees on
lower rated jobs in the same department, provided they are capable of doing the work. This
practice had been followed previously in the Light and Heavy Repair Department,
Management notes, and many employees have received temporary and permanent
promotions in such a manner. Management maintains that the special understanding that
had been reached as respects the men in the New Car Conditioning Department was to
the effect that, as jobs opened up in any department, if men in that department capable of
doing the work were not available, then men in the New Car Conditioning Department
would be given the opportunity to qualify for the promotion before the men in any other
department. In the present case, Management maintains that the men selected to fill the
four available openings in the Light and Heavy Repair Department were selected entirely
within the procedure noted.
Management denies that the so-called O.P.M. agreement supersedes the existing
Agreement as respects method of promotion. In fact, Management notes, Provision No. 7
of the O.P.M. agreement specifically removes any portion of that agreement from the
provisions of the Grievance Procedure of the June 3, 1941 Agreement. Provision No. 7, as
cited by Management, reads as follows:
"Any claim of discrimination by an individual employee arising out of

these provisions may be reviewed by the Shop Committee with the
local Plant Management but shall not be subject to further appeal.
The Shop Committee is given the right to appeal any charge of
general discrimination to the Corporation through the Defense
Employment Division of the International Union, UAW-CIO. Such
charges must be supported by written evidence at the time the
appeal is made."
For the reasons noted, then, Management contends that the promotions contested in this
grievance were in conformance with the recognized practice at this plant, and were not in
violation of any of the terms of the Agreement dated June 3, 1941.
Conclusions and Decision of the Umpire
The issue in this case is whether or not Management has acted within the terms of the
June 3, 1941 Agreement in promoting certain men to higher paid jobs in the Light and
Heavy Repair Department, instead of the eight men who signed the instant grievance.
All of the evidence available in this case clearly supports the conclusion that promotion
practice at this plant has been along departmental and seniority group lines. First
opportunities for advancement have obviously been given within the department in which
openings on higher rated jobs occurred, when employees qualified to do the job have been
available. It is clear, also, that a recent understanding has been reached that if men are not
available within a department to qualify for higher paid jobs in that department, first
opportunity for advancement will be given to employees in the New Car Conditioning
Department.
The promotion of the four men within the Light and Heavy Repair Department was made
directly in conformance with the practice noted above. In its selection, Management gave
proper recognition of the factors of ability, merit, capacity, and seniority, and thereby
conformed with Paragraph 63 of the June 3, 1941 Agreement. It is held, therefore, that
failure of Management to promote any of the eight signators to the instant grievance to the
four available jobs in the Light and Heavy Repair Department, was not in violation of any
provision of the June 3, 1941 Agreement.
The citation by the Union of Provision 2 of the so called O.P.M. Agreement, in support of
the right of the eight men here involved to promotion to defense work, is quite obviously
outside of the jurisdiction of the Umpire. Provision 7 of that same agreement, as cited by
Management, clearly removes any question arising under that agreement from the purview
of the regular grievance procedure established by the terms of the June 3, 1941
Agreement.
Inasmuch as Management has not violated past practice or any provision of the June 3,
1941 Agreement, the Union's claim for back pay for the eight men, whose grievances have
been herein combined, is held to be improper and is denied.
Decision
1. Promotion at this plant has been along the lines of departmental or seniority
groups, and has only varied there from when no employees were thus available
who were qualified to fill job openings.
2. Management's promotion of four men within the limits of the Light and Heavy
Repair Department represented conformance with previous practice, and with
Paragraph 63 of the June 3, 1941 Agreement.
3. The eight men whose grievances have been combined for consideration in
this decision are held to have had no rights to promotion to the four openings in
the Light and Heavy Repair Department, and their claims to back pay for failure
to receive such promotions are denied.
UMPIRE.
March 9, 1942.
No. B-129
March 31, 1942
Appeal of a Discharge
GRIEVANCE:
Detroit Transmission -- Case B-8
"I was unjustly discharged without notice. I demand reinstatement, back pay and full
seniority in department 77 which would have gone into effect on November 15, from
department 4. Discharge slip said I hadn't enough experience. Have followed this work for
20 years. I claim discrimination."
Umpire's Decision:
1. The discharge of Employee D., for failure to fulfill the requirements of the
machine repair job to which he was transferred, was to a great extent, a misuse
by local Management of the Corporation's right to discharge for cause.
2. Because of his very poor attendance record, Employee D. is held subject to

a disciplinary layoff from the date of his improper discharge to December 8,
1941.
3. Employee D. is to be reinstated on the payroll as of December 8, 1941,

without loss of seniority, and is to receive back pay for any wages lost up to
December 30, 1941, as directed in the body of this decision.
4. Within two weeks of the date of this decision, or at the proper time in the
future if his seniority does not entitle him to recall on that date, D. shall be
offered a job comparable in rate to his previous production job. Failure to
accept such a job shall result in the termination of his employment as a "quit,"
as of December 30, 1941. (Entire Decision should be read)
In the Matter of:

and
General Motors Corporation -- Detroit Transmission Division – Case B-8
On November 6, 1941, Employee D. presented a grievance which read: "I was unjustly
discharged without notice. I demand reinstatement, back pay and full seniority in
Department 77 which would have gone into effect on November 15 from Department 4.
Discharge slip said I hadn't enough experience. Have followed this work for 20 years. I
claim discrimination." A hearing was held on this matter in Detroit on March 11, 1942.
Nature of Case
Employee D.'s seniority hiring date is February 27, 1940. From the date of his hire until
September 12, 1941, D. was employed in production work, but for several extended
periods he was absent because of major medical treatment, including at least two
operations. Sometime during the latter part of the period noted above, D. was told that his
attendance record was not good. D. admitted his poor attendance record but claimed that,
in addition to his major medical operations and treatment, his sinus had been aggravated
by the oil spray connected with the production job he was then operating. Management
notes that D. requested a transfer from this work to machine repair work, in which he
claimed to have had a long period of experience prior to his employment at the Detroit
Transmission Division.
On September 12, 1941, D. was transferred to the machine repair department (No. 77)
where he worked for approximately six weeks. During this period his attendance record
was not good, but the major fault he evidenced in this period, Management notes, was his
inability to perform the machine repair work required at this plant. After six weeks' trial at
this work, D. was discharged "for lack of experience." The Union protests the discharge on
the ground that it was not warranted under the circumstances involved in this case.
For a period of six months prior to his transfer to machine repair work, Management notes
that D. was absent thirty-two working days, and in addition was granted a leave of absence
for approximately six weeks. When this poor attendance record was called to D.'s
attention, Management indicates that it accepted his request for a transfer, and, on
September 12, 1941, placed him in Department No. 77 (Machine Repair) "in order that he
might have another chance to make good at Detroit Transmission Division."
The period that D. spent on machine repair work was sufficient, in Management's opinion,
to indicate that he lacked the experience to do the type of machine repair work required at
this particular plant. "Accordingly," Management notes, "D. was released." For the period
of six weeks prior to his discharge, Management presented data that showed that D. was
absent eleven days. Because of the fact that D.'s attendance record showed no
improvement in the six weeks he was on machine repair work, Management notes, "no
consideration was given to transferring the man back to production."
In discharging D. "for lack of experience," Management contends it exercised its

responsibilities as set forth in that part of Paragraph 8, of the Agreement dated June 3,
1941, that reads: "The right to hire; promote; discharge or discipline for cause; and to
maintain discipline and efficiency of employees, is the sole responsibility of the Corporation
except that Union members shall not be discriminated against as such."
Union Position
The Union's major contention in this case is that, if Management found D. unable
satisfactorily to fulfill its requirements as respects machine repair work, he should have
been transferred back to his previous occupation. The transfer to the machine repair job,
though at the behest of D. himself, is interpreted by the Union as an indication that
Management considered D. as a capable worker. Had he not been considered as an
efficient worker, with past experience that would fit him for the machine repair work, the
Union contends Management would not have granted him the promotion. If by accepting
that promotion, D. subjected himself to discharge through failure to make good on the job,
the Union contends all other employees at this plant would rightly fear to accept
advancements in the future. An employee has rights to his job, the Union maintains, and
he should not place those rights in jeopardy by accepting advancement to a job with which
he is not completely familiar.
While the Union notes it does not wish to defend habitual absenteeism, it claims that D.'s
case is peculiar in that a substantial medical history has resulted in absences in excess of
the usual experience. Questioning at the hearing on this matter divulged the fact that D.
had an extremely unusual medical history in the past three or four years which, in the
Union's opinion, explains D.'s relatively poor attendance record. In the six-week period D.
worked on machine repairs, four of the eleven days of absence noted by Management,
were claimed by the Union and D. to have been caused by the death of D.'s brother-in-law
in Toronto, Canada. Questioning at the hearing, and a study of the time cards of D., lend
credence to this latter contention. In addition to the four days thus accounted for, the Union
notes that D. reported off sick for two other days out of the eleven, and maintains that all of
the remaining days of absences in this period were likewise caused by illness.
Because of its contention that D. should have been returned to his former job, rather than
to have been discharged for lack of ability on the machine repair work, the Union asks that
the discharge be invalidated, that D. be reinstated with no loss of seniority, and that he be
paid back pay for all wages lost.
A study of the rather impressive medical record of D. divulges many sources of potential
illness that can well account for a considerable part of his poor attendance record.
However, while his medical record explains many of his absences, it does not explain the
consistency with which he was absent for some of the period prior to the date of his
transfer to machine repair work. D.'s attendance record is not good even when the
absences explained by his medical history have been taken into account.
The shift of D. from production to machine repairs cannot be considered as a promotion,

even though he received a higher rate on the latter work. It is obvious that D. requested
this work as a means of getting away from work in which an oil spray was involved, and
that Management made the change partly with this thought in mind. The Umpire, therefore,
considers the change in D.'s work in the form of a transfer rather than as a promotion.
When D. was transferred to machine repair work, it is evident that he was cognizant of his
poor attendance record. However, when the transfer to machine repair work was proffered
to him there is simply no evidence that any intimation was given to him that failure to make
good on the work, or a continuation of his previous attendance record, would lead to his
discharge.
Management has clearly indicated that D. was discharged because of his lack of
experience in machine repair work, and because of his inability to perform many of the
kinds of machine repairs required at this plant. While D. did show an intimate knowledge of
many kinds of machine repair work, Management has supported with real evidence its
contention that he could not satisfactorily perform much of the machine repairs required in
its plant. Since the discharge was enforced because of D.'s inability to do the machine
repair work, the question arises whether the discharge was "for cause," as required by
Paragraph 8, of the June 3, 1941 Agreement. Management has not cited D.'s attendance
record as a cause for his discharge, but has stated that his attendance record prevented
consideration being given to transferring him back to production.
In effect, what local Management has done in this instance is to say D.'s attendance record
was not good cause for his discharge while he remained on production, but when he failed
to make good on another job, his attendance record blocked his return to his former job
and made his discharge necessary. If D.'s attendance record was not sufficient cause for
his discharge while he remained on production work, it was not sufficient cause to block his
return to that work and indirectly to cause his discharge. If Management's action in this
instance were to be upheld entirely, it would follow that D. pyramided the risk involved in
his attendance record by accepting the transfer, without being aware that he was exposing
himself to an additional risk.
Management has the sole responsibility of transferring employees under Paragraph 63 of

the June 3, 1941 Agreement. Paragraph 8, of the same Agreement, grants to Management
the right to discharge "for cause." Since the immediate cause for the discharge of D. was
his inability to perform work to which he had been transferred, the Umpire is of the
considered opinion that the discharge was not "for cause." The inability of D. to perform the
machine repair work gave Management the clear right to remove him from such work, but
as an employee who still held seniority in the production group, he should have been
returned to his previous job on some other one comparable in nature. Any other
interpretation of the Agreement would obviously cause other employees to hesitate to
accept promotions for fear that they would lose all accumulated rights if they should fail to
meet the requirements of the new job.
While it has been ruled here that D. was not discharged for cause, the Umpire is of the firm
conviction that Management had real reason for disciplinary action against D., because of
his very poor attendance record. With a view to indicating to D. the seriousness of his poor
attendance record, and to emphasize the need for a distinct improvement in that record in
the future, the Umpire directs that the disciplinary action be changed from discharge to a
disciplinary layoff of approximately one month beginning with the date he was informed of
his discharge.
Employee D. is to be reinstated to the payroll at this plant as of December 8, 1941, and his
seniority shall not be affected. Any loss in wages that D. may have suffered between
December 8, 1941, and December 30, 1941 (when he obtained employment at a rate of
pay higher than he had received at this plant) shall be made up in the form of back pay in
accordance with Paragraph 50 of the June 3, 1941 Agreement. Payment shall be made for
this period, however, only for the days that D. would have received work in keeping with
his seniority date. If D.'s hiring seniority date now entitles him to a production job he shall,
within two weeks of the date of this decision, be offered a job comparable in rate to that
which he previously held in production work. If his seniority date does not entitle him to
recall at the present time, he shall be offered a job as soon as his seniority would so entitle
him, under the terms of the seniority agreement in effect at this plant. Because of the
circumstances involved in this case, the Umpire directs, further, that if D. does not accept
recall as noted above, Management shall terminate his employment as a "quit," as of
December 30, 1941.
Decision
1. The discharge of Employee D., for failure to fulfill the requirements of the
machine repair job to which he was transferred, was to a great extent, a misuse
of local Management of the Corporation's right to discharge for cause.
2. Because of his very poor attendance record, Employee D. is held subject to

a disciplinary layoff from the date of his improper discharge to December 8,
1941.
3. Employee D. is to be reinstated on the payroll as of December 8, 1941,

without loss of seniority, and is to receive back pay for any wages lost up to
December 30, 1941, as directed in the body of this decision.
4. Within two weeks of the date of this decision, or at the proper time in the
future if his seniority does not entitle him to recall on that date, D. shall be
offered a job comparable in rate to his previous production job. Failure to
accept such a job shall result in the termination of his employment as a "quit,"
as of December 30, 1941.
UMPIRE.
March 31, 1942.
No. B-138
April 10, 1941
Disciplinary Layoff
GRIEVANCE:
Saginaw Malleable Iron -- Case B-11
"Arbitrary enforcement of shop rule No. 8. I ask that I not be given time off under the above
rule."
Umpire's Decision:
1. Shop rule No. 8 at this plant, which requires employees to call in or report by
lunch time of the shift on which an absence occurs, has been in effect for some
time, and has been qualified only to extent of recognizing the need to apply
such rule with proper recognition of the extenuating circumstances that may be
existent in any particular case.
2. No compelling reasons have been advanced for H.'s failure to notify the plant
within the time required by the rule here noted. The imposition of a two-day
penalty against H., therefore, represented a proper application of the rule here
questioned. The Union's request for the reimbursement of H. for the two-day
layoff is denied. (Entire Decision should be read)
In the Matter of:
and
General Motors Corporation -- Saginaw Malleable Iron Division – Case B-11

file://C:\Users\bobology\AppData\Local\Temp\Framework\b-138_13C09FEE.htm 3/22/2011
On December 17, 1941, Employee H. presented a grievance which read: "Arbitrary

enforcement of shop rule No. 8. I ask that I not be given time off under the above rule." A
hearing on this matter was held in Flint on March 26, 1942.
Nature of Case
On December 11, 1941, Employee H. found it necessary to be away from his job and failed
to call in before his lunch hour. Management held that this failure to call was a violation of
shop rule No. 8 which reads: "Failure to call in or report by lunch time of shift on which
absence occurs. (Two days to discharge.)" As a result, Management assessed the
minimum penalty of two days' layoff against H., but the Union objected to this penalty on
the grounds that a representative of Management, as late as June 10, 1941, stated that, "if
a man called in any time during his shift, rule No. 8 would be considered complied with."
The Union contends that inasmuch as H. called in during the afternoon of the shift from
which he was absent, he complied with the interpretation of rule No. 8 as advanced by a
member of supervision.
Union Claim
The Union notes that the excerpts of a meeting held between Management and the Shop
Committee on June 10, 1941, in which the content and application of rule No. 8 was
discussed, show that the presiding representative of Management made the statement:
"We have thrashed that over and have been agreed that as long as the man calls in on his
shift it will be O.K." The Union holds that this statement represents a qualification of rule
No. 8 that must continue to be operative unless specifically changed through negotiations
between Management and the Shop Committee. The Union contends, therefore, that there
is a definite misunderstanding between Management and the Shop Committee as to what
represents compliance with shop rule No. 8.
The Union notes that the circumstances in this case are almost identical with those
considered by the Umpire in Decision B-45, in which it was ruled that Management's action
represented such a rigid enforcement of the rule that back pay was awarded to the
employee involved. In the present instance, the Union states that H. attempted to inform
the Company of his absence, although he called in at 12:20 P.M., just 20 minutes later
than noted in the rule. The Union insists that Management in this particular instance failed
to consider that if the rule as written was violated, it was rather a technical infraction.
The Union notes that since Management has insisted on an exact interpretation of rule No.
8 as written, it has made several proposals to change the rule. One of these proposals was
to incorporate what the Union considered a modification of the rule by a representative of
Management on June 10, 1941, namely, to permit employees to call in any time during
their respective shifts. When Management objected to this change in the rule, the Union
further notes that it proposed that the rule be changed to read: "reprimand -- first offense;
two days' layoff -- second offense." After failing to reach an agreement on any of these
proposals, the Union still further notes that it "asked that some discretion be used in
enforcing the rule."
To settle the instant dispute, the Union requests that the Umpire recognize the statement
which the Union claims was made by a representative of Management on June 10, 1941,
as an effective qualification of rule No. 8, and that this decision be made the vehicle for a
final ruling on the content and interpretation of that rule. Finally, the Union asks that H. be
reimbursed for the two-day disciplinary layoff on the grounds that this layoff resulted from
Management's arbitrary position in regard to Rule No. 8.
Management notes that the shop rules at this plant have been in effect for several years,
are posted in conspicuous places throughout the plant, and that every employee has been
given a copy of these rules as recently as June 27, 1941. Management contends that since
H. did not call in by his lunch hour, and presented no extenuating circumstances in
explanation of his failure to comply with rule No. 8, it was quite proper to invoke the
minimum penalty of a two-day layoff. The shop rules in effect at this plant, Management
states, "have existed for some time as one of the means of enabling Management to
maintain the efficiency and proper attendance of employees." The particular rule here in
question is claimed by Management to be in no sense a violation of any provision of the
June 3, 1941 Agreement.
Decision B-45 is cited by Management as evidence that the Umpire has considered rule
No. 8, and has interpreted it as being in full force and effect as written. The findings in that
decision are reasoned by Management to support the rule here questioned, and to note
only that the rule should not be applied so rigidly as to fail entirely "to give proper weight to
the extenuating circumstances of the case."
Observation and Decision of the Umpire
The entire history of rule No. 8 at this plant is replete with evidence of attempts to enforce
the rule with a recognition of the fact that existing circumstances may make it impossible
for a particular employee to notify the plant of his absence within the exact time provided in
the rule. In Decision B-45 there was noting cited as to the content of the rule itself, but it
was particularly stressed that the rule had been applied in the past with full recognition of
extenuating circumstances of each individual case.
The Union has noted that a representative of Management on June 10, 1941, made a
statement which it claimed changed the content of the rule and waived the necessity for
employees to call in by lunch hour. The Umpire wishes to note the complete question and
answer that concerned this matter, to indicate the full meaning of the statement of
Management's representative. The excerpts of the meeting between Management and the
Shop Committee held on June 10, 1941, show that Committeeman F. asked the following
question concerning rule No. 8: "Isn't this the rule: If an employee lays off and does not call
in before noon and does not have a satisfactory reason for laying off he is given two days
off?" To this question a representative of Management replied: "I think so. We have
thrashed that over and have been agreed that as long as the man calls in on his shift it will
be O.K."
The question as placed by Committeeman F. did not seek approval of a change in the rule
from that which was written, but was directed toward an understanding as to its application.
The question of Committeeman F. specifically included a recognition of the need to call in
by lunch time, and the affirmative answer to that question indicated approval of the
Committeeman's interpretation of the rule including the need to call in by lunch time. The
second part of the answer, when directed to the question as placed, can mean only that an
explanation of extenuating circumstances that prevented an employee from calling in by
his lunch time, if advanced some time during his shift, will be accepted by Management as
a reasonable fulfillment of rule No. 8. There was absolutely no agreement to waive the
requirement that employees call in by lunch time. The Umpire is of the firm conviction,
therefore, that rule No. 8 is still effective as written, and that Management has only agreed
to qualify that rule to the extent of applying it in recognition of the particular circumstances
involved in each particular case.
The requirement that an employee call in by lunch time on the days he must be absent is
still in effect, as is the penalty for failure to abide by that requirement. However, as noted
above, there has been agreement that the rule will be applied in recognition of the
circumstances surrounding each particular case. By its request in this case, the Union is
really seeking to have the Umpire change rule No. 8 to a form that it has been
unsuccessful in getting Management to agree to for some time past. The Umpire obviously
has no right to change the rule in question, nor can he reinterpret it in a manner that would
make that part of the rule requiring calling in by lunch time entirely inoperative. The two
parties have been unable to agree on a change in the rule, and the Umpire's position
cannot be used to force such an agreement on either party.
In the particular case of H. cited in this grievance, no compelling reasons have been
advanced for his failure to call in by his lunch time. The only explanation made was that he
understood the rule to mean that he would call in any time during his shift. Ignorance of the
rule, or of its full content, cannot be supported as an extenuating circumstance for H.'s
failure to call in by lunch time on December 11, 1941. In the absence of reasonable
qualifying circumstances, the two-day disciplinary layoff imposed on H. represented proper
application of rule No. 8. The Union's request for the reimbursement of H. for the two-day
layoff, therefore, must be denied.
Decision
1. Shop rule No. 8 at this plant, which requires employees to call in or report by
lunch time of the shift on which an absence occurs, has been in effect for some
time, and has been qualified only to the extent of recognizing the need to apply
such rule with proper recognition of the extenuating circumstances that may be
existent in any particular case.
2. No compelling reasons have been advanced for H.'s failure to notify the plant
within the time required by the rule here noted. The imposition of a two-day
penalty against H., therefore, represented a proper application of the rule here
questioned. The Union's request for the reimbursement of H. for the two-day
layoff is denied.
UMPIRE.
April 10, 1942.
No. B-204
August 28, 1942
GRIEVANCE:
"Violation of Paragraph 63 of June 1941 Agreement. Not giving seniority enough

consideration in promoting job setter."
Umpire's Decision:
1. The factors of ability, merit and capacity of available employees were not
given proper consideration in the selection of W. as a job setter. The limitation
of the choice for promotion to the employees on a single shift within one
department also caused the selection to have been questionable as respects
past practice.
2. The promotion of W. was not in conformance with Paragraph 63 of the June

3, 1941 Agreement, and his position as a job setter shall be considered as
vacant as of September 15, 1942. The job shall then be filled in a manner
complying with Paragraph 63 of the Agreement, but without consideration of the
experience gained by W. as a job setter in the interim. (Entire Decision should
be read)
In the Matter of:
and
file://C:\Users\bobology\AppData\Local\Temp\Framework\b-204_13C0ACAA.htm 3/22/2011
General Motors Corporation -- Pontiac Motor Division -- Case B-79
On March 13, 1942, Employee R. presented a grievance which reads: "Violation of

Paragraph 63 of June 1941 Agreement. Not giving seniority enough consideration in
promoting jobsetter." A hearing on this grievance was held in Detroit on August 20, 1942.
Nature of Case
On March 13, 1942, Employee W. was promoted to the position of a jobsetter in

Department 460 of the Pontiac Motor Division. Employee R. presented the instant
grievance claiming that the promotion was made without full consideration of the factors of
ability, merit, capacity and seniority as required by Paragraph 63 of the June 3, 1941
Agreement. Initially the grievance was discussed only as respects Employee R., but at the
later steps of the grievance procedure consideration was given by both parties to other
available employees in the same group and department. The Union contends that
Management did not give proper weight to the correct determining factors for a sufficiently
large number of men to arrive at the decision to promote W. to the jobsetter vacancy. The
Union requests, therefore, that this job be declared vacant, and that it be filled with proper
consideration of the factors included in Paragraph 63 of the Agreement.
Union Contention
When the General Foreman of the department concerned in this promotion was asked by a
representative of the Shop Committee as to how the jobsetter was selected, the Union
states the foreman replied that, "as long as he picked what he considered the best man
that seniority was not a factor to be considered." Under such a procedure, the Union
contends that the foreman merely picks out who he thinks is the best man, and no
consideration is given to other men whose ability, merit and capacity may be approximately
equal to that of the promoted man. In the present instance, the Union strongly urges that at
least a half dozen men in the group in which W. worked were equal to W. in ability, merit
and capacity. It contends that any one of these six men should have been promoted in
preference to W. because they were equal to him in ability, merit and capacity, and in
addition had greater seniority. To support its contention in this particular, the Union
presented data which showed that in W.'s department, out of a total of twenty-eight men of
greater seniority than W., twenty-five had more machine experience than W. The Union
further notes that five of these men were transferred to Department 460 before W., and
seven more of them were transferred in the same month as W. Four or five of the men
cited by the Union as having much greater machine experience than W. (in several
instances three to four times as great) are noted as having a much wider variety of
experience than W. as respects the types of machines operated.
The abilities of particular employees in the group in which W. worked were cited by the
Union to support its conclusion that Employee W. did not stand "head and shoulders"
above his group, but was merely a good worker who was approximately equal to at least a
half dozen other available employees. Management's claim that W. worked on virtually
every machine in his group finds little objection from the Union (hones, jobbers and deep
hold drills are set up by the operators), but it does maintain that on several machines this
work by W. involved nothing more than a few hours that he was employed as a helper. The
time spent by this employee in the new department (#460) is contended by the Union to
have been insufficient to warrant the weight attributed to it by Management as a major
point in the selection of W. for promotion.
A further contention of the Union in this instance is that Management did not consider a
sufficiently large number of men as available for the promotion to jobsetter. Only the men
in a small group and on one shift were given any consideration, the Union maintains, and
out of a total of 135 men in the department, only seven of the 47 on the same shift as W.
were given any consideration whatsoever. By limiting the selection to such a small group of
employees on a single shift, the Union claims that Management did not follow the practice
it had adopted in several past promotions by extending selection beyond a single
department and shift (Decision B-55).
Management points out that W. was employed in that part of Department 460 supervised
by Foreman R., and that since the jobsetting vacancy occurred in that area, the men
supervised by Foreman R. were the first considered. Since these men had the best
knowledge of the machines to be set up in that area on that shift, Management states that,
"Supervision reviewed the ability, merit and capacity of these employees and determined
that W. was the best qualified of any employee in the group."
Employee W. is noted by Management as having been one of the first fourteen employees
assigned to Department 460 (he was assigned on August 22, 1941), and in addition
Management points out that he worked in the particular group where the jobsetter vacancy
existed longer than any other employee. Furthermore, Management urges that, "he had
displayed considerable aptitude for machine work and possessed the ability to move from
one machine to another with a minimum amount of training and break-in time on new
operations." Because of his adaptability, Management states he was used on various jobs
and has operated practically all of the machines in the department. His versatility and
ability as a machine operator is contended by Management to be evidenced by several
situations in which he was able to produce much greater quantities of various war products
than other men in his group.
While Management admits that all promotions are not necessarily made within a particular
department and shift, it contends that most promotions are made in this manner at this
plant. In W.'s department and shift, Management notes that W. was forty-seventh in line of
seniority as of March 13, 1942, but that 40 of the men who preceded him on the seniority
list had been in the department less than three months when W. was promoted. (Employee
W. had been in Department 460 for a trifle less than seven months at the time of his
promotion.) Within the particular group and shift in which W. was working at the time, then,
Management contends no one had demonstrated their ability to fulfill the duties of the
jobsetter on the particular machines there in place as conclusively as had Employee W.
Management urges that the Shop Committee at this plant has always contended that
seniority is the primary element to be considered in advancing employees to higher rated
jobs. In this connection, Management observes, "The Committee has frequently stated...
that Management should start at the top of the seniority list and ask each employee in the
order of his seniority whether or not he wants the available higher rated job." Management
argues that it is not obliged to select the employee with the longest service who is capable
of doing the job. Such a conclusion is unwarranted, claims Management, and is not
supported by any past decision of the Umpire. Management points out that it has already
been ruled that seniority only becomes an element for consideration in the advancement of
employees when ability, merit and capacity are equal. The evaluation of the ability, merit
and capacity of W. is concluded by Management to have placed him "head and shoulders"
above those in his group and on his shift, and to have warranted his promotion within the
meaning of Paragraph 63 of the June 3, 1941 Agreement.
The promotion of W. in this case must be considered in conjunction with Paragraph 63 of

the Agreement dated June 3, 1941. This paragraph reads in part as follows:
"(63) The transferring of employees is the sole responsibility of

Management. In the advancement of employees to higher paid jobs
when ability, merit and capacity are equal, employees with the
longest seniority will be given preference."
If the local Union has taken any position of the nature cited by Management, to the effect
that the employee of greatest seniority who is capable of fulfilling a particular job and
wishes to try for the job should be promoted, it disregards entirely the wording of
Paragraph 63, and the several decisions which have been issued interpreting that
paragraph. The first factors that must be considered are the ability, merit and capacity of
particular employees. If an evaluation of those combined factors does not result in the
determination of one employee as standing "head and shoulders" above the rest, then past
decisions have already indicated that the employees whose ability, merit and capacity are
determined to be approximately equal may be grouped together, and from this group the
employee with the greatest seniority should be promoted. It is only through such a
procedure that proper weight can be given to seniority.
The promotion of W., since there was no grouping of employees of approximately the
same ability, merit and capacity, can only be held to have been in conformance with
Paragraph 63 of the Agreement, if W. clearly stood "head and shoulders" above all other
employees who should have been considered available for the promotion.
One factor which apparently weighed very heavily in the selection of W. for promotion was
the small amount of extra time he had spent in Department 460 over other men who were
transferred to this new Department a month or two later. This additional time permitted W.
to gain brief experience on the operation of most of the machines in his group, but it is
noted that this experience in several instances extended no further than to allow for a
cursory knowledge as to how a particular machine operated. It would seem, therefore, that
the few weeks of additional experience of W., plus his ability to secure considerable
production on a few machines, was used by supervision as the determinants for W.'s
promotion. There is little evidence of any real evaluation of other factors such as length of
machine experience, variety of machines operated, productive ability on machines
operated prior to the production of war materials, etc. Without an evaluation of such factors
for the available employees, it is difficult to see how any real attention could have been
paid to the elements of ability, merit and capacity as is required by Paragraph 63 of the
Agreement.
Still another shortcoming in the promotion of W. was the limitation of the number of men
who were considered by Management as available for promotion to jobsetter. While the
newness of the Department may have indicated the advisability of limiting the selection to
the men who had worked in this Department, there is little to support the limitation to a
particular shift. Such a limitation is not entirely in conformance with past practice, and
leads to the conclusion that, in making its selection, supervision looked no further after the
foreman had decided that a particular employee on the shift he supervised was qualified to
fill a job available on that shift. In the limitation of the selection to a small group of
employees on a single shift, then, Management failed to make the choice of an employee
for promotion in a proper manner.
The available evidence causes the Umpire to conclude that the promotion of W. was not
made with proper consideration to the factors of ability, merit and capacity of available
employees, and the selection was incorrectly limited to employees on a single shift. It
seems quite evident that W. did not stand "head and shoulders" above all of the
employees who should have been considered available for promotion to jobsetter. It must
be held, therefore, that the promotion of W. was not in compliance with Paragraph 63 of
While the Umpire cannot determine who should have been promoted in the place of W.,
since the element of choice rests only with Management, proper compliance with
Paragraph 63 can be effectuated by the selection by Management of several men on all of
the three shifts in Department 460, whose ability, merit and capacity are considered as
approximately equal. From this group, Management can then select the man with the
greatest seniority for promotion, and can thereby fulfill the requirements of Paragraph 63.
The position of jobsetter held by W. shall be considered as a vacancy on September 15,
1942, and shall be filled in a manner to conform with Paragraph 63. In so doing, however,
no weight shall be given to W.'s experience as a jobsetter that he has gained since the
date of his improper promotion.
Decision
1. The factors of ability, merit and capacity of available employees were not
given proper consideration in the selection of W. as a jobsetter. The limitation of
the choice for promotion to the employees on a single shift within one
department also caused the selection to have been questionable as respects
past practice.
2. The promotion of W. was not in conformance with Paragraph 63 of the June

3, 1941 Agreement, and his position as a jobsetter shall be considered as
vacant as of September 15, 1942. The job shall then be filled in a manner
complying with Paragraph 63 of the Agreement, but without consideration of the
experience gained by W. as a jobsetter in the interim.
UMPIRE
August 28, 1942
No. B-265
FEBRUARY 10, 1943
Promotion Under Paragraph 63
GRIEVANCE:
Chevrolet Flint -- Case B-236
"Group charge Management with violation of National Agreement, Paragraph 63, in the
transferring of men to armor plate welding. Request this violation be stopped and men
affected be paid all pay due them due to this violation."
Umpire's Decision:
1. The claim of Employee W.M. that he should have been advanced to the
position of Welder Leader instead of Employees L.H. and J.M. is without merit
inasmuch as it does not represent timely presentation of his grievance. If any
claim existed on the part of W.M., it should have been filed at approximately the
time that these two other employees were placed in training for the Welder
Leader classification.
2. On August 26, 1942, the date of the instant grievance, Employees L.H. and
J.M. had been assigned to the Welder Leader classification for almost one
month. Though they undoubtedly possessed greater ability, merit and capacity
than did Employee W.M. to fulfill the Leader classification on that day, the
opportunity of W.M. to claim that he possessed approximately equal ability,
merit and capacity to these two men no longer existed because of the lapse of
four months in the filing of his grievance. His request for assignment to the
Welder Leader classification, together with his claim for back pay are denied.
In the Matter of:

file://C:\Users\bobology\AppData\Local\Temp\Framework\b-265_13C0B716.htm 3/22/2011
and
General Motors Corporation -- Chevrolet-Flint Division -- Case B-236
The grievance in this case, which was initiated as a group grievance on August 26, 1942,
reads as follows: "Group charge Management with violation of National Agreement,
Paragraph 63, in the transferring of men to armor plate welding. Request this violation be
stopped and men affected be paid all pay due them due to this violation." This grievance
was signed by Employee W.M., but through the various steps of the grievance procedure it
has been argued only as respects Employee W.M.'s claim that he should have been
promoted to a welder leader classification instead of Employees L.H. and J.M. As
presented to the Umpire, then, the grievance is confined entirely to the question of the right
of Employee W.M. to promotion in the place of these two other employees. A hearing on
this matter was held in Flint on January 15, 1943.
Nature of Case
Early in 1942, Management of the Chevrolet-Flint Division found it necessary to set up a

plan for the training of a group of supervisors, leaders, and welders to perform productive
welding operations on a new war product. The records of all employees in the Press Metal
Department were studied, and groups were selected on the basis of their ability and past
experience for training as potential foremen and leaders for the new welding operation.
The men who were selected as potential foremen and leaders (including L.H. and J.M. but
excluding W.M.) began their training in welding. Early in April, 1942, additional employees
who had been selected from applications for welding jobs were placed in training as
potential productive welders. Employee W.M., who was one of this group, began his
training on June 23, 1942.
The employees who had been selected as potential foremen, leaders and welders finished
their welding training at various times and many of them were placed in other jobs pending
the beginning of productive welding. On August 3, 1942, the particular war product
requiring the use of the new welders was placed in production and a group of the men who
had been trained as potential foremen and leaders (these men had been performing
experimental welding from the date they qualified as welders) were placed in a new
classification of "Welder Leaders" to begin the productive operations. Later, other men
were placed in the leader classification and still other newly trained welders were placed
on regular production welding work. On August 26, 1942, Employee W.M. filed the present
grievance, but not until October 13, 1942, was it made clear that he was protesting the
promotion of Employees L.H. and J.M. to the leader classification that had been
effectuated on August 3, 1942. In presenting the instant grievance, then, the Union takes
the position that Management failed to give proper recognition to the relative ability, merit
and capacity of Employee W.M. as compared to these two other employees when it
promoted these employees to the leader classification.
Union Claim
The Union's major contention in this case is that inasmuch as all of the men who were
placed on the welding work were trained at about the same time they should all have had
approximately the same relative ability, merit and capacity. If this contention is supported,
as the Union believes it should, the Union reasons that promotions to the leader
classification should have been made entirely on the basis of seniority. Any additional
training that may have been given to the men who were considered as potential leaders is
reasoned by the Union to have been training which should have been made available to
the welders on the basis of seniority since they all had approximately the same ability,
merit and capacity as welders.
In particular, the Union insists that Employee W.M. should have been considered as
possessing the same relative ability, merit and capacity as Employees L.H. and J.M.
because of the fact that he had experience as a leader from 1931 to 1934. The versatility
which W.M. showed in the many jobs which he held from 1934 to 1942 is cited by the
Union as an additional reason why he should have been selected for promotion to the
leader classification over and above the two other employees. It is the Union's contention,
then, that Employee W.M. had at least the same ability, merit and capacity as Employees
L.H. and J.M., and that his greater seniority should have entitled him to promotion to the
leader classification. Though the original claim sought back pay for all of the men affected
by what the Union claimed was a violation of Paragraph 63 in the promotion of all leaders,
the instant grievance as presented to the Umpire has been limited to the case of Employee
W.M. in such a manner that the claim for back pay can apply only to his individual case.
Management maintains that it gave proper consideration to the relative ability, merit and
capacity of all the employees in the Press Metal Department whose records indicated any
welding experience, potentiality for welding work, or leader qualifications. The first
selection of men to be trained for welding, Management states, was made from among
these men whom Management felt showed the greatest ability, merit and capacity to
become leaders in the welding classification. Later, when many of the men had completed
their welding training, Management contends that it again gave particular attention to the
relative ability, merit and capacity of the various individuals who were placed in the leader
classification. Had it followed the Union's suggestions that promotions to the leader
classification be based only upon the seniority dates of the employees who had finished
their training as welders over a short interval of time, Management reasons that it would
have disregarded entirely the need for leadership ability. To have judged all employees
solely on their ability to weld would, in Management's opinion, have been to give absolutely
no consideration as to their relative abilities, merits and capacities to fulfill the positions of
leaders.
Inasmuch as the National Agreement does not provide for promotions to higher rated jobs
on the basis of seniority alone, but rather on the basis of seniority when ability, merit and
capacity are equal, Management reasons that its promotion of Employees L.H. and J.M.
does not represent a violation of the Agreement. It is Management's strong contention that
the relative ability, merit and capacity of Employees L.H. and J.M. to fill the job of welder
leaders far exceeded that of Employee W.M. Employee W.M. was transferred to
production welding in line with his seniority from among those men who had qualified as
productive welders, Management notes, but he was not promoted to the position of a
leader for the reasons that he has never held the position of leader and has not shown the
capacity or ability to assume real responsibilities.
Paragraph 63 of the June 3, 1941 Agreement has been the subject of many decisions of
the Umpire in the "B" series. It is hardly necessary at this late date to state again that
seniority is only a factor in promotion to a higher paid job when the ability, merit and
capacity of a group of employees available for that job are considered to be relatively
equal. In the present case the only point on which the Umpire can rule is whether or not
the relative ability, merit and capacity of Employee W.M. was approximately equal to those
of Employees L.H. and J.M. If such were found to be the case, it would only then be
possible to hold that the greater seniority of Employee W.M. entitled him to promotion
before the other two employees.
If Employee W.M. had any real claim in this case it should have been made early in 1942
when employees were selected for training in the welding classification. If he felt his ability,
merit and capacity were equivalent to the two men to whose job he now lays claim, it
seems clear that he should have made his claim known at the time these men were
selected for training in the welding operation. Of course, such a claim could only have
gained merit had the welding classification carried a rate that would have represented a
promotion for him and for the men to whose jobs he lays claim.
When Employees L.H. and J.M. were selected in April, 1942, to be trained as welder
leaders, Management apparently made its choice on the basis of the relative ability, merit
and capacity of these men as compared to other applicants. Had Employee W.M. felt that
he was improperly treated in that selection he should have made his claim known at that
time. By his failure to press his claim, these two employees had been in training for
approximately two months before Employee W.M. began productive welding, and both of
them had already qualified as welders at about the time that W.M. entered the welding
training program. By September 15, 1942, when W.M. began productive welding, these
two men already had approximately five months' experience as welders and were
obviously far above him in ability, merit and capacity to do the welding task. Their positions
as welder leaders were then firmly entrenched, and it is difficult to conceive how Employee
W.M. could claim on August 26, 1942, that he should have been given one of the jobs for
which the two men had completed their special leader training and had such a relatively
long period of experience (as a welder and a leader).
All of the available evidence in this case leads to the conclusion that on August 26, 1942,
when Employee W.M. presented the instant grievance, the position of welder leader had
been held by Employees L.H. and J.M. for almost one month and that these two
employees had already had an excess of four months' training and experience as welders.
On that date, Employee W.M. had only qualified as a welder and had not done any
productive welding. Since Employee W.M. raised no objection in April, 1942, when these
two other employees were first given training as potential welder leaders, the claim he filed
in late August is certainly not a timely presentation of his individual grievance. On August
26, 1942, Employee W.M. had absolutely no claim to the jobs held by Employees L.H. and
J.M. inasmuch as he had failed to lay claim to such jobs at the time the two men were first
placed in training for the welder leader job. His request for assignment to the Welder
Leader classification and for back pay, therefore, must be denied.
Decision
1. The claim of Employee W.M. that he should have been advanced to the
position of Welder Leader instead of Employees L.H. and J.M. is without merit
inasmuch as it does not represent timely presentation of his grievance. If any
claim existed on the part of W.M., it should have been filed at approximately the
time that these two other employees were placed in training for the Welder
Leader classification.
2. On August 26, 1942, the date of the instant grievance, Employees L.H. and
J.M. had been assigned to the Welder Leader classification for almost one
month. Though they undoubtedly possessed greater ability, merit and capacity
than did Employee W.M. to fulfill the Leader classification on that day, the
opportunity of W.M. to claim that he possessed approximately equal ability,
merit and capacity to these two men no longer existed because of the lapse of
four months in the filing of his grievance. His request for assignment to the
Welder Leader classification, together with his claim for back pay, are denied.
Signed G. ALLAN DASH, JR.
Umpire
February 10, 1943.
B-271
FEBRUARY 20, 1943
Layoff of Temporary Employees
GRIEVANCE:
Electro-Motive -- Case B-18
"I have worked for 5 months. I was laid off Friday on ground of curtailing production. Many
men with as little as 1 or 2 months service are still working while I have been laid off. I feel
that I have been unjustly discriminated against and demand that I be rehired at least until
layoffs affect men with 5 months service or more."
Umpire's Decision:
1. No provision of the June 3, 1941 Agreement applies seniority rights to

temporary employees. By the very nature of the Agreement, temporary
employees do not gain such rights until they have completed six months'
service. Since Employee A. had only five months' service, seniority rights on
layoff were not applicable to him.
2. No claims of personal prejudice or discrimination for Union activity in

connection with the layoff of Employee A. have been made. Since he had no
seniority rights in connection with such layoff, his entire claim in this matter
must be denied. (Entire Decision should be read)
In the Matter of:
and
file://C:\Users\bobology\AppData\Local\Temp\Framework\b-271_13C0C191.htm 3/22/2011
General Motors Corporation -- Electro-Motive Division -- Case B-18
On October 17, 1942, Employee A. presented a grievance which read: "I have worked for 5
months. I was laid off Friday on ground of curtailing production. Many men with as little as
1 or 2 months service are still working while I have been laid off. I feel that I have been
unjustly discriminated against and demand that I be rehired at least until layoffs affect men
with 5 months service or more." A hearing on this matter was held in Chicago on January
21, 1943.
Due to a curtailment of work in the Locomotive Division at this plant in October, 1942,
transfers of seniority employees resulted in the layoff of a number of temporary employees.
Employee A., one of these temporary employees, had been working approximately five
months at the time of his layoff. When A. was laid off, a number of employees doing work
he felt capable of performing, and who had worked for periods much shorter than he, were
still employed. The Union contends in his case, therefore, that he should not have been
laid off until all other men with less service at this plant had been laid off.
The Union's major contention here is that, within the group of temporary employees, "the
principles of seniority should equally obtain". It is the Union's feeling that a temporary
employee should continue to work, at jobs he is capable of performing, until all persons
with a shorter service record have been laid off. In accordance with Paragraph 56 of the
June 3, 1941 Agreement, the Union reasons that Employee A. should not have been laid
off, and requests that he be granted compensation for all time lost by reason of his layoff.
Management lays particular emphasis on the fact that no charge accompanied by written
evidence has been made in support of the original allegation that there was discrimination
against the employee for any kind of activity. In the absence of such evidence,
Management reasons that Paragraph 56 of the June 3, 1941 Agreement does not require
that the temporary employees be laid off according to length of service, and does not
extend to such temporary employees the rights given by the Agreement to employees
possessing seniority. For this reason, then, Management maintains there was no obligation
to retain Employee A. in a job until all other employees with less than five months' service
had been laid off.
The only means by which Employee A. could have supported his claim of improper layoff
in this instance is to have presented clear and unmistakable evidence that there was
personal prejudice, or discrimination for Union activity, in connection with his layoff. There
has been no such material presented in written form in this case, nor has any such
evidence been referred to in the final step of the grievance procedure. For this reason, the
part of A.'s claim that originally alluded to discrimination has no basis in fact.
The remainder of the Union's claim in this case is that Employee A. should have had
seniority rights in his layoff, and that all other employees with less than five months' service
should have been laid off before him. There is simply nothing in the Agreement which can
be cited as extending seniority to employees who do not possess seniority until they have
been employed for a period of six months. To do so would be to extend to temporary
employees the seniority provisions of the National Agreement, at least insofar as layoffs
are concerned. Since no provision of the June 3, 1941 Agreement gives any seniority
rights to temporary employees, there was no obligation on the part of Management to
retain A. until all other temporary employees with less than five months' service had been
laid off. Employee A.'s entire claim is denied.
Decision
1. No provision of the June 3, 1941 Agreement applies seniority rights to

temporary employees. By the very nature of the Agreement, temporary
employees do not gain such rights until they have completed six months'
service. Since Employee A. had only five months' service, seniority rights on
layoff were not applicable to him.
2. No claims of personal prejudice or discrimination for Union activity in

connection with the layoff of Employee A. have been made. Since he had no
seniority rights in connection with such layoff, his entire claim in this matter
must be denied.
Umpire
February 20, 1943.
UMPIRE DECISION C-4 Page 1 of 5
No. C-4
February 9, 1943
Protest of Disciplinary Action
GRIEVANCE:
Saginaw Steering Gear—Case C-8
"I was given 3 days leave of absence from work to go deer hunting by my foreman. I was
absent one day over my leave. When I reported for work with a reasonable alibi I was told I
was a voluntary quit, and as such was cleared out. I asked for a committeeman and was
denied that also. I therefore claim violation of Par. 113-75 and 121-b. I ask that I be
returned to work, and be reimbursed for all lost time."
1. The complete loss of seniority standing as a disciplinary action assessed

against Employee M. for leaving the plant one week prior to the time he was
excused to go deer hunting, is considered as too severe a penalty for the action
involved. A member of supervision is largely responsible for M.’s belief that he
would be subjected only to a disciplinary layoff if he failed to comply with
Management’s instructions in this matter.
2. Employee M. is held subject to a disciplinary layoff and to a partial loss of

seniority, because of his utter disregard of Management’s orders, together with
the advantage which he took of Management’s unsolicited attempt to grant
leave to deer hunters.
3. The period that elapsed between the date a "voluntary quit" notice was sent
to Employee M. and the day he resumed work, is held to have been a proper
disciplinary layoff. His penalty for his act shall be considered complete by an
adjustment in his original seniority date to the extent of the number of days of
that disciplinary layoff. (Entire Decision should be read)
file://C:\Users\bobology\AppData\Local\Temp\Framework\c-004_13C0CBAF.htm 3/22/2011
In the Matter of:
United Automobile Workers of America—C.I.O.—Local 434
and
General Motors Corporation—Saginaw Steering Gear Division—Case C-8
The employee grievance in this case, which was presented by Employee M. on November
19, 1942, reads as follows: "I was given 3 days leave of absence from work to go deer
hunting, by my foreman. I was absent one day over my leave. When I reported for work
with a reasonable alibi I was told I was a voluntary quit, and as such was cleared out. I
asked for a Committeeman and was denied that also. I therefore claim violation of Par. 113
-- 75 and 121-b. I ask that I be returned to work, and be reimbursed for all lost time." A
hearing on this matter was held in Saginaw on January 13, 1943.
Nature of Case
Past experience during the Michigan deer hunting season led Management of the Saginaw
Steering Gear Division to believe that steps would be necessary to cope with an
abnormally high rate of absenteeism. For this reason, plans were formulated by which
employees were excused for several days to go hunting, but these plans did not enable all
employees to leave at the beginning of the season. Employee M. was excused for the
dates of November 21, 22, and 23, 1942, to go deer hunting, but he absented himself from
the plant on November 14, 15, 16, and 17, 1942, so that he could start his hunting at the
beginning of the deer season.
At the end of the shift on November 17, 1942, Management sent M. a letter informing him
that he was a "voluntary quit without notice" for being absent for three working days
without proper notice. Management offered to return him to his job, but did so with the
stipulation that his seniority would be broken. The Union protests this action as
representing discipline far in excess of that warranted by the circumstances, and requests
that M. be reinstated in his job with his previous seniority standing. It is noted that an
original request for back pay for the time lost, together with other charges included in the
original grievance, have been dropped by the Union through the steps of the grievance
procedure. The only recent request of Union has been that M.’s seniority be reinstated.
Union Claim
When Employee M. was told that he would not be granted time to go deer hunting until
November 21, 1942, the Union observes that he discussed the matter with his foreman
"from the point of view of determining the possible penalty" if he should go hunting at the
beginning of the deer season. In this connection, it is claimed by the Union that the
foreman indicated that a disciplinary layoff would undoubtedly be invoked against M., and
that M. left at the beginning of the deer hunting season with full cognizance that he would
be subject to a disciplinary layoff for his act. The expectation that Management would act
leniently in this case is reasoned by the Union to have arisen from the fact that M.’s
department had been working on a seven-day week basis for a considerable period of
time.
In the Union’s opinion, Management was aware of Committeeman M.’s intention to absent
himself from the plant on November 16, and 17, 1942.
In fact, the Union claims that M. informed three different members of supervision on
separate occasions that he intended to go deer hunting on November 15, 1942. Though it
agrees that he should have been subjected to a disciplinary layoff for such an act, the
Union does not feel that disciplinary action should have taken the extreme form of a loss of
seniority. Furthermore, the Union contends that M.’s absence on November 14, 1942, was
occasioned by the loss of time which he experienced in getting his car repaired at a local
garage. His absence on November 15, 1942, is claimed by the Union not to have
represented the loss of a regular work day, because of the fact that it was a Sunday, and
his job was not necessarily to be operated on that day. In conclusion, the Union contends
that the loss of income which Employee M. suffered through his act should be a sufficient
penalty, and requests that his seniority date be re-established as of its original date.
Management observes that it made every effort to establish some plan whereby
employees at this plant, who were interested in deer hunting, would have an opportunity to
pursue their hobby as early in the season as was possible. When M.’s foreman informed
him that he would be excused on November 21, 22 and 23, 1942, Management maintains
that M. "declared in the presence of other supervisors and employees in the department
that he was going to take the opening week whether anyone liked it or not." When this
employee did not report to work, and did not notify Management as to the reason for his
absence on November 14, 15, 16, and 17, 1942, Management maintains that he absented
himself without reporting, and was logically held responsible for severing his seniority
under the terms of Paragraph 64-C of the October 19, 1942 Agreement.
In the instant case, Management maintains that it had two alternatives, namely, to
terminate M.’s employment by discharging him for failure to report to work in disregard of
his foreman’s instructions, or to have cleared him out as a voluntary quit. Management
notes that it decided on the latter course because of the employee’s length of service at
this plant. Disciplinary action is noted by Management to have been taken in only a few
cases of the hundreds of men who were given leaves of absence to go deer hunting. In
each of these cases, Management observes that "discipline was meted out to fit the
situation." Had Management taken any other action than it did in the instant case, it is
contended that "shop discipline would have been challenged, discrimination would have
been shown, and production employees could have claimed that the alleged aggrieved had
been permitted to disregard the rules because he was a skilled employee." In such a case,
Management reasons, "the loss of an employee’s seniority is not too severe a penalty
when the violation concerns a deliberate and complete disregard of posted rules and
regulations particularly when such violation is known to not only the men in his own group
but to others in the plant." For these reasons, Management contends that its action in this
case should be supported by the Umpire.
The action protested by the instant grievance cannot be adjudged in any other form except
as a disciplinary action invoked for failure to abide by orders of Management. While it is
evident that Employee M. absented himself improperly for three days, and thereby violated
Paragraph 64-C of the October 19, 1942 Agreement, it is nevertheless true that
Management’s action in this case was wholly in the form of discipline that was invoked for
an act by an employee which it determined to be entirely improper. It is necessary,
therefore, for the Umpire to consider whether or not the loss of seniority to this employee
was a proper disciplinary action under all the circumstances involved in this case.
When Employee M. decided to disregard Management’s instructions to do his deer hunting

on November 21 to 23, 1942, he took a distinctly improper advantage of Management’s
real attempt to give an opportunity to deer hunters at this plant to follow their distinctive
hobby. By his action of leaving a week earlier than the period granted to him, M. made it
rather difficult for Management to carry on the projected production schedules in his
department. Furthermore, he flaunted Management’s authority in this instance and
severely affected Management’s ability to maintain proper discipline in part of this plant.
For such a violation of his responsibilities as an employee, M. was obviously subject to
some sort of disciplinary action.
The fact that the Saginaw Steering Gear Division is a relatively new plant as respects the
seniority of its employees, makes the seniority standing of Employee M. a very important
matter. In fact, loss of seniority in such an instance is second only to discharge as to
severity of discipline. The Umpire is of the conviction that M. should have been subjected
to a severe disciplinary layoff, but feels that the complete loss of seniority as a disciplinary
action in this instance is too severe a penalty. This conclusion is particularly based on the
fact that M.’s foreman was responsible for M.’s belief that he would be subjected only to a
disciplinary layoff if he disregarded Management’s instructions in the matter.
Inasmuch as Employee M. lost approximately one month of employment at this plant (he
returned to work on December 16, 1942), he experienced a real loss of income as an
outgrowth of his entirely improper action. However, such a loss as a disciplinary layoff is
not considered by the Umpire to be a sufficient penalty under the circumstances. While a
complete loss of seniority is too severe a penalty, it is held that Employee M. should be
subjected to a loss of seniority equivalent to the period between the day the notice was
sent to him that he was a "voluntary quit," and the day he started back to work.
Decision
1. The complete loss of seniority standing as a disciplinary action assessed

against Employee M. for leaving the plant one week prior to the time he was
excused to go deer hunting, is considered as too severe a penalty for the action
involved. A member of supervision is largely responsible for M.’s belief that he
would be subjected only to a disciplinary layoff if he failed to comply with
Management’s instructions in this matter.
2. Employee M. is held subject to a disciplinary layoff and to a partial loss of

seniority, because of his utter disregard of Management’s orders, together with
the advantage which he took of Management’s unsolicited attempt to grant
leave to deer hunters.
3. The period that elapsed between the date a "voluntary quit" notice was sent
to Employee M. and the day he resumed work, is held to have been a proper
disciplinary layoff. His penalty for his act shall be considered complete by an
adjustment in his original seniority date to the extent of the number of days of
that disciplinary layoff.
Umpire
February 9, 1943.
No. C-6
February 10, 1943
Disciplinary Layoff
GRIEVANCE:
Oldsmobile Forge—Case C-1
"I was given a 4-day layoff for infraction of company rules. I did not violate any company
rule and demand that I be paid for the four days."
1. Employee B.’s failure to notify the plant of his expected absence on October
16, 1942, when it followed an incident of like nature on October 12, 1942, and
in addition occurred at the end of a three-day period during which B. failed to
notify Management of his improperly recorded presence in the first instance,
indicates clearly that he was guilty of complicity in a plan to record his time for
work not performed. His act, therefore, was in direct violation of existing Shop
Rules for which he was rightly the subject of discipline.
2. The disciplinary layoff of four days invoked against Employee B., when
compared with the two-week layoff which was assessed against the employee
who actually punched his clock card on the two days in question, is deemed as
a proper evaluation of his part in the entire incident. His claim for back pay is
denied. (Entire Decision should be read)
In the Matter of:
and
file://C:\Users\bobology\AppData\Local\Temp\Framework\c-006_13C0D659.htm 3/22/2011
General Motors Corporation—Oldsmobile—Forge Plant—Case C-1
On October 23, 1942, Employee B. presented a grievance to Management which read as

follows: "I was given a 4-day layoff for infraction of company rules. I did not violate any
company rule and demand that I be paid for the four days." The discipline in this case was
imposed for alleged complicity in an improper recording of B.’s time on his clock card. A
hearing on this case was held in Flint on January 15, 1943.
On Monday, October 12, 1942, Employee B. did not report for work, although his clock
card was punched in at 12:02 A.M. and out at 8:01 A.M. He worked the next three days
and later admitted that he noted that his card had recorded his presence on Monday but
had made no attempt to report the fact to any member of supervision. On Friday, October
16, 1942, Employee B. was again absent, but his card was punched in at 12:00 Midnight.
An observer was placed near the time clock at the close of the shift and another employee,
who Management alleges is a close friend and associate of Employee B. was detected in
the act of ringing B.’s clock card at approximately 8:00 A.M. This second employee was
given a two-week layoff and a like penalty was first assessed against Employee B. for his
alleged complicity in the matter. Through an error, Employee B. was told to report to work
on October 21, 1942, after having served four days of his disciplinary layoff. His penalty
was then reduced to four days, and two days later he filed the instant grievance protesting
the entire disciplinary action.
Management points out that Employee B. did not telephone to the plant, nor did he have
anyone report his expected absence to supervision on October 12, or 16, 1942. Though he
failed to call in on Monday, October 12, 1942, Management does not contend that he was
necessarily involved in having his time card punched in and out by another employee on
that day. However, when he failed to report the matter on the following three days, and
then was absent without reporting on the final day of the week, Management feels that he
was definitely involved in the second incident in which his time was recorded improperly on
his clock card. By his failure to notify supervision of his expected absence on the two days,
plus his failure to report the fact that his card was punched in for a day on which he did not
work, Management claims that Employee B. was involved in a violation of the two following
Shop Rules: "Rule 1 -- Falsification of personnel or other records. (Penalty: One week
layoff to discharge.)" "Rule 2 -- Knowingly ringing the clock card of another. (Penalty: Two
weeks layoff to discharge.)"
While Management recognizes that Employee B. did not admit that he conspired with
another employee furtively to record his time on the two days he was absent, it holds that
B. was benefited by the act, failed to bring the improper record to the attention of
Management, and neglected on two separate occasions in the same week to report his
expected absence to the plant. In view of these facts, Management holds that B. was
"guilty of complicity in this dishonest act." Management, therefore, concludes that
Employee B. was rightly disciplined by a four-day layoff, and maintains he should not be
reimbursed for the time lost.
The Union reasons that it is not the duty of an employee to report time which is recorded
incorrectly on his time card, but that it is Management’s responsibility to make the
necessary checks to avoid any improprieties. In the present case, it is the Union’s opinion
that there was absolutely no proof that Employee B. conspired with the man who punched
his time card on the days in question, and that Management assessed the penalty entirely
on the basis of conjecture. Without the presence of telling evidence to connect Employee
B. with the act of improperly recording his time, the Union reasons that Management
proceeded on the basis of pretext or fancy in assessing B.’s discipline. The Union’s major
contention in this case, then, is that disciplinary action properly applied is entirely
necessary, but that such discipline should be assessed on the basis of facts which can
sustain the reason for such action on the part of Management. Finally, the Union contends
that not only has an injustice been done in this particular case, but it strongly urges that "a
very distinct principle of collective bargaining is involved... namely, that a worker should not
and cannot be disciplined upon assumption". In view of what it contends is the absence of
irrevocable facts in this case, the Union requests that Employee B. receive reimbursement
for the four days of his disciplinary layoff.
Conclusion and Decision of the Umpire
The facts in this case point definitely to the conclusion that Employee B.’s card was
punched in and out on October 12, and 16, 1942, in a manner that casts serious suspicion
upon Employee B. On at least three separate occasions he had an opportunity to take a
step which would have shown clearly that he had no part in the improper recording of time
for which he alone could benefit. The first instance was when he failed to call the plant, or
have anyone report to the plant, on October 12, 1942, relative to the fact that he would not
report to work. Had B. notified supervision, it would have been clear that the employee who
punched in B.’s card did so entirely upon his own initiative. When Employee B. reported
back to work, and on three separate days failed to notify any member of supervision that
he was improperly recorded as having worked on Monday, he again missed an opportunity
of lifting suspicion as to his complicity in this entire matter. Even though he may not have
felt it his responsibility to report the recording of such time to Management, his failure to do
so causes him to be responsible for any suspicion which was later thrown upon him as to
his connection with this whole incident. When, after three days of failing to report his
improperly recorded presence, he again absented himself from the plant and failed to
notify Management in any way, his connection with the second act of recording his
presence in the plant seems certain beyond all question of doubt.
The final failure of Employee B. to notify the plant as to his expected absence on October
16, 1942, when it followed all of the other factors which caused real suspicion to be thrown
upon him, forces the Umpire to conclude that he was directly connected with a dishonest
plan to record his presence in the plant. In as much as Employee B is found to have been
directly involved in a plan to record his presence in the plant improperly, the Umpire must
conclude that he was rightly subject to a disciplinary layoff. The fact that he received a
four-day disciplinary layoff, as compared to that of two weeks for the man who actually
punched his card on the two days in question, seems to attach proper weight to his part in
the matter. For this reason, then, it is ruled that Employee B. was rightly subjected to a
four-day disciplinary layoff, and his claim for back pay is denied.
Decision
1. Employee B.’s failure to notify the plant of his expected absence on October
16, 1942, when it followed an incident of like nature on October 12, 1942, and
in addition occurred at the end of a three-day period during which B. failed to
notify Management of his improperly recorded presence in the first instance,
indicates clearly that he was guilty of complicity in a plan to record his time for
work not performed. His act, therefore, was in direct violation of existing Shop
Rules for which he was rightly the subject of discipline.
2. The disciplinary layoff of four days invoked against Employee B., when
compared with the two-week layoff which was assessed against the employee
who actually punched his clock card on the two days in question, is deemed as
a proper evaluation of his part in the entire incident. His claim for back pay is
denied.
Umpire
February 10, 1943.
C-12
February 20, 1943
Job Classification and Wage Rate
GRIEVANCE:
Chevrolet Bloomfield—Case C-6
"The department demands new classifications retroactive from November 9th, starting date
of the new operation."
The classification of the work of assembling trucks, that had been previously
boxed for export, was not correctly established as "Loading and Boxing
Automobiles—Export". Neither can the Union point to any classification in the
local wage agreement that can be held to be directly applicable to this particular
work.
The present case is returned to the parties for the negotiation of a correct
classification and wage rate. Any rate agreed upon is to be applicable on a
retroactive basis to November 11, 1942, the date of the instant grievance.
In the Matter of:
and
file://C:\Users\bobology\AppData\Local\Temp\Framework\c-012_13C0E0E3.htm 3/22/2011
General Motors Corporation—Chevrolet—Bloomfield Division—Case C-6
The employee grievance in this case, which was presented by Committeeman Z. on

November 11, 1942, reads as follows: "The department demands new classifications
retroactive from November 9th, starting date of the new operation." The hearing on this
matter was held in New York on January 19, 1943.
For many years prior to the date of the instant grievance the Chevrolet-Bloomfield Division
performed an export boxing operation which consisted of boxing completely knocked-down
automobiles and trucks for export. A classification in the local wage agreement entitled
"Loading and Boxing Automobiles—Export", with a rate of $1.09 per hour, has been
applied to this work. In November 1942, this division received a temporary assignment to
remove approximately 250 trucks from boxes in which they had already been crated, and
to replace these units in their original form for delivery to Military authorities. This operation
required the performance of a series of operations which Management felt was merely the
reverse order of the operations of disassembling and packing the trucks for export.
Inasmuch as this was a temporary job that was to be completed in approximately four
weeks, Management placed the men who performed the work under the classification
noted above. The Union filed the instant grievance requesting a new classification and rate
for this job.
The operation performed by the men in question in this case is claimed by the Union to
have been of a nature customarily performed in Assembly plants. Inasmuch as the local
wage agreement has no classification or wage rate for this job, the Union contends that the
rate for the new job should have been negotiated with the Union committee pursuant to the
provisions of Paragraph 112 (a), and 112 (b), of the October 19, 1942 Agreement. The
Union requests, therefore, that a proper rate be established for this job, and that it be made
retroactive to November 9, 1942, the starting date of this particular job.
Inasmuch as the performance of the work here in question was so much like that of
"Loading and Boxing Automobiles—Export", in that it required the same tools, and involved
identical operations performed in a reverse order, Management reasons that the job was
properly classified under that heading. In Management’s opinion, this work could not be
compared to the regular assembly operations that are performed in Assembly plants,
inasmuch as it consisted of rebuilding trucks from complete units that had been previously
boxed for Export. Furthermore, it is noted that this work was not performed on moving
conveyors with established times. Because of the similarity of the operation involved with
that of the loading and boxing of automobiles for export, and because of the fact that the
work was of a temporary nature "which could not be established under any other existing
classification at this location", Management reasons that the work was correctly classified
under the terms of the local wage agreement. Management concludes its argument in this
case as respects the events that occurred after the job was classified as above, as follows:
"Negotiations were opened on the basis that the export loading classification would cover
this work and that the production job rate would be established under the same factors as
the rate for this classification."
Observations and Conclusions of the Umpire
In the job in question in this case, Management sought a classification in the local wage
agreement that would most closely apply, in order to assign a rate to a job which it was
aware would last for only a short period. In doing so, however, Management selected a
classification which was quite different from the actual work involved. Instead of
disassembly for boxing this operation actually consisted of assembly of a complete truck
from a box of disassembled units. While many of the operations which are performed in the
disassembly job were performed in this instance, they were obviously performed in a
different manner. Instead of disassembling a series of parts and units to be packed in a
box, the men involved had to apply the necessary skills to assemble a truck that would be
in working order when completed. Under such circumstances, the classification and rate
which applied to the disassembly of the trucks for export, clearly should not have applied
for the assembly of the trucks for actual operation.
In the earlier steps of the grievance procedure, the Union has cited rates in the vicinity
which have applied to the assembly operations. Inasmuch as these operations are not a
part of the local wage agreement, they are clearly not applicable. Rather, the parties must
apply themselves to the negotiation of a classification and rate which should apply to this
particular job on a retroactive basis. This conclusion is necessary inasmuch as neither
party can point to any particular classification in the local wage agreement which can be
held to have been specifically applicable to the operations here in question. For this
reason, the present case is returned to the parties for their negotiations, and it is held that
any rate which they may agree upon shall be applicable on a retroactive basis to
November 11, 1942, the date of the instant grievance.
Decision:
The classification of the work of assembling trucks, that had been previously
boxed for export, was not correctly established as "Loading and Boxing
Automobiles—Export". Neither can the Union point to any classification in the
local wage agreement that can be held to be directly applicable to this particular
work.
The present case is returned to the parties for the negotiation of a correct
classification and wage rate. Any rate agreed upon is to be applicable on a
retroactive basis to November 11, 1942, the date of the instant grievance.
Umpire
February 20, 1943.
No. C-34
April 19, 1943
Disciplinary Layoff
GRIEVANCE:
Saginaw Malleable—Cases C-7 and C-8
"I ask that I be returned to work and that I be paid for all time lost."
Employees K. and S. are held to have violated a deer hunting privilege extended by
Management, and to have subjected themselves to the two-week penalty which was
invoked in all instances in which employees were guilty of such a violation. Had either of
the employees made any real attempt to return to the plant, and had not "hidden" behind
the excuse of a break-down of their car, the inevitable conclusion in this case could not
have been reached by Management or the Umpire. The two employees’ requests for
reimbursement are denied. (Entire Decision should be read)
In the Matter of:
United Automobile Workers of America, C.I.O.—Local 455
and
General Motors Corporation—Saginaw Malleable Division—Cases C-7 and C-8
Two employee grievances have been combined for consideration in this case. These two
grievances, signed by employees K. and S. on November 25, 1942, read as follows: "I ask
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that I be returned to work and that I be paid for all time lost." A hearing on these matters
was held in Saginaw on March 19, 1943.
In anticipation of the deer hunting season, Management of the Saginaw Malleable Division
arranged a plan whereby employees could take time off with a minimum loss of operating
efficiency. Employees K. and S. asked for and received permission to be absent from work
from November 26, through November 29, 1942, for the expressed purpose of deer
hunting. When they filed their requests for leave, these two employees asked their
superintendent what they could expect in the way of discipline if they should absent
themselves on days other than those for which they were excused. Management states
that they were both informed that they would get "time off" if they should take any such
action. Two days before the hunting season opened they repeated this query and were
again informed in the same manner. It is also noted that the committee at this plant was
notified ten days prior to the opening of the deer season that all employees who took
unauthorized leaves would be given two weeks off as a penalty.
Employees K. and S. went hunting on the day the deer hunting season began, November
15, 1942. On the morning of November 16, 1942, a telephone call was received at the
plant to the effect that the two men would not be in to work that day "as their car broke
down." The message also stated that "they might possibly be back on Tuesday (November
17) or Wednesday, November 18." Both men reported to work on November 18, 1942, but
were sent home because replacements had already been secured for them. A few days
after they returned to work a disciplinary layoff was invoked against them for taking
improper leave. The Union has filed the instant grievance contending that the disciplinary
layoff was invoked without proper proof that a violation of the deer hunting privilege had
occurred.
Management’s position is that these two employees left with the admitted intent of going
deer hunting and simply found an excuse for failing to return to the plant on November 16,
1942. Had the "convenient" break-down occurred as the men claimed, Management
reasons that other transportation could have been arranged by them inasmuch as the
break-down is said to have occurred while they were on the highway on their way back to
Saginaw. Management felt that "these two men had improperly absented themselves
thereby violating a condition of their employment and later chanced upon the car break-
down excuse to permit them added days of hunting at the opening of the season rather
than to wait for their excused ‘leaves’ from November 25 to November 29..." Because of
what it contends represents a "flagrant violation" of the deer hunting privilege,
Management maintains that it exercised discipline in this case commensurate with
Paragraph 8 of the October 19, 1942 Agreement.
The Union admits that the men concerned went hunting on November 15, 1942, but it
maintains that they had every intention of returning to work on Monday, November 16,
1942. When these employees notified Management that their car had broken down, the
Union contends that they fulfilled their obligation to inform Management of their expected
absences and should not have been held responsible for a violation of the deer hunting
privilege. It was pointed out that the two men went approximately 100 miles from Saginaw
to hunt and had a great deal of equipment in their car which they could not leave at some
distant location. The Union presented a copy of a receipted bill from a garage in Fairview,
Michigan, which noted that a total of $11.89 was paid by one of the employees for
automobile repairs. It is the Union’s opinion that the two men were not guilty of staying
away from the plant improperly, and it cites as a basis for this conclusion its thought that
the two men would not have paid a repair bill if their excuse was not authentic. The Union,
therefore, requests that the disciplinary layoff of these two men be revoked, and asks that
they be reimbursed with back pay for all time lost.
Management’s attempt to make a period available for employees to indulge in their favorite
hunting sport is an act which should be encouraged rather than being taken advantage of
by unthinking employees. By their acts prior to the beginning of the deer season,
employees K. and S. definitely indicated that they were weighing the discipline that might
be meted out to them if they should take improper leave at the beginning of the season.
They were definitely told that they would be given "time off" if they took such an action, and
their committeeman was informed that a two-week disciplinary layoff would be invoked for
any such infraction.
When the two employees, who had anticipated what their potential layoff might be if they
went deer hunting prior to their excused leave, went deer hunting on November 15, 1942,
with all of their equipment, they brought upon themselves the potentiality of being found in
violation of the deer hunting privilege. If the break-down of their car actually occurred, it
seems reasonable that at least the employee who was not the owner of the car would have
made every attempt to return to the plant immediately so that the obvious conclusion which
could be drawn from their absence would lose any reason for existence. By the failure of
either of them to make any attempt to get back to the plant within a reasonable interval, the
only obvious conclusion that can be drawn is that the days of November 16 and 17, 1942,
represented two additional days that they had planned to go deer hunting, and for which
they were merely seeking an excuse. Upon both of the employees rests the onus for this
conclusion, and they must bear the responsibility for placing themselves in jeopardy of a
two-week layoff.
Under all of the circumstances here present, then, the Umpire must conclude that
Employees K. and S. violated the deer hunting privilege. For this reason they are held
properly the subject of a two-week disciplinary layoff. Their claims for back pay are denied.
Decision
Employees K. and S. are held to have violated a deer hunting privilege extended by
Management, and to have subjected themselves to the two-week penalty which was
invoked in all instances in which employees were guilty of such a violation. Had either of
the employees made any real attempt to return to the plant, and had not "hidden" behind
the excuse of a break-down of their car, the inevitable conclusion in this case could not
have been reached by Management or the Umpire. The two employees’ requests for
reimbursement are denied.
UMPIRE
April 19, 1943.
No. C-35
April 20, 1943
Disciplinary Layoff
GRIEVANCES:
Saginaw Malleable—Cases C-9 and C-10
"I ask that I be returned to work at once and paid for all time lost."
"I ask that I be returned to work at once and that I be paid for all time lost."
1. Employees B. and J., upon the basis of the specific charges made against
them by Management as respects their alleged violations of certain shop rules,
are found to be neither guilty nor subject to disciplinary layoffs.
2. It is held that both employees were improperly disciplined for their absences
on November 27, 1942, and it is ruled that they be reimbursed with back pay for
all time lost by May 1, 1943. (Entire Decision should be read)
In the Matter of:
United Automobile Workers of America—C.I.O. Local 455
and
General Motors Corporation—Saginaw Malleable Division—Cases C-9 and C-10

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Two employee grievances have been combined for consideration in this single decision
because of the likeness of the issue involved. The first was presented by Employee B. on
November 30, 1942, and reads: "I ask that I be returned to work at once and paid for all
time lost." The second grievance, which was presented by Employee J. on December 1,
1942, reads "I ask that I be returned to work at once and that I be paid for all time lost." A
hearing on these two matters was held in Detroit on March 19, 1943.
Employees B. and J. were told by their superintendent on the Wednesday before

Thanksgiving to report on Friday, November 27, 1942, the plant being closed on
Thanksgiving Day. Neither of these employees reported to work, though telephone calls
were received on the morning of November 27, 1942, concerning both of their cases. A
representative of the Personnel Department called at B.’s home and was told that no one
there had any knowledge of B.’s whereabouts. Another representative called at J.’s home
to investigate J.’s absence and found no one at home. The unexcused absences of the two
men necessitated the use of a group leader on an overtime basis to complete work these
two men were expected to perform. Because of the absences, Management imposed a
nine-day layoff on B. and an eight-day layoff on J. The two grievances that are the subject
of this decision were filed in protest of these layoffs.
Management submits that no permission was granted for the absence in either instance.
Though telephone calls were received in both cases, Management contends that a
telephone call in itself does not constitute an excused absence "since it is a primary
obligation of employment for all employees to report for work when work is available unless
they have been excused or advanced a satisfactory reason for such absence". The
disciplinary layoffs, Management states were imposed "for failure to meet a condition of
their employment, that of being present when work was available or being properly
excused, and for failure to follow the specific instructions of their supervision". Discipline of
this nature is contended by Management to be within the meaning of Paragraph 8 of the
October 19, 1942 Agreement.
The Union protests Management’s disciplinary action in these cases upon the grounds that
both employees had telephone calls made for them to report their absences to the plant,
and that they thereby complied with the plant rules requiring an employee to report his
absence before lunch time. The Union admits that neither of the men were home at the
time the representative of the Personnel Department called, but strongly contends that
these single isolated absences did not violate any plant rule for which they could be
subjected to discipline. Upon the grounds that these layoffs represented unjust penalties,
the Union requests that both of the men be reimbursed for all time lost.
At the hearing on these layoff questions, the parties cited various shop rules which should
be noted for purposes of this decision. Four of these shop rules are quoted below:
"6. Habitual absence without reasonable

cause. (One week to discharge.)
"8. Failure to call in or report by lunch time of

shift on which absence occurs. (Two days to
discharge.)
"7. Absence three days without notification.
"14. Refusal to obey orders of foremen or

other supervision. (One day or more to
discharge.)"
The first three of the shop rules quoted above may be said to anticipate that absences may
occur, and set up limits within which discipline will be invoked if such absences happen
under specified sets of circumstances. It must be noted that the absences of B. and J. on
the day in question did not violate any of these shop rules inasmuch as telephone calls
were received at the plant within the proper time, the one day did not represent three days
of absence without notification, and no claim has been made that the two men were
habitually absent without reasonable cause. Obviously single days of unexcused absences
occur at this plant without penalty; it is only when these unexcused absences total three
consecutive days without notification, or become habitual, that a penalty has been
ordinarily imposed.
Management’s contention that the failure of these two men to be present on the day in
question represented a "refusal to obey orders of... supervision" is not a tenable reason for
upholding the disciplinary action taken in these cases. To give support to such a contention
would be to extend the shop rules on absences at this plant to all sorts of situations.
Obviously such an extension of these shop rules would go far beyond their ordinary
application.
Of particular significance to the disposition of this case is the fact that Management failed
to present its major contention throughout the entire grievance procedure. At the hearing
on this question it became clear that Management had originally learned that there was to
be a joint effort on the part of all of the men in B. and J.’s group to remain away from work
on November 27, 1942. Had Management assessed its discipline in this matter on the
grounds that there was an organized "stay-at-home" that amounted to a form of stoppage
of work, there would have been real reason to support Management in its position—in fact
it is highly probable that any reasonable proof of such a situation would have prevented the
matter from proceeding very far through the grievance machinery. Local Management’s
failure to present its real contention in this matter, then, causes it to be responsible for the
case being considered and evaluated on other grounds. That the strength of
Management’s position in the assessment of the discipline here being tested is much
weakened by such a procedure should be obvious.
Inasmuch as the Umpire fails to find any tenable point in Management’s position that
Employees B. and J. were guilty of violating existing shop rules, it is necessary to hold that
the two men were unjustly disciplined. It follows that both men on the basis of this
reasoning are entitled to receive reimbursement for the number of days each of them was
disciplined. Such reimbursement is directed to be made by May 1, 1943.
Decision
1. Employees B. and J., upon the basis of the specific charges made against
them by Management as respects their alleged violations of certain shop rules,
are found to be neither guilty nor subject to disciplinary layoffs.
2. It is held that both employees were improperly disciplined for their absences
on November 27, 1942, and it is ruled that they be reimbursed with back pay for
all time lost by May 1, 1943.
UMPIRE
April 20, 1943.
No. C-75
July 9, 1943
Seniority in Bargaining Unit and Promotion Under Paragraph 63
GRIEVANCE:
Detroit Diesel—Case C-50
"Supervision violated Par. 59 by transferring Clerks from office to Stock Chasing out of line
of seniority. Request the oldest qualified in A3A to be given Stock Chasing jobs."
No provision of the National Agreement was applicable to the two clerical employees
concerned in this grievance prior to the date that they were moved into the bargaining
group. When they were placed in that group they were properly treated as new employees,
and no violation of any Agreement provision can be said to have obtained. The Union’s
claim in this entire matter, therefore, must be denied. (Entire Decision should be read)
In the Matter of:
and
General Motors Corporation—Detroit Diesel Division—Case C-50
A policy grievance in this case was presented by District Committeeman N. on March 18,
1943. The grievance protests the assignment of two clerical employees to jobs within the
bargaining units on the grounds that such jobs should have been given as promotions to
men in the bargaining unit who possessed the greatest ability, merit and capacity for the
jobs. The grievance reads as follows: "Supervision violated Par. 59 by transferring Clerks
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from office to Stock Chasing out of line of Seniority. Request the oldest qualified in A3A to
be given Stock Chasing jobs." A hearing on this matter was held in Detroit on June 25,
1943.
The grievance in this case was presented as a policy grievance in protest of the placing of
two clerical employees in jobs in the clearing group that is a part of the bargaining unit at
the Detroit Diesel Division. These two men had been employed as clerks on Service Move
Orders in the Material Handling Office. When Management determined that they should be
replaced by women employees because of the shortage of manpower, they decided to
move them to the work of Stock Chasing in the plant. Consequently, on February 9, 1943,
and March 1, 1943, Employees D. and G. respectively were transferred into the bargaining
unit as "Stock Chasers." The Union protests this action, claiming that it represented a
violation of Paragraphs 59 and 63 of the October 19, 1942 Agreement.
The Union’s contention that the move-up of the two clerical employees into the jobs above
the minimum of the clearing group constituted a violation of Paragraph 59 of the
Agreement, arises out of its opinion that such an act represented a transfer of the
employees out of line with their seniority. The Union further contends that the ability, merit
and capacity of several employees already in the clearing group far surpassed the relative
ability, merit and capacity of the two clerks as stock chasers. Management’s action of
moving these clerks into jobs in the bargaining unit without giving employees already in the
unit the opportunity of securing promotions to such jobs, is held by the Union to set a
precedent which will deny promotion to employees already covered by the agreement. The
Union concludes by asserting that, "the oldest qualified employees in Department A3A,
should be immediately transferred to the stock chasing jobs with retroactive adjustment to
3-18-43 the date original claim was made."
Management notes that the clearing group to which the clerks were moved, is comprised
of truckers, stock pickers, and stock chasers. While Management concedes that the clerks
in question were not entitled to carry their period of service with the Division into the stock
chaser jobs when they were transferred into the bargaining unit, it strongly contends that
there was no violation of any National Agreement provision when it moved the two men
into the stock chaser classification. It is pointed out that no provision of the National
Agreement prohibits the transfer of an employee outside of the bargaining unit to a job
within the bargaining unit. It is the contention of the Corporation that the two employees
"possessed the ability, merit and capacity for stock chasing by virtue of having worked as
clerks in the Material Handling Office."
Had the two clerical employees never worked for the Division prior to the date they were
placed in the stock chasing jobs, Management observes that it would have been quite
proper for it to have assigned them to stock chasing as new employees. Furthermore,
Management maintains that since the two employees were transferred from one job to
another paying the same hourly rate, the change in their job was simply a transfer in which
seniority was not a factor. In conclusion, Management declares itself of the opinion that
any Agreement provisions that may have been applicable in this case were not violated in
any manner by the transfer of the two clerks into the bargaining unit.
The clearing group in the department involved in this case includes classifications that vary
as to wage rate. However, there is no requirement in the local seniority agreement, or the
local wage agreement, which provides that new employees must be hired in at the bottom
or lowest rated jobs in the group. Past practice has been to hire employees directly into all
of the jobs in the clearing group. Inasmuch as the two clerical employees were placed in
the clearing group without taking their hiring dates with them to affect their seniority, it is
obvious that they were treated simply as new employees.
Since Management had the perfect right to hire new employees for any of the jobs in the
clearing group that it desired, it cannot be held that there was a violation of any paragraph
of the National Agreement when the two clerks were placed in that group. Neither
Paragraph 59 nor 63 were applicable in this case, inasmuch as the two clerical employees
were not covered by either of those paragraphs before being placed in the bargaining unit
and neither paragraph could be cited as affecting them when they were placed in the
clearing group. They were new employees insofar as the bargaining unit was concerned,
and their treatment as new employees did not violate any provision of the National
Agreement. The Union’s request in this case, then, is denied.
Decision
No provision of the National Agreement was applicable to the two clerical employees
concerned in this grievance prior to the date that they were moved into the bargaining
group. When they were placed in that group they were properly treated as new employees,
and no violation of any Agreement provision can be said to have obtained. The Union’s
claim in this entire matter, therefore, must be denied.
UMPIRE
July 9, 1943.
No. C-83
August 2, 1943
GRIEVANCE:
Eastern Aircraft Trenton—Case C-6
"I charge Management with a direct violation of Paragraph 63. Seniority was not taken into
consideration in this case. Request that this case be reviewed and the wrong done
righted."
1. Though Employee L. was not "head and shoulders" above Employee G. with
respect to ability, merit and capacity, Employee G. could not be said to have
been approximately equal to Employ L. in these criteria. His record of warnings
and reprimands, plus his evidenced inability to gain cooperation of some of the
men with whom he worked, did not warrant placing him in the same group as
Employee L. when relative abilities, merits and capacities of the available
employees were considered.
2. Inasmuch as Employee G. was not approximately equal to Employee L. in

ability, merit and capacity at the time of L.’s promotion, G.’s contention that he
should have received the promotion given to L. in February, 1943, cannot be
supported. His claims, therefore, are denied. (Entire Decision should be read)
In the Matter of:
and
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General Motors Corporation—Eastern Aircraft—Trenton Division—Case C-6
Two grievances presented on February 11, 1943, by Employees G. and S. were originally
combined for consideration in this single decision. At the hearing on this matter the Union
withdrew the case of Employee S. and presented its claim only with regard to Employee G.
Employee G.’s grievance reads as follows: "I charge Management with a direct violation of
Paragraph 63. Seniority was not taken into consideration in this case. Request that this
case be reviewed and the wrong done righted." The complaint made by the employee in
this case was that he was not promoted to the job of pipefitter leader that was awarded to
Employee L. in early February, 1943. A hearing on this matter was held in New York on
July 8, 1943.
Nature of Case
Early in February, 1943, a need developed for an additional leader in the pipefitter group at
this plant. Supervision reviewed the records of eligible pipefitters and promoted Employee
L. (seniority date November 22, 1940) to the new position. Employee G. (seniority date
October 17, 1938), a pipefitter with approximately seven years more experience than
Employee L., filed the instant grievance claiming that he should have received the
promotion. It is the contention of the Union that the ability, merit and capacity of Employee
G. was approximately equal to that of Employee L., and that his greater seniority should
have caused him to be promoted in place of L.
Union Claim
The Union observes that the plant history record of the aggrieved Employee G. is an exact
duplicate of Employee L. It states that these records read as follows:
Employee Employee
G. L.
Seniority date 11/7/38 11/20/40
Quantity of work A-A A-A
Quality of work A-A A-A
Attendance O O
Cooperation A-A A-A
Safety A A
Adaptability A-A A-A
The information contained in the table noted above is reasoned by the Union to give full
support to its contention that L. was not "head and shoulders" above G., but that they were
approximately equal as to "ability, merit and capacity". For Management to say that
Employee L. was "head and shoulders" above Employee G. in ability, merit and capacity,
the Union maintains, is simply not supported by the facts of the case.
The Union notes that Management has cited other types of nebulous qualities which it
maintained led it to choose L. over G. for the promotion to the leader classification. Since
the gradings noted by the Union are deemed by it to be such significant determinants of
the qualities of a good employee, and those qualities have actually been recorded, the
Union maintains that the two employees concerned should have been evaluated on those
qualities and not on the basis of some nebulous criteria which Management cannot
actually define or cite in any concrete form. The statement made by Management to the
effect that Employee L. successfully operated his own business for a number of years and
thereby indicated his leadership and initiative, is severely questioned by the Union. Though
some minor significance might attach to this point, the Union maintains that it could not
possibly be a reason to hold that L. was "head and shoulders" above G. in ability, merit
and capacity.
In the earlier steps of the grievance procedure, the Union notes, Management has stated
that "fellow employees have sometimes requested that they not be assigned to work with
G." If it is true that employees requested not to be assigned to work with G., the Union
maintains that the hesitancy occurred only because some workers are not prone to seek to
work with a journeyman who sets a very exact pace. The competence of G. as a mechanic
and his outstanding service record attest to the fact that he has set an outstanding pace as
a pipefitter to which some workmen might not care to expose themselves, the Union
reasons.
In conclusion, the Union maintains that Management has made only statements of a
general nature to support its claim that L.’s potentialities of leadership and initiative are
greater than G.’s and has cited no precise evidence or reasons on which it has based its
conclusions. Since Management’s records and supervisor’s ratings are identical for the two
men, the Union asserts that they should have been considered equal in ability, merit and
capacity. The Union asks, therefore, that Employee L.’s job as a pipefitter leader be
declared vacant and be awarded to Employee G. It requests also that Employee G. receive
a wage adjustment for the losses suffered by failure to receive promotion to the pipefitter
leader’s job in February, 1943.
While Management admits that plant records covering quality and quantity of work,
attendance, cooperation, safety, and adaptability of the two men in question show them to
be approximately equal as mechanics, it maintains that other elements caused it to
consider L. "head and shoulders" above G. when it made the promotion to the pipefitter
leader classification in February, 1943. The fact that Employee L. had thirteen years’
experience as a journeyman plumber as compared to the twenty years’ experience of
Employee G. is claimed by Management to be more than offset by the fact that in nine of
the years L. successfully operated his own business. By operating a business in this
manner Management maintains that he indicated his potentialities of leadership and
initiative. Furthermore, Management claims L. has "proven himself to be very cooperative,

conscientious, and progressive in his work". It is said that he has led other employees in
various work assignments and has succeeded in commanding the respect and cooperation
of men working with him due to his knowledge and ability of his trade.
In the case of Employee G., the complainant, Management agrees that he is competent as
a mechanic, but maintains that he has allowed "his attitude to reflect carelessness in his
work". It holds that his cooperation and attitude have caused Management to find him
unsuitable for the position as a leader. Several times, Management points out, it has been
necessary for supervision to call G.’s shortcomings in regard to his cooperation and
attitude to his attention, but it is maintained that these warnings have had little effect. On
June 5, 1942, when pipefitters were engaged in changeover work, it is observed that G.
received a reprimand for poor workmanship. It is also noted that the statement of
reprimand calls attention to the fact that G. had been verbally warned on several occasions
"but each time had given a surly and sarcastic reply". On still another occasion
Management asserts that G. was requested to make an adjustment shortly after his
starting time (December 27, 1940). It is said that he expressed resentment to the request
and responded with an oath. On that occasion and several other times, Management
maintains that G. was warned regarding his negative and belligerent attitude. Finally, it is
said that several employees have stated that they do not care to work with G. because
they have experienced real difficulty in working peacefully with him. This latter problem has
been so serious at times, Management maintains, that it has been necessary to have G.
work practically alone. Under these circumstances, Management reasons that G.’s
suitability to become a leader was far below that of Employee L. at the time that it made
the promotion in question.
Though Management admits that as workmen and mechanics there is an approximate

equality between the employees in question, it asserts that Employee L. "proved to be
more deserving in point of merit and better fitted in point of capacity to assume the
responsibilities of the leader job". His ability to work with men in a congenial and
cooperative manner was proven by his experience in working as a pipefitter with helpers,
Management states. On the other hand, a complete absence of ability to work in a
congenial and cooperative manner has been proven by G.’s experience, Management
maintains. Since G., in its opinion, lacked the qualifications of leadership and dependability
that are necessary prerequisites for a leader’s job, and since over a period of time he has
been reprimanded on several occasions for a negative and belligerent attitude,
Management maintains that its decision to promote L. to the pipefitter leader classification
instead of Employee G. was in full compliance with the requirements of Paragraph 63 of
the National Agreement.
The Umpire cannot agree with Management that Employee L. stood "head and shoulders"
above Employee G. with respect to his ability, merit and capacity to perform the pipefitter
leader’s operation. The seven years of additional experience which Employee G. had over
Employee L. could easily have offset any advantage which Management may feel arose
out of L.’s conduct of his own plumbing business. All of the elements of objective rating
which Management had used, and of which the Union was aware, showed the two men in
question to be equal as to quantity and quality of work, attendance, cooperation, etc. With
those measurements in mind it cannot be said, then, that Employee L. stood "head and
shoulders" above Employee G. with respect to ability, merit and capacity.
However, the Umpire is likewise convinced that Employee G. should not have been
grouped with Employee L. as being approximately equal to him with regard to ability, merit
and capacity. Though all of the objective ratings cited by the Union, plus the offset of
greater experience on the part of Employee G. over L.’s operation of his own business,
should have resulted in the conclusion that they were approximately equal in ability, merit
and capacity, there are several offsetting factors present.
The record of Employee G. with respect to the warnings and reprimands which were given
to him for improper actions on his part find no equal in the record of Employee L. In
addition, there is no question that Employee G.’s potentialities as a leader were far less
than those of Employee L. because he has evidenced some inability to work well with other
men. Though this problem may be effaced in the near future it certainly existed at the time
that the promotion was made. Since the leader classification is one from which
Management often picks its members of supervision, an inability to get along with fellow
workmen is a serious impediment to fulfilling the requirements of the leader classification.
With respect to his record of warnings for improper acts, and his inability to obtain
complete cooperation of the men with whom he worked, then, it must be held that G. was
not in the same class as L. When a grouping of available pipefitters was made within which
men of approximately equal ability, merit and capacity were placed, it seems quite proper
to have excluded G. from the group in which L. had been placed.
Since Employee G. did not properly belong in the same group as Employee L. insofar as
his relative ability, merit and capacity were concerned, it follows that the promotion of L.
over G. in February, 1943, did not represent a violation of Paragraph 63 of the National
Agreement. Employee G.’s requests that L.’s job be declared vacant, that it be awarded to
him, and that he be reimbursed for alleged improper loss of income, are denied.
Decision
1. Though Employee L. was not "head and shoulders" above Employee G. with
respect to ability, merit and capacity, Employee G. could not be said to have
been approximately equal to Employee L. in these criteria. His record of
warnings and reprimands, plus his evidenced inability to gain cooperation of
some of the men with whom he worked, did not warrant placing him in the
same group as Employee L. when relative abilities, merits and capacities of the
available employees were considered.
2. Inasmuch as Employee G. was not approximately equal to Employee L. in

ability, merit and capacity at the time of L.’s promotion, G.’s contention that he
should have received the promotion given to L. in February, 1943, cannot be
supported. His claims, therefore, are denied.
UMPIRE.
August 2, 1943.
No. C-122
October 8, 1943
GRIEVANCES:
Chevrolet Flint—Cases C-97 and C-112
"Request that dipping parts in wax be put in its right classification. (Rust Proofing.) Request
retroactive pay."
"Request that I be paid the proper rate, $1.09 per hour, for the work I am doing, dipping
unit parts in rust preventative compound. Request retroactive pay."
The operation of covering packaged parts completely by brushing or dipping them was not
in existence at the time the local wage agreement and the June, 1942 supplement were
effectuated. Neither party can cite a specific job classification in the local wage agreement
which correctly applies to this work. Therefore, the present grievances are returned to the
parties for their negotiations of a proper classification and rate for this new work. If any
adjustment appears to be necessary after such negotiations, the adjustment shall be made
under the terms of Paragraph 112 of the National Agreement. (Entire Decision should be
read)
In the Matter of:
and
General Motors Corporation—Chevrolet Flint Division—Cases C-97, C-112.

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Two employee grievances that involve the same type of work have been combined by the
parties for consideration in this single decision. The first grievance was presented by
Employee O. on March 22, 1943, and read:
"Request that dipping parts in wax be put in its right classification. (Rust Proofing) Request
retroactive pay." The second grievance presented on April 20, 1943, by Employee A., read
as follows: "Request that I be paid the proper rate, $1.09 per hour for the work I am doing,
dipping unit parts in rust preventative compound. Request retroactive pay." A hearing on
these two grievances was held in Flint on September 10, 1943.
Nature of Case
The employees covered by the instant grievances are classified as "Unitizers" in the Parts
Division at this plant. A part of this unitizing operation included the sealing of packages
with wax, gum tape or compound. Shortly before the filing of the instant grievance a
system was installed that involved the wrapping of certain packages in "NO-OX-ID" cloth or
waterproof paper and closing the package either by brushing or dipping it in wax or some
other compound. Some of these parts have already been rust-proofed by having been
dipped before wrapping into rust-proofing compound.
The instant grievance claims that the work of applying the wax or compound should be
classified under the heading "Rust-proofing" which Supplement No. 11 of the local wage
agreement defines as "spraying, dipping or brushing oil or other rust-proofing compounds
on service parts". It requests that the reclassification of this work be made effective as of
the date of the instant grievances.
Union Claim
The Union observes that on June 18, 1942, a supplement was negotiated and added to the
local wage agreement to cover the work of rust-proofing. The Union maintains that it was
understood during these negotiations that the classification was to include all rust-proofing
in the Service Parts Department. A considerable time after this supplementary agreement
was reached, the Union notes, employees classified as unitizers were assigned to the job
of dipping wrapped packages into rust-proofing compounds. The Union holds that the
primary reason for this procedure is to rustproof the package while the sealing is of
secondary importance.
In the particular case of A., the Union states that the employee’s job consists of dipping the
packaged parts into the same rust-proofing vat as two other employees who dip the "bare"
parts. The significance of this point is noted to arise from the fact that the aggrieved
employee is classed as a "Unitizer" while the two other employees are recognized as being
engaged in "Rust-proofing". It is particularly noted that these three men use the same tank,
the same solution, and are required to perform their activities in an identical manner so that
no bubbles remain on the surface of the dipped parts or package.
The Union maintains that the primary object of the dipping of the packages is to rustproof
them. The application of this rust preventative compound whether the part is bare metal,
partially wrapped or wholly wrapped, in the Union’s opinion, is not a significant element of
the job. Rather, it maintains that the packages are dipped or brushed for rust-proofing
purposes and the employees who cover the packages completely with wax or compound
should be paid the rust-proofing rate. It asks, then, that the employees covered by the
instant grievances be classified under the heading of "Rust-proofing", and be paid the
appropriate rate from the date of their grievances.
Management maintains that the classification of rust-proofing that was negotiated with the
Union was to cover the application of oil or rust preventative compounds "to the bare metal
parts". In the cases covered by the instant grievances, Management contends that the
application of the wax is for sealing purposes only. Since unitizers have always been
assigned the job of sealing containers in which they wrap parts, Management reasons that
it was correct in assigning this sealing work to them in their existing classification.
Supplement No. 11 of the local wage agreement, which refers to the classification of rust-
proofing, is noted by Management to read as follows:
"Spraying, dipping or brushing oil or rust preventing compounds on service parts". The
phrase "on service parts" is held by Management to refer only to the application of rust
preventing compounds directly to the bare metal. To give this phrase any meaning other
than to cover the application of rust preventing compounds to the bare metal, in
Management’s opinion, would be to give meaning to the job classification that was not
agreed to by the parties. Even if the wax sealing should have rust-proofing value,
Management contends that it is not a part of the rust-proofing classification as defined in
the agreement and is not a necessary process in the case of parts that have already been
rust-proofed. The section of the wage agreement relating to rust-proofing, Management
concludes, does not place any limitation on the unitizer classification that did not exist
before the rust-proofing classification was established.
The contentions of both parties in this case are partly correct and partly incorrect.
Management’s claim that the jobs of dipping packages in wax or other compounds, or of
covering them completely by brushing, were not contained in the original rust-proofing
classification is obviously correct because such jobs were not operative at the time the
rust-proofing classification was established. The Union’s contention that the work of
completely covering a package with wax or other compound by brushing or dipping is not
included in the unitizer classification, is likewise correct. Management’s position that this
work should be considered as "Unitizing", and the Union’s position that it should be
considered as "Rust-proofing", are both in error.
The major reason that both parties have had such difficulty in attempting to classify the job
here in question is that this work did not exist at the time that they negotiated the rust-
proofing or unitizing classifications. Both parties, then, have been trying to place a new job
within existing classifications and have had great difficulty in convincing the other party that
the elements of the new job rightly places it in one or the other classification.
The Umpire cannot agree with either party in this particular case. It would seem that the
idea of completely covering a packaged part (whether or not the part is rust-proofed on the
bare metal) by brushing the wax or compound on the package or by dipping it completely
into a vat, is an entirely new operation that was added after the local wage agreement and
the June 1942 Supplement were effectuated. The Umpire is convinced that neither party
can look to the local wage agreement for a specific job classification into which this work
can be placed. For this reason the Umpire must return the instant case to the parties and
direct that they enter negotiations to establish a classification and rate for this job. Any
adjustment that appears to be necessary after negotiating a final classification and rate on
this work should be made under the terms of Paragraph 112 of the National Agreement.
Decision:
The operation of covering packaged parts completely by brushing or dipping them was not
in existence at the time the local wage agreement and the June 1942 Supplement were
effectuated. Neither party can cite a specific job classification in the local wage agreement
which correctly applies to this work. Therefore, the present grievances are returned to the
parties for their negotiations of a proper classification and rate for this new work. If any
adjustment appears to be necessary after such negotiations, the adjustment shall be made
under the terms of Paragraph 112 of the National Agreement.
UMPIRE
October 8, 1943
No. C-130
October 18, 1943
Selection for Promotion Under Paragraph 63
GRIEVANCE:
Hyatt Bearings—Case C-34
"We, the undersigned feel that there has been a violation of clause (63) of the contract.
The clause states that whenever there is an advancement into higher paid job, where
ability, merit, and capacity are equal the employees with the longest seniority shall be
given preference. We also feel that the man appointed for the job at the present time has
not the disposition to make the men want to work for him without feeling that there has
been an injustice done. The men feel that they have nothing to work for in the future under
these conditions. We request that this situation be adjusted."
1. Management’s selection of Employee H.B. for promotion to the position of

Electrician—Leader was not in compliance with Paragraph 63 of the October
19, 1942 Agreement. Employee H.B. did not stand "head and shoulders" above
all other employees in his group with respect to ability, merit and capacity.
Employee J.L. was at least equal to Employee H.B. in these particulars.
2. Inasmuch as the two employees who are considered to have been relatively
equal in ability, merit and capacity have both been promoted to the job of
Electrician—Leader, it is not necessary to vacate the job held by Employee
H.B. These two men were in a class by themselves insofar as warranting
promotion to the Leader classification is concerned, and both have been
advanced to that classification.
3. The concomitant request of the Union that Employee E.M. be awarded the
promotion granted Employee H.B. is denied, because it is an improper request
to make of the Umpire, and because Employee E.M. is judged as not being
equal to the two other noted employees with respect to relative abilities, merits
and capacities. (Entire Decision should be read)
In the Matter of:
and
General Motors Corporation—Hyatt Bearings Division—Case C-34
On May 6, 1943, some ten employees, headed by Employee E. M., presented a grievance
which read: "We, the undersigned feel that there has been a violation of clause (63) of the
contract. The clause states that whenever there is an advancement into higher paid job,
where ability, merit, and capacity are equal the employees with the longest seniority shall
be given preference. We also feel that the man appointed for the job at the present time
has not the disposition to make the men want to work for him without feeling that there has
been an injustice done. The men feel that they have nothing to work for in the future under
these conditions. We request that this situation be adjusted." A hearing on this grievance
was held in New York on October 1, 1943.
Nature of Case
Shortly before the date of the instant grievance, Employee H. B. was promoted from the
job of Electrician to Electrician—Leader. Some dissension occurred among the other
electricians of longer service over this promotion and caused a group of them to file the
instant grievance protesting the promotion of H. B. Although the Union has presented a
claim with respect to at least ten employees, it stresses the contention of four employees
who hold that they possessed at least equal ability, merit and capacity to Employee H. B.
(Seniority date 3-6-36), and should have been promoted in his place. Specifically the Union
cited the cases of the employees whose initials and seniority dates are shown below.
Initials of employee Seniority date
J. L. 10-22-17
E. M. 7-24-35
M. M. 7-25-35
E. S. 1- 8-36
It is observed that Employee J. L., who leads the list noted above, was promoted to the
classification of Electrician—Leader on June 28, 1943. In the final steps of the

consideration of the instant grievance, the Union has narrowed its claim and contends that
Employee E. M. should be given the job of Electrician—Leader in place of Employee H. B.
Union Claim
The Union urges that a considerable number of electricians in the group from which
Employee H. B. was selected were at least equal to him in ability, merit and capacity. It
contends that the three specific jobs which had been performed by Employee H. B., and on
which his selection had largely been based, were of a nature which any of the allegedly
aggrieved employees could have performed had they been given the opportunity and the
necessary equipment to perform the work. Because they were not given an opportunity to
show their merit, the Union notes that the ability of the individual employees to perform the
work could not be demonstrated. The single exception that it makes in this particular is in
the case of Employee J.L., whom it notes performed several Leader jobs of undoubted
merit.
The Union has cited a number of individual jobs (not Leader work) which were performed
by several of the aggrieved employees. It maintains that the workmanship on all of these
jobs was sufficiently outstanding to merit the consideration for promotion of the men who
performed them. The Union has also stressed some of the background of the various
claimants to indicate that their experience covered a longer period of time than Employee
H. B. and should have qualified them for consideration for the job as Leader.
The Union takes the position that Employee H. B. was not "head and shoulders" above all
of the candidates for the Leader’s job. It feels that while he may have been equal to other
employees in these attributes, conformance with past decisions of the Umpire and proper
recognition of Paragraph 63 of the National Agreement should have caused Management
to group H. B. with other employees of like ability, merit and capacity before making a
promotion to the Leader classification. If such a step had been taken, the Union holds that
Employees J. L. or E. M. would undoubtedly have been promoted. Inasmuch as Employee
J. L. has been promoted since the date of the instant grievance, the Union reasons that
Employee E. M. should be given the job held by Employee H. B. because of his equal
ability, merit and capacity and his longer seniority.
Management maintains that Employee H. B. "was outstanding in ability, merit and capacity
among other electricians in his group and had manifested qualifications embracing these
qualities needed for the fulfillment of the duties of Electrician—Leader". It holds that H. B.
surpassed all other electricians with respect to ability, merit and capacity and that he stood
"head and shoulders" above all others in his group. The Corporation claims that local
Management gave every consideration to the qualifications of all of the available
electricians and states that it was fully satisfied that "B. excelled in these qualifications
which are so essentially necessary for the fulfillment of the duties of Electrician—Leader."
Particular emphasis in the choice of Employee H. B. for promotion, Management notes,

was based on the fact that Mr. S. and Mr. G. (two members of supervision) "recalled the
various occasions when Mr. B. had been given assignments which gave him an
opportunity to demonstrate leadership qualities". On these occasions Management feels

that H. B. demonstrated his possession of leadership qualities to the extent that he was
considered to be "head and shoulders" above the other electricians in the department in
this respect. Management does not deny that many of the other electricians were excellent
mechanics, but it holds that none of them demonstrated leadership qualifications equal to
H. B. Upon the basis of its contention that Employee H. B. was "head and shoulders"
above all other electricians available for the Leader job, Management maintains that his
promotion was in proper compliance with Paragraph 63 of the National Agreement.
Observations and Decisions of the Umpire
Many past decisions of the Umpire have indicated that one method of promoting an
employee in compliance with Paragraph 63 of the National Agreement is to group those
employees who stand relatively equal as to ability, merit and capacity and then to promote
the employee in that group with the greatest seniority. It has also been indicated that if an
employee is found to stand "head and shoulders" above other available men insofar as
their relative abilities, merits and capacities are concerned, there is no question but that the
promotion of such an employee would be in compliance with Paragraph 63 of the National
Agreement. It has also been indicated that the rather nebulous character of the three
attributes of ability, merit and capacity make difficult any objective measure. The very
difficulty of the measure should make it evident that an employee should certainly be
outstanding in relation to other employees to be considered "head and shoulders" above
them with respect to relative ability, merit and capacity. A fine shade of difference between
two employees does not make one stand "head and shoulders" above the other.
In the present case, it cannot be said that supervision attempted to use any objective
measures in the determination to promote Employee H. B. to the job of Electrician—
Leader. It is noted, for instance, that when two members of supervision discussed the
possible future necessity for additional Leaders, one of the supervisors stated that "in his
opinion Mr. B. was the outstanding electrician in the department for consideration as a
Leader", and another member of supervision "concurred with his opinion". When the actual
need for an additional Leader arose, it is said that two members of supervision, "mutually
agreed" that H. B. should be advanced to the classification of Leader. In arriving at this
decision, it is stated that these two members of supervision "recalled the various occasions
when Mr. B. had been given assignments which gave him an opportunity to demonstrate
leadership qualities".
Because of three instances in which it was recalled that Employee H. B. had demonstrated
certain leadership qualities, it is now said that he stood "head and shoulders" above all
other electricians in his group. With such fragmentary evidence the determination that H.
B. stood "head and shoulders" above all of the other electricians can hardly be supported
especially with respect to Employee J. L. who had 19 more years seniority at this plant and
had demonstrated leadership potentialities in other jobs. Certainly the few jobs which
Employee H. B. had performed satisfactorily to "demonstrate his leadership qualities" were
not sufficient to offset the 19 years of additional experience on the part of J. L. who had
also demonstrated the same qualities in other jobs which he performed satisfactorily.
The available evidence in this case convinces the Umpire that Management did not make
its original choice of Employee H. B. for promotion to the job of Electrician—Leader in
conformance with Paragraph 63 of the National Agreement. It seems quite evident that
though Employee H. B. stood above most of the other employees with respect to ability,
merit and capacity, he did not exceed Employee J. L. in these attributes. To comply with
Paragraph 63 of the Agreement, then, Employee H. B. should have been considered
approximately equal in ability, merit and capacity to Employee J. L. before the promotion
was made. Had this been done, it is evident that Employee J. L. would have received the
promotion because he held 19 years more seniority than Employee H. B.
Management’s failure to make its choice in the manner noted above must be held to have
represented a violation of Paragraph 63 of the October 19, 1942 National Agreement.
However, inasmuch as Employee J. L. was advanced to the position of Electrician—
Leader on June 28, 1943, it is not necessary for the Umpire to declare H. B.’s job vacant to
be filled by Employee J. L. These two men were obviously in a class by themselves with
respect to relative ability, merit and capacity to become Leaders. Since both of them have
been advanced to the Leader classification, there is no necessity to declare vacant the job
held by Employee H. B.
The final request presented by the Union, namely that Employee E. M. be given the
promotion that was made available to H. B., cannot be granted. Obviously the Umpire has
no right to order the promotion of any individual but can simply declare a job vacant to be
filled by Management in compliance with Paragraph 63 of the National Agreement. Since
the Umpire has already found that Employee H. B. should have been grouped only with
Employee J. L. before the original promotion, he has already disposed of the contention of
E. M. that he should have been grouped with these two employees for consideration for
the Leader job. The Union’s specific request in the case of E. M., therefore, must be
denied.
Decision
1. Management’s selection of Employee H. B. for promotion to the position of

Electrician—Leader was not in compliance with Paragraph 63 of the October
19, 1942 Agreement. Employee H. B. did not stand "head and shoulders"
above all other employees in his group with respect to ability, merit and
capacity. Employee J. L. was at least equal to Employee H. B. in these
particulars.
2. Inasmuch as the two employees who are considered to have been relatively
equal in ability, merit and capacity have both been promoted to the job of
Electrician—Leader, it is not necessary to vacate the job held by Employee H.
B. These two men were in a class by themselves insofar as warranting
promotion to the Leader classification is concerned, and both have been
advanced to that classification.
3. The concomitant request of the Union that Employee E. M. be awarded the

promotion granted Employee H. B. is denied, because it is an improper request
to make of the Umpire, and because Employee E. M. is judged as not being

equal to the two other noted employees with respect to relative abilities, merits
and capacities.
UMPIRE
October 18, 1943.
No. C-139
November 29, 1943
Hiring of Women
GRIEVANCES:
Chevrolet Gear & Axle—Cases C-105, C-109 and C-120
"Management is violating local seniority agreement by putting employees with no seniority

on grinding when I am on the waiting list for grinding."
"I am being discriminated against by Supt. O’C. for Union activity. My name has been on
the waiting list for Grinder for 1 year. The available list is now exhausted and new
employees are being placed on Grinders while Supt. O’C. refuses to have me placed on
Grinder because I am a Committeeman."
"Management is violating the local agreement by putting on employees with no seniority on

grinders when I am on the waiting list."
This grievance was amended in the Shop Committee-Management meeting of July 6,

1943, by adding the following statement:
"This is also a violation of National Agreement Paragraph 63."
1. No provisions of the October 19, 1942 National Agreement, of the local

seniority agreement, or the local wage agreement limit Management in the
hiring of female employees for higher rated jobs. In the absence of such
provisions, the hiring of the female employees protested in the instant
grievances was entirely within the rights of Management.
2. Inasmuch as the female employees concerned in these cases were new

employees, it could not be said that their respective abilities, merits and
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capacities should have been compared with those of the complainants to

determine who should have been given the available job openings. Paragraph
63 of the October 19, 1942 Agreement was not applicable in such a situation.
3. The requests of the complainants for transfers, which really represent

requests for promotion, must be denied. Such denial does not arise merely
from the fact that the requests are for promotions of a nature that cannot
possibly be granted by the Umpire. It is primarily based on the fact that no
rights of the complainants were violated when Management placed female
employees in the jobs to which the complainants were awaiting promotion.
In the Matter of:
United Automobile Workers of America, C.I.O. Local #235
and
General Motors Corporation—Chevrolet Gear & Axle Division—Cases C-105, C-109, C-

120.
The three employee grievances in this case have been combined by the parties for a
single decision. The first of these, which was presented by Employee M. on July 7, 1943,
reads: "Management is violating local seniority agreement by putting employees with no
seniority on grinding when I am on the waiting list for grinding." The second and third
grievances were presented by Employee D. on July 7, 1943 and July 5, 1943, respectively.
The first of these refers to D.’s status as a Committeeman and reads as follows: "I am
being discriminated against by Supt. O’C. for Union activity. My name has been on the
waiting list for Grinder for 1 year. The available list is now exhausted and new employees
are being placed on Grinders while Supt. O’C. refuses to have me placed on Grinder
because I am a Committeeman." The final grievance reads: "Management is violating the
Local Agreement by putting on employees with no seniority on grinders when I am on the
waiting list." This grievance was amended in the Shop Committee-Management meeting of
July 6. 1943, by adding the following statement: "This is also a violation of National
Agreement Paragraph 63."
While the above grievances do not mention the fact, the issue in this case really concerns
the rights of the complainants for promotion to jobs (from existing "waiting lists") that were
filled by newly hired female employees. A hearing on these three combined grievances
was held in Detroit on October 28, 1943.
Nature of Case
On May 26, 1943, increased production demands, plus losses of personnel to the armed
forces, necessitated the adoption of a schedule of six days per week at the Chevrolet Gear
and Axle Division. In order to keep the weekly working hours of the employees within
reason, management began to hire a large number of female employees. The physical
limitations of women and the regulations of the State Labor Laws necessitated the placing
of women within limited types of jobs. Consequently, Management found it necessary to
place the new female employees on jobs within the higher rated classifications as well as
within the lower rated jobs. While some of the female employees were moved from lower
rated jobs to higher rated jobs, the large majority of openings were filled by newly hired
female employees who had not previously worked in the plant.
When female employees were brought into the plant and assigned to various jobs,
complaints arose from the male employees who were on the so-called "waiting lists"
pending possible promotion to higher rated classifications. These male employees
complained that the placing of women in the jobs just above them in rate prevented the
male employees from gaining the promotions to which they would ordinarily have been
entitled.
The grievances covered by this decision are simply illustrative of a large number of
grievances that were filed about the same time. At the hearing on these three cases,
however, it was indicated that the parties might well use the decision in these cases to
settle the other pending grievances.
Union Claim
While the Union presented specific details with respect to the two individuals who filed the
instant grievances, the Umpire does not deem it pertinent to cite these particular facts. The
general arguments common to each of the grievances represent the real significance of
the case.
The local Union contends that Management violated Paragraph 63 of the October 19, 1942
‘Agreement by placing female employees on various jobs while male employees, who were
awaiting promotion to such jobs, remained in their previous classifications. It notes that
Paragraph 63 states that in the advancement of employees to high paid jobs, when ability,
merit and capacity are equal, employees with the longest seniority will be given preference.
The two complainants are claimed by the Union to have possessed greater ability, merit
and capacity than the women employees who were given the available jobs. The Union
reasons, then, that Management did not consider the ability, merit and capacity of the
available male employees to fill the various jobs, and consequently violated Paragraph 63
of the October 19, 1942 Agreement.
The Union also contends that Management has violated past practice with respect to the
waiting lists by hiring new female employees instead of promoting male employees from
the waiting lists. The Union holds that the employee with the greatest seniority whose
name appears on the waiting list should be promoted when an opening occurs in the
occupational group to which the employee has requested promotion. When Management
failed to follow this procedure, and brought female employees into various jobs without
considering the promotion of the complainants who were on the waiting lists, the Union
contends that the principle of the waiting list was violated.
In the cases here at issue, the Union seeks to have the two complainants promoted to the
classifications to which they feel they would have been promoted had female employees
not been brought into the plant. In addition, the Union seeks to have the two men granted
back pay for all monies lost by them through failure to receive the promotions as of the
date of their respective grievances.
The Corporation emphatically denies that the employment of females at this plant violated
the written local seniority agreement or the October 19, 1942 National Agreement. The
Corporation maintains that the right to hire employees is the sole responsibility of
Management under Paragraph 8 of the National Agreement, and notes that this right was
upheld by the Umpire in Decision C-75 that involved a similar issue.
The Union’s charge of a violation of the local seniority agreement with respect to waiting
lists, is also denied by the Corporation. It notes that this section simply provides that "a
waiting list shall be kept by the plant superintendent of employees requesting to go on
another shift". It maintains that this provision does not preclude the hiring of new
employees for higher rated jobs, nor does it specify the manner in which the waiting lists
shall be used for promotions, transfers, etc. Management is not committed by agreement
or practice to a policy of filling all job openings from a waiting list, the Corporation reasons.
In fact, it is strenuously maintained that the established practice at this Division has been
to place new employees on any jobs requiring their services.
The charge of discrimination for Union activity contained in Case C-109, is denied by the
Corporation with the observation that this charge has not been supported by written or
verbal evidence.
No provision of the October 19, 1942 National Agreement, of the local wage agreement, or
of the local seniority agreement limits Management of the Chevrolet Gear and Axle
Division as to the manner in which it may hire new employees. If there was any provision in
any of these agreements that required Management to hire new employees into the lowest
rated jobs or into clearing groups, there may have been some merit in the present
grievances. However, in the complete absence of any such provisions, Management of the
Chevrolet Gear and Axle Division has a right to hire employees for higher rated jobs and to
place them directly into such jobs.
The claims presented in the instant grievances were not affected in any manner simply
because female employees are involved. There is no more of a limitation with respect to
the hiring of female employees than there is with male employees. Management’s right to
place these employees in higher rated jobs has not been affected by any agreement
provisions.
The contention of the Union that consideration must be given to the ability, merit and
capacity of the complainants to fill the available jobs, is not correctly made in the present
instances. The female employees here concerned were not employees who had been
promoted after a period of time on the company payroll. Paragraph 63 would be of
significance in the advancement of persons already on the payroll of the company, but is
not compelling when the employee who is given a particular job is a new employee and is
in no sense being advanced to a higher paying job from a lower rated job. Paragraph 63 of
the National Agreement, therefore, was not applicable in the instances covered by this
decision.
The inevitable conclusion that must result from the reasoning included in this decision is
that the complainants had no merit in their contentions. Their requests for transfers are
really requests for promotion which obviously the Umpire could not possibly grant.
However, in view of the reasoning here presented, the entire requests made by the
complainants must be denied.
The Umpire notes that on August 19, 1943, the two parties reached an agreement to settle
the various issues concerning the employment of women at this Division. This agreement
should serve to eliminate many of the grievances which have been filed over the question
of the employment of women in specific jobs at this Division. It is hoped that the present
decision will eliminate the remainder of such grievances.
Decision
1. No provisions of the October 19, 1942 Agreement, of the local seniority

agreement, or the local wage agreement limit Management in the hiring of
female employees for higher rated jobs. In the absence of such provisions, the
hiring of the female employees protested in the instant grievances was entirely
within the rights of Management.
2. Inasmuch as the female employees concerned in these cases were new

employees, it could not be said that their respective abilities, merits and
capacities should have been compared with those of the complainants to
determine who should have been given the available job openings. Paragraph
63 of the October 19, 1942 Agreement was not applicable in such a situation.
3. The requests of the complainants for transfers, which really represent

requests for promotion, must be denied. Such denial does not arise merely
from the fact that the requests are for promotions of a nature that cannot
possibly be granted by the Umpire. It is primarily based on the fact that no
rights of the complainants were violated when Management placed female
employees in the jobs to which the complainants were awaiting promotion.
UMPIRE
November 29, 1943.
No. C-144
November 30, 1943
GRIEVANCE:
Pontiac Motor—Case C-46
"Violation of Paragraph 63 of National Agreement. Ask back pay."
1. The grievance presented by Employee L. was not timely and must, therefore,
be denied.
2. Even though L.’s grievance had been presented in a timely fashion, the
redress he seeks could not have been granted inasmuch as the Umpire would
have had to substitute his jurisdiction for Management’s rights and have
determined that the ability, merit and capacity of Employee L. warranted his
promotion regardless of the meaning of Paragraph 63 of the National
Agreement.
3. A final reason that the specific redress sought by L. in this grievance could
not be granted is that other unexpressed grievances may well have resulted.
The disposition of one grievance is not proper when it creates meritorious
grievances on the part of other employees. (Entire Decision should be read)
In the Matter of:
United Automobile Workers of America, C.I.O.—Local 653
and
file://C:\Users\bobology\AppData\Local\Temp\Framework\c-144_13C13AA6.htm 3/22/2011
General Motors Corporation—Pontiac Motor Division—Case C-46
The employee grievance in this case, presented by L. in his own behalf on June 11, 1943,
reads as follows: "Violation of Paragraph 63 of the National Agreement. Ask back pay."
This grievance involves a contention by Employee L. that he should have been promoted
to a higher paying job setter opening in place of another employee who was promoted from
another classification. A hearing on this matter was held in Detroit on October 29, 1943.
Nature of Case
On May 3, 1943, Employee C. (seniority date 2-19-37) was advanced from the
classification of "Grinder—Rough and Finish" at $1.20 per hour, to the classification of "Job
Setter" at $1.30 per hour. On June 11, 1943, almost six weeks later, Employee L. filed the
instant grievance protesting the advancement as a violation of Paragraph 63 of the
National Agreement. At the time of the promotion of Employee C., the complainant (L.) was
working as a job setter in another department at the rate of $1.27 per hour. The Union asks
that L. be promoted to the higher paying job now held by C., and requests that he receive
back pay for the period during which C. held that job.
Union Position
The Union contends that Employee L.’s experience as a job setter caused him to be far in
advance of Employee C. with respect to ability, merit and capacity to fill the opening into
which Employee C. was promoted. Though Employee L. may not have had as much
experience as Employee C. in setting up some of the jobs in the department, the Union still
maintains that L. had sufficient experience to have enabled him to fill the job without any
additional training. Because of L.’s past experience as a job setter at $1.27 per hour, then,
the Union reasons that he was fully capable of filling the job that carried a rate of $1.30 per
hour, and possessed far greater ability, merit and capacity than C. for such a job.
The Union notes that Management has raised a question as to the timeliness of the
present grievance. The Union denies this untimeliness with the following statement, "This
grievance was raised by L. and a promise was given that he would be given a $1.30 job.
This promise was enough to delay the filing of this written grievance which was raised
again verbally before being submitted in writing." When Employee L. was not given a job at
$1.30 per hour, the Union reasons that he was correct in filing the instant grievance
requesting that he be given the job into which C. was promoted and receive back pay for
the period he was denied the promotion.
The Corporation presented particular details with respect to the various machines that had
to be set up in the department into which C. was promoted as a job setter. It contends that
the experience he had gained in setting up these machines during the periods in which he
substituted for, or assisted, the regular job setter, enabled him to perform the work when
the opening occurred. If Management had promoted Employee L. to the job, it is reasoned
that delays would have resulted while L. was being taught the setup of some of the
machines on which he had no experience. In Management’s opinion, Employee C.
possessed much greater ability than the complainant to set up the various machines that
were involved in the department in which the opening occurred. Management claims,
therefore, that the ability, merit and capacity of Employee C. was greater than Employee
L., "especially since the employee who was advanced to the higher rated job possessed
considerable knowledge about it, while the employee protesting the advancement had a
rather limited knowledge of only a phase of the work to be done".
The Corporation raises strenuous objection to what it contends is a lack of timeliness in the
presentation of the instant grievance. It maintains that the claim raised by the employee to
the effect that he was promised a set-up job at $1.30 per hour "resolves itself to a
statement by supervision that if separate setup men were placed on the 1054 line (Mr. L.’s
job) to handle the mills and grinders, then the complainant would be given the set-up job
for the grinders." The Corporation requests, therefore, that the Umpire find that Paragraph
63 of the National Agreement has not been violated in the advancement of Employee C.,
and further asks that the Umpire deny the request for back pay.
The present grievance lacks much that is necessary to obtain redress from the Umpire. Its
lack of timeliness is of extreme importance in this connection, but it also fails to give
cognizance to the principle enunciated in prior decisions to the effect that a decision in one
case should not result in the creation of grievances for other employees. These two
aspects of the present case are the only ones which the Umpire feels necessary to
comment upon at any length in this decision.
Apparently the real reason for the presentation of the instant grievance stemmed out of
Employee L.’s failure to receive a promotion from his position as a job setter at $1.27 per
hour to one at $1.30 per hour. While Employee L. was awaiting Management’s fulfillment
of its rather limited promise to make a specific job available if such a job should develop,
he raised no formal objection to the promotion that had been granted to Employee C.
However, when he did not receive the promised promotion in what he felt was a proper
time, he presented a grievance and attempted to make it retroactive to a specific promotion
that had occurred approximately six weeks before that date. By that time the employee
who had received the promotion was firmly established in the job and Management had
not received the slightest inkling that any disagreement had existed with respect to that
promotion. Certainly under such circumstances, the Umpire can come to no other
conclusion than that Employee L.’s grievance was untimely.
The other aspect of this case which requires comment is in reference to the propriety of
Employee L.’s claim to the exact job held by Employee C. This comment would be
necessary even if Employee L.’s grievance had been timely. It should be noted that
Employee L. filed a specific grievance asking that he be promoted to the job held by
Employee C., and that he be paid back pay for all of the time during which he did not
receive the higher rate of pay. If the Umpire should grant such a request, several improper
results would occur. First, and foremost, the Umpire would have to substitute his own
evaluation for that of Management in deciding who should be promoted to a specific job
opening. Obviously, the Umpire cannot assume a power of right that rests with
Management under the terms of Paragraph 63 of the National Agreement. All that the
Umpire could have done under these circumstances would have been to declare the job
held by C. vacant, and have directed Management to fill the opening with someone they
had properly selected on the basis of Paragraph 63 of the National Agreement. The
Umpire would have acted far beyond the provisions of the National Agreement, and
entirely without conformance to past decisions, if he had ordered the promotion of
Employee L. or had directed back pay for any period of time.
The second basis on which Employee L.’s claim is questionable is that if it had been
granted, it is highly probable that grievances on the part of other persons would have
automatically resulted. The mere fact that Employee L. presented a claim to the job held by
C. did not permit his qualifications to be the only ones that could be considered to fill the
opening that would have occurred had C.’s new job been declared vacant. The ability,
merit and capacity of other employees may well have been such as to entitle them to
consideration in filling the job to which C. had been promoted. The Umpire could not
disregard such rights by ordering the promotion of Employee L. That very promotion may
well have given rise to the filing of grievances by other employees whose ability, merit and
capacity to fill the higher rated job setter opening may have been equal to, or have
surpassed, those of Employee L. (It should be noted in passing that the presentation of the
grievance by Employee L. did not cause him to be the spokesman of all employees whose
rights may possibly have been violated by the promotion of C., unless they joined him in
some concise manner in presenting the grievance.) It should be clear, then, that L.’s
promotion to the specific job held by C. could not be ordered if for no other reason than
such a procedure may have resulted in the motivation of other unexpressed claims by
persons with greater ability, merit and capacity than those possessed by Employee L.
It should be noted that the Umpire has given no consideration to the specific abilities, merit
and capacities of Employee L. as compared to Employee C. Such treatment of this case is
not an oversight, but arises entirely out of the lack of timeliness and the improper
presentation of the grievance by Employee L. Any right which L. may have had to have his
qualifications compared with those of Employee C. were lost by the lack of timeliness of
the presentation of his grievance. However, it should be noted that even if the grievance
had been presented in a timely manner, the actual redress sought by Employee L. could
not have been granted because it would have resulted in the Umpire substituting himself
for Management and determining that a specific employee should be promoted regardless
of the requirements of Paragraph 63 of the National Agreement.
Decision
1. The grievance presented by Employee L. was not timely and must, therefore,
be denied.
2. Even though L.’s grievance had been presented in a timely fashion, the
redress he seeks could not have been granted inasmuch as the Umpire would
have had to substitute his jurisdiction for Management’s rights and have
determined that the ability, merit and capacity of Employee L. warranted his
promotion regardless of the meaning of Paragraph 63 of the National

Agreement.
3. A final reason that the specific redress sought by L. in this grievance could
not be granted is that other unexpressed grievances may well have resulted.
The disposition of one grievance is not proper when it creates meritorious
grievances on the part of other employees.
UMPIRE
November 30, 1943.
No. C-152
December 28, 1943
GRIEVANCE:
Chevrolet Bay City—Case C-32
"According to Par. 63, I should have been advanced to a machine setter instead of a
younger man."
1. The grievance of Employee D.S. lacked timeliness with respect to the

promotions of Employees F.R. and E.W. No comparison of the abilities, merits
and capacities of these individuals can properly be made.
2. The ability, merit and capacity of Employee D.S. was not equal to that of
Employees A.B. and A.S. Promotions of these latter two individuals were in full
compliance with Paragraph 63 of the October 19, 1942 National Agreement. All
claims by Employee D.S., therefore, are denied. (Entire Decision should be
read)
In the Matter of:
and
General Motors Corporation—Chevrolet Bay City Division—Case C-32

file://C:\Users\bobology\AppData\Local\Temp\Framework\c-152_13C1457F.htm 3/22/2011
The employee grievance in this case, which was presented by D.S. on July 28, 1943,
reads as follows: "According to Par. 63, I should have been advanced to a machine setter
instead of a younger man." A hearing on this matter was held in Saginaw, Michigan, on
December 1, 1943.
Nature of Case
In the months of June and July, 1943, four employees were advanced to the position of job
setter on a group of automatic screw machines at the Chevrolet Bay City Division. On July
28, 1943 (from one month and two days to nine days after the above promotions),
Employee D.S. filed a grievance that did not specifically refer to any of these particular
promotions. However, in subsequent steps of the grievance procedure, the Shop
Committee referred to the four individuals indicated below.
Initials Seniority Date Date of Promotion
F.R. 11-26-28 6-21-43
E.W. 12-27-29 7-12-43
A.B. 4-10-30 7-19-43
A.S. 6-21-33 7-19-43
It is the Union’s contention that Employee D.S. has ability, merit and capacity equal to
these four employees, and that he should have been promoted in the place of any one of
them because of his greater seniority.
Union Claim
The Union notes that Employee D.S. had 16 years of service as an automatic machine
operator, and in this time produced a large number of parts. Consequently, the Union feels
that Management’s action of promoting four other employees amounted to "passing over a
top flight automatic operator with greater seniority". It holds that none of the four men
promoted "are particularly outstanding", and that Employee D.S. was their equal in ability,
merit and capacity. It asks that he be promoted to the job of machine setter on automatic
screw machines, and that he be paid back pay retroactively to the date of his grievance to
the extent of the difference between the rate he received and the rate for the machine
setter classification.
Management asserts that several factors kept Employee D.S. out of the group of
employees with whom he claims equality. It holds that the promotions of the four
individuals cited by the Union were strictly on the basis of seniority within a group which
Management felt possessed approximately the same ability, merit and capacity to fill the
position of a job setter on automatic screw machines.
In support of the promotions of the four men here in question, Management has made a
series of statements. It observes that Employee F.R. had previous job setting experience,
was an above-average operator on all jobs and frequently assisted in job set-up work over
and above the requirements of an operator. It notes that Employee E.W. had proven
himself an all-around operator who could readily adapt himself to all of the machines in the
department, and who had made several outstanding machine improvements. Employee
A.B., it asserts, had previous experience as a job setter at this plant and at the A.C. Spark
Plug Division in Flint, Michigan. It concludes by stating that the fourth man, Employee A.S.,
was included because of three months’ prior experience as a job setter, plus long
experience on New Britain machines. In addition, Management maintains that all four of
these men have demonstrated their ability to diagnose operational troubles on machines
and remove the cause for such troubles. Finally it holds that all four of the promoted men
greatly excel Employee D.S. with respect to gaining the cooperation of their fellow
workmen.
While Management admits that Employee D.S. is "a capable automatic screw machine
operator on specific phases of the work", it contends that he has had considerable trouble
in getting new jobs started and lacks the necessary initiative to perform the job setter’s
work. Specific instances are noted that have caused a rather negative reaction by
Management as to this individual’s potentialities as a job setter. It is pointed out that on a
particular nut job it was necessary to remove him because "he complained of too much
work". On two screw and stud jobs, it is contended that he frequently burned the turning
tool rollers by failing to watch the tool and to grind when necessary. On another screw and
bolt job, it is said that he "could not get average production". On the job which he was
performing just before the hearing on this matter, it is noted that his production was good,
but that his percentage of scrap was very high.
For the reasons noted above, Management contends that Employee D.S. should not have
been considered equal in ability, merit and capacity to the four men who were promoted to
set-up work in June, and July, 1943.
At the hearing on this case, the Umpire indicated his feeling that there was a lack of
timeliness in the instant grievance at least with respect to the promotion of Employee F.R.
The Umpire is convinced that the same conclusion is proper in the case of the promotion of
Employee E.W. In both of these instances the employees had obtained such experience in
the machine set-up work by the time this grievance was filed that a consideration of their
qualifications could only have concluded that their existent abilities, merits and capacities
to fill openings in the classification of machine setter on automatic screw machines were
far above those of Employee D.S.
The contentions which Employee D.S. has raised with respect to the promotions of
Employees A.B. and A.S. do not find any real support. Both of these men had previous job
setting experience, and already had proven themselves as to their ability and capacity to
perform the job setting tasks. While this proven ability may not have been on automatic
screw machines, it nevertheless indicated their capacity to perform all of the elements of
such work when a knowledge of the automatic screw machines was also available.
Of real importance are the negative aspects that must be considered in evaluating the
ability, merit and capacity of Employee D.S. with respect to the available set-up jobs. In the
several ways cited by Management, Employee D.S. had proven himself considerably
below the promoted employees with respect to ability, merit and capacity. Support cannot
be given to the Union’s position that Management’s failure to assess disciplinary action to
control the negative aspects of the employee’s work should eliminate such factors from
consideration when potential promotion is involved. Even if disciplinary action had been
taken the factors would not have been removed from the man’s record. Management’s
failure to take disciplinary action does not excuse or remove these factors from the work
record of the employee. It is proper, therefore, to consider such matters when a promotion
to an available opening is contemplated.
For the reasons noted herein, the Umpire is convinced that Employee D.S. did not possess
ability, merit and capacity equivalent to Employees A.B. and A.S., who were promoted to
the job of set-up men on automatic screw machines on July 19, 1943. It must be held,
therefore, that all promotions here involved were in compliance with Paragraph 63 of the
National Agreement. The claims of Employee D.S. are denied.
Decision
1. The grievance of Employee D.S. lacked timeliness with respect to the

promotions of Employees F.R. and E.W. No comparison of the abilities, merits
and capacities of these individuals can properly be made.
2. The ability, merit and capacity of Employee D.S. was not equal to that of
Employees A.B. and A.S. Promotions of these latter two individuals were in full
compliance with Paragraph 63 of the October 19, 1942 National Agreement. All
claims by Employee D.S., therefore, are denied.
UMPIRE
December 28, 1943.
No. C-155
December 30, 1943
GRIEVANCE:
Buick Motor—Case C-69
"I request that I be placed and tried on 3664 classification. I feel that Management has
discriminated against me and violated the Agreement on Page 31, Paragraph 63."
While the complainant may well be able to perform the functions of a Utility Inspector if
given the opportunity to do so, it is quite evident that his ability, merit and capacity to
perform that work was far less than that of Employee M. who was assigned the functions of
that job in May, 1943. Since the choice of M. for promotion was in full compliance with
Paragraph 63 of the October 19, 1942 Agreement, Employee R.’s request must be denied.
In the Matter of:
and
General Motors Corporation—Buick Motor Division—Case C-69
On May 22, 1943, Employee B. presented a grievance that read as follows: "I request that I
be placed and tried on 3664 Classification. I feel that management has discriminated
against me and violated the Agreement on Page 31, Paragraph 63." A hearing on this
matter was held in Flint on December 2, 1943.
In November, 1942, Employee M. (seniority date, 6-12-29) was advanced from the
classification of "Inspector—Machining, Bench and Floor" to the classification of
"Inspector—Utility". For a short time he did the work of the utility classification, but a
reduction in the utility work caused him to be returned to bench work without a change in
classification. In April, 1943, a new opening in utility work occurred and Employee M. was
given the job. It was determined at that time that he was still classified as "Inspector—
Utility", and Management found it necessary only to increase his rate to the top rate of the
classification. In May, 1943, his duties were changed from bench work to utility work and
other employees became aware of M.’s changed classification. Employee R. (seniority
date 11-13-11) filed a grievance protesting this promotion and requesting that he be
"placed and tried" in the utility classification.
The Union contends that "R. is capable and in the past has been used by the Management
to break in new employees." It submitted two statements by men who have worked with R.
and who consider him "capable of all white metal jobs in this group". Because R. has the
ability to do the job, and has much greater seniority than any other man in his department,
the Union requests that R. be given the classification of "Inspector—Utility."
Management contends that the ability, merit and capacity of Employee M. to fill the job of
Utility Inspector is far greater than that of Employee R. It observes in particular that the
physical condition of employees is of considerable significance in determining their
capacity to fulfill the requirements of an available job. The considerable difference in the
ages of the two men, together with the greater physical stamina possessed by M., are cited
by Management as important elements in support of the conclusion that Employee M.
stood "head and shoulders" above R. to fill the job of Utility Inspector.
In effect, the Union’s request in R.’s behalf in this case is merely that he be given a chance
to be tried on the utility classification to see if he can perform the work. No such request
can correctly come to the Umpire inasmuch as Management retains the right of promotion
under Paragraph 63 of the October 19, 1942 Agreement.
There is no doubt in the Umpire’s mind but that the ability, merit and capacity of Employee
M. to fill the job of Utility Inspector in May, 1943, was far greater than that of Employee R.
Since Management made its selection on such a basis, it correctly applied the principles
enunciated in Paragraph 63 of the National Agreement, and was in conformance with past
decisions with respect to such promotions. Employee R.’s claim, therefore, is denied.
Decision
While the complainant may well be able to perform the functions of a Utility Inspector if
given the opportunity to do so, it is quite evident that his ability, merit and capacity to
perform that work was far less than that of Employee M. who was assigned the functions of
that job in May, 1943. Since the choice of M. for promotion was in full compliance with
Paragraph 63 of the October 19, 1942 Agreement, Employee R.’s request must be denied.
UMPIRE
December 30, 1943.
No. C-157
January 8, 1944
GRIEVANCE:
"Group—Violation Paragraph No. 63. Ask back pay. Other advancements out of line."
1. Employee J. H. was not a member of a group that had a joint grievance. His
grievance, therefore, could cover no one other than himself. The decision in this
case, then, is confined solely to the claims of Employee J. H. with respect to the
promotion of L. C.
2. The ability, merit and capacity of Employee J. H. did not warrant his being
grouped with Employee L. C. in a choice for promotion to the available job of
Relief Man. Consequently, it must be held that the promotion of Employee L. C.
insofar as the particular complaint of J. H. is concerned, represented
compliance with Paragraph 63 of the October 19, 1942 Agreement. The
request of Employee J. H. contained in the instant grievance is denied. (Entire
In the Matter of:
and
General Motors Corporation—Pontiac Motor Division—Case C-35

file://C:\Users\bobology\AppData\Local\Temp\Framework\c-157_13C15AD3.htm 3/22/2011
On April 26, 1943, Employee J.H. presented a grievance which purported to be a group
grievance by a number of men protesting the promotion of Employee L.C. to the
classification of Relief Man in April, 1943. The grievance reads: "Group—Violation
Paragraph No. 63. Ask back pay. Other advancements out of line." The first hearing on this
matter was held in Detroit on September 8, 1943. At that time the Umpire determined that
the parties had largely confined themselves to a comparison of the ability, merit and
capacity of the signer of the grievance (J.H.) and the employee who had been promoted
(L.C.) However, in view of certain inconsistencies as to facts, the grievance was returned
to the parties for their further consideration. A second hearing on the case was held on
October 29, 1943, at which time the Umpire again found that the parties were not in
agreement as to certain important facts in the case. Immediately after this second hearing,
the Umpire returned the case to the parties with a request for specific information that
would indicate the exact work record of Employees J.H. and L.C. in 1942 and 1943. The
parties accepted the second return of the case and prepared the necessary data which
they mutually considered before presenting it to the Umpire. The third and last hearing on
this matter was held in the Office of the Umpire on December 9, 1943. The present
decision is the final disposition of a case that has required a series of three hearings to
develop all pertinent material.
Nature of Case
In April, 1943, an opening occurred for a Relief Man on the Diesel Block line in Department
681 of the Pontiac Motor Division. Employee L.C. (seniority date, March 10, 1936) was
advanced from the classification of Swing Grinder to the classification of Relief Man with
an increase of five cents per hour in his rate. Employee J.H. (seniority date, November 26,
1935), who at the time had established his seniority in Department 683, filed the instant
grievance as a group grievance protesting the advancement of Employee L.C. While the
grievance was filed in the form of a group grievance, the Union has consistently stressed
only the claim of Employee J.H. to the job in question. In fact, it was for this reason that the
Umpire directed the parties to present specific data with respect to these two men and
confined the final two hearings entirely to this aspect of the case. The present decision,
therefore, concerns only the contention that Employee J.H. should have been given the job
to which Employee L.C. was promoted.
Union Claim
The Union’s original position was to the effect that Employee L.C. did not stand "head and
shoulders" above the other employees in the group of available men who could have filled
the opening for a Relief Man. It presented the work experience of Employee J.H. as a
means of proving that the signer of the instant grievance was at least equal to the
promoted employee with respect to ability, merit and capacity, and that he should have
been given the promotion because of his greater seniority.
Originally the Union presented material which contended that Employee J.H. had
experience in the work of Department 681 that was equivalent to that of Employee L.C. In
the latter hearings on the matter, this contention was not particularly stressed, but it was
held that his work experience prior to the development of the Diesel work proved
Employee J.H. more versatile than Employee L.C. The Union has asked, therefore, that
Employee J.H. be advanced to the job of Relief Man in place of Employee L.C., and that
he be paid back pay for all the time that the job has been held by Employee L.C.
In the three written statements presented by the Corporation in connection with this case, a
series of facts has been developed in detail to support its contention that the ability, merit
and capacity of Employee L.C. was far greater than that of the complainant, Employee J.H.
This material was particularly stressed in the written statement presented at the hearing of
December 9, 1943. In its final statement on the matter, Management contended that the
ability, merit and capacity of Employee L.C. for the opening on the Diesel Block line in
Department 681 was far greater than was true in the case of Employee J.H. whose
experience in this work had been rather meager.
A considerable part of the Corporation’s briefs concerned its contention that Employee J.H.
was not properly one of a group who could present a group grievance. Inasmuch as
Employee J.H. was in Department 683 at the time of the promotion, and a considerable
number of men with greater seniority than J.H. in Department 681 did not file a specific
grievance, Management reasons that Employee J.H. was not the proper person to file a
group grievance. Only if Employee J.H. had been a member of a group directly affected by
the promotion, Management reasons, could he have properly filed a group grievance
protesting such a promotion.
During the several hearings on this case, the Umpire indicated clearly by his questioning
that he was concerned only with the claims of Employee J.H. A conclusion on this point
was necessary because this employee was claiming that his ability, merit and capacity
entitled him to a promotion to a job in another department. Different supervision headed
the two departments and there was nothing about the employees or their work that would
permit for any grouping of them. Employee J.H., therefore, could not bring any other
employees under a group grievance simply by filing his own grievance and calling it a
group grievance that was applicable to any persons who might conceivably be aggrieved
by the promotion. For these reasons, the Umpire is confining this decision to that part of
the grievance that has status, namely, the contention of Employee J.H. that he should
have been promoted to the job given to Employee L.C.
The very detailed material presented to the Umpire, after several attempts to get the
parties to develop such detail and to give their joint consideration to the pertinent material,
convinces the Umpire that Employee J.H. should not have been grouped with Employee
L.C. for promotion to the job of Relief Man. This is not to say that Employee L.C. stood
"head and shoulders" above all other employees available for the job. The only conclusion
that has been reached in this instance is that the ability, merit and capacity of Employee
J.H. did not warrant the conclusion that he possessed approximately the same ability, merit
and capacity as Employee L.C. to permit him to be grouped with that employee before a
choice was made for promotion. It must be concluded, therefore, that the promotion of
Employee L.C., insofar as the complainant J.H. is concerned, represented conformance
with Paragraph 63 of the October 19, 1942 Agreement. The claim of Employee J.H. is
denied.
Decision
1. Employee J.H. was not a member of a group that had a joint grievance. His
grievance, therefore, could cover no one other than himself. The decision in this
case, then, is confined solely to the claims of Employee J.H. with respect to the
promotion of L.C.
2. The ability, merit and capacity of Employee J.H. did not warrant his being
grouped with Employee L.C. in a choice for promotion to the available job of
Relief Man. Consequently, it must be held that the promotion of Employee L.C.,
insofar as the particular complaint of Employee J.H. is concerned, represented
compliance with Paragraph 63 of the October 19, 1942 Agreement. The
request of Employee J.H. contained in the instant grievance is denied.
Signed G. Allan Dash, Jr.
UMPIRE
January 8, 1944.
No. C-160
JANUARY 11, 1944
GRIEVANCE:
Olds Forge Plant No. 1 -- Case C-12
"I request that back pay be given me from the time the line was changed over. This is a
conveyor tending job and should be paid as such."
1. The extension of an automatic conveyor to the packing position on one of the

shell lines has changed the packing task in a significant manner. The packer
now must gear the tempo of his work directly to an automatic conveyor so that
he will not delay the work of the painters and inspectors who precede him on
the automatic conveyor line.
2. The work performed by the "Packers" is still substantially that of packing the
shells into containers. For this reason it is not possible for the Umpire to hold
that the complainant should be reclassified as a "Conveyor Attendant."
3. Because of the change that has occurred in the packing task, the Umpire
finds that the classification and rate contained in the local wage agreement
under the heading of "Packer", is no longer applicable to the new job. The
question of the classification and rate for this job is returned to the parties so
that they may reconsider the matter in the light of the observations made in this
decision. The parties are directed mutually to negotiate either a continuation of
the present rate and classification, or to establish some other classification
and/or rate which they consider proper for the task as newly constituted. (Entire

In the Matter of:
and
General Motors Corporation—General Motors Forge Plant No. 1 – Case C-12
On July 21, 1943, Employee R. presented a grievance which read as follows:
"I request that back pay be given me from the time the line was changed over. This is a
conveyor tending job and should be paid as such". A hearing on this matter was held in
Lansing, on December 7, 1943.
Nature of Case
When the local wage agreement was negotiated at the General Motors Forge Plant No. 1
on December 31, 1941, a conveyor carried 75 MM shells only as far as a paint machine.
The shells were then painted, were taken out of the painting machine by an operator and
were placed on a bench for inspection. After inspection the shells were rolled to one end of
the inspection bench to an employee whose duty it was to pack them into cartons. The
operation of packing the shells in cartons was negotiated and classified as "Packer .95 --
1.01". This rate has since been increased by a Directive of the War Labor Board to $.99 --
1.05 per hour. It is contended by the Union that the aforesaid classification rightly should
be designated as "Conveyor Attendant—Loader or Unloader", and that Employee R.
should be entitled to an increase in rate retroactively to the date of the instant grievance.
Union Claim
The Union contends that at the time of the original rate negotiations for the classification of
"Packer", the job content required that the work be done by hand. It claims that several
men were needed to set up cartons, put in shells, seal the cartons and mark the code
letters on the cartons. These men all worked in one group, the Union notes, and received
the "Packer’s" rate of pay. A change in this method was instituted by Management, the
Union holds, so that the men who were formerly classed as Packers experienced a large
increase in the amount of shells handled and were required to be in constant attendance
on the conveyor line. To all intents and purposes, the Union maintains, the duties of these
men became equivalent to those classed as Conveyor Attendants.
The Union further contends that at the time of the original signing of the local wage
agreement, the job content of the "Packer" classification did not include any provision for
an "automatic conveyor". The Union further maintains that changes in methods of
manufacture or production make it mandatory upon Management to negotiate with the
Union and establish a new "meeting of the minds" as to proper wage rates and job
classifications. To follow any other procedure, the Union concludes, would result in
unilateral setting of wage rates and job classifications.
The Union asks, therefore, that the job presently classified as "Packer" be reclassified to
that of "Conveyor Attendant—Loader or Unloader", and that the proper rate applicable to
this operation be paid Employee R. on a retroactive basis.
The Corporation maintains that the operation performed by Employee R. was recognized
by the parties to be a packing operation during the discussions leading up to the signing of
the local wage agreement on December 31, 1941, and that a wage rate of this
classification was negotiated and included in that wage agreement.
The Corporation states that the primary function of Employee R. is to pack the shells into
cartons. The installation of a packing machine immediately behind his place of work in no
way added to his responsibilities and did not necessitate any requirement of added skill or
experience on his part in the performance of his packing operation, the Corporation holds.
The shells must be packed regardless of how they arrive at the packing station, the
Corporation notes, and the addition of a mechanical means of conveying the shells to the
operator at the packing post did not necessarily result in an increase in the number of
shells to be packed. The Corporation reasons that constant improvements in methods of
operation and the addition of new and better equipment all contribute toward the
attainment of increased production in the manufacture of any article. The Corporation
concludes that the Union’s claim that the job has been changed in a manner sufficient to
warrant a reclassification is not proper and is not based upon fact.
Because there was some difference of opinion as to the actual content of the packing job
involved in this case, the Umpire felt it necessary to have an inspection made of the job.
The Assistant to the Umpire examined the job in question on January 5, 1944. The
inspection divulged the fact that where formerly the packer was merely required to slide the
shells off a bench directly into a carton, he now is required to lift each one of the shells and
pass it across his body in an arc of approximately 150 degrees. While the actual physical
effort involved in the packing task has been greatly increased by the addition of the
automatic conveyor, there would not be sufficient reason in that fact alone to hold that any
reconsideration of the rate for the job was warranted. In fact, if the production of the job
had been increased considerably because of the elimination of certain "kinks" in prior steps
of the productive process, there would still be no reason to hold that the rate was not
applicable.
However, the major point of significance in the change that has occurred in the packing
task is the addition of the automatic conveyor. The packer now must gear his work directly
to the tempo of a conveyor in a manner that was not present in any way at the time the
original rate was established for this job at this particular plant. The necessity to gear
himself directly to the work of the painters and examiners, and to keep the end of the
conveyor clear of shells (the work of the whole line will stop if any shell touches the
automatic lever just beyond the packing position) has affected his task considerably. While
the job is still basically that of packing shells in cases, there has been such a significant
change in the task that a reconsideration of the classification and rate is necessary.
Inasmuch as the job in question is still so basically that of packing shells, the Umpire
cannot hold that the job should be reclassified as "Conveyor Attendant". On the other
hand, he cannot support Management in its contention that the job should be continued
under the existing "Packer" classification and rate. Therefore, neither party can be
supported entirely in their position. It is necessary to return this matter to the parties for
negotiations so that they may mutually determine whether the present classification and
rate should be continued for the job or whether some adjustment should be made therein.
It should be understood by both parties that this finding applies only to the specific job
involved and only to that job in General Motors Forge Plant No. 1.
Decision
1. The extension of an automatic conveyor to the packing position on one of the

shell lines has changed the packing task in a significant manner. The packer
now must gear the tempo of his work directly to an automatic conveyor so that
he will not delay the work of the painters and inspectors who precede him on
the automatic conveyor line.
2. The work performed by the "Packers" is still substantially that of packing the
shells into containers. For this reason it is not possible for the Umpire to hold
that the complainant should be reclassified as a "Conveyor Attendant".
3. Because of the change that has occurred in the packing task, the Umpire
finds that the classification and rate contained in the local wage agreement
under the heading of "Packer", is no longer applicable to the new job. The
question of the classification and rate for this job is returned to the parties so
that they may reconsider the matter in the light of the observations made in this
decision. The parties are directed mutually to negotiate either a continuation of
the present rate and classification, or to establish some other classification
and/or rate which they consider proper for the task as newly constituted.
Decision
Signed G. Allan Dash, Jr.
UMPIRE
January 11, 1944.
Office of the Umpire
No. C-250
OCTOBER 3, 1944
Time Limit In Filing Grievances
GRIEVANCE:
Eastern Aircraft—Linden—Case C-737
"I have been discharged unjustly. I request to be reinstated and paid for all time lost."
The grievance is dismissed as not having been filed within the time limit specified in
Paragraph 77 of the Agreement. (Entire Decision should be read)
In the Matter of:
and
General Motors Corporation—Eastern Aircraft—Linden—Case C-737
The only issue presented to the Umpire in this case is whether or not the grievance was
filed within the time limit set by Paragraph 77 of the Agreement.
Employee R. was discharged on June 30, 1944, for habitual absenteeism. On June 1,
1944, Management sent a telegraphic notification of her discharge to the address listed for
her on its records. The telegram was accepted by someone at that address on July 2,
1944. On July 5, Employee R. reported for work and was orally notified of her discharge.
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The present grievance was filed on July 7.
Management claims that as the grievance was filed more than three working days after her
discharge, it is invalid within the meaning of Paragraph 77 of the Contract.
Employee R. states that from June 21 to June 25, and again from June 28 to June 30, she
was ill with appendicitis. Prior to her illness, she asserts, she had moved from her former
residence with her parents and had notified a girl in the Personnel Office of her change of
address. She states further that as she had learned that on the first four days of July the
Plant was going to be closed for the purposes of taking inventory she did not report for
work until July 5th. As she did not receive the telegram which was sent to her parents’
home, the first notice she had of her discharge came when she reported to work on the 5th.
Under these circumstances, therefore, she claims that by filing the grievance on July 7,
she came within the three-day time limit established by Paragraph 77.
In support of her claim the Union originally argued that the oral notice of her change of
address which she claims to have given the Personnel Department should have been
treated as sufficient to place upon the Management the responsibility for the misdirection
of the telegram. It seems to have become clear during the discussions of the case in the
earlier stages of the grievance machinery, however, that R. did not follow the regular
procedures established by the Management for the recording of a change of address, and
that she thereby failed to discharge the responsibility placed upon her by Paragraph 74 of
the Agreement.
In its brief to the Umpire, therefore, the Union appears to have abandoned that point and to
rest its case upon the contention that since the Plant was closed for inventory purposes
from July 1 to July 4, those days should not be counted as "working days" within the
meaning of Paragraph 77. Management points out, however, that a large number of
employees were scheduled to work on the days in question in the taking of the inventory
and that at this plant all days are considered regular working days, except Sundays and
holidays. It concedes that Sunday, July 2, and Tuesday, July 4, were not regular working
days and should not be counted. Had R. filed her grievance on July 5 when she received
oral notification of her discharge, it might well have been honored as falling within the
three-day time limit. Employee R., however, delayed another two days before filing her
grievance and thereby exceeded the time limit.
This Plant has been operating on a regular 48-hour week for approximately two years. All
days except Sundays or the holidays specified in the Agreement have been customarily
considered and treated as working days. Had the Plant shut down completely for a few
days, of course, it might well be argued that the days on which it was closed were not
working days. It appears, however, that the taking of inventory did not mean a complete
shutdown of the Plant. Some 900 employees were working in connection with the
inventory, including a number of Union Committeemen and supervisory officials. The
interruption of operations was not sufficiently complete to take these days out of the
definition of "working days" in Paragraph 77 of the Agreement.
The Umpire has previously held that the contractual provisions with respect to the
grievance machinery must be construed in the light of the fundamental purposes of the
grievance machinery; i.e., to provide a means whereby grievances can be decided on their
merits. This principle cannot be carried, however, to the point at which the provisions of the
Agreement are disregarded or their plain meaning ignored. The Umpire finds that July 1
and July 3 were working days within the meaning of Paragraph 77 of the Agreement. He
finds that Employee R. was herself responsible for the misdirection of the telegram and for
the two-day delay in filing the grievance which followed her oral notification on July 5.
Whatever may be the merits of her grievance she has lost her right to bring it, and for that
loss she has only herself to blame.
The Umpire will dismiss the grievance as not filed within the time limit specified in
Paragraph 77 of the Agreement.
Decision
The grievance is dismissed as not having been filed within the time limit specified in
Paragraph 77 of the Agreement.
Signed, Ralph T. Seward
UMPIRE
October 3, 1944.
No. C-255
October 2, 1944
Alleged Violation Of Local Wage Agreement
GRIEVANCE:
Chevrolet Aviation Engine Plant No. 1 -- Case C-55
"Policy. Violation of Local Wage Agreement. Management setting up subclassification of

Mount and Dismount at a lower rate. $1.09 an hour, when our Local Agreement has this
classification as Test Operator, Mount and Dismount at $1.14. Request rate of $1.14 on
this classification as negotiated and back pay."
The Union’s request is denied. (Entire decision should be read)
In the Matter of:
and
General Motors Corporation—Chevrolet Aviation Engine Plant No. 1 -- Case C-55
Procedural Objections of the Corporation
The above grievance, which protests an alleged violation of the local wage agreement at
Chevrolet Aviation Engine Plant No. 1, was filed on June 6, 1944, by Committeeman W. In
its Notice of Unadjusted Grievance, Management observed that Committeeman W.’s own
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rate was not in question and would not be affected by this grievance. At the Umpire
hearing, held in Buffalo on September 8, 1944, the Corporation raised this point as an
objection to the status of the grievance, arguing that under Paragraph 28 of the Contract
grievances could only be filed by an employee "having the grievance" or by a "designated
member of a group having a grievance."
A similar objection has been interposed by the Corporation in respect to other grievances
which allege violations of local wage agreements and which are now pending before the
Umpire. The Umpire has found that a decision on the point will require a somewhat
extended survey of the past practice of the parties in dealing with so-called "policy"
grievances. As the Umpire finds that in any case he must decide the instant case against
the Union, he sees no reason for withholding his decision pending his determination of the
Corporation’s procedural objection. He is, therefore, issuing this decision on the merits with
the express understanding that the decision is without prejudice to the position of either
side upon the procedural issue.
The Union alleges that Management is violating the terms of the local wage agreement
entered into August 24, 1943, by establishing a new classification designated "Mount and
Dismount" at the rate of $1.09 per hour. The original agreement provided for two
classifications of employees working in the Engine Test Cells; i.e., Engine Test Operator,
including Mount and Dismount -- $1.14, Engine Test Control Room Operator and/or
Recorder -- $1.11. The Union argues that since the Mount and Dismount operations were
included among those rated at $1.14 an hour, it is a violation of the agreement to separate
them from these operations and assign to them a new and lower rate.
Management claims that the rate of $1.14 was established for employees whose duties
included not only the mounting and dismounting of the engines but also the performing of
all the other operations involved in engine testing. It has not altered the duties of these
employees. It has merely added a new booster crew of employees to aid in the physical
labor of mounting and dismounting the engines. The employees in this new crew perform
no testing operations whatsoever. Since they perform only one of the operations which the
"test operators, including Mount and Dismount, perform," Management argues, it cannot
be reasonably claimed that they are entitled to be classified along with such test operators
or receive the test operators’ rate.
The right of Management to set up new temporary classifications and rates for new jobs
which cannot be properly placed in existing classifications by mutual agreement is clearly
established by Paragraph 112 of the Agreement. The only question before the Umpire is
whether or not the activities of these new booster crews are covered by the existing local
wage agreement or should properly be considered to be a new job. On that issue the
Umpire finds for the Corporation. The local wage agreement established a rate of $1.14 an
hour for employees who were both operating the engines during their test runs and
mounting and dismounting these engines. The rate, in other words, was set with both
these responsibilities and skills in mind. The booster crews, on whose behalf this grievance
is brought, perform only one of these functions. They need have no skill or experience in
operating the engines during their test run. In the Umpire’s opinion, they are not properly
covered by the wage agreement of August 24, 1943, and have been properly considered
by Management as performing a new job within the meaning of Paragraph 112 of the
Agreement.
It appears from the discussions at the hearing that the basic question which separated the
parties in this case is not raised by this grievance at all, but concerns the proper rate for
the Engine Test Control Room Operators and/or Recorders. The employees in this
classification are for the most part females who are physically unable to perform the work
involving the mounting and dismounting of engines. For that reason, during the
negotiations on the local wage agreement, Management insisted that these employees
should have a somewhat lower rate than the test operators who had not only to test the
engines but mount and dismount them. The Union asserts that it agreed to the lower rate
for these operators at $1.11 with the reservation that if the functions of mount and
dismount were ever separated from the Engine Test Operators, the Control Room
Operators and/or Recorders should be brought up to $1.14. The Union asserted that the
addition of booster crews has fulfilled the condition mentioned in its oral reservation, that
the local wage agreement with respect to the Test Control Room Operators and/or
Recorders is no longer binding and that their rates should now be raised by renegotiation.
The Umpire’s jurisdiction, however, is confined to the issues raised by the grievance
presented. The present grievance places at issue only the proper rate for the new booster
crews who are exclusively performing the task of mounting and dismounting the engines. If
the Union believes that the local wage agreement with respect to the Engine Test Control
Room Operators and/or Recorders has been invalidated, and that their rates should
properly be thrown open to renegotiation, it may file a grievance which will place this
contention in issue. In the present case, however, this matter is beyond the jurisdiction of
the Umpire to consider.
For the reasons above set forth the Umpire finds that Management has not violated the
local wage agreement by establishing a temporary rate of $1.09 for employees exclusively
performing the operations "Engine—Mount and Dismount." The Union’s request will
accordingly be denied.
Decision
The Union’s request is denied.
UMPIRE
October 2, 1944.
No. C-269
November 14, 1944
Protest Against Transfer Of Work
To Employees Outside Of Bargaining Unit
GRIEVANCE:
Chevrolet—Kansas City—Case C-4
"Violation of negotiated rate of stock room clerks as set forth in local wage agreement
dated January 11, 1943. This violation has occurred by reason of the fact that the
Corporation is having salaried employees do the handling and posting of shortage records
and reports at a much lesser rate than the rate negotiated for this type of work. It is
requested that the handling and posting of shortage records and reports be immediately
taken from salaried employees and given to warehouse hourly rated employees at the
proper wage scale of $1.06 per hour, which is the negotiated rate. Back pay is asked for
such employees from this date. Any additional stock room clerks necessary for handling
and posting of shortage records and reports to be chosen as prescribed by Paragraph 63
of the Agreement, and not by the employment of salaried employees at a lesser wage
scale that has been negotiated for this classification. Classification of stockroom clerks
reads in part as follows: ‘Cover general warehouse clerical work such as posting and
handling of shortage records and reports.’"
The grievance is dismissed. (Entire Decision should be read)
In the Matter of:

and
General Motors Corporation—Chevrolet—Kansas City—Case C-4
In this grievance, the Union claims that Management has violated both the National
Agreement and the local wage agreement by transferring the work of handling and posting
shortage records from Stock Room clerks, who are included within the bargaining unit, to
salaried clerks in the Order Department who are outside of it. It asks a ruling from the
Umpire establishing the right of the Stock Room clerks as a classification to this work on
the ground that it was theirs when the bargaining unit was defined and when the local
wage agreement was executed. It asks further that they should receive back pay for the
time during which they have been denied work to which they were rightfully entitled.
Management declares that the transfer of the shortage operations from the Stock Room
clerks in the Warehouse to salaried clerks in the Order Department was made necessary
by the increase in the amount of back orders which followed the curtailment of parts
manufacture under wartime restrictions. A system of checking available stock against
shortage records, which was adequate when back orders were less than 5% of the total
sales volume, became impractical and inefficient when back orders increased to 60% of
sales volume. It points out, furthermore, that the work as transferred is entirely clerical in
nature, involves no manual handling of materials, and is therefore excluded from the
bargaining unit by the established interpretation of Paragraph 3 of the Agreement.
The Union does not deny that the volume of back orders had increased and that some
changes in the system of keeping shortage records was necessary for efficiency. It
contends, however, that Management should have solved the problem by hiring additional
Stock Room clerks. To transfer the work to the clerks in the Order Department, whose
weekly salary is equivalent to an hourly rate lower than that of the Stock Room clerks, it
states, was a violation of the local wage agreement. Transferring it to salaried employees
even at a higher rate, moreover, would violate the Union’s right to bargain for this work—a
right which Management recognized when it included the Warehouse employees within the
bargaining unit and negotiated with the local Union a rate for the Stock Room clerks.
Latent in the Union’s position there appears to be a contention that the employees in a
classification covered by a local wage agreement are entitled for the duration of that
agreement to all work which was theirs when the agreement was executed. This idea
seems to be the basis of the Union’s claim for back pay for the Stock Room clerks, none of
whom have been laid off or had their wage rates reduced. Yet nowhere in the National
Agreement or in any local wage agreement of which the Umpire has knowledge is there
any such guarantee. Many operations classified and rated in local wage agreements have
been discontinued entirely while those agreements were still in force. Other operations
have frequently been so altered as to justify their reclassification and re-rating either by
fitting the altered work into other existing classifications or by negotiating a new rate
pursuant to Paragraph 112 of the Agreement. Management’s rights under Paragraph 8 to
discontinue or alter such operations can hardly be questioned. A local wage agreement
does not guarantee work to an employee. It only determines what he shall be paid when
he is assigned to that work. Nothing is clearer but that in removing from the Stock Room
clerks certain of the work which had formerly been theirs, Management was within its rights
and violated no agreement which it has with the Union.
Did it then violate the Agreement by transferring this work to salaried clerks in its Order
Department who are not included within the bargaining unit? The answer to this question
depends upon whether or not the job of keeping and posting shortage records as
transferred is clerical in nature. It has been well established by prior Umpire decisions that,
in interpreting Paragraph 3 of the Agreement, the line between clerical and non-clerical
work must be drawn between those operations which include any degree of manual
material handling and those which involve no manual operations whatsoever. From the
evidence presented it appears that when the work of keeping the shortage records was
performed by the Stock Room clerks it involved a certain amount of manual material
handling such as the unpacking of boxes, the counting of material in the bins, and the
lifting and carrying of parts from place to place. It is admitted, however, that in transferring
the work to the Order Department Management has eliminated all of these manual
operations. The Umpire finds, therefore, that the work as now performed is strictly clerical
in nature and that nothing in the Agreement prevents its assignment to salaried employees
outside of the bargaining unit. It might well be pointed out, furthermore, that even if this
were not the case the Union would have no grounds for asking that the work be returned to
the Stock Room clerks. Its only proper remedy would have been a request for the inclusion
of the Order Department clerks within the bargaining unit.
The Union points out, nevertheless, that the salaries of the clerks in the Order Department,
computed upon an hourly basis, are lower than is the negotiated wage rate of the Stock
Room clerks. The paying of this lower rate for the work of keeping shortage records, it
argues, is a violation of the local wage agreement. It should be clear, however, that this
claim could only properly be advanced in behalf of the clerks in the Order Department, and
these the Union has no right to represent. The wages of the Stock Room clerks, whom the
Union does represent, have not been lowered.
The Umpire sees no grounds for the Union’s contention that this decision will establish a
precedent permitting the Corporation to destroy the Union by transferring any type of work
which it chooses from employees in the bargaining unit to salaried and unrepresented
employees outside of the bargaining unit. This decision covers only the question of the
Corporation’s right to make such a transfer where the work is clerical in nature. Upon the
contractual consequences of other attempted types of transfer, it expressly does not pass.
Though the Umpire will dismiss this grievance upon its merits, he believes that he should
comment upon a final contention of Management that since the grievance was signed by a
Union Committeeman rather than by one of the Stock Room clerks, it should properly have
no status before him. This contention could only be sustained by a holding that Shop and
District Committeemen are not aggrieved by a violation of a local wage agreement within
the meaning of Paragraphs 28 and 30 of the Agreement. In the Umpire’s view such a
holding would be highly unrealistic. A local wage agreement is the product of negotiations
in which the local Union organization has frequently played a major part. Wage matters lie
close to the heart of every collective bargaining relationship, and local Unions often stand
or fall according to their success in negotiating and enforcing such agreements.
Grievances of this type, moreover, cannot possibly be settled at the Foreman level. They
must obviously be dealt with by top local Management and the Shop Committee. The
Umpire holds, therefore, that under Paragraphs 28 and 30 of the Agreement, grievances
which allege violations of a local wage agreement may properly be signed and filed by
District or Shop Committeemen and that such grievances have status before him.
In the past, "policy" grievances signed and filed by Union Committeemen have frequently
been vaguely worded. Sometimes they have been so indefinite that Management has been
unable to determine the specific nature of the Union’s claims and the identity and number
of the employees affected until the case has reached the Umpire. Nothing in the present
holding should be taken to indicate any acquiescence by the Umpire in such a practice. A
grievance which alleges a violation of a local wage agreement should clearly and
accurately describe the classifications involved, the nature of the violation alleged, and the
remedy requested. It should give Management such information as will permit it from its
records to identify accurately the employees who would be affected if the request in the
grievance were granted. If adequate information is not contained in the grievance as
originally filed, Management has every right to insist that the necessary additional
information be submitted to it before the close of the second step of the Grievance
Procedure. The grievance machinery is no place for fishing expeditions, and in the future
the Umpire will give short shrift to vague grievances introduced in the hope that if the net
thrown out is sufficiently broad some legitimately aggrieved fish will be caught.
Decision
The grievance is dismissed.
UMPIRE
November 14, 1944.
No. C-300
January 23, 1945
Appeal From A Disciplinary Layoff
GRIEVANCE:
Chevrolet-Flint—Case C-409
"Charge unjust penalty. Request back pay. Foreman’s order was unreasonable and
detrimental to my health."
In the Matter of:
and
General Motors Corporation—Chevrolet—Flint—Case C-409
On June 29, 1944, Employee P. was sent home for a week for refusing to work at his job of
paint spraying in violation of Shop Rule 15: "Refusal to obey orders of Foreman or other
Supervision. (One day or more to discharge.)" In this grievance he claims that the penalty
was unjust and seeks back pay for the time lost.
This Office has uniformly recognized the principle that employees are required to obey the
orders of Supervision and may normally protest the reasonableness of such orders only
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through the established channels of the grievance machinery. It is here argued, however,
that where employees are ordered to take actions which would involve unreasonable
danger to life, limb or physical health, an exception to this rule should properly be made.
The Umpire does not find it necessary to rule conclusively upon this contention in the
present case. For it is clear that even were such an exception to be recognized, the burden
of proof would be on the Union and the Employee to prove the unreasonableness of the
order and the abnormal danger to the employee which compliance with it would entail.
No such satisfactory proof has been forthcoming in the instant case. There is, indeed,
evidence that P. had sinus trouble, that he had visited the First Aid stations for treatments
listed on the records as "gargle, aspirin, etc., miscellaneous," and that his private physician
believed that he might be allergic to the paint he was using. On the other hand, the record
shows that P. was twice examined at the Plant Medical Department and that following his
complaint his job was studied by the Plant Safety Director. Neither of these departments
found that there was any necessary connection between P.’s sinus trouble and his
occupation of paint spraying.
As the Umpire has previously indicated in Decision C-276, the Umpire cannot properly
review the findings of a Plant Medical Department on an issue of this sort. Such findings
are binding upon him unless they are shown by the Union to be arbitrary, capricious, or
unsupported by reasonable evidence. The Umpire must therefore accept the findings of
the Plant Medical Department in this case as justifying the Foreman in ordering P. to
continue working on the paint spraying job.
The Umpire is confirmed in this conclusion by the presence in this record of strong
evidence that P. had frequently feigned illness or injury in an effort to secure a transfer to a
better-paying or more agreeable job. Under the circumstances, his penalty was justified
and his request for its rescission must be denied.
One aspect of this case, which the parties appear to have overlooked deserves some
comment. Even if P. had presented to the Umpire conclusive evidence that he was ill with
sinus trouble on June 29th, 1944, the Umpire could not properly have awarded him back
pay. Satisfactory evidence of illness, indeed, would have entitled P. to an automatic sick
leave of absence under Paragraph 116 of the Agreement and would have justified the
Umpire in directing that P.s’ employment record be corrected to show such a leave of
absence rather than the disciplinary layoff which was in fact imposed. It must be clear,
however, that a claim for a sick leave of absence is by its very nature inconsistent with a
claim for back pay. Management was under no contractual obligation to transfer P. to
another job even upon proof that he was allergic to paint spraying. P.’s claim for back pay
would therefore have had to rest upon the contention that Management was responsible
for his failure to earn money at paint spraying during the week of his layoff. The Umpire
could hardly have recognized that contention in the face of P.’s assertion that even had
Management not laid him off he would have been physically unable to perform the paint
spraying job.
Decision
UMPIRE
January 23, 1945.
No. C-305
January 26, 1945
GRIEVANCE:
Chevrolet-St. Louis—Case C-40
"Unjustly suspended for being absent. Request that I be paid for time lost."
The grievance is dismissed. (Entire decision should be read)
In the Matter of:
and
General Motors Corporation—Chevrolet—St. Louis—Case C-40
On June 6, 1944, Employee J. was absent from work. When he reported on the following
day he presented a letter from his dentist stating that he had undergone dental treatment
the day before. Management alleges, however, that at about 9:30 A.M. on June 6, he had
been seen near the Plant in an intoxicated condition. As J.’s prior record of absenteeism
was extremely bad, he was suspended for one week for violation of Shop Rule 8: "Habitual
absence without reasonable cause. (One week to discharge.)"
In presenting this grievance to the Umpire the Union claimed that J. was not intoxicated on
the morning in question, that he visited his dentist during the day, and that his suspension
was unjust. The Umpire finds from the evidence, however, that Employee J. had in fact
been drinking on the morning of June 6th and that he was in no condition to come to work.
Doubt is cast upon the good faith of Employee J.’s excuse, moreover, by his extremely
poor attendance record and his consistent habit of offering dubious claims of illness in
explanation of his absence. It has not been shown, moreover, why a visit to a dentist
should have required his absence during an entire day. From the evidence in this case the
Umpire must conclude that J.’s drunkenness was the basic reason for his absence on June
6th and that his visit to the dentist on the same day was at best coincidental and at worst a
manufactured excuse.
Decision
UMPIRE
January 26, 1945.
No. C-315
February 12, 1945
Propriety Of A Promotion Under Paragraph 63
GRIEVANCE:
Chevrolet—Bloomfield—Case C-73
"In accordance with Par. 63, one of us should have been made checker instead of F.C."
In the Matter of:
and
General Motors Corporation—Chevrolet—Bloomfield—Case C-73
This grievance raises the question as to whether Local Management properly applied the
provisions of Paragraph 63 of the National Agreement in promoting Employee C. to the
position of Checker in the Parts Warehouse in preference to either of the two
complainants, F.T. and N.
There is little dispute over the essential facts in the case. In July, 1944, Management
determined that two additional Checkers were needed in the Warehouse. The following six
employees from the Warehouse seniority list were found in line for consideration:
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Name Seniority Date
E. 8/29/28
R. 2/ 9/34
F.T. 3/12/34
N. 3/12/34
W.T. 3/12/34
C. 3/16/34
Management determined that Employee W.T. stood head and shoulders above the other
five employees in ability, merit and capacity and promoted him to one of the two Checker
vacancies. This promotion was not protested by any of the other employees.
Management alleges that it then reviewed the qualifications of the remaining five
employees and decided that Employees E. and C. were approximately equal in merit,
ability and capacity, for promotion to the Checker job and that they were definitely superior
to the remaining three. As Employee E. had the highest seniority the vacancy was first
offered to him. When he declined, the job was offered to C. who accepted.
As may be noted from the above table, Employee C. was junior in seniority to the other five
employees. The Union alleges that Employees F.T. and N. were at least the equal of C. in
ability, merit and capacity, and that in view of their greater seniority one of them should
have received the promotion. Because of their experience as Packers in the Parts
Warehouse, the Union claims, both F.T. and N. are thoroughly conversant with the various
parts which the Checker must identify and with their locations. It is emphasized, moreover,
that he is superior to C. in education, as he holds a degree in Engineering from the Newark
Technical College.
In reply, Management points out that C. had experience as an Unloader in the Export
Department in 1928 and 1929; that he worked as an Export Material Handler in 1934 and
1935; that he was a Material Handler in the Parts Warehouse from 1935 to 1940; and that
he served as a Stock Picker from 1940 to 1944. It emphasizes particularly this latter
experience, since a Stock Picker must work in all parts of the Warehouse, become familiar
with the wide variety of parts handled, and learn the procedure followed in filling orders.
Though Employee E. had spent far more time as a Packer than as a Packer than as a
Stock Picker, it was felt that his general ability and intelligence coupled with his six years of
greater experience made him approximately the equal of Employee C. Employees F. T.
and N., on the other hand, had spent most of their time between 1934 and 1942 as Parts
Dippers in the Enamel Room. From May, 1942, until the present they were assigned to the
packing of parts for shipment. Management asserts, moreover, that even if the experience
factor is discounted, F.T. and N. have shown a lack of initiative and of ability to carry out
job assignments without close supervision which would make it impossible to consider
them the equals of either E. or C.
On the record in this case the Umpire must hold that no violation of Paragraph 63 has
been established. In a case of this sort the burden of proof is upon the Union to show that
Management’s judgment of the relative ability, merit and capacity of the employees was
faulty. It has not sustained that burden here. The Umpire cannot discount the greater
experience of both C. and E. in handling parts in the Warehouse, or hold that this factor is
necessarily overcome by the fact that F.T. holds a degree in an unrelated educational field,
or by the alleged fact that both F.T. and N. have proven diligent workmen on the jobs they
have been given to perform.
It is true, of course, that no two employees can be found who are the exact equal of each
other in all the elements of experience, skill, diligence, and intelligence, that are covered by
the contractual phrase "ability, merit and capacity." For that reason this Office has required
that when no employee stands "head and shoulders" above his fellows, "Management may
select several employees whose ability, merit and capacity are adjudged by Management
to be approximately equal. The individual in the group with the greatest seniority may then
be selected for promotion." By prescribing only approximate equality for the group under
consideration, prior Umpires clearly believed that Management should not be allowed to
defeat the purposes of Paragraph 63 by relying on differences in skill and ability which are
minor and unsubstantial. On the other hand, by leaving the selection of this group to
Management, the Umpires clearly indicated that the initial judgment of ability, merit and
capacity was a Management function and was not to be overturned save upon clear proof
of error. In the instant case, the Union’s showing has not been sufficient to offset the
presumption in favor of Management’s judgment. The grievance must accordingly be
dismissed.
Decision
UMPIRE
February 12, 1945.
No. C-319
February 16, 1945
Appeal From An Alleged Violation Of Paragraph 63
GRIEVANCE:
Chevrolet—Atlanta—Case C-23
"Charge Management with violation of Paragraph 63. Request that I be given job in paint
room as paint mixer since I have all due qualifications. Also seeking retroactive pay from
date of this grievance."
"Charge Management with violation of Paragraph 63, by placing men on job in paint room
as paint mixer when I am qualified and also have more seniority. My request is that I be
given job as paint mixer."
In the Matter of:
and
General Motors Corporation—Chevrolet—Atlanta—Case C-23
During the month of October, 1944, a vacancy occurred in the classification of Paint Mixer
in the Paint Department at the Chevrolet Plant at Atlanta. In filling this vacancy
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Management gave consideration to two employees who had a high school education and
whom it considered to be otherwise approximately equal in ability, merit and capacity. One
did not desire the job; the other, Employee W., was thereupon given the promotion.
The three complainants in these grievances all have greater seniority than Employee W.,
and all claim to be his equal in ability, merit and capacity. None of them, however, has a
high school education, two of them having completed the eighth grade and one the ninth.
Management admits that it passed them over largely because of their lack of education. It
points out that it is now preparing its Paint Department for the resumption of commercial
production and that under modern conditions it must meet the color requirements of its
customers rather than set its own color standards. Paint mixing has therefore become a far
more complicated and specialized operation than it formerly was. A qualified Paint Control
man must be able to maintain records and perform detailed clerical work, and must have
sufficient knowledge to read mathematical formulae for tinting colors and to compute the
various mixes he requires. A minimum of a high school education is thus necessary for
Paint Control work, Management argues, and since Paint Mixers may eventually graduate
to Paint Control, it is proper to consider the educational qualifications of candidates for a
Paint Mixing job.
The Union does not dispute Management’s claims with respect to the education necessary
for successful Paint Control work. It insists, however, that paint mixing involves only simple
mechanical operations and requires no mathematical or theoretical knowledge whatsoever.
It notes that in rejecting a request for a wage increase for Paint Mixers at the time of the
distribution of the one and one-half cent allotment under the 1940 Agreement,
Management itself pointed out that no skill was required for paint mixing. It asserts, finally,
that Management should judge the qualifications of candidates for promotion solely with
relation to the job which is to be filled, and that their relative fitness for future promotions to
still a higher classification cannot properly be considered.
This latter contention by the Union has already been considered and rejected by the
Umpire in Decision B-55. In filling a job which is considered to be a stepping stone to a
higher classification, Management may properly weigh not only the ability of candidates
successfully to perform all functions of the job which is vacant but also their potentialities
for later promotion. It is clear, of course, that if Management once adopts this principle it
must carry it out in good faith. It could not properly base its promotions to a lower paid job
upon a program of further intradepartmental promotions and then disregard this program
when vacancies in the top jobs are eventually filled. Despite the Union’s suggestions to the
contrary, however, the Umpire must assume that Management’s assertion that Paint
Mixers are potential Paint Control men is made in good faith. Upon that assumption
Management’s consideration of the educational qualifications of candidates for the Paint
Mixing job is reasonable and proper.
There is no necessary inconsistency between Management’s earlier position with respect

to the proper wage rate for Paint Mixers and its present assertion that an employee’s
educational background should be considered in weighing his relative fitness for the job.
Management is not now saying that the Paint Mixers’ job is difficult or that these three
complainants could not do it. It is saying only that an employee who can not only perform
the job successfully but also be trained for future promotion is superior in ability, merit and
capacity to employees who lack the educational requirements for such training.
In the view of the Umpire, Management’s desire to staff its Paint Department with potential
Paint Control men is reasonable and its action in filling this vacancy involved no violation of
Paragraph 63.
Decision
UMPIRE
February 16, 1945.
No. C-324
February 23, 1945
Alleged Violation Of Paragraph 63
GRIEVANCE:
Chevrolet-Atlanta—Case C-10
"Request that I be given utility job on trim line in accordance with Paragraph 63 of the
National Agreement."
In the Matter of:
and
General Motors Corporation—Chevrolet—Atlanta—Case C-10
The question raised in this case is whether or not Management violated Paragraph 63 of
the Agreement by promoting Employee W., seniority date July 7, 1933, to the position of
Utility Man on the Trim Line in place of Employee C., seniority date April 12, 1928.
Upon the evidence in this case the Umpire can find no violation. It appears that prior to
January, 1944, when the promotion was made, W. had experienced upon almost all of the
Trim Line operations and was able to take over the job with little or no training. C., on the
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other hand, had not been broken in on a number of Trim Line jobs. The Umpire concludes
from the evidence, moreover, that C. is physically far less qualified than W. for many types
of Trim Line work, and particularly such jobs as require great rapidity and dexterity or
which involve climbing in and out of cabs and working in cramped and difficult positions.
The Union is correct in arguing that greater age by itself should not be taken to indicate
lesser ability, merit and capacity, and that any such principle would often render
meaningless the seniority provisions of Paragraph 63. On the other hand, the Umpire
cannot disregard proven physical incapacities merely because they result from age. In the
view of the Umpire, Management has established that W. was unquestionably C.’s
superior in ability, merit and capacity and that no violation of Paragraph 63 has been
shown.
Decision
UMPIRE
February 23, 1945.
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No. C-341
May 1, 1945
Discharge For Repeated Absenteeism
GRIEVANCE:
Eastern Aircraft—Linden—Case—C-763
"I am being released unjustly. Request back pay for all time lost. This release was given
because of Union activities."
In the Matter of:
and
General Motors Corporation—Eastern Aircraft—Linden—Case C-763
This grievance is brought to test the justice of the discharge of Employee L., on August 21,
1944, for violation of Shop Rule 38: "Repeated violation of shop regulations or safety
rules."
Employee L. had originally been hired on May 11, 1937. During the first five years of his
employment he received two warnings and a reprimand. (A discharge for the use of
abusive language to a Supervisor was rescinded by the Umpire and must be disregarded.)
This record, while not good, was certainly not exceptionally bad. Thereafter, however, he
began to receive warnings, reprimands and penalties in increasing numbers for
absenteeism, leaving his job without permission, wasting time, and like offenses. This
portion of his record, as set forth in Management’s brief is as follows:
November 4, 1942:
Reprimand for leaving his job before the end of the shift. (Filed
Grievance No. 315360, appealed to second step on November 10,
1942. Decision unchanged and appeal abandoned.)
January 19, 1943:
Reprimand for leaving his department without permission during

working hours and remaining away excessive lengths of time and
producing unsatisfactory amount of work. (No record of grievance.)
February 11, 1943:
Reprimand for causing confusion in his department and using loud

and abusive language to Supervision. (Filed Grievance No. 314955,
appealed to third step as Appeal Case C-102. Penalty unchanged,
appeal abandoned.)
May 20, 1943:
Disciplinary layoff of one week for habitually leaving his department

during working hours without permission, and constant abuse of
bargaining time, and leaving his department within the first hour of
the shift. (Filed Grievance No. 318216, appealed to third step as
Appeal Case C-235. Penalty unchanged, appeal abandoned.)
October 14, 1943:
Warned for leaving his department without permission, and failing to

keep a proper record of his time spent on grievance. (No grievance
filed.)
November 16, 1943:
Upon his assignment to a different shift, his foreman called his

attention to his attendance record for the months of September and
October, 1943, which showed that out of 61 days, he was absent 28
days, 12 of which were excuseable as he attended a Union
Convention. He was in the plant only 11 full days during the period,
having reported late or left early on the remaining 22 days. He was
informed that the quantity of his work and the time on the job would
have to improve. (No grievance filed.)
November 24, 1943:
Disciplinary layoff of two weeks for deliberately wasting three hours

of Company time in violation of Rule 18 of "Rules for Personal
Conduct." This penalty was later reduced from two weeks to one
week by the Umpire. (See Umpire Decision C-182.)
April 28, 1944:
Disciplinary layoff of six weeks ending June 9, 1944, for violation of

the following Plant Rules for Personal Conduct:
Rule 1 -- "Falsification of personnel records

or other records."
Rule 6 -- "Habitual absence without

reasonable cause."
Rule 7 -- "Habitually reporting late for work."
(No grievance filed.)
On June 24, 1944, when L. returned after his six weeks’ layoff, the record of his
attendance since December 27, 1943, was reviewed with him. It was shown that during
this period out of 911 available working hours, L. had worked only 622.9 hours or 63.37%
and had lost 288.2 hours or 31.63%. He was told that his record would have to improve or
he would be discharged.
Despite this warning, the record of L.’s attendance during the next two months showed that
out of 408 available working hours, L. worked only 196.3 or 48.12%. During the entire
week of August 14th to 19th, L. was absent without permission. Management states that
this absence finally convinced it that the possibility of improving L.’s attendance record by
corrective discipline had been exhausted and that his discharge was necessary.
The Union does not dispute the accuracy of Management’s figures or attempt to condone
L.’s record of irresponsibility. It offers by way of excuse only the fact that during the entire
period of excessive absenteeism L. had been an official of the Local Union, and that during
the final months preceding his discharge he had been the Local President. The burdens of
this office, the Union says, have been greatly expanded and increased during the war and
frequently required L. to be away from the Plant and often from the locality. During the final
week of absence, which precipitated his discharge, the Union says, L. was at the Union’s
New York Regional Office. On Monday of that week, L. talked on the phone with a
representative of the Plant Labor Relations Department and informed him that he was
away on Union business. On Thursday, a telegram was sent to Management notifying
them that he was in Washington on Union business. Though Management may have been
correct in considering that neither notice was timely or proper, the Union argues, they at
least indicate that L. was aware of his responsibility to the Plant and should therefore serve
to mitigate his offense.
The Umpire can appreciate the heavy demands which the business of a local Union makes
on its President. He cannot treat such demands, however, as an excuse for such
excessive absenteeism as was here involved. Under Paragraph 119 of the Agreement, a
local Union President has the right, if he chooses, to apply for a year’s leave of absence
from employment, which will set him free to devote his full time to Union business and still
protect his seniority. If he chooses to remain on his job at the Plant, he must accept the
responsibilities which accompany that choice.
L.’s record of absenteeism was inexcusable. It indicated an indifference to his obligations

as an employee which did little credit to himself or to the Union which elected him to office.
In view of the record of past warnings, reprimands and layoffs, there can be no question
but that the possibilities of corrective discipline had been exhausted and that Management
could not reasonably hope that further penalties would bring about an improvement. The
discharge is upheld.
Decision
UMPIRE
May 1, 1945.
No. C-348
May 10, 1945
Discipline For Absenteeism
GRIEVANCE:
Chevrolet-St. Louis—Case C-59
"Protest being laid off when I had a reasonable excuse, asked foreman to be off Oct. 25 or
26, request I be paid for time lost."
The two-week disciplinary layoff imposed on Employee B. shall be reduced to one week
and he shall receive pay for the remaining time lost. Back pay shall be computed in
accordance with Paragraph 50 of the National Agreement. (Entire Decision should be
read)
In the Matter of:
and
General Motors Corporation—Chevrolet—St. Louis—Case C-59
This grievance concerns the justice of a two-week disciplinary layoff imposed on Employee
B., for being absent from work on October 28th without permission and without a
reasonable excuse.
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B. desired to be absent on that day in order to cover an overdraft at his bank, located in a
town some 125 miles from St. Louis. From his account of the circumstances, the Umpire
concludes that he was reasonable in wishing to be personally present at the bank and that
his excuse, had it been properly presented, should have been honored by his Foreman.
The Umpire finds from the evidence, however, that in asking his Foreman for permission to
be off, B. merely stated that he had to take care of "personal business" without explaining
its nature. B.’s prior record of absenteeism was extremely bad, and the Foreman’s
disregard of such a vague and general excuse from an habitual absentee was natural. The
Umpire can understand B.’s hesitancy to publicize the condition of his bank account. Yet
no employee can expect a Foreman to honor an excuse which is not stated, or to
understand the urgency of private affairs whose existence and nature are not revealed.
As B. absented himself without permission he deserved a penalty. As he did in fact have

reasonable grounds for his absence, however, the Umpire believes that the two-week
penalty was too severe. He will accordingly direct that B.’s layoff shall be reduced to one
week and that B. shall receive pay for the remainder of the time lost.
Decision
The two-week disciplinary layoff imposed on Employee B. shall be reduced to one week
and he shall receive pay for the remaining time lost. Back pay shall be computed in
accordance with Paragraph 50 of the National Agreement.
UMPIRE
May 10, 1945.
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No. C-358
May 24, 1945
Alleged Improper Transfer
GRIEVANCE:
Delco-Remy—Muncie—Case C-62
"They are transferring a man from 996 to 998 and putting him on a utility job when there
are men with more seniority that should have the right to that job."
In the Matter of:
and
General Motors Corporation Delco Remy—Muncie—Case C-62
On September 21st, 1944, Employee S. was transferred from the Record Clerk
classification in Department 996 to the Utility classification in Department 998. The
complainant, Employee H., protests this transfer on the ground that a number of other
employees then working in Department 998 had greater seniority than S. and should have
been considered for the job.
S.’s seniority date is November 16, 1939. He had originally been advanced to a Utility job
in Department 998 on October 4th, 1943. On February 21st, 1944, he had been transferred
without change in rate to Department 996, to fill the vacancy left by E., a Record Clerk who
had entered military service. On September 18th, 1944, E. returned from the Army and was
given back his old job. Though in the meantime S.’s former Utility job had been filled,
Management decided that another Utility Operator was needed in Department 998, in
connection with its rapidly developing overseas business. S. was therefore transferred to
that job, again with no change in rate.
The Union contends that S.’s original promotion to the Utility classification, in October,
1943, was improper and disregarded the rights of other employees in the same department
who had greater seniority than S. and who were at the time his superiors in ability, merit
and capacity. Its failure to protest the promotion at the time, it says, was due only to the
fact that S. had injured his hand and that the Union believed he would have an easier time
in the Utility job than in performing the regular routine work of the department. The Union
urges, however, that S. should not be allowed to profit indefinitely from the concession
then made to him and that the earlier willingness of his fellows in view of his injury, to
subordinate their rights to his need, should not now react to their disadvantage.
Appealing as this position may be on its face, it cannot be sustained. S.’s status as a Utility
Man must be held to have been definitely established when he was advanced to the job
without protest in 1943. If a transfer or promotion is to be protested at all, proper claim
must be made within a reasonable time after it is effected. If none is made, the potential
claimants must be held to have waived their rights in the matter. Employees who are
debating whether or not to present such claims, should understand that such a waiver is
permanent and cannot later be withdrawn.
Had S., then, remained continuously in Department 998 as a Utility Man, his assignment to
the new Utility job created to handle overseas shipping would clearly have been
unobjectionable. Is the case, then, altered in any way by his interim service as a Record
Clerk in Department 996? The Umpire does not believe so. No change in pay was involved
in his transfers to and from the Record Clerk’s job. Neither of them involved a promotion
and neither, therefore, can properly give rise to any claims based on Paragraph 63.
It appears that H., the complainant, is not himself a candidate for the Utility job and that at
no time during the discussion of this case in the Grievance Procedure has the Union
definitely identified the employees whose seniority rights it claims should be considered.
Under Paragraph 28 a designated member of a group having a grievance has every right
to file a grievance on their behalf. Since H. does not consider that his own rights were
infringed, however, his right to be considered "a member of a group having a grievance" is
dubious at best. Intelligent handling of cases of alleged improper promotion, moreover, is
well nigh impossible unless the aggrieved employees are sufficiently identified to permit
consideration of their abilities, merits and capacities. Even if this grievance were not
otherwise lacking in merit, it would have to be dismissed for lack of such identification.
Decision
UMPIRE
May 24, 1945.
No. C-361
May 29, 1945
Alleged Improper Promotion
GRIEVANCE:
Buick Motor—Melrose Park—Case C-211
"I protest Management’s decision in making another employee, with less seniority than I, a
utility man. I claim that I should have the opportunity to prove my merit."
UMPIRE’S DECISION:
In the Matter of:
and
General Motors Corporation—Buick Motors—Melrose—Case C-211
Employee T. claims in this grievance that the promotion of Employee K. to the Utility
classification on January 13, 1945, was in violation of Paragraph 63 of the National
Agreement. The Union asks that K.’s Utility job be declared vacant and that in filling it due
consideration be given to T.’s qualifications.
K. is junior in seniority to T., but has had thirteen months’ prior experience as a Utility Man
in the same department, while T. has had no such experience. Management claims that
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this experience obviously made K. the superior in ability, merit and capacity. T. is claiming,
it suggests, not that he is now K.’s equal, but that he could become so if given a chance to
"prove his merit" on the job. Under Paragraph 63, Management states, men must be
selected for promotion on the basis of their existing, rather than potential, worth.
On the evidence before him, the Umpire must agree with Management. The Union has
made little or no effort to prove that T. is now K.’s equal in ability, merit and capacity. It has
based its case largely upon the allegation that because K.’s father was barber to the
Assistant General Superintendent, K.’s promotions were gained by favoritism, and the
thirteen months’ experience in the Utility classification which resulted from the first
promotion should accordingly be discounted. Aside from this experience, it claims, there
could be no possible basis for considering K.’s abilities superior to those of T.
Favoritism in promotions is contrary to both the spirit and the letter of Paragraph 63. Had
the Union protested K.’s first promotion at the time it was made, proved that it was
motivated by improper considerations, and shown that it infringed the rights of other
employees, the Umpire would have been justified in rescinding it and declaring the job
vacant. Having failed to challenge it at that time, however, the Umpire cannot now be
allowed to attack it indirectly by outlawing from consideration the experience and skill it
gave him. Once a promotion has passed without timely protest, the status and experience
gained by the promoted employee must be accepted as valid and given proper
consideration in Management’s further dealings with him.
In view of K.’s experience, Management had reasonable grounds for concluding that K.’s
relative ability, merit and capacity warranted his promotion. In the absence of proof that
Management erred in this conclusion, the Union’s unsupported allegations of favoritism
would not by themselves justify the Umpire in declaring the job vacant.
Decision:
UMPIRE
May 29, 1945.
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No. C-369
June 25, 1945
GRIEVANCE:
Saginaw Malleable Iron Division—Case C-8
"Ask everyone to work on December 17, 1944 but me. I am requesting pay for that day."
"Was laid off for failure to report on December 17, 1944."
"This man was penalized two days after calling committeeman on grievance. Charge
discrimination for Union activity and violation of Par. 6 of Agreement. Request pay for time
lost."
In the Matter of:
and
General Motors Corporation—Saginaw Malleable Iron Division—Case C-8
In the first of these grievances, Employee C. claims that he was unfairly denied an
opportunity to work on Sunday, December 17th, 1944, and asks pay for that day. In the
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second and third grievances he claims that he was not told to come to work on December
17th and that a two-day penalty given him for failing to appear or call in on that day was
unjust. He asks back pay for the two days he was penalized.
The sole issue in this case is whether or not on Saturday, December 16th, C. was
instructed to come to work on the following day. It is agreed that on Saturday afternoon,
when Superintendent H. informed the other employees that they were to come to work on
Sunday, C. was absent in the men’s washroom. The Superintendent testifies, however,
that he thereafter found C. in the aisle by the drinking fountain, and expressly told him to
come to work the next day, adding that he should make a point of being there because the
pay for that Sunday’s work would be included in his Christmas pay check.
The Superintendent states further that at about 9:00 A.M. on Monday morning, December
18th, he spoke to C. and asked him why he had not been to work on the previous day. C.
replied that he had not been told to come to work. The Superintendent reminded him of the
conversation by the drinking fountain and told him that he would probably receive a two-
day penalty.
Because it was filed at 10:25 A.M., after this conversation, Management interprets C.’s first
grievance as being merely a defensive move made in an effort to escape the two-day
penalty. Later in the day, after the Superintendent had checked the records to be sure that
C. had not called in on Sunday to explain his absence, C. was informed that his penalty
was in effect and that he should take the next two days off. The filing of the second and
third grievances followed.
For his part, C. denies having any conversation whatsoever with Superintendent H. on
Saturday, December 16th. He likewise denies that he saw the Superintendent Monday
morning before he filed his first grievance. According to C., the two-day penalty was
decided on by the Superintendent only after he had "placed the Superintendent on the
spot" by complaining about the Superintendent’s failure to tell him to come to work on
Sunday. It was, says the Union, a defensive move on the part of the Superintendent to
cover up his own administrative lapse.
The case, therefore, comes down to a straight question of the Umpire’s judgment of the
comparative credibility of Employe C. and Superintendent H. He found little to choose
between them as regards their attitude and demeanor while testifying. Each side was
equally vehement in asserting its confidence in the integrity of its own witness and its
distrust of the opposing witness. The truth or falsity of their respective claims regarding the
alleged conversation at the drinking fountain on Saturday, December 16th, can therefore
be judged only indirectly through testing the accuracy of their testimony on other matters.
So tested, the dispute must be resolved in favor of Management. An affidavit by Foreman

M. definitely corroborates the Superintendent’s claim that he discussed the matter with C.
on Monday morning before C. called his Committeeman and filed the first grievance. C.’s
unsupported testimony to the contrary, therefore, must be rejected. C.’s claim, moreover,
that he discussed the matter with the Chairman of the Shop Committee at 10:15 A.M. prior
to the filing of his first grievance at 10:25 A.M. has also been shown to be untrue. The
discussion, C. said, took place during the lunch period while the men were waiting in line in
the cafeteria. Management’s records, however, establish that the last tap out before lunch
that day was at 10:22 A.M. It takes a few minutes after the last tap out before the molten
iron is completely poured and the men are ready to go to lunch. Unless both men left their
jobs early that day, they could hardly have had time to discuss the question before the
grievance was filed at 10:25 A.M.
These discrepancies may seem to have little relevance to the merits of the case. They are,
however, of direct relevance to the question of credibility. Having found that C.’s testimony
on these minor matters was false, the Umpire must resolve the main issue of credibility
against him and conclude that he was in fact told to come to work on Sunday as the
Superintendent alleged. These grievances must accordingly be dismissed.
In fairness to the International Union and the Local Shop Committee, the Umpire must
state that he finds in the evidence no reason to believe that they were aware of the
inaccuracies in C.’s story. Though the Umpire has decided the issue against them he
believes that both the International and Local Union officials acted in this matter in entire
good faith.
Decision
UMPIRE
June 25, 1945.
No. C-373
July 9, 1945
Alleged Improper Classification
GRIEVANCE:
Oldsmobile—Lansing—Cases C-51, C-52
"We request the $1.11 rate for working on a motor driven conveyor. The rate for a
conveyor attendant is no lower than $1.11. We, also, request back pay from the date
conveyor started."
In the Matter of:
and
General Motors Corporation—Oldsmobile—Lansing—Cases C-51, C-52
At the time these grievances were filed, the eight complainants were employed in the
"Stores and Shipping—Cannon Parts" Department at the task of wrapping small parts for
overseas shipment. Prior to August, 1944, these parts were carried in wire baskets to and
from the wrapping tables to the tanks where they were covered with sealing wax or
cellulose solution. On August 1st, 1944, this phase of the operation was changed by the
installation of a motor-driven conveyor. The employees responsible for the inner wrap
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would remove the part from a conveyor, wrap it and then replace it on the conveyor where
it was carried to the employees responsible for the outer wrap, and thence to the tanks of
sealing wax. In these grievances it is claimed that the addition of the motor conveyor
should have resulted in the reclassification of the complainants from "Stock Picker Counter
Bundler and Packer" ($.95 to $1.05) to "Conveyor Attendant" ($1.01 to $1.11).
The Umpire must deny the claim. It is apparent to him from his examination that the
operation is still essentially a wrapping operation and that the change in the manner in
which the parts reach the wrappers has not substantially altered the job. The Union
contends, it is true, that the employees are now forced to keep up with the conveyor and
must remain at all times at their stations unless relieved. In this argument, however, the
Union is confusing a question of proper classification with a question of fair production
standards. It can hardly be argued that the classification of employees on an Assembly
Line should change with every variation in the speed of the conveyor. Nor can it
reasonably be contended that freedom to abandon their work station at will during working
hours was a factor in the original classification and rating of the wrapping job.
The Union refers, however, to Umpire Decision C-160, in which the Umpire found that the
introduction of a conveyor had so altered a shell-packing job as to require the negotiation
of a new classification and rate. Study of the evidence presented in that case, however,
reveals that the introduction of the conveyor had substantially altered the manual
operations performed by the Shell Packer. It is to be noted, furthermore, that the Umpire in
that case declined to grant the Union’s request to place the job in the "Conveyor Attendant"
classification but ruled only that the introduction of the conveyor had so changed its
elements as to make it a new job within the meaning of Paragraph 112.
The "Conveyor Attendant" classification as used in this plant applies to employees whose
essential function is the loading or unloading of a conveyor. It cannot properly be applied to
jobs such as those here in question in which the removal and replacement of material from
a conveyor is merely incidental to the processing of the material itself.
When their jobs were first classified, the essential function of the complaining employees
was the wrapping of parts. The introduction of the conveyor has not sufficiently changed
the nature of this operation to justify a holding that it is a new job under Paragraph 112.
The grievance must accordingly be dismissed.
Decision:
UMPIRE
July 9, 1945.
No. C-378
July 23, 1945
Claim Of Improper Promotion
GRIEVANCE:
Oldsmobile-Lansing—Case C-67
"I request to be given set-up job in accordance to Paragraph 63 of the Agreement.

Seniority of F.K. 3-9-28. Has 18 months of experience on set-up. L.S. seniority date of 4-
20-34 was given this job with no previous experience."
In the Matter of:
and
General Motors Corporation—Oldsmobile—Lansing—Case C-67
On February 4th, 1945, Management promoted Employee S., seniority date 4-20-34, to the
job of setting up certain external grinders, engravers, and Cincinnati Mills in the 75 Mm.
Cannon Department. In this grievance, Employee K., seniority date 3-9-28, claims that at
the time this promotion was made he was equal if not superior to S. in ability, merit and
capacity, and that under the terms of Paragraph 63 of the National Agreement he should
have received the promotion. The Union asks that the job be declared vacant and that the
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Umpire direct it be filled in accordance with the provisions of Paragraph 63, giving due
consideration to the ability and experience of Employee K. and discounting the experience
which Employee S. gained while on the job.
Between March 28th, 1942, and November 8th, 1943, K. had worked as a Set-Up man in
the 37 Mm. Cannon Department. Prior to his promotion, on the other hand, S. had never
worked in the Job Setter classification. The Union contends that this fact alone proves that
on the basis of experience K. was more qualified for the job than was S. and that he should
have been placed on the job.
Management contends, however, that K.’s set-up work in the 37 Mm. Cannon Department
was very different from that which he would have been called upon to perform in the 75
Mm. Cannon Department. It conceded that he would have been able without further
training to set up the engravers and the external grinders, but stated that without additional
instruction and experience he would not have been able to perform difficult set-ups on the
Cincinnati Mills. S., on the other hand, had worked on every operation in the 75 Mm.
Cannon Department. As a relief man he had had to fill in at one time or another on every
one of the machines. Though he had never been classified as a Job Setter, he had put in
approximately 176 hours of set-up work in the regular Job Setter’s absence. He was
therefore able to take over the job with no additional instruction or training.
As has frequently been explained in past Umpire Decisions, nothing in Paragraph 63

requires Management to give employees an opportunity to try out in higher paid jobs
before employees with lower seniority but greater experience are promoted to them. An
employee’s rights under that Paragraph depend upon the ability, merit and capacity which
he has at the time the promotion is made, not upon that which he might acquire if he were
given a few weeks or months on the job. During the Umpire’s investigation of this case, the
complainant frankly admitted that without further training he would not have been able to
perform all of the set-up work on the Cincinnati Mills. As S. was able to perform that work
immediately upon his promotion, K.’s admission is decisive of this case. He is held not to
have been the equal of S. in ability, merit and capacity and, therefore, despite his greater
seniority he was not entitled to the job.
During the Umpire’s investigation, some suggestion was made that Management had
attempted, in this instance, to defeat the purposes of Paragraph 63 by taking a favored low
seniority employee and, with an eye to fitting him for his prospective promotion, giving him
special advance training which was denied to other employees. If the Umpire found
evidence of any such deliberate attempt to "stack the deck" he would be quick to correct it.
There is no showing, however, of any such effort in this case. The special opportunities for
training which S. received while working as a relief man came to him only through the
normal routines of plant administration. There is evidence, indeed, that the other
employees, including the complainant, were reluctant to take the relief assignments from
which S. eventually profited. Under the circumstances it must be held that no rights of the
complainant have been infringed.
Decision:
UMPIRE
July 23, 1945.
C-385
August 10, 1945
Penalties For Failure To Meet Time Limitations
GRIEVANCE:
Pontiac Motor—Cases C-276, C-277, C-279, C-251, C-256 and C-257
"As these filters XH-30, XH-31, XH-35, are production machines, they should be cleaned
by machine cleaners."
"Protest unjust penalty. Request back pay."
"I request that my rate be adjusted to $1.50 immediately, merit having been established
and agreed to by both Foreman and General Foreman in the November 1944 discussion."
"Protest unjust and indiscriminate penalty. I was not and do not gamble. Ask pay for time
penalized and my record kept clear."
1. With regard to cases C-251, C-256 and C-257, it is held that the untimeliness of
Management’s Third Step Answers did not result in the grievances being automatically
settled upon the basis of the Union’s demands.
2. With regard to Cases C-276, C-277 and C-279, it is held that the untimeliness of the
Union’s presentation of its Statements of Unadjusted Grievance did not result in the
settlement of these cases upon the basis of Management’s Second Step Answers. These
three cases are accordingly returned to the parties for the exchange of Statements of
Unadjusted Grievance and for such other proceedings as they may desire to take in the
Grievance Procedure. (Entire Decision should be read)

In the Matter of:
and
General Motors Corporation—Pontiac Motors—Cases C-276, C-277, C-279, C-251, C-256

and C-257
The original grievances in Cases C-276, C-277 and C-279 were filed on February 19th,
February 17th, and February 26th, 1945, respectively. After the usual First Step
proceedings, the cases were duly appealed to the Second Step and received consideration
at a Management-Shop Committee meeting. Management’s Answers at the Second Step
were given to the Union on March 8th, 1945. The Union’s Notices of Unadjusted Grievance
were filed on March 15th, 1945. The Union did not submit its Statements of Unadjusted
Grievance for exchange with Management, however, until March 23rd, 1945. Management
thereupon contended that as the Union had failed to meet the time limit of five working
days established by Paragraph 37 for the exchange of Statements of Unadjusted
Grievance, the cases must be considered as settled on the basis of Management’s Second
Step Answer and as not being subject to further appeal. For that reason the merits of these
cases were not discussed at the Third Step or presented to the Umpire. The sole issue
now to be decided concerns the validity of Management’s procedural contention; whether,
in other words, the cases should be considered as closed on the basis of local
Management’s Answer at the Second Step or referred back for an exchange of Statements
of Unadjusted Grievance and for such further proceedings as the parties may desire to
take.
At the same time that these cases were heard by the Umpire, three other cases from the
same plant, C-251, C-256 and C-257 were presented. (The merits of these cases are
considered in Umpire Decisions C-383, C-384, and C-382, respectively.) In the earlier
proceedings on these cases, Management had failed to mail to the Union its Third Step
Answers within five working days after the Appeal Committee meeting as required by
Paragraph 42. The Union therefore took the position that if it was to be penalized for its
delinquency in Cases C-276, C-277 and C-279 by the settlement of those cases on the
basis of Management’s Answer, Management should with equal justice be penalized for its
delinquency in Cases C-251 C-256 and C-257 by the settlement of these grievances upon
the basis of the Union’s demands. In appealing the merits of the cases to the Umpire, the
Union expressly stated that it was not waiving this contention.
The National Agreement defines the consequences of a failure to meet the various time
limits of the Grievance Procedure only in the following instances:
1. With regard to procedures at the Second Step, Paragraph 34

states that:
"Any grievance not appealed from a decision at one step of this
procedure in the plant to the next step within five working days of
such decision shall be considered settled on the basis of the last
decision and not subject to further appeal."
2. With regard to procedures at the Third Step, Paragraph 38

provides that:
"Any case not appealed within thirty days of the date of the written
decision by the local Plant Management to the Shop Committee
shall be finally and automatically closed on the basis of that decision
and shall not be subject to further appeal."
3. With regard to procedures at the Fourth Step, Paragraph 43

provides that: "Cases not appealed to the Umpire within twenty-one
days from the date of a final decision given after review in an Appeal
Committee meeting shall be considered settled on the basis of the
decision so settled."
4. With regard to complaints of unjust or discriminatory layoffs or

discharges, Paragraph 77 provides that: "If a decision of the local
Plant Management in such a case is not appealed by the Shop
Committee within five working days, the matter must be considered
closed."
As to the specific situations covered by the above quoted language, there can be no
argument. The time limitations to which they refer, however, are only a few of those
established in the Grievance Procedure Section of the contract. Not covered, for example,
are:
1. The obligation of highest local Management to give its final

decision at the Second Step within fifteen working days from the
date of the first written filing of the grievance (unless a different time
limit is established by written local agreement) (Paragraph 34);
2. The requirement that Management and Union shall exchange

Statements of Unadjusted Grievance within five working days after
the Shop Committee has given Management its Notice of
Unadjusted Grievance (unless the time limit is extended by written
local agreement) (Paragraph 37);
3. The obligation placed upon both parties to hold an Appeal

Committee meeting within seven days after a Notice of Appeal has
been received, if no meeting has been held within the two-week
period prior to such receipt (Paragraph 41);
4. Management’s obligation to furnish to the Union its Third Step

decision and a summary of the minutes of the Appeal Committee
meeting within five working days after such meeting (unless a longer
period is agreed to in writing) (Paragraph 42);
5. The obligation of both parties to file their briefs with the Umpire
within twenty-one days of the receipt of a Notice of Appeal
(Paragraph
43); and
6. The obligation of local Management to render a decision in

discipline and discharge cases within five working days after the
grievance is filed.
The issue in Cases C-276, C-277 and C-279, relates only to the time limitation on the filing
of Statements of Unadjusted Grievance. The Corporation’s reasoning, however, is equally
applicable to any of the other time limitations just listed. In essence, Management is
contending that the same penalty expressly established by the Agreement for the Union’s
failure to meet the time limit for an appeal should be applied to other procedural
delinquencies of the Union, even though there is no express language in the Agreement
providing for such penalties. At the same time it opposes the Union’s claim in Cases C-
251, C-256 and C-257 on the ground that no penalties for its own delinquencies are
established by express language in the Agreement. It is asking the Umpire, in other words,
to construe the Agreement strictly insofar as its own liabilities are concerned, but liberally
insofar as concerns those of the Union.
The Umpire can accept no such dual standard of interpretation. The penalties for untimely
appeals expressly set forth in the Paragraphs noted above, must necessarily be
recognized and applied. He cannot extend their scope, however, without adding to the
terms of the Agreement. The impropriety of such action by the Umpire has been
emphasized by Management on numerous occasions and was urged most energetically in
Management’s reply to the Union’s claims in Cases C-251, C-256, and C-257. In all
fairness, however, the restrictions on an Umpire’s power must apply with equal force
regardless of which party is asking for their relaxation. Management is correct in holding
that the Umpire is without jurisdiction to penalize it for its delinquency in Cases C-251, C-
256 and C-257. By the same token, however, it must recognize that he is also without
jurisdiction to penalize the Union for its derelictions in Cases C-276, C-277 and C-279.
The Umpire recognizes that this decision construes the penalty provisions of the
Agreement more narrowly than the parties themselves have done at many of the local
plants. He recognizes the importance of expedition in the handling of grievances and the
need of ensuring such expedition by penalizing failures to meet the time limits specified for
each stage of the Procedure. Only the parties themselves, however, can properly broaden
the scope of the penalty provisions of the Agreement. Only the parties can properly
consider the equities in the Union’s claim that there should be a mutuality of penalties and
that the Union should not be held to strict observance of the time limits while Management
is allowed to violate them with complete impunity. This decision reflects and applies the
language which the parties have themselves written into their Agreement. If the parties
consider that further penalties are required, they must themselves provide for them.
Decision:
1. With regard to Cases C-251, C-256 and C-257, it is held that the untimeliness of
Management’s Third Step Answers did not result in the grievances being automatically
settled upon the basis of the Union’s demands.
2. With regard to Cases C-276, C-277 and C-279, it is held that the untimeliness of the
Union’s presentation of its Statements of Unadjusted Grievance did not result in the
settlement of these cases upon the basis of Management’s Second Step Answers. These
three cases are accordingly returned to the parties for the exchange of Statements of
Unadjusted Grievance and for such other proceedings as they may desire to take in the
Grievance Procedure.
UMPIRE
August 10, 1945.
No. C-389
August 15, 1945
Discharge For Habitual Absence Without Reasonable Cause
GRIEVANCE:
Fisher Flint No. 1 -- Case C-111
"I protest discharge meted out by Labor Relations Department in view of the fact my
absence was due entirely to sickness, also request pay for all time lost."
In the Matter of:
and
General Motors Corporation—Fisher No. 1 -- Flint—Case C-111
On Monday, March 5th, 1945, the complainant, Employee F. complained that he was ill
and requested permission to leave the plant. At the Plant Medical Department he stated
that he was suffering from nausea and diarrhea and was allowed to go home. He did not
return to the plant until March 14th, 1945. At that time he was interviewed in the Labor
Relations Office and informed that on the evening of Tuesday, March 6th, he had been
observed drinking in a bar directly across the street from the plant. Management also
pointed out that during the period of his absence he had visited the plant on three
occasions, twice on Friday, March 9th, 1945, to get, his pay check and to report the loss of
some keys, and once on Monday, March 12th, 1945, to inquire about a refund of his bond
deduction. On March 9th, moreover, Management had sent a Company representative to
his place of residence to determine why he had not reported for work and had found that
he was not home. In view of F.’s failure to give any satisfactory explanation which could
reconcile these facts with his claim of illness, and after considering his long prior record of
discipline for excessive absenteeism, Management discharged him for "Habitual absence
without reasonable cause." In this grievance F. claims that his discharge was unjustified
and asks reinstatement with back pay.
F.’s record of absenteeism is among the worst which has come to the Umpire’s attention.
He was originally hired in 1930, was laid off early in 1942 at the termination of civilian
production, and was rehired to work on war production on May 14th, 1942. During the
following six months he was absent from work on 30 occasions and as a result, on
November 10th, 1942, received a one-week disciplinary layoff. During the next seven
months he was absent on 36 occasions and on June 3rd, 1943, received a written
reprimand. During the next seven months he was absent on 34 occasions, and on January
11th, 1944, received a verbal warning. During the next eight months he was absent on 32
occasions and on September 9th, 1944, was given a two-week disciplinary layoff.
During the four months between the time of his return from this layoff and January 15th,
1945, he was absent 12 times and on the latter date was given a four-week disciplinary
layoff. This four-week layoff was later reduced to two weeks with the understanding that if
his attendance record failed to improve he would be discharged.
The number of absences revealed in this record is bad enough. Even more significant,
however, is the fact that the majority of the absences which he attempted to excuse by a
claim of illness occurred on weekends. F. seems to have had the consistent habit of
becoming ill on Friday and well again on Tuesday. So far as the Umpire knows, nothing in
medical science can account for such a remarkable correlation between the state of F.’s
health and the state of the calendar. His record is not such as to inspire confidence in his
present good faith.
The Union makes no attempt to excuse or condone F.’s record. It contends only that in the
instant case his excuse was in fact bona fide; that though he was able to be "up and
around" from time to time during the nine days of his absence, he was nevertheless too
sick to come to work. It first attempted to explain his presence in the bar on the evening
following his initial claim of illness by the fact that he lived by himself in a nearby hotel and
had to take his meals in restaurants nearby. It developed at the hearing, however, that no
food is served in the bar in which he was observed. F. then attempted to explain his
presence by stating that he had gone to the bar to buy cigarettes. It seems, however, that
cigarettes are available only on Wednesday evenings at this bar and it is established
beyond question that he was seen there on Tuesday. It is evident from the testimony of
these who observed him, moreover, that his conduct in the bar was not that of a sick man.
In view of his presence at the bar on March 6th and his visits to the plant on March 9th and
12th, it appears to the Umpire beyond question that F. was physically able to return to work
many days before he actually did. As Management had already exhausted the possibilities
of improving his attendance by corrective discipline, his discharge was justified and is
upheld.
Decision:
UMPIRE
August 15, 1945.
No. C-402
October 22, 1945
Loss of Seniority Under Paragraph 64(c).
GRIEVANCE:
"I request that my seniority be restored. My foreman was properly notified as per Pars. No.
64-C of our Nat’l Agreement."
Employee T.’s seniority shall be restored and his employment record shall be altered
accordingly. (Entire Decision should be read)
In the Matter of:
and
General Motors Corporation—Pontiac Motors—Case C-303
Employee T., the complainant in this grievance, was a crane operator in the Foundry,
holding seniority back to May 13th, 1936. On November 18th, 1944, T. was arrested on a
charge of murder in the second degree and confined in the county jail. On November 20th,
1944, the General Foreman was informed by two of the complainant’s fellow employees as
to the circumstances and reason for his absence.
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On December 22, 1944, T. was arraigned and released on bond. On December 27th,
1944, he reported for work and was rehired at the same job and wage rate which he had
previously held. Some time later, however, he learned that during his detention in jail,
Management has terminated his employment as a voluntary quit and that he had been
rehired as a new employee without seniority. He thereupon filed the instant grievance,
claiming that in cancelling his seniority Management had misinterpreted and misapplied
Paragraph 64(c) of the National Agreement and asking that his seniority be restored. *
On May 11th, 1945, the charge against Employee T. was reduced to manslaughter, and he
entered a plea of guilty to that charge. On May 28th, 1945, he was placed on three years’
probation and was required to pay $100.00 costs.
Paragraph 64(c) of the National Agreement provides that an employee’s seniority shall be
broken "...if the employee is absent for three working days without properly notifying the
Management, unless a satisfactory reason is given." Management admits that within three
days of T.’s arrest it was notified as to the reason for his absence. It contends, however,
that the reason given was not "satisfactory" and that it was therefore justified in breaking
T.’s seniority and in terminating his employment as a voluntary quit.
The Union contends, on the other hand, that a "satisfactory reason" is required by
Paragraph 64(c) only for a failure to give Management proper notice of a contemplated
absence. Since T., through his friends, gave such notice, the breaking of his seniority was
improper. In taking this position the Union relies in part on the following language of the
Umpire in Decision B-16.
"Under Part(c) of Paragraph 64, an employee’s seniority is broken if he is absent for three
working days without properly notifying the Management. An exception to the requirement
just stated is provided by the same clause when it states ‘unless a satisfactory reason is
given’. Under this paragraph, an employee who is absent for three working days or more
assures retention of his seniority by notifying Management on the third day of absence.
The required ‘proper notification’ clearly includes a statement of the reason for the absence
and its likely duration. Both factors are important to Management in the conduct of the
business. In the absence o proper notification as outlined, an employee’s seniority is
nevertheless not broken if he later advances a ‘satisfactory reason’ to explain his failure to
give such notice. This is the clear meaning of the clause as it is written and it is not proper
to extend the coverage of that clause."
The present Umpire agrees with this construction. The general rule established by
Paragraph 64(c) is that an employee’s seniority is broken if he is absent for three working
days without properly notifying the Management. Even if nothing whatever was said in the
Agreement about the giving of "a satisfactory reason", proper notification would prevent the
breaking of seniority. The inclusion of an exception which prevents the breaking of
seniority, under certain circumstances, even when notification has not been given, can
hardly be construed as furnishing grounds for the breaking of seniority when notification
has been given.
Management argued at the hearing that it was unreasonable to expect it to retain an

employee indefinitely on its payrolls on the basis of his mere notification and regardless of
the length of his absence or of the reason for it. Can an employee call up the Employment
Office, Management asks, and by saying "I’ll be off for a month, getting drunk," tie
Management’s hands and force his retention on the payroll? The answer is obviously no.
That negative answer, however, is based upon the fact that Management’s disciplinary
powers in cases of that sort do not depend upon the absence of notice but depend
squarely upon the existence or non-existence of reasonable cause for absence. This is not
a holding that such an employee could not be penalized or discharged. But it is a holding
that since T. had properly notified Management of his absence, his seniority could not be
broken under Paragraph 64(c).
Decision:
Employe T.’s seniority shall be restored and his employment record shall be altered
accordingly.
UMPIRE
October 22, 1945.
No. C-410
July 6, 1946
Claim Of Improper Wage Classification
GRIEVANCE:
Hyatt Bearings—Case C-83
"Charge Violation of Paragraph 112 of the National Agreement on New Job of ‘Rotary
Head Miller’."
In the Matter of:
and
General Motors Corporation Hyatt Bearings Division—Case C-83
The only question at issue in this grievance is whether or not the operation of the
Milwaukee Rotary Head Miller in the Tool Room at the Hyatt Bearings Division differs so
substantially from the operation of the other milling machines as to justify its designation as
a "new job" within the meaning of Paragraph 112 of the National Agreement.
The Umpire finds from his investigation of the job that a new classification is not justified. It
is true, as the Union points out, that among the jobs performed on this machine are a
number which had formerly been performed by the Jig Borer. Management has
established, however, that most of these jobs could be and often had been performed on
the regular milling machines and were assigned to the Jig Borer only in order to utilize all
available machine capacity. Few of these jobs require the precision and close tolerance
ordinarily associated with a Jig Borer’s work. The regular Jig Borer jobs, which justify the
special Jig Borer classification and rate, are not and can not be performed on the Rotary
Head Miller.
It is also true, as the Union points out, that the rotary head attachment and the great
precision of which the Rotary Head Miller is capable make it possible to perform many
operations with this machine which could not be performed on a standard milling machine.
By the same token, however, there are a number of difficult jobs, requiring great skill on
the part of the operator, which have been performed on the regular milling machines and
never on the Rotary Head Miller. It must be remembered, moreover, that we are concerned
in this case with classifying not the machine itself, but rather the job of operating it. The
very attachments which differentiate this machine from other types of milling machines
appear to the Umpire to reduce the amount of work and in some cases the degree of skill
which is required of the operator. There seems, indeed, to be a rough balance between the
higher standards of precision and the closer tolerances which the operator of the Rotary
Head Miller must sometimes meet and the special attachments on the machine which
simplify the task of meeting them.
The Union claims in its brief that it takes six months to train a milling machine operator to
operate the Rotary Head Miller. The evidence does not support this claim. W.K., the first
operator assigned to the machine, testified that he operated it "on his own" after only a few
days of instruction and that it took him only a day or two to break in the present operator.
It appeared to the Umpire that throughout its argument the Union was concentrating on the
types of precision jobs which the machine could turn out rather than on the part played by
the operator in achieving such precision. Even were this a proper basis upon which to
decide a question of wage classification, the Union’s case would have grave weaknesses,
since a majority of the jobs which have in fact been assigned to the Rotary Head Miller
could have been turned out on other milling machines. It must be emphasized, however,
that in applying a general wage classification, such as the "Milling Machine Operator"
classification in the present local wage agreement, we are not so much concerned with the
machine or with the products as with the demands which are made on the operator.
Viewing the case in this light, the Umpire finds that the nature of this operator’s task and
the degree of skill which is required to perform it are not sufficiently different from those of
a regular milling machine operator to justify the establishment of a new classification.
Decision:
UMPIRE
July 6, 1946.
UMPIRE DECISION D-2 Page 1 of 5
D-2
JULY 20, 1945
Claim Of Unjust Discharge By A Temporary Employee
GRIEVANCE:
Detroit Diesel Division—Case D-8
"I was unjustly discharged. Demand pay for all time lost."
As L.’s claim of unjust discharge was not "stated in detail in writing" at the time of the filing
of the grievance, as required by Paragraph 56 of the National Agreement, it must be
dismissed as having been improperly filed and hence without status in the grievance
procedure. (Entire Decision should be read)
In the Matter of:
and
General Motors Corporation—Detroit Diesel Engine Division—Case D-8
Employee L., one of five blind men employed by the Detroit Diesel Engine Division at the
hand lapping of injector bushings, was discharged on May 18th, 1945. On the following day
he filed the instant grievance which reads: "I was unjustly discharged. Demand pay for all
time lost."
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The Foreman accepted the grievance and placed a disposition upon it stating: "Discharge
justified. Back pay denied." At the Second Step, however, Management refused to
consider the grievance on the ground that it had not been presented in accordance with
the requirements of Paragraph 56 of the National Agreement. It maintained this position at
the Third Step and at the Umpire hearing. The only question before the Umpire, therefore,
is the correctness of Management’s technical position. The merits of L.’s discharge are not
here at issue and are not passed upon in this decision.
Paragraph 56 of the National Agreement of April 16th, 1945, reads as follows:
"Employees shall be regarded as temporary employees until their

names have been placed on the seniority list. There shall be no
responsibility for the reemployment of temporary employees if they
are laid off or discharged during this period. However, any claim by
a temporary employee made after 30 days of employment that his
discharge is not for cause may be taken up as a grievance. Such
claims must be stated in detail in writing at the time of the filing of
the grievance."
Employee L. had been hired on March 26th, 1945. At the time of his discharge he was still
a temporary employee but had been employed for more than 30 days. In principle,
therefore, he was clearly entitled to have his claim that his discharge was not for cause
taken up as a grievance.
In objecting to the consideration of the merits of his case by the Umpire, Management
makes two points: In the first place, it points out, L.’s grievance was not accompanied by
any detailed written statement of the basis for his claim. The last sentence in Paragraph 56
requires the submission of such a statement at the time of the filing of the grievance. As L.
did not meet this requirement, Management argues, his grievance is without status.
Management was not required to consider it and the Umpire is without jurisdiction to
decide it.
In the second place, Management contends that even if his grievance had been properly
filed and was supported by the weight of the evidence, his reinstatement could not properly
be required. Management here relies upon the statement in Paragraph 56 that: "There
shall be no responsibility for the reemployment of temporary employees if they are laid off
or discharged during this period." It seems to argue that the succeeding sentence, which
permits temporary employees who have been employed for 30 days to have a claim of
unjust discharge taken up as a grievance, merely allows such employees to appeal
through the grievance machinery for the favorable exercise of Management’s discretion,
but places Management under no obligation to reinstate them regardless of the merits of
their case. It would presumably follow that the most the Umpire could do if this case were
before him on the merits would be to make a finding as to the existence or non-existence
of good cause for L.’s discharge. Regardless of the nature of this finding, however, he
could not direct L.’s reinstatement.
With this latter contention of Management, the Umpire must flatly disagree. Any such
interpretation would render the last two sentences of Paragraph 56 meaningless and
superfluous. Temporary employees have always been able to ask Management, in its
discretion, to reinstate them following a layoff or discharge. They have always had the right
to file grievances protesting that a layoff or discharge was without cause and to ask that
Management, in a spirit of equity and fairness, should voluntarily correct the injustice which
they claimed to have suffered. Their rights in this respect, under the former National
Agreement, differed from those of seniority employees only in that they could not demand
reinstatement as a matter of right unless they claimed that their layoff or discharge had
been the result of personal prejudice or of discrimination for Union activity. The
Corporation is thus in effect contending that the new language in Paragraph 56 did nothing
to improve their situation—that the rights of employees who have more than 30 days of
employment are not substantially different from those who have less. Indeed, if its
argument is accepted and followed out logically, temporary employees are now worse off
than they were before Paragraph 56 was amended, for even their right to reinstatement in
cases of personal prejudice or anti-Union discrimination has been lost.
The Corporation argues, nevertheless, that its interpretation is necessary if the statement
that "There shall be no responsibility for the reemployment of temporary employees if they
are laid off or discharged during this period" is to retain any meaning and effect. No such
necessity is apparent to the Umpire. The same language was contained in the earlier
versions of Paragraph 56 and was never thought to be negated by the exception permitting
claims of personal prejudice or of discrimination for Union activity to be taken up as a
grievance. The expansion of the exception to include claims that a layoff or discharge is
not for cause narrows the application of the general rule but does not render it
meaningless. There is an elementary distinction between layoffs and discharges which are
occasioned by an employee’s conduct in the plant and those which are the normal result of
changes in operating schedules and manpower requirements. As to the latter, the rights of
temporary employees have not been altered. As to the former, temporary employees with
more than 30 days of employment now have the same right to have their claims taken up
as a grievance that they previously had with respect to claims of personal prejudice or anti-
Union discrimination. It has always been understood, moreover, that the right to have
these latter claims "taken up as a grievance" included the right of the Umpire to direct their
reinstatement if the claim was supported by the evidence.
Management’s first point, however, is well taken. The requirement of Paragraph 56, that
claims of unjust layoff or discharge made by temporary employees "must be stated in detail
in writing at the time of the filing of the grievance", is absolute. The provision seems to
have been included as a safeguard to prevent Management from being deluged with
grievances every time a reduction in force required the layoff or discharge of temporary
employees. It is mandatory and permits of no exceptions. Unless it is complied with, the
grievance is not properly filed, and Management is under no more obligation to consider it
than if it had been filed after the expiration of the time limits of Paragraph 77.
The Union contends, it is true, that unless an employee has knowledge of the reason for
his layoff or discharge, a detailed explanation of his claim that it is without cause is
impossible to prepare. Suppose, it says, an employee was fired for no reason at all,
through the mere whim or caprice of a Supervisor. What could he "state in detail"
concerning his discharge beyond the bare allegation that so far as he knew it was without
cause? In the instant case, it says, L. knew that he had been spoken to about his
production and told that he must improve it. But he also believed that he was producing as
much and working as efficiently as any of the other employees in his group. Without
knowing in detail the basis of Management’s belief that he was an unsatisfactory

employee, without knowing whether they thought that he was deliberately "pegging
production" or considered that he had shown himself to be incompetent, how could he
write a statement proving that they were wrong? Is not Management construing the last
sentence of Paragraph 56, in other words, as embodying the unreasonable requirement,
unheard of in Anglo-Saxon law, that a man shall state his defense before he is made fully
aware of the charges against him?
In the view of the Umpire, this contention has more weight in theory than in fact. Obviously,
Paragraph 56 does not require a temporary employee to state his full defense if his
ignorance of the facts or of the reason for his discharge renders this impossible. Obviously,
it does not bar the Union from amending its contentions in respect to his grievance at the
Second Step if facts come to light which were not known before. But, quite as obviously, it
does require the employee to state what he does know of the facts—to make a bona fide
effort to comply with the requirements within the limits of his knowledge even if he can only
explain the reasons for his bewilderment at his penalty. The sufficiency of such statements
in the circumstances of each case must be for the Umpire to determine. He must
necessarily be governed by the rule of reason in his determinations. But he cannot hold
that L.’s mere statement that his discharge was unjust, supported by no facts whatsoever,
complies with the requirements of Paragraph 56.
L. can hardly claim, moreover, that he was unaware of the reasons for his discharge. He
had had a number of conversations with his Supervisors concerning his production. He
had been specifically warned that his failure to improve would bring about his release. If
doubt remained, he had the opportunity at the time of his discharge to inquire further as to
the reason for it. Before leaving the plant he talked with his Committeeman, who should
certainly have been familiar with the language of Paragraph 56 and have advised L. as to
how to comply with it. And though L. might not have been able to give accurate figures on
his production, he was clearly in a position to state in his grievance what he believed it to
have been, how he believed it to compare with that of his fellows, what efforts he had
made to improve, and what justifiable excuse there may have been for his failure.
It is always unfortunate when a case must be dismissed for technical reasons. The Umpire
would prefer to consider every case upon its merits and to ensure—to his own satisfaction
at least—that justice is done. His primary duty, however, is to apply the National
Agreement as it is written, and that duty extends to the procedural requirements of the
Agreement as clearly as to its substantive provisions. In no way could he honor the present
grievance without nullifying the stated requirements of Paragraph 56. The grievance must
be held to have been improperly filed and therefore beyond the jurisdiction of the Umpire to
consider on its merits.
Decision:
As L.’s claim of unjust discharge was not "stated in detail in writing" at the time of the filing
of the grievance, as required by Paragraph 56 of the National Agreement, it must be
dismissed as having been improperly filed and hence without status in the grievance
procedure.
UMPIRE
July 20, 1945.
No. D-6
August 30, 1945
Request Of Journeymen Machine Repair Machinists
To Be Classified As "Leaders"
GRIEVANCE:
Hyatt Bearings—Case D-1
"Charge violation of Paragraph 112. Demand management proceed to negotiate a Leader

Classification for Machine Repair Machinist classification."
1. It is found that Employees R., B., M. and P. have been functioning as

"Leaders" in the Machine Overhaul Department, and that they have done so at
the direction and with the knowledge and consent of the departmental
Foreman.
2. As no "Leader" classification for Machine Repair Machinists exists in the

local wage agreement they are held to have been working at a "new job" within
the meaning of Paragraph 112.
3. Management is directed to establish a temporary classification and rate

covering their jobs, to negotiate a permanent classification and rate, and to
classify and pay the four journeymen upon the basis of these temporary and
permanent classifications so long as it requires them to perform a Leader’s
functions. (Entire Decision should be read)
In the Matter of:

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and
General Motors Corporation—Hyatt Bearings Division—Case D-1
The sole issue presented by this grievance is whether or not since August, 1944,
Employees R., B., M. and P., now classified as Machine Repair Machinists, have been
functioning as Leaders, and whether or not Management, in recognition of that fact, should
negotiate a new "Leader" classification and rate for them in accordance with the provisions
of Paragraph 112.
The parties do not differ widely over the basic facts in this grievance, but are completely at
odds as to their interpretation. Prior to August, 1944, machine overhaul at this plant was
performed for the most part by upgraders and trainees under the immediate direction of a
Foreman. It is clear from the evidence that Foreman F., who was in charge of machine
overhaul on the day shift, actively directed the work of these upgraders and trainees,
assigned them to specific jobs, gave them instruction and checked their work upon its
completion. Though no detailed evidence was presented concerning the activities of
Foreman E. on the second shift, he seems to have functioned in essentially the same
manner as Foreman F.
It appears that Management became dissatisfied with the results which were being
obtained in the Machine Overhaul Department. In August, 1944, therefore, it combined the
day and the night shift into one, removed the two Foremen who had previously supervised
the work on these shifts, and placed the department in the charge of Foreman R. Foreman
R. decided that the work of the department would be improved if he secured three
journeymen Machine Repair Machinists and assigned them to work with the upgraders and
trainees on the three main types of machines being overhauled. Employees R., B., and M.
were therefore taken from the repair work which they had been doing on the floor of the
plant and assigned to overhaul work on the 81 Heald Grinders, the 72 Heald Grinders, and
the Cincinnati Grinders, respectively.
The Union alleges that when the men were brought into the Overhaul Department they
were told by Foreman R. that they were to be in charge of the work on the respective types
of machines assigned to them, that they should assign work to the upgraders and trainees,
give them instruction when needed, check their work as it progressed, and give it their final
o.k. The Union claims further that they have ever since performed these functions, that
each has had anywhere from two to nine upgraders and trainees working not only with
them but under their immediate direction, and that they gave these men their assignments,
answered their questions, inspected their work and gave it final approval when they saw
that it had been satisfactorily completed. Several of the upgraders and trainees in question
appeared at the hearing and testified to the same effect, indicating that their relation to the
journeyman with whom they worked was substantially the same as that which they
previously had had to Foreman F. before the department was reorganized. For example,
Employee L., a machine repair trainee assigned to 81 Heald Grinders, testified that for a
month or two after Foreman R. took charge of the department he used to go to him for his
assignments, but that early in the Fall, the Foreman told him that he should check with
Employee R. and that if his work "was o.k. with R. it is o.k. with me". Ever since, Employee
L. has taken his job assignments from Employee R., going to the Foreman only if
Employee R. was out of the department.
Employee P., a machine repair trainee assigned to 72 Heald Grinders, gave similar
testimony as to his relation to Employee B. Foreman R. told him, he said, that when he ran
out of work he should go to B. to see if B. had anything for him to do, that B. would o.k. his
work, and that he should follow B.’s instructions. This was the situation, P. said, whenever
he was working on 72 Healds. Only when he was occasionally assigned to other types of
machines did Foreman R. give him instructions. The evidence given as to the functioning
of Employee M. on the Cincinnati Grinders was to the same effect.
In addition to the three journeymen discussed above, the Union claimed that Employee P.,
a Machine Repair Machinist assigned to overhauling Cone Automatics, was also
functioning as a Leader, Employee K., a machine repair upgrader, had been working on
the Cone Automatics for some time prior to the departmental reorganization. When
Foreman F. was in charge, he said, F. assigned him to his work, gave him instruction and
checked his results. When F. left, however, K. was told to work with P. and has ever since
taken P.’s instructions and had P. inspect and approve his work. To quote K.’s direct
language at the hearing "P. is my boss just the same as F. was before."
Management denies that any of the four journeymen involved were ever given any
supervisory authority over the upgraders and trainees with whom they worked. The
journeymen, it says, are excellent workmen with long experience, great skill, and thorough
knowledge of the machines on which they have specialized. It is altogether natural,
Management says, for the other employees to come to these old hands for advice on the
problems they encounter, and it is part of a journeyman’s normal job to inspect and check
thoroughly all work done on the machine he is repairing before giving that machine his final
o.k. It is understandable, moreover, that the upgraders and trainees should not come to the
Foreman for daily work assignments. They are men with some years’ experience and know
from past practice the manner in which one job follows another on a particular machine
and that when one machine is finished they are normally expected to go to the next. None
of the facts developed, Management believes, indicate that journeymen are acting as
Leaders or are doing anything beyond the normal scope of their job. In Management’s
opinion, therefore, the grievance should be regarded as merely a request for more money,
justified by no real change in the employees’ functions or responsibilities, and on that basis
denied.
The line which separates a Leader from a mere skilled employee is often difficult to draw.
As Management points out, it is normal for employees of lesser experience and skill to
seek the advice and instruction of the old hands that may be working with them. It is
expected, moreover, that highly skilled employees will check the work which they are doing
and that such a final check will involve inspection of the work which other employees may
have done on the same job. On the evidence in this case, however, the Umpire believes
that Management has allowed the boundary line to be crossed. These four journeymen did
far more than give advice. They gave instruction, direction, and in a real sense,
supervision. Though job assignments were not frequently necessary, when assignments
were made they made them. The checking and inspection which they did of others’ work
seems not to have been merely incidental to the giving of their final "o.k." to the machine
overhauled, but rather to have been a special responsibility which the departmental
Foreman himself had previously exercised.
It is true that when the classification of these employees was first informally discussed in
the Fall of 1944, a Management representative informed the Union that they were not to be
Leaders. It is likewise true, however, that they assumed their special responsibilities at the
express direction of the departmental Foreman and continued them with his knowledge
and tacit consent. And in matters of classification it is the assigned function and not
Management’s opinion with respect to classification titles which the Umpire must consider
as decisive. As the Umpire said in Decision C-292:
"It is true, of course, that supervisory authority—even of the limited

sort which a Leader exercises—must be conferred upon an
employee from above and that no employee can properly assume it
on his own initiative. But that does not mean that if an employee is
directed to perform functions which are recognized as those of a
Leader, his right to payment as a Leader is in any way conditioned
upon the title by which Management designates his job."
Since no "Leader" classification for Machine Repair Machinists exists in the local wage
agreement it must be held that the four journeymen, R., B., M. and P., have been working
at a new job within the meaning of Paragraph 112. Management must therefore be
directed to establish a temporary classification and rate covering the job, to negotiate a
permanent classification and rate, and to classify and pay the four journeymen upon the
basis of these temporary and permanent classifications and rates as long as it requires
them to perform a Leader’s functions.
Decision:
1. It is found that Employees R., B., M. and P. have been functioning as

"Leaders" in the Machine Overhaul Department, and that they have done so at
the direction and with the knowledge and consent of the departmental
Foreman.
2. As no "Leader" classification for Machine Repair Machinists exists in the

local wage agreement they are held to have been working at a "new job" within
the meaning of Paragraph 112.
3. Management is directed to establish a temporary classification and rate

covering their jobs, to negotiate a permanent classification and rate, and to
classify and pay the four journeymen upon the basis of these temporary and
permanent classifications so long as it requires them to perform a Leader’s
functions.
UMPIRE
August 30, 1945.
No. D-11
October 16, 1945
Discharge For Refusal To Work Saturdays Because Of Religious Beliefs
GRIEVANCE:
Buick-Flint—Case D-1
"Protest against Buick Management’s vicious anti-religious policy. This policy deprived me
of my livelihood for worshipping on Saturday. Request back pay for all time lost."
In the Matter of:
and
General Motors Corporation—Buick Motor—Flint—Case D-1
The complainant, Employee H., has been an employee of the Buick Motor Division in Flint
since 1921. For 16 years he has been a Seventh Day Adventist and in accordance with the
tenets of that faith has refused to work on Saturdays. During the days of commercial
production, when the plant was on a 40-hour week, there seems to have been little
difficulty over his refusal. Even when overtime work was required on Saturdays,
Management allowed the complainant to remain away and to make up the time on other
days.
In 1942, when the war program required Management to establish a 48-hour week,
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Management felt it necessary to alter its policy in such cases and to require that all
employees work their regularly scheduled hours unless they had reasonable cause for
absence. A religious belief which acted as a continuous bar to an employee’s working on
one particular day of the week was not considered by Management to be such a
"reasonable cause". On this basis a number of employees who subscribe to Seventh Day
Adventist beliefs were discharged for "habitual absence without reasonable cause",
Management indicating in each case that the employee would be allowed to return to work
and have his seniority restored provided that he would agree to work on Saturdays.
For some reason unexplained at the hearing, however, Employee H. was not penalized for
his Saturday absences until his discharge on May 7th, 1945. It would appear that he was
discharged at that time only because of the complaints of another employee that
Management was discriminating in H.’s favor by not holding him to the same requirements
to which it held other employees.
Two issues are therefore present in this case. The first presents the question of
Management’s right as a matter of principle to require Seventh Day Adventists to work on
Saturdays as a condition of employment, and the second, the question of whether by its
prior leniency toward H. Management deprived itself of the right to enforce its rule against
him.
With regard to the first issue, the decision must clearly be for Management. It must at once
be made clear that no question of religious freedom is involved in this case. H. has every
right to believe as he chooses and to act in accordance with his beliefs. His beliefs cannot
entitle him, however, to special privileges which are denied to other employees.
Management has the basic right to employ and retain in employment only such employees
as are able and willing in the long run to perform the work required of them on the work
days regularly scheduled. It has always been recognized that the Corporation need not
retain indefinitely on its payrolls an employee who through illness or accident is rendered
permanently incapable of performing work in the Corporation’s plant. In the same manner,
it must be held that the Corporation need not keep in its employ an individual whose
religious beliefs are a permanent bar to his observance of regular shift schedules.
Management has no right, of course, to concern itself with the beliefs themselves, but it
has every right to insist that in the long run its work schedules shall be fulfilled and its Shop
Rules uniformly applied.
The Union argues that if any one thing could ever be considered a reasonable cause for
absence that thing should be the religious tenets of a sincere and devout believer such as
H. There is an obvious distinction, however, between causes for absence which operate
only occasionally, such as illness in the family, a need to take care of special and pressing
business or a desire to observe occasional religious holidays, and causes which operate
permanently and result in regularly recurring absences on specified days during the week.
The standards of reasonableness which might have applied had H.’s absences been
exceptional could not apply when those absences became the permanent and unvarying
rule.
On the second issue, likewise, Management is in principle correct. The Umpire has
previously indicated that by being lenient with an employee over a short or long period of
time Management does not lose its right in its discretion to become strict. Management’s
wisdom in suddenly imposing its rules against H. when the end of the war was
approaching and return to a 40-hour week could be readily envisioned, may seem
questionable. There can be no doubt, however, of its right to do so. The evidence is clear
that with regard to other employees of the Seventh Day Adventist faith Management had
uniformly imposed its attendance rule. In all fairness the Umpire cannot hold that it should
have discriminated in favor of H.
It is admitted by Management that H. is a good workman and a valued employee. It is to be

hoped that with the return of these plants to a 40-hour week some means may be found of
reemploying him on some basis similar to that on which he worked during the years prior to
the war. From Management’s attitude and expressions at the hearing the Umpire is
confident that if that can be done his long seniority can also be restored. For the reasons
stated above, however, the Umpire cannot find that Management exceeded its rights in
discharging him and must accordingly dismiss his grievance.
Decision:
UMPIRE
October 16, 1945.
No. D-14
December 4, 1945
Alleged Violation Of Paragraph 63
GRIEVANCE:
GMC Truck & Coach—Case D-13
"I request a Group Leader classification in line with my seniority. Claiming I have the merit,
ability and capacity to fill such a position."
In the Matter of:
and
General Motors Corporation GMC Truck and Coach Division—Case D-13
On June 11th, 1945, Management promoted Employee C., seniority date June 5, 1941,
from his job as relief man on the boxing line in Department 1030 to a position as group
leader on the same line. In this grievance, Employee O., who was also a relief man and
whose seniority date is June 7, 1928, claims that he is at least the equal of Employee C. in
ability, merit and capacity and that in view of his greater seniority he should have received
the promotion. The Union asks that the job be declared vacant and that Management be
directed to fill it in accordance with the requirements of Paragraph 63 of the National
file://C:\Users\bobology\AppData\Local\Temp\Framework\d-014_13C250E4.htm 3/22/2011
Agreement, giving due consideration to the qualifications of the complainant.
Because of the cancellation of war contracts, the group leader job was discontinued on
November 5, 1945, and Employee C. was demoted in line with his seniority to the
assembler classification. The case has, therefore, in many respects become moot. In view
of the possibility that new leader jobs may be created in the future for which the two will be
considered, however, certain comments seem appropriate.
The Union’s principal contention was that O. was denied promotion solely because of his
advanced age. O. had more experience as a relief man than C. His efficiency ratings have
been consistently either good or excellent. Since as a relief man O. performed more actual
physical labor than he would as a group leader, his physical stamina was clearly adequate
for the job. Since he was the equal or superior of C. in experience and knowledge, and
since his efficiency ratings were good, the Union argues, he should have been given the
job. Any other holding, it urges, would allow Management to discriminate between
candidates for promotion upon the basis of their age alone, and age is not necessarily an
indication of an employee’s ability, merit or capacity.
With the Union’s general thesis that age, taken by itself, has no necessary relevance to the
question of ability, merit and capacity, the Umpire is in full accord. He does not agree,
however, that age was the only or even the principal factor which distinguished the two
candidates from each other. The qualities which seem to have been most important in
filling this group leader job were those of initiative, alertness and flexibility. Management
was looking for a "self starter" as opposed to an employee who merely did well what he
was told to do. In view of the varied nature of the boxing operation in this department,
frequent changes in speed and the constant necessity of shifting employees from one
operation to another, the importance of these qualities in the man immediately in charge of
the line is self evident. The evidence leaves little question but that in these qualities C. was
definitely the superior of the two. The Umpire finds that the Union has not established that
O. was the equal of C. in the ability, merit and capacity necessary for this group leader job.
The grievance must accordingly be dismissed.
Decision
UMPIRE
December 4, 1945.
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No. D-19
April 29, 1946
Appeal From An Alleged Violation Of A Local Wage Agreement
GRIEVANCE:
Delco-Remy—Case D-4
"The Bargaining Committee of Local 662 charges Management with violation of

Paragraphs 112, 112a and 112b of the April 16, 1945 Agreement when the molding
operation on the new Jet Propulsion job in Plant 7 was arbitrarily placed in the Coremaker
classification without mutual agreement."
In the Matter of:
and
General Motors Corporation—Delco-Remy Division—Case D-4
The Union charges in this grievance that the Management of the Delco-Remy Division
violated Paragraphs 112, 112 (a) and 112 (b) of the National Agreement by placing the
manufacture of forms for the casting of bearing supports for jet propulsion aircraft engines
in the "Core Maker" classification at a rate of $1.16 per hour instead of in the "Molder"
classification at a rate of $1.18 per hour.
file://C:\Users\bobology\AppData\Local\Temp\Framework\d-019_13C2592E.htm 3/22/2011
The forms in question are used to shape the outside of the bearing support. The Union
claims that by definition and by common foundry usage such an "outside" form is a "mold"
and the job of making one is that of a "Molder." Similarly, the form which is placed inside
the "mold" to shape the inside of the piece to be cast is a "core", and only the making of
such "inside" forms can be called "Core Maker’s" work. To classify the present operation
as "core making", therefore, is contrary to the customary meaning of the term and a clear
violation of the local wage agreement.
Management does not deny that elsewhere in industry the terms "core" and "mold" are
frequently used to designate inside and outside forms, respectively. It contends, however,
that it is not common usage but its own established plant practice that should govern the
interpretation of this wage agreement. For many years at Delco-Remy, both before and
after the wage agreement was negotiated, "Core Makers" were distinguished from
"Molders" solely by the type of sand used in making the form. If "Dry Sand" was used, the
form was a "core", and if "Green Sand" was used, the form was a "mold", and these terms
applied regardless of the function of the form in the casting process. Thus on certain gear
and crank cases, the "core", made of dry sand, forms a considerable portion of the outside
surface. In the Crank Housing job, a green sand "mold" forms the inside and a dry sand
"core" forms the outside. In the casting of a certain cover green sand is used to make both
the inside and outside forms, and both are referred to and classified as "molds". It is
because of the somewhat greater care and skill required in the handling of "green" as
compared to "dry" sand that the "Molder’s" rate is two cents above the "Core Maker’s" rate.
In view of this undisputed evidence regarding the established practice at Delco-Remy, the
Umpire must dismiss the instant grievance. Where local practice is in doubt, common
industrial usage is often helpful in the interpretation of a local wage agreement. The issue,
however, is never "What is proper dictionary usage?" or "How are these terms used
elsewhere?", but always "What did this Management and this local Union mean by the
terms when they placed them in their agreement?". In this case the answer to that question
is clear beyond dispute. At Delco-Remy, the term "core" has always been applied to a form
made of dry sand and the term "mold" has always been applied to a form made of green
sand As the form in question was of "dry sand" it was properly classified as a "core" and
paid for at the "Core Maker’s" rate.
The Union argued at the hearing, nevertheless, that as the bearing support was a new
product, placed in production only a few weeks before the grievance was filed, the work of
making the forms should have been considered a "new job" within the meaning of
Paragraph 112. Since it could not be placed in an existing classification by mutual
agreement, the Union urged, Management should have established a temporary rate for it
and negotiated a permanent rate with the Bargaining Committee.
After almost six years of Umpire proceedings the fallacy in this argument should be
apparent. Work of the type involved in this case has been covered by the "Core Maker"
classification for years. That a product is new does not necessarily mean that the task of
making it is a "new job". Tool Rooms are not reclassified every time new tools are
manufactured; nor has it in the past been found necessary to negotiate new "Molder" and
"Core Maker" rates every time model changes required the casting of new parts.
Decision:
UMPIRE
April 29, 1946.
No. D-27
May 2, 1946
Penalty Layoff For Absenteeism
GRIEVANCE:
Chevrolet-St. Louis—Case D-30
"Unjustly suspended. Request pay for all time lost."
In the Matter of:
and
General Motors Corporation—Chevrolet-St.Louis—Case D-30
In view of the complainant’s prior record of absenteeism and of his previously announced
intention of becoming liable to a week’s penalty if he were not granted a week’s vacation,
the Umpire concludes that he was absent from work without excuse on August 31st, 1945,
and that the one week layoff imposed upon him was justified.
Decision:
UMPIRE
May 2, 1946.
UMPIRE DECISION L-12 Page 1 of 4
No. L-12
NOVEMBER 10, 1965
Paragraph 153
Transfer to Skilled Trades (E.I.T.)
GRIEVANCE:
"I charge Management with vio. of Par (153) of N.A. I request this man be put on job, and
all back pay be given." S/JMD
"I charge Management in vio. of Par. 153 of the N.A. as I have more seniority and more
qualifications than employee selected for employee in training in W.E.M.R. classification.
Req. pay I lost and this job at once." S/REF
The grievances are dismissed. (Entire decision should be read)
In the Matter of:
United Automobile Workers of America, AFL-CIO, Local Union No. 645
and
General Motors Corporation Fisher Body—Los Angeles Division -- Appeal Cases L-101
and L-102
The grievant, J.M.D., seniority date 10-14-57, classified "Assembler - General," and R.E.F.,
seniority date 11-28-59, classified "Spot Weld-Major and Line," protest Management’s
file://C:\Users\bobology\AppData\Local\Temp\Framework\l-012_13A51461.htm 3/22/2011
action, on May 7, 1965, in transferring employee M.L.K., seniority date 9-17-62, also
classified "Spot Weld - Major and Line" to the Welding Equipment - Maintenance and
Repair - In Training (WEMR-EIT) classification in the Maintenance Department. Each
grievant claims that at the time he applied for the transfer, his qualifications were at least
equal to K.’s, therefore, the transfer of K. violated Paragraph 153 of the National
Agreement, which reads as follows:
"Notwithstanding other provisions of this Agreement, Management

may select non-journeymen employees who have previously filed an
application as provided above for transfer to the skilled trades
classifications for training and to perform the work in such
classifications. Employees transferred to skilled trades
classifications shall be selected on the basis of their qualifications,
and when their qualifications are equal, employees with the longest
seniority will be given preference." (Emphasis added)
The union witnesses were Employee O. and the two grievants. O., formerly a non-skilled
production Gas & Arc Welder, who has worked for the past six years in the WEMR-EIT
classification, testified as to the duties of that classification, the training or experience
required, and the qualifications of employees previously transferred to that classification.
O. described those duties as including maintenance and repair of welding equipment and
estimated the job content as 75% mechanical and 25% electrical. According to O., of the
dozen or so WEMR-EIT employees whom he knows, 9 or 10, at the time of transfer, had
no previous experience or training in electrical work but, like himself, have been learning
that work on the job. Finally, O. testified that even though, at the time of transfer, he had
possessed his present qualifications, he would still need a total of ten years of service in
WEMR-EIT for promotion to journeyman status.
Grievant D. testified that at the time of his application he had 13 years’ experience in
repairing and rebuilding electrical tools and motors, including work with blueprints and
control panels, as well as 3 years’ vocational school training in electricity for about six
hours weekly. Grievant F. testified that he had several years’ experience as a spot welder
in the aircraft industry; that he had attended night classes in mathematics and electronics;
and that he had learned how to read and work with electrical diagrams and electronic
instruments and how to build amplifiers and rectifiers, though he had applied this training
only in doing odd jobs "on his own, not for pay."
Management’s witnesses were General Foreman T., one of the supervisors who selected
employees for the WEMR-EIT classification, and K., the employee transferred. T. testified
as follows: Work in the WEMR classification includes installation, maintenance and repair
of welding and associated electrical, electronic and mechanical equipment. Performance of
the work requires knowledge of an experience in electricity. After evaluating the
applications for transfer in this case, it was clear to him that, by virtue of K.’s three years of
training and experience, his qualifications were far superior to all other applicants’.
Specifically, during K.’s three years in the Navy, where T. had also served as an
electrician, K. had attended electrician training schools and served as an electrician on a
ship, rising to Electrician’s Mate, Second Class. Also, K. had attended an electronics
school after his Navy service. T. considered that K.’s duties on board ship were similar in
many respects to those in the WEMR-EIT classification and that his experience in the
"practical factors" of operating, maintaining and repairing electrical equipment, was

relevant. His conclusion was that K. was able to perform the WEMR-EIT duties with
considerably less training than other applicants. In comparison, the experience shown on
D.’s application was principally on bench jobs, not in "trouble-shooting" with power on, as
in the WEMR-EIT classification. Finally, as to F., T., on the basis of having worked as an
electrician in spot welding, knew that F.’s experience was not really relevant; also, F. had
less electronics school training than K. Finally, T. pointed out that Management always has
sought employees qualified to perform as much of the WEMR-EIT work as possible,
without further training. True, Management has, at times, selected employees with
minimum qualifications, but only because no better qualified employees had applied.
OPINION
Transfers under Paragraph 153 are governed by relative and not minimum qualifications,
to be determined as of the time of the application. As a practical proposition it would not be
unreasonable, in a Paragraph 153 case, to expect either or both of the parties,
Management and the Union, in shaping their contentions as to the relative qualifications of
two or more competing applicants, to attempt to predict how such applicants might "stack
up" in the immediate or foreseeable future. But it is not to be assumed that the parties, in
negotiating Paragraph 153, meant that in a particular case, either party, as part of its
contentions or arguments, would be permitted to speculate as to how the competing
applicants would "stack up" ten years later, on the verge of promotion to Journeyman
status, under the Agreement. Next, the words "transfer... for training and to perform the
work" indicate that a relevant consideration is whether an applicant may already be trained
or experienced in some aspects or parts of the job to such an extent that he can "perform
the work" with relatively little or no additional training.
The work of the WEMR-EIT classification involves both mechanical and electrical duties.
The evidence indicates (1) that in terms of skill and related requirements, the electrical
duties, while they may be less in volume, are more important than the mechanical and (2)
that by virtue of his prior experience in the Navy, employee K. was considerably ahead of
the two grievants in the performance of the electrical work when he applied for transfer.
This finding does not, of course, put a premium on naval or any other particular brand of
training. Finally, while it might be contended that either grievant might be so apt as to be
able to "catch up" to employee K. after a period of training on the job, no such contention
has been advanced, or if advanced, has a foundation in the record of this case.
On the basis of the foregoing analysis, the Umpire must find that Management did not
violate Paragraph 153 in concluding that K.’s qualifications were clearly superior to the
grievants’ and in transferring him to the classification in question.
DECISION
The grievances are dismissed.
November 10, 1965
S/Nathan P. Feinsinger
Umpire
No. L-16
DECEMBER 1, 1965
Discharge:
Assault on Supervision
Paragraph 76:
Notice of Discipline
GRIEVANCE:
CHEVROLET DIVISION, TONAWANDA FOUNDRY PLANT, TONAWANDA, NEW

YORK—APPEAL CASE L-38
"Protest unwarranted discharge demand discharge be rescinded and I receive all

economic benefits lost and reinstated at once" S/LF
"Policy The Union is charging mgt with violation of para 76 NA. demand modification of
penalty assessed emp L F on 4/10/65 without prejudice to the merits of grievance
#639663" S/PHW
UMPIRE’S DECISION
The grievances are dismissed. (Entire decision should be read)
In the Matter of:
United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America, AFL-CIO

Local 1173
and
file://C:\Users\bobology\AppData\Local\Temp\Framework\l-016_13A51DC3.htm 3/22/2011
General Motors Corporation, Chevrolet Division, Tonawanda Foundry Plant, Tonawanda,

New York -- Appeal Case L-38
The Union protests the discharge on 4-10-65 of the grievant, F., seniority date 2-21-55,
classified as "Core - Load and/or Unload", for an alleged assault on Foreman R. W., in
violation of Shop Rule No. 22, "Threatening, intimidating, coercing or interfering with
employees or supervision at any time."
The Union also charges that Management violated Paragraph 76 of the National
Agreement by failing to advise the grievant as to the grounds, other than the alleged
assault, which the Union claims that Management considered in arriving at the penalty of
discharge. Paragraph 76 reads:
"Any employee who has been disciplined by a suspension, layoff or

discharge will be advised in writing of the reason therefore...."
Foreman R. W., a supervisor for only two weeks at the time of the events below, testified
as follows: On 4-10-65, he came into the grievant’s work area and instructed the grievant
to move some #896 cores from the end to the center of the core rack, so as to get them
through the production line before a change to a different type of core. The grievant was
then sitting on a barrel opposite the south end of the core oven waiting for the cores in the
oven to reach a certain point when he would move them to a rack located across the 3-foot
wide aisle, in which the events below took place. The grievant refused to comply, saying
that he had to take out the cores then in the oven as they came along, and moved across
the aisle, next to the oven. Foreman R. W. told him he could let some cores go by if
necessary, while he moved the #896 cores. F. again refused, called R.W, a vile name, told
him to "get the hell away," and pushed him on the chest. R. W. said, "We’ll see about that,"
and started for the office to get advice. As he moved sidewise past the grievant, he held
his hand about waist high in front of him, to avoid a collision. There was no physical
contact, except perhaps as the grievant turned toward him. At that point, the grievant
struck him on the left side of the nose. The blow split W.’s lip, knocked his glasses to the
floor and his hard hat to the top of the core rack, and caused his nose to bleed profusely.
Foreman R. W. did not see the blow coming, or note with which hand the grievant hit him.
Foreman R. W. picked up his glasses and hat and went to the First Aid Office.
Superintendent H. went there to get Foreman R. W.’s story. Later, Foreman R. W. learned
that following a disciplinary interview, the grievant had been discharged.
Superintendent H. testified as follows: After talking to Foreman R. W., he called the

grievant to his office for a disciplinary interview which was attended by the grievant,
General Foreman P. and Committeeman P.H.W. The grievant’s first story was that nothing
had happened; his second story was that he might have hit Foreman R. W. accidentally
with a pallet of cores as he turned from the oven to the rack. Knowing that the pallet was
held about waist high, and that, therefore, Foreman R. W.’s injuries could not have been
caused that way, H. again asked the grievant what had happened. His third story was: "I
pushed him as hard as he pushed me." In view of these different stories, H. concluded that
no further investigation was necessary, and discharged the grievant. As to the alleged
violation of Paragraph 76, the discharge was based only on the striking of the foreman
and, while supervision was aware of prior disciplinary infractions and of the abusive
language and insubordination on the occasion in question, they played no part in the
decision. Therefore, there was no violation of Paragraph 76.
General Foreman P. testified as follows: To determine whether there was any basis to
suggest that the grievant’s discharge be rescinded, he interviewed several employees.
One employee, E. S., said that he saw the grievant strike Foreman R. W.; another said that
he saw the foreman leaving with blood on his face; the others said that they saw nothing.
The grievant and employees E.S., B., and H.S., and Committeeman P.H.W. testified for
the Union. The grievant testified as follows: Foreman R. W. told him twice to move the
#896 cores, on the second occasion poking him in the chest. As Foreman R. W. started
toward the office, he pushed the grievant on the back, throwing him slightly off balance.
Reacting against the push, the grievant swung his arms together in an upward and
sideward motion, his elbow striking Foreman R. W. The grievant did not notice that
Foreman R. W.’s hat and glasses had come off. Foreman R. W. left and the grievant
continued to work at the oven. At no time did the grievant claim that he might have struck
Foreman R. W. with a pallet; that suggestion came from Management, not from him. In
short, at no time did the grievant take any aggressive action toward the foreman
accounting for his injuries.
The net of the testimony of employees E.S., B., and H.S., was that Foreman R. W. had
pushed the grievant. E.S. said that all he saw was the grievant’s arms swing up. He denied
that he told General Foreman P. that the grievant hit Foreman R. W. Neither B. or H.S.
saw the grievant’s reaction.
Committeeman P.H.W. testified as follows: Although the grievant had requested his
presence, he knew nothing about the matter until he learned from another employee that a
disciplinary meeting was taking place in the superintendent’s office. He joined the meeting
which was already well in progress. When he arrived, the grievant was describing how
Foreman R. W. pushed him and his reaction to the push. Before the interview was
concluded, Foreman R. W. arrived and gave his version of what had occurred. Later, when
Committeeman P.H.W. talked with Foreman R. W. alone, the latter said that he might have
inadvertently pushed the grievant slightly when he put out his hand to avoid a collision.
Finally, the grievant’s prior record, and his insubordination on the occasion in question,
were part of the discussion, from which it follows that, failing written notice thereof,
Management violated Paragraph 76.
The Corporation contends that the evidence supports its position that the grievant
knowingly struck Foreman R. W. and that he was discharged solely for that reason;
therefore, (1) the grievant was properly discharged and (2) Paragraph 76 was not violated.
The Union’s principal contentions may be summarized as follows: (1) Granted there was a
physical contact of some sort between the grievant and Foreman R. W., at no time did the
grievant intentionally injure the foreman by striking him or otherwise. (2) Management was
derelict in not making a thorough investigation before the discharge. (3) The evidence
shows that Management, despite its denial, gave consideration to factors outside the
alleged assault, without advising the grievant in writing as required by Paragraph 76. That
violation should be considered, at least in mitigation of the penalty assessed the grievant.
OPINION
The Corporation has the burden of proof in a discipline case. The evidence in this case
establishes that a physical encounter occurred in a confined area, involving the grievant
and Foreman R. W., during which the latter suffered a bloody nose and had his glasses
and hat knocked off. The key question is whether, as the Foreman claims, those results
followed from a blow struck by the grievant, without extenuating circumstances. The
physical circumstances, the lack of any acceptable explanation as to how else the injuries
might have happened, and the inconsistent and, in some instances, unsupportable
versions offered by the grievant, all lead to the conclusion that the grievant struck Foreman
R. W., and that the blow was intentional.
The Umpire agrees with the Union that it would have been more in keeping with
established principles in disciplinary situations had supervision interviewed other
employees in the area of the incident before, rather than after, the decision to discharge
the grievant. Under other circumstances, the Umpire might feel impelled to take account of
that fact in determining the extent of penalty. In this case, however, he does not deem that
fact sufficient, on balance, to warrant returning the grievant to his job.
On the basis of the foregoing, the Umpire must conclude (1) that the Union has not proved
its charge that Management violated Paragraph 76; and (2) that the Corporation has
sustained its burden of proof that the grievant violated Shop Rule 22 by assaulting
Foreman R. W. Therefore, the grievances must be dismissed.
DECISION
The grievances are dismissed.
December 1, 1965
/S/Nathan P. Feinsinger
Umpire
No. L-30
MAY 11, 1966
Discipline:
Discharge for Loitering
Extent of Penalty
GRIEVANCE:
GM ASSEMBLY DIVISION, SOUTH GATE PLANT, SOUTH GATE, CALIFORNIA—

APPEAL
CASE L-752
"I charge Mgt with giving me an unjust discharge on 10-14-65 for alleged violation of SR-
10-40. I request reinstatement immediately pay for all time lost due to Mgts error and all
benefits due." S/EWA
Grievance dismissed. (Entire decision should be read)
In the Matter of:
United Automobile-Aerospace-Agricultural Implement Workers of America, UAW-AFL-CIO

Local 216
and
General Motors Corporation, GM Assembly Division, South Gate Plant -- Appeal Case L-
752
The Union protests the discharge on 10-14-65 of the grievant, A., seniority date 9-24-60, a
"Caustic Tank Attendant," for alleged violation of Shop Rule 10, "Wasting time or loitering
in toilets or on any Company property during working hours," and Shop Rule 40,
"Repeated violations of Shop or Safety Rules." The protest includes a charge that
Management failed to comply with Paragraph 76 of the National Agreement which reads:
"Any employee who has been disciplined by a suspension, layoff, or

discharge will be advised in writing of the reason
therefore...." (Emphasis supplied)
The grievant’s prior disciplinary record is as follows:
Date Action Violation
May 23, 1961 Reprimand Shop Rule #6, "Absence without

reasonable cause."
May 24, 1961 Disciplinary Layoff – Shop Rule #4, "Using another’s badge
Balance of Shift and or pass, or permitting another to use
one day your badge or pass to enter the
property.
May 24, 1961 Disciplinary Layoff – "Failure to wear badge in plain sight
Balance of Shift and while on Company property."
one day
June 13, 1961 Disciplinary Layoff – Shop Rule #35, "Disregard of safety
Balance of Shift and rules or common safety practices."
two days
June 23, 1961 Disciplinary Layoff – Shop Rule #15, "Refusal or failure to do
Balance of Shift and job assignment. (Do the work assigned
one week to you and follow instructions; any
complaint may be taken up later through
the regular channels.)"
October 5, 1961 Disciplinary Layoff – Shop Rule #36, "Assignment of wages

Balance of Shift and or frequent garnishments."
one & ½ weeks
November 10, Disciplinary Layoff – Shop Rule #36

1961 Balance of Shift and
two weeks
April 11, 1963 Disciplinary Layoff – Shop Rule #23, "Unauthorized

Balance of Shift and distribution of literature, written or
thirty days printed matter of any description in
working areas on Company premises
during working time."
June 3, 1963 Disciplinary Layoff – Shop Rule #7, "Reporting late

Balance of Shift and
three weeks for work."
April 20, 1965 Disciplinary Layoff – Shop Rule #36

Balance of Shift and
three weeks
May 3, 1965 Disciplinary Layoff – Shop Rule #36. (This penalty was
Balance of Shift and removed from the grievant’s record
thirty days during the week of 3-21-66.)
August 17, 1965 Disciplinary Layoff – Shop Rule #10, "Wasting time or
Balance of Shift and loitering in toilets or on any Company
thirty days property during working hours."
Maintenance Foreman G., the sole witness for the Corporation, testified in substance as
follows: On 10-14-65, at about 8:45 a.m., as he started down a ramp from the main plant
building, he observed A. in the Caustic Tank area, some 220 feet away, bent over an
object which, at that point, G. could not identify. He continued on towards A. As he reached
a point some 75-100 feet from A., he could see that the object was a newspaper and that
A. was reading it. The paper lay on a box in that part of the Caustic Tank area called the
"pit," below the level of a grating or platform bearing the caustic tank, which it was A.’s job
to tend. A. did not raise his eyes until G. reached him. G. asked A. whether he was on
relief. A. replied, "You are not my foreman. I don’t have to do what you say." G. directed
him to put the paper away and go to work. A. answered, "Go to hell. You are ignorant." G.
again told A. to put the paper away. A. replied: "Go away, you bother me." G. thereupon
directed A. to go with him to Labor Relations for a disciplinary interview. Thereafter, G. and
Labor Relations Representative F. reviewed the grievant’s record which at that time
included a 30-day disciplinary layoff, assessed on 5-3-65. This penalty was removed from
A.’s record on or about 3-21-66. But even if the penalty of 5-3-65 had not been considered,
the grievant would have been discharged. The notice given A. stated: "Shop Rules 10 and
40. You are being discharged for loitering and repeated violations of Shop... Rules."
The Union’s witnesses were grievant A. and Committeeman K. A. testified, in substance,

as follows: He saw G. coming down the ramp. At that point he was on the grating, tending
the caustic tank, watching it to see that it did not boil over, and keeping an eye out for the
lifttruck driver to move some more metal into the area. When G. asked him whether he was
on his break, A. told him "No." G. asked how come, then, he was on the grating. A’s reply
was that G. was trying to "antagonize" him. The reason for this reply was that G., on
another occasion, had told A. he was going to fire him. There was a box with a newspaper
lying on it about two feet away from where A. was standing, but they were there when A.
came to work, and he had not read the paper. Without questioning A., G. jumped up on the
grating, took the paper from the box, and accused A. of having just been reading it, which
A. denied. A. did not make any of the remarks attributed to him by G., except to say that G.
was not his foreman, and that G. was trying to "antagonize" him. The substance of
Committeeman K.’s testimony was that G. was prone to go to extremes in imposing
disciplinary penalties.
The Union’s principal contentions may be summarized as follows: (1) G.’s testimony was
not credible. For example, at the Umpire Hearing, on direct examination, G. testified that A.
said, "Go to hell"; on cross-examination, when reminded of a statement made prior to the
Umpire Hearing, in which he said A. used the words, "Get the hell away," G. changed his
testimony accordingly. (2) As to the extent of penalty, the decision to discharge the
grievant was admittedly based, in part at least, on the grievant’s entire disciplinary record,
which then included a 30-day penalty, later removed. (3) Management violated Paragraph
76 of the National Agreement in not advising A., in the written notice of discipline, that in
deciding the extent of penalty, G. had taken into consideration not only the current
occasion of loitering but A.’s alleged "insubordinate remarks" on that occasion as well.
Further, the failure to refer to such remarks in the notice of discipline is evidence that the
grievant did not make them, and affects G.’s credibility. The discharge should be modified
because one of the items taken into consideration by Management in deciding on
discharge was the penalty of May 3, 1965, balance of shift and 30 days, which was later
removed from the grievant’s record. (4) In any event, the penalty should be modified
because the shop rule infraction of 10-14-65, which triggered the discharge, was a minor
one.
The Corporation’s principal contentions may be summarized as follows:
(1) Inconsistencies between his testimony before the Umpire and his statements in the
prior record impair. A.’s credibility. (2) Even if A.’s past record had not included the penalty
of May 3, 1965, which was later withdrawn, with a record such as his, including a 30-day
penalty, he would have been discharged as incorrigible. (3) The Union’s contention that
Management failed to comply with Paragraph 76 is "new" and should not be considered by
the Umpire. (4) An employee may be found to be "incorrigible" even though his latest
offense is a minor one.
OPINION
The only claimed deficiency in the foreman’s testimony warranting consideration is the
difference as to the exact language surrounding the word "hell," which G. attributed to the
grievant. This difference, in the Umpire’s judgment, is not significant. The grievant’s story,
on the other hand, raises a serious question of credibility. For example, when his foreman
indicated that he thought the grievant was loitering, the grievant had only to point out that
he was tending the tank, as part of his job duties. Instead, he accused the foreman vaguely
of trying to "antagonize" him. Under these circumstances, the Umpire must conclude that
with respect to the charge of loitering, the Corporation has sustained its burden of proof.
The second question involves the extent of penalty. On the side of the Corporation, it may
be argued that with or without the 30-day penalty layoff of 5-3-65, subsequently withdrawn,
Management’s action met the established criterion of progressive, corrective discipline and
the discharge should therefore be sustained. On the side of the Union, it may be argued
that since Management considered every penalty in the record at that time, including the
penalty of 5-3-65, it must have been influenced to some extent by that penalty so that, on
its later removal from the record, the discharge should have been modified accordingly.
There may be cases in which the kind of contention that Management has advanced in this
case, - that discharge would have followed with or without the penalty of 5-3-65 in the
record, - might be challenged as "hindsight" or "speculation." This is not such a case. The
grievant’s record, beginning with the 30-day penalty on April 11, 1963, shows the following
penalties: June 3, 1963, three weeks; April 20, 1965, three weeks; August 17, 1965, thirty
days; October 14, 1965 (the current violation), discharge. Taken by itself, this is hardly a
record on which to base an appeal to the Umpire’s discretion. The only special
circumstances which might be considered to warrant a reduction of the penalty in this case
are (1) two long periods of "good behavior", and (2) the minor character of the current
offense. The first period of good behavior began after the grievant’s return from the penalty
layoff of 11-10-61 and ended 4-11-63, a total of about 17 months. The second such period
began after the end of the penalty layoff of 6-3-63 and ended 4-20-65, a total of about 22
months. On the latter date, the grievant incurred a penalty of three weeks; on 8-17-65, a
30-day penalty; and on 10-14-65, the current offense, discharge. Next, it is well established
that on the question of incorrigibility, even a minor offense may warrant a review of the
grievant’s entire record in order to determine whether he is "incorrigible." In that narrow
sense, the minor offense may be said to have triggered the discharge, but the discharge
itself is based not on the current offense alone but on the whole record.
This leaves only the Paragraph 76 issue for consideration. That issue was injected into the
case by the Union for the first time at the Umpire Hearing and was strenuously objected to
by the Corporation as a "new contention." The Umpire is reluctant to pass on an issue as
important and controversial as the interpretation of Paragraph 76, in a case in which there
was no advance notice and opportunity to the opposite party to prepare for a full dress
argument. On the whole record, the Umpire is of the opinion that the grievance should be
dismissed.
DECISION
Grievance dismissed.
May 11, 1966
/S/Nathan P. Feinsinger,
Umpire
No. L-46
December 22, 1966
Discipline:
Absence Without Reasonable Cause
GRIEVANCE:
GM ASSEMBLY DIVISION, DORAVILLE PLANT, DORAVILLE, GEORGIA—APPEAL

CASE L-68
"Protest mgmt giving me unjust D.L.O. request this D.L.O. be remove from my record and
be Paid for all benefit deprive of" S/H.E.S.
The grievance is sustained, with back pay. (Entire decision should be read.)
In the Matter of:
United Automobile Workers of America Local #10
and
General Motors Corporation, GM Assembly Division, Doraville, Georgia -- Appeal Case L-

68
The Union protests a penalty of balance of shift plus thirty days against the grievant, S., an
"Assembler," whose seniority date is March 20, 1953, for the alleged violation of Shop Rule
No. 6, "Absence without reasonable cause." The grievant’s disciplinary record is as
file://C:\Users\bobology\AppData\Local\Temp\Framework\l-046_13A533C3.htm 3/22/2011
follows:
2-23-62 Reprimand Shop Rule #7 "Reporting late for work."
2-25-63 Reprimand Shop Rule #6 "Absence without reasonable

cause."
5-10-63 Reprimand Shop Rule #6 "Absence without reasonable

cause."
6-25-63 Bal & 1 day Shop Rule #6 "Absence without reasonable

cause."
12-12-63 Bal & 2 days Shop Rule #6 "Absence without reasonable

cause."
5-18-64 Bal & 1 week Paragraph 117 of National Agreement.
12- 7-64 Bal & 2 weeks Shop Rule #7 "Reporting late for work."
(5- 4-65 The present case.)
On Monday, May 3, 1965, the grievant called the plant before his shift started at 7 a.m. to
give notice that he would not be at work that day because he had to take his wife to a
dentist and go to police headquarters for a report of an automobile accident involving his
son. Later in the morning a Labor Relations Representative telephoned to the grievant and
asked him to try to come in. The grievant, however, did not go to work that day. When he
returned to work on Tuesday, Foreman C., his supervisor, was not satisfied with his
excuse and imposed the disciplinary penalty at issue.
Foreman C., who was the Corporation’s sole witness, testified that the grievant told him
that on the way to police headquarters Monday morning he stopped to telephone the police
and being told that the report he wanted was not ready, returned home, called a dentist for
his wife and made an appointment for 2:30, and then stayed home until it was time to take
her to the dentist. According to C., the grievant said nothing to indicate that his wife’s
condition was serious and admitted that she could have gone to the dentist in a taxi or
been driven there by his father who took her on Tuesday to get the accident report, but did
not explain why he made no such arrangements.
The grievant and his wife were witnesses for the Union. The grievant did not agree that he
told C. his wife could have taken a taxi to the dentist. He did admit saying that his father
might possibly have taken her, but explained that he did not ask him to do so because his
mother’s health was poor and she needed his father with her. The grievant claimed that he
told C. about his wife’s condition and that the dentist had extracted three of her teeth. His
version of what happened Monday was as follows: His wife had suffered all day Sunday
from a severe toothache and asked him to stay home Monday and take her to a dentist. He
called the dentist about 9 a.m., when the office opened, and the 2:30 appointment was the
earliest available. He started for police headquarters after he called the dentist, not before,
but then stopped and telephoned about the accident report because he felt that he should
not be away from his wife. He was away from home only about 20 minutes. When the
Labor Relations Representative telephoned him, about 10 a.m., he agreed to go to work, if
possible, but meant only after he brought his wife home from the dentist. By that time,
however, it was too late. While he was at home he took care of his small child, but would
have stayed home with his wife in any case. The grievant conceded that he told the Labor
Relations Representative, when he telephoned, that getting the accident report was one
reason for his absence, although he knew then that it was not available.
The grievant’s wife testified that her face and gums were so swollen that she could hardly
talk and she insisted upon her husband’s making an appointment and taking her to the
dentist, that she would not have considered going without him in a taxi because she was
afraid to be alone and was also concerned about their small child, whom they took with
them.
The Union contended that the issue is whether the grievant had a reasonable cause to be
absent, not whether he used poor judgment in failing to make other arrangements; and that
the obligation to care for his wife was a reasonable cause for his absence.
The Corporation contended that inconsistencies in the grievant’s testimony and his failure
to mention earlier that his wife’s condition was serious or that he had to care for their small
child, reflected a lack of credibility, also that the grievant had an obligation to endeavor to
make other reasonable arrangements for his wife, and that his absence was without
reasonable cause.
OPINION
Umpire Decision G-156 states the principle which applies to this case, as follows:
"Where as here an employee is absent without permission, it is

incumbent upon him to show that such absence was necessitated
by personal considerations which by accepted standards
outweighed his duty to his employer to be present during working
hours."
The question is whether the state of health of the grievant’s wife was such a personal
consideration; his desire to get a copy of the police report of his son’s accident did not
warrant absence in this case. While some doubt is cast on the grievant’s credibility, there is
no evidence that the grievant’s wife was not in severe pain and in urgent need of dental
treatment. Hence, it was not unreasonable for the grievant to consider that it was
necessary for him to take care of her. Arguments to the contrary rest largely on the
grievant’s leaving his wife to go to police headquarters. But as to this he had second
thoughts, and returned home. What would have happened, or how long he would have
been gone had the accident report been available is a matter about which one can only
speculate.
The question remaining is whether it was unreasonable for the grievant not to try to make
other arrangements. If the grievant’s wife feared to go to the dentist alone, a taxi was ruled
out. While the grievant’s father might possibly have stayed with her, taken her to the
dentist at the appointed time, waited to drive her home, and remained until the grievant
returned from work, the condition of the grievant’s mother made it reasonable for the
grievant not to ask his father to give up the better part of the day to this. That the grievant’s
father drove his daughter-in-law to police headquarters on Tuesday does not prove that he
could have devoted all the time to her on Monday necessary to replace the grievant. On
the whole record, therefore, the Umpire concludes that the grievant had reasonable cause
to be absent Monday, May 3, 1965, and that his grievance should be sustained.
DECISION
The grievance is sustained, with back pay.
December 22, 1966
/S/Abner Brodie,
Umpire
No. L-47
DECEMBER 22, 1966
Discipline:
Careless Workmanship:
Paragraph 76b:
Extent Of Penalty
GRIEVANCE:
GM ASSEMBLY DIVISION, DORAVILLE PLANT, DORAVILLE, GEORGIA—APPEAL

CASE
L-195
"Protest unjust Discharge. Request I be reinstated with all moneys and other Benefits
deprived of and my record be cleared." S/R.S.B.
The grievant’s discharge shall be rescinded and the grievant reinstated with back pay for
the 60 days preceding the date hereof. (Entire decision should be read.)
In the Matter of:
United Automobile-Aerospace-Agricultural Workers of America, UAW-AFL-CIO, Local #10
and
General Motors Corporation, GM Assembly Division, Doraville Plant -- Appeal Case L-195
file://C:\Users\bobology\AppData\Local\Temp\Framework\l-047_13A53D64.htm 3/22/2011
The Union protests the discharge on April 26, 1966, of the grievant, B., an "Assembler,"
seniority date April 8, 1963, for the alleged violation of Shop Rule 17, "Making scrap
unnecessarily, or careless workmanship," and Shop Rule 41, "Repeated violations of Shop
or Safety Rules." The protest includes a charge that Management did not comply with
Paragraph 76b of the National Agreement which reads, in part, as follows:
"The employee will be tendered a copy of any warning, reprimand,

suspension or disciplinary layoff entered on his personnel record
within three days of the action taken...."
The grievant’s disciplinary record is as follows:
11-27-63 Written reprimand for

careless workmanship
12-11-63 Written reprimand for

absenteeism
5-18-64 Disciplinary layoff,

balance of shift and 1 day for
violation of Paragraph 117 of the
National Agreement

balance of shift and 2 days for
absenteeism

balance of shift and one week for
garnishment of wages
6- 3-65 Disciplinary layoff,

balance of shift and two weeks for
careless workmanship

balance of shift and 30 days for
absenteeism
(4-26-66 The present case.)
The grievant, who had been discharged on January 12, 1966, was reinstated without back
pay and returned to work on April 18, 1966. He was assigned to the "Rear Bumper
Schedule" operation, the first on the bumper subassembly line. His duty was to check a
written manifest for each job and put on a conveyor line carriage the parts required to
assembly the type of bumper identified by a code number on the manifest, along with any
accessories the manifest described and certain parts which were standard for every
bumper. According to Foreman N., the grievant’s supervisor, who was the Corporation’s
sole witness, the job was relatively simple and average employees learned it in a few
hours. The grievant began work about 8:15 a.m., and was instructed until about 1 p.m.,
when he said that he could do the job himself but asked that the trainer watch him for the
rest of the day. Thereafter the grievant did the job without help. During the next several
days he made mistakes on twenty-three jobs, either omitting necessary parts and
accessories or putting on wrong or defective parts. The grievant did not explain his
mistakes, but assured N. that he knew the job and how to read a manifest. N. noted the
errors and his contacts with the grievant about them in his log. N. claimed that this was his
usual practice when occasions arose to speak to employees about their work. Nothing was
entered on the grievant’s personnel record. On April 26, the grievant again put the wrong
parts for a job on the conveyor carriage and did not explain the error. N. discharged the
grievant for this after an interview with the grievant and his committeeman and a review of
the grievant’s prior disciplinary record. N. insisted that neither the decision to discipline nor
the penalty was grounded on the grievant’s earlier errors.
The grievant was the Union’s sole witness. He denied that he was careless, claimed that
he did his best, and asserted that his errors were due to lack of experience and inadequate
training.
The Union contended that there is no evidence of careless workmanship, that evidence of
the unrecorded events and contacts of N. with the grievant violated Paragraph 76b of the
National Agreement, and that the penalty against the grievant was excessive.
The Corporation denied violation of Paragraph 76b, which it contended does not bar
consideration of the earlier events as background and evidence that the grievant was
careless on the occasion in question. It maintained that the grievant was shown to be
incorrigible and was properly discharged.
OPINION
The evidence is that the grounds for the grievant’s discharge were his mistake of April 26,
which the Corporation claimed was due to carelessness, and his prior disciplinary record.
There is insufficient evidence to support the Union’s position that Management used the
unrecorded events preceding the incident in issue as a basis for disciplining the grievant or
to determine the penalty to be assessed. Accordingly, there is no ground for concluding
that Management violated Paragraph 76b of the National Agreement. See Umpire
Decisions J-10, J-13, K-11.
The next question is whether proof of the grievant’s mistake is sufficient evidence to
support the charge of careless workmanship. Whether proof of a mistake is evidence of
careless workmanship depends upon the circumstances of the case. On the record in this
case, including the grievant’s assurances to his foreman that he knew how to do the job,
the lack of any explanation for the error, and the fact that he had been on the job several
days and performed the operation in question hundreds of times, the Umpire concludes
that the error was caused by the grievant’s lack of proper care.
There remains the issue of the penalty. The infraction which led to the grievant’s discharge
can be considered minor. But even a minor infraction may warrant a review of the
employee’s prior disciplinary record leading to a conclusion that the possibilities of
corrective discipline have been exhausted. In this case, however, a consideration of the
whole record, including the fact that the grievant’s minor infraction was not intentional,
leads the Umpire to conclude that in the interest of essential justice the grievant should be
reinstated with back pay for 60 days prior to the date hereof.
DECISION
The grievant’s discharge shall be rescinded and the grievant reinstated with back pay for
the 60 days preceding the date hereof.
December 22, 1966
/S/Abner Brodie,
Umpire
No. L-51
January 21, 1967
Leave of Absence:
Paragraph 104 of the National Agreement
GRIEVANCE:
GM ASSEMBLY DIVISION, SOUTH GATE PLANT, SOUTH GATE, CALIFORNIA—

APPEAL
CASE L-1242
"I charge Mgt with giving me an unjust discharge for alleged viol of S.R. #6 & #40 on 2-16-
66. I request re-instatement with all benefits due me and discharge be removed from my
records." S/JLE
The discharge of the grievant shall be rescinded, and he shall be reinstated, with back pay
in accordance with this opinion. (Entire decision should be read)
In the Matter of:
United Automobile-Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America, AFL-CIO,

Local #216
and
General Motors Corporation, GM Assembly Division, South Gate, California -- Appeal

Case L-1242
The Union protests the discharge on February 16, 1966, of the grievant, a "Hi-Lo
Operator," seniority date November 18, 1954, for the alleged violation of Shop Rule No. 6,
"Absence without reasonable cause," and Shop Rule No. 40, "Repeated violations of Shop
or Safety Rules."
The grievant was to be tried on February 16, 1966, on a charge of driving under the
influence of liquor. He expected to be convicted and sentenced to jail for 60 to 90 days. To
protect his job he applied in writing on February 9 for 90 days’ leave of absence for
"personal reasons." Management denied the request on the ground that it would be
"contrary to a long established Company policy" to grant a leave of absence to an
employee to serve a jail sentence. The grievant was convicted and sentenced to jail for 85
days. He did not report to work February 16; and Management discharged him that day
when it learned of his sentence. On April 19 the grievant was released and reported to the
plant, but was not permitted to return to his job. On April 26 he reported for work to the
Personnel Office. He was denied work and told there was no chance of a job as a new
employee.
The Union contends that Management violated Paragraph 104 of the National Agreement
when it denied the grievant’s request for a leave of absence, hence, he was not absent
without reasonable cause. Paragraph 104 provides as follows:
FORMAL LEAVE OF ABSENCE FOR PERSONAL REASONS.
(104) Employees requesting formal leave of absence shall first

make application in writing to the Personnel Department on the form
provided. Such leave of absence will be granted to an employee for
not more than ninety days on approval of the Local Management
when the services of the employee are not immediately required
and there are employees available in the plant capable of doing his
work.
The Corporation does not deny that the grievant applied in writing for 90 days’ leave for
personal reasons, that his services "were not immediately required," or that there were
"employees available in the plant capable of doing his work." Its position is that provision
for "approval" in Paragraph 104 necessarily implies that Local Management had discretion
to disapprove the leave of absence the grievant sought, which was without reasonable
cause. Otherwise, it argues, Management could not deny a leave of absence, for example,
to an employee to work for a competitor, yet he would accumulate seniority under
Paragraph 105. It asserts that denying Management discretion under Paragraph 104
makes for inconsistency with Paragraph 103, giving a foreman discretion to deny a leave
for 30 days or less, especially as Paragraph 111 permits a return to work before leave
expires. Finally, it points out that jailed employees have been disciplined for absence
without reasonable cause, yet it does not appear that any had ever before sought or
obtained a leave of absence, or that the denial of leave under Paragraph 104 has ever
been appealed to the Umpire in any case.
The Union’s position is that when the conditions prescribed by Paragraph 104 are met
leave must be approved, that the provision that "leave of absence will be granted" is
mandatory in such a case and denies Management discretion to disapprove. It contends
that the phrase, "on approval of the Local Management," does not mean that leave of
absence is "subject to" Local Management’s approval, but merely designates the authority
within the Corporation to approve it, under Paragraph 114. The Union also introduced
evidence of employees who were discharged when sentenced to jail and then reinstated
and returned to work at the local plant without loss of seniority after serving their
sentences.
In the Umpire’s opinion, the terms of Paragraph 104 providing for "approval of the Local
Management" do not give Local Management discretion to deny an employee a leave of
absence for personal reasons when his services "are not immediately required and there
are employees available in the plant capable of doing his work." Otherwise, it would be
pointless to prescribe the conditions under which a leave of absence "will be granted", or to
provide, as the National Agreement does, (Paragraphs 103-110, 112-113a) that some
leaves of absence "will (or shall) be granted" and others "may be granted". Thus,
Paragraph 104 provides that leaves of absence "will be granted", while Paragraph 105
provides that such leaves "may be extended" but extension requires approval of the Plant
Manager. (Emphasis supplied.) Elsewhere in the Agreement are provisions that certain
matters are "subject to approval." (Paragraphs 59, 63b and 75.) Lacking evidence that the
parties intended otherwise the Umpire must conclude that they employed different terms to
express differences in meaning and that the provision in Paragraph 104 that "leave of
absence will be granted", given compliance with the conditions stated, was intended to be
mandatory. This is not to say that such a leave is automatic; Local Management may
question whether the prescribed conditions exist, but if they do "approval of the Local
Management" must follow. This Interpretation accords with the language of Paragraph 104
and gives effect to all its terms. It is consistent, not inconsistent, with Paragraph 103, which
provides for informal leave of absence up to 30 days "upon application of the employee to
and approval by his foreman." Paragraph 103 does not require the employee seeking
leave to show compliance with any conditions.
There is precedent for an interpretation that provisions for Management’s approval do not
necessarily imply discretion to disapprove. Umpire Decision C-295 held that provisions for
posting "notices approved by the Local Managements" required Management to approve
posting where the notice was of a type listed in the Agreement and its language was
unobjectionable.
The Corporation’s argument that it is "inconsistent" to deny Management discretion to

disapprove a leave of absence when such absence without leave would not be with
reasonable cause is not persuasive. There is nothing to indicate that when the parties
referred to "personal reasons" they intended "reasonable cause." Again, that seniority
accumulates during leave of absence is no reason to disregard what appears to be the
plain meaning of Paragraph 104. Before the 1961 Agreement seniority did "not accumulate
during the period of formal leave of absence for personal reasons." There is no suggestion
that the 1961 change was intended to affect the granting of leaves. Whether, as the
Corporation contends, a decision that it lacks discretion under Paragraph 104 to deny a
leave of absence when the prescribed conditions exist would require it to grant a leave to
an employee to work elsewhere is not in issue in this case. There is, likewise, no occasion
to express an opinion on the Union’s assertion that what is a personal reason is for the
employee concerned to decide. In this case, it is not denied that the leave of absence the
grievant applied for was for personal reasons.
The fact that there have been no previous cases before the Umpire under Paragraph 104
is not irrelevant. But there is no evidence of any practice in which the Union has
acquiesced or sufficient to support a view that the parties have interpreted Paragraph 104
to accord with the Corporation’s position.
For the reasons stated, the Umpire concludes that the grievance should be sustained and
the discharge of the grievant set aside. Under Paragraph 111a an "employee on leave may
return to work in line with his seniority before the expiration of his leave," on not less than 7
days’ notice to Management. The union asserts, and it is not disputed, that the grievant
reported for work on April 19 and that on April 26 he again reported ready to work. Back
pay should be paid from April 26, or such later date as would be "in line" with his
"seniority".
DECISION
The discharge of the grievant shall be rescinded, and he shall be reinstated, with back pay
in accordance with this opinion.
January 21, 1967
/S/Abner Brodie
Umpire
No. L-53
February 13, 1967
Paragraph 102:
"New Job"
GRIEVANCE:
CHEVROLET MOTOR DIVISION, FLINT ASSEMBLY PLANT, FLINT, MICHIGAN—

APPEAL
CASE L-180
"I charge Management of violating Par #102 N.A. and/or L.W.A. Demand new rate and
classification be established for the camber and caster operation. Demand the above
violation be corrected at once." S/DO
NOTE: At the Shop Committee Meeting held on April 22, 1965 the Union amended the
grievance to read:
"Further demand that all employees involved be made whole for all losses and/or benefits."
In the Matter of:
United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America, AFL-CIO,

Local #659
and
General Motors Corporation, Chevrolet-Flint Assembly -- Appeal Case L-180
The Union seeks a new classification and to negotiate a rate for the caster and camber
operation, performed on the final assembly line by employees classified as "Assemblers".
The issue is whether changes in that operation for the 1965 model created a "new job"
within the meaning of Paragraph 102 of the National Agreement.
On earlier models caster and camber were set on a geometric machine on the frame line.
The operator punched a combination of buttons on the control panel, as indicated on a
manifest accompanying the chassis, referring by code number to the body and other
components to be assembled down the line. The machine, thus activated, came down on
the chassis and exerted pressure on the frame, simulating the weight of those
components. This opened a gap between the upper control arm of each front wheel and
the frame into which the operator bolted shims and fixed the caster and camber so set. An
inspector spot checked following the setting of the caster and camber.
The 1965 and later models carried a new front end suspension. The geometric machine is
no longer used to set caster and camber; they are now set during the initial assembly of
the front end suspension. Assemblers now check and, if necessary, adjust caster and
camber on the completed car on the final assembly line. There, two operators, working as
a team and using bubble gauges, check the caster and camber on each front wheel. If the
bubble is not centered between two points marked on the caster gauge the lower control
arm is moved by turning a nut on the strut rod until the bubble is centered. The other
operator then locks the setting by tightening a bolt with an air driven wrench. Camber is
similarly checked and adjusted. If the operators cannot make the proper adjustments they
reject the vehicle and it is taken to the final repair area. Following the caster and camber
operation is a spot check by an Inspector.
The Union contends that the caster and camber operation since 1965 entails more skill,
effort and responsibility than formerly. It maintains that the present operation merges the
inspection functions of reading and interpreting gauges with the assembly functions of
making adjustments, that the duties of the employees go beyond the Assembler
classification and merge the skills and the responsibilities of the Assembler and Inspection
classifications and constitute a "new job" within the principles announced in Umpire
Decision J-102.
The Corporation contends that the functions of the operators in adjusting and tightening
are traditional duties of the Assembler classification, performed with Assemblers’ tools; and
that merely determining whether a bubble on a gauge is within limits which are plainly
marked requires no special skill or training and involves no significant elements of the
Inspection classification but is within the scope of the Assembler classification which
involves the use of gauges on other jobs.
OPINION
The Union has the burden of establishing that the operations in question require
substantially greater or different skill or effort, or impose substantially greater responsibility
than the former caster and camber operation and involve characteristic elements of
inspection. New tools or machinery, alone, do not require the establishing of a new job.
Umpire Decision J-102, which the Union cites to support its claim, concerned employees
classified as Assemblers who had taken over functions formerly performed by Inspectors -
Final Car. The Umpire decided that their jobs merged functions of the Assembler and
Inspector - Final Car classifications. Here, the rotating and tightening of nuts and washers
to make adjustments is Assemblers’ work. The claim that inspection functions are
performed rests only upon the fact that the employees look at bubble gauges to determine
whether adjustments should be made and whether they have been completed. On the
basis of the evidence, including his examination of a model of the front end suspension
and the bubble gauges, the Umpire is of the opinion that the Union has not established that
the present caster and camber operation and, particularly, determining whether a bubble
on a gauge is between two points marked, entail substantially greater or different skill,
effort or responsibility than was formerly required of the employees in deciding upon the
shims to fix the caster and camber. Accordingly, the grievance must be dismissed.
DECISION
February 13, 1965
/S/Abner Brodie
Umpire
No. L-54
MARCH 4, 1967
Paragraph 102:
"New Job":
Alleged Violation Local Wage Agreement
GRIEVANCE:
FISHER BODY DIVISION, GRAND BLANC PLANT, GRAND BLANC, MICHIGAN—

APPEAL
CASE L-3
"M/R emp. protests Mgt. right to reclassify Plant 40 repair work without negociating with
Shop Comm. This work is sk. trades oper. and belongs to Maint trade. Demand this
practice be stopped immediately." S/MC
"Chg. Mgt. with viol of Local Wage Agreement. demand Mgt. assigne proper employes and
pay proper wage rate for jobs in Plt 40, also demand employes presentley employed be
paid proper rate for all time invold."
"Chg. Mgt. eliminating my job classif. in Plt. #40 Repair, which to my knowledge has been
a skilled classif. for last 8 yrs. Demand Mgt. restore Millwright classif, as per past practice
& M/W do own work as before." S/VE, ME, and LS
"Chg. Mgt. is intentionally eliminating M/W from part of their rightful duties in Plt. #40,
useing prod. emps to heat & straighten A-Frames with tools (torches) formally used by
M/W’s classif. when repairing rolling stock for Fisher Plts. Demand Millwrights be returned
& proform their former duties as before." S/LS
"Chg. Mgt. with violation of Local Wage Agreement. Demand Mgt. assign skilled emp’s, &
pay proper wage rate for jobs in Plt. #40 also present emp’s assigned be paid proper rate
for all time on this job."
file://C:\Users\bobology\AppData\Local\Temp\Framework\l-054_13A559CA.htm 3/22/2011
Grievances dismissed. (Entire decision should be read)
In the matter of:

Local #1292
and
General Motors Corporation, Fisher Body Division Grand Blanc Plant -- Appeal Case L-3
The issue in this case is whether Management violated the Local Wage Agreement by
assigning the repair of certain 9-foot racks and "A" frames to employees in a new "Rack
Repair" classification, established under Paragraph 102 of the National Agreement, instead
of to employees in the "Millwright" classification.
Between 1956 and September, 1964, each Fisher Body fabrication plant maintained and
repaired its own steel "A" frames and 9-foot racks, used in shipping sheet metal parts to
assembly plants. At the local plant this work was done at what is now known as Table #1
by employees in the skilled trades classification of "Millwright." They used "C" clamps,
grinders, shims, portable hydraulic jacks, cutting torches, pry bars, mandrils, hoists,
brackets and other tools and equipment to straighten and align frame members and racks,
cut off and replace damaged components, etc. Their job was to make racks serviceable;
and they decided what to do, how to do it, and what set-ups and methods to use.
In September, 1964, the Fisher Body Division centralized repair and maintenance of "A"
frames and 9-foot racks for the entire division at the local plant. As a result, the weekly
volume of work there increased from the repair of about 50 racks and 75 "A" frames to the
repair of 1200 racks and 1900 "A" frames. Management classified repairs as "Major" and
"minor," added new tables and transferred certain material handling employees to a
previously dormant "Salvage Mechanic" classification to work at the new tables on minor
repairs. Millwrights have continued to work at Table #1 on major repairs; they also make
needed minor repairs on frames and racks coming to them for major repairs. After these
grievances were appealed to the Umpire and then returned to the Second Step,
Management established the "Rack Repair" classification, to which it transferred the
employees working on minor repairs.
The Union has never agreed to the Rack Repair classification. It maintains that all 9-foot
rack and A-frame repairs, whether called "minor" or "major," are Millwrights’ work. The
union’s position is that there was no significant change in the nature of the repair work on
racks and frames in September, 1964, or thereafter; there was merely an increase in the
volume of work. Testimony for the Union was that the same tools, fixtures and methods are
used for minor repairs as for major, except that on Table #1 portable hydraulic jacks are
used while on the other tables the jacks are in fixed, but adjustable, positions; that major
and minor repair work are of the same type, major repairs merely requiring more work,
such as the cutting off and replacing of damaged components, while minor repairs "just
need to be squared up." There was also evidence that on occasion a Rack Repair
employee has worked on Table #1, and that Millwrights on the second shift have worked
on minor repairs on the new tables.
The Union acknowledges that Millwrights perform a variety of maintenance and repair work
in the plant, involving the reading of blueprints, the use of precision instruments, a
knowledge of stresses and strains, some mathematical calculations, work on machine
layouts, etc., and that Rack Repair employees lack the qualifications of Millwrights. It
contends, however, that at the local plant the Millwright classification has a broad scope,
encompassing a wide variety of work at various levels of skill; and that work at the lower
levels of a skill is not outside or removed from the scope of a skilled trades classification
merely because unskilled employees, not qualified to be journeymen, may be able to do it.
It points out that it is work which is classified and not the level of skill and ability with which
it is performed.
The Corporation’s claim that minor repairs are a "new job" under Paragraph 102 rests on
testimony that Management mechanized and reduced minor repairs to routine and
repetitive work by equipping the new repair tables with fixed hydraulic jacks operated by
hand and foot controls, stationary stop block and fixtures, table tops scribed with the form
of properly aligned "A" frames, etc., so that the operator need merely place out-of-line and
out-of-square frames and racks in position in fixtures on the table, activate the controls and
the fixed jacks do the rest, squaring the racks and forcing the frames into alignment
against the stationary stop blocks. Occasionally, it was testified, a heating torch is applied
to the metal to make it easier to bend; and when tubular frame ends are deformed they are
easily reshaped by hammering in a mandril or wedge. As the Corporation describes the
present practice, a Salvage Mechanic employee sorts racks sent to the plant for repair,
routing major repair jobs to Millwrights at Table #1 and minor repair jobs, which include all
"A" frames, to Rack Repair employees at the other tables.
The Corporation contends that the minor repairs do not call for special skill or training, and
are significantly different from the Millwrights’ work on Table #1 which involves skill,
judgment and responsibility not only in doing the work but in deciding what and how to do it
and improvising methods and set-ups for the particular jobs. It argues that the fact that
Millwrights have repaired racks and "A" frames for a number of years does not preclude
Management’s changing the nature of the job by introducing mechanical devices and
improvements, removing from the work elements requiring Millwrights’ skill and training,
and assigning the changed job to unskilled employees.
OPINION
The Union has the burden of proof. It relies principally on the past practice at the local
plant for Millwrights to do all repair work on 9-foot racks and "A" frames to support its claim
that Management violated the Local Wage Agreement when it assigned the disputed work
to unskilled employees. It appears, however, that that practice was under different
conditions from those existing since September, 1964. In the Umpire’s view, the
segregation then of minor repairs from major, and the mechanization of the work on the
minor repairs through the introduction of new procedures and equipment resulted in
significant changes in the nature of that work. These changes were sufficient to
differentiate the work on minor repairs from the work on major on the basis of the skill,
effort and responsibility entailed, and not, as the Union argued, merely on the basis of the
amount of work involved or the level of skill and ability with which the work is done.
Under Paragraph 8 of the National Agreement, Management may change "the methods,
processes and means of manufacturing." It is work which is classified, not the employee
who performs it, the product or equipment worked on, or the skill and ability with which it is
performed. Hence, a significant change in the "methods, processes and means" of
performing work may justify Management in establishing a new job under Paragraph 102
and "a new classification and a rate covering" it. This applies to work which has historically
been performed by skilled employees as well as to any other. Such work may be assigned
to unskilled employees if changed so that it no longer entails the skill, effort and
responsibility characteristic of the skilled classification.
Evidence that Millwrights have performed the disputed work from time to time on the
second shift does not require a different result in this case. There is no claim that
Millwrights did not receive their regular wage rates. And that a Rack Repair employee may,
on occasion, have worked on Table #1 does not entitle him to the Millwrights’ classification
nor establish that work on the other tables was Millwrights’ work. Whether that Rack Repair
employee was properly paid and, if not, the amount of back wages due, if any, are matters
as to which evidence was not submitted.
On the whole record the Union has not sustained the burden of proof and the grievances
must be dismissed.
DECISION
Grievances dismissed.
March 4, 1967
/S/Abner Brodie
Umpire
No. L-72
July 31, 1967
Discipline:
Assault on Supervisor
Procedure:
Effect of Irregularities
GRIEVANCE:
CHEVROLET MOTOR DIVISION, WARREN PLANT, WARREN, MICHIGAN—APPEAL

CASE
L-483
"The union charges mgt. with a unjust suspension of this employee union demands
employee brought back to work his record cleared an paid for all time lost." S/M.N. 4-5-67
NOTE: This grievance was amended on April 6, 1967 to delete:
"Suspension." to add: "Discharge to make emp. whole for all

Benefits. The Union also charges Mgnt. with a Direct violation of
Par. #29 of N.A. by taking emp. to personal office and interrogating
him, prior to getting him a committeeman."
The grievant shall be reinstated, with back pay, until May 24, 1967, and discharged as of
that date. (Entire decision should be read.)

In the Matter of:

Local #909
and
General Motors Corporation, Chevrolet Motor Division, Chevrolet-Warren Plant, Warren,

Michigan -- Appeal Case L-483
The Union protests the discharge on April 6, 1967, of the grievant N., seniority date
November 3, 1965, classified as an "Assembler-Other than Car or Body", for an alleged
assault on April 5 on a member of supervision, Foreman S.
According to Foreman S., to whose testimony the Union objected, as discussed below, the
grievant, assigned to the assembly of mortar shells, objected to the work gloves issued to
him and insisted on a type no longer available, refused to work when ordered, and
knocked S. down and repeatedly kicked, stomped, and struck him, inflicting lacerations,
bruises, abrasions, a fractured rib and other injuries, for which he was hospitalized. S.
denied calling the grievant, a Negro, "nigger". Employee S.D. testified that he heard that
the grievant was "killing" the foreman, rushed to the area to find the foreman on the floor
and the grievant "raining blows on" him, and that as he tried to pull the grievant away and
help the foreman to his feet, the grievant kicked the foreman in the ribs and back, and
grabbed a mortar shell as if to throw it at S.D. General Foreman H.M. said that he came to
the area after Foreman S. left, and that the grievant told him that S. had called him
"nigger", so he "shoved him around a bit and pushed him down on the floor". The grievant
stands over 6 feet and weighs more than 215 pounds; S. is 5 feet 9 inches tall, and weighs
less than 150 pounds.
The substance of the grievant’s version is that Foreman S. called him "nigger" when he
asked for new gloves, snatched away from him a pair he got himself, and that as he tried
to leave the foreman to avoid trouble, the foreman charged at him, knocked him to his
knees, tried to kick him, and fell on top of him. The grievant claimed that as he again tried
to get away the foreman threatened him with a mortar shell, and that he struck the foreman
on the side of the head to make him drop the shell because he could not get it away from
him. According to employee T., the foreman called the grievant "nigger" and was the
aggressor in a fight; that as the foreman grabbed a shell to hit the grievant, the grievant
knocked him down "with a hard right" to the head, "gave him a good kick" when he started
to get up, got on top of him, and shook the shell away. T.’s statement was joined by three
other employees.
General Foreman H.M. gave the grievant notice of possible discipline for assault and sent
for his committeeman, as requested. As the grievant waited in the Plant Protection Office
for the committeeman, Labor Relations Supervisor K.M. asked for and obtained a
statement from him about the encounter with S. K.M. claimed that he merely asked for the
grievant’s version, which the grievant voluntarily gave; and that had he known that the
grievant was waiting for his committeeman, he would not have spoken to him. K.M. gave a
copy of the grievant’s statement to the committeeman, who made no objection to it.
Committeeman W., who investigated this case under Paragraph 33 of the National
Agreement, tried to get from Foreman S. his version of the events, but S., backed by
General Foreman H.M., would say only that he had been assaulted, bruised, otherwise
injured, and hospitalized; and refused to give any details.
The Union’s principal contentions may be summarized as follows: (1) Foreman S.’s refusal
to tell Committeeman W. his version violated Paragraph 33 of the National Agreement;
under Decision G-12, the Umpire should exclude S.’s testimony. (2) Labor Relations
Supervisor K.M.’s interview with the grievant violated Paragraphs 29 and 76a of the
National Agreement. (3) The grievant did not assault the foreman; there was a fight in
which the foreman was the aggressor. While the grievant deserves some penalty,
discharge is excessive. A decision as to the appropriate penalty should take account of
Management’s procedural violations, including the withholding of evidence.
(1) The Umpire should consider Foreman S.’s testimony. The Union received all the
evidence on which Management relied, including the substance of S.’s version of the
events in issue. (2) Paragraph 29 was not violated. K.M. did not know of the grievant’s
request for a committeeman; and the Union relied on the statement K.M. obtained and was
not prejudiced thereby. The Union’s claim that Management violated Paragraph 76a is
new. (3) The evidence establishes an assault; there are no mitigating factors, and the
discharge should be upheld.
OPINION
The issues before the Umpire concern (1) the exclusion of Foreman S.’s testimony; (2) the
grievant’s guilt of the assault charged; and (3) the effect of procedural irregularities, if any,
should the grievant’s guilt be established.
1. Umpire Decision G-12, upon which the Union relies in objecting to Foreman S.’s
testimony, relates to evidence of facts withheld by a party, or otherwise not disclosed, until
the Umpire Hearing. It is well settled that the Umpire should not consider such evidence. In
the present case, however, the issue does not concern evidence not previously disclosed
which the Corporation seeks to introduce at the Umpire Hearing. Here, the Union received
the version of the relevant facts, to which S. testified, before the Third Step. The Umpire,
therefore, has no basis to exclude or suppress Foreman S.’s testimony as evidence of
facts not previously disclosed, even if Management violated Paragraph 33 when Foreman
S., seconded by General Foreman H.M., refused to tell Committeeman W. his version of
the events in issue. The remedy for that will be discussed below.
2. On the question whether the grievant was guilty of the assault charged, the physical
differences, alone, between the relatively small and slender foreman and the large, strong,
well-built, and muscular grievant, tend to negative the grievant’s version of the foreman as
an aggressor and his claim that he was merely defending himself and that a fight ensued.
Even if the foreman did attack the grievant, which, in the Umpire’s view of the evidence, is
improbable, the grievant employed far more force than was reasonably necessary to repel
him. The evidence indicates that the grievant continued to beat the foreman despite
opportunities to disengage himself and leave, and that only the intervention of others
brought the beating to a stop. A careful review of the record leaves the Umpire with the
conviction that the foreman employed an offensive racial epithet which "triggered" an
attack upon him by the grievant. Even a racial epithet as offensive as the one charged,
however, cannot justify the assault, not because a supervisor’s abusive epithets are
condoned, which, of course, is not so, but because order and discipline must be preserved
in the plant. The grievance procedure is the channel for redress of abuse of an employee
by a supervisor, not physical violence. On the whole record, the Umpire finds that the
Corporation has sustained its burden of proof that the grievant committed the assault
charged.
3. The remaining questions concern procedural irregularities, if any, and their redress. In
the Umpire’s opinion, the evidence establishes the violation of Paragraph 29 charged in
the grievance. Whether or not Labor Relations Supervisor K.M. knew that the grievant had
asked for and was awaiting his committeeman is not material; under the circumstances of
this case the grievant’s presence in the Plant Protection Office should have alerted K.M. to
the possibility and he had a responsibility to ascertain the facts. The Umpire is also of the
opinion that the refusal of Foreman S. and General Foreman H.M. to give S.’s version of
the events in question to Committeeman W. violated Paragraph 33. Under that section of
the National Agreement the Union has a right to investigate a grievance appealed to the
Shop Committee so that it may be discussed properly when the Shop Committee takes it
up with Management. But when access to the facts is denied, as it was in this case, then
the purpose of Paragraph 33 is frustrated. It is not now necessary to decide what that right
to investigate includes and how far it extends; here it is clear that the refusal to give the
committeeman no more than a repetition of Management’s charge against the grievant
effectively denied the Union the right provided by the Agreement to obtain information. And
while the grievant’s offense was serious, that neither obscures nor excuses Management’s
violation of agreed procedure. See Umpire Decisions G-12 and K-93.
Finally, there is the problem of an appropriate remedy for the procedural irregularities. In
Umpire Decisions G-12 and K-93 discharges were reduced to reprimands. In the present
case, however, because of the aggravated character of the grievant’s offense, the
Corporation should not be required to continue to employ the grievant. A fair balance
between the grievant’s offense and Management’s irregularities will be struck by
reinstating the grievant to May 24, 1967, the date of the hearing in this case, and upholding
the discharge as of that date.
DECISION
The grievant shall be reinstated, with back pay, until May 24, 1967, and discharged as of
that date.
July 31, 1967
/S/ Abner Brodie
Umpire
No. L-75
September 3, 1967
Discipline:
Insubordination:
Incorrigibility
GRIEVANCE:
CHEVROLET MOTOR DIVISION, FLINT ASSEMBLY PLANT, FLINT, MICHIGAN—

APPEAL
CASE L-108
"I charge Management with an unjust penalty. I demand that I be returned to work at once
and paid all monies due me and be given all benefits due me." S/A.R.
The grievant’s discharge shall be set aside and he shall be reinstated, but without back
pay, until August 18, 1966. (Entire decision should be read.)
In the Matter of:

Local #659
and
General Motors Corporation, Chevrolet Division, Flint Assembly Plant, Flint, Michigan --
Appeal Case L-108
file://C:\Users\bobology\AppData\Local\Temp\Framework\l-075_13A56F6C.htm 3/22/2011
The Union protests the discharge on December 23, 1964, of the grievant R., seniority date
November 18, 1954, classified as "Polisher Lacquer-Sheet Metal" for violation of Shop
Rule 15, "Refusal to obey orders of Foreman or other Supervision."
May 15, 1964

Reprimand Shop Rule
#1 - ("Failure to be in
place ready to begin
work when signal is
sounded.")
May 15, 1964 Balance

of Shift Shop Rule #22
- ("Threatening,
intimidating, coercing
or interfering with
employees or
supervision at any
time.")
July 20, 1964

Disciplinary Layoff -
One Day Shop Rule
#16 - ("Refusal or
failure to do job
assignment.")
November 11, 1964

Balance of Shift Plus
Three Days Shop Rule
#16 - ("Refusal or
failure to do job
assignment.")
November 11, 1964 Thirty Days - ("Assault on supervision.")
(This penalty was originally assessed as a discharge and was subsequently settled with
the grievant’s reinstatement on a "last chance" basis on December 14, 1964.)
(December 22, 1964 The present case.)
On December 22, 1964, the grievant, an experienced polisher, was not performing his job
properly and his foreman reinstructed him and directed him to observe a demonstration by
a utilityman, who relieved the grievant for that purpose. Before the demonstration was
finished, however, the grievant started back to work. The foreman again told him to watch
the utilityman’s demonstration, but he turned his back to it. When the grievant resumed
work his foreman ordered him to do the job in the same way as the utilityman, but he did
not and fell behind the line. He was then suspended, and discharged the following day. On
that day, December 23, the grievant was admitted to a hospital where he remained until
December 29, 1964. Effective December 23, 1964, he was granted benefits under
sickness and accident insurance for disability for the maximum insured period of 52 weeks,
and has been totally disabled ever since. His ailments included a kidney disorder, arterio
sclerotic heart disease, myocardial ischemia, and angina pectoris.
According to the grievant he felt well on some days, but on December 22 was suffering
from chest pains and felt ill. He considered that his illness may have impaired his mental
faculties and caused him to behave as he did. He acknowledged, however, that he did not
explain to his foreman that he was ill and could not perform his job properly; and he neither
went nor sought permission to go to the plant Medical Department. The first claim that the
grievant’s illness caused him to act as he did on December 22 appears in the Union’s
Statement of Unadjusted Grievance, February 25, 1965. There, the Union, after noting that
the "grievant was a patient in the hospital where he was being treated for a coronary
condition" when notified of his discharge on December 23, stated that the "Union does not
pretend to be a medical authority, but would point out the fact that on the day of
suspension the grievant was not entirely rational."
On December 29, 1964, the grievant claimed workmen’s compensation for injury to his
heart and nervous and circulatory systems from excessively heavy work at the local plant.
This claim, which the Corporation denied, was settled on August 18, 1966, by a lump sum
payment of $12,000, in exchange for which the grievant agreed to give up all claims
against the Corporation for workmen’s compensation, pensions, insurance and any other
benefits which might accrue if his discharge were set aside, and, in writing, quit his
employment and agreed that pending grievances should be dismissed.
After the case was first appealed to the Umpire, by agreement of the parties, it was
referred back to the Third Step for Management to include its evidence and contention that
the grievant had quit his employment.
The Union does not deny that the grievant violated Shop Rule No. 15, but it contends that,
despite the grievant’s "last chance" status, he was not incorrigible, that the penalty was too
severe for an offense which it characterizes as "minor," and that the grievant’s illness and
pain he was suffering caused him to act as he did. It maintains that the sole issue before
the Umpire is the propriety of the grievant’s discharge, that the Union did not consent to
the withdrawal of the grievance, and that the Umpire should not rule on the issue of the
grievant’s alleged quit.
The Corporation contends that in view of the grievant’s prior disciplinary record and,
especially, the "last chance" basis on which he was reinstated, the undisputed evidence
that he violated Shop Rule No. 15 establishes that he was incorrigible. It maintains, further,
that the grievant’s quit is an issue in this case, having been raised by Management in the
prior record, and that even if it should be found that the grievant’s discharge was improper
the Umpire cannot order his reinstatement since the grievant voluntarily quit his
employment on August 18, 1966.
OPINION
The first question is whether the evidence establishes that the grievant is incorrigible. On
this question the Corporation has the burden of proof. The grievant’s entire disciplinary
record was accumulated in the last seven months of his employment; before that his
record was unblemished. Before the 30-day layoff assessed November 11, 1964, in
connection with the grievant’s reinstatement on a "last chance" basis, the most severe
penalty against him was a three-day layoff. As of the day following his suspension, the day
on which he was discharged, the grievant was found totally disabled, suffering from serious
cardiac, circulatory and other ailments. These must have developed some time before the
grievant was discharged, and progressed to the stage at which they totally disabled the
grievant during the period in which he accumulated his disciplinary record. While there was
no medical corroboration of the grievant’s claim that his ill health was responsible for his
behavior on the day in question, it is not unreasonable to conclude that the state of his
health had some effect upon him and his work. His failure to tell his foreman that he was
sick and in pain was not inconsistent with the physical and mental state in which he
claimed he was on the day he was suspended. On the entire record the Umpire is not
convinced that the grievant was incorrigible and could not adapt to industrial employment.
The grievant’s "last chance" status does not change the situation; discharge of an
employee in that status does not automatically follow another infraction. The question is
still whether a review of the employee’s entire record warrants a conclusion that he is
incorrigible.
The next question is the effect of Management’s settlement with the grievant of his
workmen’s compensation claim and his quit and withdrawal of his grievance as part of that
compromise. There is no evidence that the Union participated in or agreed to the
settlement and withdrawal of the grievance; and the Corporation does not claim that a
grievance, at least one which has passed the first step, may be settled directly with a
grievant and withdrawn or dismissed without the Union’s consent. Had the grievant not
quit, therefore, he would have been entitled to reinstatement. He did quit, however, but not
until August 18, 1966. He is entitled, therefore, to reinstatement until that date. Since the
grievant has been totally disabled since the date of his discharge, he is not entitled to back
pay. The Umpire has no jurisdiction to consider questions concerning the grievant’s right to
pension, insurance, disability, or other benefits which may arise as a result of this decision.
DECISION
The grievant’s discharge shall be set aside and he shall be reinstated, but without back
pay, until August 18, 1966.
September 3, 1967
/S/ Abner Brodie
Umpire
No. L-77
September 24, 1967
Paragraph 72:
Incapacity:
Availability for Work
GRIEVANCE:
FISHER BODY DIVISION, FLINT PLANT NO. 1, FLINT, MICHIGAN—APPEAL CASE L-40
"Charge Mgt. with violation of Local Seniority Agreement. Request I be returned to work
and paid for all time lost."
AMENDED - Management-Shop Committee Meeting of June 14, 1966 as follows:
"Charge Management with a violation of Paragraph 72 of the National Agreement. Ask that
I be returned to work and paid for time lost plus all other benefits due me."
The grievance is dismissed. (Entire decision should be read.)
In the Matter of:

Local #581
and
General Motors Corporation, Fisher Body Division, Flint Plant No. 1 -- Appeal Case L-40
file://C:\Users\bobology\AppData\Local\Temp\Framework\l-077_13A5793B.htm 3/22/2011
The Union protests the layoff on July 16, 1965, of the grievant L., seniority date October
19, 1950, classified as "Double Crank Press Operator," claiming a violation of Paragraph
72 of the National Agreement, which provides:
"Any employee who has been incapacitated at his regular work by

injury or compensable occupational disease while employed by the
Corporation, will be employed in other work on a job that is
operating in the plant which he can do without regard to any
seniority provisions of this Agreement, except that such employee
may not replace an employee with longer seniority, provided,
however, that by written agreement between local Management and
the Shop Committee, any such employee may be placed or retained
on a job he can do without regard to seniority rules."
On April 12, 1962, the grievant had a surgical operation for a hernia caused by an injury at
work. He returned to work June 11, 1962, and was on light jobs for several weeks. He was
then returned to his regular job on a double crank press, but complained that this caused
him pain in the area of the surgery and was laid off. He was awarded workmen’s
compensation from August 29, 1962, until June 2, 1965, excepting some short periods of
work, including one from March 23, 1962, to April 3, 1964, when he worked as a sweeper
until he complained of pain when lifting trash barrels. Workmen’s compensation was
terminated June 2, 1965. He was again assigned to work on a double crank press on July
13, 1965, after a physical examination. For a few days he kept up with his work, then fell
behind. When he complained that the work caused him pain, he was laid off on July 16,
1965, as "unable to perform available work." According to the Union, the grievant can work
as outside truck driver; inside truck driver; sweeper (excepting the lifting of trash barrels);
cleaner; small press operator; and large press operator, his regular job, if that does not
require left side movement. In all these jobs employees with less seniority are employed.
The large press operation is higher-rated than some, if not all, the other jobs.
According to the Corporation, the double crank press operation requires no greater
exertion than work on the small press and possibly less bending and twisting; and the
other jobs the grievant claims he can do may require as much or more bending, twisting,
turning, pushing and reaching, as well as strenuous lifting. Since his layoff on July 16,
1965, the grievant has done a variety of work without ill effects, including car washing and
polishing for automobile dealers, scrubbing and waxing floors in a supermarket with
manually guided power equipment, installing hot water heaters and eaves troughs for an
appliance dealer, and remodeling, roofing and repairing on his own house.
Between June 27, 1962, and July 12, 1965, Dr. J., the Plant Medical Director, made 12
examinations of the grievant, of which at least 4 were complete physical examinations. He
also had reports from other physicians who examined the grievant, two of which implied
that the grievant’s difficulty, if any, might be psychological. According to Dr. J., neither he
nor any other physician who examined the grievant found any objective, physical basis for
the work on the large or double crank press to cause the grievant pain; but he
acknowledged that pain is a subjective symptom. In April 1965, when a physical
examination at the University of Michigan Hospital, which Dr. J. arranged for the grievant,
revealed no objective symptoms, the Neurosurgery Department there suggested to the

grievant that local anesthesia might relieve the pain he complained about, but the grievant
rejected the suggestion. On July 12, 1965, Dr. J. made a complete physical examination of
the grievant and found him physically fit for work on the double crank press. In March
1967, Dr. J. again sent the grievant to the University of Michigan hospital. On the basis of
the grievant’s description of his symptoms it was concluded that the grievant had a
neuralgia, but the examining physician could not "give any sort of authoritative opinion as
to whether or not this has been caused by the previously described operation" for hernia.
The grievant refused nerve surgery which, it was reported, might provide relief.
OPINION
The question presented in this case, on which the Union has the burden of proof, is
whether the grievant, by reason of his injury, "has been incapacitated at his regular work"
and, in violation of Paragraph 72, is denied "other work on a job... he can do" which
employees with shorter seniority are doing. The only evidence that the grievant is so
incapacitated is his own statement; and that is the only basis for any physician’s report on
which his claim can rest. The diagnosis in the report of March 6, 1967, from the University
of Michigan Hospital, which the Union, as well as the Corporation, offered, does not
support the Union’s claim. Even assuming that the neuralgia incapacitates the grievant
only for work on the double crank press, the physician’s report cannot attribute it to the
grievant’s injury and operation. Since his layoff, the grievant has performed various jobs
elsewhere without pain; his regular job seems to be the only one which causes him any
difficulty. The grievant’s testimony as to what there was about the double crank press job
to cause him pain, was confusing and somewhat evasive, but seemed to come down to the
twisting and turning involved. His demonstration, however, of the movements which, he
asserted, caused him pain seemed to involve only minimal twisting and turning. And on a
plant visit to observe the jobs in the press area, it did not appear to the Umpire that some
of the other jobs on the small or single crank presses which the grievant claims he can
perform involved substantially different movements or exertion. Before the amendment of
the grievance on June 14, 1966, it was not asserted that the grievant was incapacitated
from doing his regular job. While the grievant’s willingness to accept a lower-rated job is
some evidence supporting his claim, it cannot take the place of the objective medical
evidence needed to satisfy the Union’s burden of proof and overcome the findings of
Management’s doctors. See Umpire Decisions C-276, G-18, J-9 and K-85. On the record
presented, the Umpire cannot find that the Union has sustained its burden of proof that
Management has violated Paragraph 72. Accordingly, the grievance should be dismissed.
DECISION
September 24, 1967
/S/Abner Brodie
Umpire
UMPIRE DECISION
No. L-80
October 6, 1967
Paragraph 64(d):
Termination of Seniority:
Notice to Return to Work
GRIEVANCE:
CHEVROLET MOTOR DIVISION, WILLOW RUN PLANT, YPSILANTI, MICHIGAN—

APPEAL
CASE L-254
"I, charge Management with violation of Par. 64 of the National Agreement, Demand all
lost pay and my seniority re-instated." S/E.B.
The grievance is sustained. The grievant’s seniority shall be reinstated with back pay.
(Entire decision should be read.)
In the Matter of:

Local #65
and
General Motors Corporation, Chevrolet Motor Division, Willow Run Plant, Ypsilanti,
Michigan -- Appeal Case L-254
file://C:\Users\bobology\AppData\Local\Temp\Framework\l-080_13A5828E.htm 3/22/2011
The issue in this case is the propriety of the termination, under Paragraph 64(d) of the
National Agreement, of the employment of the grievant B., seniority date December 13,
1955, classified as a "Stock Chaser," and assigned to work in the material department on
the first shift with hours from 7 a.m. to 3:30 p.m. Paragraph 64(d) reads:
"Seniority shall be broken for the following reasons:
(d) If the employee fails to return to work within three working days
after being notified to report for work, and does not give a
satisfactory reason."
The grievant was laid off on July 1, 1966, and instructed then to return to work on Monday,
August 15. On Wednesday, August 10, he received the following letter from Management:
"Production Operations have been rescheduled to begin on August

29, 1966.
In accordance with this change, you are hereby notified to report for
work at 7 A.M. on AUG 15 1966.
We are sincerely looking forward to seeing you on the above date. If

for some reason you will not return on the above date, please notify
the Personnel Department."
The last paragraph of the letter was included, according to the Corporation, because
Management was doubtful about the return of many employees and was trying to ascertain
for whom it would have to hire replacements.
The grievant was not at work on Monday, August 15, but at 4:18 p.m. appeared at the
Plant Security Office, to which employees report absences, to say that he was on his way
to Milwaukee to get his sick wife and bring her to Detroit, and would try to be at work on
Wednesday, August 17. He next appeared at the plant at about 3:34 a.m., Thursday,
August 18. According to the grievant, he was on his way back from Milwaukee, and
stopped at the plant to say that his return had been delayed, that he could not work the
shift beginning at 7 a.m. that morning, but would be at work Friday, August 19. When the
grievant came to work on August 19, and explained to his foreman that he had not come in
earlier because he had had to rest on Tuesday after his trip to Milwaukee on Monday, that
it was too hot Wednesday to drive back to Detroit until the evening and that he could not
work the Thursday shift because he had to get his wife and six children settled at home,
Management terminated his seniority on the ground that he had not returned "to work
within three working days after being notified to report for work and... (did) not give a
satisfactory reason."
The principal question is whether the letter to the grievant triggered an automatic
termination of his seniority under Paragraph 64(d) because he was not present at the plant
ready, willing and able to work, "within three working days" of its effective date, August 15.
The letter told all laid-off employees to whom it was sent, and not only those who did not
expect to return to work at all and for whom replacements would be needed, that, as an
alternative to reporting for work, they should notify Management if "for some reason" they
would "not return on the" date given. It would seem to follow, then, that a laid-off employee
could notify Management that he expected to report for work on some other date than that
stated, especially as there was no reference to the consequences of a failure to be present
in the plant for work within the time stated in Paragraph 64(d). And this was consistent with
Management’s purpose to ascertain who would be in its work force.
It is not necessary to consider whether a simple, unqualified notice under Paragraph 64(d)
to report for work on a given date must state the consequences of a failure "to return to
work within three working days"; it may be assumed in this case that it need not. But the
letter in the present case was not such a simple, unqualified notice. It included an
alternative to reporting for work which qualified it and made it ambiguous, at best. It was
not "unmistakable in directness and clear in purpose" (see Umpire Decision E-284).
Rather, it cast on the employee a burden of interpreting it at the risk, if his interpretation
was not Management’s, of enabling Management to take a "step equivalent in some of its
effect... to a discharge." See Umpire Decision D-28.
This is not to say that the grievant, with impunity, could have postponed indefinitely
notifying Management of his intention to return to work. But in the present case the
grievant told Management, within three working days after the effective date of the notice
to him, that he intended to work. And whether the three days be computed as three 24-
hour periods, as in Umpire Decision E-241, or by excluding the day upon which the period
begins and allowing all of the last day to comply, as in Umpire Decisions F-8 and G-97,
within that period the grievant told Management when he would be at work which, under
the computation rule of Decisions F-8 and G-97, was the next shift beginning after the end
of the three-day period. Umpire Decisions E-241 and F-8 point out that a report by
telephone before the end of three working days after the effective date of notice under
Paragraph 64(d) will preserve the seniority of an employee who does not appear at the
plant for work within the three-day period. In Decision F-8 the employee reported by
telephone on Wednesday, August 4, but did not appear at the plant. The Umpire noted that
"Management does not contend that such a report was defective" and pointed out that "a
report on Wednesday would have satisfied the requirements of the National Agreement"
had the effective date of the notice been Friday, July 30, as contended by the Union.
Since, however, he found the notice date to have been Thursday, July 29, the report on
Wednesday was too late. Umpire Decision E-241 held that by a telephone call just before
the end of three working days, the employee "reported his availability for work" and
preserved his seniority. Although holding that under the circumstances of the present case
the grievant preserved his seniority, this decision is not a holding that the grievant would
have been free to put off reporting for work until it suited him to do so. Management’s
power to discharge or otherwise penalize for absence without reasonable cause is not
impaired by anything decided here.
Management’s use in the past, without protest from the Union, of letters similar to the one
in issue here, does not foreclose the Union in the present case without evidence that in like
situations the Union has accepted the position the Corporation now takes.
To summarize, while an unequivocal notice from Management or one stating the

consequences of not being present at work within three working days would probably have
supported the Corporation’s position, in view of the ambiguous notice from Management
and the grievant’s reports of his intentions, and for the reasons stated, the Umpire finds
that the grievant’s seniority was improperly terminated and should be reinstated with back
pay.
DECISION
The grievance is sustained. The grievant’s seniority shall be reinstated with back
pay.
/S/Abner Brodie
Umpire
October 6, 1967
No. L-102
November 19, 1968
Probationary Employee:
Separation from Employment:
Paragraph 108
GRIEVANCE:
CHEVROLET MOTOR DIVISION, GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, LOS ANGELES

PLANT, VAN NUYS, CALIFORNIA—APPEAL CASE L-359
"I charge J. K. in violation Para 72 N.A., Para 76 N.A. I was injured (right upper arm &
elbow) on job (hood assembly) 11/26/66.
"On 12-5-66 K. gave me 24 hr. notice of employment termination on following counts (1)
unsat. employee (2) inability to function on job assignments. Demand compliance Para 72
N.A. to resolve grievances."
S/D.R.C.
In the Matter of:
United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America (UAW)
and
file://C:\Users\bobology\AppData\Local\Temp\Framework\l-102_13A58BE1.htm 3/22/2011
General Motors Corporation, Chevrolet Motor Division, Los Angeles Plant, Van Nuys,
California -- Appeal Case L-359
The Union claims that the complainant, C., date of hire October 20, 1966, was denied sick
leave to which he was entitled under Paragraph 108 of the National Agreement, also that
C.’s separation from employment on December 6, 1966 violated Paragraph 56. By
amendment at the Second Step of the grievance procedure the Union substituted the
Paragraph 108 claim for one under Paragraph 72, which provides that an employee
incapacitated at his regular work "by injury or compensable occupational disease... will be
employed in other work on a job that is operating in the plant which he can do..." Later, the
Union withdrew its charge of a violation of Paragraph 76, reserving the right to raise that
question in other temporary employees’ cases.
Paragraph 56 provides:

layoff or discharge is not for cause may be taken up as a grievance.
Such claims must be stated in detail in writing at the time of the filing
of the grievance and must be handled in accordance with the
provisions of Paragraph (77)."
Paragraph 108 provides:
"In compensable injury... cases, sick leave will be granted

automatically and seniority will accumulate for the full period of legal
temporary disability. Temporary employees disabled by
compensable injury... shall be given credit for the period of such
disability toward acquiring seniority."
The complainant was hired into the surplus labor pool. On November 8 he was assigned to
the console cluster installation on the Trim Line, and started working there November 9.
Between November 9 and December 6, 1966, the complainant had several job
assignments. According to Management, he was not a satisfactory employee in any; he
complained that work on a console cluster operation hurt his hand, that bending into cars
on an air conditioner assembly job hurt his side, and that he could not do a rear spring
shackle job because it hurt his shoulder; and on a subassembly operation, on which he
worked between the console cluster and air conditioner assembly jobs, he failed to follow
instructions to provide banks of subassemblies and fell behind production needs. On
November 23, Management told him that he had not been satisfactory and would be given
a last chance on a hood hanging job and laid off if not satisfactory there. But, according to
Management, he did not follow instructions as to the manner of performing the hood
hanging job and injured his arm November 26, was on restricted duty and returned to the
hood hanging job November 30, but continued to work in the same way and again
complained about his arm. On December 1 Management decided to release him. He was
absent on December 2, returned to work on December 5 and worked a full shift on that day
and on December 6 and was released. He received disability compensation benefits until
January 11, 1967.
The complainant claimed that on his second day on the console cluster job he cut his
finger and it became infected, hence, he could not continue on that job and was assigned
to the subassembly operations where, he said, he maintained production and no one
complained about his work, but on the air conditioner job his infected finger caused him
pain in his arm and side, he was too tall for the rear spring shackle job and it hurt his
shoulder, and on the hood hanging operation he had to favor his infected hand and could
not do the job as he had been instructed.
According to the employee who broke him in on the console cluster operation, the
complainant’s work was good, but he cut his finger on the first day on that job and could
not continue it.
Medical Department records indicated that the complainant cut his finger on October 29
and that it had healed before he started the console cluster job on November 9; and he
acknowledged that this was what may have happened but that he may have reopened the
cut on the console cluster. There was, however, no record of further treatment of his finger
or anything else between November 9 and 26; treatment of his arm followed the injury on
November 26.
(1) The Union made no claim under Paragraph 56 until the Umpire Hearing. Furthermore, it
did not comply with the requirement of a detailed statement of its claim in writing. (2) The
complainant was not totally disabled, hence not entitled to sick leave under Paragraph 108.
(3) Paragraph 108 does not bar Management from releasing an unsatisfactory employee.
The Union’s principal contentions may be summarized as follows: (1) Although questioning
whether Paragraph 56 applies to a case like the present and reserving the right to urge in a
proper case that Paragraph 56 is inapplicable, it maintains that the grievance in the
present case was treated in the earlier steps of the grievance procedure as a Paragraph
56 claim and complied with requirements of Paragraph 56; the reference to Paragraph 72,
and later to Paragraph 108, indicated that the complainant had suffered a compensable
injury. (2) The complainant was entitled to sick leave under Paragraph 108, hence
Management could not separate him from employment because of the injury that entitled
him to sick leave.
OPINION
It is not necessary to decide whether this case is properly before the Umpire under
Paragraph 56 as well as Paragraph 108. The evidence supports a finding that the
complainant, whom Management reassigned several times because he complained that he
was unable to perform the job assigned without pain, and did not keep up with the job, and
who could or would not follow instructions so that he would not be injured, was an
unsatisfactory employee, and that this was not due to any injury suffered before November
26. As to the complainant’s injury of November 26, the evidence warrants a conclusion that
it was the consequence of the complainant’s not following instructions about the manner in
which to perform the job.
The question is whether the complainant’s injury of November 26 and Paragraph 108
exempt him from separation from employment as an unsatisfactory employee, assuming
for this discussion that an injury causing partial disability may entitle an employee to sick
leave under Paragraph 108, a question which it is not now necessary to decide. This is not
a case in which an employee, separated as unsatisfactory, became such as a
consequence of compensable injury. In the present case the complainant was an
unsatisfactory employee before he suffered the injury which, the Union asserts, protects
him under Paragraph 108 against separation; and his not following instructions caused that
injury.
Paragraph 108 must be read and interpreted with other terms of the National Agreement of
which it is a part. Whatever the decision might be in a case in which it is established that
an employee’s compensable injury caused the unsatisfactory performance for which he
was separated, in the present case Paragraph 108, when read with other provisions of the
Agreement, particularly Paragraphs 56 and 8, does not exempt the complainant from the
consequences of the fact that he was an unsatisfactory employee. His troubles on his job
did not flow from, but were rather responsible for his compensable injury. The grievance
must be dismissed.
DECISION
November 19, 1968
/S/Abner Brodie
Umpire
No. L-103
November 18, 1968
Discipline:
Absence Without Reasonable Cause:
Extent of Penalty
GRIEVANCE:
GENERAL MOTORS ASSEMBLY DIVISION, GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION,

SOUTH GATE PLANT, SOUTH GATE, CALIFORNIA—APPEAL CASE L-1672
"I protest Management’s unjustly discharging me for the alleged violation of S/R #6 and
#40. Request my record be cleared and I receive all monies and benefits due me, due to
Management’s error."
S/L.S.
The complainant shall be reinstated without back pay except for a period of 60 days prior
to the date of this award. (Entire decision should be read)
In the Matter of:
United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America
and
General Motors Corporation, General Motors Assembly Division South Gate Plant, South
Gate, California -- Appeal Case L-1672
The Union protests the discharge of the complainant S., seniority date August 13, 1956, for
the alleged violation of Shop Rules No. 6, "Absence without reasonable cause," and No.
40, "Repeated violations of shop or safety rules." The Union contended, and the
Corporation denied, that the complainant had reason to believe he had permission to be
absent, hence was absent with reasonable cause, and that, in any event, discharge was
an excessive penalty.
The complainant’s disciplinary record is as follows:
August 8, 1962 DLO Shop Rule #7 "Reporting late for work."

Balance of shift and two weeks.
February 13, 1963 DLO Shop Rule #6 "Absence without reasonable

cause." Balance of shift and 30 days.
July 8, 1963 DLO Shop Rule #10 "Wasting time or loitering in toilets
or on any Company property during working hours." Balance of shift
and 30 days.
October 21, 1965 DLO Shop Rule #36 "Assignment of wages or

frequent garnishments." Balance of shift and 2 weeks.
March 23, 1966 DLO Shop Rule #36 Balance of shift and 30 days.
(August 23, 1966 The present case)
The complainant was laid off August 1, 1966, with instructions to report to work August 22,
1966. Later, Management changed the callback date and sent the complainant a telegram
on August 16 to report that day for work on the second shift. The complainant did not
report for work but telephoned the plant on the morning of August 17. Personnel Clerk C.,
testifying for the Corporation, said that he took the call and the complainant told him that
for personal reasons, which the complainant did not specify, he would not return until
August 22. The complainant was absent August 17, 18 and 19 and reported for work
Monday, August 22. According to Labor Relations Representative M. and Foreman V., the
complainant’s supervisor, the complainant was then called for a disciplinary interview with
them and did not claim that he had permission to be absent, but merely said that he was
painting his house and considered that a sufficient reason for his absence. The decision to
discharge him was based on his absence and on his record.
The complainant was the Union’s sole witness. He testified that he told the clerk who
answered the telephone on August 17 that he could return to work that day but was
painting his house and preferred not to return until August 22, that the clerk told him to
return on the 22nd if he could not on the 17th, that he believed he had permission to be
absent until the 22nd, and that at the disciplinary interview he told this to Labor Relations
Representative M. and another member of Management whom he did not know. He denied
that Foreman V. was at the interview.

OPINION
On the record as a whole the Umpire finds that the complainant had neither permission to
be absent nor reasonable grounds to believe he had permission. Therefore, it was up to
the complainant to show that personal considerations, which by accepted standards
outweighed his duty to his employer to be present during working hours, necessitated his
absence. Umpire Decision G-156. In the opinion of the Umpire he has not shown this and
his absence was without reasonable cause.
The remaining question concerns the extent of the penalty. Considering the complainant’s
disciplinary record as a whole, including a 27-month period free of disciplinary penalties,
the Umpire is of the opinion that the grievant has not been shown to be incorrigible. But a
severe penalty is warranted. It is the Umpire’s judgment that essential justice will be
accomplished by reinstatement of the complainant without back pay except for a period of
60 days prior to the date of this award.
DECISION
The complainant shall be reinstated without back pay except for a period of 60 days prior
to the date of this award.
November 18, 1968
/S/Abner Brodie
Umpire
No. L-104
January 20, 1969
Discharge:
Alleged Absence Without Reasonable Cause
GRIEVANCE:
HYDRA-MATIC DIVISION, GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, YPSILANTI PLANT—

APPEAL -- CASE NO. L-449
"I protest discharge. I demand all money lost & my record cleared. I also protest Mr E new
rule of using a phone for this matter. This is not a practice of G.M. or Local 735. Union
demands same of N.A." S/A.V.
The grievant’s discharge shall be set aside and the penalty reduced to a 30-day
disciplinary layoff, with back pay for the balance.
In the Matter of:
General Motors Corporation, Hydra-matic Division, Ypsilanti, Michigan
and
United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America -- Appeal

Case No. L-449
At issue in this case is the propriety of the discharge on March 23, 1967, of the grievant, V,
file://C:\Users\bobology\AppData\Local\Temp\Framework\l-104_13A5A0B8.htm 3/22/2011
seniority date, May 15, 1952, for the alleged violation of Shop Rule No. 6, "Absence
without reasonable cause," on March 17, 1967. V’s disciplinary record is as follows:
December 27, 1963 Shop Rule 6 Written Reprimand
February 18, 1964 Shop Rule 6 One day disciplinary layoff
May 1, 1964 Shop Rule 6 Three days disciplinary layoff
November 27, 1964 Shop Rule 35 Verbal Reprimand
September 14, 1965 Shop Rule 6 One week disciplinary layoff
October 7, 1965 Shop Rule 6 Thirty days disciplinary layoff
January 20, 1966 Shop Rule 6 Thirty days disciplinary layoff

(Reduced from Discharge)
(March 23, 1967 The present case.)
The Corporation’s evidence was, in substance, as follows: On Friday, March 17, 1967, two
members of Management visited Dr. L, the grievant’s physician, to discuss the grievant’s
absenteeism. Dr. L told them that the grievant had been there that morning complaining
that his arms and legs were numb, that he had not examined the grievant but accepted his
description of his symptoms and had given him a "shot" of vitamin B which would not
interfere with his working, and that he gave him a statement that he could not work
whenever he said he could not. Dr. L did not tell them whether the grievant could work or
not that day. The grievant, whose shift began at 3:30 p.m., did not report to work on March
17; and some members of Management went to his apartment several times that afternoon
and evening but no one came to the door when they knocked. They went again on
Monday. The grievant was at home then, and said that his doctor had not released him for
work. The grievant returned to work on Wednesday, March 22 with a note from Dr. L that
he could not work from March 17 through 21 because of neuritis. At a disciplinary interview
he refused to answer Management’s questions about his whereabouts on March 17, but
simply referred to Dr. L’s statement. He was discharged on March 23 for absence without
reasonable cause on March 17.
The Union rested on Dr. L’s written statements. These included the one given
Management on March 22, another to the same effect to the Union on March 27, 1967,
and a third, dated April 6, 1967, stating that he had been treating the grievant since April,
1965, "for neuritis (numbness) in the hands, left arm and leg, also dizziness and
nervousness." The Union represented that the grievant had been totally and permanently
disabled by an injury suffered after his discharge, and was unable to be at the Umpire
Hearing.
The Corporation contended that the grievant’s absence on March 17 which he refused to
explain, was without reasonable cause, that Dr. L’s statements cannot be accepted at face
value because they were based on the grievant’s representations and not on an
examination and objective determination, and were merely to accommodate the grievant.
The Union contended that there is no evidence that the grievant was able to work on
March 17, that Dr. L’s written statements must be accepted at face value and conclusively
establish reasonable cause for the grievant’s absence. Finally, the Union urged that, in any
event, discharge is an excessive penalty in this case.
OPINION
The grievant had the burden of establishing that he had reasonable cause to be absent
March 17. His refusal to answer questions regarding his condition and whereabouts on that
day negated his claim of reasonable cause. His absence from home that day, which is not
denied and of which there is prima facie evidence, was not necessarily inconsistent with
his claim and his physician’s statements that he was unable to work, but Management was
entitled to an explanation, and the grievant refused to provide one. Although written
statements of Dr. L that the grievant was unable to work on March 17, 1967, on their face
provided an excuse for the grievant’s absence, they are not conclusive and were
overborne by other evidence. It cannot be found, therefore, that there was reasonable
cause for his absence. And it is not necessary to decide the effect of the evidence of Dr.
L’s oral explanation to the members of Management who visited him on March 17, or
whether his statements were merely to accommodate the grievant.
The question of penalty remains. The grievant was an employee with 15 years’ seniority.
His record of 7 penalties in 25 months, 6 for absence without reasonable cause, was bad.
But it was followed by a 14-month penalty-free period before the present infraction. These
factors, as well as the nature of the offense, are relevant in considering whether discharge
was warranted. On the whole record the Umpire is of the opinion that essential justice will
be achieved by reducing the penalty to a 30-day layoff, with back pay for the balance.
DECISION
The grievant’s discharge shall be set aside and the penalty reduced to a 30-day
disciplinary layoff, with back pay for the balance.
January 20, 1969
/S/Abner Brodie
Umpire
No. L-107
February 22, 1969
Discipline Extent of Penalty:
Effect of Paragraph 76b
GRIEVANCE:

LINDEN, NEW JERSEY—APPEAL CASE L-405
"I charge Mgt. with suspending me unjustly. Request that I be returned to work, my record
cleared, and I be paid all monies and benefits due me." S/J.D.
AMENDED: By changing "suspending" to "discharging."
The penalty against the grievant shall be reduced to a 90-day disciplinary layoff, and he
shall be reinstated with back pay for time off in excess of that. (Entire decision should be
read.)
In the Matter of:
and
General Motors Corporation, General Motors Assembly Division, Linden, New Jersey --
Appeal Case L-405

file://C:\Users\bobology\AppData\Local\Temp\Framework\l-107_13A5AA78.htm 3/22/2011
At issue is the propriety of the discharge of the grievant, seniority date January 8, 1954, for
the violation of Shop Rule No. 26: "Gambling, lottery or any other game of chance on
Company premises at any time," and Shop Rule No. 40: "Repeated violations of Shop or
Safety rules."
4/8/63 Written reprimand for being

absent without reasonable cause.
5/1/63 D.L.O. (balance of shift) for

being absent without reasonable
cause.
6/10/64 D.L.O. (balance of shift)

for reporting late for work.
9/23/65 D.L.O. (1 week) for

reporting for work under the
influence of alcohol.
12/8/65 D.L.O. (balance of shift &

2 weeks) for reporting for work
under the influence of alcohol.
5/6/66 D.L.O. (30 days) (long

term) for reporting for work under
the influence of alcohol.
(2/10/67 The present case.)
The Union admits that the grievant violated Shop Rule No. 26 but claims that discharge
was an excessive penalty in view of his long seniority and the period of good behavior
since his last previous penalty. The Union also claims that Management’s decision to
discharge the grievant took into consideration items in his personnel record, including
warnings, copies of which were not given to him, contrary to the requirements of
Paragraph 76b of the National Agreement, reading: "The employee will be tendered a copy
of any warning, reprimand, suspension, or disciplinary layoff entered on his personnel
record within three days of the action taken...."
Eight such items or "incidents" were described in Management’s Statement of Unadjusted

Grievance. Management disclaimed considering them "in establishing the extent of penalty
or in any other way in this case," but claimed that they "bear examination, as illustrations of
the grievant’s total lack of concern regarding Plant Rules and Regulations," and his
"unsatisfactory attitude," and that in view of that "background information... it is evident
that... D. was not amenable to corrective discipline." For some of these incidents
Management assessed discipline which it either rescinded entirely or agreed to remove
from the grievant’s record without back pay. In connection with other incidents
Management cautioned the grievant "concerning any recurrence of the misconduct," that
he must "improve his conduct or... discipline would follow," that it "would not tolerate any
further abuses of Shop Rules and Regulations by him in the future, and (that) any
violations would be dealt with severely."
The Corporation contends that Paragraph 76b does not apply to these items or incidents,
that they are merely background matters revealing Management’s view of the grievant’s
conduct which Management was free to caution and talk to the grievant about unless such
discussions were considered in the penalty, and they were not so considered, as is
indicated by the progression of the penalties assessed. The Corporation also maintains
that the period of good behavior since the grievant’s last previous penalty does not justify
modification of the discharge in this case, that Management’s treatment of the grievant and
its discussions of the incidents mentioned reflected recognition of his seniority, and that the
Paragraph 76b issue was a "new" contention.
OPINION
In commenting on Paragraph 76b, the Umpire in Decision J-10 pointed out "that this
provision precludes the use of information not... recorded or of which copies have not been
tendered, as a basis for discipline..." Umpire Decision J-13 held that it was error for
Management to consider "warnings or instructions given to the grievant... not simply as
background but in determining the penalty,... (when) no copies were tendered to the
grievant as required by Paragraph 76(b) of the National Agreement." In the present case
Management’s claim that "the incidents bear examination, as illustrations of the grievant’s
total lack of concern regarding Plant Rules and Regulations" and that review of them made
"it evident that... (the grievant) was not amenable to corrective discipline," compels an
inference that Management did consider the items in question in deciding that the grievant
was incorrigible and should be discharged. Whether or not Management would have
discharged the grievant without considering these other items, or was warranted in doing
so, is not the issue. On the whole record, the Umpire is of the opinion that essential justice
will be accomplished by reducing the grievant’s discharge to a 90-day disciplinary layoff,
with back pay for time off in excess of that.
DECISION
The penalty against the grievant shall be reduced to a 90-day disciplinary layoff, and he
shall be reinstated with back pay for time off in excess of that.
February 22, 1969
/S/Abner Brodie
Umpire
No. L-108
April 18, 1969
Discipline:
GRIEVANCE:
HARRISON RADIATOR DIVISION, GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, LOCKPORT

PLANT, LOCKPORT, NEW YORK—APPEAL CASE L-116
"I protest my being discharged as being unfair unjust, under the circumstances involved.
Demand that I be re-instated, memo removed from my records & that I be compensated for
all monies & benefits lost." S/B.R.
The grievant’s discharge shall be set aside. He shall be reinstated, but without back pay,
except for a period of six months immediately prior to the date of this award. For the
balance of the time off he shall be considered as on disciplinary layoff. (Entire decision
should be read.)
In the Matter of:
and
General Motors Corporation, Harrison Radiator Division, Lockport, New York -- Appeal
Case L-116
At issue in this case is the discharge of the grievant, R., seniority date January 11, 1965,
file://C:\Users\bobology\AppData\Local\Temp\Framework\l-108_13A5B419.htm 3/22/2011
for the alleged violation on November 13, 1967 of Shop Rule No. 6, "Absence without
reasonable cause - or failure to notify your Foreman, the Personnel Department or Plant
Police as to the reason you are unable to report to work, unless satisfactory reason for
failure is given." The grievant’s disciplinary record is as follows:
3/23/66 Absence without reasonable cause – Memo of warning

First Offense

Second Offense

Third Offense
5/31/66 Reporting late for work. Memo of warning
6/22/66 Leaving department or plant during Memo of warning

working hours without permission
11/16/66 Leaving department or plant during Memo of warning

working hours without permission
3/7/67 Wasting time or loitering in toilets or Memo of warning

any Company property during
working hours.

First and Second Offense
4/19/67 Absence without reasonable cause – Balance of shift and

Third Offense five working days.
5/12/67 Wasting time or loitering in toilets or Memo of warning

any Company property during
working hours.
5/29/67 Absence without reasonable cause Balance of shift and

ten working days.

fifteen working
days.

twenty working
days.
11/14/67 The present case
On Sunday evening, November 12, 1967, the grievant telephoned his foreman, W., at
home, asking to be excused from work the next day to attend the funeral of a friend in
Buffalo, which is about 20 miles away. Because of the grievant’s disciplinary record, W.
told him to report for work Monday at 6:30 a.m., the start of the shift, to discuss his request,
and that he would excuse him in time to go to the funeral, if satisfied. The grievant said he
would report, but did not. According to the grievant, he had intended to report Monday but
when he went to Buffalo Sunday evening to see his friend’s mother she asked him and a
few other friends to stay and he was with her until about 10, then spent the night in Buffalo.
He stayed at a club-house, rose next morning at 8 a.m., and, after breakfast, went to the
funeral parlor and later to the cemetery. He was discharged on Tuesday, November 14, for
not reporting at the start of Monday’s shift, as he said he would.
OPINION
That Foreman W. considered attendance at a funeral a reasonable cause for absence was
evidenced by his expressed intention to excuse the grievant in time to attend the funeral,
and his explanation that the penalty was assessed only because the grievant did not report
at the beginning of the shift, as he said he would. It is reasonable to infer that Foreman W.
would have excused him on Sunday night had it not been for the grievant’s past record.
But whether an employee’s absence is to be excused depends upon the reason for the
particular absence, and not the employee’s past record. See Umpire Decision F-4. The
grievant, however, when he assured Foreman W. that he would report for work at the
beginning of Monday’s shift before being excused, was obligated to do so. He could have
reported at the beginning of the shift and still gone to the funeral; his intention to report
corroborates this. He changed his mind and decided not to report, but it is doubtful that that
was for reasons other than his own convenience.
Accordingly, a disciplinary penalty against the grievant is in order, but on the whole record
the Umpire is of the opinion that discharge is not warranted, and that reinstatement of the
grievant without back pay, except for a period of six months immediately prior to the date
of this award, will accord with essential justice.
DECISION
The grievant’s discharge shall be set aside. He shall be reinstated, but without back pay,
except for a period of six months immediately prior to the date of this award. For the
balance of the time off he shall be considered as on disciplinary layoff.
April 18, 1967
/S/Abner Brodie
Umpire
UMPIRE DECISION M-17 Page 1 of 4
No. M-17
May 5, 1969
Absence Without Reasonable Cause.
Paragraph 6a:
Racial Discrimination
GRIEVANCE:

FREMONT PLANT, FREMONT, CALIFORNIA—APPEAL CASE M-319
"I protest the unjust suspension for the alleged viol. of S.R. #6 Demand I be reinstated with
full seniority and that I be made whole for all monies and benefits lost, and my record be
cleared, also charge Manag. with viol. of Para #6a N.A. Demand corrections at once."
S/T.B.
"Grievance dismissed." (Entire decision should be read.)
In the Matter of:
and
General Motors Corporation, General Motors Assembly Division, Fremont, California --

Appeal Case M-319

file://C:\Users\bobology\AppData\Local\Temp\Framework\m-017_13A5BDBA.htm 3/22/2011
The Union protests the discharge of the grievant, Bu., seniority date, June 6, 1964, for the
alleged violation of Shop Rule No. 6, "Absence without reasonable cause, and/or habitual
absenteeism," and Shop Rule No. 42, "Repeated violations of Shop or Safety Rules." It
also claims that Management discriminated against the grievant, a Negro, on racial
grounds, in violation of Paragraph 6a of the National Agreement.
3/13/65 Written Reprimand Shop Rule 19 "Wasting time or

loitering in toilets or on any
Company property during working
hours."
4/30/65 Balance of Shift Shop Rule 19 "Wasting time or

loitering in toilets or on any
Company property during working
hours."
11/3/65 Balance of Shift Plus Shop Rule 6 "Absence Without

One (1) Day Reasonable Cause and/or habitual
absenteeism."
2/24/66 Balance of Shift Plus Shop Rule 39 "Stopping work or

Three (3) Days making preparations to leave work
(such as washing up or changing
clothes) before the signal sounds
for lunch period or before the
specified quitting time."

Three (3) Days Reasonable Cause and/or habitual
absenteeism."

Two (2) Weeks Reasonable Cause and/or habitual
absenteeism."

Two (2) Weeks Reasonable Cause and/or habitual
absenteeism."
9/20/68 Balance of Shift Plus Shop Rule 7 "Reporting late for

Thirty (30) Days work and/or habitual lateness."
(10-5-68 The present case)
The Corporation’s evidence was the following: About 4:45 p.m., Friday, October 4, 1968,
Labor Relations Representative Ba. told the grievant, who had been excused from work
that day but was at the plant for his pay, that he was to report to work the next day, and
that a telegram to that effect had been sent to him. The grievant was absent Saturday. At a
disciplinary interview on Monday, October 7, the grievant said that he did not get a
telegram or telephone message to report to work. Ba. asked him whether he remembered
being told on Friday that he was to report to work Saturday. The grievant said that he did.
At that point Committeeman N. interjected that the grievant meant that Ba. told him that he
might get a telegram to report. Foreman Bo., the grievant’s supervisor, supported Ba.’s
account of what happened at the disciplinary meeting. Contrary to the Union’s claim, the
discharge of the grievant did not reflect racial discrimination. Management excused the
absence of R., a white employee, because a telegram to report sent to him was not
delivered; he had moved and Management did not have his new address. Unlike the
grievant, R. was given no other notice. And Management had excused R. for reporting late
on other occasions because he had presented good reasons for his tardiness.
Management did not excuse the grievant’s tardiness on September 20, 1968, because he
did not offer a satisfactory reason for it.
According to the Union, Ba. did not tell the grievant to report for work; he only said that the
grievant might get a telegram to report. The grievant, however, was not at home and did
not receive a telegram. The Union also asserted that Management violated Paragraph 6a
in excusing R.’s absence, and not the grievant’s, R. having failed to comply with Paragraph
74 of the National Agreement by not giving Management his latest address. Also the Union
maintained that Management did not penalize R for tardiness when he overslept, but it did
penalize the grievant when he was late for the same reason on September 20, 1968.
OPINION
The issue is whether the grievant had notice to report for work Saturday.
In the Umpire’s opinion the evidence clearly establishes that he did. Ba.’s and Bo.’s
account of what the grievant said at the disciplinary interview supports Ba.’s version of
what he told the grievant on Friday. Moreover, it is improbable that Ba., having already
given the telegram to Western Union, would merely tell the grievant that he might be
scheduled to work. Although there was a dispute as to the time Management gave
Western Union the telegrams for employees scheduled to work on Saturday, it was before
Ba. spoke to the grievant. The evidence as a whole leaves no reasonable doubt in the
Umpire’s mind that the grievant violated Shop Rule No. 6. And in view of the grievant’s
disciplinary record, Management was warranted in concluding that he was incorrigible.
Accordingly, his discharge must be upheld unless Management was guilty of racial
discrimination against the grievant.
The Union has the burden of proof that Management violated Paragraph 6a. It does not
follow that, because employee R. was not penalized for his absence Saturday while the
grievant was, Management was guilty of racial discrimination against the grievant. The
facts clearly establish that the grievant violated Shop Rule No. 6. There is no evidence that
R. did. Whether or not R. failed to comply with Paragraph 74, the Union does not suggest
that R.’s failure to provide Management with his new address was cause for breaking R.’s
seniority or was a violation of a shop rule which Management excused because R. was
white while penalizing the grievant for the same violation under the same circumstances
because he was a Negro. And merely because Foreman Bo. excused R.’s tardiness when
he presented a satisfactory excuse, and disciplined the grievant for being late when he did
not, does not prove racial discrimination. The grievance must be dismissed.
DECISION
Grievance dismissed.
May 5, 1969
/S/Abner Brodie
Umpire
No. M-19
May 15, 1969
Discipline:
Extent of Penalty
GRIEVANCE:
GENERAL MOTORS PARTS DIVISION, GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, VAN

NUYS PLANT, VAN NUYS, CALIFORNIA—APPEAL CASE M-25
"I protest being given a D.L.O. as unfair, unjust and without warrant. I also charge Mgt. with
a vio. of Para. 76. N.A. I request that I be paid all lost and benefits, record cleared and Mgt.
abide by the Agreements." S/R.S.
The penalty is reduced to a balance-of-shift and one-week layoff, with back pay. (Entire
decision should be read.)
In the Matter of:
and
General Motors Corporation, General Motors Parts Division Van Nuys Plant, Van Nuys,
California -- Appeal Case M-25

file://C:\Users\bobology\AppData\Local\Temp\Framework\m-019_13A5C73B.htm 3/22/2011
The Union protests a disciplinary layoff for the balance of the shift plus two weeks
assessed the grievant, S., on May 8, 1968, for the alleged violation of Shop Rule No. 8,
"Absence without reasonable cause," on May 7.
The grievant’s disciplinary record is the following:
8/20/65 Written Reprimand Violation of Shop Rule #16, "Refusal or

failure to do job assignment."
6/2/67 Balance of Shift Violation of Shop Rule #32, "Fighting on

plus one (1) week the premises at any time."
5/8/68 Balance of Shift Present case

Plus one (1) week
The grievant, who worked on the first shift, which started at 7:48 a.m., took his brother and
the latter’s pregnant wife, who was in labor, to the hospital about 1:30 a.m., May 7, 1968.
The grievant’s brother had no car. The grievant remained at the hospital with his brother
and did not report to work that day. The baby was born about 7:30 a.m., and there were
indications that his health was not normal; and the grievant remained at the hospital until
he was satisfied that the baby was all right. When the grievant reported for work on May 8
his excuse for his absence was that his brother’s wife had a baby boy, and he explained to
his foreman the need to provide transportation to the hospital. The grievant’s foreman did
not accept his excuse. Later, during the processing of this grievance the Union claimed
that there were "complications" before and after the baby’s birth, and that the grievant’s
brother had asked the grievant to remain at the hospital.
Umpire Decision G-156 states the principle which applies to this case:
Where as here an employee is absent without permission, it is incumbent upon him to

show that such absence was necessitated by personal considerations which by accepted
standards outweighed his duty to his employer to be present during working hours.
It does not appear that there was anything the grievant did or could do to remedy any
"complications" before or after the birth of his brother’s child, or that he did more than
provide company for his brother at the hospital. There is no evidence that the grievant’s
sister-in-law needed any help from the grievant or that he gave her any. The grievant could
have remained at the hospital with his brother, had he so desired, and still left in time to
report for work. Management was not unreasonable in refusing to accept the grievant’s
excuse for his absence from work.
In assessing the penalty the foreman did not consider the date of the last penalty and
whether to give any effect to the lapse of eleven months without a disciplinary penalty, but
assessed a two-week layoff as a normal progression in penalties. In assessing a
disciplinary penalty, however, Management should consider, among other things, the
seriousness of the offense, the grievant’s disciplinary record, and the time elapsed since
the last penalty. Under principles of progressive discipline, disciplinary penalties should not
be mechanically increased in severity, without consideration of all relevant circumstances.
On the whole record the Umpire is of the opinion that essential justice will be served by
reducing the penalty to one week, with back pay for the balance.
Other questions raised have been considered but do not affect this decision.
DECISION
The penalty is reduced to a balance-of-shift and one-week layoff, with back pay.
May 15, 1969
/S/Abner Brodie
Umpire
No. M-21
May 24, 1969
Discipline:
Absence Without Reasonable Cause:
Fourth Step Evidence
GRIEVANCE:

SOUTH GATE PLANT, SOUTH GATE, CALIFORNIA—APPEAL CASE M-515
"I charge mgt with unjustly discharging me for alleged viol of SR #6 also charge vio of
Para’s 76, 29 and 19d of the National Agree. Request that I be paid all monies lost &
discip. be removed from my record Further request that Mgt abide by the provisions of
Para’s 76, 29 and 19d of the National Agreement now and in the future and at all times."
Amended to Read: "I charge Mgt with unjustly discharging me for alleged viol. of SR #6,
also charge vio’s of Para’s 76 and 29 of the National Agreement. Request that I be
reinstated with full benefits and that I be paid all monies lost and that the discipline be
removed from my record also request full compliance with the provisions of Para’s 76 and
29 of the Nat. Agree."
The grievant’s discharge shall be set aside and he shall be reinstated with his record
cleared of any penalty for his absence on June 3 and 4, 1968. Back pay shall be limited to
a period of four months prior to the date of this award. (Entire decision should be read)
In the Matter of:

file://C:\Users\bobology\AppData\Local\Temp\Framework\m-021_13A5D2A1.htm 3/22/2011
and
General Motors Corporation, General Motors Assembly Division South Gate Plant, South
Gate, California -- Appeal Case No. M-515
The Union protests the discharge on June 12, 1968 of the grievant, B., seniority date
September 26, 1960, for the alleged violation of Shop Rule No. 6, "Absence without
reasonable cause," on June 3 and 4, 1968. The grievant, who was away from work
because of an injured arm, was treated by Dr. M. on May 13 and May 21, and returned to
work on May 29, with a "return to work" slip signed for Dr. M. by an office assistant. The
grievant worked May 29 and May 31, was absent without permission on Monday and
Tuesday, June 3 and 4, and returned to work on June 5 with a return to work slip bearing
Dr. M.’s name signed by an office assistant and stating that the grievant had been under
Dr. M.’s care on June 3 and 4. The grievant claimed that he had been unable to work
because his arm was swollen, and that on June 3 he had telephoned
Dr. M. who advised him to stay home a few more days. Management checked with Dr. M.
who denied that he talked with the grievant on June 3 and that his office assistant had
authority to give the grievant the slip on June 5.
According to the Union, during the week following his discharge the grievant twice tried to
see Dr. M., but M. refused to see him. In August, answering a letter from the grievant’s
lawyer, Dr. M. wrote that the grievant had gotten the slip in question from the "the
receptionist without a doctor’s visit."
In February, 1969, shortly before the Umpire Hearing, Dr. M. gave the Union a written
statement that he did not recall the grievant’s telephoning him on June 3 but that since the
grievant had "two return to work slips from our office, signed by a receptionist" he was
"inclined to believe" that the grievant had told him then about his arm and inability to work.
According to the Union, this followed a discussion a week or two earlier during which Dr.
M. admitted that his office staff had erred and neglected to note that the grievant had
telephoned him on June 3. The Union also claimed that following the Third Step meeting
on August 27, 1968, International Representative G. had tried to see Dr. M., but without
success. The Corporation objected to all this evidence on the ground that it was not
referred to in the prior record of this case.
OPINION
The grievant has the burden of establishing that there was reasonable cause for his
absence without permission on June 3 and 4. The note of June 5 from Dr. M.’s office,
although on its face evidence of reasonable cause, was not conclusive. See Umpire
Decision L-104. Management was justified in acting on information from Dr. M. that he had
not seen or spoken to the grievant on June 3, sanctioned the grievant’s absence from
work, or authorized the return to work slip the grievant presented on June 5. Although Dr.
M.’s statement of February, 1969, and evidence that he admitted errors by his office staff
are objectionable as Fourth Step evidence, see Umpire Decision M-12, the Umpire
considers that he should exercise the discretion vested in him under Paragraph 47 of the
National Agreement to set aside the grievant’s discharge in the interest of essential justice
and reinstate him with his record cleared of any penalty for absence on June 3 and 4,
1968. The grievant and the Union, however, were dilatory in attempting to correct what
they claimed was an error of Dr. M.’s office. For this reason the grievant is not entitled to
full back pay, and the award of back pay should be limited to a period of four months prior
to the date of this award.
The Union presented no evidence or arguments to support its charges of violations of

Paragraphs 76 and 29 of the National Agreement, and those charges have not been
considered.
DECISION
The grievant’s discharge shall be set aside and he shall be reinstated with his record
cleared of any penalty for his absence on June 3 and 4, 1968. Back pay shall be limited to
a period of four months prior to the date of this award.
May 23, 1969
/S/Abner Brodie
Umpire
No. M-25
June 16, 1969
Assault:
Extent of Penalty
GRIEVANCE:
CHEVROLET MOTOR DIVISION, GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, INDIANAPOLIS

PLANT, INDIANAPOLIS, INDIANA—APPEAL CASE M-231
"I charge management with an unjust discharge I deny assault on anyone. I demand to be
returned to work at once with pay for all time lost and my disciplinary record cleared. I also
charge mgt. with violation of paragraph 76, with using warfare chemicals against me. I
further demand that mgt. cease these kind of activities at once. Also charge mgt with bodily
assault upon me, and falsifying IND 43 form." S/C.B.C.
"The grievant’s discharge shall be set aside. He shall be reinstated with back pay for 3
months immediately preceding the date of this award, the balance of the time off to be
considered as a disciplinary layoff." (Entire decision should be read.)
In the Matter of:
and
General Motors Corporation, Chevrolet Motor Division, Indianapolis Plant, Indianapolis,

Indiana -- Appeal Case M-231
file://C:\Users\bobology\AppData\Local\Temp\Framework\m-025_13A5DA5E.htm 3/22/2011
At issue is the propriety of the discharge of the grievant, Cl., seniority date September 19,
1966, and assigned to the second shift, for an alleged assault on October 19, 1968, upon a
member of supervision.
The Corporation’s version of the events in issue is the following: When the grievant
returned from lunch on October 19, he seemed under the influence of alcohol. General
Foreman B. and Foreman A. questioned him about his condition. He denied that he had
been drinking. B. left the area, and A. told the grievant to go to the Metal Shop office, but
the grievant refused. At A.’s request, Foreman W. summoned General Foreman B. who
returned with two other supervisors. The grievant directed obscene, abusive and
threatening remarks to B., then turning to Foreman W., pushed him backwards and
exclaimed, "Move out of my way, you white m----- f-----." He then charged at W. and
rammed both hands into his chest, shouting, "I said move." Plant Protection Sergeant Ca.,
who had come to the area with Patrolman M., told the grievant to go with him to the plant
gate. The grievant, who was about 6 feet from Ca., threatened to "cut" him and reached for
his pocket as if to get a knife, whereupon Ca., who had not used it before, released a spray
of "riot gas" in the grievant’s face and repeated it when the grievant came toward him
swinging his arms. It took the combined efforts of Ca., M. and B. to subdue the grievant
and take him to the gate, whence he was removed by the Indianapolis police. Management
sent a telegram to the grievant’s home address stating that he was discharged for an
assault on Foreman W. Later the same day, Management gave the grievant’s
committeeman notice of the discharge. The grievant at no time requested his
committeeman.
The Union’s version is as follows: During their lunch period the grievant and four fellow
employees consumed a "fifth" of whiskey. The grievant asked for his committeeman when
A. and B. questioned him about drinking and he refused to go to the office until his
committeeman was sent for. He was not told he was subject to discipline. Several
members of supervision encircled the grievant and he may have brushed against W. in
trying to break out of the circle; but he did not assault W. or use the obscene language
charged. The grievant had no knife or other weapon and made no threatening gesture
toward Ca. When Ca. sprayed him he was temporarily blinded and incapacitated.
The Union contends that use of the spray against the grievant amounted to an assault, and
that unnecessary force was otherwise employed against the grievant. The Union also
contends that Management violated Paragraphs 29, 76, and 76a of the National
Agreement.
The Corporation’s position is that the force employed against the grievant, including the riot
gas, was reasonable and necessary under the circumstances, that Management complied
with Paragraph 76 in sending a telegram to the grievant’s home and giving his
committeeman a copy of the discharge notice.
OPINION
The evidence clearly establishes that the grievant assaulted Foreman W. If, however,
Management violated the grievant’s rights, as the Union charges, the penalty must be
reduced.
The Umpire is not persuaded that it was necessary for Sergeant Ca., in self protection or
otherwise, to use the riot gas against the grievant. There is no evidence that the grievant
had a knife. True, he threatened Ca., but he had no visible means of carrying out his
threat. Considering the number of strongly built Plant Protection and supervisory personnel
on the spot, the Umpire is not convinced that the grievant, slight of build and of less than
medium height, could not have been subdued and removed to the gate without resort to
the riot gas, the effects of which might have been dangerous. Under the circumstances of
this case, the use of the spray constituted unreasonable and unnecessary force and an
assault upon the grievant which must be considered in mitigation of the penalty.
Management also violated Paragraph 76 of the National Agreement which requires a

discharged employee to "be furnished a brief written statement advising him of his right to
representation and describing the misconduct for which he has been ... discharged," and
provides that he shall have an opportunity to discuss the case with his committeeman
"before he is required to leave the plant." No reason appears why Management could not
comply with Paragraph 76. The grievant could have returned to the plant at another time
and been given the statement and an opportunity to discuss the case with his
committeeman as Paragraph 76 requires.
The evidence does not establish that Management violated Paragraphs 29 and 76a of the
National Agreement, as the Union charges.
The grievant’s offense was a serious one. But Management’s violation of the grievant’s
rights were also serious. On the whole record, the Umpire is of the opinion that essential
justice will be served by reinstating the grievant with back pay for 3 months immediately
preceding the date of this award, the balance of the time off to be considered a disciplinary
layoff.
DECISION
The grievant’s discharge shall be set aside. He shall be reinstated with back pay for 3
months immediately preceeding the date of this award, the balance of the time off to be
considered as a disciplinary layoff.
June 16, 1969
/S/Abner Brodie
Umpire
No. M-36
October 27, 1969
Discharge:
Alleged Solicitation of Money for Fund
to be Used to Have General Foreman Beaten Up;
Refusal of Company to Disclose Name of Accuser
Until Third Step of Grievance Procedure
GRIEVANCE:
GM ASSEMBLY DIVISION, GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, ARLINGTON PLANT,
ARLINGTON, TEXAS—APPEAL CASES M-1403 AND M-1429 -- Appeal Case M-1403:
"Chg. mgt. with giveing me an unjust discharge, also making false & milishious charges
against me, slander, also viol. of para. 6 of N.A., also refusing to give the union information
concerning the instant discharge. Demand Mgt. reinstate me and clear my record & pay all
monies lost, plus all other benefits restored immed., also mgt. refrain from viol. of the
remaining charges & make me whole immed." S/J.H.C.
Appeal Case M-1429:
"Chg. Mgt. with giveing me an unjust discharge on 5/8/69, also slander & false accusation
against me & defimation of my character. Demand mgt. clear my record immed. & pay me
all monies lost and make me whole on the balance of charges immediately." S/W.A.W.
For the reasons given in the accompanying Opinion, the evidence advanced by the
Company in support of the grievants’ discharge is held to be inadmissible. The Company is
file://C:\Users\bobology\AppData\Local\Temp\Framework\m-036_13A5E3C0.htm 3/22/2011
directed to reinstate the grievants with reimbursement for wages lost and restoration of
seniority rights from the date of discharge. (Entire decision should be read)
In the Matter of:
United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America Local

Union No. 276
and
General Motors Corporation, Assembly Division, Arlington, Texas -- Appeal Cases Nos. M-
1403 and M-1429
OPINION
C. is the grievant in Appeal Case M-1403. W. is the grievant in Appeal Case M-1429. Each
of them was a Stockman in the Material Department. C.’s service with the Company began
in late 1957; W.’s began in late 1965. Neither man has a clean prior disciplinary record.
Both grievants were discharged on May 8, 1969. The following is given in the "Report of
Disciplinary Action" form which was mailed to each of them:
"On the morning of March 21, 1969, General Foreman (R.) was
viciously beaten outside his home as he prepared to drive to work.
Prior to March 21, 1969, you solicited monies in the plant for the
purpose of having Mr. (R.) assaulted. You are therefore
discharged."
The background is essentially as follows:
Operations in the Material Department had been going badly, and General Foreman R.
was designated to bring them back to a satisfactory level of efficiency. Apparently, he bore
down hard.
In late January, 1969, one of the department’s Committeemen requested a meeting with
the plant’s Personnel Director and the department’s Superintendent. The request was
granted. In the meeting, the Union’s representatives stated that considerable difficulties
had developed between R. and the men and that the situation was so explosive that it
might lead or resort to physical force. Additionally, the Union’s representatives requested a
meeting with the Plant Manager. This request was denied.
For some weeks prior to March 21, 1969 -- the date of the assault— there were persistent
rumors that R. would be beaten up. At the arbitration hearing, indeed, it was put in terms of
"common knowledge". The Union concedes that the assault must realistically be assumed
to have been related to R.’s functioning as General Foreman in the Material Department.
The assault occurred as R. was leaving his house to go to work. It was vicious in the
extreme and had all the earmarks of a professional job. Aside from severe contusions at
various parts of his head, R. sustained a fracture of his right orbit (which was repaired
surgically), permanent retinal damage to one eye and partial loss of vision to the other. His
life hung in the balance for a while and he was on sick leave for nearly three months.
On the day on which the assault occurred, Management posted a notice on the plant’s
bulletin boards. In part, it read as follows:
"The Management of this plant will offer a substantial reward to any

individual or individuals giving information leading to the arrest and
conviction of the person or persons who assaulted and/or attempted
to kill General Foreman R. at his home early this morning."
The chief accuser against the grievants is a Stockman in the Material Department. He will
here be referred to as X. He read the notice when he came to work on March 21 and
indicated to his foreman that he had valuable information concerning the assault. The
foreman referred him to the department’s Superintendent and the latter referred him to
Plant Protection. X. told both of these parties that he had been solicited by W. and C. for
money to be used to having R. beaten up.
On Monday, March 24, the department’s Superintendent called X., asking whether he
would be willing to give the information to the police. X. replied in the affirmative and was
interviewed by the police on the same day. The information which he provided was put in
writing by a detective at the police station. The following is the substance of it:
"About three or four weeks ago, (C.) and (W.) came up to me and
said they were taking up a collection to get (R.) beat up. They said
they needed $250.00 to get the job done. They were asking for
$5.00 a man and that’s what they asked me for. I told them I didn’t
want nothing to do with it and if I had known what they intended to
do and that they were serious about it I would have said something
sooner. The word is out that anybody who says anything about what
happened they’re going to get his family."
At the time he gave the statement, X. apparently agreed that both the police and
Management could make use of it as they saw fit. As a matter of not hampering its
investigation, however, the police asked Management not to act on the information.
Management complied with the request. Then, some five or six weeks later, the police
dropped the case.
Upon that, Management got in touch with X. and asked him whether he was still agreeable
to its use of the statement. X. manifested reluctance, saying that he had received two
threatening phone calls, that a rock had been thrown through his living-room window, and
that he had received another phone call in which he was offered $500 if he kept quiet.
Considering his apprehensions justified, and in return for the risk he would be assuming,
Management made X. a $1,000 offer for the use of his statement. X. accepted and, at his
home on May 9, was paid the money in cash. (The date of the payment was given at the
arbitration hearing by the plant’s Personnel Director. X. stated he had received the money
about a month before the grievants were discharged.)
With respect to grievant W., there is additionally a statement by Foreman E. It was given to
the police on March 25. Its substance reads as follows:
"About three or four weeks ago, I was working at the General

Motors Assembly Plant in Arlington, Texas. I was in my section of
the plant and (W.), one of the men who work under me, came by
and asked if I would give five dollars to get the ‘Georgia Peach’ run
out of town. I thought at the time that he was just talking, but I
understood him to mean that there might be a collection to get (R.)
out of town. Many people in the plant referred to (R.) as the ‘Georgia
Peach’.
I just passed it off and I didn’t think anymore about it until last Friday
when I learned that (R.) had been beaten up."
In both the First Step and the Second Step of the grievance procedure, Management
refused to identify the names of the accusers. It took this stand on the grounds that enough
violence had occurred and that to divulge the source of its information would be to invite
further violence; it asserted to the Union’s representatives that it was in everyone’s interest
that they not press for the information and that the best and most realistic thing for them to
do was to withdraw the grievances; and it adhered to its stand despite the statement by the
Union’s representatives that the withholding of the information would be relied upon by the
Union as making the discharges defective.
On June 19, in connection with his pre-Third-Step investigation, International

Representative R.W. interviewed a number of employees. X. was one of them, and he told
R.W. that he had been solicited for money by grievants W. and C. for the purpose of
having R. beaten up. In response to R.W.’s questions, X. denied: (1) having received
money from Management; (2) having had any particular difficulties in his past relationship
at the plant with either grievant.
The Third Step meeting was held on July 10. In this meeting, Management submitted the
statements (the full texts, as obtained at the police station) of both X. and Foreman E. Also
in this meeting: 1) X. admitted having received $1,000 from Management, and 2)
Management offered, and the Union declined (unless Management agreed to pay the
grievants wages for the period of the attendant delay, which in turn was rejected by
Management), to have the grievances referred back to the Second Step.
The following is a brief review of the parties’ respective positions at the arbitration level.
Union
First, Management’s withholding until the Third Step of the evidence on which the
discharges were based was violative of the grievants’ rights to a speedy investigation of
the propriety of the action against them; it represented an insult to the Local Union; and it
constituted a flagrant disregard of the full-and-immediate-disclosure principle long
understood and followed by the parties. The statements given by X. and Foreman E. (and
their testimony at the hearing) should therefore be ruled inadmissible.
Second, even if a contrary ruling were to be made, the Company has failed to establish
that the grievants are guilty as charged. As to the grievants themselves, they appeared at
the hearing and testified that they had been falsely accused. As to Foreman E., he brought
nothing against C.; he admitted that, at the time W. allegedly approached him, he (E.)
thought that W. was merely kidding; and the likelihood is that what E. says was solicitation
for a fund to have R. mugged has been confused in E.’s mind with the soliciting which W.
did make at the time for a fund to help out ailing Committeeman S. And as to X., he stands
as a wholly discredited witness: he admittedly did not report any of the alleged phone calls
to the police—leading to the almost inescapable conclusion that he reported the alleged
phone calls to Management, particularly the alleged one involving the alleged $500 offer to
keep quiet, for the purpose of upping the amount of money Management might pay him; he
admittedly needed money at the time; he lied when he was first asked by the Union
whether he had received money from Management; he lied again on the question of
whether there had been difficulties in the past between himself and either W. or C. both by
way of the testimony of W. and C. and by way, despite his attempted evasions, of X.’s own
testimony, there is the clearest evidence that there had been various nasty encounters in
the rather recent past; and finally, there are discrepancies between the statement X. gave
the police and the testimony he gave at the arbitration hearing—the former implies that W.
and C. approached him jointly, whereas the latter is to the effect that they did so separately
and that C. merely (i.e., without specification of any particular fund) asked whether X. was
sure that he did not want to give "to the collection". It is most unlikely, the Union argues,
that the grievants would have left themselves "wide open" by soliciting these two men—the
one filled with animosity toward both W. and C., the other a supervisor.
Company
With respect to the admissibility of the evidence, the Company asks that there be
appreciation for uniqueness and realities. There had been a vengeful, planned and vicious
attack on a member of Supervision; there obviously was every indication that anyone
giving information about the conspiracy would receive quite the same treatment; and it was
therefore only wise and proper for Management to defer the identification of X. and
Foreman E. until such time as things had quieted down a bit. It was not for purposes of
tactical advantage but for good and substantial reasons that Management withheld the
information for a time. And when the Union speaks of a violation of the grievants’ "due
process’ rights, it is merely throwing around big words. For, not only was full disclosure
made at the Third Step, but the disclosure was coupled with an offer to refer the
grievances back to the Second Step. Under all these circumstances, the Company
contends, it would be theoretical and wrongful to declare the evidence inadmissible.
On the merits, the Company submits that it has met its burden of proof. It asserts that,
when X. first denied having received the money, he was acting on Management’s advice;
that the payment itself, considering the risks X. would be taking, was entirely proper; that
there was no bargaining over the amount of the money; that the Union has interjected
substantial exaggerations with respect to the past relationship between X. and W. and C.;
that the Union’s reliance on an alleged fund for Committeeman S. is suspect for a number
of reasons and should be dismissed; and that its effort to make a tainted witness out of X.
must be rejected, not only because of lack of substantiation concerning X. himself, but also
because the statement and testimony of Foreman E. corroborate those of X.—and there is
simply not the slightest showing that Foreman E. would have resorted to fabrication. In
sum, the Company submits that the statements and testimonies of X. and Foreman E.
ought to be believed and thus accepted as clearly and convincingly establishing that the
grievants are guilty as charged.
Though obviously not without real concern and prolonged deliberation, the Umpire has
concluded that the Union’s preliminary position should be sustained. If what Management
believes here happened did in fact happen— a brutal assault on a supervisor via the
collection of an employees’ fund to pay the price of professional muggers—there can be no
question that the act was as despicable an act as one can find in the annals of labor
relations. Nor can there be any question that participation in this kind of an affair warrants
the discharge penalty. In the opinion of the Umpire, however, neither these considerations
nor the concern which Management held for the safety of X. and Foreman E. can serve to
justify or excuse Management’s refusal in Steps One and Two to disclose what it was
banking on. To the contrary, the conclusion must be that Management should have known
better—simply too much has been understood between the parties and handed down by
their Umpire Office to avoid this conclusion.
Excerpts from certain prior Umpire decisions will momentarily be given. The Umpire wants
first to comment on certain matters which he thinks deserve focus.
The foremost one lies in the obvious distinction between the withholding of information and
the belated discovery of information, be it through oversight, sloppy workmanship or wholly
understandable circumstances. The Umpire is aware that some have thought him too
liberal with respect to the introduction of such belatedly discovered information. Be that as
it may, the Umpire sees no inconsistency between a liberal approach on this score and
clamping down when it comes to the deliberate refusal to divulge already-possessed
information. Oversights, understandable or otherwise, are an inescapable part of an
imperfect world. Not so with the withholding of information—it is done knowingly and it is
thus utterly inimical to what the parties have long striven for with respect to the operation of
the grievance procedure. And therein, too, lies the answer to the Company’s reliance on
Management’s offer to refer the grievances back to Step Two. The "refer back" approach is
a wholly proper and useful one when it comes to a newly discovered piece of information
or to overcoming an inadvertence of some sort—for here it is a matter of furthering the
purpose and design of the grievance procedure. In the case of withheld information, on the
other hand, a "refer back" request amounts to acknowledging a breach and thereupon
asking the other party nonetheless to proceed in open minded spirit.
Another factor is that Management here withheld its entire case, not merely some
evidentiary fact related to it. In Umpire Decision G-12, even this latter kind of withholding
was met with "Management ignored its fundamental obligation to make known all the facts
in its possession relative to the pending grievance. (See, for example, Umpire Decisions A-
15, A-25, B-29, C-175, C-204, D-56, E-132, F-53, and F-97.)" Let it be granted, however,
that when it comes to the withholding of some element of the evidence, one might have to
take a look at whether or not the matter constituted a serious enough defect to warrant
letting it affect the outcome of the case. Such qualitative approach is obviously ruled out
where Management withholds the whole of what it is relying on.
Next, there is the fact that Management’s position with the Local Union was not to the
effect of "we will of course provide you with the information in due course; we merely think
we ought to hold off for a while". Rather, Management refused flatly to divulge the
information; gave no indication that it would relent on this at some future date; and sought
to persuade the Local Union that it had "the goods" and that the realistic thing for the Local
Union to do was to drop the grievances. To seek to prevail while withholding seems to the
Umpire even more inimical to the idea of the bilateral resolution of grievances than does
the withholding which is coupled with the word "you’ll get a crack at our guy, but let’s let
things cool off first". Furthermore, aside from the fact that Management gave the Union to
understand that it would forever withhold the names of the accusers, the evidence
indicates that Management itself, when it proceeded as it did in Steps One and Two, did
not intend to change course in Step Three. Rather, the evidence indicates, the information
was there made available because the Union had uncovered X. as a possible accuser or
because Management had received word from corporate headquarters that it could not
possibly prevail without making the disclosure (or because of the combined effect of both
events).
Fourth and last, the Umpire wants to comment on the Company’s argument that
Management acted in good faith—that its sole purpose was to protect the witnesses and
that its concern for their safety was wholly justified under the circumstances. Though there
is clear and substantial appeal in the argument, the Umpire believes that it must be
overridden. It is of course to be assumed that Management was acting in good faith. Were
it otherwise, this would be the easiest of cases to decide. Indeed, one may legitimately
doubt that the Company’s corporate staff would even have let the case come to the Umpire
had Management acted in bad faith and for the purpose of gaining a tactical advantage.
The real question is whether the full-and-immediate-disclosure principle should be
respected or bent where its observance entails difficulties. The Umpire thinks it clear that
this question must be decided in favor of the sanctity of the principle. Indeed, its standing
as a principle is sorely thrown into question if it is abandoned where its application "hurts".
Moreover, though in a different context, the matter of proceeding secretively for the sake of
the protection of witnesses has long since been decided in favor of openness. See Umpire
Decision G-13, which, on this point, concludes with "We are mindful of the need to protect
witnesses against retaliation, but are of the opinion that such need can be and must be
fulfilled by other means." And further still, the fact in the present case is that X. was given
$1,000 in consideration of the risk he would be assuming. One may wonder what risk there
was to him if his identification as the accuser was to be withheld. What it all comes down
to, it seems to the Umpire, is that Management did not face up to the admittedly difficult
decision it had to make: either honor the full-and-immediate-disclosure principle or accept
the fact that discharge action could not be taken for lack of evidence.
The preceding discussion might seem harsh and doctrinaire were it not for the history of
the full-and-immediate-disclosure principle under these parties’ collective-bargaining
relationship. Excerpts from prior Umpire Decisions will now be given. Reference is to
Decisions F-97, F-98, G-12 and G-13 -- all issued in the early fifties and all either backing
and reinforcing the full-and-immediate-disclosure principle or dealing with a way of doing
things which theretofore had been tolerated as not falling within the purview of the
principle. It is in this framework—the solid and ancient character of the principle—that the
Umpire has confronted the admissibility issue here raised.
Decisions G-12 and G-13 have already been quoted from. Additionally, they contain the
following:
G-12:
"... The fact that an employee has violated a shop rule

does not automatically deprive him of his full right to
representation in accordance with the National
Agreement, or deprive the Union of the right to full and
candid disclosure of all facts upon which Management
bases disciplinary action. The necessity for following
established bargaining procedures is paramount..."
G-13:
"... In Decision G-12, last issued, the Umpire called

attention to numerous prior rulings to the effect that the
withholding of evidence at lower steps by any party is
improper, and ruled squarely that the opposite party is
entitled to have such withheld evidence excluded from
the record at the fourth step. There can be no doubt that
this principle is sound or that it is necessary in order to
maintain the proper supremacy of collective bargaining
over Umpire trials. Enough has been written in previous
opinions so that the point needs no further elaboration
here. Management erred in refusing to divulge to the
Union at the lower steps the names of the witnesses and
the close substance of the testimony upon which it was
relying to support its finding that Complainants were
guilty."
Decision F-97 has the following:
"... We cannot pass this case without noting that both Management
and the Union, locally, have so far violated the basic principles of
Agreement administration as to knowingly and intentionally refuse to
disclose to each other the names of witnesses to the altercation
from which this appeal arises. The Corporation, the International
Union, and the Umpire have made clear time and time again that
sound collective bargaining requires frank and candid disclosure at
the earliest opportunity of all the facts known to each party. There
will undoubtedly be times when facts are not discovered, and
therefore not disclosed, until after the grievance has been partially
processed, and problem enough is created by those instances.
There is not a scintilla of justification for the withholding of
information by either party from and after the time it is discovered."
And Decision F-98 has the following:
"... The Union protests the refusal of Local Management to disclose

to the Shop Committee until the Third Step the name of the
Foreman who reported the accident that precipitated the demotion.
Management admitted the charge, but sought to justify its action by
reliance on the fact that the Foreman was new and needed
"protection." Such a defense is no justification whatsoever and
manifests disregard for a fundamental aspect of the grievance
procedure that has no place under the National Agreement.
Moreover it is inconsistent with the position uniformly taken by the
Corporation that sound administration of the grievance procedure
requires the earliest possible disclosure of all available facts."
It is true that none of these decisions is "on all fours" with what is here involved and being
decided. In three of them, a verdict on the merits was rendered (and a penalty of one sort
or another was imposed). And in the fourth, the evidence which had been withheld and
was ruled inadmissible had been withheld through all the lower Steps and was presented
for the first time at the Umpire level. One could, if one chose to, differentiate the present
case from the prior ones. To the Umpire, however, the point is that it was not narrowly, or
in mere relation to particular problems presented by particular cases, that the principle
came under discussion in the prior Decisions. The words are broad, and they were uttered
by a man who understands and implements as well as anyone the need to employ terms
yielding narrow coverage where this is called for. Nor is the Company here really arguing
that the full-and-immediate-disclosure principle is of less than general applicability. Rather,
it is on grounds of a justifiable departure, of the fact that disclosure was made at Step
Three, and of the fact that an offer was made to refer the grievances back to Step Two,
that the Company is asking for the non-exclusion of the evidence. The Umpire has dealt
with these matters in the earlier discussion. His considered opinion is that the principle is of
such fundamental importance and has so long been imbedded as a cornerstone of the
parties’ grievance procedure that it should be applied, rather than merely reiterated, and
thus be given its proper standing of supremacy.
DECISION
For the reasons given in the accompanying Opinion, the evidence advanced by the
Company in support of the grievants’ discharge is held to be inadmissible. The Company is
directed to reinstate the grievants with reimbursement for wages lost and restoration of
seniority rights from the date of discharge.
October 27, 1969
/S/Rolf Valtin
Umpire
No. M-46
November 16, 1969
Paragraphs (106) and (111)(b) of National Agreement:
Termination of Employee;
Evidence
GRIEVANCE:
CHEVROLET MOTOR DIVISION, GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, TONAWANDA

FOUNDRY PLANT, TONAWANDA, NEW YORK—APPEAL CASE NO. M-19
"Protest unjust discharge under Para. (111B) employee known to be ill should not be
released from roll. Demand reinstatement and back pay." S/E.J.
The grievance is denied. (Entire decision should be read.)
In the Matter of:
United Automobile Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America Local Union
No. 1173
and
General Motors Corporation, Chevrolet - Tonawanda Foundry, Tonawanda, New York --

Appeal Case M-19
OPINION
file://C:\Users\bobology\AppData\Local\Temp\Framework\m-046_13A5F32B.htm 3/22/2011
Grievant J. was hired by the Company in October, 1961, and last worked as a first-shift
Laborer-Inside in the Foundry Department. Under protest is the Company’s dropping him
from the rolls, as of May 17, 1968, on the grounds that he was an employee who "shall be
considered as having voluntarily quit" as given in Paragraph (111) (b) of the National
Agreement.
The following is background and framework information:
Though the details on it are skimpy, J. was beset by some sort of accident involving an
automobile and himself as a pedestrian on Friday, April 5, 1968. He went to the Buffalo
General Hospital, and X-rays there taken showed that he had sustained no bone injuries.
J. also went to the office of a Dr. S. The latter’s findings were:
"sprained left ankle, left leg contused, pulled muscles & ligaments lower back, headache,
dizziness". J. and Dr. S. seem to have agreed, however, that J. should "try" to go to work
on Monday (April 8, 1968).
Having on hand a supply of "General Motors Group Insurance Program" forms, J. filled out
the "Employee" portion of the form over the weekend. He went to work on Monday, but,
within an hour, contacted his foreman, complained of soreness in his back and left leg, and
requested and was given a medical pass to leave the plant. He thereupon returned to Dr.
S.’s office and had him fill out the "Doctor’s Statement" part of the form. Dr. S. entered
"unknown" in the space provided for "Date Claimant will be able to perform usual work".
As a matter of understanding between the local parties, the following is true of the use of
the forms. First, the submission of a filled-out form serves at once as an application for
insurance benefits and as a request for sick leave under Paragraph (106) of the National
Agreement. This provision will be quoted below. It includes the phrase "supported by
satisfactory evidence". The form, of course, is an insurance-claim form. However, to avoid
the bother of making and processing two separate applications, the physician’s certification
on the form is also used for the "satisfactory evidence" purpose of Paragraph (106).
Second, where there is uncertainty about the duration of the particular employe’s
disability—in the present case, as shown, "unknown" was entered—the sick leave is
granted on a one-month-at-a-time basis. Each of such one-month leaves, where the
disability continues beyond the one-month period, is to be extended by means of the filling
of a supplementary form—the so-called short form.
The grievant went on sick leave on the basis of the form which he had filled out over the
weekend and which Dr. S. had filled out on Monday. He (the grievant) did not return for
work until about six months later -- namely, on October 15, 1968. He did not file a
supplementary form in early or mid May—i.e., upon the elapsing of a one-month period
from the beginning of his sick leave.
In late May, advised by the plant’s insurance office that J. had not been heard from, Labor
Relations Representative K. phoned Dr. S. K. testified to the following: that Dr. S. stated
"emphatically" that J. was not disabled; that he (Dr. S.) had not seen J. from April 8 until
May 13; that, on May 13, he (Dr. S.) had found J. able to work and had given him a return-
to-work slip; and that Dr. S., indeed, had assumed that J. was back at work. In response to
K.’s request, Dr. S. agreed to put these statements in writing.
The confirming information is contained in a form letter (not the insurance-claim form) sent
Dr. S. by Mr. W., Supervisor of Labor Relations. The top portion of it consists almost
entirely of pre-typed, purpose-of-letter sentences (leaving spaces to be filled in only for the
name of the physician, the name and social security number of the employee, and the date
on which the latter’s sick leave began). The bottom portion, to be filled out by the
physician, also contains a number of pre-typed sentences. The first one is "Date on which
employee was last treated by me ________"—Dr. S. entered 5-13-68. The second one is
"Employee was able to work on ________"—
Dr. S. entered 4-15-68. And the third and fourth ones are "Employee has not been
approved for return to work. However, it is expected he will return to work on ________".
Here and on the reverse side of the form letter (there is little space left by the time one gets
to the end of the fourth of the pre-typed sentences), Dr. S. noted the following:
"Pt (patient) ignores fact that I tell him he is able to work: I cannot
force him to return. Was seen 4/5, 4/8 and not again until 5/13/68.
10 days disability should be maximum for this type of injury & since
he is not coming for treatment I assume he is OK."
Management dropped J. from the rolls on the basis of this information.
As already mentioned, it applied May 17 as the date of termination. It arrived at this date
by counting "three working days" (see Paragraph (111) (b), about to be quoted) from May
13, the date on which Dr. S. had last seen J. and found him fit for work.
To be quoted, now, are the pertinent National Agreement provisions.
Paragraph (106) reads as follows:
"Any employee who is known to be ill, supported by satisfactory

evidence, will be granted sick leave automatically for the period of
continuing disability. Seniority of such employees shall accumulate
during sick leave and shall be broken, figured from the date the sick
leave started, on the same basis as provided in Paragraph (64e) for
laid off employees breaking seniority. Not later than 10 days prior to
such loss of seniority, Management will send a letter to the
employee’s last known address as shown on the Company records
reminding him of the fact that his seniority is subject to being broken
as provided above. A copy of such letter will be furnished promptly
to the Chairman of the Shop Committee. However, failure through
oversight to send the letter to the employee or furnish a copy to the
Chairman of the Shop Committee will not be the basis for any
claim."
Paragraph (111) commences with:
"All of the above leaves of absence including sick leaves are

granted subject to the following conditions:"
Subparagraphs (a) and (c) need not be given. Subparagraph (b) reads as follows:
"Any employee who fails to report for work within three working days
after the date of expiration of the leave, shall be considered as
having voluntarily quit unless he has a satisfactory reason; provided,
however, that in the case of failure to report for work within three
working days after the expiration of leaves of absence granted
under Paragraphs 104, 105, 109, 109a, 110, 110a and 113,
Management will send written notification to the employee’s last
known address as shown on the Company records, that his seniority
has been broken and that it can be reinstated, if, within three
specified working days thereafter, he reports for work or properly
notifies Management of his absence. A copy of such Management
notification will be furnished promptly to the Chairman of the Shop
Committee. If the employee complies with the conditions set forth in
the notification, his seniority will be reinstated if it has not otherwise
been broken; however, such reinstatement shall not be construed
as limiting the application to his case of the Shop Rule regarding
absence without reasonable cause."
The case was among the hardest-fought which the Umpire has witnessed, required a
hearing of great length, and embodies numerous and varied contentions and counter-
contentions. The Umpire has considered all that has been presented but sees no need to
provide a comprehensive review of it. The following is the essence of what the Union
submits:
The burden for showing that the grievant’s "period of continuing disability" had
ended rests on the Company. The Company has failed to meet this burden.
The very Dr. S. on whose statement the Company is relying has signed various
documents containing information which conflicts with it. He signed a
supplementary insurance-claim form on June 8, 1968, in which he gave 4/5/68
as the "Date Claimant was unable to work because of his disability" and he
thereby designated a period of disability which spans the point at which the
Company broke the grievant’s seniority. To the same effect is a document
dated November 18, 1968: it certifies to visits by J. on the dates of 4/8, 5/13,
5/17, 5/29, 6/3 and 6/8/68. And, aside from these certifications by Dr. S., there
is the action of the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, the insurance carrier
for General Motors. Insofar as the April 8 - May 8 period is concerned, it is true
that the payment of disability benefits was a matter of what had been approved
by the plant. The fact is, however, that the grievant—pursuant to Metropolitan’s
authorization and upon an examination by a Metropolitan physician—was
additionally paid disability benefits until June 14. Simply stated, the Union
submits, J. was receiving disability benefits at the time the Company declared
him no longer disabled.
Following June 14 -- namely, on June 15 -- J. had another accident (falling

down stairs) and Dr. S. has certified that he saw J. on June 15 as well as on
June 21. Then, in July, J. was in a fight in which his lip and left hand were
injured. Dr. S. has certified that he saw J. on July 19. Then, on August 13, J.
suffered a contusion of his great right toe. Dr. S. has certified that he saw J. on
August 13 and 14. And finally, in late August, J. was in a bus accident. Dr. S.
has certified that he saw J. on August 21, August 26, September 14,
September 30 and October 14. On the occasion of the last visit, J. asked for,
and was given, Dr. S.’s approval for returning to work. J. in fact reported for
work on October 15 (though he was turned away). He has accounted, the
Union submits, for the entire approximately 6-month period. All of it was a
"period of continuing disability" and it was promptly upon the end of it that J.
reported back for work.
Management, in terminating J., not only acted erroneously, it acted secretively

and, in all likelihood, vengefully. It broke his seniority without in any way letting
him know or inquiring of him as to whether he was still disabled and as to when
he might be expected to be back at work. And Management’s true motivation is
revealed by its insertion into the record of J.’s prior sick-leave record. True
enough, J. had been on numerous sick leaves. But this is obviously irrelevant to
the question here to be determined, and what the introduction of the past sick
leave record really shows is that Management was ready to seize on any
excuse for getting rid of J. Paragraph (111)(b) was not intended to operate as,
and must not be permitted to become, a substitute for disciplinary action.
Even if it were to be concluded that J. was no longer disabled and on sick leave
in the period following May 13, he certainly did not know that his leave of
absence had expired and he thus had good grounds for believing that he was
not obligated to be at work. This adds up to being absent for a "satisfactory
reason", as given in Paragraph (111)(b).
For the reasons to be given below, the Umpire has concluded that the grievant was
malingering rather than still disabled at the time in question and that his termination under
Paragraph (111)(b) is therefore to be sustained. It is necessary first to deal with an
evidentiary matter as to which a dispute of considerable proportions developed at the
hearing.
The dispute is concerned with whether or not, in determining a question of an employee’s

"period of continuing disability", evidentiary weight should be given to: 1) findings or
statements by a Metropolitan physician and the action taken by Metropolitan with respect
to the payment or non-payment of disability benefits; 2) such findings or statements made
by the employee’s own physician as appear on the insurance-claim forms.
The Company objected to the Union’s attempted use of the fact that Metropolitan
authorized and paid disability benefits to J. from May 8 to June 14 on the grounds that: the
assessment of Metropolitan’s criteria and the correctness or incorrectness of the actions to
which they lead are beyond the jurisdiction of Umpire determination, that the plant’s
approval or disapproval of sick leave is made independently of Metropolitan, and that the
plant’s approval of J.’s disability benefits did not extend beyond May 8. The Company also
objected to the Union’s reliance on the statements of Dr. S. to the extent that they appear
on the insurance-claim forms. It argued that the Union was proceeding in utter
inconsistency with the stand it took in a prior case (which resulted in Umpire Decision J-
91). There, the tables were turned and the Union strongly objected to the Company’s effort
to make use of the statements, appearing on the insurance-claim forms, by the physician
of the particular employee.
The Union countered by pointing out that it was the Company, in one of the lower steps of
the grievance procedure, which put into the record the report of Metropolitan’s medical
examiner. The Union does say that this was improper and it asks that the report be
disregarded. It also argues, however, that, once anything relating to Metropolitan’s action
was put into the record by the Company, the Union can properly rely both on the approval
by Metropolitan for the payment of disability benefits to J. through June 14 and on Dr. S.’s
statements contained in the insurance-claim forms.
The controversy is rooted in certain assurances sought by the Union and given by the
Company in the 1961 negotiations. As they were in the case leading to Decision J-91, the
parties are in dispute as to what was and was not intended to be covered by the
assurances. It would manifestly be better if the parties, rather than the Umpire, made a
determination of a dispute of this sort. This is especially true here, as testimony from those
who participated in the discussions leading to the assurances is lacking. Nevertheless, the
Umpire cannot escape confronting the matter, and, based on what can be gathered from
the parties’ arguments and documentary submissions, he makes the following findings.
The first one seems necessarily called for. It is that any action by Metropolitan or its agents
with respect to disability benefits is precluded from consideration when it comes to
determining a sick-leave question under Paragraph (106). Unless the Umpire has badly
misunderstood things, the Union’s very underlying concern was that a physician working
for Metropolitan—one who represented its interests and who, so to speak, was in its
corner—should not be permitted to be of influence, let alone have a decisive role, in
determining the employee’s rights under Paragraph (106). Sought was protection against
adverse determinations wrought by clashing interests. And, in addition to what seems
clearly indicated as a matter of underlying purpose, there is the language of paragraph (c)
of the assurances. The Umpire reads it as explicitly proscribing the use of the report of a
Metropolitan medical examiner for any purpose other than the evaluation of a claim for
sickness and accident benefits.
Obviously, if the report of a Metropolitan medical examiner is to be excluded from

consideration for the purpose of sick-leave determinations, so must the disposition by
Metropolitan—the payment or non-payment of benefits—which is based on the report.
Else, one would allow to come in indirectly what is prohibited from coming in directly. And
obviously also -- unless it were shown, which it has not, that the assurances were meant to
be applied to the one-sided advantage of the Union—the exclusion must be taken to cut
both ways. It is to be respected, in other words, whether it helps or hinders either party’s
claim in any particular (106) case.
Based on this first finding, the Umpire is here striking from consideration the report of the
Metropolitan medical examiner and the payment of the disability benefits to J. from May 8
to June 14. It may be added that the present case rather powerfully illustrates the
soundness of the assurances’ exclusion policy. Despite the report of Metropolitan’s
medical examiner—he found that J.’s complaints could not be objectively substantiated
and that J. "should be able to do any type of work exclusive of heavy object lifting over 50
pounds" (not involved in J.’s job) --
Metropolitan chose to pay J. disability benefits for the time preceding the examination
(which was conducted on June 14). It is at least possible that Metropolitan made the lump-
sum, retroactive payment as a matter of its preference to settle rather than face the
potential expense of litigation. And this is merely another way of saying that Metropolitan’s
disposition could well have been based on the kind of economic considerations which can
cut both ways and which the Union fundamentally sought to have removed for the sake of
protecting the employees’ rights under Paragraph (106).
On the second question—concerning the use of statements which are made by the
employees’ own physician and which are contained on the insurance-claim forms—the
Umpire finds that such statements are admissible and properly considered in connection
with (106) determinations. In the first place, the Umpire sees no language in the
assurances which either explicitly or impliedly directs itself to such statements. And the
bare assertion in the Union’s October 30, 1962 letter to the effect that such statements
were intended to be within the coverage of the assurances -- there is certainly nothing in
Decision J-91 which can be taken as upholding the contention—seems to the Umpire an
insufficient basis for going beyond what the assurances, by their own terms, provide for. In
the second place, it is confirmed by both parties that such statements have long been
accepted and applied for the purpose of "satisfactory evidence" under Paragraph (106) (at
least insofar as this plant and the plant involved in J-91 are concerned). To accept and
apply them also for the purpose of the "period of continuing disability" under the same
Paragraph seems nothing more than a natural extension—nothing more than merely
continuing the avoidance of needless duplication on which the "satisfactory evidence"
practice is based. Indeed, if the "satisfactory evidence" practice is to be retained, the
Umpire does not see where one would draw the line beyond which the physician’s
statements (on the insurance claim forms) could no longer be relied upon. And in the third
place, the above-discussed clash of interests can obviously not be said to be present when
it comes to the employee’s own physician. To the contrary, if anything, it is in the
employee’s corner that his own physician would be found. Moreover, an employee is not
stuck with any particular physician and instead can shop around to whatever extent he
considers to be in his own best interests. (J.’s use of some twelve or thirteen physicians in
connection with his various sick leaves is extreme, but it makes the point.)
Granted that Metropolitan’s action and the statements of the employee’s physician appear
on one and the same form and that considerable difficulty is therefore presented in looking
at the one without looking at the other. But to see and yet to disregard is simply not an
insuperable task. For all the reasons given, the Umpire finds against the exclusion of the
physician’s statements.
To turn, then, to the termination itself.
It seems to the Umpire that there can be no question that the Company, at the point where
it terminated J., had the strongest prima facie grounds for concluding that J.’s sick leave
had ended and that the "considered as having voluntarily quit" language was therefore
operative. It had before it all of the following: that J. had sustained no broken bones and
that Dr. S.’s assessment that "10 days disability should be maximum for this type of injury",
as he subsequently put it, seemed correct on its face; that, by the local parties’ long and
understood practice, a sick leave of "unknown" duration is a sick leave for one month and
is renewable at the end of it; that J.’s failure to file a supplementary form on or about May 8
was the equivalent of not renewing it; and that, upon inquiry with Dr. S. in late May,
Management received the report which, to re-quote part of it, said: "Patient ignores fact
that I tell him he is able to work: I cannot force him to return... since he is not coming for
treatment I assume he is OK." When these things are taken together, it is difficult to
conceive of stronger evidence yielding the expiration of an employee’s sick leave and his
failure to come back to work upon it. *
The Umpire went to considerable length (see p. 5) in describing the form letter which
contains Dr. S.’s late-May statement. He did so in order to show how one of the Union’s
contentions in this case cannot possibly be accepted. The contention is that the letter,
among other things, states that "Employee has not been approved for return to work". As
explained, however, this sentence is one of the pre-typed ones. The Umpire rejects the
Union’s contention as clearly wide of the mark.
In the opinion of the Umpire, the Company’s prima facie case has not been overcome by
what the Union has presented.
There are, on the one hand, the various other statements by Dr. S. Granted that they can
be taken as showing Dr. S. to be going off in different directions. But there is at least some
ambiguity on the question of whether, as to the post-June 15 visits, J. was treated because
of the series of alleged accidents (or instead merely visited Dr. S. while asserting the
various accidents); what the Union seeks to make of Dr. S.’s statements of June 8, 1968
and September 8, 1968 is substantially squashed by Dr. S.’s letter of September 29, 1969;
whatever statement by Dr. S. is taken, there is a 5-week gap between J.’s visit of April 8
and May 13; and, above all, the one truly positive and unequivocal statement by Dr. S. is
the one he gave in late May (1968). It has not been retracted and it is obviously of the most
damaging effect on the grievant’s case.
The grievant’s own testimony was among the least persuasive testimonies which the
Umpire has ever encountered. To the Umpire, the grievant was someone who simply could
not be believed. His testimony was at once marked by the extra-fast answer of the veteran
fabricator and by a too long-suffering demeanor. There is the objective indicator that, in
seeking employment with another company following his termination, J. falsified his
employment application. There are the series of alleged accidents starting with June 15 --
considering their conveniently overlapping nature and the types of accidents which are
alleged, there is simply too much to accept by normal human experience and reasonable
standards of credulity. There is J.’s allegation that, between April 8 and May 13, he
stopped in at Dr. S.’s office on several occasions for heat treatments, seeing the nurse and
not Dr. S. himself—no substantiating records were supplied, J.’s assertions were
unaccompanied by meaningful detail, and the only realistic reading of the assertions is that
J. was seeking to "cover" the 5-week gap in his visits to Dr. S.’s office. And there is, finally,
what to the Umpire became the true climax of J.’s fabrications. In connection with the cross
examination of the Company’s insurance-office representative, the Union asked why the
usual custom of sending the monthly supplementary form to an employee on sick leave of
unknown duration had not been followed with respect to J. The asking of the question left
no doubt in the Umpire’s mind that the Union was under the impression—presumably
because of what it had been told by J.—that the supplementary form had not been sent
him. Yet, the answer of the insurance-office representative, backed by a record-entry
which substantiated it, was that the form had been sent to J. J. was subsequently recalled,
but his lame statement that he had "lost" the form was utterly unconvincing. Putting it all
together, the Umpire believes that J. stands as a badly discredited witness.
The Union’s remaining arguments cannot be sustained. Given the above conclusions and
given J.’s truly extensive experience with sick leaves, it would be wholly unrealistic and
wrong to hold that J. thought he was free not to come back to work and therefore was
within the meaning of the "unless he has a satisfactory reason" phrase. And as to the
"secretively and vengeful" arguments, the answers must be these: 1) the fact that the
supplementary form was sent shows that J., rather than having been treated
discriminatorily, was treated completely in accordance with what the renewal practice calls
for—it was not Management which, deliberately or otherwise, failed to send him the leave-
extension form, it was he who failed to have it filled out and return it to the plant; 2) the
"written notification" proviso of Paragraph (111)(b) applies to a series of enumerated leave-
of-absence Paragraphs of which Paragraph (106) is not one.
The Umpire, then, sustains the Company’s position that J.’s "period of continuing disability"
had ended on May 13, 1968, and that, on May 17, 1968, J. was properly terminated as an
employee who "shall be considered as having voluntarily quit".
DECISION
The grievance is denied.
/S/Rolf Valtin
Umpire
November 16, 1969
No. M-47
FEBRUARY 26, 1970
Discharge:
Possession of Loaded Pistol
GRIEVANCE:
FISHER BODY DIVISION, GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, MARION PLANT,

MARION,
INDIANA—APPEAL CASE M-114
"Chg Mgt. W/unjustly discharging emp.________(W.) on 1/27/69 for alleged vio of Shop
Rule #12. Demand Mgt. reinstate emp. at once, clear record of penalty and pay emp. for all
time lost & any other benefit lost due to the discharge." S/L.E.W.
The grievance is denied. (Entire Decision should be read.)
In the Matter of:

Union No. 977
and
General Motors Corporation, Fisher Body Division, Marion, Indiana -- Appeal Case M-114

file://C:\Users\bobology\AppData\Local\Temp\Framework\m-047_13A60110.htm 3/22/2011
OPINION
Grievant W. was hired by the Company in early 1960. He last worked as a second-shift
Press Operator-All. With one slight exception, he has a clean prior disciplinary record. He
was discharged for violating the prohibition laid down in Shop Rule 12: "Possession of
weapons on Company premises at any time."
The essential facts are these:
At about 2:15 PM on Thursday, January 23, 1969, Management received a phone call from
the Marion City Police Department. The police reported that it had received a tip that W.,
supposedly because of differences with another employee (J.S.), would be armed in
coming to work.
Management decided that W. should be stopped at the plant entrance—Plant Gate No. 1.
It got in touch with the police; the police agreed to the plan; and two officers from the police
(the Assistant Chief and a Captain) came to the plant shortly before 3 PM. Also dispatched
to Plant Gate No. 1, to identify W., was Shift Superintendent M.W.
Grievant W. arrived at about 3:15 PM. As he came through the gate, he was stopped by
Shift Superintendent M.W. and asked to step into the Plant Protection Office. There, the
two police officers asked him whether he was carrying a gun. W. denied it, and the police
officers thereupon searched him. The search revealed a .25 caliber Hawes automatic
pistol. Though there was no round in the chamber, the pistol clip contained live
ammunition.
Confirmed, conceded or in the status of something to be assumed for the purpose of

deciding the case are the following: 1) W. was on his way to and, had he not been
apprehended at the gate, would have gone to his work area (about a quarter of a mile from
the gate); 2) there had been bad blood between W. and the other employee; 3) it was for
the purpose of self-protection that W. was carrying the pistol; 4) it takes but a split second
to retract the chamber and thus to feed a bullet into it.
The Union makes clear that it does not condone the possession of weapons at the plant,
but takes the position that the discharge penalty is excessive. Its arguments are: 1) that the
Shop Rule designates a penalty range of a 2-week DLO to discharge and that, given the
grievant’s nine years of service and practically spotless disciplinary record, the outer limit
of the range should not be applied; 2) that the imposition of the discharge penalty is
inconsistent with certain prior instances at this plant involving the possession of guns; and
3) that employees are entitled to be in the know of the consequence of one transgression
or another, and that the grievant here—for lack of either general knowledge or policy
announcement by Management—did not know that discharge would follow from his
possession of the gun.
The Umpire sees no proper choice but to sustain the discharge. As shown, the facts here
are that the pistol was loaded, that the grievant did not intend to leave it with the guard at
the gate, and that he had the purpose of using it—the contention that it would have been a
matter of self-protection merely serves to confirm, rather than alter, this conclusion. The
grievant thus committed the most extreme form of a Shop Rule 12 violation. That he knew
as much is indicated by the fact that he initially denied possession of the pistol and initially
asserted that he had not come to the plant to go to work. It cannot be held, the Umpire
believes, that the discharge was improper for lack of awareness by the grievant as to the
consequence of his act.
Even in the absence of evidence indicating the presence of a feud between two employees
and the intention by one of them to fire his pistol, it seems to the Umpire that possession of
a loaded pistol at the plant must itself be regarded as a capital offense—as an offense so
serious that length of service and a clean disciplinary record cannot be given their normal
weight. For, obviously, the possession of the loaded pistol spells the ever-present danger
that the pistol will be used. Consider, as an illustration, what happened in the case covered
by Decision M-30. To regard the possession of a loaded pistol at work as less than a
capital offense, in other words, would be to tamper with the Company’s clear obligation to
protect the safety of its employees and supervisors.
The Umpire sees no merit in the Union’s reliance on the prior instances at this plant
involving the possession of a gun. All but one of them were a matter of leaving or seeking
to leave (it was declined in one of the instances) an unloaded gun at the guardhouse.
Clearly, these were not violations of the Shop Rule in anything other than the strict
semantical sense. And as to the one instance which did involve possession of a loaded
pistol (beyond the guardhouse and in the employee’s work area), the employee was
discharged. The Union’s effort to distinguish this instance on the grounds that the
employee, unlike the grievant in the present case, was also in possession of alcohol and
caused a struggle before the pistol was taken away from him is rejected as utterly
unconvincing.
DECISION
February 26, 1970
/S/Rolf Valtin
Umpire
No. M-51
MARCH 19, 1970
Paragraph 63 (a) of National Agreement:
Local Practice and Local Agreement;
Evidence
GRIEVANCE
CHEVROLET MOTOR DIVISION, GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, ST. LOUIS

ASSEMBLY PLANT, ST. LOUIS, MISSOURI—APPEAL CASE M-2009
"I charge management with violation of paragraph #63A of the National Agreement &
demand to be given the higher paying job in line with my seniority. Also be paid back pay
past due to this violation." S/C.D.
UMPIRE’S DECISION
In the Matter of:
United Automobile Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America, Local

Union No. 25
and
General Motors Corporation, Chevrolet Assembly Division, St. Louis, Mo. -- Appeal Case
M-2009

file://C:\Users\bobology\AppData\Local\Temp\Framework\m-051_13A60CD3.htm 3/22/2011
OPINION
This case is concerned with the filling of a promotional vacancy in Department 35. Both the
grievant and employee G. are members of this department. The grievant’s service dates
from October, 1935; G.’s service dates from April, 1953. At the time in question, G. was a
third-shift employee and the grievant was a first-shift employee.
The vacancy was in the third-shift job of "Utility-man-Driver-Licensed Truck and Passenger
Car-Out". It is higher-rated than either of the jobs respectively held at the time by G. and
the grievant. G. was selected to fill the vacancy, and he began filling it on November 4,
1968. The grievant is here claiming that he was entitled to fill the vacancy in preference to
G.
The opening portion of Paragraph (63)(a) of the National Agreement reads as follows: "In
the advancement of employees to higher paid jobs when ability, merit and capacity are
equal, employees with the longest seniority will be given preference."
As already given, the grievant is of longer service than G. Also, it is conceded that the
grievant’s qualifications were such as to have satisfied the phrase "when ability, merit and
capacity are equal". The Umpire nevertheless believes that the grievant’s claim must be
denied.
The case is concerned with the so-called scope of selection and reduces itself to three
points. First, it has long been true under the parties’ collective-bargaining relationship that
the scope of selection—the group of employees from among whom a selection is to be
made in filling a promotional vacancy—is establishable by practice or agreement. By long
practice at this plant, the scope of selection within a department (or a unit consisting of
more than one department) was confined to the shift on which a vacancy might arise. To
this extent, thus, the grievant was not eligible to fill the vacancy here in question—he was a
first-shift employee and the vacancy was a third-shift vacancy.
Second, the within-shift scope of selection was expanded in the 1967 local negotiations.
The expansion agreement reads as follows:
"For the purpose of applying Paragraph 63(a) of the National

Agreement, the following shall apply:
"Employees in Departments 7 & 8

(Passenger Assembly Line), Departments 1
& 3 (Truck Assembly Line), Departments 51
& 53 (Corvette Assembly Line), Departments
27 & 28 (Material), Department 26
(Inspection), Department 55 (Corvette
Inspection), Department 2 (Paint),
Department 51 (Corvette Paint), Department
25 (Final Process), Department 32 (Loading
Dock), and Departments 35 & 39 (Porters),
will be permitted to make written application
for higher rated jobs within the established
scope of selection on the opposite shift."
Thus, since the time of the adoption of the agreement, employees on one shift have been
in a position to make themselves eligible for consideration for filling a promotional vacancy
on another shift. Two things, however— despite some contentions to the contrary voiced at
the hearing—are unquestionably true; 1) by the express terms of the agreement, the cross-
shift application must be in writing; 2) the application must be on file in advance of the time
that a particular promotional vacancy is filled. On this latter score, the point is simply that it
is for the purpose of vacancy filling that the cross-shift application is filled and that, if the
application were implemented either retrospectively or simultaneously with its filing—
irrespective of whether or not a promotional vacancy were in existence—the filing of a
cross-shift application would serve to displace an occupant of one job or another. The
difference between a vacancy-filling event and a displacement event requires no
elaboration. One would clearly be going beyond the bounds of what the scope-of-selection
arrangement is intended to accomplish were one to sanction such retrospective or
simultaneous implementation of a cross-shift application.
Third, on the factual dispute as to the date on which the grievant’s cross-shift application
was filed, the Umpire believes he must hold that it was filed on November 5 (1968) -- the
date which was in fact filled-in on the application form. The evidence, in the Umpire’s
opinion, fails to substantiate the Union’s contention to the effect either that it was before
November 5 that the application was filed or that, if not filed until that date, there was a 2 or
3-day delay attributable to administrative fault on the part of Management. The fact that
these contentions were not introduced until the Third Step of the grievance procedure
would seem to support the Umpire’s conclusion. And the meaning of the conclusion is that
the grievant’s cross-shift application was filed after the vacancy was filled—as shown, the
vacancy was filled on November 4.
The Union has additionally sought support for the grievant’s claim by pointing to the fact
that it was not until late on November 4 that G. began to occupy the job and that the shift
on which he began to occupy it extended into November 5. But the answer must be that
the job had been filled by the time the grievant’s cross-shift application was received.
Given the grievant’s long service, one can be sympathetic about the proximity of the
vacancy-filling day and the application-filing day. The grievant indeed "missed it by a hair";
but he did miss it, and this must be made controlling.
DECISION
March 19, 1970
/S/Rolf Valtin
Umpire
No. M-59
May 15, 1970
Discharge:
Threatening Patrolman;
Evidence;
Extent of Penalty
GRIEVANCE:
CADILLAC MOTOR CAR DIVISION, GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, DETROIT

PLANT,
DETROIT, MICHIGAN—APPEAL CASE M-53
Grievance 756652.
"I Charge Manaj With Unjust Discharge. Request I be reinstated and I be paid All lost time
involved." S/B.J.S.
The grievance is denied. (Entire decision should be read)
In the Matter of:

Union No. 22
and
General Motors Corporation, Cadillac Motor Car Division, Detroit, Michigan -- Appeal Case
M-53
OPINION
Grievant S. was hired by the Company in late 1955. At the time of his discharge - June 3,
1968 - he was a Plant 4, midnight-shift Press Operator. His prior disciplinary record is
composed of two entries (Shop Rule 27 - Restricting Output, and Shop Rule 13 - Refusal
to Obey Orders of Supervision). He was discharged for violating the prohibition laid down
in Shop Rule 20: "Threatening, intimidating, coercing or interfering with employees or
supervision at any time."
The first issue in the case is one of credibility. On the evidence presented, the Umpire is
left with no reasonable doubt that the grievant committed that with which he is charged.
The following is the essence of what happened.
Friday, May 31, 1968, was pay day. S. had been absent from his scheduled shift (ending at
8 AM). He drove to the plant in the afternoon to obtain his pay check.
S. parked his car at the apron near Plant Security Post No. 6. At the Post itself, he
identified himself to Patrolman M. and told the latter that he wanted his pay check. By
telephone, M. ascertained that a particular Clerk had the check and would deliver it to the
Post in about five minutes. M. transmitted the information to S.
Two or three minutes later, and before the Clerk had arrived, S. told M. that he would not
wait and would go into the plant to get his check. M. made it clear that he would not permit
it and positioned himself on the sidewalk in such a way as to block S.’s entrance into the
plant.
S. made one unsuccessful effort to go around M., and, while bending sideways, M.’s
shoulder came in contact with S. He (S.) then stepped backward, pulled a knife from his
pocket, opened it, held it in "palmed" fashion, and made two threatening remarks at M.
Shortly thereafter, as M. stood his ground, S. closed the knife and returned it to his pocket.
He then made two or three degrading remarks at M., to the effect that M. would be afraid to
fight him.
S. then asked for his Committeeman; M. said he was not authorized to call a
Committeeman; and the incident came to a close as employees, at shift-ending time, were
leaving the plant via the Post.
According to the grievant, the object which he pulled out of his pocket was a key. The
improbability of it is nearly self-apparent, and the Umpire otherwise found the grievant’s
testimony wholly unconvincing. He rejects the "key" as well as other parts of the grievant’s
version.
On the above facts, the Umpire does not believe that he can properly modify the discharge
penalty. He has considered both the facts that the grievant had about 12 ½ years of
service and that he apparently was somewhat intoxicated when he came to the plant on
the day in question. But the pulling of a knife is the mark of a bully, and it obviously
constitutes an extreme form of a Shop Rule 20 violation. It is, in other words, so serious an
offense that the most extraordinary extenuating circumstances are needed to overturn the
discharge penalty. In the opinion of the Umpire, the two factors here presented do not
suffice to reach such level of extenuating circumstances.
DECISION
May 15, 1970
/S/Rolf Valtin
Umpire
UMPIRE DECISION
No. M-62
May 27, 1970
Paragraphs (103) and (111) (b) of National Agreement;
Termination of Employee
GRIEVANCE:
CHEVROLET MOTOR DIVISION, GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, BAY CITY

PLANT, BAY CITY, MICHIGAN—APPEAL CASE M-173
Grievance 806656
"I charge management with unjustly discharging me as management did not live up to the
provisions of Par. #111 of the N.A. I demand immediate reinstatement with all back pay
and any benefits due me." S/W.F.S. (grievant) W.L., Jr. (Committeeman)
In the Matter of:

Union No. 362
and
General Motors Corporation, Chevrolet Motor Division, Bay City, Michigan -- Appeal Case
M-173

file://C:\Users\bobology\AppData\Local\Temp\Framework\m-062_13A61FA7.htm 3/22/2011
OPINION
Grievant S. was hired by the Company in late 1958. At the time of his termination, he was
a Die Cast Operator in Department 51. Having been granted a leave of absence under
Paragraph (103), he was terminated as an "employee who fails to report for work within
three working days after the date of expiration of the leave", as given in Paragraph (111)
(b). The latter paragraph will be quoted below. Paragraph (103), titled "Informal Leaves of
Absence", reads as follows:
"A leave of absence may be granted for personal reasons for a

period not to exceed thirty days, upon application of the employee to
and approval by his foreman. Such leaves of absence shall not be
renewed and seniority will accumulate during the leave."
The following is the factual framework:
Pursuant to his request, S. was granted a personal-reasons leave beginning April 30, 1969
and ending May 11, 1969. He was told that the leave was being granted under Paragraph
(103) and, additionally, was sent a letter which closed with: "Such leaves of absence are
not renewable; therefore, you will be expected to report to your respective job on May 12,
1969."
S. did not show up for work on any of the three days commencing with May 12, 1969.
However, Management received two phone calls—one on the 12th, the other on the 14th.
On the 12th, the caller identified himself as S., stated that he was absent for "personal
reasons", and said that he expected to be at work on the following day. On the 14 th, the
caller identified herself as S.’s wife, stated that S. was "sick", and said that S. would come
back to work "when able".
The Company neither accepted the phone calls as meeting the "report for work"
requirement nor believed that the explanations advanced in the phone calls constituted "a
satisfactory reason"—both of which phrases, as will be seen, appear in Paragraph (111)
(b). Following the end of the grievant’s scheduled shift (3 PM) on the 14th, Management
prepared a termination letter; and the grievant was thus terminated on the 15th. The Union,
on the other hand, is no longer contending (as it did at one or another stage of the
grievance procedure) either that Management acted prematurely in preparing the
termination letter or that the grievant had a "satisfactory reason" for failing to show up for
work.
Paragraph (111) (b) reads as follows:
having voluntarily quit unless he has a satisfactory reason; provided,
however, that in the case of failure to report for work within three
working days after the expiration of leaves of absence granted
under Paragraphs 104, 105, 109, 109a, 110, 110a and 113.

notifies Management of his absence. A copy of such Management
notification will be furnished promptly to the Chairman of the Shop
Committee. If the employee complies with the conditions set forth in
the notification, his seniority will be reinstated if it has not otherwise
been broken; however, such reinstatement shall not be construed
as limiting the application to his case of the Shop Rule regarding
absence without reasonable cause."
As shown, it is a conceded fact that the grievant (without "satisfactory reason" for his
absence) did not show up for work on any of the three working days following the
expiration of his leave. What the Union is contending, on the grounds to be developed
below, is that the telephone calls sufficed to put the grievant in the status of someone who
did "report for work". Therein lies the sole issue here to be determined: whether to
telephone the plant with the message of an intention to return to work— of an intention to
maintain the employer-employee relationship—is "to report for work" within the meaning of
Paragraph (111) (b).
Initially to be noted is that the Union is not saying that, insofar as Paragraph (111) (b) itself
is concerned, the words "to report for work" have been construed as it is here urging by
any prior GM-UAW decision. Nor, for that matter, does the Umpire believe that the
decisions cited by the Company squarely support its position in this case—namely, that "to
report for work" under Paragraph (111) (b) requires the employee’s physical presence at
work.
To understand the Union’s position, it is necessary to quote Paragraph (64) (d) of the
National Agreement. Paragraph (64) commences with "Seniority shall be broken for the
following reasons:", and subparagraph (d) reads as follows:
"If the employee fails to return to work within three working days
satisfactory reason. A copy of Management’s notification of such
loss of seniority will be furnished promptly to the Chairman of the
Shop Committee."
Thus, the very same phrase—"to report for work"—appears in (64) (d). Invoking the same-
language-same-meaning principle, the Union is relying on three prior Umpire decisions
involving (64) (d) -- E-241 (Wallen), F-8 (Alexander), and L-80 (Brodie). The Union
submits: 1) that these decisions stand for the proposition that "to report for work" under
(64) (d) is satisfied by a telephone call to the plant; and 2) that it must follow that the same
construction properly applies under Paragraph (111) (b).
Moreover, the Union argues, the construction is not at variance with the underlying
purpose of Paragraph (111) (b). That purpose is to avert the burden which Management
would be under if it did not know whether an employee, upon expiration of his leave,
intended to remain in the Company’s employ. Silence from the employee would create
such a burden. And, while the employee’s actual showing-up for work obviously reveals his
intention to remain in the Company’s employ a telephone call giving the word that the
employee will be coming back to work also achieves the central purpose of keeping
Management in the know respecting the maintenance of the employment relationship.
Here, on the very first day following the expiration of his leave, the grievant let
management know that he intended to come back to work. The phone call should have
been accepted as meeting the "to report for work" requirement, and the grievant’s
termination should therefore be set aside.
On essentially two grounds, the Umpire is in disagreement with the Union. The first is that
the three prior decisions, as the Umpire reads them, do not interpret Paragraph (64) (d) in
the clear-cut way which the Union is claiming. The second is that, even granting some
support for the Union’s position by virtue of the three prior decisions, there is a significant
difference between Paragraph (64) (d) and Paragraph (111) (b) -- both in what they direct
themselves to and in their language. The Umpire does not believe that, by proper reading
of Paragraph (111) (b) in its entirety, he can accompany the Union in the construction it is
seeking for "to report for work".
To proceed, first, to a discussion of the three prior decisions. As to Decision E-241, it is

true that a phone call served to preserve an employee’s seniority. The factual
circumstances, however, were highly unusual. The case involved an employee who had
been laid off and who became aware of the fact that he had been recalled in the very nick
of time -- 18 minutes before the elapsing of the critical "three working days" period. If he
was to preserve his seniority, it was by phone alone that he could have done so. Moreover,
the issue of whether or not a phone call satisfies the requirement of Paragraph (64) (d)
was not squarely raised, and was neither briefed nor argued by the parties. Rather, as
Umpire Wallen put it:
"This case poses two questions: (1) When is an employee ‘notified’

to report for work? (2) What constitutes ‘three working days’ within
the meaning of Paragraph 64 (d)? These questions comprise the
issues in the case."
It was in this context—i.e., upon deciding these two questions in the Union’s favor and thus
concluding that the "three working days" period had not yet ended—that Umpire Wallen
applied the phone call as preserving the employee’s seniority. And, to repeat, he did so in
a situation where but 18 minutes were left to preserve the seniority.
In the case leading to Decision F-8, the grievant (a female) had gone to Florida (from
Indiana) under the guise of illness; Management, apparently on the basis of a "tip"
concerning the true nature of the grievant’s absence, sent her a (64) (d) notice; during the
period which the Umpire found to be the "three working days" period, the grievant made no
contact of any kind with the plant; and the grievance protesting her termination was denied.
Hence, in terms of both the absence of any phone call within the "three working days"
period and of what was in fact decided in F-8, there is nothing for the Union here to bank
on.
It is true, however, that the grievant telephoned the plant on the day which, by the Umpire’s
finding as to when she had been "notified to report for work", was the day after the
elapsing of the "three-working days" period. And it is also true that the Umpire—and this is
what the Union is here relying on—noted that "Management does not contend that such
report (the telephone call) was defective". The fact is, however, that the issue of the
standing of a telephone call in lieu of showing up for work was rendered moot by the
Umpire’s finding as to when the "three working days" period had begun and ended. It was
merely in passing that the Umpire made the statement. And the further fact is—the present
Umpire has studied the entire record in the case—that the question of whether a telephone
call is "good" under Paragraph (64) (d) was simply not gone into and that the Company
nowhere went on record as conceding that it considered such a call to be "good".
Accordingly, rather than accept the statement which the Union is relying on as connoting
an affirmative conclusion on the question, the Umpire believes that it cannot be accepted
for anything more than it in fact says: "Management does not contend that such report was
defective".
The facts in the case leading to Decision L-80 were these: having been on layoff, the
grievant was notified on August 10 (1966) to come back to work on August 15; rather than
come back to work, the grievant stopped by at the plant to explain why he would not be at
work on any of the "three working days"; Management refused to accept the explanation,
and the grievant was thus terminated.
It is obviously true that, on these facts, a significant holding might have emerged on the
question of whether anything short of actually coming to work is "good" under Paragraph
(64) (d). But, on the one hand, the case did not involve a phone call; and, on the other
hand, such a holding did not emerge. It is true that Umpire Brodie sustained the grievance
and that, in doing so, he referred to Decisions E-241 and F-8 and relied in part on the fact
that the grievant had come to the plant and let Management know of his intention to
resume his employment relationship. But the holding appears primarily to be based on the
nature of the return-to-work notice which the grievant had received. Umpire Brodie found,
in effect, that the notice was so written as to constitute more an invitation to tea than the
sort of unequivocal return-to-work mandate which he considered necessary to make the
termination consequence operative. Moreover, it is arguable that the grievant, in coming to
the plant and telling Management that he could not go to work within the "three working
days" period, had complied with the notice. For, the last sentence of it read: "If for some
reason you will not return on the above date, please notify the Personnel Department."
So much for the three prior decisions. Obviously, the discussion is without intention to
interpret Paragraph (64) (d) or to go so far as to say that a phone call under it is not
"good". What the Umpire is saying, to restate what he said above, is that the three prior
decisions amount to something less than the ironclad support which the Union is urging.
The Umpire next turns to the differences between Paragraph (64) (d) and Paragraph (111)
(b). One difference is that Paragraph (64) (d) does not contain the language, found in
Paragraph (111) (b), "if... he reports for work or properly notifies Management of his
absence". This difference will be dealt with below.
The other difference concerns the fact that Paragraph (64) (d) and Paragraph (111) (b) are
not directed to the same type of absence. At least for the most part—it was true of two of
the three prior decisions, and F-8 involved the unusual situation of an employee slipping-
away—Paragraph (64) (d) is directed to layoffs. Hence the language "to return to work
within three working days after being notified to report for work". Though not without
exception, layoffs are by their nature of indefinite duration -- i.e., they do not have a known
terminal point—and an employee thus has no advance knowledge of when he will be
coming back to work. He thus may be "notified" quite unexpectedly; and it is this
unexpectancy that can engender the sort of problems which were presented in E-241 and
L-80.
Paragraph (111) (b), on the other hand, is directed to leaves of absence. Its requirement,
rather than put in terms of notification to the employee, is that the employee "report for
work within three working days after the date of expiration of the leave". And though it is
not true of all leaves of absence, it is certainly true of a Paragraph (103) leave that it is of
definite and known terminal point and that there thus simply cannot be the uncertainty for
coming back to work involved in E-241 and L-80.
What the Umpire is saying in pointing up these matters is that Paragraph (64) (d) and
Paragraph (111) (b) play different Agreement roles. He is not prepared, accordingly, to
equate the two Paragraphs in the fashion which the Union is urging.
To turn, finally, to Paragraph (111) (b) itself. For the following reasons, the Umpire rejects
the meaning which the Union is seeking to give to "to report for work".
First, in the absence of compelling considerations, Agreement words are to be given their
ordinary, everyday-usage meaning. By that standard, "to report for work" plainly means to
show up in readiness to go to work. To report for work is simply not the equivalent of
reporting off—and, in the end, the Union is urging that the phrase be given both meanings.
Second, the requirement to report for work or suffer the voluntarily-quit consequence is not
without an "out". The "out" lies in "unless he has a satisfactory reason". Given its presence,
the Umpire sees no good reason in equity to fail to adhere to the plain meaning of the "to
report for work" phrase.
Third, there is the already-mentioned language in the latter part of Paragraph (111) (b).
With respect to certain types of leaves of absence (and the fact that a Paragraph (103)
leave is not among them is clearly without bearing on the present discussion),
Management is obligated to "send written notification to the employee’s last known
address as shown on the Company’s records, that his seniority has been broken and that it
can be reinstated, if, within three specified working days thereafter, he reports for work or
properly notifies Management of his absence". Emphasis supplied.) There is no way to
read this underscored portion except that "properly notifies Management of his absence" is
an alternative to "reports for work". Yet, by the construction which the Union is seeking,
"reports for work" would be the same thing as "properly notifies Management of his
absence". The stated alternative would be no alternative at all and, instead, would be
rendered useless surplusage. Thus, it is not merely that the Union is bucking the natural
meaning of "report for work"; it is also that the Union is in effect asking that one should
accept that, with respect to the latter part of Paragraph (111) (b), the parties set out to say
the same thing twice.
To come back, in conclusion, to the present case itself. The grievant had a Paragraph
(103) leave; the leave was non-renewable—by the terms both of Paragraph (103) and the
letter which was sent him; the grievant did not show up for work on any of the three
working days following the expiration of the leave and he did not have—so it must
obviously be assumed by the Union’s withdrawal of its earlier contention in this regard -- a
"satisfactory reason" for failing to show up for work; the excuses advanced in the phone
calls must thus be rejected as worthless ("personal reasons"), on the one hand, and as
false ("sick"), on the other; and, for the reasons given, the phone calls cannot be accepted
as meeting the "to report for work" requirement.
In the opinion of the Umpire, it is the specific "to report for work" terms of Paragraph (111)
(b) which matter. Rather than accept the underlying-purpose argument which the Union
has here made, the Umpire believes that the case is correctly viewed as involving an
employee who lost the benefits of the National Agreement because he failed to live up to
his obligations under it.
DECISION
/S/Rolf Valtin
Umpire
May 27, 1970
No. M-66
June 24, 1970
Discharge:
Absence Without Reasonable Cause;
Extent of Penalty
GRIEVANCE:

TARRYTOWN PLANT, TARRYTOWN, NEW YORK—APPEAL CASE M-62
Grievance 292951
"I charge Management with unjustly discharging me and demand that I be reinstated with
full benefits and pay and that all lost moneys be paid me. Also all credits and my record be
cleared." S/B.C.F.
For the reasons given in the accompanying Opinion:
1. The grievant’s absence on the days in question was without

"reasonable cause" and a violation of Shop Rule 6.
2. The grievant is to be reinstated without back pay. The time lost

shall be applied as a DLO. (Entire decision should be read.)
In the Matter of:

file://C:\Users\bobology\AppData\Local\Temp\Framework\m-066_13A62C83.htm 3/22/2011
Union No. 664
and
General Motors Corporation, GMAD Tarrytown, New York -- Appeal Case M-62
OPINION
At the time of his discharge—September 5, 1969 -- grievant F. was a second-shift Utility

Reliefman in the Paint Department. The Labor Day holiday in 1969 fell on Monday,
September 1. F. was absent on the succeeding two days. He was discharged under Shop
Rule 6: "Absence without reasonable cause" and Shop Rule 39: "Repeated violations of
Shop or Safety Rules".
The first issue is whether, as F. asserts, he had "reasonable cause" for his absences on
the two days in question. The following is a summary of what he relies on:
On the afternoon of Friday, August 29, F. was told that his wife had called him at the plant.
He returned the call, and his wife told him that her aunt, residing in Darlington, S.C., was
gravely ill with cancer. The relationship between the aunt and F.’s wife had been a close
one because the aunt, following the death of the father of F.’s wife, had helped to bring her
up.
F. and his wife decided to take advantage of the Labor Day weekend and to drive to
Darlington to visit the aunt. They departed in the early morning hours of Saturday, August
30, and arrived at Darlington some 20 hours later.
The aunt was in a state of deliriousness and apparently near death. F.’s wife, therefore,
insisted that they stay on. A day or two later (there is a conflict between the Union’s brief
and F.’s testimony), the aunt rallied, and F. and his wife therefore decided to drive back
home.
They left in the early morning hours of September 2 and arrived home, some 36 hours
later, in the afternoon of September 3 (on this score, too, there is a conflict between the
Union’s brief and F.’s testimony). Upon arrival at home, F. called the plant and left word
that he would be back at work on September 4.
F. was twice interviewed on September 4; he explained why he had been absent; he was
asked a series of questions; his explanation was not accepted; and he was discharged on
September 5.
The Company has attacked the veracity of F.’s account; and it is true that the account is
accompanied by a number of weaknesses and inconsistencies. The Umpire, however, is
not deciding the case on the basis of the credibility issue thus raised. Rather, he is holding
that, even if F.’s version is accepted in its entirety, it does not add up to "reasonable
cause" for the absence. For one thing, there is at least a serious question of whether a
wife’s aunt qualifies as sufficiently close a relative to justify taking off from work in the
event of her illness. For another, by F.’s own account, he knew about the illness and his
wife’s wish to travel to South Carolina over the Labor Day weekend before he left work on
the Friday. Clearly, the Umpire believes, F. should have sought permission from
Supervision to make the trip. For it simply cannot be accepted that F. and his wife would
make so long a trip with the intention of staying a mere 24 hours with the aunt—which is
about all the time they would have had, by F.’s own account of the time consumed in
making the roundtrip, if he was going to be back for the afternoon shift on September 2. To
the contrary, F. says that he and his wife came back when the aunt rallied; and the
implication of this is that, absent the rallying, they would have come back from Darlington
even later than they did. And finally, the fact is that it was F.’s wife, not F. himself, who was
anxious to visit the aunt, and that F.’s wife could have traveled to South Carolina by bus at
approximately the same expense as being driven by private automobile by her husband.
Putting it all together, the Umpire believes that he must hold that "reasonable cause" for
F.’s absence on September 2 and 3 was lacking.
On the second issue—the extent of the penalty—the Umpire is nonetheless holding for the
grievant. There is no denying the facts that the grievant has a woefully poor past
disciplinary record and that, as to that record, both of the last two violations were Shop
Rule 6 violations. It is also true, however, that about nine months elapsed between the
second of these violations and the present one (and that the grievant’s record was
otherwise clean in this 9-month period). And, overshadowing all else, the fact is that the
grievant had 22-1/2 years of service at the time of his discharge. It is much like in the case
covered by Decision M-43: the Umpire believes that this much service should be given
overriding weight. He is directing the grievant’s reinstatement without back pay and with
the same comment made in M-43: "The grievant must understand that this is the
equivalent of being given one more chance for the most drastic kind of improvement and
that, if he cannot shape up, it will be the Company’s basic plea—‘we cannot build (cars)
with employees like (F.)’—which will have to be given overriding weight."
DECISION
For the reasons given in the accompanying Opinion:
1. The grievant’s absence on the days in question was without

"reasonable cause" and a violation of Shop Rule 6.
2. The grievant is to be reinstated without back pay. The time lost

shall be applied as a DLO.
June 24, 1970
/S/Rolf Valtin
Umpire
No. M-67
July 1, 1970
Under Paragraph (64)(c) of National Agreement;
Failure to State True Reason for Absence
GRIEVANCE:

"I protest Management placing off rolls as voluntary quit. I did not voluntarily quit and am
not a quit. Demand I be reinstated with full seniority at once and pay for all time lost from 3-
25-69 and I be made whole for all benefits due me." S/J.L.H.
The (64)(c) termination here in question is held to have been improper, and the Company
is directed to reinstate the grievant with restoration of seniority rights and with
reimbursement for the wages lost. (Entire decision should be read.)
In the Matter of:
United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America, Local

Union No. 1364
and
General Motors Corporation, GMAD, Fremont, California -- Appeal Case M-585

OPINION
Grievant H.’s plant seniority dates from September, 1967. He was a first-shift Assembler in
the Chassis Department. He was terminated, effective February 25, 1969, under
Paragraph (64) © of the National Agreement.
Paragraph (64) is titled "Loss of Seniority"; commences with "Seniority shall be broken for
the following reasons:"; and its subparagraph (c) reads as follows:
"If the employee is absent for three working days without properly
notifying the Management, unless a satisfactory reason is given.
After the unreported absence of three working days, Management
will send written notification to the employee’s last known address
as shown on the Company records, that his seniority has been
broken and that it can be reinstated if, within three specified working
days thereafter, he reports for work or properly notifies Management
of his absence. A copy of such Management notification will be
furnished promptly to the Chairman of the Shop Committee. If the
employee complies with the conditions set forth in the notification,
his seniority will be reinstated if it has not otherwise been broken;
however, such reinstatement shall not be construed as limiting the
application to his case of the Shop Rule regarding absence without
reasonable cause."
The following are the basic facts:
H.’s last day of work was Friday, February 14, 1969. On the following Monday, he was
arrested and sent to jail.
On Wednesday, February 19, 1969 -- the third working day of the grievant’s absence from
work—his wife telephoned the plant’s call-in center. She stated that her husband was ill
and that she did not know when he would be back at work.
A week later, having received no further word about the grievant, Management sent a letter
to the grievant’s house. It was not answered.
The body of it read as follows:
"This is to inform you that our records indicate that you have been
absent from work for three consecutive working days without proper
notification. In accordance with Paragraph 64c of the GM-UAW
National Agreement, dated December 15, 1967, your seniority has
been terminated.
Your seniority may be reinstated, however, if you contact the

Employment Office or report to work on Feb. 27, 28 or March 3,
1969 and give a satisfactory reason for your failure to report for
work."
H. was released from jail on March 24, 1969. He reported for work on the next day, but
was turned away as a person whose seniority had been broken.
Both parties’ positions are of manifold character. Rather than provide a review of all that
has been argued, the Umpire will move directly to the central question.
As indicated in the above statement of the facts, it is conceded that Mrs. H. called the
proper place (the plant’s call-in center) and that it was within the "three working days" that
she notified Management of her husband’s absence. What the case turns on is the fact
that Mrs. H. did not tell the truth as to the reason for her husband’s absence. By virtue of
this, the Company asserts, Management had not been "properly" notified. The Company is
contending, in other words, that telling the truth as to the reason for the absence is
included among the requirements for satisfying the phrase "properly notifying" in (64)(c)’s
first sentence. Contrarily, the Union contends that "properly" goes to following the correct
procedure in notifying Management of the absence, not to the substantive matter of
whether or not the reason given for the absence reflects the truth. In the alternative, the
Union relies on Decision B-16 (about to be reviewed) and thus asserts that, even if it were
to be accepted that Mrs. H. had failed "properly" to notify Management, there was a
"satisfactory reason" for the failure, and H.’s termination must therefore be set aside by
application of the phrase "unless a satisfactory reason is given".
The Umpire believes that proper treatment of the case requires a rather extensive review
of past (64)(c) Decisions. He will next turn to that review.
The facts in B-16 (Taylor, 1941) were these: the grievant had been jailed for a 30-day
period; his wife phoned the plant within the "three working days"; she gave false reasons
for his absence (death and illness in the family); Management learned of the true reason
for the grievant’s absence; it considered the true reason as spelling less than a satisfactory
reason for the absence; and it thereupon terminated the grievant under (64)(c).
The following is the heart of Umpire Taylor’s Opinion:
"Under Part (c) of Paragraph 64, an employee’s seniority is broken if

he is absent for three working days without properly notifying the
Management. An exception to the requirement just stated is
provided by the same clause when it states "unless a satisfactory
reason is given". Under this paragraph, an employee who is absent
for three working days or more assures retention of his seniority by
notifying management on the third day of absence. The required
"proper notification" clearly includes a statement of the reason for
the absence and its likely duration. Both factors are important to
management in the conduct of the business. In the absence of
proper notification as outlined, an employee’s seniority is
nevertheless not broken if he later advances a "satisfactory reason"
to explain his failure to give such notice. This is the clear meaning of
the clause as it is written and it is not proper to extend the coverage
of that clause.
"In the present case, management was actually notified that S.

would be absent. The notification was clearly defective, however, as
respects the reason advanced for the absence and the likely
duration of the absence. Under Paragraph 64, S.’s seniority would
therefore be broken because of the lack of proper notification
"unless a satisfactory reason is given" for this situation.
"The defect in the notice of absence resulted because it was given

by S.’s wife while S. was not at liberty. She was obviously beset with
unexpected and serious troubles. In the midst of them, and not
knowing how best to proceed, she gave a report to management
that is quite understandable under the circumstances. If she made a
mistake, it was a very human error. These circumstances, in the
judgment of the Umpire, provide a "satisfactory reason" for the
defect in the notice. It is concluded, therefore, that the technical
defect in the notice of absence that was given does not result in a
break of seniority under the terms of Part (c) of Paragraph 64."
Thus, Umpire Taylor applied "properly" as requiring that the truth be told as to the
absence, and he applied "unless a satisfactory reason is given" as an "out" for the failure
to give the truthful reason for the absence. The Union, here, argues two things: 1) that,
even if "properly" were so to be re-applied, the present situation is quite the same as was
the situation in B-16; 2) that the Opinion in B-16 went on with comments which indicate
that Umpire Taylor was less than enthusiastic about the "properly" interpretation. The
Opinion closes with: "his (the grievant’s) seniority should not be considered broken since
that could be effected only by a technical and highly doubtful interpretation of Paragraph
64".
Decision C-402 (Seward, 1945) is concerned with another "jail" case. In this case,
however, the truth had not been withheld from Management— i.e., Management had been
notified (in timely fashion) of the grievant’s actual predicament. Management terminated
the employee, not on the grounds that it had not been properly notified, but on the grounds
that it had not been furnished with a "satisfactory reason" for the absence.
Umpire Seward overruled the Company. He first expressed his agreement with the Taylor
interpretation of (64)(c) -- as given in the first of the above-quoted three paragraphs—and
he then went on with the following:
"... The general rule established by Paragraph (64) © is that an

employee’s seniority is broken if he is absent for three working days
without properly notifying the Management. Even if nothing
whatever was said in the Agreement about the giving of "a
satisfactory reason", proper notification would prevent the breaking
of seniority. The inclusion of an exception which prevents the
breaking of seniority, under certain circumstances, even when
notification has not been given, can hardly be construed as
furnishing grounds for the breaking of seniority when notification has
been given."
Mr. Seward added the following:
"Management argued at the hearing that it was unreasonable to

expect it to retain an employee indefinitely on its payrolls on the
basis of his mere notification and regardless of the length of his
absence or of the reason for it. Can an employee call up the
Employment Office, Management asks, and by saying "I’ll be off for
a month, getting drunk," tie Management’s hands and force his
retention on the payroll? The answer is obviously no. That negative
answer, however, is based upon the fact that Management’s
disciplinary powers in cases of that sort do not depend upon the
absence of notice but depend squarely upon the existence or non-
existence of reasonable cause for absence....".
Decision E-263 (Wallen, 1948) involves language which the Union is here in part relying
on. The case involved an employee who, by Mr. Wallen’s reconstruction of the facts, "did
notify Management of his impending absence, in a general way several times in the three
months prior to his absence, and specifically a few days prior to March 9th. Management
was not left in the position of not knowing when, if ever, B. was going to return to work. By
virtue of this notice it had time to make arrangements for a substitute for B."
Mr. Wallen then stated:
"Was this proper notice within the meaning of Paragraph 64(c)?

What does the word "properly" as used in Paragraph 64(c) mean?
Does it mean that notice must be given in a proper manner or is
Management properly notified only if a satisfactory reason for the
absence is also given?
"Both the context of the word "properly" and the purpose of

Paragraph 64(c) lead to the conclusion that it is procedural and not
substantive in its meaning. The obvious meaning of the phrase
"properly notifying the Management" is that Management must be
notified of an absence within three working days in the correct
manner; that is, the notice must be timely and it must be directed to
the proper persons. This meaning is in accord with the manifest
purpose of 64 © which is to make certain that an employee who is
or expects to be absent will inform Management of that fact in order
to enable it to make arrangements for a replacement.
"If an employee notifies Management of his absence within three

working days but fails to furnish a satisfactory reason for his
absence, however, he is guilty of a violation of shop rules governing
absences without reasonable cause and he is subject to the
disciplinary powers of Management under Paragraph 8..."
The Union characterizes E-263 as involving a case where the Umpire "squarely considered
the matter of whether ‘properly notifying’ had to include the true reason for the absence...".
The present Umpire dissents from this characterization. The use of the phrases "proper
manner" and "procedural and not substantive" indeed goes a long way in the direction
which the Union is here urging, but the distinction in E-263 clearly goes to whether or not
the reason for the absence is a satisfactory one, not to whether or not the true reason for
the absence has been advanced.
Decision G-145 (Alexander, 1953) is also relied upon by the Union. It involved an
employee who, according to Mr. Alexander’s factual finding, "said no more to Foreman H.
than that he was sorry to ‘run out’ on him, or ‘to leave him in a mess’, and that Grievant did
not say he was ‘going on his vacation’ or was ‘taking a trip’."
Mr. Alexander then stated:
"On the question of whether Grievant’s remark as uttered was a

‘proper notice’ under Paragraph 64(c), the Umpire is of the opinion
that on its face and in its immediate context it was not... Actually
from the testimony of B. himself, the Umpire gains the impression
that he was indifferent as to the consequences of his leaving, and
was willing to be written off as a quit, if that was necessary in order
for him to take his vacation. It was only after he returned and was
denied employment that B. seriously considered the advisability of
protecting his seniority rights.
"Loss of seniority is a drastic consequence, but the operation of

Paragraph 64(c) may easily be avoided by the simple expedient of
giving an intelligible notice of absence..."
The Union is here seizing on the use of the phrase "intelligible notice" and argues that a
notice which is timely and which is given to the right person, albeit one which conceals the
true reason for the absence, is an "intelligible notice". Nevertheless, the Umpire must note,
Decision G-145 simply does not direct itself to the question of whether "properly notifying"
requires giving the true reason for the absence.
Both Decision D-33 (Seward, 1946) and Decision F-6 (Alexander, 1949) involved a jailed
employee. The holding in D-33 was that the employee could have let Management know of
his whereabouts and that, as he did not, he was properly terminated under (64)(c). The
holding in F-6 was that the grievant "was unable to communicate with persons outside the
jail because of his physical condition and the restraint of his jailers"; that the grievant
therefore had a satisfactory reason for failing to notify Management of his absence; and
that it followed that he had been improperly terminated. The implication of both Decisions,
and it is expressly so stated in F-6, is that confinement to jail is not a satisfactory reason
for failing to report the absence so long as the employee is in a position to communicate
with the outside world. It is to be stressed, however, that no absence notice was given in
either case (though it is true that the jail sentence in D-33 came on the immediate heels of
a military leave and that the employee was thus not expected at work while serving the jail
sentence).
All the remaining (64)(c) cases which the Umpire has researched—D-28, E-265, E-242, F-
128, G-10 and G-107 -- involved only the question of whether Management had in fact
been notified of the employee’s absence, and did not go to the question of the employee’s
obligation to advance the true reason for his absence.
This review, in the opinion of the Umpire, warrants the following conclusions: 1) the
question raised in B-16 -- whether telling the truth as to the absence is a required part of
"properly" notifying Management— was not re-confronted in any case since the issuance
of B-16 (Umpire Seward, in C-402, expressed his agreement with the Taylor interpretation,
but he did so in the absence of any truth-telling problem and he ruled on an entirely
different issue); 2) the rationale in B-16 -- that the phrase "unless a satisfactory reason is
given" can serve to overcome the failure to tell the truth as to the absence—has neither
been set aside nor been perpetuated; 3) putting aside the question of whether or not the
truth has to be told, the reason for the reported absence does not have to be a satisfactory
one to prevent the breaking of seniority—i.e., the Company erred, and was overruled, in
applying "satisfactory reason" as requiring that the absence be a justifiable one; 4) to be
jailed is not in and of itself justification for not notifying Management at all of the absence
from work; 5) though not in relation to whether or not the truth has to be told, there are
some strong comments among the prior decisions to the effect that "properly notifying" is
procedural in character—i.e., that what matters is, not the reason for the absence, but that
the absence be accompanied by notification so that Management will be in the know that
the absence is a temporary one and that the employee intends to come back to work; 6) all
of the Decisions were issued prior to 1955; and, until then, Paragraph (64) © consisted
solely of what is now its first sentence.
With these things in mind, and with the elaboration about to be given, the Umpire has
concluded that the approach taken in B-16 ought to be abandoned. He is holding that the
termination here in question was wrongful and is to be rescinded.
First, it seems to the Umpire that, while B-16 is to be applauded for its refusal to sanction
untruthfulness and for yet coming up with the "right" result in terms of humanistic
considerations, it was nevertheless the Wallen Decision (E-263) which correctly construed
the nature and design of Paragraph (64)(c). The basic idea is that Management is to be
kept informed and is not to have an obligation indefinitely to retain an employee on the
seniority roster where he simply stays away from work. And it is in this light that "unless a
satisfactory reason is given" emerges sensibly— namely, that the employee’s seniority is
still not broken if he has a satisfactory reason for failing to notify Management. It would be
unrealistic to assume, it seems to the Umpire, that those who drafted (64)(c) inserted
"properly" in part because they anticipated that employees might lie as to the reason for
their absence and went on with "unless a satisfactory reason is given" in part because they
sought to provide a means by which such a lie might be excused. Clearly, taking off from
work while giving a phony explanation is conduct which makes an employee subject to
disciplinary action under the Shop Rule prohibiting absence without reasonable cause.
Would the parties write National Agreement language which exonerates such conduct?
Second, there is not only the fact that Umpire Taylor himself characterized his construction
as "technical and highly doubtful", but there is the fact that 1955 saw the expansion of (64)
(c). In the opinion of the Umpire, the expansion cannot help but confirm that it was in E-
263, rather than in B-16, that the then-(64)(c) -- i.e., what is now the provision’s first
sentence—was correctly interpreted. For the expansion, rather than in any way echo
"properly" as construed in B-16, commences with "after the unreported
absence" (emphasis supplied). To the Umpire, this is the clearest indication that the parties
themselves saw (64)(c) as being concerned with an employee from whom there is no word
concerning his absence. And this is further confirmed by the language "to the employee’s
last known address as shown on the Company records"— language which reflects an
assumption that the employee has not been heard from.
Third, though related to the point just made, the expansion of (64)(c) is here of additional
significance. As shown, Management sent the grievant the letter provided for in the second
sentence of (64)(c); and the fact is that an employee’s seniority nowadays cannot be
broken without the letter (and his failure to respond to it by either reporting for work or
properly notifying Management of his absence). The letter, in other words, is a sine qua
non for the breaking of an employee’s seniority. Yet, by the express terms of the second
sentence of (64)(c), the letter must here be rejected as lacking in contractual standing. For
it is after an "unreported" absence that the letter is to be sent. And an "unreported"
absence is simply not what Management was presented with. If Management was
skeptical about the truthfulness of the report it had received or if it wished to know more
about the likely duration of H.’s absence, it might have proceeded with an investigation; it
might have proceeded with disciplinary action; or it might have sent the grievant a (64)(d)
notice (though it is to be noted that there is a Decision, F-13, which holds that confinement
to jail is a "satisfactory reason", within the meaning of (64)(d), for not reporting to work).
What Management could not do, to repeat the point, is to send the (64)(c) letter and rely on
it for the purpose of H.’s termination under (64)(c).
Fourth, it seems to have been well established (see C-402 and E-263) even before (64)(c)
was expanded that a reported absence, for purposes of (64)(c), did not have to be an
absence for the kind of good and sufficient reason which would constitute an absence for
reasonable cause in the Shop Rule sense. With respect to the present (64)(c), the matter
can be stated more positively: by the provision’s own terms, there can be absences which
are not justified absences in the Shop Rule sense but which nonetheless do not operate to
break an employee’s seniority. This is the clear meaning of the last portion of (64)(c):
"however, such reinstatement shall not be construed as limiting the application to his case
of the Shop Rule regarding absence without reasonable cause". And if this much is true,
why should an absence which is reported as stemming from illness, when in fact it stems
from a brief jail sentence, operate to break seniority? The Umpire has found no good
answer.
Fifth and finally, while it is a time-honored principle that employees must live up to their
obligations under the Agreement in order to reap its benefits, a principle which the Umpire
recently (see Decision M-62) had occasion to restate and which he has every intention to
continue to hold respect for, it is also true that (64)(c) is a kind of forfeiture clause which
operates alike for an employee with 30 years of service and for an employee with 3 months
of service and that the application of such a clause, at least in the Umpire’s opinion, should
be held to its express and clear terms. What the Company is here urging requires doing
the opposite— requires going the broad-interpretation route by reading something into
"properly" which, both as a matter of preserving substantial meaning for "properly" and as
a matter of the context in which it appears, does not have to be read into it. For all the
reasons given—particularly the fact that the Company’s disciplinary powers respecting the
Shop Rule prohibiting absence without reasonable cause are in no way jeopardized— the
Umpire declines to go this broad-interpretation route.
DECISION
The (64)(c) termination here in question is held to have been improper, and the Company
is directed to reinstate the grievant with restoration of seniority rights and with
reimbursement for the wages lost.
July 8, 1970
/S/Rolf Valtin
Umpire
No. M-72
August 3, 1970
Termination Under Paragraph (64) (d) of National Agreement;
Home Address of Record
GRIEVANCE

LINDEN PLANT, LINDEN, NEW JERSEY—APPEAL CASE M-804
Grievance 267940
"I have been discharged unjustly. Request reinstatement at once my record cleared of this
discharge and I be reimbursed for all monies and benefits lost."
S/S.M. (Grievant)
E.M. (Committeeman)
UMPIRE’S DECISION
In the Matter of:

Union No. 595
and
General Motors Corporation, GMAD Linden, New Jersey -- Appeal Case M-804
file://C:\Users\bobology\AppData\Local\Temp\Framework\m-072_13A6460B.htm 3/22/2011
OPINION
Grievant M. was hired by the Company in October, 1967. At the time of his termination—in
mid-August, 1969 -- he was a Factory Sweeper in the Maintenance Department. He was
terminated under Paragraph (64) (d) of the National Agreement. Under this Paragraph,
seniority is broken.
satisfactory reason. A copy of Management’s notification of such
loss of seniority will be furnished promptly to the Chairman of the
Shop Committee."
The following are the basic facts:
By reason of model changeover, M. was laid off on July 3, 1969. The announced recall
date, at the time of his layoff, was September 2, 1969.
On August 7, 1969, it was determined that certain maintenance employees, including M.,
would be needed back at work as of August 18, 1969. A telegram to this effect was
dispatched to M. at the home address shown on the so-called recall card (the content of
which will be shown below). The telegram was verified as received, though not by M.
himself.
M. did not show up for work on August 18; and, on August 22, Management sent him, at
the same address, a (64) (d) termination letter.
M. returned to work on September 2 (the original recall date). Asked why he had not come
back to work on August 18, M. replied that his home address was no longer the one to
which the telegram had been sent; that, on three separate past occasions, he had taken
steps to have the records reflect the address at which he now lived -- 346 South 12th
Street, Newark, New Jersey; and that, though not on his person at the time, he had a copy
of the change-of-address form.
Management re-checked the employment records; found that the address there shown for
M. -- 292 Hunterdon Street, Newark, New Jersey—was the one to which the telegram and
the termination letter had been sent; and advised M. that, unless he could present the copy
of the change-of-address form assertedly in his possession, the termination would stand.
Subsequently, saying that he had misplaced it, M. was unable to produce such copy.
The Union takes essentially a twofold position in asking that M.’s termination be set aside:
1) that M. had lived at the 12th Street address for about a year and that Management for
various purposes—e.g. SUB, Savings Bonds and Medical Insurance—was in possession
of this address and had used it; 2) that, insofar as the specific recall purpose is concerned,
there were three occasions on which M. let it be known that he had moved to the 12th
Street address: once in the spring of 1968, to his then-supervisor, B.; again, upon his recall
from model-change layoff in 1968, when he filled out the appropriate change-of-address
form and gave it to a Clerk in the Personnel Office (though he lost his copy of the form);
and once more, at the time of the (model change) layoff in 1969, when he told his
supervisor, L., that the recall card showed the old address—and when L. told him not to be
concerned about it and to go ahead and sign the card.
The Umpire has previously (see Decision M-67) indicated his approach when it comes to
the sort of forfeiture clause represented by (64) (d); and, as he noted at the hearing, he
holds concern for the fact that, at least for two purposes (Savings Bonds and Medical
Insurance), the 12th Street address had been on record with Management for as long as
about a year. For the reasons about to be given, however, he believes that he has no
choice but to uphold the grievant’s termination.
An employee’s obligation to keep Management informed of his home address -- for the
purpose of protecting his seniority—is laid down in the National Agreement itself.
Paragraph (74) reads as follows:
"To protect his seniority, it is the employee’s responsibility to keep

the Plant Management informed of his proper home address. The
method of notification of change of address is to be established by
the respective Plant Managements for their operations. Forms for
this purpose shall be available in designated offices in the
plant." (Emphasis supplied.)
The evidence is entirely clear that it has long been understood at this plant that there is but
one particular form on which the home address, for seniority-protection purposes, is to be
provided. The address provided on this form is known as the official address, and it is this
address alone which "counts" for seniority-protection purposes. The Local Union’s own
newspaper acknowledged as much, and a bulletin-board notice expressly stated that an
address shown on a card for paycheck purposes would not be treated as the official
address.
The reason for Management’s insistence that there be but one official for seniority-
protection purposes was made clear at the hearing and, in the opinion of the Umpire, must
be accepted as entirely legitimate: there are many employees who give Management one
address for Savings Bonds, another for Medical Insurance, yet another for SUB (with
variations from time to time within this category) and any one or all of these addresses may
be different from the one to be used for seniority-protection purposes. Management simply
must be in a position to rely on the so-called official address—rather than have to wonder
which address is to be used—when it comes to recalling employees.
And beyond these things, there is the fact that the grievant, along with all other employees
being laid off in connection with the 1969 model changeover, was handed the so-called
recall card. Its body read as follows:
"You are to report for work at the time and date indicated on this
card, unless otherwise notified. In case of any change in your
reporting date, you will be notified at the above address, as on file in
the Employment Office. If this is not your correct address, make
sure it is changed at the Employment Office. I fully understand the
above." (Emphases supplied.)
The card showed the Hunterdon Street address. M. signed the card (and received a copy
of it). Moreover, a check with the Post Office, made by Management after the present
grievance was filed, revealed that M. had taken no change-of-address step and was still
listed as residing at the Hunterdon Street address.
Little need be said about the Union’s second contention—that M., on three separate
occasions, took steps to have the Hunterdon Street address changed to the 12th Street
address (for official-address purposes). M.’s testimony was wholly unconvincing; both of
the two supervisors (B. and L.) effectively denied any such conversation; and as to the
grievant’s allegedly going to the Personnel Office and leaving a filled-out form with a Clerk,
it seems too much to believe—given the facts both that no such filled-out form could be
found at the Office and that M. could not produce a copy of it. The real significance of the
introduction of these assertions, in the Umpire’s opinion, is that the grievant was well
aware of the fact that it is the so-called official address along which "counts" for seniority-
protection purposes.
To reiterate the point already indicated, it would obviously be a "crying shame" if the
breaking of the grievant’s seniority is the result of a mere oversight—of overlooking the
need to have a change in his official address recorded. The Umpire, however, cannot
assume this to be the fact. Neither the grievant nor the Union has so pleaded; and it is
quite as possible, as appears to be true of a host of other employees, that the grievant has
been keeping two addresses, seeking to have one or the other address used for one or the
other purpose.
DECISION
August 3, 1970
/S/Rolf Valtin
Umpire
No. M-78
September 4, 1970
Discharge:
Shop Rules 9 and 42:
Evidence Respecting the Alleged Violation of Shop Rule 9;
Extent of Penalty;
Right to Private Discussion with Committeeman in Advance of Disciplinary

Interview;
Evidence Respecting Existence of Local Agreement
Under Which the Private Discussion is Not Permitted Until After the Disciplinary
Interview;
Conflict Between That Local Agreement
and
Paragraph (76)(a) of National Agreement as Interpreted in Decision J-63;
Remedy
GRIEVANCE

Grievance 167512
"I protest manag. alleged viol. of S/R #9. I did not viol. this or any other Shop Rule. I
demand that my record be cleared and be made whole all monies and benefits lost
immediately.
file://C:\Users\bobology\AppData\Local\Temp\Framework\m-078_13A64FFA.htm 3/22/2011
Amended at the Step and One-Half to include violation of Para. #76(a). Also, demand
grievant be reinstated at once from discharge. 11-20-69."
S/W.D. (Committeeman)
UMPIRE’S DECISION
The various issues presented by the case are defined and dealt with in the Opinion. Their
disposition need not be restated but should be seen as part of the "Decision". The Com- is
directed to reinstate the grievant as given in the Opinion. (Entire decision should be read)
In the Matter of:

Union No. 1364
and
OPINION
Grievant H. was hired by the Company on July 3, 1963. At the time of his discharge—mid-
November, 1969 -- he was a second-shift Driver Unlicensed Cars and/or Trucks and was
assigned to the Truck Repair Department (No. 28-17). He is charged with violating the
prohibitions laid down in Shop Rule 9, "Leaving the job or work place during working hours
without permission", and Shop Rule 42, "Repeated violations of shop or safety rules".
H. is the same person whose protest (Appeal Case M-833) against a 30-day DLO was
considered and determined in Decision M-70. That Decision explains the circumstances
under which, and the extent to which, certain penalties which preceded the 30-day DLO
were modified. And, by the holding in that Decision, the 30-day DLO itself was modified to
a 2-week DLO. In setting forth H.’s prior disciplinary record for the purpose of the present
case, the Umpire is incorporating all of these modifications. Note should be taken of the
fact that H. received a further 30-day DLO following the one considered in Decision M-70.
It preceded the discharge here at issue by about two months. H.’s protest against it was
withdrawn by the Union.
Rendered as given above, H.’s prior disciplinary record is as follows:
2-23-65 Balance of Shift & One Day Shop

Rule 6 "Absence without reasonable cause
and/or habitual absenteeism."
3-18-65 Balance of Shift & Three Days Shop

Rule 6 "Absence without reasonable cause
and/or habitual absenteeism."
6-12-67 Balance of Shift Shop Rule 13

"Refusal to obey orders of foreman or other
supervisor."
7-11-68 Written Reprimand Shop Rule 15

"Refusal or failure to do job assignment. (Do
the work assigned to you and follow
instructions; any complaint you may take up
later through the regular channels.)"
8-23-68 Balance of Shift Shop Rule 15

"Refusal or failure to do job assignment. (Do
the work assigned to you and follow
instructions; any complaint you may take up
later through the regular channels.)"
8-28-68 Balance of Shift & One Day Shop

Rule 15 "Refusal or failure to do job
assignment. (Do the work assigned to you
and follow instructions; any complaint you
may take up later through the regular
channels.)"
10-16-68 Balance of Shift & Three Days

Shop Rule 6 "Absence without reasonable
cause and/or habitual absenteeism."
4-30-69 Balance of Shift & One Week Shop

Rule 13 "Refusal to obey orders of foreman
or other supervisor."
6-29-69 Balance of Shift & Two Weeks Shop

Rule 19 "Wasting time or loitering in toilets or
on any Company property during working
hours."
9-10-69 Balance of Shift & 30 Days Shop

Rule 9 "Leaving the job or work place during
working hours without permission."
As indicated by the topical heading, the case presents a series of issues. They will be
successively defined and dealt with.
The first issue is factual in nature and comes down to a question of credibility—did H.
violate Shop Rule 9? Once more - i.e., as in Appeal Case M-833, covering the 30-day
DLO—the two principals are H. and Foreman O. There, the Umpire accepted
Management’s version and essentially concluded that H. was an endlessly evasive person
and someone who could not be believed. The Umpire saw or heard nothing in the present
case which would change that assessment. The difference between the prior case and the
present case is that, here, Management’s version rests substantially on the testimony of
Foreman O. alone (whereas the prior case saw the testimony of four members of
Management, the Umpire finding their respective testimonies consistent with each other).
However, as to both cases, the testimony of Foreman O.—by the usual standards of
straightness, firmness and staying intact under cross-examination—was wholly convincing.
Indeed, in the present case, the Union argued that Foreman O.’s testimony was "too
good"—that flawless testimony is something to be wary of. The Umpire has himself
encountered situations where the point could validly be made, but he does not believe that
this is one of them. As was true in the prior case, the Umpire perceived no "canned" ring in
Foreman O.’s testimony and, instead, found it to have the ring of truth to it. (So assessing
Foreman O.’s testimony, and noting that Foreman O. denied the men’s presence or near-
presence during the conversation, the Umpire rejects the statements of certain fellow
employees of H.’s to the effect that they overheard him ask to go home with the
passenger-car-line employees.)
As he did in M-833, then, the Umpire accepts Management’s version. It remains to show
what happened on the night in question. The following is a summary.
At the time in question, the second-shift hours for an 8-hour shift ran from 5:12 PM to 1:54
AM. The incident occurred on the night of November 12-13, 1969.
Both the Truck Repair unit and the passenger-car line had been scheduled to work 9.5
hours (until 3:24 AM). Sometime between 12:15 AM and 12:30 AM, Foreman O. received
word, and thereupon passed it on to his men, that the Truck Repair unit was to work 11
hours.
At about 1 AM, H. approached Foreman O. and asked whether he could go home at the
end of 9.5 hours. Foreman O. said he would check on it. He got back to H. at about 1:30
AM and gave him permission to leave at the requested hours. (The essence of H.’s version
is that he asked for permission to go home with the passenger-car-line employees, at the
end of 8 hours, and that Foreman O. (then and there, without first checking on it) gave him
permission to do so. It is a fact that, sometime during the course of the shift, the
passenger-car-line hours were reduced from 9.5 to 8 hours.)
Shortly before 2 AM, Foreman O. encountered H. at the lockers. H. was changing to his
street clothes and said to Foreman O.: "Hey, m----- f-----, you didn’t tell me the line was
only working eight hours; now I’m going home in eight hours." Foreman O.’s reply was to
the effect that H. had been given permission to leave at the end of 9.5 hours and would
have to work until then. H. nonetheless went home upon the conversation (clocking-out at
2:04 AM).
There is obviously no telling whether H., in asking to go home at the end of 9.5 hours, had
in mind his own Truck Repair unit or the passenger-car line (both of which, as shown, had
been scheduled for 9.5 hours). Granted that, if true that H. had the passenger-car line in
mind, it is understandable that he would want to change his request once he found out that
the passenger-car line’s hours had been reduced from 9.5 to 8 hours. Granted also that, by
virtue of the fact that passenger-car-line employees were coming off at the end of 8 hours
and that one or another of them could readily serve as replacements for departing Truck
Repair employees, it would have been administratively easier to excuse H. at the end of 8
hours than at the end of 9.5 hours. And granted, finally, that this administrative ease could
still have been taken advantage of at the time of the conversation between H. and
Foreman O. at the lockers. Thus, had H. at that time made a civilized request to go home
at the end of 8 hours rather than at the end of 9.5 hours, one may conclude that there was
no good reason why such a request should not have been granted. By the facts as the
Umpire finds them, however, there was no such civilized request. Rather, with a degrading
obscenity as a starter, H. told Foreman O. that he was going home at the end of 8 hours.
An employee who so conducts himself can scarcely expect a cooperative attitude from
Supervision and, instead, must expect what here happened: Foreman H. got his dander up
and insisted that H.’s departure hour not be further changed. The Umpire, thus, does not
believe that he can properly hold that H. should have been given permission to leave at the
end of 8 hours and, instead, believes that the proper holding is that H. left the plant earlier
than he had been permitted to leave and, indeed, in defiance of what he was expressly told
just before he left.
The next question is concerned with the extent of the penalty. The meaning of Decision M-
70 is that the discharge penalty was preceded, not by two 30-day DLO’s, but by one 2-
week DLO and one 30-day DLO. This is what the Union is relying on. The Umpire rejects
the argument. There is no gainsaying the fact that, as things have turned out, the two
penalties preceding the discharge are not those which were in existence at the time that
the discharge action was taken. It is clearly also true, however, that H.’s prior disciplinary
record, even as modified, is such as to have rendered him ripe for discharge. It is an
atrocious record; it fully reflects the application of the corrective-discipline principle; and the
most recent 30-day DLO not only came a mere approximately two months before the
discharge but was given H. for an offense of quite the same nature as the offense here at
issue. Furthermore, the Company entered the statement, and the Union did not effectively
refute it, that the plant’s practice is to resort to discharge in the face of the disciplinary
sequence which is now here presented—i.e., that employees are normally not given two
30-day DLO’s within a short span of time, and that it was as a matter of leaning over
backwards that H. was given a further chance (represented by the second 30-day DLO).
Given all of these things, the Umpire believes that he must properly rule that the
conversion of the (M-833) 30-day DLO to a 2-week DLO does not warrant modifying the
discharge penalty here in question.
On the issues dealt with up to this point, accordingly, the Umpire finds not only that H. was
guilty of the Shop Rule 9 violation he is charged with but also that Shop Rule 42 was
properly invoked and that the discharge is therefore not to be set aside.
The next series of issues are concerned with the Union’s assertion that Management’s
refusal to grant the grievant’s request for a private discussion with his Committeeman in
advance of the disciplinary interview violated his rights under the National Agreement.
It is stipulated that: 1) grievant H. came to work on the day (the second shift, November
13-14) following the incident dealt with above; 2) sometime during the course of the shift,
he was asked why he left early on the preceding day and was told that there was to be a
disciplinary interview; 3) he made the request that he be permitted to have a private
discussion with his Committeeman (D.) before the disciplinary interview would take place;
4) his request was turned down, though together with the statement that he could have the
private discussion following the disciplinary interview; 5) the grievant’s Committeeman
attended the disciplinary interview; 6) the disciplinary interview commenced at about 11
PM; 7) thereafter, starting at about 12:30 AM, the private discussion between H. and his
Committeeman took place.
The first question is whether—in January, 1969 -- the local parties entered into an
agreement which called for deferring the private discussion until after the disciplinary
interview.
In contending for an affirmative answer, the Company (among other things) introduces the
following:
There came the time, sometime in 1968, where it was recognized that something had to be
done about the poor and ever deteriorating relationship between the local parties at the
Fremont plant. It was agreed that meetings should be held with an eye toward frank and
problem-solving discussions of various issues marring the parties’ relationship. The tone-
setting session was attended by Messrs. Bramblett and Woodcock.
The matter of disciplinary interviews was among the problem areas taken under
consideration. Both parties had complaints on this score. The Union’s complaint went to
the presence of Labor Relations personnel in the disciplinary interview: that their presence
had frequently resulted, to the disadvantage of the employee being given the disciplinary
interview, in prepping and quarterbacking. Management’s complaint went to the private
discussions, held in advance of the disciplinary interviews, between the employee and his
Committeeman: that the private discussions frequently consumed an inordinate amount of
time. Taken together, the complaints seemed to call for the removal of both sides’
"technicians" and the opportunity for immediate and unencumbered confrontation of the
employee and his supervisor.
At a meeting held on January 20, 1969, the following was agreed to: 1) except in cases
involving so-called capital offenses, Labor Relations representatives would not attend
disciplinary interviews; 2) to the extent that the particular employee wanted it at all (it is not
asked for by many an employee), the private discussion with his Committeeman would be
held after completion of the disciplinary interview.
On this first question, it is the Umpire’s opinion that the Company’s presentation was far
the stronger and that the evidence as a whole, properly weighed and balanced, must be
taken as establishing that the asserted agreement was made. Pages could be filled in
elaboration. Suffice it to point up: that the plant’s Personnel Director, who simply cannot be
dismissed as an inexperienced or incompetent man, reported the consummation of the
agreement to his Central Office; that there is a video tape which shows him announcing
the agreement (and explaining the problems to be overcome by it) to the plant’s entire
supervisory staff; that Management put together and conducted (role playing) training
sessions covering the change disciplinary-interview procedure; and that it is at once true—
a well-nigh conclusive fact, it seems to the Umpire—that the former procedure (meaning
the holding of the private discussion in advance of the disciplinary interview and the
presence of Labor Relations representatives in the disciplinary interview) had previously
been followed and was abandoned on or about January 20, 1969, and that the new
procedure was put in effect at that time and has been followed to this day.
The next question assumes the just-made holding—that the local "disciplinary interview"
agreement was in fact made and that the denial of the grievant’s request for a private
discussion with his Committeeman in advance of the disciplinary interview was a matter of
the existence and implementation of the local agreement. The question raised is whether
the local agreement is consonant with Paragraph (76)(a) of the National Agreement, as
interpreted in Decision J-63. If so, the Umpire would be prepared—the Union seemingly
did not quite grant it—to hold the local agreement to be of proper standing and thus to
sanction its continued implementation. If not, it is agreed—the Company, as the Umpire
thinks it must, concedes this point—that the local agreement is without proper standing
and must fall.
The Umpire will momentarily quote Paragraph (76)(a) of the National Agreement. He notes
at once, however, that he is doing so only as a matter of orientation. His task in the present
proceeding is, not to interpret the Paragraph, but to determine whether the already-given
interpretation of the Paragraph—i.e., Decision J-63 -- leaves the "not before" part of the
local agreement a permissible state of affairs. On this much—that it is for the Umpire to
examine and apply Decision J-63 rather than to look at the Paragraph’s language itself for
the answer—the parties are in agreement.
Paragraph (76)(a) reads as follows:
"Any employee who, for the purpose of being interviewed

concerning discipline, is called to the plant, or removed from his
work to the foreman’s desk or to an office, or called to an office,
may, if he so desires, request the presence of his District
Committeeman to represent him during such interview."
Though it is of course accompanied by a series of sub-arguments, the Company’s position

with respect to Decision J-63 is susceptible to brief summary. Granting that the Decision
established the right of private discussion between the employee and his Committeeman in
connection with a (76) (a) disciplinary interview, the Company is saying that the Decision
did not lay down a mandate as to when the private discussion shall take place. To the
contrary, so the Company comments in its brief, "The Umpire (Feinsinger) stated the
interview (reference is to the private discussion) could be held before, during, or after the
disciplinary interview ..." These things being true, the Company submits, the local
agreement constitutes a perfectly proper implementation of the Decision—it merely adopts
as a single course one of the courses which the Decision leaves as alternatives.
The Umpire has read and re-read both the Decision and the briefs which the parties filed in
the J-63 proceeding. It is true that the Decision does not direct itself to the "before vs.
after" issue here presented. Nor did it turn on the question of whether the private-
discussion right encompasses both a "before" and a "during" right. Of themselves,
however, these things are obviously not the equivalent of the flexibility—"before", "during"
or "after"—which the Company is asserting. And as to what was determined in Decision J-
63, as well as from the stand-point of the various considerations underlying the holding, the
Umpire sees no proper way for accepting the position which the Company is here
advancing.
Search as he has for it, the Umpire simply cannot find the "before, during or after"
statement which the Company attributes to the Decision. The closest to it is found at the
very beginning of the Opinion, where Umpire Feinsinger defined the issue: "The issue in
this case is whether the right of an employee to have his Committeeman ‘represent him’
during a disciplinary interview, as set forth in Paragraph 76(a) of the National Agreement,
includes the right of a private discussion between them either before or after the interview
has begun." True enough, there is here a "either before or after" reference. The full
reference, however, is that of "either before or after the interview has begun" (emphasis
added). Clearly conveyed by "after the interview has begun", the Umpire believes, is the
assumption that the interview is still in progress. Which is to say that the "after" is a matter
of "following the commencement of the interview", not "following the completion of the
interview". Any doubt about so reading the "before or after" reference in the issue
statement is erased by a subsequent paragraph in the Opinion (paragraph 11). It reads:
"Finally, the Corporation calls attention to the word ‘during’ in

Paragraph 76(a) as implying that a private conversation before the
disciplinary interview is clearly excluded. The present positions of
the parties seem to be, however, that the same ruling must apply to
conversations before and after the beginning of the
interview." (Emphasis in the original.)
Plainly, "after the beginning of the interview" is used as synonymous with "during" and thus
in no way goes to any stage following the completion of the interview. And incidentally to
be noted—incidental insofar as this immediate discussion is concerned, but of obvious
significance insofar as the determination of the issue here raised is concerned—is that the
Company’s emphasis on "during" was entirely a matter of contradistinction to "before", not
a matter of seeking to confine the private discussion to "during" in the sense of excluding
both a "before" and an "after" discussion. On this, the paragraph reflects the J-63
proceeding as a whole. It simply did not go to any question concerning a private discussion
following the completion of the disciplinary interview; it dealt entirely with the "before" and
"during" stage. It was these two stages which Umpire Feinsinger treated as alike in
answering the Company’s "during" argument. And though it is arguable that his Opinion
does not make clear whether he upheld the right to private discussion at both stages or
merely at one or the other stage—though it may be true, in other words, that he had these
two stages in mind as alternatives—it is not arguable that the "after" stage which the
Company is here contending for was thrown-in, or impliedly incorporated, as a third
alternative.
Consider, next, the facts in the case leading to Decision J-63.
Paragraph 3 of the Decision reads as follows:
"The facts of the particular case are agreed. On 8-28-59, as Labor

Relations Analyst G. and Foreman V. were about to interview
employee S. concerning discipline, the latter requested the
presence of Committeeman B. to represent him, pursuant to Section
76(a). Prior to the start of the interview and, it may be assumed,
again thereafter, B. asked to be allowed to speak privately with S.
Management rejected the request. B.’s grievance followed, alleging
a violation of Paragraph 76(a).
Little by way of elaborating comment is required. The facts are truly "on all fours" with
those of the present case. The sole difference is that the "before" claim in J-63 was made
by the Committeeman whereas here it was incorporated as part of the interviewee’s
grievance. This can scarcely serve as a basis for distinguishing the two cases.
Worthy of mention, also, is the grievance statement in the case leading to J-63. It reads:
"I charge Mgt. & F.G. with a violation of Para. 76a of N.A. G. refused
to let me talk to C.S. alone preceding & during a discip. interview 8-
25-59 & thereby denied me the right to properly represent him. I
demand this practice stop immed."
As can be seen, no claim is advanced for an "after" discussion—either as such or as an

alternative to the claim which is made. Nor, unless the Umpire has missed something, did
either party before Mr. Feinsinger as much as even suggest that an "after" discussion
might serve either as a proper alternative or itself as satisfaction of the private-discussion
right which the Union was asserting. And, to return to the grievance statement, Umpire
Feinsinger’s answer - i.e., the ultimate holding found under "Decision"— was:
"The right of a Committeeman to ‘represent’ an employee during a

disciplinary interview pursuant to Paragraph 76(a) includes the right
to private conversation. The grievance is sustained."
As already noted, there is room for doubt as to whether Mr. Feinsinger established a
private-discussion right for both the "before" and the "during" stage of a particular
disciplinary interview covering one and the same employee. But, to say it again, he was
confronted by, and dealt with, these two stages alone. And he chose to conclude with the
straightforward sentence "The grievance is sustained". The present Umpire sees some
significance in this because it happens not infrequently, because of slight or not-so-slight
issue changes by the time a grievance reaches the Umpire level, that the ultimate ruling
cannot be stated in straightforward "grievance is sustained" terms.
Finally, and at least as significant as anything which has so far been discussed, there is
what the present Umpire would characterize as the main thread of Decision J-63: Mr.
Feinsinger’s reliance on the presence and normal meaning of the word "represent". This,
rather than the presence of the word "during" (which, as shown, he dismissed rather
summarily), is what Mr. Feinsinger started with, elaborated upon, applied as a matter of
what the Company would have to overcome to prevail (which it failed to do, in his
judgment), and ultimately came back to in the final paragraph of his Opinion. The
discussion part of Mr. Feinsinger’s Opinion starts with the following:
"Paragraph 76(a) expressly gives an employee the right to have his

Committeeman ‘represent’ him during a disciplinary interview.
Contractual language should be given its common meaning unless
to do so would produce an absurd result. The word ‘represent’, by
common understanding not limited to the attorney-client
relationship, includes private consultation between the
representative and the person represented."
In making this his point of departure, Mr. Feinsinger did three things. The first two, by any
reasonable reading of the parties’ briefs in the case, are clear on their face; the third is a
matter of the present Umpire’s deduction. First, Mr. Feinsinger accepted the essence of
the Union’s position (and it simply cannot be argued that it was for the purpose of gaining
an "after" right that the Union submitted its "represent" position). Second, he rejected one
of the Company’s main arguments—that there is no right of private discussion unless
expressly conferred by the Agreement and that it would be wrong to create the right by the
implied-meaning route. Third, so the present Umpire believes, once the presence and
commonly-understood meaning of the word "represent" was made the approach and
cornerstone for deciding the case, there could be but little question that a "before" right
would be found to exist. For, at least as the Umpire has always understood the matter, a
"before" right inheres in the right to private consultation in an adversary proceeding. And
an adversary proceeding with the right to private consultation (to be "represented") is what
Mr. Feinsinger essentially made of Paragraph (76) (a).
It is, however, unnecessary to rely on what the present Umpire is making of Mr.
Feinsinger’s central reliance on "represent". In a succeeding part of the Opinion, Mr.
Feinsinger became quite explicit about the "before" right. He turned to Paragraph (29) and
its history. Noting that the language of the Paragraph had resulted from a directive of the
War Labor Board, and that the Board, following the issuance of the directive, had been
called upon to provide an interpretation, Mr. Feinsinger quoted the three-part interpretation.
The third part read as follows:
"3. After arrival of the committeeman, the employee shall have the right, if he so desires, to
discuss the grievance privately with the committeeman before it is discussed with the
foreman."
Having provided the quote, Mr. Feinsinger commented:
"The significance of this history is the clear indication that in the

minds of experienced people representing the points of view of
management, labor and the public, the concept of representation
includes the right of private discussion, at least at that stage of a
grievance. It is not immediately apparent why a different concept
should apply at the stage of a disciplinary interview."
Mr. Feinsinger’s references to "at least at that stage of a grievance" and "at the stage of a
disciplinary interview" unquestionably go to the "before" stage—no other stage is
mentioned in the War Labor Board interpretation.
The rest of Mr. Feinsinger’s Opinion is largely devoted to his rejection of the Company’s
reliance on the history of Paragraph (76)(a), on the Union’s unsuccessful effort in 1958 to
make a particular language change in it, and on past practice. His discussion of these
matters is bare of even so much as a faint hint to the "after" stage as a proper alternative.
It is, then, the Umpire’s conclusion that the Company is urging an erroneous interpretation
and application of Decision J-63. The Decision establishes a "before" private discussion as
a right, not as one of two courses—"before" or "after"—either of which can be precluded
while still satisfying the private-discussion right of Paragraph (76)(a). It follows, as already
given, that that portion of the Fremont local agreement which confines the private-
discussion right to the "after" stage is invalid and must be declared null and void.
The remaining question concerns the remedy insofar as the grievant is concerned. It is well
settled under the parties’ collective-bargaining relationship—and it is not here disputed by
the Company—that a violation of an employee’s procedural rights in connection with the
imposition of a disciplinary penalty calls for the modification (not full reversal) of the
penalty. The Union is urging the grievant’s reinstatement with back pay beyond a
reasonable period. The Company stresses the fact that the local agreement was
implemented without protest from the Union for nearly a year; invokes the so-called "first
instance" rule (citing C-227, G-13, G-30, E-81 and E-105); and thus asks that the grievant
not be awarded any back pay.
The "first instance" rule arose in the early days of the parties’ collective-bargaining
relationship and apparently was thought to be the equitable solution in connection with
Agreement violations resulting from inexperience and lack of knowledge respecting the
proper application of Agreement clauses. One may gather that the following from Decision
E-192 signaled the obsolescence of the rule: "... The ‘first instance’ rule, which results in
the denial to an employee of pay to which he is held to have been entitled under the
Agreement, must be narrowly construed—if indeed, after seven years of familiarity with the
Agreement, its continued application is justified at all..." (emphasis added). To the extent
that the rule has become obsolete, the Umpire in no way means to resurrect it.
It does seem to the Umpire, however, that it would be wrongful in the present case to grant
back pay for any period prior to such time as the Company was made aware of that
contention by the Union on which it has here been upheld. The Company is simply correct,
and with obvious persuasiveness, that the local agreement was allowed to be implemented
for nearly a year. Insofar as the denial of his "before" request is concerned, the grievant
was treated quite the same as had been scores of other employees. And, until such time
as it was confronted with the contention that the local agreement would have to be
disbanded for lack of validity— the one contention which warranted having a real look and
on which the Union has now been upheld—Management had every good reason to resist
the charge that the grievant’s procedural rights had been violated. The Umpire does not
believe, in other words, that either the mere assertion that there was a violation of
Paragraph (76)(a) or the denial by the Committee that the local agreement had been
made, should be taken as sufficient to "start the clock running". He has examined the prior
record; finds it bare of the specificity which he is here requiring; and therefore assumes
that it was at the shake-out meeting that the Union first made the "local agreement cannot
stand even if made" contention. His ruling, accordingly, is that the grievant is to be
reinstated with back pay from the date of the shake-out meeting.
DECISION
The various issues presented by the case are defined and dealt with in the Opinion. Their
disposition need not be restated but should be seen as part of the "Decision". The
Company is directed to reinstate the grievant as given in the Opinion.
September 4, 1970
/S/Rolf Valtin
Umpire
No. M-81
September 22, 1970
Termination Under Paragraph (111) (b) of National Agreement
Application of Phrase
"Within Three Working Days After the Date of Expiration of the Leave"
GRIEVANCE:
FISHER BODY DIVISION, GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, ST. LOUIS PLANT, ST.
LOUIS, MISSOURI—APPEAL CASE M-1080
Grievance 634753
"Protest unjust release under par. 103. Request employee be paid for all time lost and all
benefits." S/R.F. (Grievant) G.B. (Committeeman)
In the Matter of:

Union No. 25
and
General Motors Corporation, Fisher Body Division, St. Louis, Missouri -- Appeal Case M-
1080
file://C:\Users\bobology\AppData\Local\Temp\Framework\m-081_13A660BC.htm 3/22/2011
OPINION
Here under protest is grievant F.’s termination under Paragraph (111)(b) of the National
Agreement. F. was a Committeeman and a second-shift Loaner in the Trim Department.
He held seniority from mid-1956.
The facts are not in dispute:
For reasons not here material (though it should be noted that the absence was an
authorized one), F. was absent from work on Monday, Tuesday and Wednesday, January
27, 28 and 29, 1969. He was to be back at work on the second shift on Thursday, January
30, 1969.
During the course of the morning on the latter date, he requested a Paragraph (103) *
leave of absence for the remainder of the week and all of the following week. The request
was granted.
Paragraph (103) of the National Agreement is titled "Informal Leaves of Absence" and
reads as follows:
"A leave of absence may be granted for personal reasons for a

period not to exceed thirty days, upon application of the employee to
and approval by his foreman. Such leaves of absence shall not be
renewed and seniority will accumulate during the leave."
It is conceded that: F. understood that he was to be back at work on Monday, February 10,
1969; he did not come to work either on this day, or on Tuesday, February 11, 1969, or on
Wednesday, February 12, 1969; rather, he came to work at 4 PM on Thursday, February
13, 1969; he was still a second-shift man in this week; and, also as had been true before F.
went on leave, the second-shift hours were from 4:30 PM to 1 AM.
On the grounds that his wife had become ill (while vacationing with him in Florida), F.
initially asserted that he had a "satisfactory reason" for not coming to work in the Monday-
through-Wednesday period. This assertion has been abandoned.
The opening language of Paragraph (111)(b) reads as follows:
having voluntarily quit unless he has a satisfactory reason..."
To be determined is whether F.’s absence on the three days—i.e., Monday, Tuesday and
Wednesday, February 10, 11 and 12, 1969 -- was a matter of failing to report for work
"within three working days after the date of expiration of the leave". It is a fact that
Management, in terminating F., applied these three days. The Union contends that
Management misapplied the Agreement and that F., in coming to work at 4 PM on

Thursday, February 13, 1969, was not outside the "three working days" period provided for
in Paragraph (111)(b).
It should preliminarily be noted that the Union, in so contending, is neither overlooking nor
seeking to pull back from the concession that F. understood that he was to be back at work
on Monday, February 10. The Union is saying that a case of contractual interpretation is
before the Umpire and that, whatever F. or Supervision may have understood, it is the
terms of the Agreement which must be made to control the outcome of the case.
In contending that F. was improperly terminated, the Union offers three approaches.
Though the first two are different in terms of refinement, their common point is the
argument that Management erred in treating the Monday as the first of the "three working
days". The third approach, to be considered only if the first two are rejected, is geared to
the starting time of the shift on which F. was scheduled to work.
The argument in the first two approaches proceeds from the inclusion of the word "date" in
the (quoted) language. Banking on the fact that F. was concededly on leave on the date of
Sunday, February 9, the Union submits that a date of leave cannot be taken as
synonymous with a date of expiration of the leave; that it is equally true that the two dates
cannot be taken as overlapping; that, accordingly, it is not until all of the last day of leave is
over that the date of expiration of the leave sets in; that it follows from these things that
Monday, February 10 was the "date of expiration of the leave"; that the fact is that it is
three working days after that date which is the permissible period under the provision; that
Thursday, February 13 was within this three-working-days period; and that F. in fact
reported for work on that Thursday.
In its first approach, the Union is saying simply that all of Sunday— i.e., Sunday, through
the last minute and second of the day—was part of F.’s leave and that it was thus
inescapably Monday, February 10 when the "date of expiration of the leave" arrived. As
indicated, the Union’s second approach is of similar character. Here, however, the Union
goes with the ending time of the second shift. It is concededly true both that the second
shift ended at 1 AM and that, had F.’s unit been scheduled to work on the second shift on
the Sunday, he would not have been obligated to report for work in the last hour of the
shift—i.e., that the hour ending at 1 AM on Monday was seen as part of his leave. Again,
the Union submits, Monday, February 10 was in being when the "date of expiration of the
leave" had arrived.
The Union’s third approach is altogether different. Here, the Union foregoes the "date of
expiration" argument which it makes in its first two approaches. It grants, in other words,
that the "three working days" period began to run on the Monday. This statement,
however, is accurate only if it is read with emphasis on the "on" in "on Monday"—i.e., the
Union does not grant that all of calendar Monday was properly made the first working day
of the "three working days" period. What the Union is saying is that, given the fact that F.
was a second-shift man and thus obviously was not obligated to be at work before the 4:30
PM starting time of the second shift, the Monday hours up to 4:30 PM constituted excused
time and hence should not be applied as part of the "three working days" period. Taking
three successive 24-hour periods commencing with 4:30 PM on Monday, the Union
submits that the "three working days" period ended at 4:30 PM on Thursday and that F.,
having concededly come to work at 4 PM on Thursday, was not an "employee who fails to
report for work within three working days after the date of expiration of the leave."
The Umpire is in disagreement with the Union. By any one of its approaches, he believes,
the Union is urging an interpretation which goes contrary to what is conveyed by natural
reading of the language. The Umpire is not prepared to discard the language’s natural
meaning in the absence of a compelling showing which would support doing so—e.g.
absurdity of result, past practice or past Umpire Decisions respecting the application of the
language, evidence respecting the intent of the drafters of the language. No such showing
has been made.
In its first two approaches, the Union is contending that the presence of the word "date"
requires that the last day of leave and the day of expiration of the leave be treated as two
separate and distinct days. One reason for rejecting such a construction lies in the fact that
the word "date" does not appear in the language which immediately follows the already
quoted language of the provision. The succeeding language is:
"provided, however, that in the case of failure to report for work

within three working days after the expiration of leaves of absence
granted under Paragraphs 104, 105, 109, 109a, 110, 110a and 113,
notifies Management of his absence."
Obviously, if the appearance of the word "date" is to carry the significance which the Union
is urging, the non-appearance of the word must carry the contrary significance. But what
this would mean is that that which is provided for in the earlier quoted language ("shall be
considered as having voluntarily quit") and that which is provided for in the just quoted
language ("Management will send written notification") do not come into play at the same
point in time. This lack of sameness is itself enough to decline to give significance to the
appearance and non-appearance of the word "date": the two parts of the provision
immediately succeed each other; the criteria in each part (here assuming that "date" is not
a distinguishing feature) are exactly the same—"within three working days", "after" and
"expiration"; and it is simply manifest that the second part goes back to the event given in
the first part. But it is not merely that the two parts would come into play at different points
in time. It is also that the second part would come into play a day earlier than the first part.
And, given what is provided for in the two parts, this would be a wholly nonsensical result:
the "written notification" event would be triggered at a time when the "considered as having
voluntarily quit" event had not yet materialized.
But even apart from this, it seems to the Umpire that the Union is urging a strained
interpretation. It can scarcely be questioned that the provision—meaning now the earlier
quoted language—addresses itself to the point where an employee’s leave is over. And
what is it that comes to mind when thinking of when one’s leave or vacation is over? The
Umpire has asked himself the question over and over again, and the answer he keeps
coming back to is "the end of the last day of the leave or vacation". It is not, so the Umpire
believes, the first day of one’s return to work which springs to mind in identifying the end of
a leave or vacation. The Union, of course, is not saying that the date of expiration is the
first day of work—it relies on "date of expiration" coupled with "after". But this does not
change the unlikelihood of the proposition that the parties gave standing to the day of
expiration as a separate and distinct entity which follows the day on which the leave ends.
Indeed, together with "after", the proposition yields a day which is a non-entity—a kind of
no-man’s land, constituting neither a day of leave nor a working day and thus constituting a
day as to which the parties’ respective obligations would be left unclear. If the employee
showed up for work on it—and one may certainly assume that the vast majority of
employees do show up on it— would the Company be free to send him home without
paying him on the grounds that the day is of independent standing and something other
than a working day? To raise the question is to answer it. And yet, it is not the farfetched
question which it seems to be. For if the "date of expiration" as the Union asks to have it
construed is also to be accepted as constituting a working day, the meaning of it would be
that the parties, though clearly addressing themselves to the problem of an employee’s
failure to show up for work at the end of the leave, provided that there first be a working
day following the end of the leave which is not to "count" and that there then be three
working days which are to "count". This is farfetched and the Umpire does not believe that
the presence of the word "date" is enough to support such a construction. Moreover, the
net effect of such a construction would be precisely the same as would a provision calling
for a limit of four working days following the end of the leave. If this had been the parties’
intention, the Umpire is convinced that they would have found a way to express it directly
and would not have expressed it in the circuitous "date" fashion.
The Umpire, then, rejects what the Union is seeking to make of the presence of "date" and
holds that, under Paragraph (111)(b), the "three working days" period begins to run on the
day following the day on which the employee’s leave ends.
This conclusion, the Umpire believes, is not alterable by what the Union argues in its
second approach. In the first place, at least so far as the Umpire has been made aware,
leaves are not granted in terms of shift hours. They are granted in terms of days or weeks.
F.’s own request illustrates the matter—the rest of the then current week and all of the
succeeding week. In the second place, and consistent with the above, the language of
Paragraph (111)(b) is without indication that a full day is to be added— or, equally
important, to be subtracted—based on the accident of an employee’s particular shift hours.
More on this below. And in the third place, the Union’s second approach merely echoes its
first approach and, in substance, is no different. Either way—just past midnight, in the first
approach; 1 AM, in the second approach—the Union is saying that Monday had arrived
and that Monday thus has to be applied as the date of expiration rather than as the first of
the "three working days". It is obviously true that, had F. been scheduled for the second
shift on Sunday, he would have been free—as a matter of still being on leave—not to come
to work on it. In this sense, in other words, it is true that F. was on leave through 1 AM,
Monday. But the fact is that, despite its Monday terminal hour, the shift is regarded as a
Sunday shift. It is quite the same—and here the Umpire comes back to the above made
point that it is equally true that the accident of shift hours cannot properly result in the
subtraction of a day—with respect to a shift which commences at 11 PM. Taking such a
shift in terms of a Sunday-to-Monday overlap, it is regarded as a Monday shift. And, any
more than the fact that the second shift ends at 1 AM on Monday can be taken to mean
that Monday is the last day of leave and that Tuesday, Wednesday and Thursday become
the "three working days", so cannot the fact that the night shift begins at 11 PM on Sunday
be taken to mean that Sunday is not the last day of leave and that Sunday, Monday and
Tuesday become the "three working days." In both instances, rather, Monday is the first of
the "three working days."
Two caveats are in order. One concerns the possibility that there are shifts—say, one
which starts at 8 PM—as to which it is not clear what calendar day they fall into. This would
be a complication to be dealt with at such time as it might arise. The Umpire is not seeking
to make all encompassing law. The other matter concerns the fact that the Umpire is not
saying that an employee’s shift hours are without relevance. He is holding: 1) that the fact
that the second shift ends at 1 AM of the succeeding day cannot be taken to mean that this
succeeding day is squashed as one of the "three working days"; and 2) that, consistent
with Decision E-241, "three working days" are three 24-hour periods. This does not mean,
however, that Paragraph (111)(b) can properly be applied on a straight calendar basis and
without regard to an employee’s shift hours. Thus, in F.’s case, the "three working days"
period would properly have to be applied as having run its course, not at the end of the
calendar Wednesday (February 12), but at 1 AM on Thursday (February 13). And though it
may be technical to treat someone situated as was F. as being "good" under Paragraph
(111)(b) if he showed up for work at, say, 12:30 AM on the Thursday, the fact is that the
provision, rather than in any way being geared to an all-or-major-part-of-the-shift
requirement, expressly stipulates "within three working days" (emphasis supplied).
For all intents and purposes, the foregoing discussion disposes of the Union’s third
approach as well. Fundamentally, the Union is relying on what has been rejected (save for
the wrinkle given in the caveat) as a proper basis for identifying the "three working days"
period—namely, the accident of an employee’s shift hours. It is quite true that all the hours
up to 4:30 PM on Monday were free hours for F. But it simply does not follow that these
hours are properly given the status of leave hours. Rather, for all the reasons given: the
leave was over on Sunday; Monday was the first of the "three working days"; and the
"three working days" period was over at 1 AM on Thursday. F. did not come to work within
this period.
Even if the "three working days" period were to be construed as commencing at 4:30 PM
on Monday, the Umpire does not believe that F.’s arrival at work at 4 PM on Thursday
could legitimately be accepted as having made him "good" under Paragraph (111)(b). For
it is not any showing-up within the 3-day period which the provision speaks of. Rather, the
provision expressly refers to "report for work" (emphasis supplied). And just as the Umpire
believes, as given above, that the calendar day must be seen as extended by an hour
where the employee’s shift ends at 1 AM and that the employee is "good" even if he shows
up for work just a few minutes before the completion of the shift, so does the Umpire
believe that the showing-up at some hour outside the employee’s shift hours—the mere
declaration of presence, which, for want of the employee’s shift hours, cannot be converted
to going to work—could not be credited as making the employee "good". In both instances,
it is a matter of heeding the provision’s language—"report for work", on the one hand, and
"within three working days", on the other. F. came in at 4 PM on Thursday, but he was not
going to work then. His arrival cannot be related to anything but the 4:30 PM starting time
of the second shift. And at 4:30 PM, even the "three working days" period contended for in
the Union’s third approach had run its course.
The Opinion should not close without comment on certain past Umpire Decisions.
First to be considered are Decisions E-241, F-8 and G-193 (respectively: Wallen, 1948;
Alexander, 1949; and Alexander, 1954). These Decisions, though they dealt with various
fact situations and decided various points, may be joined for the purpose of this discussion.
Taken together, they unquestionably establish that the day of notification is not to be
counted in applying the "three working days" period under Paragraph (64)(d). The fact is,
however, that they are (64)(d) Decisions. And, this being so, the Umpire does not believe
that they provide support for what the Union is urging in the present case. For one thing,
there are the differences between (64)(d) and (111)(b) discussed in Decision M-62 --
particularly the fact that most layoffs are of indefinite duration whereas most leaves, and
certainly all Paragraph (103) leaves, have a definite and known terminal point. And for
another, it seems to the Umpire that what he is here holding does not constitute an
application which is contrary to that established by the three Decisions. Under both (64)(d)
and (111)(b), there is the phrase "within three working days after". The "after" has been
honored in both instances: under (64)(d), it is a matter of "after" the day of notification—
rather than making the day of notification part of the three days; and under (111)(b), it is a
matter of "after" the last day of the leave—rather than interposing an extra day between
the end of the leave and the beginning of the three days.
Decision G-97 (Alexander, 1952), though it includes the statement "see F-8", is concerned
with one of the time limits laid down in Paragraph (77). The Umpire admits to some
surprise over the "see F-8" comparison—for, unlike the "after" at (64)(d), it is a matter of
within so many days "of" the particular event at Paragraph (77). The essential point to be
made, however, is that Paragraphs (111)(b) and (77) cover entirely different subject
matters. Paragraph (77) is concerned with time limits respecting protests against DLO’s
and discharges, and the only real concern to be had is that there be consistency of
application among the three separate time limits given in this Paragraph.
Left is Decision E-190 (Seward, 1948). All of the following are true about this Decision: it is
a (111)(b) Decision; the fact situation in it is quite similar to that which is here presented;
and it includes a statement which supports what the Union is here contending for.
Briefly stated, the case had the following framework: the grievant had been granted a
Paragraph (103) leave; the leave was for a period which ended on, and included, Sunday,
June 22, 1947; the grievant was neither seen nor heard from until Friday, June 27, 1947;
he was terminated under Paragraph (111)(b); and his claim was that he had become ill—
i.e., that he had "a satisfactory reason"—and that he had notified Management of his
illness on Wednesday, June 25, 1947.
The grievance was denied on the grounds that the evidence failed to support the
"satisfactory reason" claim. However, in defining the issue, Mr. Seward stated:
"The sole issue in this case is whether or not the complainant had a
satisfactory reason for failing to report to work within three working
days after June 23rd."
It is the latter part of the statement which the Union is here relying upon: though there was
no question in the case that the grievant was due back at work on Monday, June 23, Mr.
Seward put it in terms of "within three working days after June 23rd" (emphasis supplied).
This statement is undeniably in line with what the Union is here urging to be the correct
interpretation. Further, there are few, if any, who would deny that Mr. Seward is among the
most careful craftsmen in the arbitration profession. The present Umpire, nevertheless,
declines to accompany the Union in its reliance on the statement. The clear fact is that Mr.
Seward was not confronted with the issue here posed. Nor, obviously, can it be assumed
that he intended to decide anything more than the factual issue which was before him. The
statement could have been made -- as happens even to the best of arbitrators—in haste
and without reflecting on its implications. And if the contrary be true—if Mr. Seward saw
the problem here raised as a potential issue and consciously made the 3-day period as
beginning on the day after the Monday—the present Umpire sees himself as without
proper choice but respectfully to disagree.
DECISION
September 22, 1970
/S/Rolf Valtin
Umpire
No. M-83
October 1, 1970
Discharge:
Falsification of Employment Application
GRIEVANCE:

LEEDS PLANT, KANSAS CITY, MISSOURI—APPEAL CASE M-83
"Charge Management with unjust discharge and request that my record be cleared and all
back pay be made up, and also be brought back to work."
S/W.H.W.
The discharge here at issue is set aside; a 30-day DLO is to be entered on the grievant’s
disciplinary record for a violation of Shop Rule 1; the grievant is to be reinstated with
reimbursement for wages lost starting with what would have been the completion of the
serving of a 30-day DLO. (Entire decision should be read.)
In the Matter of:

Union No. 93
and
General Motors Corporation, GMAD Leeds Plant, Kansas City, Missouri -- Appeal Case M-
628
file://C:\Users\bobology\AppData\Local\Temp\Framework\m-083_13A66E05.htm 3/22/2011
OPINION
At the time of his discharge, grievant W. was classified as "Install Door Hinges" and
worked on the second shift in the Body Department. His plant seniority dates from October
20, 1967. He was discharged about fourteen months later—on December 13, 1968 -- for
violating the prohibition laid down in Shop Rule 1: "Falsification of personnel or other
records."
The facts are not seriously in dispute. The following is a summary.
Until November 1, 1958, the Company’s Kansas City complex was made up of two
plants—the Chevrolet Division plant and the Fisher Body Division plant. As of that time, the
two plants became one GMAD facility.
On April 6, 1967, in the capacity of Material Handler, W. was hired by the Chevrolet plant.
On April 25, 1967 -- i.e., less than three weeks later and at a time when W. was still a
probationary employee and therefore without right of appeal—he was let go as an
unsatisfactory employee.
On October 19, 1967, W. applied for employment with the Fisher Body Division. In filling
out the application form, he entered "no" for the question "Have you ever worked for Fisher
Body or any other GM Division?". It is conceded that it was not through inadvertence that
W. gave the "no" answer—the fact is, indeed, that it was in order not to jeopardize his
chances of being hired that W. resorted to falsification.
As already given, W. was hired a day after filling out the application form and worked for
Fisher Body for about fourteen months. The evidence can only be taken to show that he
was a wholly satisfactory employee: he had a spotless disciplinary record and the Union
asserts, without refutation by the Company, that Superintendent C. expressed himself in
commendatory fashion about W. to a Union representative.
In mid-November, 1968, there arose a problem between W. and another employee. The
Umpire will let the Company’s brief tell the story: "The grievant alleged the other employee
had threatened him with a knife and reported this fact to his Supervisor and Labor
Relations. The other employee denied the threat, but conceded making a remark in poor
taste to the grievant. In Management’s presence the other employee apologized to the
grievant and Management considered the matter dropped. The grievant did not accept the
apology and, when he determined no disciplinary action was to be taken against the other
employee, he swore out a warrant for his arrest with the Kansas City, Mo., Police
Department. Subsequently the other employee was taken from the plant by Police Officers,
booked and released on bond. This conduct, plus the grievant’s attempt to personally
deliver a summons to the Labor Relations Representative involved in the case to appear in
Court as a witness, led to the discovery that he had recently been discharged from
Chevrolet at the same plant site. The grievant’s involvement in this type incident had
recalled his name to the minds of the former Chevrolet salary supervisors who were now
his employer."
It was by virtue of this development that Management checked W.’s employment

application and discovered the falsification. Though conceding this much, the Company
insists that it was for the falsification—not for the above-described fracas—that W. was
discharged.
The case is one of those which, though of factual simplicity, presents a number of
considerations which are rather substantial and which pull one back and forth in trying to
decide what the proper outcome is. Based on what he sees as the two ultimate
considerations—the state of the law respecting falsification under the parties’ collective-
bargaining relationship, and the particular facts and circumstances here presented— the
Umpire has concluded that W. should not have been discharged.
Preliminarily to be noted—as a matter of showing what the Umpire is not relying upon—is
that there are two Union arguments which, when put together, strike the Umpire as trying
to have it both ways. As it has in prior falsification cases, the Union argues, on the one
hand, that humanitarian considerations require tolerance of certain omissions in an
employment application form: a person with a bad past has little chance of being hired if he
admits to the bad past on his employment application, and, in turn, has little chance of
going "straight" if he does not obtain gainful employment. This much, though it raises the
ever-difficult question of whether the end justifies the means, cannot help but fall on
sympathetic ears. At the same time, however, the Union seeks to go with the proposition
that only such acts of falsification as go to something "material" are punishable offenses
and that, at least in many instances, the withholding of one part or another of a person’s
bad past does not have the requisite materiality. This is where the Umpire has difficulty
accompanying the Union. The very reason that the falsification is resorted to is that the
applicant assumes that his chances of being hired are substantially reduced if he tells the
truth. Nor can it reasonably be argued that this person is making anything but a correct
assumption. But to grant these things, it seems to the Umpire, is to grant that there is
materiality to the hiring process in the particular piece or pieces of withheld information.
Simply stated, the falsehood is by definition a material one. And, this being so, the Umpire
thinks it would be wrong to shift the burden to the Company at some subsequent stage to
prove that it would not have hired the particular individual if the correct information had
been before it at the time of his hire. The Umpire does not believe, in other words, that
cases of this sort can properly be approached on the basis of "the Company hasn’t shown
that it wouldn’t have hired him."
It does not follow, however, that either the nature of that which has been withheld or the
length and quality of the employee’s service prior to the discovery of the falsification are
without relevancy. Consider two extreme examples: on the one hand, the withholding of
information relating to some physical impediment together with the employee’s inability,
shortly upon hire and by virtue of the impediment, to cope with the physical demands of the
job; and, on the other hand, the withholding of information relating to arrest in connection
with a drunken brawl—which, rather than being reflective of the person’s life pattern,
constitutes an isolated incident—together with an extended period of service which is
wholly satisfactory and which the Company then seeks to bring to an end solely because
the falsification is discovered. The Umpire sees but one basis for failing to distinguish
between these two situations. It is that "a lie is a lie is a lie" and that, therefore, falsification
per se equates to the discharge penalty. The Umpire is not saying that this is an inherently
preposterous proposition. It is not one, however, for which he holds any great enthusiasm.
And, as already indicated, the fact is that the state of the GM-UAW law on falsification is
such as to foreclose an automatic-discharge approach.
Rather than merely make this statement, the Umpire thinks it useful and appropriate to
provide a review of what it is based on.
First, there is the Shop Rule itself. It is concerned exclusively with falsification (of records
of one sort or another) and yet provides for a penalty range of a 1-week DLO to discharge.
Since deceit is involved in every form of falsification, there is no way to read the presence
of the range except as a recognition that deceit is not a single or uniform entity invariably
calling for the discharge penalty and that, instead, there are various forms of falsifications
which, because of varying degrees of seriousness and various sets of surrounding
circumstances, call for penalties of varying severity. The one prior falsification case which
has been brought to the present Umpire—the Norwood case resulting in Decision M-53 --
illustrates the point. The case was concerned with the falsification of a record other than an
employment-application form. However, no less vehemently than here, Management
argued that the grievant had deliberately sought to mislead it and that this was something
which Management could not be expected to tolerate. The penalty which had been
imposed was a 30-day DLO.
Next, there are the eight prior GM-UAW Decisions (aside from M-53) to which the Umpire
has been referred—F-11, F-132, J-3, K-64, K-93, M-15, M-20 and M-29. All of these cases
are concerned with falsification of an employment-application form; all of them involved the
discharge penalty; in four of them, the penalty was upheld; and in the other four, it was
either set aside or modified. The Umpire is obviously not proceeding in box-score fashion.
Indeed, it is to be granted that: two of the reversals went on special grounds (the
Company’s failure, in J-3, to prove that the grievant had in fact been discharged for the
falsification; and a violation, in K-93, of the grievant’s Paragraph (76) rights); all sorts of
factors were analyzed and relied upon in the eight Decisions; and the common element in
the eight decisions is, not some governing principle, but the emphasis which each of the
decisions placed on the cases’ particular facts and circumstances. Nevertheless, it is clear
beyond question that, taken together, the eight Decisions fall far short of supporting an
automatic-discharge approach. Indeed, Decision K-64 includes the following statement
(made in the context of referring back to F-11, F-132 and J-3):
"discovery of... concealment of a material fact does not automatically justify discharge."
Yet to be discussed is the history of Paragraph (76b) as it relates to falsification. Before

doing so, the Umpire wants to insert brief treatment of two matters.
One concerns the fact that the application form which the grievant signed includes the
following among its printed material:
"I hereby represent that each answer to a question herein and all
other information otherwise furnished is true and correct. I further
represent that such answers and information constitute a full and
complete disclosure of my knowledge with respect to the question or
subject to which the answer or information relates. I understand that
any incorrect, incomplete, or false statements or information
furnished by me will subject me to discharge at any time..."
It goes without saying that this cannot help but give one substantial pause. In the opinion
of the Umpire, however, it is not something which can properly be given determinative
weight. In the first place, though true that Management here acted within the 18-month limit
provided for in the Agreement, the "at any time" statement lacks contractual validity (see
the discussion respecting Paragraph (76b), below). In the second place, the statement
does not absolutely make discharge the consequence of falsification—it employs the
hedging phrase "subject to". And in the third place, there is no showing that the statement
was not part of the application form in the years in which the falsifications leading to the
prior Umpire Decisions came to light. In the absence of such a showing, it seems proper to
assume that the statement has long been a standard part of the form and thus was in
being when the discharge-reversing Decisions were handed down.
The other matter concerns the fact that the Company has sought to liken the present case
to the "gun" case covered by Decision M-47. The Umpire has two reactions. One is that
the argument impliedly grants the absence of an automatic-discharge rule in the
falsification area. The discharge penalty in the "gun" case was upheld, not via an
automatic-discharge rule, but on the grounds that the carrying of a concealed and loaded
pistol into the plant constitutes the most extreme form of violating the prohibition laid down
in the "possession of weapons" Shop Rule (which also, at least at the Marion Plant, has a
range of penalties). The Umpire’s other reaction is a matter of declining to accompany the
Company in the comparison. The Umpire simply does not believe that the falsification
offense here presented warrants a penalty of the same drastic proportions which he held to
be warranted for the offense presented in the "gun" case. Stated otherwise, contrary to
what he held to be true in the "gun" case, the Umpire does not believe that the offense
here in question is of capital magnitude.
Standing in the way of an automatic-discharge approach, finally, is the history of

Paragraph (76b) of the National Agreement. The Paragraph’s final portion nowadays
provides that Management will not "impose discipline on an employee for falsification of his
employment application after a period of eighteen (18) months from his date of hire". To
say this obviously is to imply that Management can impose discipline for the offense within
the 18-month period. It is, however, the word "discipline" which is employed in the
regulation. By common application of industrial-relations practitioners, "discipline" is the
broad term which covers the entire penalty range. It includes, but is not limited to, the
discharge penalty. And any notion that one might have that a full proscription after so much
time has elapsed is meant to render the discharge penalty as an automatic one in the
period preceding the cutoff point, is dispelled by the regulation’s negotiating history. That
history, without rejoinder by the Company, is given in the Union’s brief as follows:
"In 1964 Negotiations and following the issuance of Decision K-64,

we sought a provision in the Agreement that if an employee
escaped detection for a period of one year following hire he was not
subject to be fired for falsification of his employment application. We
were well aware that Mr. Feinsinger had already ruled that the
employee’s amount and quality of service before a material
falsification was discovered were factors to be taken into account
when considering imposition of discharge and that discharge was
not automatic in that type of case. The Corporation was aware of it

too. It sought to upset K-64 by its response to our demands for a
statute of limitations on falsification of employment application. The
Corporation proposed language which would have granted our one
(1) year demand and made discharge automatic for any material
falsification discovered within one (1) year of hire. This Corporation
proposal was rejected by the International Union because of the
provision for discharge which it contained. As a result we waited
another three (3) years for a statute of limitations which was
incorporated into Paragraph 76(b) in its present form."
So much, then, for a substantiation of the already-stated conclusion that an automatic-

discharge approach cannot properly be followed. The Umpire has gone to some length in
providing the substantiation because it seems to him that the question of the proper
approach is the basic one raised in this case. On the facts here involved—i.e., once it is
determined that falsification is not in and of itself a dischargeable offense—it seems rather
clear to the Umpire that the discharge penalty was excessive.
One may gather that W. pressed things unduly, with consequent headaches for
Management, in connection with the difficulties he had with the other employee. But the
Company itself insists that it was not for the incident that W. was discharged. And unless
there were evidence which would establish a tie-in between the incident and the
falsification—unless it were shown that the incident was reflective of proneness by W. to
get embroiled in production-interfering arguments and that it was for this reason that W.
was let go from the Chevrolet plant in April, 1967 -- it seems to the Umpire that W.’s
approximately fourteen months of service, wholly satisfactory as shown above, must be
taken as standing in the way of discharge as a proper penalty. Under the non-automatic
approach, Management is barred from making falsification the device for getting rid of
individuals whom it has come to regard as undesirable. It seems to the Umpire that one
would be sanctioning just that were one to uphold discharge on the facts of the present
case.
This is obviously not to say that the falsification should go unpunished. Management has a
legitimate concern about obtaining honestly filled-out-employment-application forms; the
Shop Rule was violated; and it was within the 18-month limit of Paragraph (76b) that the
falsification was discovered. The Umpire is directing a 30-day DLO.
DECISION
The discharge here at issue is set aside; a 30-day DLO is to be entered on the grievant’s
disciplinary record for a violation of Shop Rule 1; the grievant is to be reinstated with
reimbursement for wages lost starting with what would have been the completion of the
serving of a 30-day DLO.
October 1, 1970
/S/Rolf Valtin
Umpire
No. M-84
October 13, 1970
Discipline:
Evidence
GRIEVANCE:
CHEVROLET MOTOR DIVISION, GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, FLINT

ASSEMBLY PLANT, FLINT, MICHIGAN—APPEAL CASES M-146, M-232 and M-330
Grievance 740537 - Appeal Case M-146
"I charge Mgt. With giving me and unjust Penalty and demand my record cleared at once
with Pay." S/W.D.N.
"I chg. mgt with an unjust Pen. I demand this Pen be removed from my record & that I be
made whole for all losses & or benefit due me at once." S/R.C.
"I charge Mgt with an unjust pen. I demand that this pen be cleared from my record at once
& that I be made whole for all losses at once."
S/J.J.
The grievances are denied. (Entire decision should be read.)

file://C:\Users\bobology\AppData\Local\Temp\Framework\m-084_13A67B3E.htm 3/22/2011
In the Matter of:

Union No. 659
and
General Motors Corporation, Chevrolet Motor Division Flint Assembly Plant, Flint, Michigan
-- Appeal Cases M-146, M-232 and M-330
OPINION
Each of these cases was separately heard and involves its own grievant and its own set of
facts and contentions. The Umpire is here joining them because: they were heard as part
of one agenda; they involve one and the same plant and Local Union; the charge in each
instance is that the grievant was absent without reasonable cause (Shop Rule 8); though
the penalty is not the same in all three cases—Balance of Shift in both M-232 and M-330,
2-week DLO in M-146 -- the variation is a matter of differences in the respective prior
disciplinary records and no extent-of-penalty issue is raised in any of the three cases; the
sole issue thus presented in each of the cases is the factual one of whether or not the
grievant was absent without reasonable cause.
In the opinion of the Umpire, the evidence in each case is such as to require an affirmative
answer. Each of the grievances, accordingly, is being denied. Brief explanatory comments
will be given on a separate basis.
Appeal Case M-146
Hired in late 1958, grievant N. was a second-shift "Utility Paint and Enamel Class A" in the
Paint Department. He was absent on Tuesday, October 8, 1968.
On the next day, Foreman M. asked N. about the reason for the absence. N. replied that
he had been sick and had seen a doctor. Foreman M. inquired whether N. had
substantiation, and reminded N. that it was understood that, in the light of N.’s poor
attendance record, N. had an obligation to provide substantiation.
It is agreed: that N. was not in possession of a doctor’s certificate on this day—October 9;

that Foreman M. gave his consent to N.’s request to submit the substantiation on the
following day; that on this day—October 10 -- N. was once more without a doctor’s
certificate; and that Foreman M. therewith imposed the DLO. The difference between the
respective versions of Foreman M. and grievant N. is as follows. Foreman M. asserts that
N., on October 9, said that he had overlooked, when seeing the doctor on October 8, to
ask him for a certificate; that, because the doctor was out of town, he (N.) could not obtain
a certificate on October 9; but that he (N.) would obtain the certificate on October 10 and
would have it with him when coming to work on that day. Grievant N., to the contrary,
asserts that he said nothing about having failed to get a certificate when seeing the doctor
on October 8 or about the doctor being out of town on October 9; that, instead, he told
Foreman M. (on October 9) that he (N.) had a doctor’s certificate but had forgotten to bring
it with him; and that, unfortunately, he forgot to bring it not only on October 9 but also on
October 10.
Though there is some dispute about it, the Umpire is going on the assumption that, as of
October 11, Union representatives were in possession of a certificate from the doctor and
apprised Supervision of this fact. Supervision nonetheless declined to rescind the DLO.
The certificate is in the form of a receipt—of $6.00 from N. by a Dr. W.J.L., Chiropractic
Physician. It is dated October 8, 1968; and, at "For Professional Services", it states
"Unable to work - muscle spasm".
A doctor’s certificate is obviously not something lightly to be cast aside. Indeed, more often
than not, it is dispositive of a controversy of this sort. For reasons which require no
elaboration, however, the Umpire has long been of the opinion that a doctor’s certificate
cannot mechanically be applied as always being of determinative weight. And as to the
present case, the Umpire believes that the surrounding circumstances are such as to
render the certificate most suspect. His conclusion is that the certificate was secured on
October 11 and that it merely echoes a false statement of disablement by the grievant.
N. admittedly had had a poor attendance record and admittedly knew that illness as an
asserted reason for absence would have to be substantiated. It is simply incredible that
such an employee, if in fact ill to the point of missing work and in fact visiting a doctor for
the illness, would forget to ask the doctor for a statement certifying to the illness. By
Foreman M.’s account, this is what N. said had happened. By N.’s account, of course, he
had not forgotten to ask for such a statement and in fact had obtained it. But this creates
an improbability of equally great proportions—that N. then forgot to bring it to work. And
one is asked to accept that this was true not only as to October 9 but as to October 10 as
well. In the absence of either a truly convincing explanation or of evidence showing that N.
offered to go home to fetch the alleged certificate, the Umpire sees it as too much to
accept. Neither such an explanation nor such an offer is here in the picture. Indeed, N. was
among the most unpersuasive witnesses whom the Umpire has ever encountered. Aside
from other problems in his testimony, there was N.’s statement that he could not remember
when (on October 8) he had gone to the doctor’s office. Given the nature of the case and
the fact that the grievance was promptly filed, this is simply something which N. would
have remembered. N. subsequently changed the "don’t remember", asserting that it had
been in the afternoon. But if this were to be accepted, the meaning of it would be that N.,
though beset by muscle spasms as early as 4 AM (as he testified), waited until the
afternoon before seeing a doctor—once more a rather unlikely state of affairs. And finally,
it is a conceded fact that N. at no time made a phone call informing someone at the plant
of the alleged predicament, which would have been of about 12-hour duration. Putting it all
together, the Umpire believes that N. has presented a story which does not stand up.
Appeal Case M-232
Grievant C. was a first-shift Truck Production Assembler. His seniority dates from
September 7, 1967. He was absent from work on Tuesday, January 7, 1969.
C.’s version, essentially, is that his car had for some time been in a state of disrepair; that,
for this reason, he had been riding to and from work with B., a fellow employee from
another department; and that, due to a heavy snowfall on January 6 followed by heavy
winds and accompanying snowdrifts on January 7, B. was unable to get through to his
(C.’s) house on January 7 and thus failed to bring him to work.
The Umpire wants to make clear that he is deciding this case without consideration of what
amounts to the Company’s alternative position: that an employee has an obligation to
make certain that he has reliable means of getting to work and that, where his failure to get
to work is the result of his having arranged for transportation which is not reliable, he is an
employee who is absent without reasonable cause. Not only is the Umpire here proceeding
without consideration of this contention, but, indeed, it seems to him that if C.’s story held
up—i.e., if true that C. was someone who had a rider arrangement while his car was under
repair and who was left stranded on a particular day due to snow conditions—a holding
that reasonable cause for the absence was lacking would be highly questionable.
In the opinion of the Umpire, however, there are too many holes in C.’s story to accept it.
There is no question that a considerable amount of snow had fallen in the Flint area and
that January 7 was a day of considerable winds. It is equally clear, however, that the
roads—at least for the most part—had been cleaned up; that January 7 was not a day of
abnormal absenteeism at the plant; that B., who lives but a short distance from C., did get
to work; and that, even if one were to place credence in C.’s assertion that there were high
snowdrifts in the immediate vicinity of his house, the fact would remain that C. would have
had to walk but 50 or 60 feet to the point at the (admittedly) cleared highway where he
could have met B. and been picked up by him. Aside from this, there is the fact that C.’s
attendance record had been a poor one and that Supervision had counseled him about the
need to improve it. Given this, if true that it was by reason of snow conditions that C. had
been kept from getting to work, it seems to the Umpire that C. would have spared neither
time nor effort to report this fact to Supervision. This would mean, for one thing, that C.
would have called Supervision on the morning of January 7 -- when he knew that he would
not be picked up and when he obviously would have surmised (his testimony at the
hearing renders this an inescapable point) that it was because of snow conditions that he
had not been picked up. C. did not call the plant on January 7. Even if this were to be
overlooked— and, as C. plainly is not a stupid man, the Umpire does not believe that it can
be overlooked—C. surely would have referred to snow conditions in responding to
Foreman J.’s inquiry, on January 8, as to why he (C.) had been absent on the day before.
Foreman J. testified, firmly and convincingly, that C. made no mention of snow. C. denies
this, but the Umpire believes that, by any realistic assessment, the testimony of both C.
and B. was marked by hedging and evasiveness and was generally unpersuasive.
One must doubt, indeed, that B. and C. were riding together at the time.
Both men testified that B. drove C. to work on January 8. Thus raised—C. left the plant not
long after the beginning of the shift (serving the balance-of-shift DLO) -- is the question of
how C. got home on January 8. The question was in fact asked, and both men first stated
that they were not sure and subsequently said that they "thought" B. drove C. home. And
this led to the highly improbable proposition that B. had "heard" (though he could not
remember from whom) that C. had been disciplined and that the two men then somehow
met at a nearby bar or bowling alley at the end of the shift (and, indeed, with B. allowing
that he could not remember whether he had picked up C. or whether C. already had B.’s
car when they met). Neither man, moreover, gave anything even approaching specifics on
the question of how long C. had been riding with B. There is, furthermore, the fact that B. is
a Committeeman and that, when asked whether it did not occur to him to protect C.’s
interests and thus to let Foreman J. know on January 7 that snow had kept him from
picking up C., B.’s answer was the wholly evasive and hedging one of "I might have told
another member of Supervision—but I’m not saying that I did". And finally, there is the fact
that B.’s written statement asserting that snow had kept him from picking C. up (though
dated January 8) was not submitted to Management until March 19 (1969). Unless the
Umpire is very much mistaken, B. is the sort of person whose response to an injustice
which he is in a position to correct would be one of quickly and directly confronting
Supervision.
When all these things are put together, it seems to the Umpire that there is no realistic
choice but to conclude that there are too many implausibilities in C.’s story. It is a story
which does not hang together. The grievance is being denied on this basis.
Appeal Case M-330
Hired in October, 1965, grievant J. was a first-shift Assembler. He was absent on Monday,
Tuesday and Wednesday, May 19, 20 and 21, 1969. As to May 20 and 21, he alleges
illness on the part of his infant child, requiring his wife to be with the child at a hospital and
requiring him to stay at home for baby-sitting purposes. As to May 19, he admits to having
been in Detroit for personal-business reasons but alleges that he had told Foreman C. (on
the last working day of the preceding week) that he would be absent. J.’s testimony was
unpersuasive, and his alleged proof with respect to May 20 and 21 not only was submitted
belatedly but is weak and tenuous in important particulars. As to May 19, Foreman C., who
was a convincing witness, denies that J. told him anything of an upcoming absence. As to
all three days, if J. had had the good reasons which he now alleges—in effect excused on
May 19 and family needs of a quasi-emergency nature on May 20 and 21 -- it seems
certain to the Umpire that J., when he came back to work on May 22 and was asked about
the absences by Foreman C., would have stated the reasons rather than have responded
in profane and defiant "none of your business" fashion. That the nature of the response
was denied throughout the lower steps of the grievance procedure and then finally
admitted at the arbitration hearing makes it all the more certain. The Umpire concludes that
J.’s version has to be rejected as untruthful.
DECISION
The grievances are denied.
October 13, 1970
/S/Rolf Valtin
Umpire
No. M-85
NOVEMBER 12, 1970
Denial of Promotional Opportunity Under Paragraph (63)(a);
Company’s Offer to Place Grievant in Job with Back Pay;
Whether Questions Raised by Grievance Have Been Rendered Moot
GRIEVANCE:
Grievance 670393
"I charge mtg with vio of 63a of the N.A. I request that I be promoted to the job, in question,
in line with my seniority, and I be paid all back pay due me, due to this vio and mtg abide
by 63a of the N.A. in future." S/B.T.
For lack of a concrete case before him, the Umpire rejects the Union’s request for a ruling
on the particular interpretative question. (Entire decision should be read)
In the Matter of:

Union No. 25
and
General Motors Corporation, Chevrolet Assembly Division, St. Louis, Missouri -- Appeal
Case M-1328

OPINION
The basic facts are not in dispute and may be summarized as follows: As of September 9,
1968, employee S. was promoted from the job of Reliefman-Repair Auto General to the job
of Utilityman-Repair Auto General. The rate for the latter job is 5¢ an hour above that of the
former.
The Reliefman job was created in 1967 and, pursuant to local negotiations, carries a rate
5¢ an hour above the Repair Auto General job. Once vacancies in the Reliefman job were
declared, S. was among those to apply for it and to be placed in it. T., the grievant in this
case, neither expressed an interest in it nor was placed in it.
On this ground—that he was not a Reliefman at the time the opening in the Utilityman job
came up—T. was considered as not being in the so-called scope of selection and therefore
was bypassed for the purpose of filling the Utilityman vacancy.
The grievance constitutes a claim that T. rather than S. should have been placed in the
Utilityman opening. T. is of longer service than S. and relies on the opening portion of
Paragraph (63)(a) of the National Agreement.
The Paragraph reads as follows:
"(63) The transferring of employees is the sole responsibility of

Management subject to the following:
(a) In the advancement of employees to higher paid jobs

when ability, merit and capacity are equal, employees
with the longest seniority will be given preference. If the
settlement of a grievance alleging violation of this
Paragraph (63)(a) is on the basis that a different
employee should have been promoted, that employee
will receive back pay equal to the difference between his
rate and the rate for the job in question for the number of
hours worked by the employee improperly promoted on
the job in question, back to the date of the grievance."
Shortly before the arbitration hearing, S. was removed from the Utilityman job and grievant
T. was placed in it. Also, the Company has offered to pay T. the back pay provided for in
the Paragraph’s second sentence. Actual payment of it has been held up pending the
outcome of this proceeding.
The Union is seeking a twofold ruling: (1) that Management was wrong in the scope-of-
selection position which it took in resisting T.’s grievance; (2) that Management—rather
than merely remove S. from the job, declare it open, and thereupon make a selection from
among those eligible and qualified for it—had an obligation to place T. in it. Contrarily, the
Company, relying on the fact that T. has been placed in the job and has been offered the
back pay, asks for a ruling that any question raised by the grievance has been rendered
moot and that there is therefore nothing for the Umpire to decide.
Potentially at stake is an interpretation of the second sentence of Paragraph (63)(a). It was

adopted in 1964, in response to the Union’s concern over the fact that, theretofore, the
erroneous placement of a relatively junior employee into a promotional vacancy resulted in
no more than Management’s redeclaring the job open and thereupon making another
selection and, without back pay, placing the selectee in the opening. The Company,
though granting its back-pay obligation, is here saying that it still possesses the right to
redeclare the job open and to start the selection process anew, rather than award the job
to the grieving employee. The Union is saying, on the other hand, that Management is not
free so to "start all over" and that it is the grieving employee who is entitled to be placed in
the job (so long as eligible, qualified and senior to the employee who was placed in the
job).
The Umpire agrees with the Company that the present grievance is not the proper vehicle
for deciding the controversy. It is true that Management’s corrective action vis-a-vis T. is
not the equivalent of a declaration by the Company that the Union is right on the principle
on which it seeks to be sustained. It is also true that there is no telling why Management
chose to grant T.’s claim. But there is no getting away from the facts: (a) that, for the
purpose of T.’s claim, Management has abandoned its prior reliance both on the scope-of-
selection assertion and on the "declare vacancy and select anew" assertion; and (b) that
Management has fully granted T.’s claim. There is thus nothing in T.’s grievance which is
left to be decided. It is this which matters. Confronting and deciding contractual principles
is indeed among the Umpire’s functions. It is, however, a function which is to be carried out
on the basis of concrete cases, not via pronouncements in the absence of such cases. The
need for this restraint has long been recognized by GM-UAW Umpires, and is echoed in
M-39, one of the present Umpire’s decisions.
It should be obvious that the non-acceptance of Management’s back-pay offer is without

consequence. Together with T.’s placement in the job, Management’s back-pay offer
constitutes full satisfaction of T.’s claim. All that is needed to produce a settlement of the
case is for T. to accept that which his grievance asks for and which Management has
offered him. To permit the Union to bar the acceptance of the offer, and thus to be in a
position to argue that a "live and kicking" case is pending, would be to act in discord with
the very purpose of the grievance procedure.
DECISION
For lack of a concrete case before him, the Umpire rejects the Union’s request for a ruling
on the particular interpretative questions.
November 12, 1970
/S/Rolf Valtin
Umpire
No. M-92
April 27, 1971
Disciplinary Action,
30-Day DLO in the One Case and Discharge in the Other,
for Alleged Use of Abusive Language
Against Various Members of Management;
Evidence;
Extent of Penalty;
Charge of Violation of Paragraph (76) of National Agreement
GRIEVANCE:
CHEVROLET MOTOR DIVISION, GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, NORWOOD

PLANT,
NORWOOD, OHIO—APPEAL CASES M-880 and M-881
"Grievance No. 395260:
Protest Mgt. for giving me unjust suspension, d.l.o., or discharge. Charging me with S/R
31, I am not guilty of this charge. Demand I be paid for all lost time & my record be
cleared." s/E.S.
"Grievance No. 394891:
Protest unjust suspension and or discharge for alleged viol. of S.R. 31. I am not guilty as
charged. Demand record cleared and pay for all time involved." s/J.O.

1. Grievances Nos. 394892, 394893, 395261 and 395262 -- referred to in the Opinion, but
not quoted therein—are dismissed.
2. The 30-day DLO against grievant S. is upheld.
3. The discharge of grievant O. is modified to a 90-day DLO. Grievant O. is to be reinstated

with back pay covering the period from the end of the 90-day DLO to the time of his
reinstatement. (Entire decision should be read.)
In the matter of:

Union No. 674
and
General Motors Corporation Chevrolet Motor Division Norwood Plant, Norwood, Ohio --
Appeal Cases M-880 and M-881
OPINION
At the time here in question, grievant S. was a Utility-Stock Chaser in the Material
Department and a second-shift Zone Committeeman. His seniority dates from October 17,
1966. He is the grievant who was assessed a 30-day DLO. Grievant O. was an Inspector-
Final Car, Body and/or Repair in the Inspection Department and the Chairman of the Shop
Committee. His seniority dates from October 12, 1964. He was discharged.
S.’s prior disciplinary record consists of but a single reprimand. O.’s prior disciplinary
record has four entries; some of the offenses covered by the entries were serious offenses;
but it is also true that O. had compiled a clean record in the nearly three-year period which
preceded the time here in question. The Umpire will not further elaborate on the grievants’
prior disciplinary records because, though there was some equivocation about it at the
hearing, the Company’s position is that the offense in each instance was such as itself to
have called for the particular penalty which was assessed.
As indicated at the heading, the grievants are charged with having violated Shop Rule 31.
This Shop Rule prohibits "abusive language to any employee or supervisor."
In the context of "117" discussions concerning production standards (which discussions

had been going on for about a week), the incident occurred on the evening of July 20,
1970. O. and S. called the plant personnel office and requested a meeting. They came to
the office of Assistant Personnel Director H. and were there seen by H. himself and by K.,
Supervisor of Labor Relations. They are accused of having thrown various abusive
epithets at H. and K.—largely in response to H.’s refusal to discuss production-standards
problems. About a half-hour later, after they had been put on disciplinary-action notice and
been asked to wait in the conference room, they entered the office of Personnel Director S.
They are accused of similarly abusive conduct, both there and at a counter outside of
Personnel Director S.’s office (while K. was making out a plant-leaving pass for them).
Though conceding that rough language was used, the grievants deny that they are guilty
as charged. Indeed, they assert that they were abused by one or another of these
members of Management—both in the form of abusive language and in the form of a
deliberate shove by K. against O. Their assertions on these scores are covered by four
grievances (Nos. 394892, 394893, 395261 and 395262). These grievances are officially
before the Umpire as part of the present proceeding. He has not quoted them (in contrast
to the two grievances appealing the disciplinary actions) because he sees them as
representing sheer fabrication. Insofar as the facts are concerned, in other words, the
Umpire finds that Management’s version—at least in its essence, if not precisely in all of
the particulars—is the correct one.
More particularly, the Umpire makes the following three-fold finding:
First, the abusive language in this case was as extreme as anything one might
encounter—certainly more extreme than anything the Umpire has heretofore encountered.
This is true both as to the protracted nature of the incident—there was a stream of
invectives, rather than one or two outbursts—and as to the choice of words. Little purpose
would be served by reproducing the particular epithets. But it is to be understood that there
was here a verbal attack of the worst kinds of vulgarities and degradations. Management’s
plea to the effect of "no one should have to take that much" is thoroughly justified.
Second, going to the fact that O. was discharged whereas S. was given a 30-day DLO, it is
true that O. was the first one to resort to abusive language and that his were the more
extreme and more numerous vilifications. Additionally, the Umpire accepts that O., some
three hours after leaving the plant, phoned Personnel Director S. and hurled further
invectives at him. O. thereby compounded things. It is also true, however, that S. (except
for the phone call) was a participant in the affair and did employ foul and insulting terms.
Third, the abuse which was heaped on the members of Management cannot be excused
on grounds of provocation. H. gave the grievants to understand that he was not prepared
to settle the production-standards issues, saying that an understanding had been reached
with representatives of the International that the issues would be referred to a
subcommittee. One can accept that this stand by H. accentuated the feeling of frustration
and irritation which the grievants had already been experiencing. But H.’s stand was
truthful and valid, and was not a matter of "needling" or improper resistance to discussion.
The abusive response by O. and S. was unjustified and they themselves must be held
accountable for it.
By these findings, the Umpire upholds the 30-day DLO against S. but believes that O.’s
discharge must be overruled as excessive. The Umpire agrees, as indicated, that O.’s
conduct warranted a more severe penalty than S.’s conduct. Also as indicated, however,
the Umpire does not accept that S. should be seen as a kind of unfortunate victim of
circumstances— as a mere "dragged-in" person of comparatively mild conduct. It was
entirely within S.’s powers, if not to caution O. against the vilifications, to stay out of the
affair by simply refraining from abusive conduct of his own. This is not what happened. To
the contrary, S. produced both denigrations and hard filth. And, as the Umpire believes that
Management has an obligation to proceed even-handedly in the administration of discipline
and as he sees the distances from a 30-day DLO to discharge as a disproportionately long
one, he has concluded that O.’s discharge should be reduced to a 90-day DLO (with
reimbursement for the wages lost in the remainder of the time since the discharge).
In so holding, the Umpire is overruling a series of contentions by one party or the other.
Some of them require comment.
In appealing the severity of S.’s penalty, the Union urges that Management should have
gone the progressive-discipline route; and, in so urging, the Union stresses a prior case
(involving one Van H.) in which the use of abusive language was responded to with the
progressive-discipline approach. The Umpire has not accepted this argument because he
sees the incident here in question as having involved conduct of such a uniquely extreme
nature as to have warranted foregoing the application of the corrective-discipline approach
and to have warranted going directly to a severe penalty. At the same time, of course, the
upholding of S.’s 30-day DLO is not the equivalent of the upholding of a 30-day DLO which
has been assessed by application of the corrective-discipline approach—meaning that S.
is not in the "launching pad" posture as is someone with a 30-day DLO which climaxes a
series of corrective-discipline penalties.
The record in this case incorporates a substantial number of prior GM-UAW decisions. For
the most part, they cover cases involving the use of abusive language. Either upheld or
directed by the particular Umpire were penalties of various severities, and, taken as a
whole, the decisions simply do not compel one result or other in the present case.
There are two decisions, however—C-273 and F-72 -- which are not concerned with
abusive language and which are concerned, rather, with the matter of disparate
disciplinary action. The Company relies on both decisions in defending the discharge of O.
vis-a-vis the 30-day DLO of S.
In F-72, the Umpire agreed with the Union that the particular incident (a fight between two
employees) called for the application of the equal-penalty rule but rejected the Union’s
contention to the effect that Management, having failed to impose equal penalties, was
stuck with the lower penalty and had to bring the higher penalty down to the lower one.
The decision’s implication—that unequal penalties are proper where the one employee is
more culpable than the other—is not here being rejected or disregarded. It is on the extent
of the disparate treatment that the Umpire is overruling the Company. Obviously true,
however, is that the present decision does not adopt the holding in F-72 that the Company
was free to equalize either in terms of the lower penalty or in terms of the higher penalty.
The umpire sees no error in this non-adoption of the F-72 holding. For one thing,
equalization is not being required in the present case. And for another, F-72 has the
statement that "In this case the greater penalty (one week) is not so inappropriate for the
conduct of either employee as would justify modification". The Umpire thinks it would be
unrealistic and wrong to apply this statement to the present case— i.e., that discharge
would have been an appropriate penalty for S.
Properly to summarize C-273 would require a review of considerable length. Suffice it to

say that C-273 does grapple with the problem of disparate treatment of equally guilty
employees and does seem to be in conflict with the evenhandedness to which the Umpire
has here referred as a requirement in the proper administration of discipline. It is at once
true, in other words, that C-273 (though in carefully stated terms) rejected the Union’s
contention that the penalties there at issue had to be set aside by virtue of the disparity of
treatment of the grievants vis-a-vis others and that, here, the Umpire is modifying the
discharge of O., not because of the intrinsic inappropriateness of the penalty in relation to
the offense, but because the disparity between O.’s discharge and S.’s 30-day DLO is too
great. The case itself in C-273, however, involved a different situation. It involved five
grievants all of whom had been given a disciplinary layoff—with the disciplinary layoff in all
five instances having been of equal length—for continuing to violate a no-smoking rule
while others, also guilty of continuing to violate the rule, had not been penalized at all. The
Umpire is not saying that the difference is necessarily a decisive one. It does seem to him,
however, that it is by no means certain that the conclusions and comments in C-273 would
have been the same had the case involved disparate treatment as between the five
grievants—at least if that had been true without corresponding differences in the frequency
of resort to smoking, the nature and extent of warnings, the prior disciplinary records, etc.
This uncertainty, obviously, is particularly to be held in mind where, as here, the steeper of
the two disciplinary actions is the ultimate penalty of discharge and the disparate treatment
is not based on differences in the prior disciplinary records. And, beyond these
considerations, there is the fact that the pertinence of F-72 extends beyond what has
already been discussed. It includes the following statement (found in its last paragraph): "A
penalty may be fair in severity and unfair comparatively, or vice versa. Both aspects are
within the compass of the Umpire’s discretion." The statement clearly gives expression to
evenhandedness as a consideration in reviewing the propriety of disciplinary action.
The Union brings the charge that the grievants’ rights under Paragraph (76) of the National
Agreement were violated. The opening sentence of the Paragraph provides that:
"Any employee who has been disciplined by a suspension, layoff or

discharge will be furnished a brief written statement advising him of
his right to representation and describing the misconduct for which
he has been suspended, laid off or discharged and, in the case of a
layoff or discharge, the extent of the discipline."
No question is raised with respect to anything in the sentence other than the under-scored
portion. The Union is saying that the grievants’ disciplinary-action notice fell short of
constituting "a brief written statement... describing the misconduct". The disciplinary-action
notice for each grievant cited and quoted Shop Rule 31 and then, following the printed
phrase "This discipline is assessed because", stated "of your actions on Monday, July 20,
1970 when you directed abusive language towards members of Management."
The Umpire has been exposed to many disciplinary-action notices. In some instances, they
have been brief and of skeleton-like character; in others, they have been rather lengthy
and detailed. This is not surprising, and it confirms the Umpire’s belief that no broad or
rigid rule can be laid down on the question of what constitutes an adequate description of
the misconduct. It is clearly true that a mere citation of the particular Shop Rule is not
sufficient: Management nowadays is obligated to "furnish a brief written statement...
describing the misconduct". But as to whether or not the description suffices to put the
grievant and the Union in the know of what it is that needs to be defended should there be
an appeal from the disciplinary action—and for the grievant and the Union so to be in the
know is the clear purpose of the "describe misconduct" requirement— the Umpire believes
that there are bound to be so many varying circumstances that a case-by-case approach
must be followed.
The Umpire finds that the description of the misconduct in the present case was adequate
and sufficient. The description gave the date and it stated that abusive language had been
directed at members of Management. The phrase "members of Management" normally
connotes a reference to persons other than a Foreman or a General Foreman. Hence,
even assuming that either grievant had profane or abusive words with immediate
Supervision on the day in question (and there is nothing in the record to this effect by way
of either assertion or evidence), the disciplinary-action notice nonetheless pinpointed the
affair here at issue. Given this much, there could not be any doubt as to the misconduct
the grievants were being charged with—unless, of course, the grievants denied all and
thus took the stand that they didn’t know what Management was talking about. The Umpire
agrees with the Company that Management was not obligated to do that which the 76-
violation charge is in effect claiming should have been done -- attach a statement detailing
the string of uncivilized remarks.
The Union has also invoked Paragraph (76b) of the National Agreement.
Reference here is to the fact that there had been one or two past occasions on which O.
had been cautioned about the use of abusive language and that this was alluded to by the
Company at one stage or another in the processing of O.’s case. The Umpire will overlook
the fact that the Union is here making a new, 4th Step assertion. He overrules the Union on
the same grounds as were given in M-70 (see the decision’s paragraphs 14 and 15). It is
entirely true that Management cannot issue warnings or reprimands, fail to enter them in
the individual’s personnel record, and then rely on such warnings or reprimands in
defending a subsequent disciplinary action against him. As shown, however, the fact is that
the Company is not relying on the prior cautioning and, instead, is taking the position that
O.’s misconduct was such as itself to have warranted the discharge penalty. And though,
also as shown, there was some equivocation about it at the hearing, the Umpire has held
the Company to that position -- i.e., in assessing the disparate treatment between O. and
S., he has given no "credit" to the fact that O. had been cautioned and S. had not.
A final comment ought to be entered. The Umpire is by now squarely on record with the
proposition that disciplinary measures for violations of Shop Rules (or for serious
misconduct not covered by a Shop Rule) can be taken against an individual even if true
that the individual is in the role as Committeeman, rather than an ordinary employee, at the
time that the offense is committed. (See Decisions M-53, M-88, M-89 and M-90.) It is to be
understood, however, that the Umpire holds concern for the possibility that the principle
might be stretched too far. When it comes to meetings involving the administration of the
Agreement, as was here involved, it is at once true that things can get rough—abusive
recriminations are hardly unheard of—and that the parties must meet on equal terms. This
much— equality of status—is a vital assumption underlying collective bargaining. And as
Management’s disciplinary powers with respect to employees are not matched by Union
disciplinary powers vis-a-vis Management personnel, the maxim of equality of status would
be seriously jeopardized if it were held that Management is as free to move against
abusive language in meetings involving the administration of the Agreement as it is with
respect to abusive language used "on the floor" or other forms of misconduct by an
employee who is acting as Committeeman at the particular time. The holding in the present
case is not intended to lay down any such broad rule. It is a holding geared to the finding
that the grievants’ misconduct was both uncalled-for and as extreme as anything one might
encounter. The Umpire reiterates his acceptance of the Company’s plea that "no one
should have to take that much".
DECISION
1. Grievances Nos. 394892, 394893, 395261 and 395262 -- referred to in the Opinion, but
not quoted therein—are dismissed.
2. The 30-day DLO against grievant S. is upheld.
3. The discharge of grievant O. is modified to a 90-day DLO. Grievant O. is to be reinstated

with back pay covering the period from the end of the 90-day DLO to the time of his
reinstatement.
April 27, 1971
/S/Rolf Valtin
Umpire
No. M-96
MAY 19, 1971
Interpretative Question Concerning 30-Day Period
Under Paragraph (56) of National Agreement
GRIEVANCE:
GENERAL MOTORS PARTS DIVISION, GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, DALLAS

PLANT, DALLAS, TEXAS—APPEAL CASE M-82
"I charge management with an unjust discharge and ask that I be returned to work, without
loss of seniority days and that I be paid for all lost time." S/S.C.
The grievance is denied for the reasons given in the accompanying Opinion. (Entire
In the Matter of:
United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America -- Local

Union No. 816
and
General Motors Corporation, GMPD, Dallas, Texas -- Appeal Case M-82
OPINION
file://C:\Users\bobology\AppData\Local\Temp\Framework\m-096_13A69F80.htm 3/22/2011
The facts in this case are simple and undisputed:
Grievant C. was hired by the Company on February 17, 1969. He worked as a second-shift
Stock Handler.
It is agreed that March 18, 1969, marked the 30th day of his employment, within the
meaning of Paragraph (56) of the National Agreement. (The Paragraph will be quoted
below.) C. worked on that day. During the course of his shift (though apparently near the
end of it), he was told that he was being terminated as an unsatisfactory employee. C.
completed the shift and was thereupon in fact terminated.
It is conceded that C. was not discharged for misconduct or any sort of Shop Rule
violation; that he was not given a notice as provided in either Paragraph (76) or Paragraph
(76b) of the National Agreement; and that Management has offered no "for cause" defense
of C.’s discharge.
The question raised is whether Management was free so to discharge C. The Company
urges an affirmative answer, saying that C. should be held to have been discharged within
the 30-day probationary period and that no "for cause" defense need be made, and no "76"
notices need be given, with respect to an employee so situated. The Union, though it
insists that even a probationary employee has the right to protest his discharge to the
extent that it is tainted by either personal discrimination or discrimination for Union activity,
concedes that no "for cause" showing need be made, and no "76" notices need be given,
with respect to an employee who is discharged within the 30-day probationary period. Its
position is that C. was an employee who had gone beyond the end of the 30-day
probationary period and that, this being so, C.’s discharge was defective for lack of a "for
cause" showing and for lack of fulfillment of the "76" procedural requirements.
Before going further, two things should be noted by way of issue clarification. One
concerns the status of a grievance filed by an employee who is admittedly still within the
30-day probationary period. As indicated, the Union insists that certain types of actions
adversely affecting a probationary employee can properly be protested through the
grievance procedure. No such issue, however, is here raised and the present decision
should not be read as passing on it. Nor can the Umpire do what the Company is here
urging: to declare the present grievance to be lacking in status if the Company prevails on
it. What the present grievance in effect does, quite properly so, is to test a question of the
proper application of the 30-day period under Paragraph (56).
The second issue-clarifying matter concerns the method for calculating the duration of the
30-day period under Paragraph (56). Though the parties are agreed that it is a calendar-
day, rather than working-day, period which is to be applied under Paragraph (56), cases
could conceivably arise which, due to such complications as shift-starting times or an
employee’s transfer from one shift to another within the 30-day period, would raise
questions as to when the 30-day period should be seen to have begun and to have ended.
Again, however, the Umpire is not here passing on any such questions. For, in the present
case, the parties have stipulated that the end of the second shift of March 18, 1969,
marked the end of 30 days of employment for C. and the beginning of the second shift of
March 19, 1969, would have marked the beginning of the 31st day of employment for C.
Paragraph (56) of the National Agreement reads as follows:

layoff or discharge is not for cause may be taken up as a
grievance."
The Umpire is making a de novo interpretation. Part of the record in the present case is
made up of a series of documents—past GM-UAW decisions and certain letters covering
understandings between the parties—which make reference to the 30-day period under
Paragraph (56). Thus, there is a letter with respect to the proper application of Paragraph
(77) which refers to an employee who has passed the probationary period as an employee
"with thirty (30) days of employment"; there is a letter with respect to the proper application
of Paragraph (76) which refers to such an employee as an employee "with more than thirty
(30) days of employment"; and there is a series of past GM-UAW decisions which have
various references typified by "a temporary employee but with more than 30 days of
employment". The Union places reliance on the first of these documents; the Company
places reliance on the remaining ones. Aside from the fact that there is here something of
a stand-off, the difficulty with the parties’ reliance on these documents is that none of the
documents is concerned with an interpretation of Paragraph (56) itself. It is quite like in M-
81, where the issue was how the phrase "within three working days after the date of
expiration of the leave" at Paragraph (111b) was to be applied and where the Union relied
on a prior GM-UAW decision which had a statement in line with the interpretation urged by
the Union but which was not itself concerned with the proper interpretation of the phrase.
The Umpire rejected the Union’s reliance on the decision as misplaced for this reason --
i.e., that the mere appearance of language favoring one side or the other in a decision,
where the decision is not itself concerned with the particular interpretative problem, cannot
be applied as already having disposed of the problem. So it is here. The task is that of
directly and independently confronting the interpretative question posed by the present
case.
In the opinion of the Umpire, the Company must be upheld. It is true that, taken literally,
the last sentence of Paragraph (56) supports the Union’s position. C. had completed 30
days of employment when he protested his discharge, and the sentence does say that
"any claim by a temporary employee made after 30 days of employment that his layoff or
discharge is not for cause may be taken up as a grievance". Equally true, however— and
equally to be borne in mind if this literal route were to be pursued— is that the decision to
discharge C. had been made, and had been transmitted to him, before the end of the shift.
The mere fact that C. was permitted to complete the shift can hardly be legitimately applied
as having produced the "for cause" right which C. otherwise was lacking.
But the real point, in the opinion of the Umpire, is that to proceed along the literal route
would be to go contrary to what the Paragraph, in clear essence and purpose, provides for:
a 30-day probationary period. Management is given a 30-day period to "look over" a new
employee and to make up its mind as to his or her suitability. The 30th day is obviously part
of the 30-day period. And what the Union, by relying on the fact that C. had been
terminated by the end of the shift, is in effect urging is that not all of the 30 th day can
properly be applied as part of the 30-day period. Stated otherwise, the Union is saying that
the "for cause" right became operative a minute after the completion of the shift marking
the 30th day of employment. This is where the Umpire is in disagreement with the Union.
For the clear fact is that C. was terminated on grounds of unsuitability as assessed by
Management over the course of the 30-day probationary period. In the opinion of the
Umpire, it is this—the fact that the Company is relying on Management’s assessment of
C.’s performance over the 30-day period, together with the fact that the termination came
without elongating the assessing period—which matters. The fact that it was a minute or
two past the completion of the shift marking the 30th day -- or, indeed, that it might have
been an hour or two—does not matter.
The Umpire thus holds that Management is free—i.e., without a "for cause" showing and
without a "76 notice" obligation—to terminate an employee at any time before the
beginning of the shift marking his or her 31st day of employment. This is no mere
technicality—merely switching the "for cause" and "76 notice" requirements from a few
minutes after the end of the shift marking the employee’s 30th day of employment to a few
minutes following the beginning of the shift marking the employee’s 31st day of
employment. For, as the Umpire sees it, there are two sides to the probationary-period
coin. One side is the one already treated: that Management can use all of the 30-day
period for making up its mind. The other side—and this is again a matter of going with what
the Umpire sees as the Paragraph’s design and purpose, rather than going with an
express command—is that once the employee has been permitted to go to work on the
31st day of his or her employment and is thereupon discharged, Management, even if
prepared to fulfill and in fact fulfilling the "for cause" and "76 notice" requirements in the
formal sense, cannot bank on general unsuitability as shown by the employee’s
performance during the probationary period. The Paragraph’s assumption is that an
employee who is permitted to go to work on the 31st day of his or her employment has
hurdled the probationary period and is not dischargeable on grounds of unsatisfactory
performance during the period. Stated otherwise, the Paragraph’s assumption is that the
discharge of an employee who is no longer a probationary employee will be geared to
conduct which occurs subsequent to the end of the probationary period.
At the hearing, the parties alluded to the possibility that an employee might be discharged
for some sort of off-plant offense committed during the period between the end of the shift
marking the 30th day of employment and the beginning of the shift marking the 31st day of
employment. Such a discharge would be based, not on general unsuitability as assessed
over the course of the 30-day probationary period, but on a particular event occurring
beyond the end of the period. It would therefore be subject to the "for cause" and "76
notice" requirements and appealable via a grievance.
DECISION
The grievance is denied for the reasons given in the accompanying Opinion.
May 19, 1971
/S/Rolf Valtin
Umpire
No. M-106
November 26, 1971
Termination of Employee Under Paragraph (111)(b)
of National Agreement
GRIEVANCE:
GM ASSEMBLY DIVISION, GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, FREMONT,

CALIFORNIA — APPEAL CASE M-2490
Grievance 378713
"I protest Manag’t removing me from Rolls as Voluntary quit per 111b N/A. I contend that I
did not vol. Quit. Also charge Manag. with Viol. of Para 72 N/A. Demand I be reinstated
with full seniority and made whole for all monies & benefits lost at once." S/M.S., Jr.
For the reasons and to the extent given in the Opinion, the grievance is upheld. (Entire
decision should be read)
In the Matter of:

Union No. 1364
and

file://C:\Users\bobology\AppData\Local\Temp\Framework\m-106_13A6A9EC.htm 3/22/2011
OPINION
The grievant in this case, L., was a first-shift "Utility Welder-Spot" in the Body Shop
Department. His seniority dates from September 13, 1961. To be determined is whether he
was properly terminated as a voluntary quit under the provisions of Paragraph (111)(b) of
The following are the background highlights:
On September 23, 1968, L. sustained an inplant injury to his right arm.
He was placed on a "(106)" sick leave for about a month thereafter.
On returning from the sick leave, L. was cleared for work by the plant’s Medical Director on
the basis of certain restrictions. L. was thus placed on "(72)" work. He remained on it until
late November, 1968.
For the next approximately nine months, L. worked in his regular "Utility Welder-Spot"
classification. However, on the grounds that the performance of the work of the
classification brought on pain in his arm, he frequently went home (or was sent home
because of his complaints) during the course of his shift.
Also in this approximately 9-month period, there were various medical events relating to
L.’s complaints that he continued to experience pain when performing "Utility Welder-Spot"
work. Among the events were:
L.’s filing of a Workmen’s Compensation claim (ultimately resulting in the denial of his
temporary-disability claim and the ruling that L. had sustained a 4 percent permanent
disability); the filing of a grievance by L., in the spring of 1969, claiming that he was entitled
to be placed on "(72)" work (which grievance was still alive when L. was terminated); and
the referral by the plant’s Medical Director of L.’s case to a number of specialists. On the
whole, their reports substantially supported his finding that there no longer was objective
medical evidence of a malady and that L.’s best course was to keep the arm exercised.
Also to be noted, however, is that the plant’s Medical Director and L.’s personal physician
agreed that L. should be restricted to the extent of not performing "heavy labor". The
phrase was subsequently refined as designating work involving the lifting of an object
weighing 25 pounds or more.
On August 22, 1969, L.’s foreman, in response to continuing complaints by L., instructed L.
not to keep coming to work until cleared for the performance of his regular work by his
personal physician and the plant’s Medical Director. This resulted in a letter from L.’s
personal physician to the plant, asking that L. be placed on sick leave and advising that L.
was being referred to the Stanford Medical Center for studies. L. was thus once more
placed on sick leave. The leave was granted until October 6, 1969.
L. did not come to work on the three working days following the expiration of the leave.
These are the three days which the Company relies on in defending L.’s termination.
L. came to the plant on November 10, 1969. He presented reports from staff members of
the Stanford Medical Center and he was seen by the plant’s Medical Director. The essence
of the reports was that "we are hard pressed to make a specific diagnosis in this
gentleman’s case and would hope that he would be able to return to work although not in a
heavy labor capacity it would appear". The plant’s Medical Director cleared L. for the
performance of his regular work.
Confronted with this determination by the plant’s Medical Director, L. asked to be put on
different work. The plant’s Medical Director declined himself to issue instructions to this
effect but suggested that L. consult with the plant’s Workmen’s Compensation
representative.
L. saw the plant’s Workmen’s Compensation representative both on November 10, 1969
and on November 11, 1969. On one of these two days, the representative talked to L.’s
Superintendent, passing on L.’s request for assignment to light duty. The Superintendent
indicated that no such work was available and that L. would be assigned to his regular
work. L. declined to return to work on this basis.
Then, on November 14, 1969, the plant sent L. a letter advising him that he had been
terminated as a voluntary quit under Paragraph (111)(b). L. received the letter on
November 15, 1969, and promptly went to the plant and talked to the Workmen’s
Compensation representative. L. told the representative that he was still receiving State
disability benefits and says that the representative stated that, so long as this was true, he
(L.) did not need to be concerned about the termination notice. The representative denies
that he made any such statement.
L.’s State disability benefits ran out in late February, 1970. Thereafter, L. unsuccessfully
sought to obtain benefits from two other sources (disability benefits from Social Security
and unemployment benefits from the Department of Human Resources and Development).
Failing in both efforts, he filed the present grievance in October, 1970.
The case was unusually hard-fought, saw a hearing of inordinate length, and produced a
great many contentions and counter-contentions and the citation of a substantial number of
past GM-UAW Umpire Decisions. The Umpire has thoroughly studied all that is before him.
However, rather than provide a review, he will move directly to what he sees as the core
considerations. He notes that he sees no inconsistency between what is is here holding
and what was held in the various past Umpire Decisions.
The following is the relevant portion of Paragraph (111)(b) of the National Agreement:
In thrust and essence, the Company sees the case as quite the same as the case which
led to Decision M-46. Involved, it contends, is a faking and malingering person who
preferred to taste the fruits of receiving various forms of benefits over working for a living
and who carried things one step too far. The Company submits that it spent substantial
sums of money in sending L. to the various specialists and thereby seeking confirmation of
the judgment of the plant’s Medical Director; that all the relevant medical evidence shows
that L. was not disabled and could safely have performed his regular work; and that it
therefore cannot properly be held that L. had a "satisfactory reason" for not reporting for
work on the three days in question. Moreover, the Company urges, L. was not discharged
but, rather, was released via the automatic operation of the terms of the Agreement.
Applicable to him, the Company says, is the long-held view of the office of the Umpire that
"if employees are to enjoy the privileges and benefits granted them by the National
Agreement, they must be willing to fulfill the obligations which that Agreement places on
them". And, finally, the Company urges that the grievance should be dismissed for its
extreme untimeliness. The Company grants that there is no provision in the Agreement
which explicitly bars consideration of the grievance. But the waiting of a whole year before
protesting the termination, the Company submits, is inconsistent with one of the purposes
of the Agreement ("to secure a prompt and fair disposition of grievances") -- and, at the
least, must be seen as reflective of the woefully weak nature of the protest.
The Umpire views the case differently.
There are of course substantial indications that the injury which L. sustained was of less
than great severity and that L. has since then unduly prolonged things. It may indeed be
true, in other words, that the grievant either is of enormous hypochondriacal tendencies or
has deliberately "pushed a good thing". In the opinion of the Umpire, however, the
evidence is not clear cut enough to go this route.
The evidence can also be taken as showing the existence of a lingering and stubborn
condition: there are not only the facts that L. was put on sick leave for about a month
following the injury and thereafter was placed on "(72)" work; there are also the facts that
L. received a Workmen’s Compensation disability award, that L. was repeatedly excused
from work upon being returned to his regular job without resort to discipline for absences
without reasonable cause, that the finding of the plant’s Medical Director with respect to
swelling or enlargement of L.’s arm was not substantially different in the fall of 1969 as
compared to what it was in the fall of 1968, that a "no heavy labor" restriction was imposed
and was still recognized as proper more than a year after the injury, that L. was once more
put on sick leave in the fall of 1969, and that L. received State disability benefits through
early 1970. These pieces of medical evidence, moreover, must be put alongside the facts
that L.’s "(72)" grievance was still pending; that, though the lifting of an object weighing 25
pounds or more is apparently not entailed, the work of the "Utility Welder-Spot"
classification is clearly of a physically onerous variety—it involves the repeated lifting of
objects of considerable size and weight and it requires repeated and substantial exertion in
applying the welding guns; and that, though true that the classification involves some posts
which are physically less demanding than others and that L. had in recent times not been
assigned to the "heavy" posts, the fact is that this was happenstance and that Supervision
had made no commitment to confine him to the "light" posts. Putting it all together—i.e.,
joining these latter considerations with sum total of the given pieces of medical evidence—
the Umpire holds that L. had a "satisfactory reason" for not coming to work on the three
days in question.
In so holding, the Umpire has been mindful of the particular circumstances here involved.
This was not a clear situation of a one-shot sick leave followed by a mysterious absence
upon the expiration of the leave. There was here a year of a continuum of lack of clarity
which had not come to an end with the end of the leave.
It is arguable, indeed—unless it was an instance of the right hand not knowing what the left
hand was doing—that Management itself did not see L. as someone who was terminable
for not coming to work on the three days. As shown, a whole month went by before L.
came back to the plant. When he did so, Management did not take the position that it no
longer had any obligation toward him on the grounds that he had voluntarily quit. To the
contrary, the plant’s Medical Director saw him and cleared him for work. And it was when
L. resisted the finding that he could do the work of his regular classification and once more
asked to be reassigned to light duty -- in effect persisting in his "(72)" demand—that
Management sent him a letter saying that he was terminated as a voluntary quit. Given the
sequence of events, it seems to the Umpire that there are here the earmarks of resorting to
the use of Paragraph (111)(b) as a convenient means of breaking a deadlock and
unloading an employee who had become a thorn in Management’s side. And this much,
though the Company is on sound grounds in urging the observance of the distinction
between a discharge and the automatic operation of the Agreement, clearly represents a
perversion of the purpose and intent of Paragraph (111)(b).
No long dissertation is needed on the Company’s untimeliness argument. Though it is

clear that there is nothing in the Agreement which explicitly bars the consideration of a
grievance filed long after the occurrence of the protested event and though the Union
seems correctly to have argued that the retroactive-pay limitations laid down in Paragraph
(48) of the National Agreement constitute the parties’ answers to the untimeliness
problems experienced in the early collective-bargaining days, the Umpire is not making the
broad ruling that no claim can ever be so untimely as to be dismissable under the "prompt
and fair" objective of Paragraph (5) of the National Agreement. It does seem to him,
however, that the circumstances of the present case are not sufficiently compelling to
warrant the non-consideration and non-determination of the grievance.
In accordance with the understanding reached at the hearing, the Umpire does not here go
beyond the holding that L.’s termination was improper. The implementation of the holding
is in the first instance left to the parties, with either party having the right to bring the case
back to the Umpire for final determination should a disagreement with respect to the
implementation develop.
DECISION
For the reasons and to the extent given in the Opinion, the grievance is upheld.
November 26, 1971
/S/Rolf Valtin
Umpire
No. M-107
December 7, 1971
Under Paragraph (111) (b) of National Agreement
GRIEVANCE:
DELCO MORAINE DIVISION, GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, DAYTON, OHIO—

APPEAL -- CASE M-1970
Grievance 502334
"Charge Mgt. of Delco Moraine with terminating my seniority. Demand I be reinstated with
full seniority rights and I be paid all monies and benefits lost." S/R.A.F.
In the Matter of:

Union No. 696
and
General Motors Corporation, Delco Moraine Division, Dayton, Ohio -- Appeal Case M-1970

file://C:\Users\bobology\AppData\Local\Temp\Framework\m-107_13A6B486.htm 3/22/2011
OPINION
The grievant in this case is F. His seniority dates from August 26, 1963. To be determined
is whether he was properly terminated as a voluntary quit under the provisions of
Paragraph (111)(b) of the National Agreement:
As was true of the "(111)(b)" case covered by the recently-issued Decision M-106, there is
here a great deal of material by way of both factual contentions and contractual arguments
which, if reviewed and treated, would produce a very long Opinion. Once more, rather than
go to such length, the Umpire will confine himself to what he sees as the core
considerations.
The following are the central facts as the Umpire finds them:
By reason of a hernia problem, which was surgically corrected, F. was on sick leave from
either late March or early April, 1970 until June 16, 1970. He was cleared through the
plant’s Medical Department, and he thereupon returned to work, on the latter date.
On this first day of work, he was assigned to an inspection job on the Sander Line. As a
matter of brevity and convenience, the job will here be referred to as the Sander job. It
involves visual inspection duties, no heavy lifting, and the choice of working in a sitting or
standing position. The operation goes down for 5 or 10 minutes every hour. Except for this,
it is a stationary job.
Either at the end of the shift on June 16 or at the beginning of the shift on June 17, F.
complained to his foreman about pain and swellings. On June 17, though it is not clear
whether it was done in response to his complaints, F. was assigned to a packing job
known as the Rod Guide job. It involves loading and unloading duties and the occasional
use of a crow bar. It is not, however, a job requiring substantial physical exertion; and it
offers more of a chance to "move around" than does the Sander job.
On June 18, F. was reassigned to the Sander job. He objected to the assignment; asked
for, and was given, a medical pass to visit the Medical Department; and told the Division
Medical Director that he did not think that he should be assigned to the Sander job. The
Medical Director looked at the job and concluded that its duties were such as to make F.’s
assignment to it consistent with the medical coding which F. had been given in connection
with his clearance on June 16: light labor, no climbing, moderate lifting, and moderate
pushing or pulling. F. nonetheless declined to perform the Sander job and went home.
On June 19, F. went to his personal physician, Dr. H., and obtained from him the following
statement:
"Mr. R. _____ F. _____ who has been under my care since his
recent surgery can not do any strenuous work or heavy lifting, but
should not be on a job that requires standing for any length of time.
He needs light work that he can move around at the same time."
This statement did not change Management’s mind with respect to the suitability for F. of
the Sander job.
Similarly, F. did not relent and did not go to work on the Sander or any other job. On June
22, he had a conversation with Employment Supervisor B., reiterating his request not to be
assigned to the Sander job. In response, the Employment Supervisor met with F.’s
foreman and the Medical Director and reviewed with them the job’s duties in relation to F.’s
medical coding and the June 19 statement of his physician. The conclusion of these three
men was that the job was appropriate for F. and that he should not be offered another job.
F. was so advised on June 25.
F. thereupon filed a grievance alleging a violation of his rights under the local seniority
agreement to be placed on a light-duty job. The grievance became Appeal Case M-1850. It
was still alive when F. was terminated under Paragraph (111)(b).
On July 6, either by mail or by F.’s having brought it to the plant (there is a mysterious
conflict in the evidence on this score), Management received a supplementary form
covering claims for sickness and accident benefits. It had been filled out by F.’s physician,
Dr. H. Among the pieces of information provided on it was that there had still been some
post-operative healing but that F. was sufficiently recovered to return to work. Dr. H. had
filled in the date of July 6, 1970, as the date on which he filled out the form. He had left
blank the space reserved for giving "the date the patient was able to return to work"—the
so-called "5(a)" space on the supplementary form.
On the basis of the supplementary claim, Management authorized the payment of sickness
and accident benefits and treated F. as on sick leave in the period June 18 through July 6.
This, the July 6 sick-leave terminal point, is what Management’s case is based on.
F. did not show up for work on July 7, 8 and 9 -- or, for that matter, made no contact with
the plant either on those days or on a number of days thereafter. Based on his absence on
the three days, Management decided that F. should be terminated under Paragraph (111)
(b). It sent him a letter, notifying him of his termination, on July 15.
On July 20, F. contacted the plant’s Employment Supervisor and inquired about the
availability of a suitable job. Told that he had been terminated, he replied, in effect, that this
was a wrongful action as he was still under a doctor’s care.
In response to this assertion by F., the plant’s Supervisor of Insurance telephoned Dr. H.’s
office and spoke to a secretary familiar with insurance claims. She informed him that F.
had last been seen by Dr. H. on July 6 and that Dr. H., having found the post-operative
healing process to be complete, had intended F. to return to work on July 7. Management,
accordingly, adhered to its position that F. had properly been terminated.
By this finding of the facts, the Umpire is rejecting F.’s assertions in several respects.
Among the assertions are: 1) that F. came to the plant on July 7, 8 and 10 and was turned
away on each occasion (by Management’s insistence that no job other than the Sander job
was available to him), and 2) that Dr. H. intentionally left the "5(a)" space blank to show
that he was not releasing F. to go back to work on July 7 (except perhaps on a tightly
restricted basis). The evidence convinces the Umpire that the Company’s version on these
scores is correct.
Nevertheless, though F.’s pretenses and misstatements are regrettable, the Umpire does
not believe that F.’s termination can properly be upheld. The Company is obviously right in
saying that it does not have to tolerate a situation where an employee refuses to come to
work and thus seeks to negotiate the job he is to be assigned to. Furthermore, from all that
the Umpire could gather, it seems quite clear that the Sander job was an appropriate one
for F.’s particular problem and in line with the medical coding he had been given. F. seems
simply to have preferred the Rod Guide job. However, in the opinion of the Umpire, what
Management here did was to decline to test the issue and, contrary to the intent and
purpose of Paragraph (111)(b), to seize on that Paragraph to get rid of the grievant.
The Umpire assumes it to be correct that an employee for whom Management authorizes
the payment of sick and accident benefits for a particular period is properly seen as an
employee who was on sick leave for that period. But here to honor this assumption would
be to go with the technically correct while disregarding the essential nature of the case. F.
had not been granted and placed on sick leave in the usual way or in any real sense. He
had come off sick leave, been cleared for work, and then bucked his assignment. He was
in limbo starting with June 18, and this was still his status on July 6 and thereafter but for
Management’s receipt of the supplementary form. And what Management did was not only
to apply the form to retroactively put F. on sick leave but, so it seems to the Umpire, to
pounce on the thus-established leave as a means for starting the clock running under
Paragraph (111)(b). Under all the facts and circumstances here involved, the Umpire
believes, the proper view of the case is that Management is asking to be sustained on a
convenient-vehicle-for-unloading application of Paragraph (111)(b). Such an application,
as pointed out in Decision M-106, clearly represents a perversion of the purpose and intent
of Paragraph (111)(b). Or, to return to the above technically-correct point, to sustain such
an application would be to push the technically correct to unsound extremes.
In similarity to what he did in Decision M-106, the Umpire does not here go beyond the
holding that F.’s termination was improper. With respect to back pay, there are the
problems that F. was still objecting to the Sander assignment on July 20; that he
presumably would have continued to object for some time and perhaps all the way to the
point of resolution of Appeal Case M-1850 (which point can scarcely here be identified);
and that he twice more underwent surgery in 1971. The Umpire urges the parties to come
to agreement on a realistic estimate as to the amount of back pay due the grievant. In the
event such an agreement is not reached, either party is free to return the case to the
Umpire for final determination.
DECISION
December 7, 1971
S/Rolf Valtin
Umpire
No. M-108
December 30, 1971
Discharge:
Evidence;
Extent of Penalty
GRIEVANCE:
UNITED DELCO DIVISION, GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, ATLANTA WARE-

HOUSE,
ATLANTA, GEORGIA—APPEAL CASE M-31
Grievance 324385
"I protest unjust disciplinary discharge effective 9-10-70, 5:00 PM. I had a reasonable
excuse from a doctor and was on sick leave. Request all pay and benefits for all loss of
time due to discharge and for disciplinary discharge to be removed from my record."
S/R.E.W. (Grievant) L.K. (Committeeman)
In the Matter of:

Union No. 874
file://C:\Users\bobology\AppData\Local\Temp\Framework\m-108_13A6BE85.htm 3/22/2011
and
General Motors Corporation, United Delco Division Atlanta Warehouse, Atlanta, Georgia --
Appeal Case M-31
OPINION
Grievant W. was one of the Warehouse’s Material Handlers and held seniority dating back
to early 1962. He was discharged, on September 10, 1970, by combined application of
Shop Rule 6 and his prior disciplinary record. Shop Rule 6 covers "Absence without
reasonable cause".
The case is one of those involving an employee’s absence and rather voluminous medical
material going to the question of whether the employee should have been at work. Rather
than provide a detailed review, the Umpire will seek to provide the factual framework in a
way which reflects the essence of the case.
The period of absence here at issue was from August 21 to September 10, 1970. It came
on the heels of a very poor attendance record. For 1970, W.’s prior disciplinary record has
five entries. Though one was for insubordination, another was for tardiness and the other
three were for absences without reasonable cause. The last of the disciplinary actions for
absence without reasonable cause came in mid-May, 1970; consisted of a 4-week DLO,
assessed in line with progressively-severe penalties of the corrective-discipline approach;
and was expressly coupled with the word that discharge would be the next step.
On August 21, 1970, W. requested, and was granted, permission to leave work and visit
his physician, Dr. M. W. came back to the plant a few hours later and presented a note
from Dr. M. It bears the date of August 21, 1970 and it reads as follows:
"Mr. W_____ has a lumbar disc disease and I recommend that he

continue following Dr. B_____’ treatment and advice regarding
surgery. In my opinion he is unable to work & am referring him to Dr.
B_____’ care."
On the assumption that W. would be seeing Dr. B. forthwith, and with the understanding
that it would be filled out and returned to the plant as expeditiously as possible,
Management gave W. an S & A form. W. testified that he called Dr. B.’s office on the same
day (August 21) and that he was told by a secretary that Dr. B. was on vacation and that
he, W., could not be seen until September 14. W. neither passed this on to the Warehouse
nor otherwise let Management know that he expected to be absent from work through
September 14.
Having received no word from W., Management wrote to him on August 28, 1970. The
substance of the letter is as follows:
"Attached is a S & A form that should be filled out and sent in

immediately as Dr. M_____ does not indicate your return date,
merely that you are being referred to Dr. B_____ for treatment. It will
be necessary that you have Dr. B_____ substantiate your absence
since August 21, 1970.
Please have the enclosed S & A form completed as quickly as

possible and return to my attention."
On September 4, 1970, still not having heard from W., Management sent him a so-called
64-c letter. (The counterpart to Paragraph (64)© of the National Agreement is Section IV-
(12)-© of the Warehouse Agreement. The Section expressly authorizes that which
Management put W. on notice of in the last paragraph of the letter.) The letter reads as
follows:
"This is to advise that you have been absent for three (3) working
days without properly notifying Management and that your seniority
has been broken.
Your seniority can be reinstated if you report for work, or properly

notify Management of your absence no later than September 10,
1970.
You should be aware that reinstatement of your seniority will not be

construed as limiting application of the shop rule regarding absence
without reasonable cause."
Also on September 4, 1970: a copy of this letter was given to the Chairman of the
Grievance Committee; the latter called W.’s home, but spoke only to W.’s brother; and W.
subsequently called the plant. In the telephone conversation: W. was told that the letter
was sent to him because the Warehouse had received no word from him since August 21
and because the note of that date from Dr. M. was not considered a satisfactory basis for
W.’s continuing absence; W. expressed the opinion that the contrary was true; W. also
stated that he had visited both Dr. M. and Dr. B. earlier that day; and W. was told that he
was to report for work on Tuesday, September 8 (Monday, September 7, having been
Labor Day). This instruction—to report for work on September 8 -- not only was repeated
on the phone but also was confirmed in a telegram sent to W. on September 4.
W. did not come to work either on September 8 or on September 9. He came to the

Warehouse on September 10 -- about an hour after the start of the shift, not dressed in
working clothes, and with the stated purpose of preserving his seniority. There followed an
interview in which Management’s and W.’s respective positions concerning W.’s absence
since August 21 were reviewed. Upon conclusion of the interview, W. was first put on
notice of possible disciplinary action and then sent to a Company doctor for an
examination. The latter’s opinion was that W. was physically able to perform normal
Warehouse duties.
W. was discharged following these events of September 10. However, either on

September 9 or early on September 10, Management had received a report from Dr. B.
The report was submitted in response to Management’s request of a few days earlier. It is
dated September 9 and its substance is as follows:
"... I examined Mr. W_____ on 27 July 1970 at the request of Dr.

M_____ of this city. The patient was complaining on the date of my
examination of a continuing low back and left leg discomfort which
had bothered him since 21 November 1968, when while at work he
lifted a carton of carburetors weighing approximately seventy five
pounds. To make a rather complicated subsequent history short, he
has been seen by five physicians before I saw him including two
general surgeons, two orthopedists and his family physician. During
these nearly two years he has never been hospitalized, never had
myelography nor any form of conservative therapy other than
ambulatory. His physical findings are minimal and he is overweight.
All of his x-rays of his neck and low back have been normal and
essentially identical throughout the entire series. Upon concluding
my examination I recommended that the patient reduce his weight
rapidly by some thirty pounds and that he be hospitalized for
myelography to settle once and for all the perennial question of
whether or not he was truly physically disabled and in need of
further treatment. Nothing more has come of this. In the meantime I
can see no reason why the patient should not carry out light to
moderately heavy work without prejudice to his health or comfort. I
believe that the fact that the patient is actively campaigning for the
State Legislature as a Representative would indicate that he is not
seriously disabled. Upon Dr. M_____’s request, he has scheduled
another appointment in this office on 14 September 1970 and I will
be able to advise further at this time whether he has carried out my
instructions in regard to weight reduction. In any event, authorization
for myelography should be given by the responsible carrier that I
finish the work at hand."
The Union submits two alternative contentions. The first is that W. should have been given
the status of an employee on sick leave and that Management’s failure to do so constituted
a violation of W.’s rights under Section XI-(4) of the Warehouse Agreement (which Section
is the counterpart to Paragraph (106) of the National Agreement). The Union relies
essentially on Dr. M.’s note of August 21; the fact that Management, upon receiving the
note from W., neither challenged the authenticity or content of the note nor told W. that the
note would not be treated as satisfactory evidence of a back ailment; and the fact that the
opening sentence of Section XI-(4) states that: "Any employee who is known to be ill,
supported by satisfactory evidence, will be granted sick leave automatically for the period
of continuing disability". The Union submits that W. clearly was such an employee and that
this is not alterable by the fact that he did not immediately present a filled-out S & A form.
W. did seek to be seen by Dr. B. without delay and he obviously cannot be held
blameworthy for the fact that Dr. B. was on vacation and that his secretary gave W.
September 14 as the first available date for an appointment. Hence, W. must properly be
viewed as having been on sick leave from August 21 through September 14 -- or even
beyond that, depending on what Dr. B.’s findings would have been on September 14. And,
manifestly, on a holding that W. was right-fully on sick leave, there is no alternative but to
reinstate him.
The Union’s second contention presupposes that the first contention will not be upheld.
Even assuming that W. was not in the status of an employee on sick leave, the Union
submits, W.’s absence was not without reasonable cause and W. therefore did not violate
Shop Rule 6. Once more, though here in the sense that W. was someone who could at
least rightfully consider himself to be excused from work, the Union relies substantially on
Dr. M.’s note of August 21, W.’s non-delayed getting in touch with Dr. B., and Dr. B.’s
inability to see W. before September 14. Additionally, the Union argues that neither Dr. B.’s
report of September 9 nor the examination by the Company doctor on September 10
provides aid and comfort to the Company’s case. As to the examination by the Company
doctor, the fact is that he knew little about W., had last seen him some five months before,
and could not know—indeed, did not state—whether W. was physically able to perform the
Warehouse work in the August 21 -- September 10 period. And as to Dr. B.’s report of
September 9, it similarly fails to establish that W. was physically able to perform the
Warehouse work in the period here in question—Dr. B. had not seen W. since July 27,
1970, the report states that a myelography would have to be done to determine whether
W. was in need of treatment, and the report also notes that Dr. B. was to see W. on
September 14. By all of these considerations, the Union contends, W.’s absence was not
one without reasonable cause.
In one of the lower steps of the grievance procedure, the Union also made an extent-of-
penalty argument—contending, in other words, that the discharge penalty was in any event
too severe. At the arbitration level, the Union neither briefed this contention nor otherwise
reiterated it. Whether or not the contention is to be taken as abandoned, the Umpire does
not believe that it can properly be sustained. W.’s absences without reasonable cause had
clearly reached last-straw proportions and he had specifically been so told only four
months before. If he was here once more irresponsibly absent, the discharge penalty is not
reasonably subject to modification.
The Umpire has concluded that this—that W. was once more irresponsibly absent—is the
finding which must be made.
On its face, the evidence which the Union principally relies on is of clear strength. W. was
excused from work to visit a physician; he visited a physician; he obtained a statement
from the physician and duly delivered it to the plant; the statement refers to W. as having a
lumbar disc disease, gives the opinion that "he is unable to work", and notes that W. was
being referred to the care of a specialist; there is no reason to doubt that W. got in touch
with the specialist’s office without delay; and there is also no reason to doubt that the
specialist could not see W. until some three weeks later. Ordinarily, these are facts and
circumstances which would clearly suffice either to require the granting of sick leave or to
render the employee immune from discipline on grounds of absence without reasonable
cause. Management’s desire to be in quick receipt of a filled-out S & A form obviously
cannot serve to convert an absence for good and sufficient reasons to an absence without
reasonable cause.
It is, however, quite clear that this is not an ordinary case and that the evidence on which
the Union is relying cannot be accepted at face value.
First, there is the statement of August 21 by Dr. M. It is certainly the key element in the
Union’s evidence. In February, 1971, Dr. M. gave a deposition as part of the proceeding
involving W.’s claim before the State Board of Workmen’s Compensation. In the opinion of
the Umpire, the deposition adds up to a repudiation of the August 21 statement. Dr. M.
does some weaving and he does not explicitly retract the content of the August 21
statement. But he leaves no doubt that he never examined W. (having instead previously
referred W. to Dr. B.), that he allowed himself to be pressured by W. to give him the kind of
statement which he (W.) wanted, and that he (Dr. M.) was without proper basis either for
affirmatively stating that W. had a lumbar disc disease or for giving it as his opinion that W.
was unable to work.
The following are excerpts from the deposition. They are reflective of its thrust and
essence.
"... the man was frantic, and I—he talks forever, and I thought— he
said he was going to be fired if he didn’t get some papers filled out,
so I filled this out... it was just something that I shouldn’t have been
involved in and got into... the first time the man came up here, I told
him that his problem was perfectly insoluble by me, and I will not
see him again. You couldn’t run him out of the office. He keeps
coming back. I don’t make a practice of running people out, but I just
felt like this man was wasting everybody’s time. I finally signed his
papers to get him out of here.
"... my findings were nil, Dr. B_____ did the findings... I just took no
responsibility for his treatment, diagnosis... B_____ threw him out of
his office. I don’t mean threw him out, he just said go to the hospital
or go to work.
"... He wanted papers signed for disability... This is just a case that I
shouldn’t have ever put my name on anything...
"... I have absolutely no medical opinion as to what is wrong with

him ... the fact that I started out, the man has a lumbar disc disease,
that could be in total error...
"... I felt sorry for him, he was limping around. I said, you look like
you can’t work so I will sign them this time, this is the last time, go
back to see Dr. B_____"
If it were simply a matter of the August 21 statement versus the deposition, one might have
difficulty deciding which one of the two is to be accepted as the correct version. But the
evidence as a whole gives every indication that the comments made by Dr. M. in the
deposition square with the facts. On August 21, W. was not beset by any new injury or
illness. His was a lingering complaint of long standing; and, aside from other doctors, he
had already been seen by Dr. M. and had already been referred by him to Dr. B. What
purpose, then—other than obtaining the sort of statement which he in fact obtained—would
there have been in going back to Dr. M.? The surrounding circumstances, in other words,
fit the picture which is given in the deposition. And what this means, to repeat the basic
point which is being made, is that the document which constitutes the very prop of W.’s
case stands as repudiated.
Second, aside from Dr. M.’s own repudiation of the August 21 statement, there is the
contradiction of that statement found in Dr. B.’s report of September 9. The Umpire
disagrees with the Union’s position regarding the probative value of this report. Dr. B. was
the specialist; he had thoroughly examined W., less than a month before August 21; and,
going back to the point already made, W.’s complaint was of long standing and there is
simply no evidence which would indicate that W.’s condition was any different in the period
here at issue than it was previously. To the Umpire, it is unquestionable that it is Dr. B.’s
report, not Dr. M.’s statement, which furnishes the reliable guide to the question of whether
or not W. was disabled in the period here at issue.
Third, there is W.’s own conduct. For one thing, he had been told that having a
myelography done was the one way to determine whether he was truly disabled and in
need of treatment, and he did not then—indeed, he never did—have the myelography
done. This is not the conduct of a person who truly believes himself to be disabled and
who clings to this belief despite the findings to the contrary of several doctors. And for
another thing, there is damaging evidence with respect to W.’s activities in the absence
period itself. As to some days, W. claims to have rested at home and taken medicine. As to
other days, however, he admits to: 1) having gone fishing -- indeed, off a boat; 2) having
gone to political meetings—W. was a candidate for the State Legislature at the time, and
September 9 was the date of primary elections. These are scarcely activities which lend
credence to the claim that W. was suffering from a disability which prevented him from
performing normal Warehouse duties.
By proper scrutiny and realistic assessment of all the evidence, then, the Umpire believes
that he must make the already-stated finding that W. was irresponsibly absent. This implies
that W. knowingly resorted to a sham. In all likelihood, he was furthering his political
ambitions. Even assuming, however, that W. saw himself as thoroughly "covered" by Dr.
M.’s note of August 21 and in that sense thought that he was free not to come to work, the
fact is that, on September 4, he was explicitly told over the phone that Management was
not accepting Dr. M.’s note as a satisfactory basis for his continuing absence and he was
given explicit instructions, which were confirmed by telegram, to report for work on
September 8. Yet, he did not come to work either on September 8 or on September 9.
Though the contractual framework is of course quite different from that of the cases
covered by the recently-issued Decisions M-106 and M-107, the present case stands in
stark contrast to those two cases. W. was openly given a warning, and he defied it.
DECISION
December 30, 1971
/S/Rolf Valtin
Umpire
No. M-111
FEBRUARY 3, 1972
Back-Pay Questions
Involving Reinstated Employee
Who Had Been Terminated Under Paragraph (111) (b)
of National Agreement
GRIEVANCE:
GENERAL MOTORS PARTS DIVISION, GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, ST.

LOUIS PARTS DISTRIBUTION CENTER, ST. LOUIS, MISSOURI—APPEAL CASE M-40
Grievance 375357
"Charge Management with unjust release (Voluntary quit). Demand my seniority be

restored and I be paid all monies due me". S/D.K.
UMPIRE’S DECISION
The dispositions of the back-pay questions here raised are given in the Opinion. The
Company is directed to reimburse the grievant accordingly. (Entire decision should be
read)
In the Matter of:

Union No. 25
and
file://C:\Users\bobology\AppData\Local\Temp\Framework\m-111_13A6CB8F.htm 3/22/2011
General Motors Corporation, GMPD St. Louis Parts Distribution Center, St. Louis, Missouri
-- Appeal Case M-40
OPINION
Grievant K. is one of the Warehouse’s Material Handlers. His seniority dates from
November 3, 1964.
In early January, 1968, K. sustained a back injury when pushed by others making a rush
for the time clock. For some time thereafter, he was on sick leave and received S & A
benefits. In early March, 1968, he produced a doctor’s statement recommending that he be
returned to work "in a light status with no lifting or bending". What happened thereafter is
not entirely clear, but it appears that K. either resisted undergoing an examination by the
Company’s doctor or otherwise declined to report for work and that Management saw him
as unjustifiably having failed to come back to work following the end of his sick leave. In
any event, as of March 14, 1968, K. was terminated under Paragraph (111)(b) of the
National Agreement.
K.’s protest against the termination, filed on March 18, 1968, is embodied in the above-
quoted grievance. In the ensuing nearly two-year period, there were a series of events
which will be dealt with below. Then, on February 2, 1970, Management reinstated K. by
its own action— i.e., without achieving a full settlement of the grievance. K.’s reinstatement
was accompanied by the restoration of his seniority. Hence, two of the grievance’s three
demands have been met. What remains to be determined is the extent, if any, to which K.
is owed back wages. He has received none.
The Company’s defense of the non-payment of any back wages rests on viewing the
nearly two-year period as being composed of three parts. The following are the Company’s
principal arguments:
In connection with the injury which K. had sustained in early January, 1968, K. filed a claim
under the Workmen’s Compensation laws of Missouri. Among other things, K. claimed to
have suffered a temporary total disability—and, obviously, an employee with such a
disablement cannot work and hence is not entitled to wages for the period of the
disablement. K.’s claim was settled short of litigation through a compromise, lump-sum
settlement. It was arrived at on October 7, 1968, and K. received $2,686.85. In accepting
this sum of money, he acknowledged that it satisfied all of his claims and that he would
receive no further compensation. The Company submits that it was thus freed of a wage
obligation toward K. in the period from March 14, 1968 ( the date of K.’s termination)
through October 7, 1968 (the date on which the compromise, lump-sum settlement was
reached).
The second period which is yielded by the Company’s view of the retroactive period as a
whole runs from October 8, 1968 to November 21, 1968. In this period, the Company
contends, K. must be seen either to have been still disabled (the doctor’s "no lifting or
bending" statement had not been rescinded) or to have been entitled to "(72)" work.
However, any claim as to "(72)" work must be ignored as it was not until March, 1970 --
after the grievant had been reinstated -- that the Union first made a charge relating to
Paragraph (72) of the National Agreement. Either way—continued disablement by K. or
appreciation of the belated nature of the "(72)" charge—the Company submits that K. is
not owed wages for the period October 8 - November 21, 1968.
The third period commences on November 21, 1968, and runs until the time K.’s
reinstatement. November 21, 1968, is the date on which K.’s grievance was heard at the
Third Step. In the course of the meeting, the Union asked that the grievance be referred
back to the Second Step in order to repair its (the Union’s) part of the prior record.
Management agreed to the request in return for the Union’s waiver of continuing liability
attendant on the delay. The parties’ agreement on this score is recorded in the minutes as
follows:
"This grievance is referred to the second step of the grievance

procedure at the request of the Union. Liability is waived until it is
heard at the third step of the grievance procedure."
Acknowledging that the grievance was re-appealed (as distinguished from when it was
reheard) to the Third Step on March 17, 1969, and acknowledging that the Union’s
representative sent Management a letter shortly after the issuance of the minutes in which
he allegedly made it clear that the re-appeal date was meant to be applied as the end of
the liability waiver, the Company asserts that the letter is lacking in sufficient specificity to
overcome the express "heard" reference found in the minutes. The Company submits, in
other words, that the "heard" reference must be respected as reflecting the agreement
which the parties in fact made. And by this test—i.e., by the test of when the grievance was
again heard at the Third Step—there is no onset of a wage liability toward K. prior to his
reinstatement. For it was not until after his reinstatement—namely, on March 9, 1970 --
that the grievance was again heard at the Third Step.
Contrarily, the Union contends that K. is owed back wages for the entire period from his
termination to his reinstatement except for the approximately four months—November 21,
1968 to March 17, 1969 -- for which liability was admittedly waived. By way of overall
approach, the Union urges (in line with Decision E-43) that, since it is an admitted fact that
K. was wrongfully terminated, the Company carries the burden of justifying the non-
payment of back wages and therefore should not be permitted to prevail on the basis of
infirm and casual proof. And more particularly—i.e., addressing itself to the three periods
which the Company is advancing—the Union makes essentially the following responses:
The Company errs in what it seeks to make of the Workmen’s Compensation settlement.
For one thing, the settlement represented a compromise covering all of K.’s claims—not
merely his claim of temporary total disability. It is not a settlement which can correctly be
applied against any particular period. For another, even if part of the settlement were to be
seen as covering K.’s temporary-total-disability claim, the fact is that Missouri’s Workmen’s
Compensation law provides for the payment of an amount equivalent to only two-thirds of a
person’s wages for a period of lost time. For still another, Missouri’s Workmen’s
Compensation law does not preclude the side-by-side collection of such other benefits to
which a person may be entitled by virtue of other instruments—e.g., a collective-bargaining
agreement. And finally, it is clear that K.’s acknowledgment that the settlement satisfied all
of his claims and that he would receive no further compensation related solely to his rights
under the Workmen’s Compensation law.
As to the period from October 8 to November 21, 1968, there is simply no proof as to
whether or not K. could have performed normal Warehouse duties. The doctor’s statement
on which the Company is relying was about seven months’ old and might well have been
outdated when it came to the October-November period. The Company is proceeding on
speculative grounds—and this is not enough where the Company must meet the sort of
burden of proof which it here must meet.
As to the period from November 21, 1968, to February 2, 1970, as already noted, the
Union concedes that K. is not owed back wages up to March 17, 1969. The Union insists,
however, that its waiver must be taken to have ended on that date. It relies in part on the
above-mentioned letter of its representative and in part on the argument that the Union
cannot reasonably be supposed to have agreed to the waiver of liability all the way to the
actually "heard" point.
The letter reads as follows:
"I want to take this opportunity to notify you the Union is taking
exception to your statement in the Third Step Minutes on Appeal
Case M-40. The Third Step meeting was held November 21, 1968. I
received the minutes from you December 23, 1968. I received no
correspondence from you requesting extension on these minutes,
and I would like to point out that this is very unusual and completely
contrary to the provisions of the National Agreement."
The Union is saying that the first sentence was directed to the "heard" reference in the
minutes and that, with the minutes thus having been protested, the Company cannot
validly contend that there was an agreement to waive liability up to the "heard" point. And
as to the unlikelihood of such an agreement having been made, the Union argues that,
since the hearing of any particular grievance at any particular Third Step meeting is a
matter of bilateral determination, Management could have prolonged the running time of
the waiver by simply declining to agree to put K.’s case on the agenda for one or another
upcoming Third Step meeting—that the end of the waiver period, in other words, would
have been at Management’s mercy. Accordingly, the Union takes the position that the
waiver of liability which it admittedly agreed to (and which admittedly began on November
21, 1968) ended on March 17, 1969 -- the date on which the grievance was re-appealed to
the Third Step.
The Umpire wants to make it clear at once that it will be his purpose to decide the case as
narrowly and with a little precedent value as possible. The case is unusual; neither party
has advanced a solid, internally-consistent position; and there are clear weaknesses in
both parties’ positions. One may gather, in fact, that the parties got hung up and erected
arguments in seriatim and crescendo fashion from resentment one against the other—
Management because it saw the grievant as seeking to make a good thing out of an
essentially harmless shuffle at the time clock, the Union because it saw Management as
overstepping in terminating K. What is needed now is a decision to dispose of the case—a
decision which brings a reasonable result in the light of all the peculiar facts and
circumstances here involved, rather than one which holds concern for principles on general
applicability.
As to the first period, the Umpire has not striven to become an expert in the Missouri
Workmen’s Compensation law. He is proceeding on the basis of what he can glean from,
and what he finds the most persuasive in, the parties’ respective post-hearing memoranda.
The Umpire rejects the Company’s contention that the settlement of K.’s Workmen’s
Compensation claim should be treated as freeing the Company from all back-wages
obligations from the date of K.’s termination to October 7, 1968. There appears to be no
proper basis for equating the fact—indeed, the happenstance—that the settlement was
consummated on the particular date with a point up to which no back-wages liability was
accruing to the Company; K.’s claim incorporated claims for medical costs and permanent
partial disability as well as for temporary total disability—and it would appear that there
was greater emphasis on the permanent-partial-disability claim than there was on the
temporary-total-disability claim; the settlement was a compromise settlement of overall
dimensions, without designation as to which parts of K.’s multi-element claim were being
treated as with or without merit; and it is simply a fact that K.’s "no further claims"
acknowledgment went to his rights under the Workmen’s Compensation law alone. Also,
however, the Umpire rejects the Union’s contention that no part of the settlement is
properly to be applied against the Company’s back-wages obligation toward K. Satisfaction
of K.’s temporary-total-disability claim was incorporated in the settlement, and the Umpire
sees no proper way of disagreeing with the Company’s point that a person who receives
compensation for a period of temporary total disability cannot be seen as a person who is
in a position to work and therefore entitled to wages. The Umpire rules that the settlement
is to be treated as removing ten weeks’ wages from the Company’s back-wages obligation.
By this, the Umpire means a deduction of the equivalent of ten weeks of full, not two-thirds,
wages. Also, the deduction is to be treated as apart from, not to be offset against, such
deductions for unemployment compensation and "outside" wages as are called for by
Paragraph (50) of the National Agreement.
As to the second period—October 8 - November 21, 1968 -- the Umpire is in essential

agreement with the Union. Whatever the validity may have been of the doctor’s statement
at the time of its issuance—and it is quite obvious that the Company was in disagreement
with it even at that time— the statement cannot properly be applied as still "holding" some
seven months later. Nor can it be assumed that K. would at that stage have been entitled
to "(72)" work rather than to his regular work. To the Umpire, the Company has seized on
convenient debating points and has not presented the sort of proof, just as the Union
contends, which would be required to sustain the Company. As to the second period,
accordingly, the Umpire sustains the Union’s back-wages claim in full.
To turn, then, to the third period. The Umpire’s function here is to resolve the re-appeal-
vs.-reheard controversy. Fundamentally, the Umpire believes that the Company has the
better argument. The idea behind a waiver agreement in a situation where the Union
requests that a grievance be referred back to a lower step in order to repair its prior record
is that the Company is not to be financially encumbered by virtue of the back-referral. (And
K. should understand, it may be noted in passing, that he obtained value in return for the
waiver—namely, that the repair of the prior record may have been a vital link in
Management’s decision to reinstate him.) Clearly, if the Company is not to be financially
encumbered through the delay attendant on the back-referral, the waiver must run to the
point where the grievance has returned to the stage where it was when the back-referral
request was made and granted. In the present instance, this means the Third Step meeting
itself. The re-appeal date precedes the date on which the case is heard—normally, the
Umpire gathers, by several weeks. Hence, it would be inconsistent with the just-discussed
considerations to apply the re-appeal date as the date on which the waiver ends—unless,
which is not the case here, the back-referral request had been made at the first re-appeal
stage. And though the Union may have a point in arguing that to apply the "heard" date is
to put the Union in jeopardy by giving Management the chance to prolong the period of the
waiver, it can be argued with equal force that to apply the re-appeal date is to put
Management in jeopardy by giving the Union the chance to stop the running of the waiver
and then to prolong the period in which Management has a potential continuing wage
liability.
For these reasons, the Umpire believes that the proper conclusion is that the "heard"
reference in the minutes squares exactly with what one would expect to find. Even if it
were to be assumed that the "heard" reference does not reflect the understanding which
both parties in fact came to, it certainly cannot be assumed that Management, for its part,
would have agreed to an earlier date. And as to the letter from the Union’s representative,
aside from its lack of specificity in relation to the "heard" reference, the letter can scarcely
be taken as an instrument spelling the parties’ agreement to apply the re-appeal date. To
repeat, the Company has the better argument.
Nevertheless, it is equally the Umpire’s opinion that it would here be wrong to give literal
application to the "heard" date. In the first place, nearly a year passed before the
grievance, following its re-appeal, was formally heard again at the Third Step. This is itself
enough to make one wary of giving literal application to the "heard" date—the evidence is
that the parties at the time had Third Step meetings at something like 3-month intervals.
And in the second place, though true that the grievance was not "heard" at the Third Step
in the formal sense at any time within the nearly one-year period following its re-appeal,
the evidence is that it was considered via Management offers at various stages in that
period— including even at one or two Third Step meetings. Had this not occurred— had
the grievance simply been shoved aside and left in a dormant state while covered by a
liability waiver—the Union might well have pressed, and successfully so, for getting the
grievance on one or another Third Step agenda preceding the one to which the grievance
finally made its way. The Umpire does not believe that this can be overlooked. Through its
offers, Management lulled the Union into a false sense of security and cannot now
legitimately insist on a literal "heard" application.
It is one thing to arrive at this conclusion and quite another to determine what cutoff date
for the waiver should be applied. The Umpire does not believe that he can properly order
the application of the date of the first Third Step meeting following the re-appeal. The
evidence is that the Warehouse had a very high volume of grievances at the time, and it
cannot be assumed that all the pending grievances were of such relatively low priority that
their handling would have been deferred in favor of K.’s grievance. Neither, for the reasons
given, can the converse be assumed. Under all the circumstances—admittedly somewhat
arbitrarily, but also with due regard for the objective of fair and reasonable results and for
the fact that the record does not compellingly suggest any other date— the Umpire rules
that the midpoint between March 17, 1969 and February 2, 1970 is to be applied as the
cutoff date for the waiver. This yields a back-pay obligation, for the third period, of about 5
months and 1-1/2 weeks.
The Umpire trusts that his dispositions are of sufficient clarity and exactitude to enable the
parties to agree on the overall dollars-and-cents figure which will implement the
dispositions. Should difficulties nonetheless develop, either party is free to return the case
to the Umpire for a final determination.
DECISION
The dispositions of the back-pay questions here raised are given in the Opinion. The
Company is directed to reimburse the grievant accordingly.
February 3, 1972
/S/Rolf Valtin
Umpire
UMPIRE DECISION N-4 Page 1 of 11
No. N-4
September 13, 1971
Discharge:
Falsification of Employment Application Form;
Evidence;
Application of 18-Month Period Under Paragraph (76b) of National Agreement;
Extent of Penalty
GRIEVANCE:

TARRYTOWN PLANT, NORTH TARRYTOWN, NEW YORK—APPEAL CASES N-1, N-2
AND N-13
N-1 -- "I have been unjustly discharged. I demand that I be reinstated at once with full
seniority and all benefits plus all money due." S/J.W.
N-2 -- "I charge Management with unjust discharge. Demand to be reinstated with all
monies and benefits due me." S/D.M.
N-13 -- "I charge Management with unjust discharge. Demand to be reinstated with all
benefits due me, and all back pay." S/G.T.
For the reasons given in the Opinion:
1) The discharge in in Appeal Case N-13 is rescinded. The Company is

directed to reinstate the grievant with restoration of seniority rights and
reimbursement for the wages lost since the time of the discharge.
file://C:\Users\bobology\AppData\Local\Temp\Framework\n-004_13A6D945.htm 3/22/2011
2) The discharges in Appeal Cases N-1 and N-2 are modified to 30-day DLO’s,
with a 30-day DLO in each instance to be entered in the grievant’s disciplinary
record for a violation of Shop Rule 1. The Company is directed to reinstate
each of the grievants with restoration of seniority rights and reimbursement for
the wages lost starting with what would have been the completion of the
serving of a 30-day DLO. (Entire decision should be read.)
In the Matter of:

Union No. 664
and
General Motors Corporation, GMAD, Tarrytown Plant, Tarrytown, New York -- Appeal
Cases N-1, N-2 and N-13
OPINION
Though as part of one hearing agenda, these three cases were heard separately. Each
case involves its own grievant and its own particular facts and circumstances; and one of
the cases raises an interpretative question not raised by the other two cases. There is
commonality, however, in that the grievant in each of the cases was discharged on the
grounds that he falsified his employment application form and thereby violated the
prohibition laid down in Shop Rule 1: "Falsification of personnel or other records". The
Umpire is joining the three cases for this reason.
The basic facts in each of the cases will momentarily be given. First to be noted is that the
interpretative question which is raised in one of the cases and not the others concerns the
last portion of Paragraph (76b) of the National Agreement:
"In imposing discipline on a current charge, Management will

not...impose discipline on an employee for falsification of his
employment application after a period of eighteen (18) months from

his date of hire."
The case in which the question arises is Appeal Case N-1. The Union contends that the
grievant had reached the 18-month point of immunity, and the presentation of the basic
facts in this case will therefore require the giving of a series of dates surrounding the
grievant’s discharge.
The basic facts in Appeal Case N-1 are as follows:
W. Filled out an employment application form on May 21, 1969 and was hired on May 22,
1969. In the space reserved for "Second Last Place Employed", he entered "Castle
Machine & Manufacturing Co.", claiming that he had worked as an Assembler and that he
had been employed by that company from June, 1963 to January, 1969. In the space
reserved for "Name and Location of High School", he entered "Madison H.S." and "San
Diego, Cal.", claiming that he had completed the 12th grade and had graduated in 1963.
On November 17, 1970, under circumstances to be commented on below, Management

commenced a check on W.’s employment application form. Two initial phone calls to the
Castle Machine & Manufacturing Co. were unfruitful. A third call was placed shortly before
noon (Eastern Time) on November 19, 1970. Management was informed by a Mr. K. that
there was no record of W.’s having worked for the company. Additionally, the Mr. K.
promised to send written confirmation of W.’s not having worked for the company (via a
follow up form which the Company (GM) uses in checking on the accuracy of information
given by applicants and which Management had sent to the Castle Machine &
Manufacturing Co. on November 17, 1970). The written confirmation is dated November
19, 1970 and Management presumably received it on or about November 21, 1970.
The high-school information was checked via the Company’s South Gate Plant. The record
is not clear as to when and how this check was commenced and as to when, if at all,
Management received telephonic word from the South Gate Plant that W. had not attended
the Madison High School. In evidence, however, is a letter from the South Gate Plant,
dated January 12, 1971, which attests to that fact.
The decision to discharge W. was made upon the completion of the third phone call to the
Castle Machine & Manufacturing Company. This, to recall it, was on November 19, 1970.
W. could not be directly informed of his discharge because the plant was struck at the time
(as part of the national strike against GM). The notice of discharge, in the form of a
registered letter, was sent to his home address in New York City on November 19, 1970.
Attempted delivery would evidently have been made on either November 20 or November
21, 1970. November 21 and 22 in 1970 constituted a weekend. The letter is signed for as
having been received by W. on November 23, 1970. It is additionally true, however that
Management sent the Union a letter advising it of W.’s discharge and that the Union
received this letter on November 20, 1970.
But for one entry (a reprimand for careless workmanship), W. has a clear prior disciplinary
record. The Company makes no challenge of the Union’s assertions: 1) that W. was a
wholly satisfactory employee; and 2) that the investigation of his employment application
form was not prompted by a decline in the quantity or quality of his work, or by any other
type of work-connected activity on his part.
M. filled out an employment application form on July 3, 1969 and was hired on July 9,
1969. He was discharged on December 1, 1970 -- i.e., clearly and concededly prior to the
time that the 18-month period provided for in Paragraph (76b) of the National Agreement
had elapsed.
The union does not accept all of the particulars of the Company’s falsification charge, and
it quarrels with the Company as to the importance of accuracy or completeness with
respect to certain items in the employment application form. It is an admitted fact in this
case, however, that the grievant falsified the form. It seems unnecessary to detail the
parties’ disagreement as to the nature and extent of the falsification. The essence of the
falsification goes to M.’s education and military service. Either hidden or explicitly withheld
were the facts: 1) that M. attended, and apparently even graduated from, City College of
New York; 2) that M., while in the Army, refused to serve in Viet Nam, was tried and
convicted by a military tribunal, served a three-year sentence in a military stockade, and
was given a dishonorable discharge from the Army.
As to M.’s employment at the plant, it is concededly true: that he had a clear prior
disciplinary record; that he performed his work satisfactorily throughout his period of
employment (about 17 months); and that the investigation of his employment application
form was not prompted by any work connected activities on his part.
The investigation was prompted by an inquiry from a federal agency as to whether M. was
employed at the plant. The Company stated at the hearing that the inquiry was of a
confidential nature and that it (the Company) could not properly identify the federal agency.
Introduced into evidence at another point of the hearing, however, were certain newspaper
articles covering M.’s military trial and conviction. One of the articles refers to M. as a
person "with a deep commitment to left-wing causes".
T. filled out an employment application form on October 2, 1969 and was hired on October
8, 1969. He was discharged on December 17, 1970 -- once more, clearly and concededly
prior to the time that the 18-month period provided for in Paragraph (76b) of the National
Agreement had elapsed.
In his employment application form, at the spaces reserved for "Present or Last Place
Employed" and "Third Last Place Employed", T. entered "May Fair Photo Finishing" and
showed "Dec. 68 to Present" and "Sept. 67 to June 68" as the respective periods of
employment. Management discharged T. on the twofold basis of: 1) the report of its
investigator, to the effect that the May Fair Photo Finishing Company had no record of T.’s
having worked for it; and 2) the refusal by T., in the disciplinary interview, to answer
questions relating to the asserted employment.
Following the discharge, the Union sent a Zone Committeeman to the May Fair Photo
Finishing Company. His written report to the Union and his testimony at the hearing are to
the effect that he was told by the owner of the May Fair Photo Finishing Company that T.
had worked for that Company. Though both parties requested it, neither party ever
received written confirmation from the owner (or any other representative) of the May Fair
Photo Finishing Company either that T. had or that he had not worked for that company.
Also following the discharge, Management got in touch with the company which T. had
listed as the "Second Last Place Employed", asking this company to pass on the
information which T. had given on its employment application form. The request was
complied with. T. had named two employers whom he did not name in his employment
application form with GM. As to one of these employers, the period of employment shown
by T. falls within the period of employment which T. gave, in his GM employment
application form, for the period of employment with the May Fair Photo Finishing Company
as the "Third Last Place Employed". And as to the other of these employers, the period of
employment shown by T. is a one-month period and the particular month is the month
which T., in his GM employment application form, showed as the last month of
employment with the May Fair Photo Finishing Company (again as the "Third Last Place
Employed"). Falsification by T., the Company submits, is thus clearly established. The
Union’s rejoinder is: 1) that this information was belatedly uncovered and therefore should
not be considered; and 2) that, even if considered, though it may leave a question as to the
proper dates of employment, it does not destroy the fact of employment with the May Fair
Photo Finishing Company as both the "Last Place Employed" and the "Third Last Place
Employed".
Aside from this specific rejoinder, the Union takes the position that falsification in this case
has not been proved and that, even if the Umpire were to make the contrary finding, the
discharge was defective because the Company, at the time it took the discharge action,
was lacking in an adequate basis for it—that the owner of the May Fair Photo Finishing
Company had declined to put anything in writing, that the oral word which the Company’s
(GM’s) investigator had received was of inconclusive nature, that the grievant could not be
required to accommodate Management’s fishing expedition at the time of the disciplinary
interview, and that his refusal to answer the various questions can therefore not be held
against him.
Once more, the grievant had a clear (or near clear) prior disciplinary record; he concededly
performed his work satisfactorily throughout his period of employment (in this instance, a
little over 14 months); and the investigation of his employment application form was
prompted, not by an work-connected activities on his part, but by an inquiry from a federal
agency as to whether the grievant was employed at the plant.
First to be decided is the "18 months" question raised in Appeal Case N-1. The parties are
agreed that, as to grievant W., the 18-month period ran from May 22, 1969 through
November 21, 1970. The Union relies on the fact that it was not until November 23, 1970
that the grievant received the discharge notice, saying that this date—not the date
(November 19, 1970) on which Management sent the discharge notice or the date
(November 20 or 21, 1970) on which the discharge notice might have been delivered to the
grievant had he been at home—must be made to "count". In support of this contention, the
Union asserts that National-Agreement provisions requiring notice to an employee—e.g.
Paragraph (64d) -- have historically been applied as making the date on which the
employee receives the notice, not the date on which Management sends the notice, the
pertinent date.
The Umpire is overruling the Union on this issue It should first be noted that a well-nigh
unique situation is here presented. The combination of a struck plant and of zero hour for
the start of an employee’s immunity having just about been reached is not likely to occur
very often. It should also be noted that it is rather obvious that Management acted with
last-minute haste to keep the 18-month period from elapsing—rather than await a reply to
its written communication, which it had sent on November 17, Management placed a
phone call on November 19 and then, rather than hold off until in possession of written
confirmation, went ahead with the discharge action upon completion of the phone call.
There are all the earmarks here of beating-the-deadline efforts. This cannot help but show
that Management was anxious to unload the grievant and that it saw the falsification as a
means for doing so. More on this below. And finally to be noted is that the Umpire, in here
overruling the Union, is not questioning the general validity of the Union’s assertion with
respect to notice-receiving versus notice-giving as it might affect various other parts of the
Agreement. To the contrary, it seems to him that there is a clear difference between the
language here at issue and the language which is found, for example, at Paragraph (64d)
of the National Agreement. The latter Paragraph is explicitly geared to the employee’s
"being notified".
In the conflict here presented, the Umpire is relying on the express language of the quoted
provision. It is true that a discharge involves both Management and the affected employee
and that it is not complete until the employee has been notified. But, by natural reading—
and, if not that, certainly by legitimate reading—the "imposing" of a penalty refers to the
initiating action by Management. This is the more true in the context of a clause which
requires that "the employee will be tendered a copy of any warning, reprimand, suspension
or disciplinary layoff entered on his personnel record, within three days of the action
taken." Paragraph (76b) has this requirement—what has just been quoted constitutes its
first sentence, and what has previously been quoted constitutes part of its second (and
last) sentence. Paragraph (76b), in other words, seems itself to reflect a distinction
between the action by Management and letting the employee know about it. And the
language here at issue employs the word "impose". Reading this as the discharge-initiating
action on the part of Management, and there being no dispute that Management’s initiating
action was taken on November 19, 1970 and that the 18-month period for the grievant did
not end until November 21, 1970, the Umpire rejects the Union’s contention that the
discharge should be set aside by reason of the immunity provided for in Paragraph (76b).
To the Umpire, this holding is should not only as a matter of semantical correctness but
also as a matter of reasonableness when considering the application of the phrase "date of
hire". The phrase could well be taken to refer to the date on which the employee first goes
to work for the Company. So construed, the beginning of the 18-month period in the
present case would have been June 8, 1969 rather than May 22, 1969 -- which would
mean that the grievant’s discharge would have been within the 18-month period even by
the discharge date which the Union asks to have applied. But the "date of hire" phrase is
not so applied, and instead is held to its strict meaning. The Umpire’s holding with respect
to the end of the 18-month period is consistent with the strict-meaning application which
the parties give to the beginning of the 18-month period.
Finally to be appreciated is that this is not a case as to which there might be clarity as to
the date of the receipt by the grievant of the discharge notice and lack of clarity or doubt as
to the date of the imposition of the discharge penalty. It is a clear and undisputed fact that
the Union received notification of the discharge on November 20, 1970. There simply
cannot be any doubt, thus, that Management had fully declared itself prior to the end of the
18-month period. And to make the date on which the grievant received the discharge
notice the determining date would in effect be to say that the grievant could himself be the
instrument for reaching immunity by the device or the happenstance of not being available
for the receipt of mail. Here, it happened to have been a matter of a day or two. But it might
have been a matter of a week or two. Theoretically at least, the Union’s position does not
call for a distinction based on the number of days on which an employee might be
unavailable for the receipt of mail.
Next required are findings with respect to whether or not the grievant in each of the cases
is in fact guilty of the asserted falsification, and, if so, whether or not the Union is correctly
charging that Management had too little to bank on at the time it took the discharge action.
In Appeal Case N-1, the Umpire holds for Management on both questions. W. entered
"Castle Machine & Manufacturing Co." and the dates of "June, 1963 to January, 1969" for
the second-last place employed; there is documentary evidence, in the form of a signed
statement from that company, that "we have no record of employment of this man"; W.
declined to testify at the Umpire hearing; and the Union took the position that it was neither
denying nor confirming the asserted falsification. It is true that Management went ahead
with the discharge action at a time when it had only telephonic word to the effect that there
was no record of W.’s having worked for the Castle Machine & Manufacturing Company.
But Management had assured itself that it was speaking to an authorized representative of
that company, and the telephonic word which it received was accompanied by a promise
that written confirmation would be sent. And though one can safely assume that prudent
managements, including this Management, would normally hold off until receipt of the
documentary substantiation, the fact here is that Management was up against the 18-
month deadline. The Umpire is not prepared to hold that Management was obligated to risk
being foreclosed from taking disciplinary action by awaiting receipt of the promised
confirmation.
Appeal Case N-2 requires no findings on these scores. The Union here concedes
falsification, and, in the write up of the basic facts, the Umpire has commented on the
parties’ disagreement as to the particulars.
Appeal Case N-13 presents a mixed picture, neither party being on solid grounds. On the
Union’s side, this is particularly true of the grievant’s silence. He was evasive in the
interview with Management; he once more declined to declare himself on whether or not
he had worked for the May Fair Photo Finishing Company in his UC proceeding; and,
despite the Umpire’s observation at the hearing that the grievant’s refusal to testify would
be among the factors which would have to be weighed in a case of this sort, T. was not
brought to the stand. It is obvious that a straightforward and firm denial by the grievant
would have been the strongest way to squash a false accusation, if such it was.
Something, somewhere in the grievant’s past, it seems clear, is being withheld. But, as the
Umpire has consistently ruled that questions in cross examination may be directed to
areas not covered in direct examination, it is not necessarily because the grievant did not
work at the May Fair Photo Finishing Company that he remained silent.
The Umpire has concluded that sound policy considerations require that the Union be
sustained in its contention that Management was lacking in a sufficient basis for
discharging T. at the time it took the discharge action. It is true that T., in the interview with
Management, provided anything but a satisfactory explanation. It is also true that the
interview was not based on nothing—Management had received word to the effect that
there was no record of T.’s having worked for the May Fair Photo Finishing Company. To
this extent, the Union is overstating things in asserting that Management was up to nothing
more than a fishing expedition. Nevertheless, unless one is prepared to allow Management
to have an employee make a case for it, the first question must be whether there was a
prima facie case of at least reasonable strength against T.
The Umpire believes that the answer must be in the negative. The owner of the May Fair
Photo Finishing Company not only declined to state positively that T. had not worked for
that company—and instead hedged in terms of "no record of his having worked here"—but
also declined to put anything in writing (despite several requests by Management that he
do so). Moreover, Management’s investigator, a man of ample experience in his field, was
doubtful of the reliability of the owner of the May Fair Photo Finishing Company. And
further still, Management had pursued various other investigatory routes—T.’s education,
possible arrests, and standing in his neighborhood—and had uncovered nothing untoward
along these lines. And yet, Management went ahead with an interview of T. (questioning
him not only as to prior employment with the May Fair Photo Finishing Company but also
as to education and military service). It is an admitted fact that T. was discharged, not
alone on the basis of the visit to the May Fair Photo Finishing Company by Management’s
investigator, but on the combined basis of that visit and T.’s stance in the interview. Here to
sanction the basis for the discharge, the Umpire believes, is to go too far in the direction of
compromising the prima facie requirement and letting an employee make management’s
case.
That Management was on infirm grounds when it discharged T. seems borne out by the
fact that, at least in the Umpire’s mind, doubt is left as to the asserted falsification even
after considerable further, post-discharge investigatory efforts by Management. There were
two hearings in this case. At the first hearing, the Company’s posture was that of defending
the discharge on the same twofold basis which was Management’s at the time of the
discharge. What happened at the first hearing was that the Zone Committeeman, whose
report on his conversation with the owner of the May Fair Photo Finishing Company was
part of the record, was out of town. The Union made an offer of proof that the Zone
Committeeman would testify to that which was contained in the report. The Company
declined the proffer, but expressed a willingness to adjourn the proceeding and to
reconvene at such other time as the Zone Committeeman would be back in town and
therefore in a position to testify. This was done.
As indicated in the write up of the basic facts covering this case, the report of the Zone
Committeeman is to the effect that he visited the May Fair Photo Finishing Company;
spoke to the owner; was told by him that T. had worked for that company; but also (as in
the case of Management’s investigator) wad unable to obtain written confirmation. In cross
examination, the Company queried the Zone Committeeman as to why his signature did
not appear on the report, thus suggesting that it doubted the genuineness of the report.
The difficulty is, however, that the Zone Committeeman testified in detail as to his visit to
the May Fair Photo Finishing Company and that the content of the report—i.e., even
assuming that the report was not written by the Zone Committeeman—stands up. Thus
yielded are two wholly contradictory stories by the owner of the May Fair Photo Finishing
Company.
Between the two hearings, the Company had gotten in touch with the company which T.
had listed as the "Second Last Place Employed" on his GM employment application form
and thus had obtained the information, detailed in the write-up of the basic facts, indicating
employment by T. at other companies in a period shown as employment with the May Fair
Photo Finishing Company. There is simply no gainsaying the fact that this information
could and should have been obtained before discharge against T. was resorted to.
Nevertheless, over the Union’s objection and for the reasons which he gave at the hearing,
the Umpire permitted the introduction of the information. The information is not of the
conclusive strength which the Company ascribes to it. Accepted at face value, it shows: 1)
with respect to the one employer, that T. did not work for the May Fair Photo Finishing
Company for as long as he showed; 2) with respect to the other employer, that T. worked
for him in the month which he showed as his last month of employment with the May Fair
Photo Finishing Company. Neither piece of information shows that T. was not employed by
the May Fair Photo Finishing Company. And this—that his claimed employment with that
company was a falsehood—is the charge against T.
To return, however, to the Umpire’s basic conclusion in this case: there are a series of
mysteries about it, but the discharge must be reversed for lack of a proper prima facie case
at the time of the discharge.
There remains the question of the extent of the penalty in Appeal Cases N-1 and N-2. The
Umpire is in agreement with the Union that the discharges constitute a head-on collision
with the conclusions reached in Decision M-83. Consistent with that Decision, he is
directing the modification of each of the discharges to a 30-day DLO.
Decision M-83 was rather recently issued and need not be reviewed in any great detail.
The conclusive highlights were these: that the Union’s effort to distinguish between a
material falsification and an immaterial falsification had to be rejected—that falsification is
resorted to for the very reason that there is fear that to tell the truth will mean not being
hired, and that falsification is therefore inherently material; that it does not follow that there
is no relevancy in the relationship between what has been withheld and the length and
quality of the employee’s service at the time of the discovery of the falsification (paragraph
11 of Decision M-83 gives contrasting examples); that the lack of relevancy would follow
only if falsification per se were taken to equate to the discharge penalty; that such an
automatic-discharge approach, however, was foreclosed by the state of the GMUAW law
on falsification; that, likewise, an automatic-discharge approach was not justified by
Paragraph (76b) when read in the light of its negotiating history; that a non-automatic
approach meant that falsification could not be made the device for getting rid of employees
who, though their working record was good, came to be regarded as undesirable by
Management; and that, on the facts of the particular case, one would have been
sanctioning just that had one upheld the discharge penalty.
It should preliminarily be noted that Decision M-83 was issued on October 1, 1970. This
was about six weeks before the first of the discharge actions here in question was resorted
to. The Umpire believes—and it is not contended otherwise—that he must go on the
assumption that Management either was or should have been familiar with Decision M-83
at the time of the discharges.
As the Umpire understands it, the Company is not here taking the position that the
conclusions in Decision M-83 were in error and should be reversed. Though the Company
reiterates that it is entitled to honest answers on its employment application forms and that
it has the right to act against those who supply false answers—both of which points, of
course, were granted in Decision M-83 -- the thrust of the Company’s position in the
present cases is that the falsifications were, as the Company puts it, "considerable" and
"significant". What the Company emphasizes in Appeal Case N-1 is that the grievant gave
false information with respect to a span of time which, given his relatively young age,
constitutes practically all his working life prior to coming to GM. And what the Company
emphasizes in Appeal Case N-2 is that the grievant hid what amounts to his real past.
Rather than seek to reverse Decision M-83, in other words, the Company is seeking to
distinguish the present cases from the case covered by Decision M-83.
The Umpire has not been persuaded. There are of course differences, quantitative and
otherwise, in the falsified information. But such differences can be pointed to with respect
to practically any two falsification cases. And whereas the case leading to Decision M-83
involved the falsification of but a single item and less than a month of prior employment, it
was prior employment with, and discharge from, another GM Division which had been
withheld, and the Umpire well recalls the vehemence with which the Company insisted that
it could not be expected, once it had discovered the falsification, to keep such a person in
its employ.
Even granting some difference between the prior case and the present cases, however,
the parallel is far the greater. Once more, there is the fact of a wholly satisfactory working
record over a substantial period (it was about 14 months in M-83, and it is about 18 months
and 17 months, respectively, in these two cases); there is the fact that it was not some
work-connected problem—e.g. a physical impediment—which might surface and bring with
it the discovery of a falsification; and there is the fact that it was some special event
making the employee seem undesirable in the eyes of Management which prompted the
investigation of the employment application form. There is no direct evidence on this latter
score, but, based on what is known, there is no realistic escaping the conclusion. As is true
of all three grievants, the grievant in Appeal Case N-1 was among those employees who
labeled the strike-ending agreement which the Company and the International Union
reached in the fall of 1970 as a "cheap deal" and who actively worked for the rejection of
the agreement by the Local’s membership. It was on November 11, 1970 that the
Company and the International Union reached the agreement; it was on November 23,
1970 that the Company was notified of the ratification of the agreement; as shown, it was
on November 17, 1970 that the check on the grievant’s employment application form was
begun; and there can be no question that there was singling out against the grievant—no
checks had been run at the plant on employment application forms for nearly two years;
his was among nearly 1400 of the forms which had gone unchecked; and the check was
on him as an individual, not part of a general catching-up operation. Similarly, in Appeal
Case N-2, as already given, the investigation of the grievant’s employment application form
was prompted by an inquiry from a federal agency; and what the investigation uncovered
was a military-jail sentence for a refusal to go to Viet Nam on the part of a person
described as being committed to left-wing causes. In the opinion of the Umpire, these facts
must be taken as speaking loudly for themselves when it comes to making falsification the
device for getting rid of individuals whom Management has come to regard as undesirable.
If it was correct to reach the conclusion that this "device" element was present in the case
leading to Decision M-83 -- as the Umpire thinks it was—it is at least equally correct to
reach that conclusion in these cases.
DECISION
For the reasons given in the Opinion:
(1) The discharge in Appeal Case N-13 is rescinded. The Company is directed to reinstate
the grievant with restoration of seniority rights and reimbursement for the wages lost since
the time of the discharge.
(2) The discharges in Appeal Cases N-1 and N-2 are modified to 30-day DLO’s, with a 30-
day DLO in each instance to be entered in the grievant’s disciplinary record for a violation
of Shop Rule 1. The Company is directed to reinstate each of the grievants with restoration
of seniority rights and reimbursement for the wages lost starting with what would have
been the completion of the serving of a 30-day DLO.
September 13, 1971
/S/Rolf Valtin
Umpire
No. N-8
October 18, 1971
Discharge:
Threatening Foreman;
Evidence;
Extent of Penalty
GRIEVANCE:
CHEVROLET MOTOR DIVISION, GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, SAGINAW

METAL CASTING PLANT, SAGINAW, MICHIGAN—APPEAL CASE N-65
Grievance 133926
"I, #210085, protest unjust suspension (subsequently converted to discharge). The alleged
violation is denied. I demand that I be returned to work at once and paid for all time lost
and my record cleared." S/J.C.
UMPIRE’S DECISION
In the Matter of:

Union No. 668
and
file://C:\Users\bobology\AppData\Local\Temp\Framework\n-008_13A6EC39.htm 3/22/2011
General Motors Corporation, Chevrolet - Saginaw Metal Casting Plants, Saginaw,

Michigan --
Appeal Case N-65
OPINION
Grievant C. was hired by the Company in mid-1951. At the time of his discharge—the
discharge was made effective, following three days of suspension, on April 8, 1971 -- he
was a second-shift Laborer in the #2 Core Room of the Grey Iron plant. C. was discharged
for allegedly having drawn a knife on Foreman L. C. denies that he is guilty as charged and
the Union additionally argues that, even if a contrary finding is made, the discharge penalty
should be held to have been excessive.
In the opinion of the Umpire, the evidence overwhelmingly establishes that C. is guilty as
charged. Three principal factors have led to this conclusion. The first is that the testimony
of Foreman L. was utterly persuasive—straight and firm, and replete with the sort of
meaningful detail which is foreign to a made-up story. The second factor is that the very
opposite was true of C.’s testimony. It was marked by evasiveness and improbabilities, and
it included one assertion—that C. did not know that he had been charged with pulling a
knife on Foreman L. when he left the plant on the night in question—which is contrary to
the truth beyond question. And the third factor is that C.’s story does not "fit" attendant
circumstances which, rather than merely asserted by Management, stand as confirmed.
The following is the essence of what happened:
Shortly before 10 PM on April 5, 1971, Foreman L. received word that the #4 Core
Assembly Line was running out of clamps. The furnishing of clamps to the line was C.’s
responsibility.
Foreman L. looked for C. and found him sitting on a barrel in the #2 Core Room. In the
ensuing conversation, it became clear to Foreman L. that C. had been drinking and was
not fit to work. He told C. that he (C.) would be disciplined and asked him to come along to
the Core Room office.
C. complied, but, before Foreman L. had finished checking on C.’s prior disciplinary record,
left the point just outside the office where he had been waiting and walked toward the #2
Locker Room, located in the basement. Foreman L. followed C. down the stairs and caught
up with him near the shower room. C. declined to accept the disciplinary action notice
which Foreman L. sought to give him and then went toward a locker and removed a jacket
from it. Foreman L. surmised that C. was leaving the plant.
Not long thereafter, while Foreman L. was in conversation with General Foreman M.,
another foreman came up and stated that he had just seen C. in the cafeteria (which is
adjacent to the #2 Locker Room). General Foreman M. told Foreman L. to go to the
cafeteria and instruct C. to go home.
Upon being confronted by Foreman L., C. said that he would go home but that he first
wanted to go to his locker. Foreman L. agreed to this request and accompanied C. to the
locker.
At the locker, C. removed a bottle of whiskey from it; took a drink; and then passed the
bottle to Foreman L. in drink-offering fashion. Foreman L. declined to have a drink but took
the bottle and told C. that it would be given back to him at the plant gate.
Foreman L. and C. had walked a short distance toward the staircase when C. stopped and
told Foreman L. that he (C.) would not accept being thrown out of the plant and that he
wanted his bottle back. Foreman L. did not give the bottle back and reiterated that it would
be returned to C. at the plant gate.
At this point, C. took a hold of the front of Foreman L.’s sweater. Foreman L., in turn, took
a hold of C.’s hand and succeeded in releasing it from the sweater. With that, C. said "I’ll
get my knife"; initially put his hands in his jacket pockets; and then reached with his right
hand into his right trouser pocket, withdrew a pocket knife from it, opened it up, and
brought the exposed blade to within a foot or two of Foreman L.’s stomach. Foreman L.
fled from the scene.
Foreman L. reported the incident to General Foreman M.; the latter gave him instructions
to call plant security; and three patrolmen came to the cafeteria and led C. away.
The Umpire has given every consideration to the Union’s extent-of-penalty plea. Nearly
twenty years of service obviously is a major investment in a person’s working life. And
there is additionally the fact that C. was drunk or nearly drunk on the night in question. One
cannot help but be tempted to view the incident as a single and momentary act which,
despite its seriousness, should not cost the grievant his job.
The Umpire has concluded, however, that this is the wrong view and that it must be
resisted. He still thinks—i.e., as he did in Decision M-59 -- that the pulling of a knife is the
mark of a bully, and hence the mark of a dangerous person, and that this is what the case
must turn on. The pulling of a knife cannot legitimately be likened to an enraged outburst
which, though wrongful for the lack of control which it manifests, is nonetheless not vicious
and is pardonable for its lack of meanness. If anything, the present case, rather than
likened to such "outburst" cases, should be likened to the "gun" case covered by Decision
M-47. More pertinently, however, the fact is that the present case is essentially the same
as that covered by Decision M-59. In that case, too, the elements both of long service and
of drinking were involved and specifically rejected as extenuating circumstances of
sufficient force to overturn the discharge. And, as in the case covered by Decision M-59
and unlike the case covered by Decision E-16, there is here no basis for a holding that the
grievant’s act was preceded by wrongful provocation.
DECISION
/S/Rolf Valtin
Umpire
No. N-25
MAY 1, 1972
Discharge;
Destruction of Lock on Toolbox;
Evidence;
Overstatement on 76 Notice;
Extent of Penalty
GRIEVANCES:
DETROIT DIESEL ALLISON DIVISION, GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, DETROIT

PLANT, DETROIT, MICHIGAN—APPEAL CASE N-199
Grievance 797192
"I charge Foreman J.P. _______ with giving me an unjust discharge. Demand to be
returned to work, paid all lost monies and this be removed from my record." S/M.F.
Grievance 797193
"I charge Foreman J.P. _______ with giving me an unjust discharge. Demand to be
returned to work immed., paid all lost monies and this be removed from my record." S/H.M.
UMPIRE’S DECISION
For the reasons given in the Opinion, the discharges here in question are overruled. Each
of the grievants is to be reinstated, is to have his record changed to show a 2-week DLO in
lieu of the discharge, and is to be reimbursed for the wages lost accordingly. (Entire
decision should be read)
file://C:\Users\bobology\AppData\Local\Temp\Framework\n-025_13A6F666.htm 3/22/2011
In the Matter of:

Union No. 163
and
General Motors Corporation, Detroit Diesel Allison Division, Detroit, Michigan -- Appeal
Case N-199
OPINION
The parties have joined these two grievances in one Appeal Case because the grievances
grew out of the same incident. Both grievants were day-shift employees in Department
346, classified as "Engine Assembly". Grievant F.’s seniority dates from early 1965. His
prior disciplinary record has three entries (two for absence without reasonable cause and
one for reporting late). Grievant M.’s seniority dates from early 1964. His prior disciplinary
record has one entry (disregard of safety).
Both grievants were discharged under Shop Rule 26: "Abuse, misuse or deliberate
destruction of company property, tools, equipment or the property of employees in any
manner". The rule is citied and quoted on each of the grievants’ 76 notices. Additionally,
under "Brief Explanation of Misconduct", there is the following on F.’s notice (and
substantially the same on M.’s notice):
"The Indefinite Suspension you received on 2-24-71 will read

DISCHARGED In deliberate destruction of company property. You
were observed with another employee while a company lock was
being broken off a company tool box. This misconduct was
observed by two (2) members of supervision at approximately 10:30
A.M. February 24, 1971."
The following is a brief description of the incident as pictured by Management:
At about 10:15 AM on the day in question, Superintendent McL. was on his way from
Department 345 and, as he entered Department 346, noticed both grievants at the tool-box
of an afternoon-shift employee. F. was in a bent-over position immediately in front of the
toolbox; M. was standing next to him, apparently acting as a lookout man. As
Superintendent McL. approached, M. spotted him and appeared to say something to F.
With that, both men left the toolbox and went off toward the center of the department.
Superintendent McL. did not follow them.
A short while later, at this stage in conversation with Foreman F., Superintendent McL. saw
the grievants back at the same toolbox. He pointed it out to Foreman F., and both
supervisors thereupon walked toward the grievants. The two grievants were in
substantially the same relative positions as they had been before. As M. spotted the two
supervisors, he went off in one direction. F. stood up and started to go off in another
direction. He had advanced but a few feet when Superintendent McL. called him back.
Though he first placed some sockets on another toolbox, F. obeyed and came back to the
toolbox in front of which he had been observed in a bent-over position.
The toolbox was open; the locking bar was on top of it; and the lock itself was broken.
Noticing these things, Superintendent McL. asked F. for an explanation. F. Stated that he
had broken the lock with a hammer and that he was looking through the contents of the
toolbox because someone had stolen his channel locks. Asked why he had not taken the
problem to his foreman, F. gave no reply.
Subsequently, grievant M. was similarly questioned. He confined himself to a reply to the

effect that he happened to be briefly with F.
Both grievants were initially suspended. A day later, following further investigation—which
included an interview with the afternoon-shift employee whose toolbox had been broken
into—they were discharged.
The Umpire is making a three-fold holding: 1) the grievants are guilty of having jointly
broken into the other employee’s toolbox—F. having done the actual breaking-in, M.
having acted as a lookout for F.; 2) the 76 notice was of serious defect; 3) the penalty was
in any event too severe, and, when this is joined with the 76 defect, the penalty must be
drastically reduced—to the point, the Umpire has determined, of a 2-week DLO.
The first holding is a matter of assessing the relative strength of the testimonies of
Superintendent McL. and Foreman F. and the testimony of grievant F. (grievant M. did not
appear at the hearing). One does not run into many cases where the contrast is as big as it
was here. The Umpire is left with no reasonable doubt that F. made the admission which
the two supervisors attribute to him. What F. now asserts is that he observed someone
else (whom he declined to name) break the lock. But F. admits that he (i.e., F. himself) was
at the toolbox a few minutes previously; he says that the asserted other man walked away
after breaking the lock; and he was wholly evasive on such questions as what movements
he observed the asserted other man make, what condition he (F.) found the lock in when
he got to the toolbox, and whether he (F.) had to remove the lock before gaining access to
the toolbox. F.’s is a farfetched and unsupported story, and the Umpire thinks it would be
clear folly to accept it.
The second holding concerns the "Brief Explanation of Misconduct" part of the 76 notice,
quoted above. The Umpire has previously made it clear that no rigid rule can be laid down
as to the amount of information—the extent of detail—which Management is obligated to
provide on a 76 notice. See the overruling of the Union’s objection to the particular 76
notice in the case leading to Decision M-92. Nor is the Umpire here saying that every little
mistake, no matter how inconsequential, is to be treated as indictable error. The present
case, indeed, provides an example of something which falls into this category: the notice
refers to "a company lock", when the fact is that the lock was the property of the particular
afternoon-shift employee. But the notice also says that the lock-breaking was observed by
the two supervisors. This is at once untrue and a matter of significant misinformation. Nor
can it be treated as the sort of error which a local Management might understandably
make. It would have been very simple to state the charge in accurate and unexaggerated
fashion—"you were observed at the toolbox on which a broken lock was found and you
admitted that you broke it". As already indicated, the Umpire is not here going so far as to
dismiss the Company’s case on the grounds that the Union has shown that the two
supervisors did not observe F. committing the misconduct. But to suggest that it would not
be technically incorrect to do so is to point up that 76 notices must be free of significant
misinformation and that the Union, in preparing its defenses, is not obligated to make
interpolations of 76 notices.
The third holding, aside from taking the just discussed defect into account, is a matter of
appreciating that this is not in fact a theft case. The grievants are charged with a violation
of the Shop Rule covering the destruction of employee or Company property, not the Shop
Rule covering theft. The Umpire agrees with the Company that the case cannot be treated
as if it involved the type of incident in which there is destruction from anger or pique (as, for
example, in the case leading to Decision N-21). In the present case, there were the
elements of stealth and planning; and it can hardly be assumed that the only purpose of
the breaking of the lock was to cause its destruction—indeed, grievant F. admits that he
was making use of the broken lock to gain access to the contents of the toolbox. What is
also true, however, is that the evidence shows no more than that F. (or M., or both) were
replenishing their supply of tools to be used in their work and that they were doing it in the
midst of an epidemic of reciprocal "borrowing" in the department. The Umpire is not saying
that the grievants thereby committed something less than a serious offense. But what they
did, it seems to him, was a good step removed from theft in the classic and normally-
understood sense. Management apparently saw it the same way. It did not precipitously
discipline the grievants but, rather, first made what it itself terms a full investigation of the
incident. And, upon that investigation, it applied the "destruction" Shop Rule rather than the
"theft" Shop Rule.
DECISION
For the reasons given in the Opinion, the discharges here in question are overruled. Each
of the grievants is to be reinstated, is to have his record changed to show a 2-week DLO in
lieu of the discharge, and is to be reimbursed for the wages lost accordingly.
May 1, 1972
/S/Rolf Valtin
Umpire
No. N-31
June 14, 1972
Discharge:
Alleged Fraud in Claiming Disability Benefits
GRIEVANCE:
Grievance 277022
"Chrge. Mgnt. with giving me an unjust discharge. Request I immediately be reinstated and
reimbursed all monies lost." S/J.L.S.
For the reasons given in the Opinion, the discharge here in question is overruled. The
Company is directed to reinstate the grievant with restoration of seniority rights and
reimbursement for the wages lost from the time of his discharge. (Entire decision should be
read)
In the Matter of:

Union No. 659
and
General Motors Corporation, Flint Parts Plant, Flint, Michigan --
Appeal Case N-327

file://C:\Users\bobology\AppData\Local\Temp\Framework\n-031_13A70055.htm 3/22/2011
OPINION
At the time of his discharge—late May, 1971 -- grievant S. was a first-shift Stock Picker at
Plant No. 3. His seniority dates from September, 1962. It appears—there is no express
reference to it in the record—that he had a clean prior disciplinary record. He was
discharged on the following grounds (as given in his 76 Notice):
"You are being discharged for perpetrating acts of fraud upon

General Motors Parts Division—Flint Parts Plant by going on sick
leave and collecting sickness and accident benefits, but yet
continuing to work your other regular employment at Flint City Hall.
You attempted to fraudulently gain benefits as late as the sick leave
period of May 4, 1971, through May 25, 1971; a period of time that
you worked at Flint City Hall while on sick leave from this plant. A
review of prior sick leaves for which you were paid sickness and
accident benefits indicates the same pattern of fraudulent action
perpetrated by you upon the Company."
The case was extensively argued, and a proper review of all that was presented would
take one into several areas and would produce a very lengthy Opinion. The Umpire will
forego such a review because, in his opinion, the case turns on but three or four
considerations and much of what was argued may properly be bypassed.
S. has been under a physician’s care since 1967. The physician testified at the hearing,
saying that S. has been suffering from a hypertensive cardiovascular disease with
coronary insufficiency; that the manifestations are headaches, fainting spells, dizziness
and spots in front of the eyes; that, though S. is a man in his late twenties, he has the heart
of a man in his middle fifties; and that the avoidance of stress is among the most important
requirements for keeping S. a reasonably fit person. The plant’s physician also testified. He
pointed out that examinations of S. at the plant had shown a blood pressure which, though
on the high side, stayed within the limits which permit a person to hold a job which does
not involve a great deal of strenuous lifting or pulling. He (the plant physician) also
asserted that the Stock Picker job is of that kind and otherwise is a job suitable for S. to
perform. Nevertheless, all three of the following are true: 1) the examinations of S. by the
plant’s medical department have been nowhere near as extensive as those by S.’s
physician; 2) practically all the blood-pressure readings of S. by the plant’s medical
department were done at times when S. was returning to work from sick leave; 3) the
plant’s physician testified that he was not dissenting from the findings by S.’s physician as
to S.’s medical problems.
In early 1969, S. took on a second job—i.e., a full-time job in addition to his GM job. It is a
Janitor job at the Flint City Hall with 5 PM - 1 AM working hours. S.’s first-shift hours at the
plant are from 6:30 AM to 2:30 PM.
In the approximately 2-year period preceding his discharge, S. went on sick leave from his
GM job and collected S&A benefits on some ten occasions. The length of time per
occasion varied from about 1 week to about 5 weeks. On each occasion—either some of
the time or all of the time—he worked his Janitor job at the Flint City Hall.
The Company discovered this in connection with its investigation of S.’s claim for S&A
benefits on the last occasion. Therewith, aside from stopping the payment of S&A benefits
for that occasion, it discharged S. As shown, the Company is charging that S. was guilty of
fraud in claiming disablement and collecting S&A benefits at times when he continued to
work the City Hall job. For the reasons which follow, the Umpire does not believe that he
can uphold the Company.
The case leading to Decision N-14 involved an employee who had falsified an S&A form in
order to extend the cut-off point for the receipt of S&A benefits beyond that which his
doctor had specified. The employee was discharged under Shop Rule 1, prohibiting
falsification of personnel or other records. The Union argued that the S&A form, rather than
constitute a Company record within the meaning of Shop Rule 1, constitutes a form used
under the Insurance Program; that, by the express terms of Paragraph (224) of the
National Agreement, the Insurance Program lies outside the Umpire’s jurisdiction; and that
the falsification of an S&A form was therefore not properly punishable under Shop Rule 1.
The Umpire overruled the contention, essentially holding that the S&A form at once is used
for insurance purposes and is a Company record and that no analysis of the Insurance
Program was needed to determine the fact of the falsification.
Paragraph (6) of the Opinion in N-14 reads as follows:
"The question here is not whether the disciplinary action is

warranted or dictated by one or another provision under the
Insurance Program. Or, stating it otherwise, the case is not one
involving the interpretation and application of the Insurance
Program—so that there is no transgression of the mandate that ‘no
matter respecting the provisions of... the Insurance Program... shall
be subject to the grievance procedure’. The question, rather, is
whether an S&A form may be treated as the type of record which
falls within the purview of Shop Rule 1. For the reasons given
above, the Umpire believes that the answer lies in the affirmative."
The present case is of a different nature. It does not involve the tampering with a
physician’s certification. It does not involve, that is to say, the act of falsification which is
clearly wrongful and known to be wrongful and which requires no examination of the
Insurance Program to establish the wrongfulness of it.
At the most, the present case involves an employee’s exaggerated ailment claims which
his physician supported. But this gets one into imprecise and intangible areas. Further,
because of the very nature of the uncertainties which frequently accompany medical
complaints and medical findings, there is clear danger in pursuing a path by which
allegedly exaggerated ailment claims are to be equated with fraud. And further still, ailment
claims as to which there is uncertainty of their genuineness constitute something which is
not unusual. One may properly assume that it is an event which the parties anticipated
when they wrote their Insurance Agreement. But as to how they may have guarded against
it, and as to the kinds of consequences they may have thought should attach to it, one
would have to look to the Insurance Agreement. And this much—the interpretation and
application of the Insurance Agreement—clearly is beyond the Umpire’s jurisdiction.
In fact, however, it is by no means that the case involves the careless or dishonest support
by a physician of an employee’s phony or exaggerated disablement claims. As to the last
two of the ten occasions here presented, there is reason to be suspicious about the claims
advanced by S. But, even assuming that the evidence sufficed to make a flat holding that
S. or his physician (or both) made dishonest representations as to these two occasions,
the Umpire does not believe that this could be made determinative of the case. For the
clear fact is that the Company discharged S., not for the suspect nature of the last two
occasions, but for what it saw as the fraudulent scheme wrought by all ten occasions. And
when it comes to this—unless the fact of S.’s going on sick leave and claiming and
collecting S&A benefits while continuing to work the City Hall job is itself to be accepted as
adding up to fraud—the answer must be that the medical evidence produced by the Union
is far the stronger than that produced by the Company. As indicated, S.’s physician was
clearly more familiar with S.’s condition than the plant medical department; the medical
judgments made by S.’s physician were backed by the results of objective tests; and S.’s
physician testified with what seemed to the Umpire the conviction of a doctor who is
knowledgeable and concerned about his patient’s condition. On the state of the medical
evidence in this case— again, unless the fact itself of S.’s having continued to work the
City Hall job were to be taken as establishing fraud—it cannot properly be held that the
grievant is guilty of the fraudulent conduct with which he is charged.
There remains, then, the "unless" element in the case—and clearly the real element which
caused Management to writhe and to discharge S. Based on the hearing evidence
concerning the requirements of the City Hall job and on his inspection trip to the plant to
observe the requirements of the Stock Picker job, the Umpire agrees with the Company
that there is little to choose between the two jobs in terms of either physical effort or pace.
Going to the stress factor emphasized by S.’s physician, in other words, it seems to the
Umpire that there is difficulty in distinguishing one job from the other. Also, the Umpire
agrees with the Company that it is difficult to square the concern for the stress factor with
the holding of two fulltime jobs (allowing but about four hours of sleep between quitting
time of the one job and getting ready to leave home for the other job). On the face of it,
thus, there indeed appears to be an indefensible situation notwithstanding the impressive
testimony concerning S.’s medical problems by his physician. But it is not necessarily true
that the Insurance Agreement makes the proper collection of S&A benefits dependent on
not being actively employed elsewhere. For all that the Umpire knows and for all that S.’s
physician may have known, the Insurance Agreement does not prohibit the collection of
S&A benefits while holding another job and, instead, permits relief from the one job while
continuing to work the other as a matter of alleviation for someone with S.’s particular
condition. The Umpire is not saying that this a a likely state of affairs. The point is that it
has not been established—as it cannot be, given the exclusion of the Insurance
Agreement from the coverage of the grievance procedure— that there can be no such
thing under the Insurance Agreement as a period of temporary disability with respect to the
GM job while continuing gainful employment elsewhere. Similarly, it has not been
established that there is to be literal application of the phrase "totally disabled".
What these things add up to is that there is a question even as to the impropriety, let alone
fraud, of the S&A claims here in question. And as to fraud, it is not merely that the present
case, for the reasons given, properly is to be distinguished from the case which led to
Decision N-14. It is also that the element of stealth is lacking in the present case. S. has
made no secret of the fact of his other job and, indeed, on one occasion let it be known
that he wanted a medical statement saved for presentation to his supervisor at City Hall.
The Umpire does not believe that S., to avoid being found guilty of fraudulent conduct, had
an obligation expressly to inform Management of his continuing to work the City Hall job
during the periods here at issue.
DECISION
For the reasons given in the Opinion, the discharge here in question is overruled. The
Company is directed to reinstate the grievant with restoration of seniority rights and
reimbursement for the wages lost from the time of his discharge.
June 14, 1972
/S/Rolf Valtin
Umpire
No. N-50
JANUARY 23, 1973
Paragraph 63(a):
Promotion to Draftsman-Checker
GRIEVANCE:
Grievance 052001
"I charge Management with deliberate violation of Paragraph 63(a) of National Agreement.
I demand all benefits and monies due me and this situation corrected at once." S/J.P.W.
1. The record does not substantiate C.’s promotion to Draftsman—Checker on

January 25, 1971, to have been a proper one.
2. The case is remanded to the parties for determination of who should have
been promoted and how much back pay that person is entitled to receive.
3. If the parties are unable to reach a mutually agreeable settlement of these

matters, any open questions may be submitted to the Umpire for final
resolution. (Entire decision should be read.)
In the Matter of:

Union No. 652
and
file://C:\Users\bobology\AppData\Local\Temp\Framework\n-050_13A70AEF.htm 3/22/2011
General Motors Corporation, Oldsmobile Division, Lansing, Michigan -- Appeal Case N-22
OPINION
In this grievance, submitted on January 25, 1971, W., a Draftsman—Designer—Senior,

seniority date March 26, 1948, protests the promotion of C. to the position of Draftsman-
Checker. C. was also a Draftsman—Designer—Senior, but his seniority date is June 5,
1967. Grievant W.’s seniority in the Draftsman—Designer—Senior classification is April 7,
1961.
The grievance is submitted under Paragraph 63(a) of the National Agreement which states
in relevant part: In the advancement of employees to higher paid jobs when ability, merit
and capacity are equal, employees with the longest seniority will be given preference.
This is a so-called "head and shoulders" dispute. In December 1941 the Umpire declared
in Decision B-52 that "in considering employees for promotion under Paragraph 63, it may
be that an employee’s record is so outstanding that he is ‘head and shoulders’ above any
other possible candidate. In such cases, he is entitled to promotion irrespective of seniority
and, if necessary, Management should have no difficulty in pointing out his superior
qualifications." Subsequent decisions have clarified the standards to be applied in these
cases and have made clear that the burden of establishing a "head and shoulders" case is
on Management.
Decision E-305 recites some of the relevant considerations:
Such outstanding qualifications should be evidenced by "precise reasons", "citation of

instances", "production records" and/or "Supervisors’ ratings." (Decision B-69.)
Management likewise should evaluate "length of machine experience", "variety of
machines operated" and "productive ability on machines." (Decision B-204.) The bare
opinion of Supervisors, unsupported by an objective factual showing, will not sustain a
challenged promotion. (Decision B-100, E-232.) Potential ability for further promotion is a
proper factor to consider where Management in good faith promotes for training purposes
with an eye towards subsequent promotion to Supervisory jobs. (Decision B-55 and C-
319.)
A subsidiary but critical question in this case concerns the introduction by the Company of
evidence and argument at the Umpire hearing which, the Union alleges, does not appear
in the prior record. As the parties well know, new evidence is not to be introduced at the
Fourth Step and, if called to the Umpire’s attention, must be excluded from consideration.
With these precepts in mind, let us consider the evidence which appears in the prior
record.
At the February 10, 1971, Management—Shop Committee meeting Management

submitted these facts and contentions:
1. At the time C. was hired in June 1967 he had about 25
years of experience in engineering drafting, detailing,

tool and die designing and checking. He also attended a
technical institute where he obtained a year of formal
instruction in the drafting and designing field.
2. C. was evaluated as "outstanding" by his current

Oldsmobile supervisor and a prior one.
3. Paragraph 63(a) is not applicable since C. was

upgraded in accordance with the Local Seniority
Agreement.
4. Even if 63(a) were applicable, C. is "head and

shoulders" over Grievant W. In fact, there are other
employees in the group who are equal or superior to the
Grievant and who have greater seniority.
The Union alleged that any designer with Oldsmobile training could fulfill the checker’s
responsibilities. Consequently, Management should have upgraded W. since he was
senior to C.
In its February 24, 1971, Statement of Unadjusted Grievance, Management reiterated the
facts and contentions summarized above. Additionally it argued that, although the training
available at Oldsmobile is excellent, not all employees engaged in designing activities
possess equal ability or capacity.
The Union, in its Statement of Unadjusted Grievance, after rebutting Management’s Local
Seniority Agreement contentions, presented these facts and arguments concerning the two
men:
Grievant W.: (1) He successfully completed two Oldsmobile apprenticeship courses. (2)
One was in the Die Room, (1962-66) where he worked as a top paid journeyman Die
Maker until February 1961. (3) He worked to build, repair and try out all dies used in the
production of Oldsmobiles. (4) He attended L.C.C., completing courses in machine design,
and tool and fixture design. (5) He was a Die Design Apprentice between 1961 and 1963,
when he was graduated into the Layout—Senior classification in Die Design. (Note: This
classification was subsequently changed to Draftsman—Designer—Senior.) (6) His five
years in the Die Room and Die Tryout provided him actual experience needed on all types
of dies (small, intermediate and large), in addition to experience on the presses,
automation (such as Iron Hands and Unloaders), conveyor system, feeders and
straightening rolls. (7) The list of jobs and hours Management requires to become a Die
Designer through the apprenticeship program is further evidence of his qualifications. (The
attached list revealed that 300 hours in Design Checking were required.)
Mr. C.: (1) His experience record (provided by Management) was not as impressive as it
was intended to be. (It showed four years in engineering drafting at Douglas Aircraft (1942-
46), one year at tool designing at Auto-Air, Inc. (1961-62), three years at detailing and die
design at Dependable Engineering (1946-49), seventeen years of die designing and
checking at Dependable Engineering (1949-67), and three years as a Draftsman—
Designer—Senior at Oldsmobile (1967-70).) (2) Recommendations from Dependable

Engineering were suspect since the owner was C.’s father-in-law and frequently only the
two were employed. (3) His experience was limited to small dies. (4) His checking
experience at Dependable should be discounted because the dies made there (for
Oldsmobile) were all rechecked upon delivery.
At the Third Step Meeting the parties read their Statements of Unadjusted Grievance.
Additionally, according to the Minutes, Management denied the Union’s assertion that C.
was related to the owner of Dependable Engineering—a Mr. R. (The Union subsequently
stated, in a letter to Management, that this denial had not been made at the meeting.)
At the Umpire hearing Management sought to introduce evidence and argument

concerning the details of C.’s experience in designing and checking dies, particularly
during his years at Dependable Engineering, a Lansing firm which performed work under
contract with Oldsmobile. It also sought to bring to the Umpire’s attention evidence which,
if accepted and verified, would tend to show that (1) the Grievant had actually spent very
little time designing dies during his approximately three years in the Draftsman—Designer
classification (he served as District Committeeman and Apprentice Committee Chairman
during 1969 and 1970); (2) C. spent substantially more hours on die designing, while at
Oldsmobile, than did the Grievant, and C. designed many more dies.
Unquestionably, this type of information is precisely what prior Umpires had in mind when
they held that Management should have no difficulty in substantiating the superior
qualifications of a junior employee and that outstanding qualifications should be evidenced
by precise reasons, citation of instances, production records, supervisors’ ratings, length of
experience and the like. But it is equally clear that this type of information, which forms the
very basis for selecting one employee rather than another, should be brought forward and
placed in the record before a grievance is appealed to the Umpire. Contrary to
Management’s assertion, it is not rebuttal evidence to be introduced for the first time at the
Umpire hearing.
There is testimony that in October 1971, about six months after W.’s grievance was
appealed to the Umpire, Management provided a Local Union Zone Committeeman with a
copy of a letter from the owner of Dependable Engineering which (1) verified that he and
C. were not related (the Union has dropped this allegation), and (2) contained details of
C.’s design and checking work. But again, this was not made part of the record (which
could have been reopened), although it was of clear relevance.
In view of these facts I must conclude that much of the critical information dealing with the
relative length and quality of C.’s and W.’s experience cannot be considered in this
proceeding. This includes a considerable part of the testimony of R., part owner of
Dependable Engineering, Supervisor S., who selected C., and C. himself.
When the relevant and admissible testimony is considered, and the meager prior record
evaluated. it is apparent that a "head and shoulders" case has not been established. Note,
for example, the following:
Promotions to the Checker position have customarily been made from the ranks of
Draftsman—Designer—Senior. There is a presumption (rebuttable of course) that a
competent Designer will make a competent Checker, particularly if he has fulfilled the
Checker work requirements of the apprenticeship program.
Supervisor S., who made the January 1971 selection, had very little experience
supervising W., having been appointed to his position only a few months before (on
September 1, 1970). He was only slightly familiar with W.’s work prior to September 1970
(when S. served as a Production Engineer). He had never checked W.’s work himself. He
had received no negative reports concerning W.’s work.
There is nothing in the record concerning either W.’s prior merit ratings or evaluations of
his prior supervisors.
There is nothing in the record concerning C.’s merit ratings or evaluations of his prior
supervisors (or of S., for that matter).
The record which may properly be considered here contains no information concerning
specific assignments accomplished by C. which would demonstrate his marked superiority.
Supervisor S. characterized C.’s work as "competent."
The only justification for selecting C. in preference to W. which was mentioned in the prior
record was the length of C.’s pre-Oldsmobile experience. The information provided, in fact,
consisted principally of an excerpt from the Company’s Personnel files listing names of
employers, classifications held and years of employment. While this certainly is the starting
place for a comparative analysis, it does not constitute, in and of itself, the kind of evidence
which is required to demonstrate "head and shoulders" superiority. It may be the skeleton,
but flesh and blood are needed.
While Supervisor S. was apparently familiar with C.’s work even prior to 1967 (when C.
worked on Oldsmobile designs for Dependable Engineering), his knowledge of C.’s work in
this prior period was not shared with the Union or entered into the record prior to the
Umpire hearing.
Had all the relevant facts concerning W. and C. been revealed during the processing of
this case, Management might well have prevailed. But the information on which
Management can legitimately rely here is not sufficient to meet its burden of proof.
Consequently, by proper application of the "head and shoulders" doctrine, I must declare
C.’s promotion in preference to W. to have been improper.
Pursuant to the parties’ agreement, the matter will now be remanded to them for
consideration of who should have been promoted and how much back pay that person is
entitled to receive.
DECISION
1. The record does not substantiate C.’s promotion to Draftsman—Checker on

January 25, 1971, to have been a proper one.
2. The case is remanded to the parties for determination of who should have
been promoted and how much back pay that person is entitled to receive.
3. If the parties are unable to reach a mutually agreeable settlement of these

matters, any open questions may be submitted to the Umpire for final
resolution.
January 23, 1973
Arthur Stark
Associate Umpire
Rolf Valtin
Umpire
No. N-51
January 24, 1973
Discharge;
Shop Rules Respectively Covering Absence Without Reasonable Cause
and
Repeated Violations of Shop Rules;
Evidence;
Extent of Penalty
GRIEVANCE:
Grievance 842371
"Charge Mgt. With giving me an unjust & unfair Discharge. Request that I be reinstated
and paid for all benefits lost." S/J.T.S.
In the Matter of:

Union No. 34
and
file://C:\Users\bobology\AppData\Local\Temp\Framework\n-051_13A7156A.htm 3/22/2011
General Motors Corporation, GMAD Lakewood Plant, Atlanta, Georgia -- Appeal Case N-
130
OPINION
At the time of his discharge—April 1, 1971 -- grievant S. was a first-shift Assembler in the
Passenger Chassis Department. He had seniority dating from August 5, 1965. His prior
disciplinary record was as follows:
4/20/70 Written Failure to report for work upon end of lunch

Reprimand period.
4/30/70 1-day DLO Shop Rule 17: "Making scrap unnecessarily,

or careless workmanship."
5/11/70 2-day DLO Shop Rule 17:
5/18/70 1-week DLO Shop Rule 17:
6/22/70 2-week DLO Violation of the terms of the settlement of Local Demand No. 44: "This
demand was resolved on Management’s statement that employees who
are not adjudged by Plant Medical Department Personnel as too ill to
continue at work will be granted an exit pass at their insistence to see
their personal physician, provided satisfactory medical evidence is
submitted to the foreman on the shift when he returns to work."
7/14/70 30-day DLO Violation of the terms of the settlement of
Local Demand No. 44
9/12/70 Discharge Violation of the terms of the settlement of

subsequently Local Demand No. 44
converted to a 30-day DLO
The following is a summary of the factual framework surrounding the incident which led to
the grievant’s discharge:
The annual deadline for obtaining new automobile tags in Georgia is April 1. April 1 itself is
still "good" for the old tags, and the old tags can legally be used thereafter so long as the
user has proof that he applied for new tags prior to the midnight, April 1-2, deadline.
At about the middle of the shift on Tuesday, March 30, 1971, S. spoke to his foreman,
Foreman W. Stating that he had not previously been able to afford to pay the renewal fee,
S. told Foreman W. that he wished to go to the Courthouse on the following day to obtain
new tags and that he therefore would be late in coming to work. According to S., Foreman
W. merely smiled and said nothing. According to Foreman W., he (Foreman W.) rejected
the stated reason as proper grounds for absence or lateness and, when S. said "well, I’ve
got to go to get my license plates", told S. "I can’t excuse you for that, and I expect you to
be on the job at 6:30". (6:30 AM -- 3:00 PM were the first-shift hours.) As to this conflict
between the testimony of S. and that of Foreman W., the Umpire believes that he must
accept Foreman W.’s version as the correct one. S. showed himself as less than a reliable
witness in a number of ways, and the Umpire cannot help but agree with the Company that
the thrust of the Union’s case would have been different if S.’s version were the correct
one—that the Union, rather than picture Foreman W. as a hard-nosed foreman who erred
in not accepting the stated grounds as reasonable cause for absence or lateness, would
have argued that there was tacit approval for S.’s absenting himself and that the question
of reasonable cause or the lack of it therefore did not need to be confronted.
On the following day, March 31, 1971, S. did not come to work. He accounts for the day as
follows: that he left his home at 6:30 AM, drove to the Courthouse and arrived there at 7
AM; that a long line had already formed and that he had successively to get into two
lines— one to pay the tax, the other to obtain the tags; that it was about noon when he was
through with the two transactions; that he drove home to change into work clothes; that,
upon arriving at his home, he called the plant and was told that he should come in; that,
when he came out of his house upon changing clothes, he found a flat tire on his car; that,
as he was in the process of changing the tire, an Investigator from the plant (Management
confirms that it send the Investigator) arrived and engaged S. in conversation; that S.
showed the Investigator the new tags and the papers which substantiated that the tags had
been obtained that day; that the combination of conversing with the Investigator and
completing the tire change brought the time to about 2 PM; and that S. at this stage figured
that there no longer was any use in going to work.
At the beginning of the shift on the next day, April 1, 1971, S. was given a disciplinary
interview (attended by his Committeeman, a Labor Relations supervisor, and Foreman
W.). In substance, S. provided the just-given account of the preceding day. Management
declined to accept it as a satisfactory reason for the absence and, as indicated at the
topical heading, discharged S. under Shop Rules 6 and 41, respectively covering "Absence
without reasonable cause" and "Repeated violations of shop or safety rules".
Because each party has presented its position with skillful elaboration and with supporting
excerpts from prior Umpire Decisions, a mere summary of what the parties are saying may
do them an injustice. Nevertheless, in the interest of brevity and because it suffices to
show the essence of the difference between the parties, the Umpire will state only their
main points.
The Union’s alternative position is: 1) that S. did not violate Shop Rule 6 -- i.e., that his
absence was not without reasonable cause; and 2) that, even if the Umpire were to find
that S. erred in staying away from work to get the tags, the discharge penalty should be
modified as too severe.
As to the first part of its position, the Union submits that the case should be judged, not in
terms of the might-have-beens (reference being mostly to the facts that the tag-renewal
period runs from January 1 to April 1, that the Courthouse office which issues new tags is
open until 5 PM on week days and until noon on Saturdays, and that S.’s department
worked on only one Saturday in the first quarter of 1971), but in terms of the situation
which confronted S. at the time in question. When seen in that light, what was true was
that the deadline was at hand and that S. needed to obtain new tags. Obtaining them
represented the kind of valid personal-business reason for which he should rightfully have
been excused from work. An employee with a bad disciplinary record has the same right
as an employee with a good disciplinary record to have the reason for his request to be
absent or late considered on its merit. And with respect to S.’s not coming in at all on the
day, his detention at home after he had obtained the new tags was brought on by the flat
tire and the presence of the plant Investigator—events for which S. obviously cannot be
blamed.
As to the second part of its position—the extend-of-penalty part— the Union submits that
the admittedly bad disciplinary record falls into a relatively brief period of about five
months; that the bad must be weighed against the good; that the good is represented by
nearly five years of an unblemished record; that nearly six years of seniority are not to be
dismissed as something brief and of little consequence, as the Company urges; and that S.
was not once absent from the time the plant resumed operations (in late January, following
the 1970-71 strike) to the time here in question.
Contrarily, the Company takes the position: 1) that S. was indeed absent without
reasonable cause—and, moreover, was absent contrary to the specific and perfectly
proper instructions of his foreman; and 2) that there is nothing sufficiently appealing in
either the length or the quality of S.’s service to justify a modification of the discharge
penalty.
With respect to the absence itself, the chief assertions which the Company makes are
these: that, as S. had asked for and been denied permission to be off, he cannot be
viewed as a poor soul who happened to make an erroneous judgment; that practically
everyone else owns a car and manages to take care of the annual tag-renewal chore
without taking time off and that S. is thus in effect asking that he be given privileged status;
that S. has owned cars for some ten years and hence is not someone who lacks familiarity
with either the renewal requirement itself or with the fact that the entire first quarter of the
year is available for taking care of the requirement; that S.’s "not previously enough
money" excuse does not stand up, for he had substantial earnings in week after week
starting with the end of January; that there were several Saturdays on which S. could have
obtained the tags, for it was on but one Saturday in the entire 3-month period that he was
scheduled for work; that he had ample time on his workdays to obtain the tags—his shift
ends at 3 PM, the tag issuing office is open until 5 PM, and S. lives but 5-6 miles from the
plant and but 3-4 miles from the Courthouse; and that, aside from all these points, there is
every reason to believe that S. never intended to come in at all on this day—it is incredible
that five hours would have been consumed in obtaining the tags and S. has advanced no
good reason (his job is admittedly not a dirty job) as to why he could not have worn his
work clothes and thus have been in a position to drive directly to the plant upon obtaining
the tags.
On the extent-of-penalty issue, the Company argues that S. is nowhere near the sort of
long service employee who might be given special consideration; that S.’s disciplinary
record clearly is an appalling one— and, indeed, one which includes two 30-day DLO’s;
that most of the infractions are concerned with S.’s not being at work when he should have
been at work; and that it is the fact of a bad disciplinary record, not whether it may have
been incurred over a relatively short or a relatively long span of time, which matters.
The Umpire will similarly proceed on the two issue basis. He has concluded that he must
uphold the Company on both issues.
In approaching the first issue, the Umpire has been mindful of what clearly has to be
granted: that, insofar as S. was absent to obtain the tags (i.e., overlooking the question of
whether it can reasonably be accepted that it took him 5 hours to obtain them), it was not
for frivolous reasons that S. was absent. Obtaining auto tags is a public requirement and it
involves both trouble and expense. It is an unpleasurable obligation, akin to going to the
dentist rather than to going fishing or to going to a ball game or the like. To this extent, one
is in the area of "reasonable cause"; and it seems to the Umpire to follow that an absence
("absence" is here used in the broad sense and is not intended to connote a whole shift)
for the purpose of procuring auto tags would have to be countenanced if their procurement
during working hours is the only realistically practical alternative.
But it cannot legitimately be held that such was here the case. The evidence is clear that:
the grievant was fully familiar with the tag-renewal requirement in all its aspects; Georgia
makes a 3-month period available in which to take care of the tag renewal requirement;
there was but one Saturday in that period in which the grievant worked at the plant; and his
shift hours and the distances between the plant and his home and the Courthouse were
such that there were untold opportunities to obtain the tags upon the end of one of his
workdays. To hold, in the face of these facts, that S. was entitled to be absent (wholly or
partially) on March 30 to procure the tags would be tantamount to holding that an
employee’s obligation to show up for scheduled working hours is so limited and fragile as
to properly give way where the employee prefers to use working hours rather than his own
time to procure tags.
The grievant claims, of course, that it was not until the time in question that he could afford
to pay the fee for the tags (he referred to the strike as the cause of it). The Umpire agrees
with the Company that this is too much to accept. No details by way of substantiation were
presented, and it is noteworthy that S. purchased not one, but two sets of tags on the day
in question (one for his car, and the other for his self-owned taxi). Given his earnings in the
preceding weeks, and given the absence of a showing that there were pressing debts, it
cannot be accepted that S. was as destitute as he in effect asserts. If in fact he lacked the
funds for the tags at an earlier stage, it can only be concluded that it was by his preference
or poor planning that he failed to hold back the funds for the tags until the last week. And if
that be true, it is the Umpire’s considered opinion that S. was obligated to procure the tags
upon the end of the shift on one of the days in the week or, if the lines of people at the
Courthouse were so long as to make this impossible or unduly burdensome, to procure the
tags on the forthcoming Saturday. To wait until the Saturday would have meant foregoing
the use of the car and using the bus on but one day (Friday, April 2). This would have been
an inconvenience; but, in the opinion of the Umpire, the inconvenience would have had to
be regarded as the fair price for the prior procrastinating or poor planning. S. could not
legitimately presume to take time off from work to make up for it.
Furthermore, the Company is quite right in pointing up the fact that S. had the word from
his foreman that he (the foreman) would not accept getting tags as proper grounds for S.’s
taking time off from work. Shop Rule 6 having been invoked, this is not an insubordination
case. But the Company is right in saying that the conversation between S. and his foreman
precludes a conclusion that S. made an unknowing mistake. Indeed, the fact that S. did not
consult his Committeeman upon the conversation with the foreman indicates that he
considered himself on weak grounds and thus knowingly took a substantial risk.
The conclusion which the Umpire has here come to with respect to the "reasonable cause"
question is essentially a matter of applying the following from Decision G-156:
"Absence without reasonable cause is certainly grounds for

discipline, but the concept of reasonable cause is as broad as
necessary to maintain appropriate balance between the demands of
the job on the one side, and personal and family needs on the other,
conflict between which, at one time or another, confronts every
employee.
"Where as here an employee is absent without permission, it is

incumbent upon him to show that such absence was necessitated
by personal consideration which by accepted standards outweighed
his duty to his employer to be present during working hours."
In the Umpire’s judgment, the proper application of the phrase "by accepted standards"
requires the holding that the procurement of auto tags under the circumstances of the
present case did not constitute reasonable cause for taking time off from work. This is not
to say, of course, that there might not be plants where the procurement of auto tags is by
practice sanctioned as reasonable cause for absence. Obviously, where this is true, the
practice rather than the Umpire’s judgment would govern in applying the phrase "by
accepted standards". No such practice, however, has here been shown to exist. To the
contrary, the Union’s thrust in the case—that it is not the might-have-beens but the
situation which confronted the grievant at the time in question which must be made to
matter—indicates that there is no practice at this plant which would routinely permit taking
time off from work to procure auto tags. And though the Union has shown that Foreman W.
has on occasion permitted one or another employee to leave the plant for awhile even for
pleasurable purposes (it is in this context that the Union makes the argument that an
employee’s disciplinary record must not serve to affect the intrinsic merit of a request to be
absent or late), the Umpire does not believe that there is enough in this to alter his
judgment as to what the phrase "by accepted standards" must properly be taken to mean.
Involved are situations where the foreman, largely in recognition of the employee’s
exemplary attendance record, gave the employee permission to take off even though the
Shop Rule would have justified denying the request. They were exceptional situations, and
the Umpire does not believe that they can be taken as rendering a practice which either
bound the foreman to the granting of S.’s request or precludes the Umpire from exercising
his judgment as to the proper application of the Shop Rule in the present instance.
As already stated, the Umpire believes that he must also rule against the Union on the
extent-of-penalty issue. He agrees that six years of seniority are not lightly to be dismissed
as the equivalent of mere rookie status and he agrees that more than ordinary scrutiny is
warranted where five of the six years were without disciplinary blemish. But he does not
believe that there is enough in either of these considerations to justify the modification of
the discharge penalty. S.’s disciplinary record itself is such as to outweigh these
considerations. All of the following are true: 1) four of the seven entries are concerned with
S.’s being away from work when he should have been at work; 2) only about a month after
receiving a 2-week DLO for violating the terms of the settlement of Local Demand No. 44,
the grievant committed the very same offense and received a 30-day DLO; 3) despite this,
and a mere two months later, the grievant once more committed the offense; 4) discharged
at this stage, the grievant was brought back to work through the Union’s efforts in
connection with the strike-settlement negotiations; 5) disallowing the strike as working
time, it was again a mere two months later that the present offense occurred. It seems to
the Umpire that there is no realistic escaping the conclusion that both parties have already
exerted themselves to walk the last mile with the grievant. To order the Company to
reinstate the grievant would be, not to apply, but to prostitute the corrective-discipline
notions which the Company has over the years been directed to follow.
DECISION
January 24, 1973
/S/Rolf Valtin
Umpire
No. N-67
JUNE 15, 1973
Discharge Of Probationary Employee
With More Than 30 Days Of Service
On Grounds Of Irregular Attendance
GRIEVANCE:
GM ASSEMBLY DIVISION, GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, SOUTH GATE

PLANT, SOUTH GATE, CALIFORNIA—APPEAL N-1609
Grievance 612400
"I protest as unjust my termination as an unsatisfactory temporary employee for alleged

irregular attendance. Request I be reinstated with no loss of accumulating time and pay for
all time lost."
Amended to read:
"Protest management unjustly discharging me as an alleged Unsatisfactory Temporary

Employee (Irregular Attendance). Request that I be reinstated with all time lost applied
toward acquiring seniority; further request that I be paid all time lost plus benefits lost due
to Management’s error." S/K.D.
UMPIRE’S DECISION
In the Matter of:


Union No. 216
and
General Motors Corporation, GMAD South Gate Plant, South Gate, California -- Appeal
Case N-1609
OPINION
Grievant D. was hired at the plant on September 5, 1972. She initially worked as a
"Stockman" in the Material Department and thereafter was transferred to the classification
of "Clean and Grind" in the Body Shop. She was discharged on November 6, 1972, on the
stated grounds of "unsatisfactory employee—irregular attendance". As she admittedly has
passed the 30-day point of her employment but admittedly was still within the 90-day
probationary period, the question is whether her discharge was "for cause" as given at
D.’s period of employment at the plant covered 44 working days. She lost about 20 percent
of her working time—being absent for her entire shift on eight occasions, leaving the plant
after working about 2 hours on one occasion, and being 6 minutes late in coming to work
on another occasion.
The Umpire is disregarding the one occasion of lateness. There are cases in which
tardiness and absences are properly lumped under the general heading of poor
attendance. But the Company’s concern in the present case clearly has been with D.’s
absences; and the one occasion of tardiness must properly be seen as an isolated
instance which does not form part of a pattern to be held against her. Nor, clearly, could a
lone instance of 6 minutes’ tardiness—whether or not incurred by transportation difficulties,
as alleged—itself be accepted as sufficient grounds for discharge under the "for cause"
standard of Paragraph (56).
Thus left are eight days on which D. was absent for the entire shift and one day on which
she left after being at the plant for about 2 hours. Ailments of one sort or another were the
grounds given for the absences on all nine occasions. The following is a summary in
tabular form:
Friday
9/29/72 Tooth extraction. Reported for work (second

shift) but was advised not to go to work because of
combined effect of extraction and medication.
Monday
10/2/72 Absent because of tooth extraction on previous

Friday.
Monday
10/23/72 Reported to Medical Department upon coming

to work. She was diagnosed as suffering from upper
respiratory infection and sinusitis and she was advised to
go home and see her own doctor. She did so and his
diagnosis was the same.
Tuesday
10/24/72 Absent for same condition.
Wednesday
Thursday
Monday
10/30/72 Absent because of "personal problems".
Thursday
11/2/72 Went to Medical Department about 2 hours after

start of her shift. Complained both of her previous upper-
respiratory-infection problem and of metal-poisoning
problem. Released from work via medical pass.
Thereupon saw outside doctor, who made these
diagnoses: upper respiratory disease, mild intestinal flu,
cystitis and mild kidney infection, mild pelvic
inflammatory disease. She was given S&A coverage on
this basis from 11/3/72 to 11/12/72.
Friday
11/3/72 Absent because of just-given condition.
The essence of the Company’s position is that the Agreement continues to have a 90-day
probationary period despite repeated and major efforts by the Union in past negotiations to
shorten the period; that the very idea of a probationary period is to give Management a
chance to test an employ’s suitability; that the question of suitability does not go merely to
the observance of Shop Rules—does not go merely to whether or not an employee can
stay clear of disciplinary action—but goes also to such matters as coordinated effort with
fellow workers, adjustment to the various demands of plant life, and regular attendance;
that a 20 percent absence rate is clearly excessive; that some of D.’s absences, though
they were never directly challenged by Management, are nevertheless subject to
skepticism—about half of her absences occurred on a Friday or Monday, one of the

absences came three days after the tooth extraction had been performed, another
occasion on which she claimed to be ill was the day on which she got married, and the
"personal problems" day was not a day falling within her menstrual period (at least not by
what is revealed in her employment application form); but that, in any event, her
absenteeism was such as to make her a poor employment risk—and a poor employment
risk is fundamentally what a probationary period is designed to protect Management
against.
Contrarily, the essence of the Union’s position is that, though true that the Agreement
contains a 90-day probationary period, it is equally true that the Agreement requires a "for
cause" showing once an employee has passed the 30-day point; that the "for cause"
phrase found at Paragraph (56) is the same as that found at Paragraph (8) and therefore
must be similarly applied; that D. was discharged, not for any absences without reasonable
cause, but for a series of illnesses; that illness is something beyond a person’s control and
therefore cannot applied as constituting "cause" for discharge; that the fact alone that D.
was absent for about 20 percent of the time is not enough to support discharge—one must
look to the reason for the absences and, when this is here done, neither a chronic
condition nor proneness to be ill is revealed; that the sick-leave provisions of Paragraph
(106) do not make a distinction between a probationary employee and a seniority
employee; and that to uphold the Company in the present case would amount to a holding
either that a probationary employee is required to be a superhuman person or that the
Company is free to discharge a probationary employee merely by saying that he or she is
too sickly to be kept in employment.
Both because this is his first case involving the discharge of a probationary employee who
has gone beyond the 30-day point and because both parties have made certain arguments
which ought to be treated, the Umpire deems it necessary and appropriate first to proceed
with a discussion of a general orienting nature.
Contractually speaking, the basic problem in the case concerns the proper application of
the "for cause" phrase in Paragraph (56). Insofar as it covered probationary employees,
the phrase initially came into the Agreement in 1945 pursuant to a directive of the War
Labor Board. It was removed from the Agreement in 1948; and it was then reinserted
through the parties’ own negotiating process in 1955. The Company’s arguments to the
contrary notwithstanding, the Umpire can see no significance deriving from how and when
the phrase came into the Agreement. He will deal straightforwardly with the presence of
the phrase and the context in which it appears.
To refer to the context, the Umpire believes, is to reject the Union’s reliance on the
appearance of the same phrase in Paragraph (8). It is true that the identical "for cause"
phrase appears at both places and that one would normally expect the same words in one
Agreement to have the same meaning. But "for cause" is itself a general and elastic term,
and it would be clear error to pursue an application which fails to distinguish between a
probationary employee and a seniority employee. Nor could such an application be
squared with Umpire precedent under the Agreement. Whereas "for cause" with respect to
a seniority employee has over the years been developed to incorporate such notions as
corrective discipline and varying severity of discipline based on length of service and the
prior disciplinary record, nothing of the sort is found in "for cause" Decisions covering
probationary employees. Of the five Decisions respecting probationary employees to which

the Umpire has been referred, two were in favor of the Union and three were in favor of the
Company. One of the Decisions in which the Union was upheld (E-81) will be dealt with
below.
The other one (E-165) turned entirely on the state of the evidence:
Management failed to prove its charge against the grievant that she had been inefficient
and had failed to follow supervisory instructions. And as to the three Decisions (E-115, K-
75 and L-102) in which the Company was upheld, it can legitimately be said that they were
geared to the peculiar considerations involving probationary employees and that the
discharge in none of them would have been upheld had the employees been seniority
employees with satisfactory prior disciplinary records.
It would be equally wrong, however, to pursue an application under which the "for cause"
phrase in Paragraph (56) would have so little force as to leave no real distinction between
a probationary employee who has not yet reached the 30-day point and a probationary
employee who has gone beyond it. It is unusual, in the Umpire’s experience, to find an
Agreement which provides for two classes of probationary employees. But this is exactly
what the GM-UAW Agreement does. Though there is one and the same 90-day
probationary period for all new employees, those who have not reached the 30-day point
are without recourse if laid off or discharged whereas those who have gone beyond that
point may appeal their layoff or discharge as lacking in "cause". And once this right of
appeal has been granted, the Umpire believes, it would be quite as wrong to vitiate the
right to meaningless proportions as it would be to cease to appreciate that the employee
situated between the 30-day point and the 90-day point is nevertheless still a probationary
employee.
Therein lies the difficulty. On the one hand, for the reasons just given, one cannot apply
the "for cause" phrase in a fashion which would yield the same protection against
discharge for probationary employees as "for cause" under Paragraph (8) has come to
yield for seniority employees. On the other hand, unless one is prepared to say that there
is in the end no difference between an employee who has not yet reached the 30-day point
and an employee who has gone beyond it, one cannot apply the "for cause" phrase of
Paragraph (56) so that it has the mere meaning of a "a reason" or "some reason" or "not
without reason". For the difference between a subjective disinclination by Supervision to
keep an employee—which, for lack of recourse by the employee until he reaches the 30-
day point, is what Supervision is in a position to exercise—and providing some objective
reason for the discharge could often be an elusive one. Assume that D. would have been
discharged solely for coming in 6 minutes late on the particular morning (and that the
lateness was her own fault). There would be no gainsaying the fact that her discharge was
for "a reason" or "some reason" or "not without reason". But there would also be a
discharge for so flimsy a cause as to leave no real difference from a discharge based on
the color of an employee’s hair. The point—that the "for cause" phrase cannot be reduced
to the mere meaning of "a reason" or "some reason" or "not without reason"—is also made
by Decision E-81. There, six female employees were terminated in response to six male
employees becoming available to take their place. The Company asserted that the action
had been taken in the interest of improved efficiency. Umpire Seward made it clear that he
was not passing on the merits of that contention and held, simply, that an employ’s sex
alone could not be accepted as satisfying the "for cause" standard. Restating the holding
for the purpose of what the Umpire is here seeking to say, it was a holding that not every
reason advanced in support of the discharge of a probationary employee—even a reason
which does not have the defect of being plain arbitrary or capricious—can be
countenanced as adding up to "cause" under Paragraph (56).
To say, however, that the Company has to present something substantial is not to revert to
the proposition that "for cause" under Paragraph (56) is the equivalent of "for cause" under
Paragraph (8). To the contrary, it has to be kept in mind that it is a probationary employee
with respect to whom the Company has acted and that the considerations of lack of
suitability and poor employment risk are exactly and uniquely what the probationary period
is all about. Indeed, were this not so, one would have to wonder why the Union, having
previously gained the "for cause" protection of Paragraph (56) with respect to an employee
who has reached the 30-day point, persistently sought to shorten the 90-day probationary
period. It is relevant that the Company prevailed in its insistence that the probationary
period be kept that long and that it did so on the basis of extensive position papers which
explained the reasons for its insistence—e.g. the desirability that Supervision have a
chance to try employees out on more than one job; the fact that hiring characteristically
takes place in unsettled circumstances—when new production lines are established, new
work groups formed, shifts added, and new foremen assigned; the fact that it is to the
advantage of new employees not to force Supervision to a decision within 30 days
(because doubtful cases would likely be resolved in favor of the Company’s efficiency
interests); the fact that poor work habits might be kept under control and thus not surface
in a brief, 30-day period; and the fact that experience had shown this was particularly true
of absenteeism—that 40 percent of the probationary employees who were discharged for
absenteeism were employees who had gone beyond the 30-day point.
The entire foregoing discussion should be read as representing the approach which the
Umpire believes must be taken in a case involving the discharge of a probationary
employee who has gone beyond the 30-day point. It is, of course, an approach marked by
imprecision and weaving. But the Umpire has found it unavoidable, given the Agreement’s
built-in conflicting factors. The task is to balance things as best one can.
The Umpire is holding for the Company in the present case. He agrees with the Union that
not every illness or other incapacitation which may be incurred by an employee during his
or her probationary period can serve to add up to "cause" under Paragraph (56) -- consider
such clearly one-shot afflictions as a broken leg or an appendectomy. But D.’s case, it
seems to the Umpire, must be contrasted rather than likened to that sort of predicament. In
her case, there were a series of ailments, and largely unrelated ones; the alleged ailments
for two of her days of absence are questionable on their face and would be substantiated,
rather than merely asserted, by a responsible person—reference is to: 1) an absence on a
Monday on account of a tooth extraction performed on the preceding Friday, and 2) the
convenient nature of the "personal problems" excuse when nothing of the sort had
previously kept her from coming to the plant; and, even assuming no factual difficulties as
to any of the asserted ailments, the ailments were so frequent as to reduce D. to a
practically on-again-off-again employee and as to legitimately cause Management to
believe that the reservation expressed by the Medical Department in connection with her
pre-hire examination—obesity and poor hygiene— should have been heeded. It is not
without harshness but it inheres in the fact that D. was a probationary employee: the
Umpire believes that Management justifiably released her as a poor employment risk.
DECISION
July 15, 1973
/S/Rolf Valtin
Umpire
No. N-81
DECEMBER 9, 1973
Whether or Not Non-Payment of 4 Hours’ Call-In Pay
in the Circumstances
Constituted Violation of Paragraph (80) of National Agreement
GRIEVANCE:
The Grievance:
"Paragraph 80 of the National Agreement was violated in the following representative

circumstances:
On April 18, 1973, Management at GMAD—St. Louis discontinued work for hundreds of
employees after they worked less than four (4) hours. The Union was advised that such
employees would not be paid for up to four (4) hours call-in pay. Demand the affected
employees be paid in accordance with the Agreement."
Amended to change date to April 17, 1973.
The grievance is upheld as given in the Opinion. The Company is directed to pay the
grievants on the two shifts on April 17 the difference between the time for which they were
paid and the 4 hours’ minimum provided for in Paragraph (80) of the National Agreement.
(Entire decision should be read)
In the Matter of:

file://C:\Users\bobology\AppData\Local\Temp\Framework\n-081_13A72F6F.htm 3/22/2011
Union No. 25
and
General Motors Corporation, GM Assembly Division St. Louis Plant, St. Louis, Missouri --
International Union Appeal Case N-1
OPINION
This grievance covers some 3,000 employees—about 1,500 employees on each of the two
shifts—who manned the passenger-car line on April 17, 1973. April 17 was a day within an
approximately 2-month period during which the line was run at a speed of 48.7 units per
hour. There were numerous shifts in the period on which the line was shut down prior to
the completion of 4 hours of work. On April 17, the line was shut down 1.9 hours after the
start of the first shift and 1.6 hours after the start of the second shift. Except for repair
personnel, the employees on each of the shifts were sent home upon the shutdown of the
line and paid 1.9 hours and 1.6 hours, respectively on the first shift and the second shift.
The question is whether they were entitled to receive the 4 hours’ pay provided for in
That provision is titled CALL-IN PAY and reads as follows:
"Any employee called to work or permitted to come to work without

having been properly notified that there will be no work, shall
receive a minimum of four hours’ pay at the regular hourly rate,
except in cases of labor disputes, or other conditions beyond the
control of the Local Management."
The evidence is lengthy (some 50 witnesses were heard from); the parties are in dispute
as to certain factual areas; and there are a very large number and variety of contentions
and counter-contentions. The Umpire will move directly to a statement of what he sees as
the relevant background and the immediate facts. The statement will incorporate his
findings in the disputed factual areas.
What had formerly been a complex with a Chevrolet side and a Fisher side was merged
into one GMAD facility in October, 1971. The Union suggests that this is the origin of the
difficulties which were here experienced— that labor relations deteriorated and that the
deterioration was attributable to GMAD’s stance as a hard taskmaster, bent on increasing
work pace and output per man-hour. The Company agrees that severe labor-relations
problems set in with the GMAD takeover but points elsewhere for the cause of it.
Late January, 1972, saw a top-level meeting in Detroit to see what could be done to
alleviate the situation and perhaps make a fresh start. An agreement was reached by
which Management would "pay and clear" all so-called job-related disciplines and the
Union would withdraw all grievances protesting production standards—so-called "78"
grievances. (At the time, there were 361 pending job-related disciplines and 1,175 pending
"78" grievances.)
The agreement did not have the desired results: by the fall of 1972, a hostile and
acrimonious relationship was again in being. It was accompanied by a huge rise in the
volume of grievances, by three strike authorizations, and by one actual "mini" strike. There
followed a further high-level meeting in February, 1973. Its principal outcome was an
agreement to experiment in certain ways to reduce the volume of written grievances. The
experiment had but limited success.
The passenger-car line in these turbulent months ran at a speed of 57.7 units per hour.
There came a point, in late October, 1972, where all the work-standard disputes at this line
speed seemed to have been settled. This, however, proved illusory.
As of March 26, 1973, the line began to be operated at a speed of 48.7 units per hour. The
line was operated at this speed through May 21, 1973. This is the approximately 2-month
period referred to above. Management says that its decision to go to the 48.7 line speed
was based on: 1) excessive absenteeism, 2) an unmanageable volume of grievances, and
3) market conditions. The reduction in the line speed brought the layoff of about 760
employees.
In going to the 48.7 line speed, Management let the Union know that it intended to operate
without resorting to job-related disciplines. The main reasons which the Company gives for
the fact that this approach was adopted are that massive resort to job-related discipline
had proved ineffective, if not counterproductive; that job-related discipline had repeatedly
been responded to with acts of sabotage (there were over 4,000 instances of sabotage at
the plant in the approximately 1-1/2-year period from the GMAD takeover to the end of
March, 1973); and that the Union itself, at least at the International level, had urged that
confrontations should be avoided and that problems should be worked out cooperatively.
A reduction in line speed from 57.7 to 48.7 units per hour is steep enough to require
substantial revamping of work elements and manpower arrangements per work station. It
is also inevitable that some employees will have a somewhat greater workload and others
will have a somewhat smaller workload than they did at the former line speed. Old work
arrangements simply cannot be superimposed on the new line speed. In recognition of
this—to allow employees to become familiar with changed work stations and changed work
tasks—Management directed line stops at various intervals and of various durations in the
first few days of operation at the 48.7 line speed. March 30 was the first day for which the
line was scheduled to operate without stops.
Difficulties in getting quality work done in timely fashion developed almost from the start of
the operations at the 48.7 line speed. The chief bottlenecks were the Headliner Hang area
(Soft Trim Department) and the Cushion Room (in which the difficulties were more
pronounced on the second shift than on the first shift). Though to a lesser extent than
these two areas, the Hard Trim Department was also a major source of defective and
incomplete work.
The result was that Management was faced with an inordinate volume of repairs. The term
"repairs" connotes both the correction of defective work and the making-up of missed work.
What Management did in response to the presence of the excessive volume of repairs was
to shut down the line for the rest of the shift at such times as the defective units had
accumulated to a point where the remainder of the shift would be needed to make the
repairs. Thus, the line employees were sent home early and the repair employees
remained at work. The evidence is not completely clear that this was done on all the "short
hour" shifts in the approximately 2-month period. But the evidence does permit that
inference, as it is established that repair personnel at no time worked overtime hours in the
period. In any event, as to April 17, it is undisputed that the line was shut down at the 1.9-
hour point on the first shift and at the 1.6-hour point on the second shift in order to permit
the necessary repairs to be completed by the (8-hour) end of each of the shifts. It is also
undisputed that the entire repair force on April 17 stayed on and worked until the end of
each of the shifts. This—more than six hours of repair work per less than 2 hours of
assembly work—obviously serves to show that the volume of repairs was excessive in the
extreme.
It is useful, by means of the following table, to give the overall picture for the "48.7" period:
Line Hours- Line Hours-
Date First Shift Second Shift
March 26 8.0 8.0
March 27 8.0 5.8
March 28 3.5 2.0
March 29 2.8 2.4
March 30 2.5 2.7
April 2 2.7 1.7
April 3 1.5 2.0
April 4 2.0 1.5
April 5 2.2 1.5
April 6 3.5 1.5
April 9 5.2 1.6
April 10 4.7 1.5
April 11 5.8 1.6
April 12 6.5 3.5
April 13 6.5 3.7
April 16 5.2 4.0

April 17 1.9 1.6
April 18 1.7 1.5
April 19 1.5 1.5
April 23 2.0 1.5
April 24 2.0 2.0
April 25 3.0 1.4
April 26 3.5 1.5
April 27 2.2 1.3
April 30 2.2 2.2
May 14 .2 1.4
May 27 .0 1.2
May 38 .0 1.2
May 48 .0 1.3
May 78 .0 1.4
May 84 .2 1.7
May 91 .6 2.3
May 10 4.2 1.5
May 11 2.8 1.6
May 14 8.0 1.5
May 15 7.2 1.7
May 16 4.2 2.5
May 17 8.2 2.5
May 18 8.0 1.9
May 21 8.0 8.0
The following is to be said as to the cause of the excessive repairs. It is true that some 200
"78" grievances were filed during the period and that none of them were settled. With
possibly one minor exception, Management made no concessions. Further, it may
legitimately be assumed that there were a few operations which realistically called for
some alleviation. But, on the evidence presented, the excessive repairs cannot principally
be attributed to work standards which were too tight. The excessive repairs must
principally be attributed, rather, to the deliberate restricting of output on the part of some
100 employees in the three already-identified areas. The evidence is over-whelming that
these were employees who, rather than being overworked, resorted to such tactics as
deliberately fumbling parts and materials, deliberately making excess movements, and
deliberately walking at a snail’s pace. In many instances, moreover, the non-completion of
their tasks meant that designated tasks at subsequent stations could not be accomplished.
Contrary to what the Company is suggesting, however, the Umpire is not prepared to go
the further step and attribute the excessive repairs to a general slowdown. For one thing,
the evidence does not go that far—there is merely the assertion that the conduct of the
100-odd employees is illustrative of what was happening elsewhere in the plant. And for
another, there were many days on which output-restricting employees were pulled off their
jobs and other employees were assigned to take their place. The predominant testimony of
the supervisors who were put on the stand is that these were days of good results. The
principal cause of the excessive repairs, to sum up the Umpire’s finding, was the
obstructionism on the part of some 100 employees in the three areas.
As the above table shows, the line employees worked at least 4 hours on each of the two
shifts on April 16. Also on that day, there was a meeting between certain representatives of
the plant’s Labor Relations Office, the Local Union and the International. Among the things
discussed was the Local’s objection to the use of replacement operators (assertedly as
being violative of the Local Seniority Agreement). Management agreed to bring the regular
operators back on the next day. There is not the slightest indication that Management so
agreed as a bad-faith move to produce short hours on the following day. And it is agreed
that nothing happened on April 16 which would have caused a reasonable Management to
cancel the work schedule for the following day.
At the beginning of each of the two shifts on April 17, Management held the line for 15
minutes to permit the foremen to talk to their employees. The purpose was: 1) to explain
why replacement operators had been brought to some of the jobs and why the regular
operators were at this stage being returned, and 2) to encourage everyone to do their best
so as to obtain 8 hours of production. The talks were in some instances met with cat-calls,
e.g. "to hell with the place—let’s go home now," "hurry up and start the line so we can go
home," "I’m going fishing again," "I don’t give a s—if we work or not," "are you going to call
back the employees that you laid off?" As already noted, April 17 proved to be a dismal
day in terms of the volume of repairs. Subtracting the 15 minutes in which the line was
held, operating time was about 1-1/2 hours per shift. Generated were about 2,300 repair
items on the first shift and about 2,700 repair items on the second shift. And on each shift,
it took the full repair crew the remaining approximately 6 hours to complete the repairs.
Finally to be mentioned as part of the factual framework are the following two points. First,
Management not only told the Union before going to the 48.7 line speed that it intended to
refrain from imposing job-related discipline, but it in fact imposed no such discipline
throughout the "48.7" period (though other types of discipline continued to be assessed).
The absence of any job-related discipline by any supervisor was a matter of policy directive
from top Management. Second, also as a matter of policy directive from top Management,
the repair crews worked no overtime in the "48.7" period. They worked overtime, of course,
in the sense of remaining at work when the line employees went home early. But the repair
employees at no time worked overtime in the conventional, premium-pay sense: the
shutdowns of the line were so timed as to permit the repairs to be done by the end of the
8-hour shift. The complete absence of overtime work by repair crews—particularly at work-
revamping times, e.g. when there is a model change, or style change, or line-speed
change—is a highly unusual state of affairs.
The Umpire wants it understood that he has found himself in substantial sympathy with
Management in this case. He has found it a difficult case because, as he sees it, fairness
and contractual requirement do not fall together. It is of course true that some 3,000
employees should not be made to suffer the loss of earnings for the obstructionism of
some 100 employees. But the Company, too, was made to suffer the loss of earnings—
and, indeed, its objective on the various days obviously was to obtain 8 hours, not merely 4
hours, of production. Nor is it solely a matter of blameworthiness residing in the 100-odd
employees. It is additionally difficult to overlook: that it seems never to have occurred to
the Local Union leadership that its proper role perhaps lay in "sitting on" the obstructionists
and making them own up to their obligations toward the rest of the employees and toward
the Company; that, to the contrary, the replacement operators seem in some instances to
have been made to feel that they were the disloyal ones; that, further, it was at the Union’s
instigation that the replacement operators were removed and the regular operators were
brought back; that the comments heard at the beginning of the shifts on April 17, as quoted
above, are indicative of how determined some of the regular operators were to resume
their obstructionism; that practically any employer, not merely GMAD or GM, would resent
paying overtime wages as a means of making up for the kind of deliberate restriction of
output here presented; and that, against the twofold background of 1) the "pay and clear"
agreement and the Union’s urgings to avoid confrontations and 2) the magnitude of the
sabotage problem in the months when job-related discipline was resorted to (and it is to be
noted that there was no sabotage in the "48.7" period), the fact that Management adopted
a "no job-related discipline" policy for the period is not without understandable origin. All of
these considerations, to say what has already been suggested, pull one in the direction of
siding with the Company. In the Umpire’s considered opinion, however, the case cannot
properly be decided on these bases. As he reads the contractual requirement, he believes
that different views must be taken in applying the present situation to the requirement and
that Management does not stand as absolved from the 4 hours’ call-in pay obligation.
The Company makes three arguments in relation to Paragraph (80). First, it contends that
the present situation is not one to which the opening provision of the paragraph applies.
The provision refers to an employee who is "called to work or permitted to come to work
without having been properly notified that there will be no work." The Company is saying
that the employees in the present case were not such employees—that, rather, they were
employees for whom April 17 was a regularly scheduled day and as to whom there was no
cause (as is conceded) to notify them not to come to work. Second, assuming that the first
argument is rejected, the Company contends that there was here a "labor dispute"—so as
to make operative one of the Paragraph’s exceptions to the payment of 4 hours’ call-in
pay. A "labor dispute" must be found to have existed, the Company elaborates, whether
one views the April 17 situation as generated by overly tight work standards, by deliberate
employee conduct, or by a combination of both. Third, assuming that both of the first two
arguments are rejected, the Company contends that the April 17 situation constituted a
"condition beyond the control of the Local Management"—so as, once more, to make
operative one of the Paragraph’s exceptions to the payment of 4 hours’ call-in pay.
Basically, the Company is here saying that the line employees were sent home early
because of an excessive volume of repairs, that the excessive volume of repairs was the
result of the failure of employees to make an honest work effort, and that Management’s
thus-produced inability properly to operate the plant must be seen as a "condition beyond
the control of the Local Management." With respect to the various steps which the Union
says might have been taken by Management to overcome or alleviate the situation—e.g.,
to retain the replacement operators on the jobs to which they had been brought, to resort
to disciplinary measures against the alleged offenders, to make use of the Yard for repair
purposes, to let the repair employees work overtime—the Company asserts that
Management has no such obligations. To the contrary, the Company submits,
Management has a right profitably to operate rather than have an obligation to limp along
while appeasing employees who refuse to make an honest work effort.
The first, argument, in the opinion of the Umpire, is lacking in merit. The foundation for the
argument—that the provision is of very old vintage, dating back to the days when people
were "called" or "permitted to come" to work under what amounted to shape up
arrangements—seems to be quite correct. But to go from there and argue that employees
are not protected by the call-in pay provision unless they are so "called" or "permitted to
come" to work is a very long leap indeed. It certainly cannot be held that the provision is
obsolete and that the parties somehow overlooked to remove from the Agreement what
has long since become a useless provision. This would be not only intrinsically most
questionable but also contrary to the fact that the provision has come under Umpire
scrutiny a number of times when the "obsolete" argument could have been made and
when it neither was made nor was perceived by independent Umpire analysis. On the
other hand, if the argument is construed as saying that the provision applies only in those
situations where the employees should have been but were not properly notified not to
come to work, it must be rejected for those reasons together with what, in the opinion of
the Umpire, is the plain fallacy of reading the provision as if it applied only to such
employees as were not intended to come to work—as to whom the only problem is that
Management failed to notify them not to come to work. Consider any group of employees
who have come to work pursuant to a regular working schedule and who are sent home
upon working an hour or so because there occurs a severe thunderstorm which knocks out
the plant’s source of power for the rest of the day. Such employees would not be entitled to
4 hours’ call-in pay. But they would not be entitled to it because a condition beyond
Management’s control had arisen, not because they were ineligible to begin with—
ineligible in the sense Management is here in effect urging: that the employees were
regularly scheduled employees rather than employees whom Management had not
intended to come to work but had failed to so notify.
Stated otherwise, the Umpire accepts that Management had no good reason to notify the
grievants not to come to work on April 17 but does not believe that the first provision
thereby rendered Paragraph (80) inoperative for the grievants. Though the language is old
and not geared to the simple implementation of regular working schedules, the Umpire
believes that the grievants are properly seen as employees who were "permitted to come
to work without having been properly notified that there will be no work." To hold otherwise
would be to convert an essentially defensive purpose—i.e., to make sure that employees
who are properly notified not to come to work cannot collect call-in pay by the device of
nonetheless coming to work—into an offensive weapon by which Management would be
absolved of the call-in pay obligation wherever it can show that there was no cause to tell
the employees not to come to work.
The Umpire believes that he must also reject the Company’s second argument. It is of
course true that it would be highly elusive to seek to determine the question of the
existence or non-existence of a labor dispute on the basis of whether one side or the other
was the originator or the resistor or whether it was or became a little bit of both. It is also
unquestionably true that the situation here at issue can be labeled a labor dispute. But so,
broadly speaking, can a multitude of other situations which have their genesis in a
disagreement between labor and management over working conditions of one sort or
another—including, even, a single grievance residing somewhere in the grievance
procedure. The point is that it will not do under Paragraph (80) merely to find and go with
some correct definition of a labor dispute. For, what the language of Paragraph (80) does
is to require the application of only such labor disputes as constitute a condition beyond
Management’s control. This is so because the word "other" appears between the term
"labor disputes" and the phrase "conditions beyond the control of the Local Management."
If the language were without the word "other"—if the language read "except in cases of
labor disputes, or conditions beyond the control of the Local Management"—there would
be two distinct entities, each capable of its own application. But this is not what the
Paragraph says. And to say "or other conditions beyond the control of the Local
Management" is inescapably to say that the condition which is laid down in advance of the
phrase is among such conditions. There is simply no way to get around it; it is as true as a
mathematical fact.
One or two comments of a refining nature should be added. In terms of what would
characteristically be true, the above conclusion has the meaning that "labor disputes"
under Paragraph (80) are labor disputes in which the local parties themselves are not the
disputants—i.e., that reference is to outside labor disputes which affect the operation of the
plant. One such example is found in the case which led to Decision E-1: a national railroad
strike which prevented switching operations at the plant and thereby brought a lack of
available work for employees of the Loading and Shipping Department. But it is not solely
such outside labor disputes which may properly be applied as "labor disputes" under
Paragraph (80). A wildcat strike which occurs after the beginning of a particular shift but
before 4 hours are up and which renders the plant incapable of being operated, such as
occurred in the Norwood holiday-pay cases (Decisions M-76 and M-113), would clearly
have to be taken as freeing Management of the call-in pay obligation. This would
manifestly also be true of a general sitdown or slowdown situation within the plant. At the
same time, should there ever be a case in which the evidence shows Management
deliberately to have imposed impossible working conditions in order to render the plant
incapable of being operated—the Umpire is not saying that he has encountered it, but the
Company comes at least close to postulating such a case in its elaboration of what is
properly to be taken as the presence of a labor dispute—it would obviously be wrong to
view the situation as a labor dispute beyond Management’s control.
This leads to the Company’s third argument and to what the Umpire sees as the real
question in this case. As should be clear from all that the Umpire said at the outset of his
discussion, it is not because he sees Management as the instigator or even as the party of
original blameworthiness that the Umpire is deciding the third question against the
Company. He is deciding it against the Company because, in the end, he does not believe
that he can legitimately hold that the situation was one "beyond the control of the Local
Management." For the reasons which follow, he believes that to so hold would be to go
contrary to long-articulated and long-applied notions of managerial authority—would be to
discard those notions at a particular time, contrary to what is true at practically all other
times, when their application hurts Management.
First, it seems to the Umpire that the Union is simply correct in saying that, if true that the
particular employees were deliberately and demonstrably restricting output (as the Umpire
has now found it to be true), they should have been disciplined. This is nothing but truly
old-fashioned doctrine, and the Umpire does not believe that it can be taken as overcome
either by the "pay and clear" agreement or by the high incidence of sabotage in the
approximately 1-1/2 years preceding the period here in question. The Umpire has granted
the appeal which lies in both considerations. But he believes that he would be making bad
law if he allowed them to be determinative. Management was not bound by any sort of
moratorium agreement; the "pay and clear" agreement had been made more than a year
earlier; and what Management did in the period here in question was not consistent with
what it did either before or after the period. Management opted to designate the particular
period as one in which to go without job-related discipline. Moreover, at least in the
Umpire’s experience, passivism in the face of sabotage is a novel approach. The Umpire is
obviously not saying that Management cannot rightfully resort to such policies or
techniques. He is saying that the adoption here of the "no job-related discipline" policy was
a causative factor in the short-hour shifts and that this is material to the outcome of the
case as the adoption or non-adoption of the policy was a matter lying within Management’s
control.
Second, there is the matter of the replacement operators. On the one hand, the evidence
must be taken to show that there was a substantial difference in the success of the
operations with the use of the replacement operators. And, on the other hand, the Umpire
believes that the removal of the replacement operators must be held against Management.
It is true that the Union, asserting a violation of the Local Seniority Agreement, asked for
the removal of the replacement operators and the return of the regular operators. Once
more, however, the Umpire does not believe that the otherwise appealing point can be
made determinative. It is far less than clear that the use of the replacement operators
violated the particular provision of the Local Seniority Agreement, and no contention was
made at the hearing that the use of the replacement operators in fact had breached the
terms of the provision. Assuming a state of uncertainty as to the propriety of the use of the
replacement operators (which is the most which can properly be assumed), the point must
be that it would hardly have been the first time that a Management would have stood fast,
insisting on its right of administrative initiative and letting the Union grieve the matter if it
wished. Again, Management had every right to accede to the Union’s request. Also again,
however, there is the two-fold fact that the use of the replacement operators could have
been continued by the simple exercise of managerial authority and that this is of clear and
direct bearing on the "within or beyond Management’s control" question here raised. It is
noteworthy—in terms of this question, not in terms of any broad obligation of one Local
Management to do as has another—that a very similar situation (reference is to the cases
on which there was an aborted arbitration hearing earlier this year) was successfully dealt
with by the Norwood Management by yanking, and keeping yanked, the obstructing
employees.
Last, there is the fact of the complete absence of overtime work as a matter of policy
directive. It is to be understood that the Umpire is by no means saying that overtime work
must be permitted wherever that is the necessary price for providing 4 hours’ work on any
particular shift. Here, however, there was a firm decision, laid down in advance and
invariably to be applied, to work no overtime whatever. It was an inflexible rule; and it was
so pat as to produce a wholly abnormal condition. Such a departure from the normal ways
of doing things, where it is of adverse influence on the availability of work on a shift which
becomes a short-hour shift, must be held against Management. An artificiality which is
erected by Management and which contributes to the abbreviation of a shift below the 4-
hour mark cannot be disregarded in considering Management’s assertion that it was faced
with a condition beyond its control.
DECISION
The grievance is upheld as given in the Opinion. The Company is directed to pay the
grievants on the two shifts on April 17 the difference between the time for which they were
paid and the 4 hours’ minimum provided for in Paragraph (80) of the National Agreement.
December 9, 1973
/S/Rolf Valtin
No. N-83
June 25, 1974
DISCHARGE;
ASSERTED ABSENCE WITHOUT REASONABLE CAUSE
COUPLED WITH PRIOR DISCIPLINARY RECORD;
EVIDENCE
GRIEVANCE:
Grievance 394307
"Charge Management with assessing me an unjust and unfair Discharge. Request this
unjust and unfair Discharge be removed from my records and I be reinstated with full
seniority and all monies lost." S/D.H. Jr.
The grievance is upheld. Grievant H. is to be reinstated with restoration of seniority rights

and with reimbursement for the wages lost since the time of his discharge. (Entire decision
should be read.)
In the Matter of:
United Automobile, Aerospace, and Agricultural Implement Workers of America -- Local

Union No. 34
and
General Motors Corporation, GM Assembly Division Lakewood Plant, Atlanta, Georgia --

Appeal Case N-582-A
OPINION
At the time of his discharge—May 1, 1972 -- grievant H. was an Assembler in the Truck
Department. His seniority dates from mid-1965. He was absent from work on February 16,
1972 and was subsequently discharged under Shop Rules 6 and 42, respectively
"Absence without reasonable cause" and "Repeated violations of shop or safety rules".
The issue is whether the February 16 absence should or should not be taken to have been
"without reasonable cause."
The following is the factual framework:
The grievant has a history of many absences and instances of lateness, both excused and
unexcused. Though they were all excused absences, H. was absent on seventeen
occasions in the first six weeks of 1972. And his prior disciplinary record is composed
exclusively of violations of the already-quoted Shop Rule 6 and of Shop Rule 7 --
"Reporting late for work". H.’s prior disciplinary record has eight entries, the first one
covering a Written Reprimand incurred on March 2, 1970, and the last one covering a 30-
day DLO incurred on January 13, 1972.
H. came to work on February 17, 1972 -- i.e., the day following the day which is here at
issue. Questioned by his foreman concerning the absence on the day before, H. gave the
foreman a doctor’s statement. The physician, Dr. Y., had made use of a form-type slip
requiring the filling-out of blank spaces. The statement reads as follows:
"D----H---- has been under my care from 2-16-72 to and is able to

return to school/work on 2-17-72. Limitations/Remarks: Diagnosis:
Insomnia."
Upon receipt of the statement, H.’s foreman told H. that Management would check the
statement and that he (the foreman) would get back to H.
Management ran the check on the same day (February 17, 1972), getting in touch with Dr.
Y. by telephone. The latter told Management’s representative that the insomnia diagnosis
was based on H.’s subjective complaints and that he (Dr. Y.) could not assert that H. had
been unable to come to work on the day in question. Management’s representative asked
Dr. Y. whether he would be willing to confirm the statement in writing. Dr. Y.’s answer was
in the affirmative. Management thereupon (still on the same day) prepared the following
letter and mailed it to Dr. Y.:
"Dear Dr. Y----:
On Thursday, February 17, 1972, I discussed Mr. D---- H----‘s

absence from work on Wednesday, February 16, 1972, with you.
You stated to me that you would not stipulate that Mr. H---- was
unable to work. You did say that the statement given to Mr. H---- by
you was based upon his subjective complaint.
I appreciate your candid answer to my questions regarding Mr. H----

. Please indicate your concurrence with the above by affixing your
signature to the space provided below."
Dr. Y. did provide his concurring signature, but it was not until late on February 28, 1972 --
due to Dr. Y’s failure earlier to act on the letter -- that Management obtained a confirmed
copy of the letter. H. had been at work on that day but had left the plant by the time the
confirmed copy of the letter was in Management’s hands.
Thereafter, beginning with February 29, H. was on sick leave for an approximately 2-month
period. On May 1, H. was interviewed concerning his absence on February 16. He stated
that he had suffered from loss of sleep; that he had felt that there was something wrong
with him; and that he had believed that he should go to a doctor. H. was informed of Dr.
Y’s unwillingness to attest to his (H.’s) need to be absent on February 16. H. stated that
"All I can tell you is I had a problem with my sleeping" and in effect reiterated his stance as
to why he had gone to Dr. Y.’s office. H. also stated that, sometime following February 16,
he had gone under the care of a psychiatrist "to get my nerves straightened out". In the
late stages of the interview, Management asked questions of H. concerning how he had
gotten to Dr. Y.’s office on February 16 and who the person was who had allegedly driven
him there. Management believed H. to have been evasive on these scores and
unjustifiably to have refused to answer a particular question. H. was discharged at the
conclusion of the interview.
The essence of the Company’s position is reflected by this recounting of the facts. The
Company submits that H. was an employee with an extremely bad absenteeism record;
that it is only natural with respect to such an employee for Management to run a check on
a doctor’s statement, especially a statement which on its face does not declare that the
employee was unable to come to work on the day of the absence; that the check in this
instance revealed what was legitimately suspected; that the evidence must be taken to
show that H., notwithstanding his visit to the doctor’s office, was not unable to come to
work; and that, reasonable cause for the absence having been lacking and there simply
being no proper question as to the meaning of H.’s prior disciplinary record, the discharge
must be upheld.
The Umpire finds himself in disagreement with the Company in this case. By virtue of a
variety of his prior Decisions, little doubt should be left on where the Umpire stands when it
comes to: 1) weak excuses which seek to mask malingering (see, for example, Decision
M-46); 2) the notion that a doctor’s statement covering an absence is always to be
accepted as reliable and conclusive (see, for example, Decision M-84); and 3) the notion
that an employee’s own assertions if not directly contradicted by the testimony of someone
else—reference here is to H.’s assertions concerning his sleeping difficulties—must
necessarily be accepted as true and cannot be rejected by surrounding circumstances
strongly suggesting a finding which goes contrary to the assertions (see, for example,
Decision N-59). In the opinion of the Umpire, however, the present case is not one for the
application of such skepticisms. Rather, he believes, the evidence is such as to require a
holding that the absence here in question was not an absence without reasonable cause.
H’s testimony struck the Umpire as having the ring of truth to it. The story which H. told
was not the kind of improbable one, accompanied by farfetched and implausible
assertions, which has had to be rejected in many another case. It was the story of a person
genuinely recounting, albeit not in the descriptive terms of someone trained in psychiatric
terminology, a state of emotional difficulties bringing lack of sleep. Nor, contrary to what
the Company suggested, did it seem to the Umpire that the grievant sought to paint a
picture of catastrophic proportions or that he otherwise resorted to what so often become
tell-tale exaggerations. Yielded, to the Umpire, was a picture which was real: of a person
whose upset state had led to a sleepless night, who went to a doctor and obtained a
prescription for sleeping pills, who had the prescription filled, who went home and slept
with the aid of the pills, and who came to work the next day.
The surrounding circumstances in this instance strongly tend to confirm the grievant’s
story. As shown, less than two weeks following the day here in question, H. went on sick
leave and came under the care of a psychiatrist. H. was hospitalized in the first week of
March. It is true that the diagnosis included a variety of physical ailments. But it is no less
true that it included (indeed, headed the list of ailments): "anxiety and depression".
Moreover, by virtue of the above-given sequence of events which resulted in the fact that it
was not until May 1 that H. was given a disciplinary interview, Management was in
possession of the information covering the hospitalization and diagnosis when it
discharged H. It did not have the psychiatrist’s full report until sometime in June. But it had
the S&A forms, and they substantially mirrored that report. The Umpire agrees with the
Union’s point that this was a rare situation in which Management had the benefit of
hindsight, so to speak, before taking discharge action and nonetheless went ahead with it.
In the context of this case, it seems to the Umpire that the statement to which Dr. Y. affixed
his confirming signature cannot be given the weight which the Company seeks to give it.
Dr. Y. neither denies that H. came to see him nor denies that he (Dr. Y.) prescribed
sleeping pills. Dr. Y. does not even say that he thinks, in retrospect, he was misled by a
person making a phony claim and in good enough condition to go to work. All that Dr. Y
says is that his diagnosis was based on the patient’s subjective complaints (which is
presumably the ordinary source for a diagnosis of insomnia) and that he would not
stipulate that H. was unable to work. The statement which Dr. Y. gave Management is
simply not a retraction of the slip which he had filled out for H. and which H. brought to the
plant on the next day. The Umpire repeats that it is in the context of this case that he has
addressed himself to the statement on which the Company is relying. Different surrounding
circumstances might compel a different view of such a statement.
Given the grievant’s past attendance and lateness problems, one can understand
Management’s disinclination to give credence to the excuse which he advanced. But past
problems cannot be permitted to blind one to a proper examination of the evidence
respecting the discharge-precipitating absence. In the opinion of the Umpire, the evidence
is that the grievant’s absence, though admittedly not a matter of literal inability to come to
work, was just the same not a matter of malingering and was not an absence without
reasonable cause.
DECISION
The grievance is upheld. Grievant H. is to be reinstated with restoration of seniority rights

and with reimbursement for the wages lost since the time of his discharge
June 25, 1974
/S/Rolf Valtin
Umpire
No. N-86
APRIL 23, 1975
DISCHARGE FOR TARDINESS
OF PROBATIONARY EMPLOYE
WITH MORE THAN 30 DAYS OF SERVICE;
EVIDENCE
GRIEVANCE:
GM ASSEMBLY DIVISION, GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, LAKEWOOD PLANT,

ATLANTA, GEORGIA—APPEAL CASE N-1550
Grievance 038659
"Charge Mgt. with issuing me and unjust & unfair Release. Request that the above release
be clear from my records & I be paid for all time & all benefits be reinstated." S/B.D.H.
The grievance is sustained for the reasons and to the extent given in the Opinion. Grievant
H. is to be reimbursed for the wages which she lost as a result of her July 16, 1973
termination. (Entire decision should be read.)
In the Matter Of:
United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America, Local

Union No. 34
and
file://C:\Users\bobology\AppData\Local\Temp\Framework\n-086_13BEAB15.htm 3/22/2011
General Motors Corporation, GM Assembly Division Lakewood Plant, Atlanta, Georgia --

Appeal Case N-1550
OPINION
Assembler H. was hired on April 27, 1973, and discharged eighty-two days later, on July
16, 1973. The (76) Notice stated:
On Monday, 7-16-73, you reported late to your operation at 4:35

P.M. Your excuse for your tardiness is unacceptable. You have
previously been cautioned in regards to this same type action.
Based on the above you are being released as an unsatisfactory

temporary employee.
The Grievant, who was on the 4:30 p.m. to 1 a.m. shift, had been late in starting work on
four occasions during her first two weeks of employment:
Clocked Started
Date In Work
Tues. May 1 4:16 4:40
Thurs. May 3 4:13 4:35
Tues. May 8 4:17 4:38
Thurs. May 10 4:24 4:35
Testimony concerning the circumstances surrounding these late reports and related
matters, offered by the Grievant and E., her Foreman, is summarized below:
Foreman E.: H. was assigned to the taillight wire clip job on the middle frame line. He did
not see her on the morning of May 1 until she reported for duty ten minutes late. He
explained to her the importance of being on the job when the whistle blows. She said she
had tried to get there on time. Although he probably told her on April 30 (his first day as her
supervisor) to wear coveralls, she made no reference to them on May 1, nor does he recall
whether she wore them. After their conversation he entered this notation on a form entitled
"Attendance Record 1973": "Cautioned about not being on job at starting time 4:40;"
however, he did not tell her about the entry on the form. He assigned a reliefman for ten
minutes to replace H. but cannot recall who it was.
On May 3, when H. reported five minutes late (he had not seen her earlier), he asked for
an explanation. She replied that she did not have time to change into coveralls. He told her
that she would have to get to the plant in time to change and be at work when the whistle
blows. He could not recall whether she had changed clothes. He had a reliefman replace
her. He entered another notation on the "Attendance Record" form (without informing her):
"Cautioned about being late on job at starting time 4:35."
On May 8 he asked H. about her eight minute lateness (she had not reported to him
earlier). She said her ride had picked her up late. She did not complain about congestion in
the restroom. He told her that she would have to make arrangements to be at work when
the whistle blows and entered a third notation on the "Attendance Record" form:
"Cautioned about being late 4:38." He had replaced her temporarily with a reliefman.
Later that day, probably at her request, he issued a requisition for an exchange locker
which would provide her with three clean coveralls a week. This requisition was filled a few
days later.
H. was five minutes late on May 10. He replaced her temporarily with a repairman. He
noted the tardiness on his "job jotter" and on the "Attendance Record" form but, being
involved in other matters, he neglected to ask her for an explanation.
On July 16, when asked why she was five minutes late on the Job, H. merely replied that
she had tried to get there on time. E. placed her on notice and a disciplinary interview was
conducted by Labor Relations Representative C. During the interview H. explained that her
ride had failed to pick her up and she had to get a taxi. Arriving at 4:23 p.m. (her clock-in-
time), she had to change into coveralls and go to the restroom. She acknowledged that
she had been late on prior occasions and had been "talked to" on those occasions.
E. did not consider H.’s explanation of her July 16 lateness acceptable since (1) she had
been cautioned several times before, (2) her explanation was different from the one she
initially gave, (3) it takes only about three minutes to walk from the time clock to the
assembly line. He concluded that she should be terminated.
When asked, on cross-examination, why he had decided to act on July 16 since H.’s
record had been good since her second week of employment, the Foreman explained that
H. had been absent on Saturday, July 7, and that he had cautioned her on Monday, July 9,
that he would take corrective action if there was another attendance infraction (absence or
lateness). Moreover, he recorded this incident, as he had the others, on his "Attendance
Record" form.
According to the Foreman, H. had generally donned her coveralls right on the job, not in
the locker-room (i.e., she put them on over her street clothes). She had not mentioned a
coverall problem, nor had he been aware of any claims regarding coveralls until just before
the Umpire hearing. Sometimes, E. stated, employees borrow coveralls from each other.
Grievant H.: She was not given coveralls when hired. It was not until late in May that she
was assigned a coverall locker. During the interim she asked Foreman E. to requisition
them as needed. Her job was especially dirty and greasy; she never worked without them.
She never worked in her street clothes (since the grease seeped through the coveralls)
and she never donned coveralls at her work station.
On each of the four days in May when she was late in starting work the sequence of
events was similar: She arrived at the assembly line before 4:30 p.m.; she asked Foreman
E. to requisition clean coveralls (sometimes having to wait a few minutes for him); she
went to the stock room (where she sometimes had to wait), got her coveralls, changed
clothes, and returned to her work location. (The Foreman estimated that it would take
about 25 minutes to accomplish this.) One day she was additionally delayed because the
restroom was being cleaned. On none of these occasions did the Foreman say anything to
her about her lateness; nor does she recall finding a repairman at her station.
On July 16, H. testified, she was delayed because she had to call a cab when her ride did
not turn up. She changed her clothes in the restroom and heard the whistle blow as she
crossed the line. She is quite sure she missed no work and that no one had replaced her.
At the interview, when accused of having been "late" on May 1, 3, 8 and 10 and July 16,
she replied that she had not been late before and was only a minute or so on that day. She
denied that she had admitted being "cautioned" by Foreman E.
The Union claims that H. was treated unfairly in comparison with male employees because
males had several areas in which to change coveralls and females did not. At the Second
Step the Union contended that "the second shift Truck line female employees are being
grossly discriminated against because of over-crowding in one restroom." Management
denied the charge. The same claim was reiterated and denied in the parties’ Statements of
Unadjusted Grievance.
No evidence to support this Union claim was adduced at the Umpire hearing. Further, the
claim was not initially supported by written evidence as required under Paragraph (6a).
Accordingly, this claim will be denied.
The evaluation in this case must start with Paragraph (56), which declares in part:
Employees shall be regarded as temporary employees until their names have been placed
on the seniority list......... However, any claim by a temporary employee made after 30 days
of employment that his layoff or discharge is not for cause may be taken up as a
grievance.
The Union urges, initially, that the term "for cause" in Paragraph (56) has the same
meaning as it does in Paragraph (8). This contention, however, was considered and
rejected in the case which led to Decision N-67. In that Decision the Umpire dealt with the
same cases which have been cited here—E-115, E-165, K-75 and L-102 -- and others as
well. No persuasive arguments have been offered in the present controversy as to why
Decision N-67 should be reversed or modified. Accordingly, this Union contention will be
rejected.
In another aspect of the Paragraph (56) -- Paragraph (8) relationship, the Corporation
contended at the hearing that the Umpire has no discretion under Paragraph (47) to modify
(as distinguished from reversing) a termination action taken under Paragraph (56). It states
that support for this position may be found in Decision N-67. The Union demurs, noting that
Paragraph (47) makes no exceptions on this score for probationary employees.
While there are dissimilarities between Paragraph (8) and (56) actions, there are also
similarities, as Decision N-67 makes abundantly clear. One of those similarities is the
requirement that "cause" be demonstrated, thus placing the burden of proof on the
Corporation. Moreover, there is no indication in this record that the parties, during their
bargaining, contemplated that the Umpire would be restricted in his authority to rule on
disciplinary-action disputes involving a Paragraph (56) employee. The Agreement itself
does not so provide. Paragraph (47) declares simply that "The Corporation delegates to
the Umpire full discretion in cases of discipline for violation of shop rules....."
The Corporation also suggests that "all that is required is a showing that the discharge (of
a probationary employee with more than thirty days of employment) was ‘for cause’ and
that it was not arbitrary or capricious."
It is true that in Decision K-75 (which Management cites in this connection) the Umpire
found that Management’s action was "not discriminatory or capricious nor an unreasonable
application of Paragraph 56.....". It does not follow, however, that there is a fixed "arbitrary
or capricious" standard by which all Paragraph (56) terminations are to be judged. To the
contrary, in his discussion of the subject in Decision N-67, the Umpire noted in part that
"not every reason advanced in support of the discharge of a probationary employee—even
a reason which does not have the defect of being plain arbitrary or capricious—can be
countenanced as adding up to ‘cause’ under Paragraph (56)."
I have gone into some discussion of these matters because my ultimate conclusion in the
case is that H. was deserving of an official warning, not discharge. However, because she
would have been laid off in early 1974 and thereafter have lost her recall rights pursuant to
Paragraph (64), I can only direct reimbursement for wages lost—i.e., I cannot direct her
reinstatement.
My judgment is that the evidence fails to make out a "cause" case for H.’s termination as a
poor employment risk even if consideration is given to the May incidents (which
consideration the Union opposes under Paragraph (76b)). My principal findings, based on
the testimonies of the Grievant, her Foreman, and Labor Relations Representative C., are
as follows:
1. The grievant was late in starting work during her initial two weeks of
employment. On three occasions this lateness was discussed with her.
Notwithstanding her denial, the Foreman’s contemporaneous record supports
his testimony. Moreover, both the Foreman and the Labor Relations
Representative testified that H. acknowledged at the July 16 interview that such
discussions had been held. While H. denied this, her Steward, who was present
when her statements were reviewed at the Disciplinary Interview, was not
called to rebut the testimony of the two Management witnesses.
2. There is reason to believe H.’s explanations of these May latenesses. I

cannot, without further corroboration, give weight to the speculation that she
probably found coveralls lying around or borrowed them from other employees.
Rather, I am persuaded that she spent considerable time in obtaining them. It is
significant, in my judgment, that the Foreman issued H. an exchange locker
requisition on May 8 (at her request, he acknowledged); that the requisition was
not filled until several days later; and, of clear relevance, that after that she was
not late again until mid-July.
3. In light of these facts the five-minute lateness on July 16 cannot be given the
importance which Management attached to it. It was not a part or a continuation
of the early May syndrome. Rather, it was a relatively isolated incident caused,
presumably, by the failure of H.’s regular ride to appear. I agree with
Management that she should have been able to get to her work station on time
even though she had only seven minutes to change since, on prior occasions,
she had made it with only a few minutes to spare. But this episode, taken either
by itself or in conjunction with the May events, did not, in my opinion, justify the
conclusion that H. was a poor employment risk.
There is an additional factor. As noted earlier, when asked on cross-examination why he

decided to terminate H. on July 16, the Foreman replied that he had warned her about her
attendance after her absence on July 7. But there is no evidence that this fact was
revealed to Management, the employee, or the Union; the (76) Notice mentioned only
tardiness. Under the circumstances it would be unfair to sustain a termination action which,
although professedly based on tardiness, was actually based on an alleged improper
absence as well, which was never made part of the record or otherwise openly relied upon
in discharging her.
DECISION
The grievance is sustained for the reasons and to the extent given in the Opinion. Grievant
H. is to be reimbursed for the wages which she lost as a result of her July 16, 1973
termination.
April 23, 1975
/S/Arthur Stark
Associate Umpire
/S/Rolf Valtin
Umpire
UMPIRE DECISION P-1 Page 1 of 10
No. P-1
November 25, 1974
Holiday-Pay Question Involving Employee
on the Verge of Conversion
from Probationary to Seniority Employee
Under Particular Set of Circumstances
GRIEVANCE:
Filed Directly By The International Union Under Paragraph (55) Of The National
Agreement At Gm Assembly Division, General Motors Corporation, Tarrytown Plant,
Tarrytown, New York—International Union Appeal Case P-1
"A substantial number of employees in various plants of the Corporation were affected by
the temporary shutdown of plant productive operations designed to reduce new car
inventories. A typical example is GMAD - Tarrytown where such shutdown was for the
week of December 17, 1973. Because of that shutdown, Management has denied holiday
pay for the Christmas Holiday Period to employees whose 90th day of their accumulated
credited period fell within the Christmas Holiday Period. Examples which are
representative of all such similarly affected employees in General Motors are the following
from GMAD-Tarrytown:
A. I. Hired 9-19-73 G. J. A. Hired 9-19-73
R. J. M. Hired 9-19-73 D. H. B. Hired 9-19-73
All returned after the Christmas Holiday Period in accordance with identical instructions
issued to all employees of GMAD-Tarrytown prior to the shutdown.
The employees cited and all other similarly affected in General Motors are entitled to
Holiday Pay for all or part of the Christmas Holiday Period. Pay is requested." S/I.B.

file://C:\Users\bobology\AppData\Local\Temp\Framework\p-001_13BEB9C4.htm 3/22/2011
In the Matter of:

Union No. 598
and
General Motors Corporation, GMAD—Tarrytown, Tarrytown, New York -- Appeal Case P-1
OPINION
This case involves an interpretative question under the holiday-pay provisions and
Appendix D of the National Agreement. The parties are agreed that the question is a novel
one and that there are no prior GM-UAW Decisions which even bear on it. At issue is the
proper holiday-pay application with respect to an employee whose 89th day for the purpose
of acquiring seniority fell on a day which was succeeded by a certain set of circumstances.
The following is a summary of the facts.
Each of the grievants was hired on September 19, 1973, and each of them would have put
in the 90th day of his accumulated credited period had he been scheduled to work on
December 17, 1973 (a Monday). Pursuant to the notice about to be quoted, all of the
grievants were on layoff in the week of December 17, 1973, and none of them returned to
work until January 2, 1973 (a Wednesday).
The notice, in its full text, was this:
"Date : December 13, 1973
To : All Employees
Subject: Production Schedule and Christmas Holidays
GM Assembly Division-Tarrytown will have no production scheduled for the week of

December 17, 1973.
The plant will close for the Christmas Holiday Period on Monday, December 24, 1973.
Operations will resume at the regular starting time on Wednesday, January 2, 1974.
Employees who are scheduled contrary to the above will be notified by their supervisors.
V. A. P.
General Supervisor
Labor Relations"
The exception noted in the last paragraph lay in some 600 employees who did mechanical
work in connection with the installation of a new assembly line. These employees worked
all of the week of December 17 but did not work in any part of the Christmas Holiday
Period commencing on December 24.
Laid off during the week of December 17 were some 4,000 assembly employees, including
the grievants. Also, none of these employees (the statement includes the grievants)
worked in any part of the Christmas Holiday Period. All of them except the grievants
received holiday pay for the various days recognized under the National Agreement as
paid holidays in the Christmas Holiday Period. For the 1973 Agreement’s first year, those
days were: December 24, December 25, December 26, December 27, December 28,
December 31 and January 1. As will be elaborated upon below, the grievants were treated
as non-seniority employees and thus were denied holiday pay.
As the foundation for its case, the Company presented the testimony of the (Central Office)
General Supervisor of Product Allocation and Scheduling. The essence of his testimony is:
that, pursuant to the master schedule covering GMAD as a whole, the Tarrytown plant was
scheduled to produce 8,800 units in the month of December; that, with respect to
"Standard Hours" (the equivalent of non-overtime hours), the schedule for the Tarrytown
plant showed 120 hours together with a "(-- 40)" designation -- which meant that the 8,800
units were to be produced in 80 standard hours; that, accordingly, the third week in
December (the week of December 17) was scheduled as a week in which assembly
operations would be shut down and assembly employees would be laid off; that individual
plants are not free to depart from the master schedules—are not free to produce either
more or fewer units than their designated quota; and that the upshot is that the Tarrytown
plant had no assembly operations left to be performed after the completion of the first two
weeks in December.
The following is the contractual framework.
A portion of Paragraph (57) of the National Agreement provides that: "Employees may
acquire seniority by working ninety days during a period of six continuous months...".
Paragraph (203) of the National Agreement commences with: "Employees shall be paid for
specified holidays and the holidays in each of the Christmas holiday periods as provided
hereinafter ..."
There follows a listing of the specified holidays for each for the three Agreement years.
Paragraph (203) then goes on with: "... providing they meet all of the following eligibility
rules unless otherwise provided herein:
(1) The employee has seniority as of the date of each specified holiday and as
of each of the holidays in each of the Christmas holiday periods, and
(2) The employee would otherwise have been scheduled to work on such day if
it had not been observed as a holiday, and
(3) The employee must have worked the last scheduled work day prior to and
the next scheduled work day after each specified holiday within the employee’s
scheduled work week. For each Christmas holiday period, the employee must
have worked the last scheduled work day prior to each holiday period and the
next scheduled work day after each holiday period."
Paragraph (208) of the National Agreement reads as follows:
"A seniority employee who has been laid off in a reduction of force (except as provided
below), or who has gone on sick leave, or on leave of absence for military service, during
the work week prior to or during the week in which the holiday falls, shall receive pay for
such holiday.
A seniority employee who works in the second work week prior to the week in which the
Christmas holiday period begins, and who is laid off in a reduction in force during that
week, or a seniority employee who is laid off in a reduction in force during the work week
prior to or during the work week in which the Christmas holiday period begins, shall receive
pay for each of the holidays in the Christmas holiday period."
Appendix D of the National Agreement is titled "Interpretation of Paragraph (4) thru (4c)
and Paragraph (57)". The sub-title reads: "Rules for Computing Seniority of Employees
Who Acquire Seniority by Working 90 Days Within Six Continuous Months, and Computing
the Period Specified in Paragraph (4) thru (4c)." The Appendix has five numbered
provisions, the first four of which read as follows:
"1. Credit toward acquiring seniority will begin with the first day worked by the
new employee and will include the subsequent days of that pay period.
2. Thereafter during six consecutive months until he acquires seniority he will

receive credit for seven days for each pay period during which he works except
that credit will not be given for any days the employee is on layoff.
3. No credit will be given for any pay period during which for any reason, the
employee does not work except as provided in Paragraph (108).
4. Unless the employee is at work on the 90th day of his accumulated credited
period, he must work another day within his probationary period to acquire
seniority. If the 90th day of his accumulated credited period falls on a holiday,
the employee will be considered as having seniority as of the holiday. If the 90th
day of his accumulated credited period falls on his vacation pay eligibility date,
the employee will be considered as having seniority as of his vacation pay
eligibility date."
The parties are in disagreement as to whether or not December 24 should have been
credited as the grievants’ 90th day of their accumulated credited period. Should the
Umpire’s holding be in the affirmative, it would follow -- see "the employee will be
considered as having seniority as of the holiday" in paragraph 4 of Appendix D—that the
grievants are entitled to holiday pay not only for December 24 but also for the other
specified days in the Christmas Holiday Period. Similarly, should the Umpire’s holding on
the "90th day" issue be in the negative, it would follow that none of the grievants is entitled
to holiday pay for any of the specified days in the Christmas Holiday Period. The parties
are not in dispute with respect to these consequences.
Both parties have submitted briefs of considerable length, and both have presented their
arguments with substantial elaboration. The Umpire will not attempt to provide a
comprehensive review of what is before him. The essence of the parties’ respective
positions is as follows.
Union
Granting that the week of December 17 was a week of layoff and that the grievants could
not and did not in that week acquire credited service toward their attainment of the status
of seniority employees, the Union contends that the week of December 24 cannot correctly
be viewed as a week of layoff. It submits that a number of considerations—including the
wording of the notice which Management itself posted—dictate the conclusion that the
week of December 24 was a period of holiday shutdown. This is not altered, the Union
asserts, either by the fact that the preceding week saw the cessation of assembly
operations or by the fact that the Company now chooses to call the entire December 17 -
January 1 period a period of layoff. It is indeed within Management’s power to determine
both the timing and the duration of layoffs. But the mere declaration by Management that a
particular period is a period of layoff cannot be accepted as determinative of the question
of the proper contractual status of employees—i.e., in this instance, whether the
employees were off by virtue of a layoff or by virtue of a holiday shutdown.
Once it is accepted, the Union continues, that the week of December 24 was a period of
holiday shutdown (rather than a period of layoff), the grievants’ entitlement to the claimed
holiday pay emerges clearly and indisputably: the special "90th day" application provided
for in paragraph 4 of Appendix D brought the grievants the status of seniority employees
as of December 24; with the attainment of that status, the grievants met the requirement of
clause (1) of Paragraph (203) of the National Agreement; and they were eligible for the
claimed holiday pay under clauses (2) and (3) of that Paragraph.
Company
As can be surmised from the introduction of the testimony of the General Supervisor of
Product Allocation and Scheduling, the Company’s fundamental contention is that the
week of December 24 must be viewed as a period of layoff. It happens that that week is
recognized under the Agreement as the Christmas Holiday Period. But a paid holiday is a
day on which an employee would have worked but for the fact that the day is an
Agreement-recognized holiday. And this was manifestly not the case with respect to the
grievants and the rest of the assembly employees in the week of December 24. For the
facts are that the Tarrytown plant was scheduled to produce 8,800 units and that this
production quota was fulfilled by the end of December 14. There simply were no further
assembly operations to be performed at the plant in the remainder of December. Thus the
layoff in the week of December 17; and so it was, by proper view, in the week of December
24. Surely, the Company adds, the particular choice of words in the notice cannot be made
determinative. The facts themselves are far too clear and compelling to go that route.
On the correct premise that the week of December 24 was a period of layoff, the Company
continues, there can be no question that the Union’s case must fall. For the meaning of it
(the correct premise) is that the grievants were employees to whom the special "90th day"
application of paragraph 4 of Appendix D was not operative with respect to December 24.
The grievants were situated, just as they were in the week of December 17, as
contemplated at paragraph 3 of Appendix D—"No credit will be given for any pay period
during which for any reason, the employee does not work...". And, the fact being that the
grievants did not reach the status of seniority employees, it simply follows that they have
correctly been denied the claimed holiday pay. Attainment of the status of seniority
employee is an eligibility requirement under both Paragraph (203) and Paragraph (208) of
As to the rest of the assembly employees, the Company explains, they were paid for the
holidays under Paragraph (208). They were foreclosed from receiving pay for the holidays
under Paragraph (203) for they were not employees who "would otherwise have been
scheduled to work on such day if it had not been observed as a holiday", as laid down at
clause (2) of Paragraph (203). But they were entitled to the holiday pay under Paragraph
(208) -- which depicts the very situation which was here in being. Indeed, the Company
notes, if Paragraphs (203) and (208) could be applied as interchangeably as the Union
suggests, one would have to wonder why the special "layoff" protection of Paragraph (208)
was adopted.
The Company makes an additional argument. The argument proceeds from the
assumption that the plant’s production quota would have been met, not by the end of the
second week of December, but by the end of the first week of December—so that the
assembly employees, rather than being laid off beginning on December 17, would have
been laid off beginning on December 10. The special "layoff" protection of Paragraph
(208), the Company submits, does not extend to that situation. Assume further, the
Company goes on, that there were some employees whose 89th day toward the
acquisition of seniority status had been reached by the end of the first week of December.
If the Union’s theory in the present case were accepted, the Company argues, the result in
the just-posed situation would be that the seniority employees would go without pay for the
specified days in the Christmas Holiday Period whereas the "89th day" employees—those
who had not attained the status of seniority employees by the time the layoff began --
would be entitled to the holiday pay. The Company contends that this would be an absurd
result and that the avoidance of absurdities is a proper concern in any arbitration
proceeding.
Finally, the Company presented a historical tracing of the Agreement’s holiday—pay

provisions. What the Company sought to provide was an answer to the Union’s argument
that pay for unworked holidays is a negotiated benefit arrived at as part of overall
economic packages. Granting this much, the Company’s point is that pay for unworked
holidays, rather than ever having been an absolute right, has always been a conditional
right circumscribed by various eligibility requirements. Holiday pay is simply not due an
employee, the Company is saying, where the employee has not met one or another of the
eligibility requirements.
It seems to the Umpire that the parties’ dispute and their accompanying assertions bring
one into an elusive no-man’s-land area to which the Agreement provides no clear answer.
The Umpire wants immediately to make it clear that he does not mean to make any sort of
broad holding respecting the proper application of the Christmas-New Years period,
irrespective of the nature or duration of layoffs which might precede or surround that
period. In his considered opinion, however, the Company has the weaker case in the
present instance. He is thus upholding the grievance.
The Company has indeed demonstrated that December 14 marked the end of assembly
operations at the Tarrytown plant for the rest of the month (and including January 1).
Moreover, the Company has demonstrated not only that this was factually true but also
that it was true by design and scheduling. For any other month, such a showing would
presumably require viewing the month’s last 2 or 2 ½ weeks as a period of layoff. But does
it necessarily follow from the showing which the Company has made that the remainder of
December is properly viewed as a period of layoff? Clearly, so it seems to the Umpire, it
does not. For the last week of December (including January 1) has in recent years been
treated, and was here treated, as a period in which assembly plants are in any event not to
be operated. The Company noted at the hearing that the week can be used to assemble
automobiles. But, considering the facts that such scheduling would require the Union’s
consent, would require the payment of triple-time rates of pay, and has never been
resorted to since the inauguration (in 1971) of the Christmas-period holiday benefit, the
rejoinder is theoretical in the extreme. In every real sense, the Company’s showing that the
December production quota for the plant had been met merely begs, rather than answer,
the question of how the last week of December (including December 31 and January 1)
should properly be viewed.
In relation to the evidence adduced in the present case, the Umpire believes that the
sounder view is that the last week of December (including December 31 and January 1)
was a holiday shutdown period. The Umpire has come to this conclusion by the
Company’s own evidence. Though true that that evidence inescapably shows that only
8,800 units were to be produced and that only the first two weeks of December were
needed and were to be used to produce those units, it also shows that the month of
December was designated differently as compared to other months in terms of the
availability of potentially productive hours. On the master schedule, shown are 168 hours
for November, 176 hours for January, 160 hours for February, and 168 hours for March.
These were the standard hours to the limit of their availability for each of the months (and it
was in relation to those hours that the subtractions and additions necessary to meet the
various plants’ particular production requirements were shown). Contrarily, shown as
available potentially productive hours for December were 120 hours (and it was in relation
to this quantum that the 40-hour subtraction was shown). This represents the plain lopping-
off of 48 hours -- in advance and by what clearly seems to have been a matter of first
assumption. It would obviously make no sense to link the lopping-off to anything other than
the presence of the Christmas-New Years period. And what these things seem to the
Umpire to come down to is that, if it is to be appreciated that the plant was to operate but
80 hours to produce but 8,800 units by design and scheduling, it is equally to be
appreciated that the last week of December (including December 31 and January 1) was
disqualified as operating time by prior design and scheduling.
The Company is on sound grounds in saying that the particular wording of a plant notice
should not be made determinative of an interpretative Agreement question. It need not be
overlooked, however, that the wording of the notice in the present instance seems anything
but accidental or erroneous. It is not surprising—and, indeed, it is wholly consistent with
the scheme of things revealed by the evidence—that the notice addresses the weeks of
December 17 and December 24 separately and under different shutdown designations.
The week of December 17 was removed from potentially productive time in response to
lowered output requirements.
With respect to the week of December 24 (together with December 31 and January 1), on
the other hand, the notice echoed that which had been uniformly done under the GMAD
master schedules since the inauguration of the Christmas-Holiday-Period benefit:
designating December as a 120-hour month (except, in accordance with the number of
week-days preceding Christmas, as it was a 128-hour or 136-hour month). The author of
the notice, rather than confuse things, seems clearly to have done "what comes naturally".
Viewed in the light of the fact that the scheduled assembly operations were completed in
the first two weeks of December, there is of course insuperable difficulty in finding the
eligibility requirement of clause (2) of Paragraph (203) to have been met ("The employee
would otherwise have been scheduled to work on such day if it had not been observed as
a holiday..."). This, however, is not the only or necessary view. For the reasons given, the
Umpire rejects it as myopic and misleading. He believes, again for the reasons given, that
the last week of December (including December 31 and January 1) is here properly to be
applied as a period of shutdown owing to the presence of the Christmas Holiday Period.
And by that application, the eligibility requirement of clause (2) of Paragraph (203) must
clearly be taken to be satisfied. For it could hardly be held that the Company can properly
disqualify the last week of December (including December 31 and January 1) as operating
time by virtue of the presence of the Christmas Holiday Period and yet declare that it was
for lack of work, rather than for the occurrence of the holidays, that the employees were
not scheduled to work. Such a holding would amount to sanctioning a bootstrap assertion.
By these conclusions, the special "90th day" provision of paragraph 4 of Appendix D is

applicable. The provision was clearly adopted to answer the question of what the
application should be, both for holiday and for vacation purposes, in the special
circumstance where the employee’s 90th day, though not worked by him and thus calling
for its treatment as non-credited time under paragraph 3 of the Appendix, coincides with
the day on which he would collect one or the other benefit were he considered a seniority
employee. Manifestly, the parties having explicitly addressed themselves to the situation
and having adopted language calling for the crediting of the day, the "90th day" provision of
paragraph 4 of Appendix D must be taken as an operative exception to the otherwise flat
terms of paragraph 3 of the Appendix. Further, there is nothing in the provision of
paragraph 4 (nor has any such contention been placed before the Umpire) which would
serve to vitiate the special "90th day" application by virtue of the one-week layoff which
preceded the grievants’ 90th day. The upshot is that the grievants had attained the status
of seniority employees as of the December 24 holiday.
Once this is established, it seems to the Umpire not to matter whether one views the
grievants as entitled to the holiday pay under Paragraph (203) or under Paragraph (208).
Literally read, given the facts that the assembly operations in their entirety were here shut
down in the week preceding the Christmas Holiday Period and that the grievants
admittedly were at work both on December 14 and on January 2 (which days, literally,
represented "the last scheduled work day prior to each holiday period and the next
scheduled work day after each holiday period"), the eligibility requirement of clause (3) of
Paragraph (203) was met. Still, the Company is obviously on strong grounds in asking why
the parties would have gone to the trouble of adopting the "layoff" protection of Paragraph
(208) if Paragraph (203) was of similar meaning to begin with. However, if Paragraph (208)
was indeed the governing Paragraph for the rest of the assembly employees, it is the
Umpire’s opinion that the grievants must likewise be taken as entitled to the holiday benefit
under that Paragraph. The grievants were not seniority employees at the time of the layoff
in the week of December 17. But the holiday occurred in immediate succession to the
layoff. And, as the grievants were seniority employees as of the holiday and as the very
idea behind the "90th day" provision of paragraph 4 of Appendix D is to yield holiday-pay
entitlement in the particular 90th-day circumstance, it seems proper to the Umpire to apply
the grievants’ seniority status in the week of December 17 in terms of their seniority status
on the holiday. Else, the special "90th day" holiday-pay entitlement would be rendered
inferior when applied to paragraph (208) as compared to its application under Paragraph
(203). The Umpire cannot believe that such a result was intended.
The Umpire has not sought to grapple with the situation which the Company poses and as
to which it says an absurdity would be created if the Union’s position in the present case
were sustained. He notes that the Union disputes the validity of one of the assumptions in
the Company’s argument. Be that as it may, his answer to the Company’s argument goes
back to what he said at the outset: his purpose, rather than to make a holding of broad
impact, is to determine the present case alone. If the case which the Company poses ever
arises (and is valid in all its assumptions), it might turn on different considerations and lead
to a different result.
One final matter requires comment. In its brief, the Union notes that the case involves 23
employees and that of these 23 employees: 1) twelve were hired on September 19, 1973,
2) six were hired on September 25, 1973, and 3) five were hired on September 26, 1973.
The Umpire has treated the case in terms of the twelve employees in the first category. As
a matter of proper coverage, however, the Union is legitimately including the employees in
the other two categories—for the grievance statement phrases the claim in terms of the
employees’ 90th day within the Christmas Holiday Period, rather than in terms of
December 24 to the exclusion of the other holidays in the period. With respect to the
employees in categories 2) and 3), the Union is saying that their case is in principle the
same as that of the employees in category 1). The difference, the Union submits, is merely
that the 90th day for the employees in categories 2) and 3) fell at a later point in the
Christmas Holiday Period—December 31 for those in category 2), and January 1 for those
in category 3). The Union does not claim holiday pay for any of the holidays which
preceded, respectively, December 31 and January 1. But it claims holiday pay for
December 31 and January 1 for those in category 2), and for January 1 for those in
category 3).
The Umpire has decided that these are not valid claims. In order to bring the employees in
categories 2) and 3) to their 90th day on December 31 and January 1, respectively, it is
necessary to credit them with seven days for the pay period which commenced on
December 24. It is true that paragraph 2 of Appendix D provides for the crediting of seven
days so long as the employee works "during" the pay period. It is also true that, by the
Umpire’s conclusions, the pay period of December 24 was a period of holiday shutdown.
But it does not follow from what the Umpire has concluded that holidays other than the
holiday which coincides with the employee’s 90th day are to be credited toward the
attainment of seniority status. To the contrary, as he reads the "90th day" provision of
paragraph 4 of Appendix D, it constitutes a special application which attaches to that day
alone. It does not operate to bring crediting for an employee’s 86th or 87th day, even if
those days are days on which the employee does not work by virtue of the occurrence of
holidays. Not having reached the point where their 90th day would have fallen in the pay
period of December 24, the employees in categories 2) and 3) cannot be given credit
toward the attainment of seniority status in that pay period. Their situation in that pay
period was governed by paragraph 3 of Appendix D: "No credit will be given for any pay
period during which for any reason, the employee does not work...". And, absent the
crediting of the pay period of December 24, the employees in categories 2) and 3) had not
reached their 90th day on December 31 or January 1, respectively. It follows that the
holiday-pay claim on their behalf must be denied.
DECISION
Rolf Valtin
Umpire
No. P-10
July 22, 1975
TERMINATION OF EMPLOYE UNDER PARAGRAPH (64)(d) OF NATIONAL

AGREEMENT;
EVIDENCE AS TO "SATISFACTORY REASON"
GRIEVANCE:

PLANT, SOUTH GATE, CALIFORNIA—APPEAL CASE P-121
Grievance 006185
"Protest Mgt. issuing me a very unjust and unfair Termination for an alleged viol. ov 64(D)
of the N.A. When in fact I had a satisfactory reason for my absence. Request Mgt. remove
this termination from my record and that I be reinstated with full seniority and paid for all
benefits and money lost due to Mgts. error." S/J.R.S.
UMPIRE’S DECISION
The (64)(d) termination here in question is set aside. Grievant S. is to be reinstated with
restoration of seniority rights and reimbursement for the wages lost. (Entire decision should
be read.)
In the Matter of:
United Automobile, Aerospace, and Agricultural Implement Workers of America Local

Union No. 216
and
file://C:\Users\bobology\AppData\Local\Temp\Framework\p-010_13A48FD7.htm 3/22/2011
General Motors Corporation, GM Assembly Division, South Gate Plant, South Gate,
California -- Appeal Case P-121
OPINION
Grievant S. was hired in February, 1972. Before going on sick leave, in September, 1973,
he was a second-shift Final Chassis Assembler in the Chassis Department. He was
released from sick-leave status on May 2, 1974. Owing to substantial layoffs, which had
been instituted in January, 1974, he could not come back to work when he came off sick
leave. He was thus on layoff until recalled in the fall of 1974.
On Thursday, October 3, 1974, Management sent the following telegram to S.’s address of
record:
"Report to the personnel office ready for work at 6:12 A.M. Friday, October 4, 1974."
The home at S.’s address housed both S. and his grandmother. S., about three weeks
earlier, had gone to San Francisco. He had arranged with his grandmother that he would
call her once a week or so but that she should call the plant to explain his whereabouts
should he be notified to return to work. She did so both on Friday, October 4 and on
Monday, October 7. She did not call the plant on Tuesday, October 8 or Wednesday,
October 9. She again called the plant on Thursday, October 10. According to
Management, this was the first time that she stated that S. was out of town because of his
father’s illness. (According to her, she mentioned this reason on at least one of the earlier
calls.)
In the meantime, S. had not come to work either on Friday, October 4 or on any of the
workdays in the week commencing Monday, October 7. He returned to Los Angeles at the
end of that week and he reported to the plant on the afternoon of Monday, October 14. At
this stage, he had already been terminated under Paragraph (64)(d) of the National
Agreement.
Paragraph (64) is titled "Loss of Seniority"; its opening portion states that "Seniority shall
be broken for the following reasons."; and it then goes on in subparagraph (d) with this:
satisfactory reason..."
Both by way of their briefs and by way of their arguments at the hearing, the parties
engaged in a major debate as to whether a telephone call which indicates to Management
that the particular employee intends to come back to work suffices to preserve the
employee’s seniority under Paragraph (64)(d). The Union asserts that it does, both on the
grounds of what it contends to be the GM-UAW precedent on the matter and on the
grounds that the clause, in design, goes to giving Management the chance to be in the
know as to whether the employee intends to retain his employment relationship with the
Company, not to allow Management mechanically to sever an employee’s seniority. The
Company, on the other hand, relies on the fact that the language expressly refers to "return
to work". With substantial elaboration, the Company argues that a telephone call indicating
an employee’s intention to return to work is not the equivalent of the employee’s in fact
returning to work.
The question need not be determined. For, on the evidence presented, the Umpire
believes that he must hold that S. had "a satisfactory reason" for not being at work on the
three particular days. It is true that Management can validly argue that the medical
substantiation which it sought in the period shortly following the grievant’s termination was
somewhat sketchy and confusing. But it appears equally true that Management started
from a posture of disbelief—a posture which it thereupon retained and which kept it from
making a dispassionate assessment. In the opinion of the Umpire, the testimonies of the
grievant’s father, the grievant’s grandmother and the grievant himself yield a story which
hangs together and which shows: 1) that the grievant had gone to San Francisco to help a
father beset by emotional difficulties (for which the father had been hospitalized for some
six weeks in the summer); 2) that the father lived alone—and also lived without a
telephone in his apartment, so that the grandmother could not have initiated telephonic
contact; 3) that the father’s relationship with relatives in the San Francisco area was
strained; and 4) that the financial state of both father and son was such that a telephone
call to the grandmother every day or every two or three days to determine whether a recall
notice might have been dispatched was not readily affordable. The Umpire is not saying
either that the money for such phone calls could not have been found or that the father’s
survival depended on the presence of the son. Rather, the Umpire does not believe that
the test under Paragraph (64) (d) is of a stringency of that sort. The facts and
circumstances in the present case are such, he holds, as to add up to fulfillment of the
"satisfactory reason" standard.
DECISION
The (64)(d) termination here in question is set aside. Grievant S. is to be reinstated with
restoration of seniority rights and reimbursement for the wages lost.
July 22, 1975
/S/Rolf Valtin
Umpire
No. P-19
JUNE 1, 1976
DISCHARGE;
THEFT;
EXTENT OF PENALTY;
PARAGRAPH (76a)
GRIEVANCE:
GENERAL MOTORS PARTS DIVISION, GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, DENVER

PLANT, DENVER COLORADO—APPEAL CASE P-17
Grievance 731089
"I protest my suspension on 7-24-75 for alleged violation of Shop Rule #33. Request my
record be cleared and I be made whole." S/J.B.
Grievance 731092
"I deny violation of S.R. #33. I protest unjust discharge on 8-1-75. I charge Management
with violation of Paragraph #76-76A of N.A. Request I be made whole and reinstated."
S/J.B.
Grievance Nos. 731089 and 731092 are denied. (Entire decision should be read.)
In the Matter of:

file://C:\Users\bobology\AppData\Local\Temp\Framework\p-019_13A49E48.htm 3/22/2011

Union No. 431
and
General Motors Corporation, General Motors Parts Division, Denver Plant, Denver,
Colorado -- Appeal Case P-17
OPINION
J. B., the grievant in this matter, was discharged on August 1, 1975, for an alleged violation
of Shop Rule No. 33, which prohibits: theft or misappropriation of property of employees or
of the Company.
The facts of this matter are, for the most part, undisputed. On July 24, 1975, the grievant
was working as a Receiving Checker, assigned to the second shift. At approximately 7:30
that evening, she obtained from stock a box containing a new stereo receiver with eight
track tape player, removed this item from the plant and placed it in the trunk of her car.
Later, during the lunch break at approximately 8:45 p.m. the grievant apparently changed
her mind about attempting to abscond with the property. Accompanied by another
employee, V.W., she removed the box from her car. Both employees then walked for a
short distance along the outside of the fence surrounding the plant perimeter. As they
passed a small trash container, the grievant reached over the fence and dropped the box
back inside. The box struck the end of the container and fell to the ground. The employees
then returned to the plant premises.
Virtually all the above-mentioned actions were observed by members of supervision.

Shortly thereafter, the grievant was asked to report to her supervisor’s office. At that point,
she indicated she wished to have Union representation. As it happened, the Union
committeeman was V.W., the same individual she had consulted with over lunch and who
had subsequently accompanied her in moving the stolen merchandise. Management was
aware of this, having observed both persons and, indeed, intended to discipline V.W. as
well. This fact was not discussed at the beginning of the disciplinary interview, however.
The questioning proceeded and the grievant was confronted with management’s
observations and accusations. J. B. flatly denied having stolen anything and fabricated
explanations for going to her car. After several minutes, supervision removed the grievant
to another room, indicating to her committeeman that they would not speak to her during
the time she was away. Instead, members of supervision returned to the committeeman
and asked him what he knew of the incident. He responded he knew only what he had
heard in the interview. At that point, V.W. was asked whether he desired Union
representation. He said he did. The grievant, J.B. was then brought back into the room. A
short period of questioning followed after which she was informed she would be
suspended. Thereafter, V.W.’s committeeman arrived and he, too, was suspended. Both
employees were subsequently discharged.
Some months later, the grievant acknowledged that the Company’s allegations were true.
She maintained, however, that after taking the radio, she had decided to return it. She
further indicated that V.W.’s role was confined to advising her to return the item and
helping her to do so. At this point, V.W.’s discipline was reduced to a suspension. The
Company’s position with respect to the grievant, however, remained unchanged.
The Union’s position in this case is twofold. First, it claims that the Company was remiss in
not taking into account the grievant’s relatively rapid decision to return the stolen item.
Additionally, it maintains there were serious procedural defects in the administration of the
disciplinary interview which would justify nullifying or modifying the penalty.
Assuming, without deciding, that grievant’s actions in this case should somehow be viewed
as mitigating an unquestionably serious breach of the work rules, the critical question
concerns her intent. On the one hand, one might characterize her actions as
demonstrating an abandonment of the original desire to keep the property, coupled with
the wish to restore it. On the other hand, the same efforts might reasonably be viewed as
the reactions of an individual increasingly concerned with detection and therefore seeking
to divest herself of incriminating evidence. The latter case, of course, could hardly be
viewed as circumstances favorable to the grievant. In both cases, the grievant undergoes a
change of mind with respect to the initial plan. The issue, however, as noted by the Union,
is whether there was a change of heart.
In such instances, the misconduct—stealing the goods—is a given. This was not a case of
unfulfilled intent. (See Case C-380). Absent more, there is little question that discharge is
appropriate. If mitigating circumstances are to be found, the burden properly rests with the
grievant to prove that her efforts amounted to some clear, albeit late-blooming, indication
of good faith that might serve to support a less drastic penalty. The problem, of course, is
that the good intentions to restore may well be accompanied by the urge to do so
undetected. Clearly, such was the case here. But, this being so, the problem of
convincingly demonstrating good intent is, indeed, substantial.
Here, the facts are such that an objective observer may not reasonably conclude that the
burden has been met. First, for whatever reasons, the stolen item was not returned.
Instead, it was dropped over the plant fence, perilously close to a trash container. It is not
clear from this, at least, that grievant was attempting to restore the item as opposed to
merely ‘ditching’ it. Moreover, the grievant’s actions subsequent to being discovered and
accused do not serve to support her claim of a change of heart. Her initial and continuing
reaction was to deny any involvement with the theft. Indeed, she did not admit her role until
the third step of the grievance procedure, some two months later. These actions not only
deprived the Company of the opportunity to fully review and evaluate the overall facts at
the time of the incident but also undermined the vitality of her later explanation. Finally,
while there is substantial dispute on the question, there is reason to believe that the
grievant knew she had been earlier observed. Among other things, at the time of the initial
taking, V.W. was standing next to and conversing with the foreman who was then
observing her removing the radio. Additionally, according to the evidence, there was some
activity by the Denver Police on the premises just prior to J. B.’s decision to remove the
item from her car and drop it back inside the fence. It is, of course, unknown whether the
foreman’s observations may have been known and conveyed to J.B. during lunch.
Similarly, it is unclear whether the police activity at that time necessarily inspired her
actions. At the same time, however, these circumstances raise serious questions as to
whether grievant’s decision to divest herself of the stolen property was wholly grounded on
principled considerations. Under these circumstances, the difficulties of inferring grievant’s

good faith are manifest, for there is simply insufficient evidence to allow one to conclude
that this employee’s activities clearly reflect an attempt to right her previous wrong.
The Union also maintains that it was a violation of Paragraph (76a) for the Company to
have separated the grievant from her committeeman during the interview. In analyzing the
propriety of this action, the question must be whether, under the circumstances, such
event deprived the grievant of rights specifically expressed or clearly implied by the
contract and, in so doing, resulted in inequitable consideration of her case.
The right of Union representation is contractually guaranteed and should, in all cases, be
"scrupulously observed." As stated by the Umpire in G-197:
If the right be abused, there are avenues for corrections. Though couched in language of
employee or Union rights, the free exercise of the right of representation, particularly in the
initial stages of a grievance, operates to the advantage of Management as well as the
Union and the employees; interference with that right tends to magnify grievances and
obstruct or delay settlements, thus hampering the orderly and efficient administration of the
Agreement.
Pursuant to this, one may, as a general matter, conclude that it is not within the Company’s
prerogatives to turn the representation process on and off according to its whims.
Paragraph (76a) surely requires, for example, that when the grievant requests and
receives representation, the disciplinary interview not be carried on in the absence of the
committeeman. Moreover, case precedent establishes that, if requested, the grievant is
entitled to a private conference with the representative. (J-63).
In this case, however, there was no violation of J. B.’s contractual rights. First, the grievant
did not request a private conference with V.W., and none was denied. Moreover, since no
questioning of the grievant occurred while she was out of the presence of the
committeeman, one may not find she was somehow disadvantaged by his temporary
absence. Nor is there an apparent violation of J.B.’s rights inherent in the Company’s
questioning the committeeman. The Union representative may well be apprised, in a given
case, of certain confidential facts, gained perhaps from consultation with the accused. In
the usual case, to allow supervision to then obtain such information under threat of
discipline might well be contrary to the intent of Paragraph (76). This instance, however,
differs meaningfully since the committeeman was himself suspected of complicity in the
offense. Under the circumstances, supervision was as much within its rights in questioning
him as it was in interrogating the grievant. It may be, of course, that disclosures which
might have been made by V.W. in his own self-interest would stand as substantially
detrimental to J.B.’s case. That would present a significant conflict. But the conflict, if there
be one, is most immediately apparent to the accused and the committeeman. It is not the
Company’s responsibility to monitor such possibilities, nor, in fact, is it the Company’s right
to so screen duly-appointed Union representatives. It is the representative and the grievant
who must be sensitive to such potentials.
The finding, then, is that the act of separating the grievant from her committeeman did not,
in this instance, disadvantage the grievant or somehow serve to taint the disciplinary
interview procedure or deny the due process requirements inherent therein.
Having carefully reviewed the facts and arguments concerning both the procedure and
substance of this case, the conclusion must be that there is no cause to overturn the
penalty imposed. This being the case, the grievance must be denied.
DECISION
Grievance Nos. 731089 and 731092 are denied.
/S/Richard I. Bloch
Associate Umpire
June 1, 1976 /S/Arthur Stark
Umpire
No. P-22
July 29, 1976
EXCESSIVE ABSENTEEISM;
EXTENT OF DISCIPLINE
GRIEVANCE:

PLANT, SOUTH GATE, CALIFORNIA—APPEAL CASE P-292
Grievance 145798
"Protest Mgt. with issuing me an unjust Discharge for an alleged viol ov SR #6. Request
that I be reinstated with Full Seniority and all Benefits due me and I be paid all monies due
me due to mgt. error."
S/R.G.
Grievance No. 145798 is sustained in part and denied in part in accordance with the above
findings. (Entire decision should be read.)
In the Matter of:

Union No. 216
and
General Motors Corporation, GM Assembly Division South Gate Plant, South Gate,
file://C:\Users\bobology\AppData\Local\Temp\Framework\p-022_13A4A9DC.htm 3/22/2011
California -- Appeal Case P-292
OPINION
Grievant R. G. was discharged on October 16, 1975, for violating Shop Rule #6, which
prohibits excessive absenteeism. The facts are not in dispute. In March of 1975, the
grievant was convicted of a felony. Part of the sentence required his serving one year in
the county jail. After his conviction, a representative of the Los Angeles County Work
Furlough and Parole Office contacted the Company to inquire about the possibility of R.
G.’s being released during working hours as part of a statutory work-release arrangement.
The Company declined to participate in the program. It indicated, however, that so far as it
was concerned, the grievant could return to work with no punitive action being taken
against him by the Company. Apparently, this was not satisfactory to the County and, on
September 29, 1975, the grievant began serving a one year jail sentence. On October 3,
the Company was again contacted by the Work Furlough Office and its participation in the
furlough program was once more solicited, but the Company still declined. On October 16,
1975, the Company discharged R. G. for "continued absence without good cause." This
grievance resulted.
During the course of a Third Step Appeal meeting on January 29, 1976, Management was
informed by the Union that whatever conditions had originally attended the Company’s
participation in the furlough program had now been waived by the County and that the only
qualification upon grievant’s release from jail would be the Company’s certification that his
job was available. Management indicated it was willing to have the grievant return. In view
of the extent of the absence, however, it believed a two-week disciplinary layoff was in
order. The parties differed on that point; the grievance was not resolved; and the grievant
remained in jail until has release in May of 1976.
The Union contends that since the Company rejected the work-release program, thereby
foreclosing grievant’s availability, it should not be allowed to later claim his absence was
without reasonable cause. The Union also claims that, even if the Company was within its
rights in deeming the absence to be without cause, the penalty was overly severe since it
was grievant’s first offense.
The Company denies any contractual obligation to cooperate with the furlough program
and maintains the discipline imposed was justified under the circumstances.
Resolution of this dispute depends in part upon recognition of the highly unique
circumstances. First, it should be recalled that incarceration may not be "good cause" for
absenteeism, and moreover, that management may take into consideration the actual or
potential length of the absence in imposing discipline. * For example, in E-262, the Umpire
rejected the notion that confinement in jail necessarily amounts to reasonable cause for
absence. Otherwise, he said, "an employee given a long sentence for a serious crime
would retain full employment rights for many years despite his loss of ability to function as
an employee." It was also noted that while principles of corrective discipline were
applicable, discharge might be appropriate in the case of an employee sentenced to a long
jail term.
This case arises in response to discipline for violating a shop rule and should be
distinguished, therefore, from cases involving contractual terminations under Paragraphs
64© and 64(d) of the National Agreement.
Yet, despite the prospect of a lengthy sentence, the instant case presents reasons for
finding that the discharge penalty was inappropriate. The most compelling factor is that the
underlying dispute here was not over the grievant’s continued employment. As its several
responses to the Parole Office indicate, there was never any question as to the Company’s
willingness to continue the grievant’s employment—assuming he was available. Thus, the
initial question concerned the conditions attached to the furlough program. It is true that the
grievant could have returned but for the Company’s refusal to participate. Yet, the
Company was under no contractual obligation to comply with that release program and its
decision not to do so may in no sense, therefore, be viewed as a violation of the terms of
During the Third Step meeting, the nature of the underlying dispute changed significantly.
For all intents and purposes, the question of R. G.’s return had been resolved; the penal
authorities had waived any conditions which might have previously attached to the furlough
and the Company was willing to reinstate the grievant. But, considering the extended
absence, Management was desirous of imposing a two-week disciplinary suspension.
Under the circumstances, for the reasons stated earlier, discipline was not inappropriate,
nor may it be viewed in this case as overly severe, considering, among other things, the
length of absence. Yet, the parties were still at odds. The two-week suspension was not
acceptable to the Union and the Company, for its part, conditioned re-employment on the
Union’s agreeing to the two-week penalty.
It is always within the parties’ prerogatives to formulate offers and to bargain as they
choose, and it is neither necessary nor appropriate to comment here on the content of
various settlement attempts. However, the result of the continuing disagreement was
extremely harsh and this is relevant, for the propriety of the discharge must be evaluated
with a reasonable view of the entire situation. The heart of the discussions at Third Step
was not R. G.’s availability and reinstatement—that had been essentially resolved. The
issue now was whether the grievant deserved a two-week suspension. Normally, a dispute
of that nature would cause the grievant no loss of working time beyond the contested two
weeks. But in this case, the extended dispute led to R. G.’s continued confinement and,
therefore, to his unavailability for work. To allow this chain of circumstances to culminate in
the grievant’s discharge would be to ignore the specific nature of the real issue.
This is not to say grievant should not assume some of the burden for his extended
absence. He was, after all, in jail due to his own activities. Considering, however, all the
circumstances peculiar to this unusual case, and without attempting to establish a formula
for relating length of absence to disciplinary penalties, the findings are that: (1) The
discharge shall be set aside, (2) The grievant’s record shall include a notation that he has
received a two-week DLO under Shop Rule #6, a penalty which is appropriate given the
facts here, and (3) the grievant shall be reinstated with full seniority rights and back pay
from May 29, 1976 to the date of reinstatement.
DECISION
Grievance No. 145798 is sustained in part and denied in part in accordance with the above
findings.
/S/Richard I. Bloch
Associate Umpire
July 29, 1976
/S/Arthur Stark
Umpire
No. P-38
March 9, 1978
TERMINATION UNDER PARAGRAPH (64d);
EVIDENCE
GRIEVANCE:
GM ASSEMBLY DIVISION, GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, DORAVILLE PLANT,
DORAVILLE, GEORGIA—APPEAL CASE Q-10
Grievance 262825
"Protest Mg’mt. with breaking my seniority. Request I be reinstated. Paid all monies, and
Created other Benefits deprived of." S/J.L.D. (Grievant)
Grievance No. 262825 is denied. (Entire decision should be read.)
In the Matter of:
United Automobile, Aerospace, and Agriculture Implement Workers of America Local

Union No. 10
and
General Motors Corporation, GM Assembly Division, Doraville, Georgia -- Appeal Case Q-

10

file://C:\Users\bobology\AppData\Local\Temp\Framework\p-038_13A4B58F.htm 3/22/2011
OPINION
The grievance in this case, which arose under the terms of the 1973 Agreement,
challenges the contractual termination of J. L. D.
Paragraph (64d) of the 1973 Agreement states:
(64) Seniority shall be broken for the following reasons:
(d) if the employee fails to return to work within three working days
satisfactory reason...
D. was scheduled to return from a disciplinary layoff on June 24, 1975. On that date, he
completed a sickness and accident form on which his doctor indicated he could return in
six weeks. The doctor also noted that D. would be referred to an orthopedic surgeon.
Grievant saw the surgeon, Doctor S., who, on August 5, prescribed medication, placed D.’s
arm in a sling, and referred him to the GMAD doctor, with a letter stating that he was
"being returned... for your evaluation for his return to work." By then, D. had also seen an
impartial medical examiner as directed by the Company. He had also seen a nerve
specialist, Doctor P., whose tests revealed no nerve injury.
On August 11, grievant reported to the Plant Medical Director, Doctor F., with his arm in a
sling. He had been suffering from elbow problems. Doctor F. concluded that D. was not
incapacitated and told him to remove the sling and go to work. D., however, believed
himself unable to use his arm and therefore left the plant.
On November 17, 1975, and again on the 18th, the Company mailed D. a "Paragraph
(64d)" letter, stating:
You are hereby instructed to report for work. Failure to do so within

three (3) working days following delivery or attempted delivery of
this letter will result in the loss of your seniority.
Very truly yours,
/s/ L. D. R. Supervisor-Employment
D. did not return and, on December 16, 1975, he was terminated. On January 6, 1976, he
grieved.
The union maintains that the Plant Medical Examiner’s ultimatum—‘work or leave’—
violated grievant’s contractual rights and served to place him in a sort of ‘limbo’ thereafter.
This being the case, it says, the Company was precluded from later invoking Paragraph
(64).
The Company contends the termination was proper inasmuch as it had the right to require
D. to return, but he failed either to report within three working days after notification or to
give a satisfactory reason.
The initial question in this case is whether management had the right to issue the ‘return to
work’ letters. The Union says that as of August 11, D. should have been allowed either to
work on some type of restricted duty or be placed on sick leave. Admittedly, D.’s status
was not entirely clear following that visit—his sickness and accident benefits had been cut
off in July of 1975, for example. Yet, while questions may exist in this regard, it is at least
clear that D. was not terminated. Neither was he working, and there is no contractual or
logical reason why management could not have required him to return or to somehow
demonstrate why he could not.
The Union claims that Doctor F. relied solely on the report of an impartial medical examiner
in concluding that grievant could work. But, as noted earlier, grievant had, by then, seen a
number of personal physicians as well, including Dr. S., who had sent him to the plant for
Dr. F.’s work evaluation. D. says the Company physician performed no examination on
August 11, but one is not persuaded that the one and one-half hour meeting was devoted
solely to talking, as claimed by grievant.
In any event, even were it demonstrated that a restricted job was available (and there is no
such evidence), and that it somehow should have been offered to the grievant, this in itself
could hardly deprive management of the right to call him back at a later date, which it did.
Similarly, whether D. should have been on sick leave or otherwise, one may not conclude
that he was forever immune from the requirement of returning to work or showing why he
could not. The finding, therefore, is that there was no impropriety in sending the November
letters. The remaining question is whether grievant has demonstrated a "satisfactory
reason" for not returning.
In October of 1975, Doctor S. (the orthopedic surgeon to whom D. had been first referred)
wrote the Company doctor stating, among other things, that his "impression" was "probable
mild lateral epicondylitis, right elbow"; that the nerve conduction studies performed by
Doctor B. were negative; that the patient had been seen on August 5, given a sling (to be
worn for about three weeks) and told to report to GMAD for a "work evaluation"; that the
patient did not return to him subsequently and that, therefore, the doctor "assumed... that
(grievant) was doing well."
Thus, at the time D. was terminated in December of 1975, the Company had before it the
following information:
(1) a sickness and accident form from June, stating he

would be disabled for about six weeks;
(2) a nerve specialist’s negative findings;
(3) the August letter from Doctor S., returning D. to the

Company doctor for his evaluation;
(4) Doctor F.’s conclusion that, in August, at least, D.
could have worked; and
(5) the October 28 letter from Doctor S. suggesting a

three-week disability (in August) and indicating no follow-
up.
The evidence suggests a potential conflict of opinion as to whether D. could have worked
in August or whether, instead, he would be disabled for three weeks. But the significant
question is whether D. was unable to report in November. While there is evidence that D.
suffered continuing problems with his arm, there is none by which one may reasonably
conclude he was unable to return when notified to do so.
Evidence submitted at arbitration indicates that grievant saw his original doctor (Doctor J.)
in Atlanta in November of 1975 and again in January of 1976. In April of 1977, he
apparently saw another doctor in New York and subsequently visited a New York hospital
on an out-patient basis. However, with respect to disability, there is no evidence
whatsoever stemming from any of these visits.
In all, there is reason to find that this individual was experiencing, and continues to
experience, certain difficulties with his arm. But the critical question in this case is whether
these problems prevented him from reporting for work in November of 1975. On this point,
the evidence is substantially lacking. At most, the various medical opinions of D.’s own
physicians show limited periods of disability—evidence which falls far short of
demonstrating a satisfactory reason for failing to report for work when required to do so.
For these reasons, the grievance will be denied.
DECISION
Grievance No. 262825 is denied.
March 9, 1978
/S/Richard I. Bloch
Associate Umpire
/S/Arthur Stark
Umpire
No. P-49
May 25, 1978
TERMINATION PURSUANT TO PARAGRAPH (64)(d);
EVIDENCE;
REMEDY
GRIEVANCE:
GM PARTS DIVISION, GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, DALLAS PLANT, DALLAS,

TEXAS -- APPEAL CASE P-258
Grievance 313558
"I charge Mgmt. with refusing to let me return to work on Oct. 4, 1976. I demand that I be
allowed to return to work immediately and I demand all lost monies due me." S/J.O.
(Grievant)
The termination of O. under Paragraph (64)(d) was improper and shall be rescinded. The
matters of reinstatement and back pay are remanded to the parties. (Entire decision should
be read.)
In the Matter of:

Union No. 816
and
file://C:\Users\bobology\AppData\Local\Temp\Framework\p-049_13A4C0F4.htm 3/22/2011
General Motors Corporation, GM Parts Division, Dallas, Texas -- Appeal Case P-258
OPINION
The issue here is whether Stock Handler O. was properly terminated pursuant to
Paragraph (64)(d) after she failed to report for work on April 26, 27 and 28, 1976; more
specifically, did she have a satisfactory reason for not reporting within the meaning of that
Paragraph? The clause in question provides that seniority shall be broken:
(d) If the employee fails to return to work within three working days after being notified to
report for work, and does not give a satisfactory reason...
It is the Union’s position that O. was incapacitated on the days in question.
The grievant was hired on September 18, 1975. About three months later she was hit on
the head and shoulders by a falling panel. As a result she was off work about two weeks.
In February 1976 O. suffered a miscarriage and again lost about two weeks of work. When
she returned she was assigned for a time to light duty which consisted of picking small
parts.
On April 1, 1976, O. fell off a ladder at work. She was taken by ambulance to a hospital
where she was treated. The hospital referred her to Dr. W. an orthopedic surgeon, who
examined her on April 5.
O. told Dr. W. that she had landed on the concrete floor after the fall and had re-injured her
neck and lower back. She said that since her December injury she had had pain and
tenderness in the upper spine and neck and had suffered memory lapses.
In a report of the examination to the Royal Globe Insurance Company dated April 6, Dr. W.
noted a history of lumbo-sacral sprain with some evidence of acute cervical sprain and a
concussion. He recommended that she be seen by a neurologist. He also recommended
out-patient physical therapy and a recheck in a week.
O. was examined by a neurologist, Dr. B., on April 6. He diagnosed a "post-traumatic

syndrome" and had a brain scan done.
O. picked up a sickness and accident claim form (S & A) at the plant on April 8.
On April 12, O. was seen again by Dr. W. who, in an April 19 communication to the
insurance carrier, stated that she was still complaining about her neck and back and had
been advised to continue her exercise program and to return in a week.
Dr. W. examined O. again on April 19. His report to the insurance carrier (dated April 22)
stated that she had reported "aches all over" but basically she "looks good". His
conclusion:
I feel that she probably ought to go ahead and try going back to
work which she feels that she probably can do as long as she
doesn’t do any heavy exercise routine. She is released to go ahead
back to work, continue on her exercise program and return here in a
week for recheck.
On the S & A form which Dr. W. signed (but which O. did not submit to the Company) he
specified that O. had been totally disabled for the period April 1 through April 19, but had
recovered sufficiently to return to work on the 19th.
Personnel Administrator R. learned of Dr. W.’s action on April 19 during a conversation

with a representative of the insurance carrier.
O. testified that she did not tell Dr. W. that she felt she could work if the work did not
require "heavy exercise". Because of her disagreement with Dr. W.’s finding and
recommendation that she return to work, she cancelled her appointment for the following
week and did not return to his office.
After waiting in vain for a copy of Dr. W.’s letter, Labor Relations Representative R. sent a
Paragraph (64)(d) letter to O. on April 23, notifying her to report for work on April 26 or risk
the loss of her seniority.
On April 26 the insurance carrier received Dr. W.’s letter and O. received the Company’s
communication. She did not call in or report to work, however. She testified that, while she
was concerned about the letter, her health concerned her more.
On April 27 the insurance carrier wrote to O.’s attorney to report that she had cancelled her
appointment with Dr. W. the previous day and had indicated that she planned to see
another physician. The claim representative asked for the name of the new doctor and his
medical reports, "... since Dr. W. had returned her to work on 4-19-76, we feel we will have
to terminate the compensation unless we have other medical to substantiate continuance."
The three Paragraph (64)(d) days, April 26, 27 and 28, elapsed, but O. did not report for
work.
On April 29, Personnel Administrator H. testified, O. phoned and asked for Labor Relations
Representative R. who was not available. She told H., he recalled, that she would not be in
because she was not feeling well and she did not understand why her doctor had released
her. She said that she was going to Florida to stay with her mother, planned to see a
doctor there, and did not know when she might return. H. told her that if she had been
instructed to report for work she should do so; she replied that she wanted to talk to R.
R. phoned O. on the morning of April 30. He recalls that she told him that she had been
released by Dr. W. but did not know why, that she was going to Florida to stay with her
mother and was not sure she would return to the Dallas area, and that she planned to see
another doctor. He read her the text of Paragraph (64)(d) and asked if she understood it.
She replied that she did understand, but that she would let GM fire her. He explained that
she would be considered to have voluntarily quit.
O. testified that she told R. that she was still unable to work and intended to see a different
doctor, that she was going to Florida because she was in pain and could not afford to stay
in her apartment. She did not recall saying that she no longer wanted to work for the
Company.
The Company released O. under the provisions of Paragraph (64)(d) on April 30 and
notified the Union.
O. later talked with a Union representative who advised her to seek medical treatment and
submit a grievance. She did not file a grievance at that time, however, because, she
testified, she was absorbed in her health problem; nor did she see another doctor at once.
She felt that she was unable physically, at the time, to perform any stock handler work in
the plant, although she was unaware whether there were any sitting jobs available.
On or about May 10, O. moved in with her mother in Florida. She testified that she wanted
to get well before returning to Dallas. Soon after arriving in Florida she made an
appointment with Dr. E., an orthopedic surgeon.
In the meantime, O.’s workmen’s compensation benefits had been stopped. In a letter to
her attorney dated May 20, the insurance carrier authorized O. to see a physician in
Florida and stated that, upon receipt of a narrative report with a medical diagnosis and
prognosis the carrier would decide whether to approve further treatment.
Dr. E.’s report to the insurance carrier, following an examination of O. on May 26, specified
April 1, 1976 as the date disability began, and "unknown" as the date patient would be able
to return to work. The X-ray examinations were all negative, he reported, but the patient
complained of pain in the posterior aspect of her neck when bending forward at the hips,
mild pain to percussion over the cervical vertebrae, and pain during extremes of motion in
forward flexion and extension and in right and left lateral bending and rotation. Examination
also showed that low back range of motion caused pain in the upper back. The doctor
concluded that O. had a cervical-lumbar sprain "by history" and a "definite overlying
functional problem". He prescribed medication and suggested that she apply heat to the
neck. Although "a short course of hospitalization and traction may be of benefit", he
concluded, O. may "just need some more time to improve".
Following receipt of Dr. E.’s report, the insurance carrier authorized the physician to treat
O. as indicated in his report. It also reinstated her workmen’s compensation benefits,
making them retroactive to April, so that payments were authorized, in effect, for the entire
period, April 2 through May 13. Additional workmen’s compensation benefits were
subsequently authorized for the period between June 3 and July 6.
On July 7, O. obtained work as a cashier with Greyhound Rent-A-Car in Miami. She left on
July 27, she testified, because she was to be transferred to a position which would require
her to be on her feet most of the time.
On August 6, Dr. E. reported that, while O. still had some symptoms, she was definitely
improving with physical therapy. On September 10 he noted that she had reported
continuing pain in her neck without the physical therapy treatment, which had been halted.
He could find no organic pathology, however, and he indicated that there would be no
further treatment since she was returning to Dallas.
On September 27, Dr. E. released O. for light duty, starting October 4, with "no heavy
lifting, no climbing, twisting, or prolonged walking, no pushing objects or bending."
When O. returned to Dallas on October 4 she was denied employment on the ground that
her seniority had been terminated pursuant to Paragraph (64)(d). She submitted a
grievance the same day.
Was O. disabled from working on April 26, 27 and 28, 1976? If so, she had a satisfactory
reason for not reporting under the terms of Paragraph (64)(d).
The medical evidence is in conflict. On April 19 Dr. W. released O. to return to work, while
on May 26 Dr. E. found that she had been disabled since April 1 and that it was not known
when she would be able to return to work. Both physicians are presumably reputable
orthopedic surgeons.
While the Umpire is not bound by the insurance carrier’s determinations, it is of some
significance in this dispute that the carrier, when faced with the very same conflicting
medical opinions, ultimately accepted that of Dr. E. The Umpire is not privy to any superior
medical knowledge that would justify an opposite conclusion.
It is clear that O. did receive an in-plant injury on April 1 and that thereafter she reported
pain and discomfort and was diagnosed on April 5 as having suffered a lumbo-sacral and
acute cervical sprain. A similar finding was made on May 26. Both doctors found the same
condition; both traced it to the April 1 injury and reported similar symptoms and findings.
There is no indication of any intervening event which would have influenced the second
evaluation.
It may also be noted that Dr. W. stated, in his April 19 report, that O. continued to suffer
pain. His release, perhaps as a consequence, was worded in a guarded manner: "I feel
that she probably ought to go ahead and try going back to work..." And he prescribed a
continuation of her exercise program and a recheck in a week. It is not clear, furthermore,
whether Dr. W. was releasing O. for full or limited duty. He stated, "... she feels that she
probably can do (work) as long as she doesn’t do any heavy exercise routine."
In any event, a reasonable interpretation of the medical findings, conflicting as they are, is
that O. was indeed disabled from work on the three days in question. Accordingly, and
notwithstanding her failure to keep in touch with the Company for some five months, her
termination under Paragraph (64)(d) will not be sustained.
While the grievance is upheld, what might constitute an appropriate remedy is not readily
apparent. Thus, O.’s last medical release, insofar as the record reveals, confined her to
light duty—no heavy lifting, climbing, twisting, prolonged walking, pushing objects or
bending. But evidence before the Umpire does not show whether such a light duty job was
available on October 4, 1976. Nor does the record show whether, and when, O. became
physically able to perform regular duty after that date. Additionally, the Company’s brief to
the Umpire indicates that the Union has waived monetary liability for the period, April 14,
1977 to February 17, 1978.
In these circumstances the matters of reinstatement and back pay will be remanded to the
parties.
DECISION
The termination of O. under Paragraph (64)(d) was improper and shall be rescinded. The
matters of reinstatement and back pay are remanded to the parties.
May 25, 1978
/S/Arthur Stark
Umpire
UMPIRE DECISION Q-3 Page 1 of 5
No. Q-3
June 8, 1978
TERMINATION UNDER PARAGRAPH (64)(d);
EVIDENCE
GRIEVANCE:
GM ASSEMBLY DIVISION, GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, ARLINGTON PLANT,
ARLINGTON, TEXAS—APPEAL CASE Q-63
Grievance No. 249572
"I chg. mgt. with viol. of par. 64D N.A. Request I be reinstated at once & receive all monies
& benefits lost." S/C.R.K. (Grievant)
The grievance is sustained. K. shall be reinstated and made whole for wages and benefits
lost since the date of the grievance. (Entire decision should be read.)
In the Matter of:

Union No. 276
and
General Motors Corporation, GM Assembly Division, Arlington, Texas -- Appeal Case Q-63

file://C:\Users\bobology\AppData\Local\Temp\Framework\q-003_13A4CA86.htm 3/22/2011
OPINION
The issue here is whether Assembler K. was properly terminated pursuant to Paragraph
(64)(d) after he failed to report for work on October 21, 22 and 23, 1976. Paragraph (64)
declares that seniority shall be broken:
(d) If the employee fails to return to work within three working days
satisfactory reason....
The Union contends that K. was ill on the days in question.
K. was hired on July 7, 1973, at the age of 18. He began to drink excessively in early 1975.
On June 21, 1976, K. entered the Schick Memorial Hospital in Fort Worth, which
specializes in the treatment of alcohol and other drug addiction and emotional
disturbances. He was detoxified but, against medical advice, left the hospital on June 25
after receiving only part of the behaviorally oriented treatment.
K. resumed drinking, but returned to the hospital for a continuation of the treatment on
June 28. He was released on July 9. Dr. D.’s "final diagnosis": "1. Alcohol addiction now
controlled with abstinence. 2. Sociopathic immature acting out personality disorder. 3.
Intermittent hypertension, essential. 4. Alcoholic gastritis. 5. Hepatomegaly and hepatic
dysfunction secondary to alcoholism."
K. was given a kit consisting of Antabuse and Tranxene and told to consider using
Antabuse on a regular basis and to use Valium as needed. He was also instructed to
return in one month for "routine reinforcement for alcohol abstinence," and to see Mr. S., a
psychologist at the hospital, on a weekly basis.
Dr. D.’s prognosis was "very guarded" because, although the patient had improved, he
was unable to accept total abstinence as a way of life.
K. received sickness and accident benefits during his June-July hospitalization. He

returned to work on or about July 12, 1976, and started to drink regularly about two weeks
later.
Apparently some of K.’s drinking occurred in the plant, although he was not disciplined.
The record does not contain any information concerning his attendance during the ensuing
three months.
On October 6, 1976, K. received permission to leave work early for "personal reasons". He
did not return on October 7 or 8. On the following Monday, October 11, he phoned the
plant employment office and reported that he would not be in because his wife had left him.
He phoned again on Wednesday, October 13, to say that he would be absent because of
personal reasons.
On Tuesday, October 19, the Company sent a letter to K.’s address of record notifying him
to report for work or furnish Management with satisfactory evidence that he was unable to
work. The letter specified that his failure to comply with this instruction would result in his
release as a "contractual quit". The letter was returned to the plant, marked "unclaimed,"
with a postmark date of October 20.
On Friday, October 22, the second of the three Paragraph (64)(d) days, K. phoned the
plant to report that he was absent because of sickness and family problems, but would
return on October 23.
When K. did not report on the third day, Saturday, October 23, Management considered
his seniority to have been broken in accordance with Paragraph (64)(d) and, on October
28, it sent him a notice to that effect to his address of record. This letter, too was returned
by the post office as "unclaimed."
In early 1977 K. attempted to return to work. He explained that he had been suffering from
alcoholism on the three days in question. The Union submitted statements in support of his
claim on February 7, but Management was not persuaded to return him to work. He filed
the instant Grievance on March 28, 1977.
The grievant testified substantially as follows with respect to the events of October 1976:
He left the plant early on October 6 so that he could talk things over with his wife with
whom he had been having "separation" problems. They argued that night; on the following
day she left him. He had been drinking "moderately" until then but, with her departure, he
began to drink heavily. Soon thereafter, he is not sure on which day, he left his home and
went to a motel where he stayed and drank. He did not tell anyone where he was and left
no forwarding address.
K. remembers his first phone call to the plant, but does not remember the day or date. He
does not remember making the subsequent calls on October 13 and 22. He probably made
them though, he stated, because he felt that he should: "I was under enough control to
know I was making a mistake, but not under enough control to do anything about it."
During this period he consumed a quart of whisky and at least a six-pack of beer each day.
He continued this heavy drinking until October 26, when he made the decision to return to
the Schick Hospital.
Since his release from the hospital in November 1976, the grievant testified, he has had no
drinks.
The Corporation contends that, if K. was in sufficient control of his faculties to make
several telephone calls to the plant, he could have come to work. The calls demonstrate
that he was not under the influence of alcohol during the entire period in question. In any
event, the Corporation emphasizes, being under the influence of alcohol does not
constitute a satisfactory reason for absence, and it cites prior decisions in which
discharges have been sustained (1) for continued absence due to a "preference for
alcohol" (Umpire Decision G-44), and (2) for "habitual absence without reasonable
cause" (Umpire Decision C-389). It also cites a decision upholding the assessment of a
one-week DLO where the evidence showed that "drunkeness" was the basic reason for the
absence (Umpire Decision C-305).
Management notes further that, although K. had been on a sick leave of absence for
alcoholism between June 22 and July 12, 1976, he made no effort to seek another leave
during October, although he knew it was available if he was in fact in need of help at that
time. It was not until October 26, after his termination, that K. sought attention at Schick
Hospital.
Management is concerned that if this grievance is sustained, Paragraph (64)(d) could

never be made applicable to an employee who fails to report and who subsequently claims
to be an alcoholic. The concern is understandable. But the parties have recognized that
"alcoholism" is a disease. That is why a sick leave of absence is available to an employee
who voluntarily obtains medical treatment.
The causes of alcoholism are not well understood, as the parties are aware, and cures are
frequently difficult. But the question of whether an individual is an alcoholic is not resolved
by a mere claim. It is possible to distinguish between an employee who is indeed suffering
from the disease of alcoholism over which he has little control, and the employee whose
over-indulgences reflect a lack of responsibility. And among those afflicted with the disease
of alcoholism one can distinguish between an employee who acknowledges his condition
and affirmatively seeks a cure, and one who denies his illness and cannot face up to
treatment.
Disciplinary action can certainly be justified in cases of improper behavior or excessive

absences resulting from alcoholic addiction or alcoholic overindulgence, as noted in the
many Umpire decisions sustaining such discipline. Disciplinary action may in fact serve to
induce an employee to seek a cure. But obviously each dispute, whether it concerns a
disciplinary action or a Paragraph (64)(d) termination, must be decided on its own facts.
In the instant case the evidence clearly establishes that K. was a chronic and uncured
alcoholic at the time in question who, because of deep-seated problems, could not control
his drinking. The records of Schick Hospital show that he had three acute episodes in
1976. The record covering the June 28-July 9 admission refers to his "underlying anxiety
tension relieved by excessive drinking and excessive use of Valium." It also reports
"intermittent hypertension most probably related to high anxiety levels, and to peptic
symptoms."
It is significant, however, that K. recognized that he was ill and sought treatment. When he
entered the hospital in October he required a day of detoxification. He was also given four
"aversion" and three "pentothal" sessions. Such treatments would not have been
prescribed for mild or intermittent drinking.
The medical director of Schick Hospital confirmed that "... oftentimes until one becomes
abstinent from alcohol, he is not responsible for his own behavior. These circumstances
were responsible for Mr. (K.’s) being absent from his job at General Motors during the
period from October 7, 1976 through October 25, 1976 when he entered this facility for
treatment of his addiction."
Additionally, Mr. S., a clinical psychologist affiliated with the hospital, who had served as
the grievant’s counselor, testified that, in his professional judgment and on the basis of his
familiarity with K., the grievant was unable to control his drinking during the week in
question. There were undoubtedly moments of lucidity, S. testified, during which K. made
momentary efforts to assuage his feelings by attempting to act responsibly—by
telephoning the plant, for example. But because of his severe problems, K. was unable to
carry through or to control his drinking; in short, he was effectively incapacitated.
This testimony and the medical records from the hospital, in the Umpire’s judgment,
confirm the grievant’s report with respect to his condition on the three days in question.
In sum, and without in any way implying that drunkenness is "an accepted standard" of
conduct or one to be condoned, it is the Umpire’s decision here that K. was suffering from
an illness known as acute alcoholism during the period covered by the Paragraph (64)(d)
notice, and that this Paragraph was therefore inappropriately applied.
DECISION
The grievance is sustained. K. shall be reinstated and made whole for wages and benefits
lost since the date of the grievance.
June 8, 1978
/S/Arthur Stark
Umpire
No. Q-13
January 11, 1979
DISCHARGE FOR EXCESSIVE ABSENTEEISM;
EFFECT OF GRIEVANCE SETTLEMENT;
EXTENT OF PENALTY
GRIEVANCE:
DETROIT DIESEL ALLISON DIVISION, GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION,

INDIANAPOLIS PLANT, INDIANAPOLIS, INDIANA—APPEAL CASE Q-17
"I charge Management with giving me an unfair discharge on 1-31-77. I demand this be
corrected at once and I be paid all time lost with full seniority and benefits for all time lost
and my record cleared of the incident." S/R.O.B. (Grievant) S/G.M. (Committeeman)
Grievance No. 179036 is denied. (Entire decision should be read.)
In the Matter of:

Union No. 933
and
General Motors Corporation, Detroit Diesel Allison Division, Indianapolis, Indiana -- Appeal
Case Q-17
file://C:\Users\bobology\AppData\Local\Temp\Framework\q-013_13A4D427.htm 3/22/2011
OPINION
Grievant B., seniority date, February 24, 1974, was discharged on January 31, 1977, for
violating Shop Rule #6: "Absence without reasonable cause". B. was classified as a
Grinder Operator-Production at the time.
On June 26, 1975, B. was granted a sick leave of absence based upon a statement from
his personal physician. The sick leave expired on January 30, 1976. B.’s failure to return
caused him to be released effective February 4, 1976, as a voluntary quit under Paragraph
(111)(b) of the National Agreement. The notice of termination was forwarded to B. on April
9, 1976, by registered mail, but returned on April 19, 1976, unclaimed.
On December 22, 1976, without any intervening communication from or concerning B., he
appeared at the plant inquiring about his employment status. Personnel Representative D.
informed and explained to B. that he had been released as a voluntary quit under
Paragraph (111)(b) of the National Agreement. B. informed D. that he was in an
automobile accident on August 5, 1975, and remained in the Veterans Hospital until
November 24, 1975. B. stated that he was sentenced to a term in the Indiana State Prison
commencing on November 25, 1975 and ending on November 24, 1976. Proof of the one
year sentence was submitted by B.; however he refused to divulge the reason for the
sentencing. B. had not requested a leave of absence from the job for reasons of his
incarceration.
On December 23, 1976, Grievance No. 176767, Appeal Case Q-16, was filed protesting
B.’s release as a voluntary quit under Paragraph (111)(b).
On January 24, 1977, Management decided to reinstate B. as though he had never been
terminated under Paragraph (111)(b) of the National Agreement. B. reported on January
26, 1977, and was reinstated for work beginning Monday, January 31, 1977.
B. arrived at work as instructed on January 31, 1977. Shortly after his arrival he was given
a disciplinary interview by General Foreman T. B. remained silent regarding the reason for
his sentence. On the same day he was discharged for violation of Shop Rule #6, Absence
without reasonable cause, and given a Paragraph (76) Notice of Disciplinary Action which
stated:
You are being discharged for excessive absenteeism. You were

unavailable for regular employment for matters solely within your
control from November 25, 1975 thru and including November 24,
1976. Such action warrants discharge.
The instant grievance (Appeal Case Q-17) protesting the discharge was immediately filed.
B.’s reinstatement did not end Appeal Case Q-16 as the question of financial liability
remained "unsettled" until September 9, 1977. The terms of that settlement read as
follows:
Disposition
This case is settled without precedent. Pay 40 hrs for each week
beginning 12-27-77, 1-3-77, 1-10-77, 1-17-77, 1-24-77, for total of
200 straight time hours minus one month (January, 1977) Union
dues.
On the same day a Third Step Meeting on the present grievance was conducted, but no
agreement could be reached and the case was then appealed to the Umpire.
The Union contends that B.’s discharge for violation of Shop Rule #6 is a breach of the
terms of settlement in Appeal Case Q-16, which concerned B.’s release under Paragraph
(111)(b), i.e., the reinstatement of B. is alleged to have settled all matters. It argues that if
the parties intended a temporary reinstatement, it would have been provided for in the
settlement. In the context of Paragraph (111)(b) of the National Agreement, the
reinstatement here is viewed as the practical equivalent of a settlement, according to the
Union.
Additionally, there is a contention that the Corporation can not consider B. absent during a
time he was not scheduled for work. The specific periods of reference are: the period of
disability which extended from June 26, 1975, to January 30, 1976, and the period of B.’s
release as a voluntary quit under Paragraph (111)(b) of the National Agreement, namely,
February 4, 1976, to his reinstatement on January 31, 1977.
Finally the Union argues B.’s prior disciplinary record as a basis for a lesser penalty for the
violation of Shop Rule #6, which, in its view is a minor shop rule requiring progressive
discipline.
The Corporation contends that B.’s release as a voluntary quit under Paragraph (111)(b) of
the National Agreement was proper based upon information available to it at the time.
However, it rescinded the release and assessed the discharge after investigating the
information B. shared about his whereabouts when he appeared on December 22, 1976.
The Corporation further contends that B. caused himself to be absent without reasonable
cause for an extensive period of time, when he engaged in illegal conduct the conviction
for which resulted in his incarceration and accordingly, his unavailability for work. It
considers the length of absence alone as cause for discharge. The concealment of his
whereabouts and the circumstances of his absence until almost a month after his release
from the Indiana State Prison on November 24, 1976, is viewed as a breach of his
employee responsibilities.
It is significant that neither the settlement of Appeal Case Q-16 nor the prior record in this
matter contains any statement that the settlement was intended to resolve the present
discharge grievance. The Union, both in its Statement of Unadjusted Grievance and in its
argument at the third step, focused more on the extent of penalty than on the propriety of
discipline.
Moreover, the Union does not suggest that B.’s reinstatement on January 31, 1977, was
the result of negotiations between the parties. Rather, it asserts that reinstatement, per se,
is tantamount to settlement. While that may sometimes be the case, it was not so here.
The prior record leaves little doubt that Management’s reinstatement of B. was routine and
unilateral; it was based on Paragraph (111)(b)’s "satisfactory reason" exception to the
three-day reporting rule.
I must, therefore, reject the Union’s contention that B.’s reinstatement was designed to
settle or did in fact settle all matters concerning his absence between November 25, 1975
and November 24, 1976.
The Paragraph (76) Notice gives the reason for B.’s discharge as "excessive absenteeism"
from November 25, 1975, through November 24, 1976. There is no dispute that B. was
incarcerated during this period; nor is there any dispute that the Corporation may discipline
and discharge an employee for "excessive absenteeism". There is a question, however, as
to whether B.’s absence from work was due to matters within his control during this period.
The Union points out that B. was on approved disability leave through January 30, 1976,
and was terminated, effective February 4, 1976, as a voluntary quit. Since thereafter B.
was not scheduled for employment and had no obligation to be present, the Union argues,
he cannot be considered to have been absent for the period charged by the Corporation.
This argument is not persuasive in the circumstances of this case. While the Union focuses
on scheduling, the act of scheduling assumes employee availability to work. B. was clearly
unavailable.
The Union contends further that the Corporation has the burden of proving that B. was
absent from November 25, 1975 through November 24, 1976 for reasons within his
control. But to ask now that the Corporation prove that the basis for the incarceration was
within B.’s control is tantamount to asking that it produce the information B. elected to
withhold when questioned about it. If indeed the question of control is relevant, then it was
incumbent upon B. to come forward and explain what happened.
Was the discharge penalty too severe? During his first thirteen months of employment B.
was disciplined twice for violation of Shop Rule #6: he was reprimanded in September
1974, and given a Balance of Shift DLO in March 1975. As already noted, he was absent
without leave and without explanation from January 30 to December 22, 1976, a
substantial period of time. He has provided no reason for his failure to notify Management
of his confinement or to report for work promptly upon his release. Accordingly, under all
the circumstances the Corporation was justified in terminating B.’s employment.
DECISION
January 11, 1979
/S/John Paul Simpkins
Associate Umpire
/S/Arthur Stark
Umpire
UMPIRE DECISION R-11 Page 1 of 8
DECISION R-11
APRIL 17, 1984
Discharge;
Falsification of S&A Form;
Extent of Penalty;
Evidence
GRIEVANCE:
"I protest discharge dated 11-18-81 as unfair and unjust and much to severe. I demand
manage. remove this discharge and I be brought back to work immediately and I be
compensated all lost monies and economics benefits immediately."
/s/ C.R. (Grievant)
/s/ B.J. Committeeman
In the Matter of:
UNITED AUTOMOBILE, AEROSPACE AND AGRICULTURAL IMPLEMENT WORKERS

OF AMERICA -- Local Union No. 686
and
Appeal Case R-60
GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, HARRISON RADIATOR DIVISION, Lockport, New

York
file://C:\Users\bobology\AppData\Local\Temp\Framework\r-011_13A4DF8C.htm 3/22/2011
OPINION
Grievant R., seniority date January 4, 1971, was discharged for violation of Plant Rule 23,
"Falsification of personnel or other records." At the time, R. was classified as Assembler-
Light and employed on the second shift in Department 862 (2:30 p.m.-11:00 p.m.).
Previous to her discharge on November 18, 1981, R. was disciplined on October 29, 1981
for directing abusive language to her supervisor in violation of the Plant Rule prohibiting
such conduct. At that time she was suspended for the balance of the shift and three
working days - until November 4, 1981. The reason for Grievant’s discharge surrounds this
November 4, 1981 date as it appeared on a Statement of Claim For Sickness and Accident
Benefits (S&A) form prepared by R. and her physician, Dr. C. and presented to the
Management of Harrison Radiator.
By way of background, on November 16, 1981, Labor Relations Representative T. was

shown a S&A form submitted by R. The form was shown to him by Benefit Supervisor, G.
because it appeared to be altered in two critical places. The date that was written in Item
No. 7 on the front side of the form (the employee’s side) gave the appearance of being
changed from November 3, 1981 to November 4, 1981. The same irregularity was
apparent on the reverse side of the form in Item No. 7(d), which is a part of the physician’s
statement prepared by Dr. C.
According to the testimony of T., Management felt that the S&A form should be
investigated. He and G. visited Dr. C. the next day and showed him the S&A form. Dr. C.
checked his records and advised T. and G. that the return to work date was November 3,
1981 and that the alteration of the form was not in his handwriting. Upon request, he wrote
a statement on the bottom of the form confirming what he said. He also did not believe
anyone on his staff made the alteration because they were instructed not to make changes
to S&A forms.
T. returned to the office before R.’s shift ended in order to interview her concerning the
S&A form. He showed the form to R. who recognized it as the S&A form she submitted.
She denied making the changes that appeared in the section prepared by her. While she
acknowledged that there was also a change made in the return to work date that is a part
of the physician’s statement, she denied making the change and suggested to T. that it
might have been made by Dr. C. T. then shared with R. the comments of Dr. C. and
showed her the note he wrote on the bottom of the S&A form, under his signature. R.’s
response was that the change may have been made by the doctor’s secretary but she did
not see the change being made.
According to T., R. explained that she delivered the form to Dr. C. on Saturday, November
7, 1981. When she arrived she put it on his secretary’s desk for completion by Dr. C. and
stated that she would return later to pick it up. About 1:00 p.m. she returned. Dr. C.’s
secretary, N., arranged for her to see the doctor. R. had completed her portion of the S&A
form and Dr. C. completed his section. While with the doctor she mentioned that her
daughter was outside and asked if he would examine her finger. Leaving the form on the
secretary’s desk, R. went to get her daughter who was waiting in the car. After Dr. C.
examined her daughter’s finger she left, picking up the S&A form on the way out. N. was
not at her desk at the time but the form was in plain view so she picked it up and left. When
T. asked R. how the S&A form was turned in R. stated that she personally delivered it.
T. concluded the interview and informed R. that the matter would remain open pending
further investigation. He attempted to contact Dr. C.’s secretary but learned that she
relocated to Vancouver, British Columbia. Dr. C. reiterated that no one in his office was
permitted to make changes to S&A forms and that all changes to such forms are initialed
by him.
Another interview was arranged with R. for November 18, 1981. At that time, T. informed
R. that N. no longer worked with Dr. C. and he reaffirmed that no one in his office would
have made the changes. R. denied making the alterations again and stated that N. had
ample opportunity to alter the form. She also stated that he (T.) could not rely on the
doctor’s statement that N. did not make any changes to the S&A form. R. was discharged
after the interview.
Later, T. was able to speak to N. by telephone. She vaguely recalled the day R. came to
the office with the S&A form. N. mentioned that the doctor’s secretaries do not make
changes to S&A forms and that she did not make any alteration to R.’s form. The same
day T. verbally informed Shop Committeeman G. about the telephone conversation he had
with N.
Testifying further, T. stated that he had been to Dr. C.’s office to verify information about
employees on several previous occasions. Some of those occasions concerned changes
made to medical excuses that were in the doctor’s handwriting. On previous occasions the
changes were not initialed but he was able to satisfy the inquiries made by Management.
T. acknowledged that he did not examine Dr. C.’s records and that Dr. C. and his secretary
had possession of the form and an opportunity to make changes to it. He also
acknowledged that people in the plant benefits office had possession of it and an
opportunity to change it as well.
At the time R. was an employee with ten (10) years and ten (10) months service. She was
employed on the second shift. In her testimony, R. stated that she first visited Dr. C. for
illness on October 29, 1981. She became ill from fumes inhaled while at work. She next
visited Dr. C. on November 3, 1981 arriving at about 4:45 p.m. and leaving at about 6:30
p.m. She was instructed to report back to work on the next scheduled workday, November
4, 1981.
R.’s next visit to Dr. C. was on November 7, 1981. This was when she took the S&A form
for him to fill out the Doctor’s Statement. R. further stated that she did not make any
changes to the form and when she got it back, she mailed it to the Company.
On cross examination R. stated that she completed her portion of the form in the doctor’s
office before she gave it to him for completion of his section. She acknowledged that there
was an alteration to Item No. 7 in her section of the form but had no present recollection of
what she originally stated. Whereas she admits to answering Item No. 12 she denies
altering the form.
R. explained in more detail what occurred on November 7, 1981, relative to the handling of
the S&A form. She stated that she arrived at the doctor’s office at about 11:45 a.m. and
requested to see Dr. C. She was told that she could but that she would have to wait. While
she waited she filled out her portion of the S&A form. When she finished, she left the form
with the secretary and went home to check on her daughter, who was 11 years old at the
time. She did not take the form with her because she had to return to be examined. Dr. C.
would not complete his section of the S&A form in her absence.
At 12:45 p.m. R. returned to Dr. C.’s office and waited until she could see him. When she
did, Dr. C. filled out the form sitting at his desk while she was on the examining table in the
next room. When he finished, she went out to get her daughter who was waiting in the car.
The S&A form was placed on the secretary’s desk on the way out. She did not pick it up
upon returning with her daughter. After her daughter’s hand was examined she left the
doctor’s office, picking up the form at the receptionist’s desk on the way out. The S&A form
was placed on her dining room table when she arrived home. It remained there until it was
mailed to the Company on Sunday evening.
R. further acknowledged that she signed the S&A form and that certain responses
appeared to be in her handwriting. She had no recollection of answering any of the
questions on the form. With respect to at least two (2) responses indicated on the form she
was not sure it was in her handwriting.
Lastly, when asked why she did not confront Dr. C. about his comments to Management
and the statement he wrote on the S&A form, R.’s reply was that there was no need to do
so. She further stated that by giving Management the statement he must have realized the
effect it could have on her. She did not believe she was in any position to question Dr. C.
since he had decided to go along with the Company. No attempt was made on her part to
point out to him that he made a mistake despite her anger at what he had stated.
The Corporation contends that R. had an opportunity and motive to alter the S&A form,
which was to receive S&A benefits for November 3, 1981. It maintains that no one else had
a reason to make any changes to the form and that no wages would be paid for November
3, 1981 if the return to work date was not changed to November 4, 1981. Thus, the
grievant stood to gain an additional day’s pay that would result in no loss of pay during the
period of her suspension.
The Union contends that the evidence offered by the Corporation will not support R.’s
discharge. It points to the doctor’s statement that the S&A form "appears" to have been
changed and argues that there is no unequivocal statement by Dr. C. that he did not make
the change to the form. The Union also argues that there has been alterations to previous
medical certificates from Dr. C. and that this was well known to the Union and
Management. The opportunity was available for Management to get a copy of the doctor’s
records that would show what was on the form when he signed it, but no effort was made
to do so. Since the best evidence was the doctor’s records, Management’s failure to
request them will not justify the introduction of hearsay evidence to support R.’s discharge.
Additionally, in the Union’s view, it has the right to cross examine the doctor and his
secretary about their involvement with R. and the S&A form.
Initially it should be observed that the instant grievance was withdrawn by the International
Union without prejudice at the Third Step on January 29, 1982. Grievant, R., challenged
that decision within the Union and it was determined that the grievance would be reinstated
in the grievance procedure. By agreement of the parties the grievance was reinstated at
Third Step on July 19, 1983, pursuant to the terms of Document No. 52, "Reinstatement of
Grievances." On July 25, 1983, the grievance was appealed to the Umpire.
The testimony at the Umpire hearing closely tracked the account of the events contained in
the parties’ respective Statements of Unadjusted Grievance and shows no significant
variation. The evidence as a whole demonstrates that Management investigated the
obviously altered S&A form with an open mind. It first consulted with Dr. C. about his
preparation of the form and when assured that it was materially altered the matter was
taken up with R. in the presence of the Union at a Paragraph (76a) interview.
During the interview R. acknowledged the S&A form as the one she signed, dated and
gave to Dr. C. for completion on November 7, 1981. Her denial then was the same as it
was at the Umpire hearing regarding the alteration of the form. She suggested that the
doctor or his secretary might have changed the form. But when confronted with the
doctor’s comments and written statement she focused on his secretary, N., as the person
who altered the form. At the Umpire hearing R. places the S&A form in N.’s possession
before and after Dr. C. completed it, but she did not state that N. altered it. She testified
that she did not look at the form after picking it up from the receptionist’s desk and she
mailed it without ever reading it. Her testimony on this point was to the effect that the
Corporation needed the form, not her. While she denies changing the form she offered no
testimony as to who might have altered it and for what purpose it might have been altered.
The corrections on the front and back side of the S&A form cannot escape notice with even
the most casual glance at the form. Other eye catching characteristics are the different
colors of ink used in its preparation; blue and black. The dates scratched out and inserted
on the side prepared by the employee is in blue ink the same as the response to Item No.
12 on that side. R. admits that she wrote the response to Item No. 12. This fact alone
establishes that R. used black and blue ink in the preparation of the S&A form.
The alteration made to the date on the employee’s side of the S&A form was also made to
a date on the doctor’s side. The date, written to indicate when the employee could resume
usual work activities, was obviously altered to reflect November 4, 1981. Unlike the
alterations of the same date on the front side of the form this alteration was not made in
blue ink. With the exception of something written in blue ink that was crossed out in black
pencil concerning the diagnosis, all other writing on the page is in black ink and
characteristically different.
Closer examination of the employee’s side of the form reveals that the number "4" is
written eleven (11) different times. It first appears at the top of the page over the printed
box containing the CISCO Code Number. In Item No. 1 it is one of the digits that make up
R.’s clock No. (12493) and it is two (2) of the first three numbers of R.’s telephone number
(434-...). In Item Nos. 2 and 8 it is written twice as a part of the zip code for Lockport, New
York (14094). R.’s date of birth is written as 11/20/47 in Item No. 3. Finally, it appears twice
in Item No. 7 as a part of the date (Nov. 4, 1981) which is written twice in blue ink - the last
time more legible than the first. Curiously, there is a resemblance in how the number "4" is
written. Especially striking is the identical formation of the number written in blue ink in Item
No. 7 as compared with Item Nos. 1, 3 and the top of the page. Although R. denies making
any alterations to this page there is no doubt that she did when these figures are closely
examined in relation to what she admits to writing.
Another equally significant clue to R.’s blameworthiness is the abbreviation for November.
At the bottom of the page it is written as "Nov" in black ink. R. acknowledges this to be her
writing. It is written the same way in blue ink in Item No. 7. The blue writing the last time it
is written is identical in every detail to the way it is written in black ink at the bottom of the
page.
The alteration of Item No. 7 is significant in relation to the corresponding change in Item
No. 7 (d) on the reverse side of the form. The date in Item No. 7 is the employee’s opinion
as to when he/she is able to return to work. It is not considered to be the operative date for
the payment of disability benefits. Rather, payment of S&A benefits are made for the
period of disability certified by an attending physician based on treatment given during the
period. The operative date, therefore, is provided by the employee’s doctor in Item No. 7
(d). In the instant case there is absolutely no disagreement between the parties and the
grievant that the return to work date marked in Item No. 7(d) has been altered and made to
indicate November 4, 1981.
R. and Dr. C. maintain that they did not alter or change the date originally written in Item
No. 7(d). Dr. C. had absolutely nothing to gain by admitting to making the change. He
could have simply dismissed it as an error which he immediately corrected. If this was the
true manner and reason for the alteration then Item No. 7 on the front side would not have
been materially altered insofar as the payments of S&A benefits are concerned. By Dr. C.
not admitting to the alteration it may reasonably be viewed as fraudulent. The alterations
then become irrefutably material to the payment of S&A benefits. Thus, whether Dr. C.
admitted to the alteration or not his office records would have to corroborate the admission
or denial that November 3, or 4, 1981, was the date he released R. to return to work.
It stands to reason, therefore, that Dr. C.’s records would confirm his representations to
Management that November 3, 1981 was the date he entered on the S&A form. His verbal
and written representation of this was shared with R. and the Union almost immediately, in
time for R., as the patient, to authorize Dr. C. to provide and make available to the Union,
information concerning her disability that would include and not be limited to the necessary
and appropriate medical records. For sure, she had an equal if not a greater right to the
information than Management. Her failure to challenge the accuracy of her doctor’s
representations anytime during the course of the grievance procedure when his
whereabouts were known cannot be cavalierly dismissed by stating that there was no need
to do so because he had already made his representations and sided with Management. If
the doctor’s representation was false and R. truly believed that he was aware of the effect
his statement would have on her employment, there was every reason to grieve her
discharge focusing her challenge on the sole individual responsible for her predicament.
Accordingly, it is apparent that R. had as much of a reason to challenge the doctor’s

veracity as Management had to challenge the integrity of the S&A form. Should the
challenge produce an error in what Management was informed, Dr. C. gains nothing and
R.’s honesty and truthfulness are ratified; Dr. C. is not harmed but R. is vindicated.
Seemingly, the doctor’s records could have been used to establish the falsity of his
representations. Even if he was being investigated at the time by the authorities

concerning his policy and procedures regarding medical certifications, it reinforces the
conclusion that his records of R.’s treatment and release to return to work corroborated his
representations to Management. R.’s failure to challenge her doctor’s representations
reinforces the conclusion that she knew her medical records would corroborate Dr. C.’s
representations.
Lastly, in response to the Union’s argument about the evidence against R. there are a few
points to be made. The first is that R. did not present herself as a believable witness. She
was argumentative, evasive and conveniently had no recollection of preparing the S&A
form other than dating and signing it, and her recollection could not be refreshed. Yet, she
had no difficulty remembering and tracing her steps getting to see the doctor while she was
in his office. Her loss of memory only relates to the S&A form, curiously. While she
believes the doctor and Management conspired to cause her discharge she neither offers
a reason for the collaboration nor permits the Union to inquire into her medical records to
gather the evidence to vindicate her innocence. Clearly, at the Umpire hearing R. was not
a convincing witness.
While some of the evidence against R. may be hearsay the Union is reminded that during
the critical stages of this matter Dr. C. was as available to R. as he was to Management.
Although he no longer practices in the area and his address was not known at the time of
the Umpire hearing the hearsay character of his statement does not impair its admissibility
for the following reasons:
1. The preparation of the statement was observed by T.
2. T. testified about the circumstances that produced the statement.
3. The kind of investigation that produced the written statement was routinely
conducted in such circumstances.
4. The statement was given and received in the regular course of business as it
relates to the responsibilities of T. and G.
5. The statement was not sought nor given for the purpose of being presented
at the Umpire hearing.
6. The statement does not contain any subjective assertions.
7. There was no motive for falsification.
8. Dr. C. had every reason to know what his records contained about his
treatment of R.
Undoubtedly, R.’s denial of making the alterations in the face of compelling evidence to the
contrary weighed as heavily in Management’s decision as it does here. All the evidence
points convincingly to R. as the wrongdoer and removes any doubt as to her guilt. The
purpose and motive for the falsification is clear. R.’s steadfast denial of her involvement in
the falsification coupled with her failure to question the source of the critical evidence
against her are inconsistent positions that confirm her attempted deception. Finally, under
the circumstances there is no evidence that warrants serious consideration of a lesser
penalty. The discharge will, therefore, be affirmed.
DECISION
JOHN PAUL SIMPKINS,
Umpire
UMPIRE DECISION T-2 Page 1 of 8
No. T-2
OCTOBER 2, 1985
Discharge;
Theft or Misappropriation of Company Property;
Evidence
Grievance:
"Chg. mgt. with vios. of paras. 76A & 29 of the N.A. Further chg. mgt. with giving me an
unjust discharge for alleged vio. of S.R. #33. Demand full redress."
/s/ A.P. (Grievant)
/s/ J.M. (Committeeman)
In the Matter of:

and
GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, CHEVROLET-PONTIAC-CANADA GROUP,

FLINT ENGINE PLANT, Flint, Michigan -- Appeal Case T-84
OPINION
Grievant, plant seniority date November 11, 1969 and a skilled trades seniority date of July
file://C:\Users\bobology\AppData\Local\Temp\Framework\t-002_13A4EB9D.htm 3/22/2011
25, 1971, was classified as an Electrician at the time of his discharge on December 3,
1982. He was disciplined and discharged for violation of Shop Rule #33: "Theft or
misappropriation of property of employees or of the Company." The incidents which gave
rise to P.'s discharge occurred during the third shift on December 1, 1982. His account of
his activities and that of Plant Security Officer B., the only witness to testify on behalf of
Management at the Umpire Hearing, are summarized below.
In his testimony B. stated that he was making security checks walking the Zone 2 key tour
at about 4:10 a.m. on December 1, 1982. As he was walking on an elevated catwalk at
Bay H-24 in the plant, he noticed a black male placing a cardboard box on a gon. The
person observed was at Bay H-23 and appeared to be looking for someone. The area was
well lit and there was nothing to obstruct B.'s view of the individual with the box who wore
coveralls and whose height was about 5'10". His line of sight distance was approximately
60' and he could see the person's front and left side from the waist up. He could not see
from the waist down because the person was standing behind and leaning over into the
gon. Neither could B. determine what was in the gon from the point of his observation on
the catwalk. He did, however, recognize the person as someone he had seen occasionally
but whose name was not known at the time.
B.'s observation of the individual at the gon was about 35 – 45 seconds. He became
suspicious when the person took the box out of the gon and walked away carrying it under
his right arm as he looked down the aisles. When he arrived at the gon B. noticed that it
contained pink high performance connecting rods and was one-third (1/3) full.
B. saw the person leave by aisle 18, so he proceeded to that north-south aisle and started
walking north. The lighting was good on aisle 18. At a distance of approximately 60', he
saw the individual exit Bay K-18 on a three (3) wheel electric cart and turn right to travel
north. B. followed on foot as quickly as he could. At the intersection of Bay N and aisle 18
he turned west following the direction of the person driving the cart. When he reached aisle
20 the person was observed south of the aisle facing him sitting on the cart at a distance of
approximately 60'.
The person B. stopped in aisle 20 was P. Not more than three (3) minutes had passed
from his initial observations and stopping P. on the electric cart. On the back of the cart
was a box. B. requested P. to produce his badge. When he could not, he provided his
name and the name of his supervisor at B.'s request. When asked what he was doing with
the box of rods P. replied, "What rods?" B. responded, "The rods on the back of this cart."
The box was upside down on the back of the cart when B. asked the question. It was then
opened and it contained pink rods. P. then stated that he borrowed the cart and did not
know what was on it. He also stated that he would go to his locker to get his badge.
B. initially decided to go along with P. to the locker room but changed his mind. He stopped
and called his supervisor, Sergeant C. to explain what had occurred. C. instructed him to
remain where he was until his arrival. P. continued on to the locker room and B. waited for
C.
C. arrived with another security officer to pick up the cart. Upon returning to the
Manufacturing and Engineering Office they saw P. and picked him up before continuing to
the office to speak to P.'s supervisor. When they arrived P. remained outside on the cart
while B. and C. went inside and explained what had happened to Assistant Superintendent
V. and P.'s supervisor, G. They then got the box of rods and called P. into the office. B.
briefly explained what he observed in P.'s presence and then departed to open the North
Gate.
On cross examination B. acknowledged that he may have told Management that he made
his observation at 4:10 a.m. and a Union Committeeman 4:05 a.m. In his view these times
are in the approximate range of 4:00 a.m. The key box was not working that morning so
there is no record of the time he was in the area. He also acknowledged that the box
exhibited at the Umpire Hearing was less than the dimensions he previously described, but
it was the one he marked on the day in question. It was the same box he saw P. place in
the gon, then take out of the gon and put under his arm and walk away. He did not see P.
touch any rods and assumes that the box was empty when placed into the gon. The
contents of the box was first observed when it was turned over and opened on the back of
the cart P. was using.
During the time of his observation and pursuit of the person he observed, B. saw no other
employee except P. He has walked the area many times and did not specifically recall
seeing employee M. in the area.
In testifying about the morning in question, P. stated that he took his first break between
12:00 a.m. and 12:30 a.m. He got a vehicle and rode around picking up bottles and cans.
At 4:00 a.m. he took his second break and went to get a three (3) wheel cart at
Maintenance Crib #1. P. wanted a cart so that he would not have to walk. It also provided a
place on the back of it to put any bottles that were found. Nobody was present when he
arrived so he got a cart and drove it west on Bay K to aisle 18. He then proceeded north by
turning right at aisle 18. At Bay N. he turned left to go west again and at aisle 20 he turned
left or south into the rod department. About 20' into the aisle he checked a coat rack for
bottles and cans. Then, after turning around to exit the aisle in the direction he entered, he
saw B. who stopped him at the intersection of Bay N and aisle 20.
P. was asked his name and the name of his supervisor by B. who also asked for his
badge. P. answered B.'s questions. When asked about his badge P. stated that it was in
his locker and offered to go get it. B. then asked what he (P.) was doing with a box of pink
rods. According to P. he did not respond. P. went to the back of the cart, picked up a box
and the rods fell out. P. testified that he did not see the box on the back of the cart before
B. pointed it out.
P. and B. departed the area together leaving the cart behind at Bay N-20. When they
reached Bay P-18 they parted company; P. went up the stairs and he does not know which
direction B. walked. However, after leaving his locker and returning to Bay N-20, P. was
approached by B. again. This time B. was in the company of two (2) other security officers
riding a four (4) person golf cart. C. asked him to get on and they all went to the Plant
Engineering Office.
Upon arrival at the Plant Engineering Office, C. requested P. to remain outside while he
and B. went inside. At no time did anyone accuse him of any wrong doing, according to P.
Later, C. invited P. to come into the office. As he entered, P. noticed that several
supervisors and security personnel were in the office. B. then accused him of placing rods
into a box which at that point was brought into the room. V. asked P. to respond to the
accusation.
Accompanied by G., P. attempted to examine the box containing the rods. In the process
he touched one and was instructed not to touch them because they would be examined for
finger prints. P. informed those present that he did not put the rods into the box and that he
was not at Bay HJ-23 after 4:00 a.m.
P. also recalled that V. requested him to go to another office to give a statement to C. P.

inquired of V. as to whether he needed a committeeman and was told that he did not if he
did not do anything. As a former supervisory employee, P. understood the procedure to
require cessation of all questioning when a committeeman is requested and that the
request was to be granted.
On cross examination P. stated that he went immediately to Crib #1 at break time to get a
cart. The area was well lit and there was one (1) cart there in a ready position so he
approached it from the front, got on at the left side and drove off. The cart was not
examined before getting on and driving off. Its cargo area was as wide as the cart itself
and situated about a foot below the seat which is also as wide as the cart.
P. also stated that he intended to look for a co-worker M. during his break, but did not see
him that morning.
The Corporation contends that P. is guilty of misappropriation of its property and that
events and circumstances giving rise to this charge substantiates it. In this connection the
Corporation argues that security officer B. observed P. removing pink rods from a gon
located at Bay HJ-23 at approximately 4:10 a.m.; that the lighting conditions facilitated
recognition of P., someone B. had seen in the plant; that he pursued and caught up with P.
within minutes after the observation; that P. had possession of a box containing pink rods
and that P.'s explanation of his possession of the rods was unsatisfactory. In the
Corporation's view it has met its burden of proof regarding P.'s act of misappropriation.
In response to the Union's claim that Management violated P.'s rights under Paragraph
(76a) of the 1982 National Agreement by not advising P. that discipline was being
contemplated at the interview conducted at the Plant Security Office, the Corporation
contends that P. made no demand for Union representation and was aware of his right to
be represented if that was his desire. There was no violation of the Agreement in any
context, but particularly in relation to the interview conducted in the Plant Security Office
which does not, in the Corporation's view, automatically trigger the application of
Paragraph (76a) of the National Agreement.
The Union contends that P. was deprived of due process in violation of Paragraph (76a) of
the 1982 National Agreement which provides:
"When a suspension, layoff or discharge of an employee is

contemplated, the employee, where circumstances permit, will be
offered an interview to allow him to answer the charges involved in
the situation for which such discipline is being considered before he
is required to leave the plant. An employee who, for the purpose of
being interviewed concerning discipline, is called to the plant, or

removed from his work to the foreman's desk or to an office, or
called to an office, may, if he so desires, request the presence of his
district committeeman to represent him during such interview."
The Union argues that this provision of the National Agreement became involved when B.
informed Plant Security supervision (C.) and Plant Management (V.) that he saw the
grievant engaged in misconduct and P. was questioned by them about the alleged
misconduct. It argues that discipline was contemplated at that stage. Thus, the Union
maintains that P. had a right to know why he was prevented from continuing an approved
break and directed to accompany Plant Security personnel to the Manufacturing and
Engineering Office and detained. Its position is that P. was obligated to accompany the
Plant Security personnel which is considered supervisory and not exempt from the
application of Paragraph (76a). P., therefore, had a right to know the reason for his
detention, what charge was being made against him and why.
The same contention and argument is made by the International Union in relation to the
statement given by P. at the Plant Security Office in the presence of V. and C. Thus, the
Union charges that Management did not adhere to the demands of the National Agreement
and that it has been misinterpreted and misapplied.
On the merits the Union contends that B.'s description of the individual and the box he
observed was not sufficient to identify P. as the person. In this connection emphasis is
placed on P.'s facial and hair characteristics as well as his clothing, style of dress, time of
observation, dimensions of the box and distance from the subject.
Grievant's discharge was predicated on Management's belief that he had misappropriated

21 high performance connecting rods belonging to the Corporation. Its belief is not ill-
founded given the fact that B. observed someone engaged in what he considered to be a
suspicious activity at a gondola supply container. The lighting conditions were suitable
enough to recognize the person as an employee and someone he had seen at the plant
but whose name was unknown to him. When the person observed moved away from the
container with a cardboard box under his arm, B. investigated its contents and found that it
contained a supply of high performance connecting rods each marked with a splash of pink
paint.
B. decided to locate the person he observed at the gon and proceeded to follow in the
direction the employee had walked. As he followed he saw the person come out of an
intersecting aisle driving an electric cart and turn in the same direction he was walking.
However, within a short period later he was standing face-to-face with the person he was
pursuing. This encounter occurred about three (3) minutes after B.'s initial observations.
B. confronted P. and requested him to identify himself. He then asked P. why he had a box
of pink rods on the cart. There is no dispute that a small cardboard box containing 21 pink
high performance connecting rods was in the cargo tray of the cart. The Umpire finds it
significant that the grievant was questioned about his possession of the rods before the
box was examined. In fact, the grievant's claim of ignorance about the box and its contents
is what caused it to be turned over and opened. P. admits to being approached and
questioned in this manner. P.'s possession of a small cardboard box containing the same
type of rods found in the gon, coupled with him matching the general description of the
person B. observed minutes earlier filling the box at the gon, is enough to call for an
explanation on his part.
The International Union concedes that B. may have observed someone in the finish end of
the Connecting Rod Department on the day and time in question. It contends that P. was
not the person observed, however, and suggests that there may have been another person
and another box. While the possibility of this surely exists the probability or likelihood of it
is too remote for serious consideration. Being caught with the goods – so to speak --
required P. to explain his possession of them.
P.'s explanation has remained unchanged; namely, that he was on a "bottle run" and was
not aware of the box or its contents on the back of the electric cart he borrowed for his
search of empty bottles and cans. The evidence demonstrates that P. was in the rod
department at the approximate time of B.'s initial observation -- an area of the plant where
neither production was in progress nor employees present at the time. He did not work in
the area and the rods in question were stored in close proximity to where he was stopped
by B.
When stopped and questioned by B., P. had no cans or bottles on the cart. Neither did he
have a container to store them in if any were found. Someone engaged in this type of
activity would seemingly have a bag or container of some sort to put the bottles and cans
into. P. did not have anything and testified that he intended to place anything he found in
the open cargo tray located behind the seat of the cart. He claims that he approached the
cart from the front and did not notice or examine the cargo space before mounting it from
the left side and driving off.
The practical and reasonable approach would have been to be sure the cargo space was
empty so that there was a place to put any bottles and cans that may have been found.
Even if P. was going to get an empty bag or box to use, the logical thing to do is to
examine the space where the container would be placed on the cart. Thus, it is wholly
unreasonable to believe that P. was unaware of the box on the back of the cart he
borrowed, the size of the back rest notwithstanding. This is reinforced by his stated
intention to use the cargo tray of the cart.
Accordingly, given the persuasive evidence pointing to P.'s culpability, the Umpire shares
the opinion of Management and rejects his disavowed knowledge of the box and its
contents as being sufficient to clear him from the compelling evidence of his guilt. There is
no doubt in the Umpire's mind that P. was the person observed by B. placing a box in a
gon containing high performance rods and removing it and walking away. Such
unauthorized and unexplained behavior constitutes misappropriation of Company property
for which discipline and discharge is an appropriate penalty.
Violations of the National Agreement have traditionally been regarded by the parties'
Umpires as a serious breach of the basic fabric of the relationship. Any breach no matter
how slight, must be seriously considered and addressed in order to prevent an erosion of
the underlying understanding upon which the entire National Agreement is based.
The claimed breach of the National Agreement here merits such treatment. However, in
the opinion of the Umpire there has been no breach of Paragraph (76a) of the National
Agreement.
The questions B. asked P. at Bay N-20 in no way involved an application of Paragraph

(76a). It was investigatory in nature and conducted by a non-supervisory security officer.
When C. became involved he also had every right to conduct a reasonable investigation
based on what B. informed him. C., therefore, committed no wrong when he stopped the
cart to pick up P. in route back to the Manufacturing and Engineering Office to begin his
phase of the investigation.
Without being specifically told, P. knew full well that he was being detained pending further
investigation by Plant Security of the reason he had possession of the box of connecting
rods on the back of the cart he was operating. Accordingly, detaining P. outside of the
office while B. explained to C. and V. what he observed and learned from P. was squarely
within reasonable limits of a Plant Security investigation.
There is no evidence that B. accused P. of any misconduct or that V. was contemplating

discipline based upon what he learned from B. at that time. Neither is there any concrete
evidence that his opinion had changed in this regard after he had an opportunity to hear
P.'s account of his involvement with the box of connecting rods.
The International Union submits that Paragraph (76a) of the National Agreement was
violated by the conference held at the Plant Security Office following the investigation
which took place at the Manufacturing and Engineering Office. The claim is that it was in
essence an interview within the meaning of Paragraph (76a), thereby entitling P. to Union
representation which Management failed to provide.
The evidence is clear that P. was familiar with the scope and extent of his contractual
rights as well as the limitation and obligation of Management at the time he was asked to
give a statement at the Plant Security Office. By asking V. whether he needed a
committeeman P. was in actuality asking V. whether he was contemplating any discipline.
(Note that he had already disavowed any knowledge of the box containing the rods until it
was called to his attention by B.) V.'s answer in no way suggested a disciplinary purpose
for the statement C. sought from P. Indeed, the evidence here does not in the slightest
fashion indicate that P. was obligated to cooperate. Rather, given his supervisory
experience and training in addition to his direct involvement with the disciplinary procedure
of Paragraph (76a) of the National Agreement, it is reasonable to conclude that P.
voluntarily participated in giving a statement to C. without the presence of a
committeeman. Clearly, representation was not denied. More importantly, however, it is not
required to be offered by Management under circumstances, where as here, the evidence
will not support a finding that the purpose for providing the statement was in contemplation
of discipline.
In this connection, it is noteworthy that the agenda for the session in the Plant Security
Office was controlled by C. and that C. had no supervisory responsibility for P. and could
not assess any discipline based on anything he learned or did not learn from P. Although
he is a Management representative, V.'s presence at the Plant Security Office does not in
and of itself change the purpose and character of the gathering. He was little more than a
bystander and his involvement by asking the last question contributed insignificantly to the
exchange which took place between C. and P. The Umpire can not, therefore, agree with
the Union that that meeting was an "interview" within the intendment of Paragraph (76a)
thereby entitling P. to representation as a matter of right. But, even if it was, an employee
with P.'s knowledge of his rights under the National Agreement must unequivocally assert
them.
The procedural contention of the Union is accordingly rejected and the grievance is denied.
DECISION
JOHN PAUL SIMPKINS
Umpire
No. T-3
NOVEMBER 12, 1985
Discharge for Fraud
Paragraph (76a) of the National Agreement
Evidence
GRIEVANCES:
"Charge Management with giving me an unjust release. Request full redress."
/s/ M.McG. (Grievant)
In the Matter of:

and
Appeal Case T-89

FLINT ENGINE PLANT, Flint, Michigan
SUMMARY
The basic circumstances which gave rise to the grievant's discharge are undisputed and
are summarized below. This summary has largely been developed from the prior record
file://C:\Users\bobology\AppData\Local\Temp\Framework\t-003_13A4F7DC.htm 3/22/2011
since the Corporation elected not to offer any direct testimony at the Umpire Hearing. At
that time the Corporation rested its case on the prior record and its brief. The Union offered
one (1) witness in support of its procedural contentions. That testimony is considered in
relation to the prior record and the argument contained in the Union's brief.
OPINION
Grievant McG. has no prior disciplinary record and a seniority date of August 23, 1965. He
was discharged for the following reason which was stated in the Paragraph (76) notice
dated September 23, 1982:
"You are being discharged for fraud. You admittedly received three
(3) paychecks from Supervisor (W.) drafted in your name and you
cashed them for your personal benefit, even though you knew and
understood that you did not work during the period of time for which
the pay was for. Your receipt of monies for which you knew you
were not entitled constitutes fraud."
On August 16, 1982 McG. got a form from the personnel office to be used to request thirty
(30) days leave of absence. This was his first request for a leave of this kind and after
indicating on the form the period of time he wanted to be off he gave it to his foreman W. to
present to the superintendent for final approval. McG. did not retain a copy of the form but,
with the assurance of his foreman that it would be approved, he commenced the leave of
absence on Monday, August 23, 1982, and left the area.
From Monday, August 23, 1982 through Sunday, September 19, 1982 McG. was absent
from work. During the same period his time card was clocked in and payroll checks were
issued and cashed as follows:
Pay For
Check No. Date Issued Amount Week Ending Endorsed By
602630 8-27-82 8-26-82 $290.66 8-22-82 McG. & W.
608201 9-03-82 9-02-82 249.55 8-29-82 McG.
614028 9-10-82 9-09-82 241.65 9-05-82 McG.
620398 9-17-82 9-16-82 208.63 9-12-82 McG.
On Monday, September 20, 1982 McG. returned to work to perform his job duties as a
Repairman-Mechanic. Then, on Thursday, September 23, 1982 when offered payroll check
No. 626861 dated September 24, 1982 in the amount of $374.38, McG. refused to accept
it stating that there must have been a mistake because he had not worked the week for
which the check was being presented, (the week ending September 19, 1982). Thereafter,
on the same day, McG. was placed on notice and interviewed in accordance with
Paragraph (76a) of the National Agreement.
McG. admitted receiving from W. and cashing three (3) checks at the Paragraph (76a)
interview which was conducted by Labor Relations Supervisor B. and attended by
Superintendent V. and District Shop Committeeman G. He stated that the last day he
worked was August 20, 1982 when he started a personal leave of absence which was
approved by his foreman, W. When asked whether he had received any checks since
August 20, 1982, McG. replied:
"Not really. I want to get something off my shoulders. I came back

from out west with three kids and no check in the mail. I called the
foreman and asked where my check was. He said to come over to
his house because he wanted to talk to me. At his house he said
he'd cashed it and gave me two (2) more checks and told me to
keep my mouth shut. I didn't know what the f___ to do or who to talk
to and I've been scared ever since."
McG. later amended this statement to acknowledge receipt of three (3) checks from W.
which he cashed or deposited because he needed the money and also because he "didn't
know what the hell to do or who to talk to about it."
Later in the interview, B. asked the following questions to which McG. responded as
follows:
Question: "Did you understand what the implications

were for you to accept money for which you did not work
for it?"
Answer: "Yes. I got mad at him about cashing the one

that was due me. I figured I was due one of the checks
anyway. It bothered the hell out of me since then. I
couldn't go to Management, I'd get my ass fired to, if I
went to the Union - well I figured I'd better just shut up."
Question: "So why did you take the other check if it

bothered you so?"
Answer: "I don't know. What am I supposed to do with it?

I needed the money."
Question: "You ever receive pay for not being at work

before?"
Answer: "No."
Question: "So why this time?"
Answer: "I filled out personal leave papers and came

back and there was no check, I called (W.) and he said
come and talk to him. I told you before."
Question: "Did (W.) ask for any pay to do this?"
Answer: "I didn't even know he was going to do it."
After a few more questions there was a recess then the questioning continued as follows:
Question: "I have sat here and heard you out. You've
made some serious accusations about (W). In fact
extremely serious for (W). Therefore, I would like you to
take some time and in (your) own words five me a
signed statement of what you have said."
Answer: "Why?"
Question: "As I said, this is extremely serious. I (don't)

want your story to change in a day or so."
Answer: "I've told you the truth."
Question: "Then just put it in writing."
Answer: "O.K."
McG. wrote the following statement and gave it to Management:
"On 8-16 I went to the employment office to get a form for 30 day
personal leave, the female I talked to said my foreman would have
to get the form. My foreman got the form for me and I filled it out and
returned it to him and he said that it would be Ok'd by the Supt. and
him.
"I went on vacation and returned on Sept. 3. Upon my return I went

to the post office to pick up my mail and my check for the last week I
worked, it wasn't in the mail. I called information and got the
foreman number and called him. I called him and asked him where
my check was, then he told me he wanted to see me. I went to his
house and he gave me a check and told me that he would have
another one the following week. He had cashed my check for the
last week I had worked and told me to keep my mouth shut. I told
him I didn't want any part of this, but I didn't know what else to do,
so I kept my mouth shut.
"I met him at his place the following week and picked up another
check. I told him again I didn't like what he was doing, but he said
not to worry he would take care of it.
"It was really bothering me about what was going on, but what could
I do. I was in the middle of this and wanted to tell someone, but I
didn't know who to talk to or how to go about doing something about
it.
"This is a true statement given by me on Sept. 23, 82."
/s/ M.McG (Grievant)
Thereafter, at the request of the Union, W. prepared the following statement on September
25, 1982, which was presented to Management on September 28, 1982:
"(Grievant) did file a paper for a 30 day leave in my office he does

not get a copy of this and I forgot to turn it in and came up with the
idea to do it for a little extra money because I have been under so
much pressure and stress."
/s/ R.W.
Union witness G. handled the grievance at Step 1. He was informed by Management that
W. had prepared a written statement. Requests for the statement, represented to be a
confession, as well as an opportunity to interview W., was refused at his stage of the
procedure and at other stages of the grievance procedure as well. He has always been
able to question individuals who make accusations but in this case he was not offered an
opportunity. Management's position was that the Union was not entitled to it.
The Corporation contends that the grievant's admission of guilt and other evidence forms a
prima facie case of fraud in support of his discharge. It argues that the grievant knowingly
and admittedly accepted paychecks for time not worked and to which he was not entitled.
There are no mitigating circumstances that would lessen the penalty in the Corporation's
view.
In this connection the Corporation maintains that prior to his discharge Supervisor W.
stated that the grievant was aware of the scheme before he began the leave of absence. It
argues that the grievant's denial is self-serving and that it does not appear that W. acted
independently in light of the seriousness of his behavior.
The Corporation further contends that it met its burden of proof in this matter while the
Union has failed to meet theirs. It asserts that the grievant knowingly and admittedly
wrongfully received Corporation money making his discharge an appropriate penalty; that
once the grievant admitted his involvement the burden of proof shifted to him to provide a
satisfactory explanation of his conduct sufficient to mitigate the penalty of discharge; that
there are no satisfactory mitigating circumstances; and, that it has sufficiently rebutted the
various procedural irregularities advanced by the Union during the bargaining of this
grievance. Lastly, the Corporation points out that fraud is a serious offense which calls for
discharge. The grievant's behavior, it maintains, was deceitful and repeated to receive
unearned payments under false pretense.
The Union's contentions may be summarized as follows:
The grievant's foreman was an agent of the Corporation

and the grievant was obligated to follow his instructions.
Management is in violation of the requirement of full and

complete disclosure of all facts at the earliest possible
stage in the disciplinary process.
Paragraph (45) gives the Union the right to examine an

employee's accuser.
The grievant was caught up in the scheme set in motion

by his foreman to fulfill the financial needs of his
foreman.
The foreman initiated and authorized payment for the

hours the grievant did not work without the grievant's
knowledge or consent.
The grievant took the three (3) checks given to him by

his foreman under the threat of discharge which has
meaning in the plant.
The grievant exercised bad judgment in accepting and

cashing the checks.
Based upon the evidence not disputed in the prior record the grievant's guilt is clear. He
admits to the receipt of paychecks for time not worked and to which he knew he was not
entitled. He accepted the first two (2) checks -- one of which represented the wages for the
last week he worked -- under instructions to keep his mouth shut. He claims he did not
know what to do or whom to talk to and that he needed the money at the time. He was
aware that accepting the money would involve him in an illegal transaction and it frightened
him. Yet he failed to report what had occurred to civil authorities, Management or his
Union.
It is clear that the grievant did not consider all the alternatives available to him. Upon
accepting the first two (2) checks the grievant could have cashed the one he felt was due
him for the last week he worked and not cashed the other while he considered all of his
options, not the least of which was contacting Management to immediately return to work.
Returning to work would have prevented further misrepresentation and falsification of his
time card by his foreman and ended his involvement in his supervisor's plan. He even
returned to his foreman's house and received and cashed a third check representing
payment to keep his mouth shut rather than for actual time worked; all of which was part
and parcel of his supervisor's scheme. Acceptance of the third check underscores the
grievant's approval of the arrangement and establishes him as a willing participant in the
plan to defraud the Corporation.
The Umpire is neither convinced that the grievant's behavior was based on fear nor
doubtful that he willingly participated. The alleged fearful participation must be considered
with his belief and awareness that his foreman was in a position and would prevent other
Management officials from discovering the scheme. No amount of fear of discharge could
outweigh the confidence the grievant had in the scheme not being discovered. There is no
other explanation for his participation, allegedly out of fear, that makes any sense in the
Umpire's opinion. If he did not believe it was an ironclad scheme impossible of detection
there would be no reason to participate, allegedly out of fear, and every reason to inform
Management or the Union for fear of detection and possible discipline. Thus, it is beyond
question that the grievant believed that the risk of detection was removed and that
everything would be taken care of by the person who originated the scheme and who was
also ostensibly in the position to protect everyone involved. The grievant's acceptance of
the wages he wrongfully received must be viewed in this light. It serves to explain why he
did not seek the assistance of the Union to exonerate him from his foreman's plan and also
why he accepted yet a third check.
The Umpire's assessment of relevant portions of the prior record leaves no doubt that the
grievant was a knowledgeable and willing participant in the fraudulent transaction. Allowing
it to continue and permitting himself to become a beneficiary of it is enough to establish his
intentional involvement in the scheme. When that intention is formulated is not as
significant a factor as its manifestation. Accordingly, under the circumstances, whether he
was involved in the initiation of the scheme to perpetrate a fraud on the Corporation is
irrelevant. His complicity in the conspiracy is enough to warrant being disciplined. His
discharge was not an inappropriate penalty given the voluntary repeated nature of his
behavior after he acquired knowledge of his foreman's conduct and intentions.
Having decided the appropriateness of the discharge penalty for the conduct under
consideration, it becomes necessary to treat the various contentions regarding mitigation
of the penalty assessed. The Union asserts that Management breached the understanding
of full disclosure regarding information it had in support of the discipline the grievant
received. Specifically, it claims that G.'s statement in the prior record relative to being
denied access to the written statement and other information provided by foreman W.
which allegedly implicated the grievant is a sufficient basis for mitigation of the discharge
penalty. The Corporation supports Management's refusal to share W.'s statement and
notes of his interview on the basis that it imposed discipline and discharge on the grievant
based on his confession and admission at the Paragraph (76a) disciplinary interview and
not on any information it may have attained from W. before his discharge on September
22, 1982.
The prior record contains evidence that Management focused on the grievant and staged a
further effort to entrap him in the scheme based on information it acquired from W. The
Union's request to examine this information and its source was denied by Management at
a critical stage of the Union's representation process. The scope and extent, indeed, the
very basis of its representation could very well hinge on the content and character of the
evidence withheld by Management. The decision to deny the Union the information in a
manner which permits an opportunity to evaluate its credibility is an apparent departure
from the parties' long-standing custom and practice.
In this connection the parties need not be reminded of the precedental value of early
Umpire Decisions A-25, B-29, C-204, E-132, F-97 and F-98 regarding evidence and its
disclosure during the bargaining stages of the grievance procedure. The Umpire
understands that the Corporation and the Union equally agree on the application and
viability of the principle to their relationship. Nevertheless, reference to some Umpire
Decisions seem especially apropos under the circumstances of the instant case.
In Decision F-53, Umpire Gabriel N. Alexander stated:
"... each party should fairly disclose all the facts in its possession
and that neither participant should take advantage of the
unawareness of the other." (underscore added)
Later, in Decision F-97, Umpire Alexander stated:
"The Corporation, the International Union, and the Umpire have

made clear time and time again that sound collective bargaining
requires frank and candid disclosure at the earliest opportunity of all
the facts known to each party. There will undoubtedly be time when
facts are not discovered, and therefore not disclosed, until after the
grievance has been partially processed, and problem enough is
created by those instances. There is not a scintilla of justification for
the withholding of information by either party from and after the time
it is discovered." (underscore added)
In Decision G-12 Umpire Alexander held that an employee's violation of a shop rule "does
not automatically deprive him of his full right to representation in accordance with the
National Agreement, or deprive the Union of the right to full and candid disclosure of all
facts upon which Management bases disciplinary action." He went on to comment on the
paramount significance of adhering to established bargaining procedures which do not
depend on the validity or error of the positions assumed by the parties on the main issue.
Thereafter, in Decision G-13, under circumstances where two employees were discharged
on the basis of statements of several other employees whose identities were never
disclosed and whose statements were shared only with the Umpire in private interviews
without the Union's ability to cross-examine, Umpire Alexander held as follows:
"There is no justification for taking secret testimony other than the fact that the possibility of
retaliation upon witnesses is lessened thereby. The practice is contrary to the fundamental
principles of a fair hearing and, unless the representatives of both parties are in
attendance, violates Paragraph 45 of the National Agreement, which guarantees to each
party the right to cross-examine all witnesses examined by the Umpire."
In considering the principles of full-and-immediate-disclosure under circumstances where

observance entailed difficulties, Umpire Rolf Valtin stated in Decision M-36:
"The Umpire thinks it clear that this question must be decided in

favor of the sanctity of the principle. Indeed, its standing as a
principle is sorely thrown into question if it is abandoned where its
application 'hurts'. Moreover, though in a different context, the
matter of proceeding secretively for the sake of protecting witnesses

has long since been decided in favor of openness."
In its brief the Corporation responded to the Union's claim that W.'s confession and the
transcript of Management's questioning of him were documents requested but not
disclosed by local Management. It points out that Management shared the testimony from
W. by the following statement which appears in its Statement of Unadjusted Grievance and
the Third Step Minutes:
"First of all, Supervisor (W.), prior to his own termination from this location which occurred
on September 22, 1982, admitted to Management that he and (McG.) had worked out their
scheme prior to the grievant beginning his period of absence from the plant."
At the Umpire Hearing the Corporation argued that there were no mitigating factors present
that would affect the penalty for the grievant's wrongdoing. It argued that W. implicated the
grievant and that implication was shared with the Union. Further, the Corporation
maintained that it was not the implication of the grievant by W. that caused him to be
disciplined and discharged, but rather, the inculpatory statements of the grievant disclosed
at the Paragraph (76a) interview. In the Corporation's view, therefore, disclosure was not
necessary in this case since Management did not rely on the statements of W. to
discharge the grievant. The Umpire respectfully disagrees.
In the judgment of the Umpire the practice of full-and-immediate-disclosure requires

Management, if requested, to share information acknowledged to be in its possession
which has a bearing on the decision to conduct a disciplinary interview. If known and
available, the Paragraph (76a) interview is an appropriate time to disclose requested
information. This is especially true here, where Management came into possession of
critical written information implicating an employee in a scheme to defraud the Corporation.
Without the information obtained from W., Management would not have had a justifiable
basis to conduct the Paragraph (76a) interview at which the grievant admitted and
attempted to explain his involvement in his foreman's plan. It seems only appropriate that
information used to decide whether a disciplinary interview should be conducted be viewed
as falling within the principle of full-and-immediate-disclosure. The information can not be
considered private and not falling within the policy merely because of what develops at the
interview. Its relevance is measured not by its use in a subsequent stage in the grievance
procedure but, in its use to initiate the disciplinary process. To consider information for any
purpose at any stage of the disciplinary and grievance process subjects it to the availability
of the parties for whatever purpose it can be made legitimately applicable. The Umpire's
acknowledged difficulty in reconciling Management's failure to produce the information
requested with the principle and practice of full-and-immediate-disclosure causes him to
rule in favor of the principle.
Accordingly, in keeping with the precedent of prior Umpire decisions and in view of
Management's breach of a fundamental principle in the parties' bargaining relationship to
disclose pertinent information bearing on the matter at issue at the earliest possible
opportunity, the discharge penalty must be rescinded. In the opinion of the Umpire, this
ruling is required under the circumstances in order to enforce a linchpin in the bargaining
relationship of the parties.
DECISION
Grievance No. 417543 is sustained. The Corporation shall reinstate the grievant to his
former position but without back pay. As a condition for reinstatement the grievant shall
agree to reimburse the Corporation the wages he received and to which he was not
entitled under terms Management in its sole discretion may decide.
JOHN PAUL SIMPKINS
Umpire
No. T-7
JUNE 12, 1986
Termination Under Paragraph (64)(c) of the National Agreement;
Evidence
GRIEVANCE:
"I chg. Mgt. with an unjust contractual separation under Para. 64(c) of the Nat. Agree.
Request immediate reinstatement & made whole with all applicable benefits."
/s/ A.E.S. (Grievant)
/s/ M.A. (Committeeman)
In the Matter of:

and
Appeal Case T-235
GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, CHEVROLET-PONTIAC-CANADA FRAMINGHAM

ASSEMBLY PLANT, Framingham, Massachusetts
OPINION
R. became General Supervisor of Labor Relations at the Framingham Assembly Plant

file://C:\Users\bobology\AppData\Local\Temp\Framework\t-007_13A5087F.htm 3/22/2011
during the spring of 1983. Safety, hourly benefits, labor relations, employment and some
training activities came under his general supervision in the new position.
R. recalls becoming involved in the instant matter when an employment supervisor

informed him that the grievant (S.) had been absent for three (3) work days, August 24, 25
and 26, 1983. On August 30, 1983, a letter was sent to S. in accordance with Paragraph
(64)(c) of the National Agreement, informing him that he was regarded as a voluntary quit
and that his seniority had been broken effective August 26, 1983. The letter was sent by
certified mail delivery and received by S. who signed for its delivery to him on September
13, 1983. The three (3) days following S.'s receipt of the letter passed without a response
from him. R. interpreted the lack of a response as a contractual termination and took steps
to finalize it.
In June, 1984 R. became involved again as a result of a Sickness and Accident (S&A) form
being received by the plant on behalf of S. Dr. R. was the attending physician who
prepared the doctor's portion of the form. After reading the form, R. determined that no
additional information was provided concerning the absences which gave rise to the
termination of S. The decision of Management regarding the contractual termination of S.
was not changed. But despite disagreement, on the advice of the insurance carrier,
Metropolitan Insurance Company, the S&A benefits were paid and the check for payment
was sent from the plant. S.'s benefits would have terminated by the end of September,
1983. A notice advising S. when his S&A and other insurance benefits would end was
included with the Paragraph (64)(c) notification he received.
Grievant S. had been employed by the Company for 18 1/2 years when he was terminated
in 1983. At the time of his termination he was classified Install Door Trim Panels and
assigned to the Soft Trim Department on the first shift. He held various Union positions and
was familiar with the National Agreement and how Paragraph (64)(c) was to be applied.
S. recalls being at the Union Hall on September 1, 1983 inquiring of Committeemen B. and
G. why he received a notice from the Company under Paragraph (111)(b) of the National
Agreement. B. advised him that the notice was sent in error. S. then called the plant and
was connected with C., a supervisor in the Labor Relations Department. S. asked C. why
he was sent the Paragraph (111)(b) letter and was advised that it was sent in error.
According to S., C. further explained that he (S.) would be sent a Paragraph (64)(c) letter.
S. then explained that he was ill and that he would be coming to the plant to pick up his
check. Upon arrival at the plant S. spoke to C. who signed a form for him as a
committeeman to get his check. Otherwise, according to S., the signature of the
superintendent would be necessary. The form was presented to the paymaster to receive
his paycheck after which S. left the plant. A week later S. made an appointment with Dr. S.
After three (3) visits he stopped seeing Dr. S. but could not recall why.
When S. received the Paragraph (64)(c) letter he understood its significance but did
nothing about it and gave the Company no other thoughts.
In April, 1984, S. came under the care and treatment of Dr. R. who continues to treat him.
He recalls preparing an S&A form his attorney got from M., an employee in the Benefits
Department of the plant. The form was then taken to Dr. R. who prepared and signed the
appropriate section of it before returning it to S. S. believes that he delivered the S&A form
to the plant sometime in June, 1984.
On cross examination S. stated that he did not recall receiving the Paragraph (64)(c) letter
on September 13, 1983. He further stated that he must have received it if Management
says he signed for it; he could not recall.
S. further stated that he was familiar with the call-in procedures to report absences and
used them when he was a rational functioning individual; that he was never on sick leave
before for psychological reasons; that he did not discuss his employment with Dr. S. who
would have covered him if he had; that at the time he knew he was ill but did not know the
reason for his illness; that he was involved in the sale of his home; and, that F. was his
attorney.
Dr. R. was present and testified at the Umpire Hearing. He is board certified in psychiatry,
a member of the American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law, and a member of the
Harvard Medical School faculty. He studied at Harvard and Johns Hopkins Universities.
Dr. R. stated that he became aware of S. through another patient before be began to treat
him. According to Dr. R., S. first visited his office for treatment on April 26, 1984. At that
time Dr. R. diagnosed S. as being in a major depressed state. His depression was severely
and totally debilitating. As a result S. lost the ability to concentrate, acuity of judgment,
capacity to experience pleasure or satisfaction; psychological strength and the ability to
communicate with familiar and immediate surroundings. The cause for S.'s condition was a
chemical imbalance of the central nervous system. He described S. as being a hollow shell
as compared to a functioning individual. S. had a broken brain. From his perspective his
situation was hopeless and there was no prospect of being helped.
Dr. R. testified that he was able to ascertain how long S. had been in the state of
depression and fixed August 22, 1983 as the on-set of the debilitating illness. According to
Dr. R. the date was determined by discussions with S. who described his reclusive, erratic
and phobic behavior. August 22, 1983 was when his last defenses and functional
responsiveness caved in. Thereafter, S. began staying in hotels, lost the ability to take care
of his finances and could not have known what the rules of his employment were. Dr. R.
described S.'s condition as "endogenous depression". In Dr. R.'s experience, he had never
known anyone to have the recognition and guts to know and do something about what was
going on within them. S. fell apart. Fixing the date when this happened was not difficult;
August 22, 1983 was the last time S. was all there as a total person. August 1, 1984 was
the date Dr. R. released S. to return to work.
Zone Committeeman B. was excused from work at the plant on September 1, 1983 to
attend to Union business. He recalls talking to the grievant and G. at the Union Hall on that
day. The conversation was triggered by a Paragraph (111)(b) notice S. had received
relative to his seniority being broken. B. inquired of S. whether he had called the plant and,
thereafter, witnessed a call being made by S. which he (B.) presumes was placed to the
labor relations office at the plant. As he listened to S., B. heard him say he was ill. After the
telephone call S. left the Union Hall and went in the direction of the plant.
Shop Committeeman G. recalls seeing B. and S. at the Union Hall but could not be sure of
the date. At that time S. made a telephone call. G. neither heard the conversation nor knew
to whom the call was placed.
G. further stated that a special card is used by Management to authorize the delivery of a
paycheck by the Payroll Department after the checks are issued by the employee's
department. The card is used to permit delivery of the check to the person named on it and
it must be signed by the superintendent. If the employee is a committeeman the card is
signed by R. In order for S. to get his check on September 1, 1983, someone had to sign
the card. According to G., S. could not have gone to payroll and received his check without
proper authorization.
Corporation witness C. testified on rebuttal. C. is Supervisor of Labor Relations and in that

capacity, he last spoke to S. on July 29, 1983. The telephone conversation, initiated by S.,
coincided with vacation checks being passed out and it was the same day S. was sent a
notice pursuant to Paragraph (64)(d). S. requested permission to come in and pick up his
check. He also stated that he would bring in satisfactory evidence in relation to the
Paragraph (64)(d) notice. C. was present and briefly spoke to S. upon his arrival at the
employment area. No information was provided by S. concerning his absence. After his
conversation with S., C. saw S. speaking to B. in the lobby.
C. continued by stating that he was sure he received no call from S. on September 1,

1983. That was the day after he sent S. the Paragraph (64) (c) letter. If he had received a
call from S. the Paragraph (64)(c) letter would have been voided in the same manner the
Paragraph (64)(d) letter was voided.
C. further stated that S. did not need his personal authorization to get his (S.'s) paycheck.
Additionally, after the checks in his area were distributed, the check would be delivered to
S. on his own signature by the paymaster with the showing of a plant entry pass and
identification by S. that he was a first shift employee. After the payroll is completed the
authorization card is not necessary and S. could sign for his own check. The payoff is
completed by the end of lunch at 11:24 a.m. (During C.'s testimony the parties stipulated
that S. came to the plant on September 1, 1983, picked up his check and signed a
document.)
The Corporation's position is that the grievant neither contacted the plant during the critical
period of his absence nor provided a satisfactory reason why he could not. It argues that
the grievant was absent without notifying the plant for more than three (3) working days;
that he was sent notification that his seniority had been broken; that he failed to respond to
the notice; and that about nine (9) months later he presented medical documentation of
disability which was not sufficient to explain his failure to notify Management of his
absence between August 23 and September 16, 1983. In this connection the Corporation
rejects the claim that Management was notified by the grievant on September 1, 1983 that
he was ill. Similarly, the medical documents presented on the grievant's behalf were found
to be insufficient to convince Management that the grievant was so mentally incapacitated
that he could not notify the plant of his absence.
The Union contends that Management engaged in a concerted effort to terminate the
grievant's seniority. The Paragraph (64)(d) letter of July 20, 1983, which was later resolved
and settled, the mistaken Paragraph (111)(b) letter and the Paragraph (64)(c) letter, are
incidents that the Union argues in support of this contention. It maintains that the grievant
responded to the Paragraph (111)(b) letter by telephone on September 1, 1983. At that

time upon being informed of the mistake and the intention of Management to send another
letter pursuant to Paragraph (64)(c), he informed C. -- the person to whom he was
speaking -- that illness was the reason for his absence. That telephone conversation
complied with the requirement of Paragraph (64)(c) in the Union's view.
Medical documentation attesting to the grievant's illness was presented to Management

and subsequent S&A benefits were paid. The diagnosis of the doctors who treated the
grievant must be accepted in the absence of evidence that they are arbitrary, capricious or
unsupported by evidence, the Union argues.
The Corporation and Union agree that the question presented to the Umpire is whether
Management was notified of the grievant's absence so as to void the application of
Paragraph (64)(c) to break his seniority. The Union claims that the grievant informed C.
that he was absent due to illness and that this occurred on September 1, 1983.
Management contends that the grievant neither spoke to C. on the day in question nor
anyone else in Management relative to his absence. If the grievant informed C. or some
other Management representative on September 1, 1983, the contractual termination
under Paragraph (64)(c) must be set aside. If he did not, then other elements of Paragraph
(64)(c) must be considered.
To the Umpire the following undisputed relevant factors have a bearing on the issue:
The grievant's last day worked was August 23, 1983.
The grievant was absent from work without notification to

Management on August 24, 25, 26 and 29, 1983.
On August 26, 1983 the grievant was mistakenly sent a letter under
Paragraph (111)(b) removing him from the hourly roll as a voluntary
quit and advising him that his seniority was broken effective the
same day.
On August 30, 1983 the grievant was sent a letter under Paragraph
(64)(c) removing him from the hourly roll as a voluntary quit and
breaking his seniority as of August 26, 1983 for being absent for
three (3) working days without properly notifying Management.
The grievant arrived at the plant on September 1, 1983, picked up

his paycheck and signed a document.
The grievant received the Paragraph (64)(c) letter on September 13,

1983 and did not respond to it by reporting for work or properly
notifying Management of his absence within the next three (3) days
after receiving it.
On September 16, 23 and 30, 1983 the grievant was seen by Dr. S.,
a psychiatrist, whose primary diagnosis of the grievant was
depressive reaction.
The grievant's next contact with Management was in January, 1984

regarding a grievance settlement check.
Umpire precedent is well established that in situations involving Paragraph (64)(c) of the
National Agreement the employee has the responsibility of notifying Management of an
absence of three (3) days or produce a satisfactory reason why notification could not be
given. The claim of the Union that notification was given here is refuted by Management.
To the Umpire, however, whether the notice was or was not given reduces to a question of
credibility. Reason and probability that notice was given seem to favor the Union's position
as opposed to Management's.
In reaching this conclusion the Umpire has considered the fact that the grievant was an
experienced committeeman who fully understood the significance and meaning of
Paragraph (64)(c). He was fully aware that his failure to respond to the notice he received
on September 13, 1983 within three (3) working days after its receipt, would break his
seniority as a voluntary quit. The grievant maintains that on September 1, 1983 he called
the plant and spoke to C. about receiving a notice under Paragraph (111) (b). He was then
informed that it was a mistake and that he should expect notification under Paragraph (64)
(c). If he considered himself to be ill, it is only natural for him to say so at that time and he
did. B. corroborates not only the telephone call which was made from the Union Hall in his
presence on September 1, 1983, but also the words spoken by the grievant to whomever
he was speaking.
Note also that during the September 1, 1983 telephone conversation the grievant informed
C. that he was going to report to the plant to pick up his paycheck. In doing so, he saw C.
personally and signed a document to receive his check.
In view of what is expected of employees under Paragraph (64)(c) there would be no

apparent need for the grievant to report for work or to notify Management of his absence
upon receipt of the notice if Management was already informed of the reason for the
absence. Clearly, advising C. that his absence was due to illness is sufficiently specific to
avoid the application of a voluntary quit to break his seniority under Paragraph (64) (c).
Notification on September 1, 1983, before the Paragraph (64)(c) notice was actually
received, also avoided the necessity of further notification after receipt of the notice. While
a reminder that he had previously communicated the reason for his absence to
Management would have been proper, the Corporation seems to agree that it is
unnecessary upon a finding that notice was given on September 1, 1983 as contended by
the Union.
The events and circumstances of July 29, 1983 as recalled by C. are similar to those of
September 1, 1983 as recalled by the grievant. The circumstances of the two (2) days: (1)
involved a telephone conversation between the grievant and C., (2) the grievant was
absent from work at the time and had been sent a Paragraph (64) notice by Management,
(3) the grievant communicated that there were reasons for his absence and (4) the
grievant reported to the plant to pick up a check. On balance, the evidence favors the
finding that what took place on July 29, 1983 to which C. testified actually occurred on
September 1, 1983 as testified by the grievant and to the extent of his presence and
involvement, corroborated by B.
Also bearing on the outcome of this matter is the treatment of the grievant by Dr. S. within
three (3) days of his receipt of the Paragraph (64)(c) notice. Seeking medical assistance
served to corroborate the grievant's assessment of his health and confirm the accuracy of
that assessment which he had previously shared with C. in connection with his absence.
In view of the above findings, therefore, it is unnecessary to consider what if any effect the
grievant's illness had on his ability or inability to respond to the Paragraph (64)(c) notice.
No opinion in this regard is expressed or implied. The grievance is, accordingly, sustained.
DECISION
Grievance No. 116292 is granted.
The Corporation shall reinstate the grievant with no loss of seniority, benefits and with back
pay to August 1, 1984.
JOHN PAUL SIMPKINS
Umpire
UMPIRE DECISION U-2 Page 1 of 11
No. U-2
FEBRUARY 17, 1986
Discharge Under Paragraph (8) of the National Agreement;
Selling Marijuana to Undercover Agent Assigned to Plant;
Concluding Transaction off Company Premises;
Evidence
GRIEVANCE
"I charge Mgt. with an unjust & unfair discharge. I demand that I be brought back to work at
once and be made whole on all lost money benefits & seniority at once."
/s/ S.P.S. (Grievant)
/s/ D.F. (Committeeman)
In the Matter of:

OF AMERICA, Local Union No. 1999
and
Appeal Case U-009

OKLAHOMA CITY PLANT, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma

file://C:\Users\bobology\AppData\Local\Temp\Framework\u-002_13BF4F4F.htm 3/22/2011
OPINION
In an effort to probe plant drug trafficking the Management of the Oklahoma City Plant and
the Oklahoma Bureau of Narcotics (OBN) conducted an undercover investigation of the
facility with OBN agents J.H. and L. In his testimony, J.H. stated that he was placed in the
plant as an employee and given instruction to make contact with employees trafficking in
narcotics. The objective was to investigate and make a case for those involved if at all
possible. J.H. met the grievant, S.S., on July 26, 1984 at Don's Country Store located on
the interstate highway west of the plant. At the time, S.S. was sitting in the back seat of a
car sharing a marijuana cigarette with a lady friend. J.H. introduced himself and let S.S.
know he wanted to buy some marijuana. S.S. did not have any to sell so J.H. indicated that
he would be interested if he (S.S.) got any.
The next encounter J.H. had with S.S. was on July 30, 1984 near Column L-24 in the plant
at 8:30 p.m. He and S.S. engaged in a casual conversation and S.S. asked if he was still
interested in the purchase of some marijuana. Upon J.H. stating that he was still
interested, S.S. responded that he could get a half (1/2) ounce for $35.00 and a full ounce
for $70.00. J.H. asked about the quality and was told that several employees at the plant
had tried it and it was of good quality. J.H. told S.S. he would see him later and they
parted.
J.H. returned at 9:44 p.m. and gave S.S. $70.00 for a full ounce of marijuana. S.S. wanted
to know where he (J.H.) could be reached for delivery and he was told that he would be
contacted later to discuss the delivery.
The next day, July 31, 1984, J.H. met S.S. at Column L-24. J.H. was advised by S.S. that
he could not get a full ounce and that what he could get was more expensive. When asked
if he had it with him, S.S. stated that he did not and that it was unsafe to have it in the
plant; that it was in his car. Arrangements were then made for the delivery to take place
during lunch at the Union Hall across the street from the plant.
Accompanied by L., J.H. drove into the Union Hall parking lot at approximately 9:24 p.m.
and stopped next to S.S.'s car. J.H. was a passenger in the car and S.S. approached his
side and handed him a folded paper bag indicating that he was sorry he did not have a full
ounce. J.H. inspected the contents of the bag at that time.
On cross examination, J.H. testified that he was not instructed to make cases in the plant
but to make contact with people in the plant. He also stated that he had seen S.S. before
July 26, 1984 in the Union Hall's parking lot smoking marijuana in the company of other
men. He approached within ten (10) feet of them at the time but he did not speak to
anyone in the group. Returning to the plant he identified S.S. as an employee by
examining Company records and photographs of employees. Then on July 30, 1984, he
approached the grievant near Column L-24.
Testifying further, on cross examination, J.H. stated that he was contacted twice to come
to the plant during the spring of 1985. Each time he was interviewed by Union
representatives concerning S.S., but on one of the occasions another person was also
discussed. Management representative C. was present during the interviews.
L. testified that the undercover investigation started around July 1, 1984 and lasted about
six (6) weeks. He testified to seeing S.S. a couple of times prior to July 31, 1984 but that
was the first time there was any contact between them. The first time he saw S.S. was at
Don's Country Store on July 26, 1984, during the lunch period. He was in his car and he
observed J.H. talking to S.S. On July 30, 1984 he provided J.H. with protective surveillance
in the plant while the payment was made in the narcotics transaction. He observed J.H.
walk to Column L-24 and briefly converse with S.S. after which J.H. handed something to
S.S. L. could not see what it was but had a good idea of what S.S. was handed. Then, on
July 31, 1984, he was with J.H. in the Union Hall parking lot to consummate the
transaction. At that time S.S.'s car was parked on the north side of the lot. S.S. got out and
came over to his (L.'s) car, approaching J.H. on the passenger side. J.H. was handed a
brown paper bag which contained marijuana. No money was exchanged at this time and
S.S. apologized for not having a full ounce, stating that it would not happen again.
L. concluded his testimony by stating that the investigation ended in late August, 1984, and
it took another month for the warrants to actually be issued. Overall, the investigation was
concluded in September or October, 1984.
In his testimony S.S. stated that he had a seniority date of January 30, 1984 and that he
was terminated on November 2, 1984. At the time of his discharge he was classified as
"Assembler" and worked on the second shift bolting down transmissions near Column L-
24.
S.S. recalls being approached by someone on July 26, 1984 while in the parking lot of
Don's Country Store. He was smoking a marijuana cigarette at the time and he was asked
where the marijuana could be purchased. S.S. told the person that he (S.S.) could be of no
help and the conversation ended.
On July 30, 1984, near Column L-24, S.S. was again approached by the same person,
J.H. and asked if he could get J.H. some marijuana. S.S. replied that it was not proper to
discuss it there, but if he wanted to talk about it, he (J.H.) could meet him at the Union Hall
during lunch. Later, at the Union Hall, S.S. recalls being approached by J.H. and asked
about the marijuana. S.S. stated that he was not sure if he could get it, but if he could, J.H.
should return the next day at the same time.
The next day, July 31, 1984, S.S. was contacted by J.H. in the plant as he was on the job
near Column L-24. He was asked by J.H. whether he (S.S.) could get the marijuana. S.S.
informed J.H. that he would be at the parking lot. S.S. made a stop before going to the
Union Hall during lunch. He had been advised the day before that J.H. was interested in a
half (1/2) ounce. When he arrived S.S. drove up next to J.H.'s car and got out. He then
went over to the car and handed J.H. the marijuana. J.H. held it up and inspected it before
handing over $35.00 in payment. After this exchange they both departed.
On November 1, 1984, S.S. was arrested and charged with two (2) counts of distributing
marijuana. He had not heard from Management or the police between the sale to J.H. on
July 31, 1984 and his arrest. The next day, November 2, 1984, he reported to work but he
was relieved by his supervisor and instructed to report to plant security. There he
requested a committeeman and was permitted to wait for his arrival in another room.
When Committeeman F. arrived S.S. was accused of selling marijuana on Company

property. He responded to the accusation by stating that he sold no marijuana on
Company property. Management indicated that J.H. was the person he sold the marijuana
to on Company property. J.H. was not present at the interview.
On cross examination S.S. acknowledged that someone was in the car with J.H. when the
marijuana was delivered. He could not be sure it was L.
Zone Committeeman G.S. was present at the grievant's interview on November 2, 1984.
Also present were Sergeant G.H. of Plant Security and Labor Relations Representative,
C., the person who accused S.S. of selling marijuana on Company property. When
Management was asked who accused S.S. of the activity, G.S. was informed that it was
J.H. and L. C. further stated that he got the information from plant security which provided
him with a copy of the report prepared by the OBN agents. G.S. requested but was refused
a copy of the agents' report. He was advised that he was not authorized to receive it. He
also requested an opportunity to interview the agents and was advised by C. that he would
get back in touch with him. Later in the interview he requested an opportunity to interview
the OBN agents again and was told that their schedules made it difficult for them to come
to the plant. This request was renewed again at the Third Step Meeting.
G.S. interviewed J.H. on March 13, 1985 in reference to the grievance of S.S. On March
27, 1985 he interviewed J.H. regarding another employee. That interview had nothing to do
with S.S.
During the interview conducted by G.S., J.H. responded to each question by reading from
a report which he had previously prepared. At this time G.S. requested C. to provide a
copy of the report signed by J.H. No request for the report was made of J.H.
The Corporation contends that the grievant was involved in trafficking narcotics on
Company property. In support of its position the Corporation contends that the agent gave
the grievant $70.00 on Company property for one (1) ounce of marijuana which was
delivered the next day off Company property. It argues that the grievant was reluctant to
bring the contraband into the plant for fear of being caught but willing to arrange for and
receive money for the drugs while on Company property. In the Corporation's view, there is
little that could occur that would be more adverse to the operational efficiency of the plant
than trafficking in drugs. Sales of this kind in the plant encourage drug use and undermine
the relationship between employees and the employer. It maintains that automatic
discharge is the appropriate penalty for drug trafficking.
The Union's contentions are many. Firstly, it contends that the Corporation must establish
that the grievant committed the acts described in the Paragraph 76 Notice which must
contain specific charges of activity coming within the scope of discipline "for cause", and
that the Umpire should hold the Corporation to the specific charge. In this connection, the
Union argues that the grievant was neither observed offering marijuana for sale on
Company property nor had any in his possession on Company property. The sale of a half
ounce of marijuana off Company property to someone not employed by the Corporation is
not punishable under the "misconduct" charge "for cause" under Paragraphs 8 and 47 of
the National Agreement, the Union argues. The sale of marijuana on the Union's parking
lot was handled within the civil court procedures and is not a basis for discipline within the
grievance procedure.
Secondly, the Union contends that Management's delay in imposing discipline from July
30-31, 1984 to November 2, 1984 is violative of Umpire precedent.
Thirdly, the Union contends that Management's refusal to fairly disclose information in its
possession before the disciplinary interview on November 2, 1984 and its use of reports
provided by the undercover agents as a basis for the grievant's discharge, is a violation of
the Union's right to "full and immediate disclosure". Use of the reports at the disciplinary
interview of the grievant and the refusal of Management to provide copies of them to the
Union bars the testimony of the OBN agents at the Umpire Hearing, in the opinion of the
Union.
Lastly, it is maintained that refusing the Union the right to interview the OBN agents is a
violation of due process. The Union's repeated requests to interview the Company's
witnesses were not granted by the March 8, 1985 Third Step Meeting. Submitting the
names of its witnesses and denying the Union the right to interview them will not permit
Management to escape the secret witness rule, the Union argues.
The question before the Umpire is the propriety of the grievant's discharge for the following
reason stated in the Notice of Disciplinary Action - Unacceptable Behavior dated
November 2, 1984:
"You are being discharged concerning your misconduct on the

second shifts of Monday and Tuesday, July 30 and 31, 1984, when
you were observed to be offering for sale, possession, distribution
for sale of marijuana on Company property."
The grievant does not deny that he sold some marijuana to J.H., but he denies that the
transaction took place on Company property. Certain facts are not disputed between the
parties; namely,
1. That J.H. and L. were undercover agents of the OBN.
2. On July 26, 1984 at Don's Country Store, J.H. first

approached the grievant about the purchase of
marijuana.
3. Don's Country Store is not situated on Company

property.
4. On July 30, 1984 J.H. approached the grievant at or

near his work station in the plant for the purpose of
purchasing marijuana.
5. On July 31, 1984, J.H. approached the grievant at or

near Column L-24 in the plant concerning the purchase
of marijuana and was told to meet him in the parking lot
of the Union Hall.
6. The Union Hall is not situated on Company property.
7. The grievant delivered to J.H. a quantity of marijuana

on July 31, 1984 in the presence of L. at the parking lot
of the Union Hall.
The Union's focus throughout the processing of this grievance has been directed to
whether the transaction or any part of it occurred on Company property. Until the Step
Three Meeting, Management's thrust was that the offer to sell and receipt of the money
were essential elements of the transaction which occurred on Company property which
justified the grievant's discharge. However, at that meeting Management introduced
another basis for the grievant's discharge. The next-to-last paragraph of the March 8, 1985
Four-Man Appeal Meeting Minutes has the following language:
"... The conversations that were had between Agent (J.H.) and the
grievant that led to the exchange of money must also be weighed in
the process. These conversations and the exchange of money led
to the subsequent passing of marijuana between (J.H.) and the
grievant. Whether the marijuana was passed with the exchange of
money, inside the plant or outside the plant, or at a later date should
have no bearing whatsoever. What matters is that the grievant
willfully entered into an arrangement to sell marijuana. Because the
passing of this drug did not occur on General Motors property does
not exonerate the grievant as the Union suggests." (Underscoring
added)
Although portions of this language are referenced in the Union's brief at two places, there
is no significant response to it apart from the following assertions:
1. "The notice must contain the specific charged acts

that fall in the scope of disciplinary action "for cause",
especially since there is no posted shop rules covering
the 'rules of conduct expected' of employees at this
location.
2. "(T)he sale of the one-half ounce of marijuana to a

non-General Motors person off company property is not
punishable under the 'misconduct' charge 'for cause'
under Paragraphs 8 and 47 of the National
Agreement." (Underscored in original text)
In the opinion of the Umpire the Corporation has struck the core of what must be decided
here. The use of narcotics and the trafficking of them by employees is conduct that involve
the legitimate concern and interest of the Corporation. For sure, conduct of this sort is
detrimental to the basic fabric of industrial life. If allowed to persist it will engulf the
industrial community and destroy it significantly. Clearly, therefore, the concern here is not
the extent to which the transaction took place on Company property, but the extent to
which the Company and its employees and property may be affected by the conduct.
Considered in this light it is instructive to weigh the evidence on a scale that measures the
impact of the conduct on the industrial environment and balance it with the legitimate
interests of the Corporation. Consider the following:
1. The purpose of the undercover agents was to help

Management with the problem it had with drug
trafficking.
2. The agents conducted their investigation assuming

the roles of employees and were instructed to identify
employees trafficking in drugs.
3. The grievant is an employee at the Oklahoma City

Plant and he was contacted by an undercover agent as if
he was an employee and not in any connection
unassociated with his employment.
4. On July 30 and 31, 1984 the grievant dealt with an

OBN agent as though the latter was an employee.
5. The grievant's discussions with agent J.H. on July 30

and 31, 1984 concerned the subject of selling the latter a
quantity of marijuana.
6. The transaction was finalized during the grievant's

lunch period in the Union Hall parking lot which is
located near the plant.
7. The grievant entered a guilty plea in open court for

"Unlawful Delivery-Marijuana", for his conduct in the
Union Hall parking lot and was sentenced to thirty (30)
days in county jail and fined $500.00.
No Shop Rule violation is asserted as justification for the grievant's discharge. Accordingly,
he was discharged pursuant to Management's authority under Paragraph (8) of the
National Agreement which is as follows:
"(8) The right to hire; promote; discharge or discipline for cause; and to maintain discipline
and efficiency of employees, is the sole responsibility of the Corporation except that Union
members shall not be discriminated against as such. In addition, the products to be
manufactured, the location of the plants, the schedules of production, the methods,
processes and means of manufacturing are solely and exclusively the responsibility of the
Corporation."
Management's right to discipline and discharge under this provision is so fundamental to

the parties' relationship as to require no elucidation here. The fact that an employee is
disciplined under Paragraph (8) or a Shop Rule does not lessen Management's burden to
establish an employee's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt in relation to the grounds for
discipline.
The grievant was discharged for his conduct on July 31, 1984 as much as for his conduct
the day before. In his testimony he contradicts the prior record by acknowledging that he
told J.H. in the plant to meet him at the Union Hall during lunch. He also concedes that the
purpose for the meeting was to deliver the marijuana to a location off Company property.
In Decision C-231, Umpire G. Allan Dash, Jr., held that Management's right to discharge
for cause is not limited entirely to matters happening within the confines of Company
property. Particularly noteworthy and pertinent here is the following language of that
decision:
"Several previous decisions of the Umpire have ruled that matters

which have occurred outside of Plant premises but which have a
noticeable and significant effect upon employer-employee
relationships within the Plant, are rightly matters to be handled by
discipline. ... In keeping with the principles enunciated in the noted
decisions, the Umpire is convinced that disciplinary action is proper
within the meaning of Paragraph 8 of the October 19, 1942
Agreement when it is applied as a means of disposing of an incident
arising outside of the Plant premises which has a significant and
demonstrable impact upon employer-employee relationships within
the Plant."
Commenting on the propriety of Management to discipline employees for behavior off

Company property Umpire, Ralph T. Seward, in Decision C-278, held that:
"... the mere fact that an event takes place off the Plant premises
and outside of working hours does not necessarily deprive
Management of all disciplinary authority to deal with it. Previous
decisions of this Office have already established that events outside
of a Plant which have a demonstrable injurious effect upon
employer-employee relationships within the Plant may rightly be the
subject of disciplinary action."
Umpire Decisions E-139 and G-120 reaffirmed the principle of Management's authority to
discipline for events occurring beyond its geographical boundaries and working hours. Its
authority, however, is limited to conduct effecting employer-employee relationships so
adversely as to impair its ability to maintain an efficient operation and discipline within the
operational structure. Conduct inimical to society at large which occurs off Company
premises is not punishable by the Corporation unless it can reasonably be viewed as
"cause" for discipline pursuant to the "adverse impact" test of prior precedent.
Trafficking in narcotics by and among employees is as inimical to the employer-employee

relationship as the Umpire can imagine. It is perverse conduct for which no plant rule is
necessary in order to put employees on notice that it is regarded by Management as
intolerable. For the protection of employees, the efficiency of its operations and control
within its premises, Management is justified to discipline employees under Paragraph (8) of
the National Agreement for trafficking in drugs in a way that impacts on employer-
employee relationships.
The proof that the grievant has engaged in trafficking marijuana is abundantly clear and
has been established beyond a reasonable doubt by his voluntary guilty plea to the charge
of "Unlawful Delivery - Marijuana" under the law of the State of Oklahoma. The charge
relates to a delivery of marijuana at 7125 South Air Depot Boulevard, the parking lot of the
Union Hall. The evidence is also clear that as background to the actual delivery, the
grievant, on Company property, arranged a meeting on Union property with someone he
believed to be a fellow employee for the purpose of contracting for the sale of a quantity of
marijuana. Making the arrangements to meet and discuss the transaction is so inextricably
connected to the delivery of the goods as to be one continuous transaction having its
genesis at the plant and involving someone believed to be an employee. From the moment
in the plant when the grievant discussed the arrangements to later discuss the transaction
with another employee the legitimate interests of the Company were being jeopardized.
Through it all, the grievant has demonstrated disrespect for the employer-employee
relationship, disregard for the employee-employee relationship and disinterest in his
relationship with the Union. The attendant circumstances, therefore, support the conclusion
that on July 30 and 31, 1984 the grievant engaged in a series of related activities on and
off Company property which are properly characterized as trafficking in marijuana. The
material impact of his conduct whether on or off Company property is indistinguishable in
view of the location of the contact and the employee-employee relationship involved.
Management was manifestly within its authority to discipline the grievant under Paragraph
(8) of the National Agreement.
At the outset of the Umpire Hearing the Union objected to any testimony from the OBN
agents in relation to the grievant's discharge. The stated basis for the objection was
Management's refusal to provide the Union copies of the reports received from the OBN
agents and Management's alleged refusal to allow the Union to interview the agents who
prepared the reports. The Corporation maintained that the objection was lacking in
foundation because it did not have any control over whether the Union could interview
people not in its employment. And, that in lieu of providing copies of the written reports
Management provided the Union with the names of the OBN agents and their place of
employment. Management contended further, that at no time did it interfere with the
availability of these individuals to the Union which had access to them by telephone or
personal visitation to their place of employment. In the interest of time and also to allow the
Umpire an opportunity to examine the prior record, OBN agents J.H. and L. were permitted
to testify notwithstanding the Union's objection.
The prior record confirms the Union's testimony that requests were made at the Paragraph
(76a) interview for information supporting Management's charge and also for an
opportunity to interview the individuals making the charge that the grievant had been
engaged in conduct involving the sale of marijuana on Company property. The Union was
informed that the charge was made in a report given to Management by OBN agents, but
its request for a copy of the report was refused.
Additionally, the Union's request to interview the agents was only supported to the extent
of providing their names and place of employment. The Union's position at that time was
that the grievant did not engage in the conduct charged and that the agents never
approached him on Company property. Whether a sale was consummated and, if so,
whether it occurred on Company property, were serious concerns of the Union.
At the Umpire Hearing the Union argued that the testimony of the OBN agents should not
be received because their reports were not provided to the Union and also because
Management did not produce the agents for the Union to interview in connection with their
reports. Management's refusal to provide the reports must be distinguished from its failure
to produce the agents as witnesses during the Paragraph (76a) interview.
In Umpire Decision T-3, the principle of "full-and-immediate-disclosure" was reviewed and

reaffirmed as a viable linchpin in the parties' relationship in matters of discipline. The
principle is revisited here in view of the Union's threshold objection to Management's
witnesses at the Umpire Hearing. The principle recognizes the fundamental obligation of
the parties to make known all facts in its possession relative to a pending grievance. An
obvious purpose is to provide for an exchange of information so that neither participant to
the disciplinary procedure is disadvantaged through ignorance of information in the
possession of the other. The grievance procedure presents an opportunity for the
informational exchange. Each step short of appeal to the Umpire is a forum for disclosure.
The failure to disclose prejudices both sides to a grievance and the process of collective
bargaining as well. In the case of the Union -- and a grievant -- it may be deprived of
critical information and thereby prejudiced by not being able to construct an adequate
defense to the charge asserted by Management as justification for the discipline. Clearly,
the ability to formulate a response to challenge the discipline is an interest affected by the
disclosure of information by Management or its failure to do so. Where the effect is
convincingly demonstrated the failure to disclose information relative to the reason for
discipline has been regarded as a fundamental breach of the bargaining relationship which
can affect the penalty imposed by Management.
The reports the Union were refused cannot be viewed as materially effecting its ability to
challenge the propriety of the decision to discharge the grievant. The Union has an
obligation to pursue the acquisition of information at every opportunity prior to the appeal to
the Umpire. On March 13, 1985, before its April 19, 1985 Step Four Appeal, the Union had
an opportunity to interview the OBN agent with whom the grievant made the arrangements
and delivered the marijuana. The Union representative who conducted the interview
observed that the agent referred to a report previously prepared by him to refresh his
recollection of the circumstances before responding to questions. At no time during the
interrogation was a copy of the report requested from its author. The failure to do so is
considered a waiver of any interest to see or have a copy of the document. In light of this
abandoned interest no error is found in Management's refusal to provide the Union with a
copy of the report at an earlier stage in the disciplinary procedure.
The error asserted on the basis of not producing the agents at the Paragraph (76a)
interview is rejected on other grounds. The Union was provided their names and place of
employment which enabled it to pursue its interests directly with the agents as part of the
Union's investigation of the affair. While there is evidence that the agents did not attend the
disciplinary interview, there is no evidence that Management prevented their attendance or
did not seek their attendance. Similarly, no evidence has been produced which shows that
the Union independently sought to interview the agents or that their efforts were frustrated
by Management. As non-Company employees it cannot be concluded in the absence of
evidence that Management exercised any control or influence over whether the agents
would submit to an interview by the Union. On this basis the Union's claim is rejected.
The Umpire notes that the Union eventually conducted an interview of the agent with
whom the arrangements were made to traffic in marijuana. To the extent that it did, the
Union was provided an opportunity to explore the credibility of Management's source of
information in connection with the charges against the grievant. Lastly, there is no
evidence that the Union's representation of the grievant was in any way materially
prejudiced by information acquired during the exchange with the agent which was not
disclosed at the disciplinary interview.
The other contentions of the Union merit no treatment in view of their untimely assertion for
the first time at the Umpire Hearing. There are, accordingly, no mitigating factors that will
work to reduce the penalty of discharge assessed by Management. The grievance will,
therefore, be denied.
DECISION
JOHN PAUL SIMPKINS
Umpire
No. U-4
JANUARY 5, 1987
Termination Under Paragraph (64)(c) of National Agreement;
Withholding of Information;
Evidence
GRIEVANCE:
I protest unjust termination under Parag. 64C of the N.A. I did not violate Par. 64C.
Demand I be reinstated at once with all lost wages and benefits due to this unjust action.
/S/ R.B. (Grievant)
I protest Labor Relations M. withholding pertinent information on the 64(C) letter

supposedly sent to Employee R.B. Demand this information be produced at once.
/S/ A.C. (Committeeman)
In the Matter of:

OF AMERICA Local Union No. 25
and
Appeal Case U-10
GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, GM TRUCK & BUS ST. LOUIS ASSEMBLY

file://C:\Users\bobology\AppData\Local\Temp\Framework\u-004_13BF5F46.htm 3/22/2011
PLANT, St. Louis, Missouri
OPINION
Under Paragraph (64)(c) of the National Agreement an employee's seniority shall be

broken "if the employee is absent for three working days without properly notifying the
Management, unless a satisfactory reason is given." After the unreported absence, this
clause provides that:
... Management will send clear written notification to the employee's

last known address as shown on the Company records, that his
seniority has been broken and that it can be reinstated if, within
three specified working days after delivery or attempted delivery of
such notice, he reports for work or properly notifies Management of
his absence. A copy of such Management notification will be
furnished promptly to the Chairman of the Shop Committee. If the
employee complies with the conditions set forth in the notification,
his seniority will be reinstated if it has not otherwise been broken; ...
Grievant B., a second shift Assembler with a seniority date of November 6, 1959, was
absent from work on August 22, 23, 24 and 27, 1984. On August 28 the Company sent him
a certified letter in accordance with Paragraph (64)(c). He signed a receipt for it on
September 6.
On October 5 the Insurance Section of the plant Personnel Department received a

sickness and accident claim form signed by B. It was dated August 6, 1984. Dr. T., the
attending physician, signed the appropriate part of the form and dated it September 21,
1984. He reported that B. had been totally disabled from August 22 through October 8
(estimated) and had received treatments on August 22 and 29, September 4, 7, 14 and 21.
His diagnosis: "Dorsal myositis with outlet syndrome, lumbrosacral neurodynia causing
instability of the lumbar spine."
On October 8, B. returned to the plant with a disability certificate from Dr. T. dated October
4 which stated that he was recovered and able to perform his regular duties. The
supervisor of employment, however, advised him that his seniority had been terminated
under Paragraph (64) (c). B. then met with Labor Relations Representative M. During their
conversation, M. recalled, B. said that he had disregarded the (64)(c) Notice because he
had already applied for sick leave and believed that Management was aware of the reason
for his absence. M. thereupon checked with members of the insurance staff, but none had
received a request from B. for S&A forms or a report of his absence. M. therefore declined
to rescind the termination.
Later that day two Union committeemen asked M. to show them the documents pertaining
to B.'s termination. M. replied that the material was locked in the files of the employment
office and he could not get it immediately. The two grievances here in issue were then
submitted. They were subsequently combined for purposes of discussion and appeal.
In its April 1985 Statement of Unadjusted Grievance the Union affirmed in substance that:
(1) In order to get S&L forms an employee had either to go to the Insurance Department or
request them by telephone. (2) B. had requested the forms by telephone. (3) He had
received them in an envelope which, as it happened, bore no postage date stamp (not an
unknown occurrence according to what a Union representative had learned from the Post
Office). (4) B. had given the forms to Dr. T. who, in turn, had filled them out and returned
them to the Company. (5) Several Management representatives had commented that "B.
got away from us last time but we got him now." (This, presumably, was a reference to the
fact that B. had been discharged in 1981 because of excessive medical-related absences
but, as a result of Umpire Decision R-3, dated April 5, 1982, had been reinstated.)
Management described the facts of the case in its Statement of Unadjusted Grievance as
follows: (1) B. failed to report his absence to the Employment or Security offices by August
27. (2) B. did not notify Management of the reason for his absence after receiving the (64)
(c) Notice on September 6. (3) On October 8 B. told Management that he had applied for
sick leave soon after August 22 and, since he had received the forms, he assumed that
Management was aware of the reason for his absence. A check of the appropriate offices,
however, revealed that no one had sent insurance forms to B.
The envelope presented as evidence did not support the grievant's claim, according to
Management, because it was not date-stamped and there was no way of ascertaining
when it was mailed or what was in it. B., moreover, could have obtained S&A forms from a
number of sources.
At the Appeal Meeting on May 29, 1985, the Union contended that B. had called the plant
on September 7, 1984, after receiving the (64)(c) letter, and had been told by an
employment clerk to disregard it because he had already applied for sick leave. He had
made the telephone application on August 28 (but the minutes incorrectly recorded it as
August 24, according to the Union). B. talked with a person in the Insurance Division whom
he presumed to be a black male. The Union also claimed that B. had told Labor Relations
Representative M. about the September 7 call when they conversed on October 8. It was
not unusual for Management to lack records of calls from employees applying for such
leave, the Union contended. B., in fact, had previously experienced such an incident.
Management in reiterating its position that B. had not called the plant in August, noted that
when questioned on October 8, B. had not referred to any specific individual or date.
Neither of the two insurance adjusters nor the two employment clerks reported having had
contact with B.; nor had they corresponded with him during the period in question.
Management, moreover, pointed out that the Union had failed to support by reference to
dates, time periods, or circumstances, its allegation concerning a prior instance when B.'s
application for sick leave was not recorded.
Testimony at the Umpire hearing was offered by the grievant, by Shop Committeeman J.
(concerning the envelope), by Shop Chairman C. (concerning the policy grievance), and by
Labor Relations Representative M., two claims adjusters, an insurance support clerk and a
personnel clerk (with respect to the events of August-October 1984).
Grievant B. testified that, following his usual procedure, he called the Insurance Division on
August 28. Although in all prior transactions since 1982 he had talked with S&A Insurance
Adjuster H. (who handles claims from persons whose names fall in the first part of the
alphabet), this time he conversed with a person he could not identify, but who sounded like
a black male. He stated that he was ill and asked for S&A papers. He answered specific
questions, among them, his last day of work, first day of his visit to the doctor, nature of
illness, and name of doctor.
He received the form in a hand-addressed envelope. The postmark, he stated, was blank
as to day, year, or time. He signed his part of the form on September 6 (inadvertently
writing August 6 instead) and presented it to his doctor on September 7.
He had received the (64)(c) Notice on September 6. Early the next morning (the 7th), he
testified, he called the Employment Department and talked with Personnel Clerk C.B.
whom he knew well. He asked C.B. why a (64)(c) letter had been sent since he was on
sick leave. When asked whether he had notified the S&A Division, he replied that he had
and that he had his sick leave papers. The personnel clerk then told him not to worry about
the (64)(c) notice.
When he went to work on October 8, the grievant testified, Labor Relations Representative
M. told him that he had been written off under (64)(c). He replied that he had called the
plant and he described the conversation with C.B. He also said that he had previously
called the Insurance Office and obtained the S&A forms which M. now had. M. asked if he
had the envelope and he said he would look at home. He found the envelope the next day
and gave it to the Union.
Shop Committeeman J. testified that a Post Office supervisor, who declined to give her
name, told him on the telephone that a letter could be delivered without a date on the
cancellation stamp.
Personnel Clerk C.B. testified that he had sent the (64)(c) notice on August 28, upon
receipt of a seniority cancellation notice from B.'s department. Before acting, however, he
had checked the record of incoming calls and found none relating to B., nor was there any
record that B. had made a sick leave claim. C.B. was positive that he had not received a
call from B. on September 7.
Claims Adjuster S., one of two black employees in the Insurance Division in 1984, testified
that he had received no call from B. on August 24 or 28. Insurance Support Clerk E., the
other black employee, testified similarly.
Insurance Adjuster H., a former labor relations representative, corroborated the grievant's
testimony that, since 1982, he had been responsible for the handling of claims of
employees with names from A through K and that he had processed all of the grievant's
claims during that period. He also verified that he had not received a call from B. on August
28. Had a call been received in the Insurance Division, H. stated, the person receiving it
would have recorded on an appropriate form all the pertinent information regarding the
claimant and his illness or injury. Copies of that form would then have been distributed to
the employee's department and to the payroll clerk for validation of the last day he worked
and his wage rate. The call would also have been entered in the log.
When B.'s claim was received on October 5, H. recalled, Insurance Support Clerk E.
reported that the file contained no record of claim forms having been requested or sent.
His own search of the files turned up no record of a claim request, nor was B.'s name on
the log sheet, although there had been a log entry for all other claims which he had made
since 1982. He (H.) reported his findings to W., the personnel supervisor.
H. acknowledged that the envelope turned in by the grievant contained B.'s name and
address in his (H.'s) writing; but he had addressed many such letters to B. and there was
no way of telling what the contents of this particular envelope may have been. Blank claim
forms are available outside the Insurance and Personnel offices, are kept in storage
cabinets, and can be obtained from the insurance carrier.
Labor Relations Representative M. stated that the action to terminate B. under (64) (c) had
been initiated by the departmental foreman. His involvement started on October 8 when
the employment supervisor asked him to speak to B. who had reported for work. On his
way to the lobby, M. recalled, he picked up the (64)(c) case file which included the
supervisor's Seniority Termination Request of August 27 (with the "Called In?" box
checked "No"); a copy of the (64)(c) letter of August 28; and a return receipt date-stamped
September 6.
During their lobby conversation, M. testified, B. stated that he had become sick on August
22 and had applied for S&A forms shortly thereafter - which he later received. B. said he
could not understand the reason for the termination since Management knew where he
was and that he was sick. Asked what he had done with the (64)(c) notice, B. said,
"Nothing". He received these letters all the time, he added. At no time during this
discussion, M. stated, did B. refer to a conversation with C.B. in September or mention that
he had talked with a "black male" in the Insurance Division.
The labor relations representative then returned to the office where he inquired whether B.
had, indeed, applied for sick leave as he had stated. Both W., the employment supervisor,
and E., the insurance support clerk, told M. that the first word from B. had been received
on October 5 (the mailed claim form); he had not called in to report his absence or to apply
for sick leave.
M. then returned to B. in the lobby, showed him the S&A claim form received on October 5,
and said that there was no record of a prior application or call-in. B. protested, but M. told
him that, based on the available information, the termination action would stand.
There are two key questions with respect to the propriety of the grievant's termination: (1)
Did he inform Management of the reason for his absence in late August? (2) If not, did he
promptly respond to the (64)(c) Notice, as he asserts? If either question is answered in the
affirmative it is clear that he should not have been terminated under (64)(c). But if both
questions are answered in the negative, it must be found that the termination was proper. It
should be noted in this regard, that the grievant has not contended that he failed to notify
Management but had a "satisfactory reason" for not doing so during the first three working
days of his absence.
With respect to the (64)(c) Notice which B. received on September 6, 1984, he states that
he called on the very next day, talked with Personnel Clerk C.B., and was told to disregard
it. But C.B. denies that any such conversation occurred. Who is to be believed?
Had this conversation taken place, in my estimation, B. would have reported it to M. on

October 8, as soon as the question of his termination arose. And M., an experienced labor
relations representative, would have immediately checked with C.B. to ascertain whether
B., indeed, had been told to ignore the notice.
But M., as has been noted, denies that B. told him that he had called C.B. And, had B. in
fact had the alleged conversation with C.B., he and the Union would surely have
mentioned this critical piece of exonerating evidence at the initial steps of the grievance
procedure. Yet even in the Union's Statement of Unadjusted Grievance, submitted some
eight months later, there was no reference to a September 7 call. The Union, in fact,
summarized the basis for its position that the requirements of (64) (c) had been satisfied by
stating that "this employee did, in fact, apply for Sick Leave and received Sick Leave
Papers... which Management cannot explain except to say that they did not give him the
papers..." And Management's Statement of Unadjusted Grievance confirmed that "the
Union also reiterated what the grievant had previously stated that he did not respond to the
notification which had been sent as Management was aware as to the reason for his
absence." Note, furthermore, that C.B. was not queried about the September matter until
after May 29, 1985, when the Union made the assertion for the first time at the Appeal
Meeting.
I must conclude, accordingly, that B. did not take any steps on September 7, 1984, to
respond to the (64)(c) Notice. Did he, nevertheless, properly notify Management of the
reason for his absence, as he claims?
There is no doubt that B. submitted S&L papers, signed by his physician, which the plant
received on October 5. But he has no witness to support his assertion that he phoned the
plant on August 28 or that he received S&L forms from the Insurance Office a few days
later. The only documentary evidence he has presented is a company envelope containing
a plant postage meter stamp, addressed to him in the handwriting of H., the insurance
adjuster who theretofore had processed all of his claims. This envelope, however, cannot
be accorded controlling weight since it is undated (apparently because of a malfunction of
the postage meter), there is no way of determining what it contained, and H., who
addressed it, had sent many similar envelopes to the grievant.
I have concluded, after carefully evaluating all the testimony regarding the earlier alleged
call, that B.'s version of the facts cannot be sustained. Some of the more important
considerations, in addition to those set forth above, are these:
- On October 8, when B. told M. that he had applied for S&A forms, he did not identify the
person with whom he had spoken. His subsequent identification of a "black male" was
never explained.
- Although telephonic requests for S&A forms are normally logged and information
recorded on forms which are distributed to various departments, there is no evidence that
a notation of B.'s alleged request had been made anywhere; nor had anyone in the
Insurance or Personnel offices any recollection of receiving a call from B. or a request for
forms.
- A statement by a Management representative that "we got him now", or words to that
effect, does not necessarily mean more than what it literally says - that B. had been found
in a compromising situation. It certainly does not prove that a group of Management
personnel and clerks deliberately conspired to falsify or conceal or destroy records. Yet, if
B.'s report is accurate, either that is what happened or there was a breakdown of S&A
procedures wherein an unknown person handled calls, processed requests for forms
unbeknownst to H. using envelopes addressed by H., and failed to notify anyone of the
actions he took. The evidence is not convincing that either of these situations actually
occurred.
With respect to the allegation in the second grievance - that M. withheld relevant
information - the Union's position as set forth at the Umpire hearing was that: (1) Labor
Relations Representative M. had access to the (64)(c) file and should have provided the
Union with papers from that file when requested. (2) His failure to do so constituted a
violation of due process. (3) When Management finally provided the requested information
it did so in an improper, unfair manner. (Nothing about this appears in the Union's
statement of Unadjusted Grievance or in the Second or Third Step Minutes.)
The record reveals that Labor Relations Representative M. answered Committeeman C.'s
grievance of October 8, 1984 immediately. M. wrote that, "The information requested is not
available at this time (6:25 p.m.) as it is secured in D.W.'s personnel files. It will be made
available to Z C/M C. on 10/9/84." Testifying at the Umpire hearing, M. confirmed that: (1)
C. had come to him at about 6:20 p.m. and asked to see the (64)(c) folder; (2) the folder
was locked in W.'s files to which he had no key; (3) he reported this to C. but promised to
have the material made available the next day.
C., in his testimony, stated that he felt he was entitled to the material at once since it
concerned a termination and, although it was true that Personnel and Insurance
Department employees were not normally available on second shift, a Security Department
employee had sometimes unlocked the Personnel office.
I am not persuaded, on the basis of the above evidence, that the due process rights of B.
or the Union were abridged. There is no indication that the persons with access to the
folder in question deliberately left the premises or locked the files because of B.'s
grievance; they were normally not present at 6:20 p.m. There is no evidence, moreover,
that Security kept keys to the files, although evidently that department had keys to the
Personnel Office itself. Nor has it been shown that M. had any ulterior motive for delaying
the Union's investigation of B.'s grievance. It would appear from the wording of C.'s
grievance, in fact, that the Union believed at the time that no (64)(c) Notice had actually
been sent. "I protest Labor Relations M. withholding pertinent information on the 64C letter
supposedly sent to Employee R.B. ..." As it turned out, of course, there was no dispute
about that aspect of the case.
The Union's second contention, as explained at the Umpire hearing, was not that the
requested information had not been provided (C. testified that he had received it on
October 9) but, rather, that it had been furnished in a form difficult to understand. I agree
with that criticism. What happened, apparently, was that someone collected the various
documents in the (64)(c) file, positioned them on a reproduction machine, and ran off
copies. The result was that portions of five documents appeared on one page. While this is
not an appropriate way to provide documents, it was not a critical error in terms of the
Union's ability to investigate because, by further request, it was able to obtain copies of
each document and, indeed, all of them are contained in the record. While such confusing
overlapping documentation is not to be condoned, this single example of carelessness or
thoughtlessness cannot be translated into a contract violation, in my judgment.
DECISION
Grievances Nos. 033843 and 033844 are denied.
Arthur Stark
Umpire
No. U-7
October 2, 1987
Discharge;
Fraudulent Acceptance of Wages;
Erroneous Discharge Notice;
Extent of Penalty;
Evidence
GRIEVANCE:
I protest being discharged on June 20, 1986, as being unwarranted. I demand to be

returned to work immediately and made whole with all monies and economic adjustments.
/S/ M.N.S. (Grievant)
Amended to include violation of Paragraph 76A of the National Agreement.
Amended - The Union further charges Management with breach of a fundamental principle
in the parties bargaining relationship to disclose pertinent information bearing on the other
matter at issue at the earliest possible opportunity.
/S/ T.D. (Shop Committeeman)
In the Matter of:

file://C:\Users\bobology\AppData\Local\Temp\Framework\u-007_13BF6C50.htm 3/22/2011
and
Appeal Case U-98

York
OPINION
The Company inaugurated a third shift for the condenser core assembly line in Department
874, Plant 4, in September 1985. In June 1986 Management uncovered what it believed to
be a series of fraudulent documents which had led to improper overtime payments to, and
acceptance by, six employees, all of whom were then discharged. The resulting grievances
have been submitted to the Umpire, one in this case and the other five in Umpire Decision
U-8 (Appeal Cases U-94, 95, 96, 97 and 99).
Management's suspicions were initially aroused on June 11, 1986. M.M., a first shift
Department 874 supervisor, was on his way to work at 7 a.m. when he observed J.R., a
third shift employee from his Department, in downtown Lockport. Since the third shift did
not end until 7:30 a.m., M.M. made inquiries about J.R. at the plant. He was informed that
the employee had not rung out (although he had rung in), but there was a supervisor's door
sheet authorizing J.R. to work 4 hours of overtime, that is, until 11:30 a.m.
On the following morning J.R. explained to Supervisor M.M. that he had left the plant on
June 11 to see his dentist. Temporary Supervisor J.N. confirmed to M.M. that he had
approved J.R.'s absence, but retroactively (i.e., after J.R. had come to work the next day).
Supervisor M.M. also learned that the door sheet in question, presumably signed by
second shift Supervisor A.M., had also authorized four hours of overtime for four additional
employees.
On June 13 second shift Supervisor A.M. informed first shift Supervisor M.M. that he had
not authorized overtime for the five employees and that he had not prepared the door
sheet containing his name. This information was conveyed to D.S., Divisional Administrator
of Labor Relations, who immediately initiated an investigation.
Initially, plant Personnel Director L.J. was asked to obtain the supervisors' log book and
overtime charts; Payroll and Timekeeping Departments were asked to supply relevant
documents. Then, on June 16, D.S. instructed second shift Supervisor R.W., who had just
returned from vacation, to interview the five men whose names appeared on the suspect
June 11 door sheet. At their interview each employee denied any knowledge of how his
name happened to appear on the document.
Administrator D.S. then asked the Timekeeping Department to search for additional door
sheets covering the week of June 11. Three more were found: for June 10, 13 and 17.
Each contained the signature of Supervisor A.M. who, upon being questioned, stated that
the writing was not his nor had he authorized the overtime. The scope of the inquiry was
then expanded, first back to January 1 and then back to September 15, 1985, when the
third shift had been inaugurated. It was during this part of the investigation that three door
sheets with the name of M.S. were discovered; they covered January 23, January 31 and
March 15, 1986. Two contained fake signatures of Supervisor R.W. (actually misspelled in
one) and one of Supervisor A.M.
In the meantime clerical employees were assigned the task of obtaining information from
the Payroll Department to ascertain whether the employees listed on the door sheets had
actually been paid for the hours specified. During this investigation some additional forged
door sheets turned up. No "legitimate" door sheets for the period April 1 - June 18, 1986
duplicated the forged ones, according to Administrator D.S.
At this point a spread sheet analysis was begun to correlate dates of payment with the
dates on the forged door sheets. A group of dates were found, each of which had these
characteristics (according to D.S.): (1) the employee had no out ring; (2) his name
appeared on a falsified door
sheet; (3) he was paid for the time. Additionally, the supervisors' attendance logs for those
dates revealed that the employees had worked fewer hours than they were paid for, D.S.
testified.
The five employees whose names appeared on the original door sheet were interviewed
again on June 17 and again denied any knowledge of the matter. By June 18 the
investigation was virtually completed; a total of 15 suspicious door sheets had been found
covering the period January 21 – May 8. Three contained the name of M.S., who had
worked as a Material Handler - Heavy - Production on the third shift since September
1985. His seniority date was August 26, 1976.
M.S. was given a disciplinary interview on June 19-20. Supervisor R.W. conducted it.
According to the Union's notes, R.W. gave "falsification of Payroll Records (Door Sheets)"
as the reason for the interview. R.W. testified, however, that he told M.S. that he (M.S.)
had violated a plant rule since the door sheets indicated that he had worked 12 hours,
while the foreman's log specified only 8 hours on each of the three days.
M.S. asserted that he had no knowledge of how or why his name got on the three door
sheets or who had signed the supervisor's name. When asked about the "no out ring," he
asserted that he had rung out. He added that he had had problems with his badge and had
been given a new one in May. He testified at the hearing that he assumed that he had rung
out because he customarily rang out; but he had no recollection of those particular rings.
Before the interview was adjourned, District Committeeman, H.N. asked for copies of the
so-called forged door sheets, the foreman's log, and the payroll records for the days in
question. According to the Union's notes, Supervisor R.W. said that the data would be
provided on the following day.
The interview was reconvened on the morning of June 20 with plant Personnel Director
L.J. in charge. Also present were Supervisors R.W., J.N., two district committeemen (H.N.
and H.P.) and an alternate district committeeman (F.W.). There are no notes of this
meeting. The Personnel Director testified in substance that: (1) M.S. acknowledged that he
understood the seriousness of the situation. (2) When shown copies of the three door
sheets M.S. said he was unable to shed any light on them or explain how his name
happened to appear. (3) He (the Personnel Director) said that the door sheets indicated
that M.S. had been paid for time not worked and asked for an explanation. M.S. replied
that he did not recall that far back. (L.J. had examined the pertinent overtime authorization
sheets, time records and supervisors' logs, although they were not brought to this
interview.)
Alternate Committeeman F.W. testified that L.J., after showing the three door sheets and
mentioning "falsification of records," asked whether M.S. knew anything about them. M.S.
replied that he did not. Committeeman H.N. testified that the subject of the meeting was
falsification of records; there was no reference to the fraudulent acceptance of money for
hours not worked.
Following a recess, Management issued M.S. a notice of discharge which stated:
During the extended period of time from September 15, 1985 to

June 17, 1986, the above named employee was repeatedly involved
in the fraudulent act of accepting wages, to which he had no
entitlement, for time not worked. These monies were generated
through a series of forged door sheets. As a result of his actions, as
described above, Mr. S. is being disciplined by discharge.
Personnel Director L.J. testified that the dates in this Paragraph (76b) Notice referred to
the inauguration of the 3rd shift (September 15, 1985) and the start of the investigation
(June 17, 1986).
Committeeman H.N. thought that Management referred for the first time to the fraudulent
acceptance of wages on this Notice.
M.S. submitted his grievance after receiving the discharge notice. He testified, in
substance, that: (1) To his knowledge he had not accepted money for time not worked. (2)
He did not forge any door sheets. (3) When he had become aware in April 1986 of an
overpayment for 7 hours, he reported it to his supervisor. (An exhibit in the record shows
that 7 hours' pay ($153.74) was deducted from M.S.'s check for April 13, 1986.) (4) Had he
been aware of overpayments for January 23, January 31 and March 15, 1986, he would
have reported them. (5) He did not recall how many hours he worked on Saturday, March
15, 1986. (6) The way he learned that his badge reader was not functioning (when that
occasionally occurred) was through his supervisor's questioning as to why there was no
badge ring. (7) He knew the five other grievants, and, in fact, knew all of the third shift
employees in his department.
M.S.'s grievance was denied on June 25 and 27, 1986 (Steps One and One and One-half).
On July 2 the Union amended it to include a failure-to-promptly disclose claim.
Management's Paragraph (77) answer was submitted on July 3 and Statements of
Unadjusted Grievance were exchanged on July 18. Step Three statements were
exchanged on September 16.
The Union contends that the grievance should be sustained on several grounds, some
relating to the "merits," others to procedural matters. It argues in substance as follows:
1. The Corporation has not proved that the grievant, who had an otherwise unblemished
record, either accepted pay for time not worked, or forged or caused to be forged any door
sheets. No one observed him sign a supervisor's name to any of the three sheets in
question. No testimony from a handwriting expert has been produced to connect the
writing on the sheets with that of the grievant. There was no reason for him to have noticed
a few overpayments of about $50 in his paycheck, particularly when he worked quite a lot
of overtime.
2. In order to reach its decision the Corporation has piled inference on inference, contrary
to the dictates of Umpire Decision J-1. If assumptions are to control, one could assume
that someone was out to get the grievant fired.
3. The Corporation relied on records which contained many errors, particularly Supervisor
R.W.'s log sheets and overtime equalization sheets.
4. If Management made errors in payment, it should have utilized its Paragraph (49) right
to recapture the money. That provision declares that:
Deductions from an employee's wages to recover over-payments

made in error will not be made unless the employee is notified prior
to the end of the month following the month in which the check (or
payroll order) in question was delivered to the employee.
5. Even were the grievant guilty of the alleged offenses he should not have been
discharged. Under similar circumstances Management has imposed 20-day DLOs under
posted Shop Rule #4 which prohibits "Ringing the I.D. badge or signing the door sheet for
another, or permitting another to do so for you."
6. Management has committed several procedural irregularities, among them:
a. Initially charging the grievant with falsifying door sheets and then
changing the charge, in the discharge notice, to acceptance of pay
for time not worked. This represents a violation of Paragraph (76a).
b. Issuing an erroneous and misleading (76) Notice. Thus, while the

grievant was actually charged with improper actions on three days,
the notice referred to an "extended period... from September 15,
1985, to June 17, 1986" during which he allegedly "was repeatedly
involved" in fraudulent acts.
c. Improperly withholding relevant information from the Union and

delaying, until after the Third Step meeting, the providing of copies
of all of the information requested. This was a breach of the
principle of full and immediate disclosure. (Umpire Decisions F-97
and T-3)
It is likely, the Union affirms, that if one examined all of the grievant's records back to
September 1985 (which was not done) they would reveal many instances of failure to ring
in or out and thus demonstrate that the three incidents in question were not unusual.
With respect to the "merits" the Corporation argues in essence that: (1) It is clear that the
grievant was not entitled to the overtime pay triggered by forged door sheets. (2) As an
experienced employee he must have realized that he was receiving funds to which he was
not entitled: $87 gross on two occasions for four hours, and $142 for 6.5 hours. Moreover,
his check stubs would have reflected the number of paid overtime hours. It is beyond belief
that he would have overlooked three such overpayments. (3) If the grievant were innocent
he would have reported the overpayments. (4) As in Umpire Case M-88, there was present
here a pattern of conduct which could not have been fortuitous and which showed specific
intent to defraud the Company. (5) The circumstances here are different from those in the
cases of two employees who were given 20-day DLOs under Rule #4: there were no
forgeries and no repetitions in those cases and the violations were discovered before any
payments were made.
As for the Union's claims of procedural irregularities, the Corporation argues that:
1. Management did not change the "charge" or violate (76a) in any

way. At the initial disciplinary interview it was plain that the
investigation concerned fraudulent payroll documents. Since there
was no evidence connecting the grievant to the forgery itself, he
was not charged with that act; rather he was charged with what the
evidence disclosed which, in essence, was participation in a
scheme whereby a group of third shift employees pocketed money
to which they were not entitled. The charge was not ambiguous and
specifically addressed the nature of the misconduct.
2. Management did not use Plant Rule #4, which concerns ringing
the badge of another or signing a door sheet for another, because it
had no probative evidence as to who actually committed the
forgeries. But the employee was entitled to, and received, a clear
statement of the reason for the discharge.
The Union was provided with appropriate information in a timely manner. Except for the
supervisor's daily attendance log, all relevant documents were in the Union's hands by
June 30. The information in the Daily Attendance Log was reviewed with two Union
representatives on July 8 and copies were provided on July 14. On the night of the
discharge, in fact, the Union saw the three door sheets in question and was informed that
payroll documents revealed no punch out on those days.
Assembly of the documents for reproduction was not simple. Fifteen counterfeit door
sheets, encompassing fifty overtime payments, had to be cross-checked against the
supervisor's daily attendance log, overtime equalization charts and weekly timekeeping
summaries. Some records were on microfilm. Irrelevant or confidential information had to
be purged. Many documents were difficult to reproduce.
The Union's ability to challenge the grievant's discipline was not impaired by whatever
delays occurred. (Umpire Decisions U-2 and U-5) Some of the material requested by the
Union, moreover, was not relevant, such as supervisors' logs for the period November
1985 to January 1986, overtime authorizations for the period September 1986 to January
1987, and handwriting analyses. Other documents, such as daily debit timekeeping sheets
and "corrected" door sheets covering the grievant, were not available, or were non-
existent.
It is plain that no one observed Grievant M.S. in the act of violating a Company rule or
committing a punishable offense. Since the evidence is circumstantial, the initial questions
must concern the nature and reliability of that evidence.
Let us start with the documents that triggered Management's suspicion of the grievant, the
three door sheets. A Supervisor's Door Sheet (Form TKPG 1000) is a form which is used,
as it states at the top, "for reporting of irregular hours and S.U.B. data." The printed
instructions direct the supervisor to:
PREPARE A SEPARATE DOOR SHEET FOR EACH DEPT. AND

SHIFT. PLACE ENTRIES FOR ANY PREVIOUS DAY ON A
SEPARATE SHEET. USE TWO LINES WHEN MORE SPACE IS
REQUIRED. ENTER EMPLOYE'S COMPLETE TIMEKEEPING
ACTIVITY. WHEN RECORDING TIME ALWAYS REPORT THE
EXACT TIME FOR WHICH YOU WANT THE EMPLOYE PAID.
REPORT START IN AND STOP OUT TIMES IN TENTH-HOUR
INTERVALS ONLY. SIGN ON LINE IMMEDIATELY UNDER LAST
ORIGINAL ENTRY AND ANY ADDITIONAL ENTRIES. DEPOSIT
DOOR SHEETS AND OTHER TIMEKEEPING DATA AT THE END
OF YOUR SHIFT IN: BOX AT PLANT SECURITY OFFICE.
Door sheets are used primarily to authorize overtime payments or enter badge rings not
generated at the clock. They also may reflect absences, tardiness, scheduled days off, and
the like. Blank copies are kept at the supervisors' desks. Unauthorized persons might have
access to the forms. On rare occasions, according to the testimony of the Plant Personnel
Director, a door sheet may be used to make up "shortages" in the previous week's record,
for example, if an employee had previously worked overtime which was not recorded.
Each form contains seven columns headed Badge Number, Employee Name, Time For
Which You Want Employee Paid (with four sub-columns for Start-In, Lunch Out and In,
Stop-Out), Door Sheet Codes, No. of O.T. Hours Excused, Day Employee Notified of O.T.,
and Remarks. Codes are numbered 1-9 and defined in a separate box. A special
instruction on Overtime Notification specifies that "the day the employee was notified of
such O.T. must be reported in the appropriate column using the proper code from the "Day
Number Table."
The January 23, 1986 Door Sheet
As noted earlier, the name of Supervisor R.W. appears on this form although, as he
testified, the signature was not his, nor was any of the writing. In the first two columns
appear the names and badge numbers of the grievant and three other employees (who are
grievants in the companion case, Umpire Decision U-8). The data inserted in the remaining
columns is identical for all four men:
Time For Which You Want Employee Paid
Start - In 11:00 p.m.
Lunch - Out 2:55 a.m.
- In 3:30 a.m.
Stop - Out 11:30 a.m.
Door Sheet Code(s) 7, 8
Remarks O.T.
There was no entry for "Day Employee Notified of O.T."
The January 31, 1986 Door Sheet
The names of the grievant and the five grievants in Umpire Decision U-8 appear on this
form. The data is identical with that on the January 23 form except that: The word
"Overtime" is spelled out instead of abbreviated; the grievant's badge number, although
correct for him, was also listed, incorrectly, as the badge number of one of the other
employees; the supervisor's name, R.W., is misspelled; the signature is in a different
handwriting from that on the earlier form. R.W. testified that the writing was not his.
The March 15, 1986 Door Sheet
The names of the grievant and three other employees (grievants in Umpire Decision U-8)
appear on this form. The signature is that of Supervisor A.M., who testified that it was not
genuine. March 15 was a Saturday and all four men are listed as:
Start - In 11:00 p.m.
Lunch - Out 5:00 a.m.
- In 5:35 a.m.
Stop - Out 12:00 p.m.
The Codes are 7 and 8. The "Day Employee Notified of O.T." was "6" – or Saturday.
"Remarks" were "O.T."
What these forms reveal, then, is that: (1) Some unknown person filled them out. (2) He or
she reported that the grievant failed to ring his badge and worked overtime in the amount
of four hours on two days and four and one-half hours on the third. (3) The forms were
turned in for processing. (4) The names of two other employees appear on each sheet, the
names of another two on two sheets and a sixth name appears on one sheet.
We turn next to the Supervisor's Attendance Log. This is a continuing record of the hours
worked by each employee in the department. The supervisor records by code numbers
paid personal holidays, vacation, excused absence, and other circumstances such as
DLOs, transfers and the like.
Supervisor R.W.'s log for January 1986 with respect to the grievant contains the figure
"8.0" on January 23 and 31. The other employees whose names appeared on the door
sheets are also listed for 8 hours on both days. (For reasons which are not clear,
Management whited out the columns covering January 1 through 19.) R.W. believed that
the Log with respect to M.S. for January 27 was wrong by one hour.
Supervisor R.W.'s log for March 15, 1986 (the days of March 16 through 23 were whited
out) indicates that M.S. and the other men whose names appeared on the door sheet
worked "6" hours. R.W. testified that he customarily takes attendance about one hour after
the shift starts and logs the names of those present on this form. He also notes in the log
when an employee leaves early and records overtime hours offered (which he checks on
his overtime chart as well). Supervisor A.M. records overtime hours in the same log book.
Overtime Equalization Records are maintained by each supervisor. They contain, by

employee name, badge number, and classification, weekly recordings of overtime hours
worked (or offered) as well as cumulative figures.
The Overtime Equalization Record for January 1986 lists these hours for the grievant:
W/E Jan. 26 261.5
Feb. 2 279.5
For March, the form shows:
W/E March 9 288.5
March 16 297.5
March 23 297.5
Supervisor R.W. testified with respect to these records that: (1) His log of overtime hours
worked (or offered) is input into the computer which calculates the cumulative totals. The
resultant chart is posted weekly. (2) The March 1986 record in question here was done by
hand by another supervisor while he (R.W.) was on vacation (although R.W.'s name
appears on the form). (3) There was a discrepancy with respect to the overtime hours
recorded for M.S. during the week of March 10 (when R.W. was not in the plant); 9 hours
were added instead of 10.5. (4) At an Unemployment Compensation hearing subsequent
to the discharge he had testified that he did not record overtime refusals (and he usually
didn't), although his May 5 Log shows that 8 hours were refused. (5) He is not always
notified by other supervisors when 3rd shift employees work into the 1st shift and the
information is not always entered into the log. Whether door sheets are turned in by those
supervisors he does not know.
The fourth record upon which Management relies is the Weekly Timekeeping Summary.
This is a computerized record which, as explained by Divisional Labor Relations
Administrator D.S., shows for each day all badge ring activity, actual hours paid, overtime
premium hours and straight time hours, shift premium, and total straight time hours paid.
For January 23, D.S. testified, this Summary revealed that:
1. M.S.'s badge was rung in at 2287 on the night of

January 22.
2. There was no out ring.
3. Codes 7 and 8 represented failure to ring badge and

overtime worked (the codes from the door sheet).
4. 12.0 represented actual hours paid (including 4 hours

of overtime at time and one-half).
5. 2.00 represented overtime premium hours (4 hours at

1/2 time).
6. 14.00 represented straight time hours paid (12 plus 2).
7. 1.4 represented 3rd shift premium (10% of 14).
8. 15.4 represented total straight time hours paid.
The Summary also showed that the grievant had recorded in and out badge rings on all six
days of that week except for the out ring on the day in question and an in ring on Day 3
(January 21). The 12 hours of work recorded for January 22 corresponded with the 12
hours recorded in the Supervisor's Attendance Log. The 12 hours on January 23, however,
were inconsistent with the 8 hours recorded in the Log for that day.
With respect to information concerning other employees contained in this Weekly

Timekeeping Summary, the evidence reveals that one employee's chart carried the 7 code
although other boxes showed both in and out rings. Another employee who had rung in
and out on Day 5 was coded 7 (failed to ring badge). The testimony indicates, additionally,
that if a supervisor neglects to record overtime hours on a door sheet those hours will not
appear on the Timekeeping Summary. Other errors may occur initially if a badge is not
working.
For the January 31 hours in question, Administrator D.S. testified, the Weekly Timekeeping
Summary shows that the grievant did not ring out on Day 5. The Code, however, was "C"
rather than 7. ("C" refers to a "correction.") The Summary specifies that M.S. was paid for
12 hours which, with all the premiums, translated into 15.4 paid straight time hours. The
Supervisor recorded eight hours on the Attendance Log.
The grievant worked only 7 hours on Day 1 of that week (W/E 2-2-86), according to the
Timekeeping Summary, although Supervisor R.W. had recorded 8 hours on his
Attendance Log. (Whether a door sheet exists for this irregular shift (coded "2" for tardy or
left early on the Timekeeping Summary) is not known.) Nor is it clear why the Equalization
of Overtime record for M.S. reported an increase for M.S. of 18 hours from the previous
week.
It may be noted at this point that Management crossed out the names of the other five
employees on the January 31 door sheet, indicating that they were not being charged with
having accepted wages to which they were not entitled, although for each the same entry
had been made as was made for M.S. Administrator D.S. testified in this regard that:
1. Two of the five had out rings for the appropriate time.
2. The investigation for one was not complete.
3. A fourth had not been paid for the day. It was later
realized that he had been given the wrong badge
number on the door sheet (Grievant M.S.'s number,
actually). Subsequently, a corrected door sheet was
found in February 1987 and reviewed at the
Unemployment Compensation hearing in the Union's
presence. He (D.S.) was persuaded that this man had
been paid for 8 hours.
4. D.S. did not comment on the circumstances of the

sixth man.
In a similar vein, one of the other alleged falsified door sheets, this one for January 28,
which appears to have been partially written by the same person who wrote the sheet for
January 23, includes the name of M.S. along with those of four other employees (grievants
in the companion case). But M.S., unlike the others, was not charged with this day (his
name was crossed out) because, as reported in the Union's Statement of Unadjusted
Grievance, D.S. was uncertain as to whether M.S. had been overpaid for that day. (While
the door sheet authorized 12 hours of pay - 11 p.m. until 11:30 a.m. - and the Weekly
Timekeeping Summary indicated no out ring, that Summary showed that only 8 hours of
pay was authorized.)
For the March 15 (Saturday) hours in question the Weekly Timekeeping Summary,
according to Administrator D.S., shows that M.S. did not ring out (he had rung in at 2293).
The code indication was "C". This record indicated that he had worked 12.5 hours (of
which 6.25 were premium hours). This corresponded with the door sheet but not with
Supervisor R.W.'s Attendance Log which specified 6 hours of overtime work. The 9 hours
of overtime recorded on the Equalization Record also corresponded with the hours noted
in the Attendance Log.
Before evaluating this documentary evidence let us consider the Union's (76) and (76a)
contentions. Pursuant to Paragraph (76) Management must provide a discharged
employee with a "brief written statement... describing the misconduct for which he has
been... discharged..."
The Notice given M.S. referred to repeated fraudulent acts occurring between September
15, 1985 and June 17, 1986. This was clearly an inaccurate statement. The period covered
by M.S.'s alleged improprieties was January 23 to March 15. That the longer period
represented the months covered by Management's investigation did not justify an
exaggerated charge, particularly when Management was charging the grievant with just
three dates in question. Since the grievant and his representatives were not misled about
the specific dates, however, it does not appear that his position was prejudiced by
Management's inaccurate statement. In the future, certainly, care should be taken to avoid
inaccuracies or exaggerations of this kind.
Paragraph (76a) entitles an employee to an interview in order to "answer the charges

involved in the situation for which such discipline is being considered..." As the evidence
discloses, M.S. was initially informed that the investigation concerned his alleged
involvement with the falsification of door sheets. In the end, however, he was charged "with
accepting wages, to which he had no entitlement... (which) were generated through a
series of forged door sheets..." A distinction exists here, it is true, but a reading of the
minutes of his first interview, as well as the testimony regarding the second one, shows
convincingly that both M.S. and his representatives were aware of the circumstances
giving rise to Management's suspicions. It would have been pointless in this particular
case, in my judgment, to have set up a third interview for the purpose of revising the
charge.
In Decision M-88, as here, the evidence was circumstantial. The Umpire, in commenting
on that kind of evidence, stated that several of the Union's arguments might loom large in a
doubtful case, e.g., arguments that the grievant could not reasonably have been expected
to account for his whereabouts on twelve particular dates within a previous five-month
period; that there was no positive evidence that the grievant had left the plant or that
someone had rung him out; that because pay receipts were recorded in terms of pay
periods rather than days, it could not be fairly assumed that the grievant had knowingly
accepted wages not due him; and the like. Given the facts of the case, however, the
Umpire rejected those arguments. The compelling facts, he stated, were that the grievant,
a committeeman, on twelve different occasions within a five-month period was involved in
a repetitious series of events which included a Paragraph (24) letter from the shop
committee, the appointment of a substitute committeeman, the absence of an exit pass, a
failure to punch out, and the collection of pay from both the Company and the Union for the
same time period.
In M-88 the Umpire also dealt with questions relating to the extent of penalty. He held, for
example, that the provision in the National Agreement which allows for the recovery of
over-payments made in error (then Paragraph (48a)) was not intended to be applied so as
to excuse a gross act of fraud. He accepted the concept, however, that penalties should
not be imposed in a mechanical way, even in so-called fraud cases, citing such prior
decisions as C-126, H-31, J-58, and M-49. In the particular case before him, the Umpire
found, discharge was appropriate because the grievant had repeatedly resorted to the
scheme and thus displayed an unacceptable pattern of conduct.
The instant case has some aspects of M-88, as Management has pointed out. But there
are also some areas of question or doubt which were not present in the earlier case. Thus,
notwithstanding the broad-gauged charge against M.S. ("extended period of nine months,"
"repeatedly involved"), the actual charge was narrowed to three occasions falling within a
seven-week period. On one of those occasions, moreover, five of the men whose names
appeared on the door sheet were not charged with having received improper payments
(i.e., it does not follow that having one's name on a forged door sheet automatically makes
one guilty of accepting unearned money). Similarly, on another of the days two men whose
names appeared on the door sheet did have out rings recorded on the Weekly
Timekeeping Summary. It would therefore appear that at least some of those whose
names were on that door sheet actually worked twelve hours. (A fourth man, the evidence
indicates, was paid for eight hours although the door sheet specified that he was approved
for twelve.)
It may also be noted that, although there is no cited rule with respect to an employee's
obligation to report wage overpayments, at the hearing the grievant acknowledged a moral
obligation to do so - and he had done so. He reported an overpayment of about $154 in
April, shortly after the events here in issue had occurred.
There are, nevertheless, several perplexing and unanswered questions with respect to the
evidence. For example: For what purpose were names placed on fraudulent door sheets, if
not to obtain pay for time not worked? Is it credible that an employee's name would appear
on a forged door sheet without his knowledge? If so, when did he find out? Was his name
not included after March 15 because he instructed whomever it was who was submitting
the sheets to leave him out - or for some other reason? It must be noted that the grievant
was not forthcoming with explanations.
These questions persist. Yet the evidence as to the grievant does not conclusively
demonstrate the oft-repeated pattern which is typified by the evidence in M-88 and which
would justify discharge. Accordingly, based on the entire record in the case at hand, I
conclude that the discharge should be rescinded and replaced by a 60-day DLO.
DECISION
The discharge of Grievant M.S. shall be rescinded and replaced by a 60-day DLO. M.S.
shall be reinstated and be given back pay for the period commencing 60 days from his
termination and extending until the date of his reinstatement.
Arthur Stark
Umpire
No. U-8
October 2, 1987
Discharges;
Fraudulent Acceptance of Wages;
Withholding of Information;
Wrong Rule;
Erroneous Discharge Notice;
Extent of Penalty; Evidence
GRIEVANCES:
Grievances Nos. 680801, 680802, 680803, 680804, 680805
I protest being discharged on June 20, 1986, as being unwarranted. I demand to be

returned to work immediately and made whole with all monies and economic adjustments.
/S/ J.J.B. (Grievant)
F.J.D. (Grievant)
K.L.P. (Grievant)
J.R. (Grievant)
R.W. (Grievant)
Amended to include violation of Paragraph 76A of the National Agreement.
Amended - The Union further charges Management with breach of a fundamental principle
in the parties bargaining relationship to disclose pertinent information bearing on the other
matter at issue at the earliest possible opportunity. /S/ T.D. (Shop Committeeman)
file://C:\Users\bobology\AppData\Local\Temp\Framework\u-008_13BF7EA8.htm 3/22/2011
In the Matter of:

and
Appeal Cases U-94, 95, 96, 97 and 99

York
OPINION
This is a companion case to Umpire Decision U-7. The parties have agreed to combine
these five grievances because of their similarities. The grievants all were assigned to the
third shift (11 p.m. - 7:30 a.m.) in Department 874, Plant 4, Building 8 (as was Grievant
M.S. in Decision U-7). Their classifications and seniority dates were as follows:
Appeal Appeal Grievance Classification Seniority

Case Case # Date
Name #
K.P. U-94 680803 Mat’l Handler – Heavy Prod. 8/23/76
J.R. U-95 680804 Serviceman – Department 1 1/11/65
F.D. U-96 680802 Mat’l Handler – Heavy Prod. 3/15/76
R.W. U-97 680805 Assembler – Light 8/19/68
J.B. U-99 680801 Mat’l Handler – Heavy Prod. 8/23/76
The events leading to these discharges have been set forth in the prior Umpire decision.
To briefly recapitulate: On June 11, 1986 Management's suspicions were aroused when a
supervisor observed J.R. in downtown Lockport at 7 a.m. when he should have been at
work. An initial investigation turned up a door sheet for that day which authorized four
hours of overtime for J.R., K.P., J.B., F.D. and R.W. The door sheet proved to have been
forged. Additional investigation revealed three more forged door sheets covering other
days in June. By June 18 Management had found nineteen forged door sheets, dating
back to January, each with the names of three or more (usually four) of the grievants.
Unconvinced by the employees' disclaimers of any knowledge of the matter and relying on
the fact that they had accepted unearned wages in many instances, Management
discharged the six men following disciplinary interviews on June 19. Grievances were
submitted and later amended.
In each of the five cases Management's Paragraph (76b) discharge notice read as follows:
During the extended period of time from September 15, 1985 to

June 17, 1986, the above named employee was repeatedly involved
in the fraudulent act of accepting wages, to which he had no
entitlement, for time not worked. These monies were generated
through a series of forged door sheets. As a result of his actions, as
described above, Mr. (Grievant's name) is being disciplined by
discharge.
The table below summarizes the data collected by Management with respect to the five
grievants.
TABLE 1
Overtime Hours on Forged Door Sheets
Date K.P. J.R. F.D. R.W. J.B.
1/21 4 4 4 4
1/22 4 4 4 4
1/23 4 4
1/28 4 4 4
1/31 4 4 4 4 4
3/8 4.5 4.5 4.5
3/15 4.5 4.5 4.5
3/24 4 4 4
4/25 4 4
4/29 4 4 4 4
4/30 4 4 4 4
5/2 4 4 4 4
5/6 4 4 4 4
5/7 4 4 4 4
5/8 4 4 4

6/10 4 4
6/11 4 4 4 4 4
6/13 4 4 4 4 4
6/17 4 4 4 4 4
As the above table reveals, the total overtime hours for which the grievants were allegedly
paid without having worked were:
K.P. - 39
J.R. - 48.5
F.D. - 36.5
R.W. - 53
J.B. - 28.5
Some additional information regarding timekeeping and pay procedures was provided at
the hearing by J.T., Administrator of Compensation. Thus:
Badges and Badge Readers.
Each employee's ID badge has a magnetic tape coded with his

number. When the badge is placed in the reader a green light
changes to red, indicating that the ring has been recorded. A
recorded ring cannot be removed from the record.
Paychecks.
Each check is delivered with an accompanying pay stub which lists

hours worked, overtime hours, earnings and deductions.
Door Sheets.
These are used when the badge ring information is missing. They
are the only documents which authorize payment of overtime.
Sometimes, however, when overtime is scheduled in advance, the
computer is programmed accordingly; but that rarely occurs with
Saturday work.
If a ring is missing, the supervisor customarily submits a door sheet to allow the employee
to be paid. If the timekeeper does not receive one, he sends a "correction" door sheet to
the supervisor with an appropriate notation. Similarly, if a badge ring indicates that an
employee has worked overtime and no door sheet was submitted, the timekeeper sends a
"correction" to the supervisor for approval. If there is no ring out, but a door sheet shows
that an employee worked overtime hours, the overtime will be paid because it was
approved.
The Compensation Department does not double check the accuracy of door sheets. They
are sorted and filed and used as references by the timekeeper. If all the necessary
information is on a door sheet it is processed for payment even if the supervisor's signature
is missing.
Daily Debit Report.
Issued after all data for the day has been cycled, this report lists all
employees by department and displays rings, information from door
sheets, actual hours, applicable premiums, and the like. The reports
are given to the plant manager each day; hard copies are retained
by the Timekeeping Department for a month. At the end of each
week the information is entered on a Timekeeping Summary Form
and microfilmed. These forms are retained for three years.
Efficiency Report.
This report, which goes to the plant manager (who sends copies to
supervisors in each department) compares the amount of money
spent by a department with the amount which had been planned. It
provides an indication of whether costs are out of line.
Labor Relations Administrator D.S. identified fifty sets of documents similar to the sets
introduced in Umpire Decision U-7, each containing a copy of the forged door sheet,
Supervisor's Log, Overtime Equalization Sheet and Weekly Timekeeping summary. There
is one packet for each day for which each grievant has been charged. D.S. testified that
Management subsequently turned up a correction door sheet for two of the grievants. It
was offered in evidence at the UC hearing in February 1987.
Supervisor A.M. testified that the signatures on the six door sheets attributed to him were
not his. He had approved overtime for the grievants on other occasions, however, although
they had stopped accepting it in May and June. To his recollection none had ever reported
an overpayment of wages to him.
Supervisor R.W. testified that the signatures on the thirteen remaining door sheets were
not his, nor did he have any clue as to who had filled them out. On one of the days -
January 23 - he was on vacation; and his log for his vacation period had disappeared.
None of the five grievants had ever reported having received overpayments, R.W. said.
Supervisor R.W. also testified that: (1) He did not know of any correction door sheets for
the days in question. (2) There was a discrepancy in the Weekly Time Summary records
concerning Grievant J.R. who should have been charged for 18.5 instead of 12 hours of
overtime for W/E February 2. (3) It was unlikely that he would notice an error on a Daily
Debit Report indicating that five men had worked on a Saturday when they had not done
so. In fact, he seldom reviews those reports. (4) He is not always aware when a day
supervisor asks one of the employees in his group to work overtime. (5) During the
disciplinary interviews he did not specifically state that the grievants were subject to
discipline for accepting money to which they were not entitled. He did assure Union
representatives that several documents would be provided the following day.
Each of the grievants testified that he did not knowingly accept money for time not worked
on the days in question; he did not forge or sign the name of a supervisor on any door
sheets; he had denied the charges about specific dates at the disciplinary interviews; and
he had not been previously disciplined.
Summarized below is the information contained in the documents relating to the individual
grievants and their testimony.
Grievant K.P.
January 22, 23 and 28
The Documents.
The door sheets specify that he worked from 11 p.m.

until 11:30 a.m. with a 35-minute off-the-clock lunch
period (2:55 to 3:30 a.m.) on each of these days; the
codes are "7" (Failed to Ring Badge) and "8" (Worked
Overtime). The Attendance Logs specify 8.0 hours. The
Timekeeping Summaries reveal no out rings and 12
hours of work, with codes "7" and "8".
The Grievant's Testimony.
He regularly rings his badge and is familiar with the

green light-red light system. If the red light does not flash
he usually reports that to his supervisor.
On these days he worked 12.0 hours and probably rang

out (since he usually does). He could not recall whether
he worked overtime on any other days that week.
March 8, Saturday
The Documents.
The door sheet specifies work from 11 p.m. until 12 noon

with a 35-minute off-the-clock lunch period (5 to 5:35
a.m.); the codes are "7" and "8". The Attendance Log
specifies 8.0 hours. The Overtime Equalization Record
specifies 9 hours (either offered or worked) for W/E
March 9 for K.P. and all six employees in the material-
handler-heavy classification. The Timekeeping Summary
reveals an in ring at 2286, no out-ring, 12.5 hours of

work, and the code "C" (corrected).
Supervisor R.W. (whose name was signed to the

falsified door sheet) asked him to work overtime. He did
his regular job for six hours and then moved cores for six
and one-half hours. His supervisor on that job was M.J.
He probably did not ring out because he had been
instructed not to ring out when he worked a double and
did not take lunch.
March 15 (Saturday)
The Documents.
The door sheet is similar to the one for March 8. The

Attendance Log specifies 6 hours work. The Equalization
Sheet indicates no overtime hours during W/E March 17
for anyone in the classification. The Timekeeping
Summary contains no out ring (in ring was at 2299),
reports 12.5 hours of work, and code "C".
He worked on the wash for the full time along with

employee R.Z. and two new men. M.J. was probably the
supervisor. He probably did not ring out.
March 24.
The Documents.
The door sheet is similar to the sheets for January 22, 23

and 28. It reports twelve hours of work. The Attendance
Log specifies 8 hours. (However, Supervisor R.W.'s
name appears on the Log, whereas the falsified
signature on the door sheet is that of Supervisor A.M.)
The Timekeeping Summary contains no out ring (in ring
was at 2289), reports twelve hours of work and the code
"7" and "8".
He worked 4 hours of overtime and probably rang out.
April 29
The Documents.
The door sheet specifies work from 11 p.m. to 11:30

a.m. with a 30-minute off-the-clock lunch period (3 to
3:30 a.m.). The Attendance Log reports 8.0 hours. The
Equalization Sheet indicates 229.5 hours for W/E April
27 and 223.5 for W/E May 4. (For reasons which are not
explained everyone in the classification was reported
with fewer hours for the same period.) The Timekeeping
Summary shows 12 hours of work and both an in ring
and out ring of 2291 (e.g., no out ring).
It is probable that he did not work overtime on this day

and was therefore overpaid. He does not recall any
overtime work in April. He did not report the
overpayment.
He had received three or four other overpayments

between 1977 and 1985, none of which he repaid. A
supervisor told him, during his first year of employment,
that it was foolish to report overpayments. He followed
that course without worrying about it.
May 7 and 8
The Documents.
The door sheets are similar to those for January 22, 23,
28 and March 24. The attendance logs report 8.0 hours.
The Equalization Sheet indicates that no overtime was
offered or worked for W/E May 11. The Timekeeping
Summary reveals no out rings on any day that week
except Thursday and no in ring on Sunday. Eight hours
of work is recorded for each day except May 7 and 8 for
which 12 hours are shown.
He worked 12 hours on each of these days. He is not

sure whether he rang out. He had been on vacation May
1 and 2 and had no badge on Monday and Tuesday
(which he reported to his supervisor).
June 10, 11, 13 and 17
The Documents.
A door sheet for each of these days, containing the

falsified signature of Supervisor A.M., indicates work
from 11 p.m. until 11:30 a.m. with a 35-minute lunch
period (2:55 to 3:30 a.m.) and Codes "7" and "8".
He did not work overtime on those days and assumes

that he did ring out.
Grievant J.R.
January 22, 23 and 28
The Documents.
These are the same door sheets, described above, on

which the name of Grievant K.P. appears. They report 4
hours of overtime on each of these days. The
Attendance Logs specify 8.0 hours. The Timekeeping
Summaries contain the codes "7" and "8", no ring outs
for these days, and specify that the employee worked 12
hours. (Ring ins were at 2242, 2251, and 2255.) The
Overtime Equalization Chart shows 189.0 hours for W/E
February 2 and 177.0 for W/E January 26. (The
Timekeeping Summary reflects 4 hours worked on
February 1; 12 on January 31; 11.3 on January 30; 6 on
January 29; 12 on January 28; and 8.5 on January 27.)
He always rings out. He is sure he worked because he

was paid for the time. He did not recall whether he
worked other overtime that week.
March 8, Saturday
The Documents.
K.P.'s name also appears on this door sheet. It reports

12 hours of work. The Attendance Log specifies 8.0
hours. The Equalization Sheet indicates 13.5 hours of
overtime offered or worked during W/E March 9. The
Timekeeping Summary reveals no ring out (the only time
that week), 12.5 hours of work, and code "C."
If the sheet specified that he worked 12.5 hours of
overtime, he did. There should be a genuine door sheet

for this day.
March 24
The Documents.
The door sheet, which also contains the name of K.P.,

authorizes 4 hours of overtime. The Attendance Log
specifies 8 hours of work. The Timekeeping Summary
shows an in ring of 2234. The next ring is 2236. The
hours worked are 12, the code, "C".
He rang out and he worked if the record said he did. He

worked additional overtime that week. (The Timekeeping
Summary lists 7.9, 8.0 and 8.0 on Tuesday, Wednesday
and Thursday and no hours on Friday.)
April 25
The Documents.

a.m. with a 35-minute off-the-clock period (2:55 to 3:30
a.m.); the codes are "7" and "8". The Attendance Log
specifies 8.0 hours. The Equalization Sheet shows 238.5
hours for W/E April 27 and 237.0 for the previous week.
The Timekeeping Summary reveals no in ring or out ring,
12 hours worked, and code "C".
He did not think it worthwhile to discuss these or any

further records, particularly since some were forgeries.
He had possibly been overpaid a few times over the
years, however, although not during 1986.
April 29
The Documents.
K.P.'s name also appears on this door sheet which

authorizes 4 hours of overtime. The Attendance Log
specifies 8.0 hours. The Equalization Sheet shows 235.5
hours for W/E May 4 and 238.5 for the previous week.
(The other employee in the same classification also
showed a decrease.) The Timekeeping Summary shows
an in ring of 2284. The next ring is 2254 (e.g., there is no

out ring). It also shows 12 hours worked and code "C".
April 30
The Documents.

a.m. with a 35-minute off-the-clock period from 2:55 to
3:30 a.m. and codes "7" and "8". (The name of the
supervisor is misspelled.) The Attendance Log specifies
8.0 hours. The Equalization Sheet lists 235.5 hours for
W/E May 4, the same as the preceding week. The
Timekeeping Summary reveals no out ring (in ring was
2254) and 12 hours worked.
May 2
The Documents.
The door sheet: work from 11 p.m. to 11:30 a.m. with

lunch period 2:55 to 3:30 a.m. and codes "7" and "8".
Attendance Log: 8.0 hours.
Equalization Sheet: 235.5 hours on W/E May 4 and

238.5 for the previous week. (A similar reduction was
noted for the other employee in this classification.)
Timekeeping Summary: No out rings; 12 hours of work;

code "C".
May 6
The Documents.
The door sheet: Work from 11 p.m. to 11:30 a.m. with

lunch period 2:55 to 3:30 a.m. and codes "7" and "8".
Equalization Sheet: 237 hours for W/E May 11 and 235.5

for previous week.
Timekeeping Summary: In ring at 2236, next ring at 2241

(e.g., no out ring); 12.5 hours of work; Code "C".
May 7
The Documents.
The door sheet: Same as that described above for K.P.

authorizing 12 hours of pay.
Equalization Sheet: 237 hours for W/E May 11 and 235.5

for the previous week.

(e.g., no out ring); 12 hours of work; code "C".
May 8
The Documents.
The door sheet: Same as that for K.P. authorizing 12

hours.
Equalization Sheet: Same as for previous date.

June 10, 11, 13 and 17
The Documents.
The door sheets are the same as those described above

for Grievant K.P.
With respect to June 11: He obtained the permission of

Supervisor J.N. before leaving the plant at about 7:05
a.m. (The supervisor had testified that J.R. told him on
June 12 that he had left early for a dentist's appointment
the previous day and he - J.N. - had therefore excused
him. The supervisor also stated that he had not filled out
a door sheet for J.R.)
Grievant F.D.
January 21
The Documents.
The door sheet: Showed work from 11 p.m. to 11:30

a.m. with lunch period 2:55 to 3:30 a.m. and codes "7"
and "8".
Timekeeping Summary: In ring at 2294, next ring 1932

He does not recall whether he worked overtime on this

day or on any of the other days on which his name
appeared on falsified door sheets. He does remember,
however, that he did not work overtime in June. He
regularly rang his badge in and out. He was overpaid
once during the past ten years, possibly in May 1986. He
reported the overpayment to Supervisor R.W. but does
not recall what became of the matter.
January 28, March 8 and 24, April 25 and 30 May 2, 6 and 8, June
11, 13 and 17
The Documents.
The door sheets are the same as those described above

with respect to Grievants K.P. and J.R. The information
on the other documents is summarized in the following
table.
TABLE II
F.D.
Timekeeping Summary
Out- Hrs. Code

Ring
Jan. 28 12.0 8.0 +8.0 No 12.0 C
Mar. 8 12.5 8.0 +9.0 No 12.5 C
24 12.0 8.0 +9.0 No 12.5 8, 7
April 25 12.0 8.0 +6.0 No 12.0 C
30 12.0 8.0 -6.0 No 12.0 7, 8
May 2 12.0 8.0 -6.0 No 12.0 7, 8
6 12.0 8.0 None No 12.0 8. 7
8 12.0 8.0 None No 12.0 8, 7
June 12.0
11
12.0
13
12.0
17
Grievant R.W.
January 22, 23 and 28; March 8, 15 and 24; April 25, 29 and 30;
May 2, 6, 7 and 8; June 10, 11, 13 and 17
The Documents.
The door sheets have all been described above. The

information on the other documents is summarized in the
following table.
TABLE III
R.W.
Timekeeping Summary
Out- Hrs. Code

Ring
Jan. 22 12.0 8.0 No 12.0 7, 8
23 12.0 8.0 No 12.0 8, 7
28 12.0 8.0 No 12.0 7, 8
Mar. 8 12.5 6.0 +12.0 No 12.5 C
15 12.5 6.0 None No 12.5 C
24 12.0 8.0 +12.0 No 12.0 8, 7
April 25 12.0 8.0 None No 12.0 C
29 12.0 8.0 None No 12.0 C
30 12.0 8.0 None No 12.0 8, 7
May 2 12.0 8.0 None No 12.0 8, 7
6 12.0 8.0 None No 12.0 7, 8
7 12.0 8.0 None No 12.0 8, 7
8 12.0 8.0 None No 12.0 8, 7
June 12.0
11
12.0
13
12.0
17
He probably worked overtime on January 22 because he

usually accepts overtime, but he has no particular
recollection of that date. He used to look at the posted
Equalization Charts. He once was overpaid for four
hours. He told Supervisor A.M. about it the next week
but, although A.M. said he would take care of it, he
(R.W.) is not aware that anything was done. He regularly
rang in and out unless instructed not to ring out, which
happened occasionally when he worked overtime.
In June he was called in to work early (7:30 p.m.) on one

of the days between June 15 and 19.
Grievant J.B.
January 22; March 15; April 29 and 30; May 2, 6 and 7; June 11, 13,
17
The Documents.
The door sheets are the same as those described above.
The information on the other documents is summarized

in the following table.
TABLE IV
J.B.
Timekeeping Summary
Out- Hrs. Code

Ring
Jan. 22 12.0 8.0 No 12.0 C
Mar. 15 12.5 6.0 +9.0 No 12.5 C
April 29 12.0 8.0 -6.0 No 12.0 C
30 12.0 8.0 -6.0 No 12.0 C
May 2 12.0 8.0 -6.0 No 12.0 C
6 12.0 8.0 None No 12.0 C
7 12.0 8.0 None No 12.0 C
June 12.0
11
12.0
13
12.0
17
He rang in and out every day. He could not recall

whether he worked overtime in April, May or June 1986.
He would have recognized an overpayment of four hours
for time not worked and would have reported it. He had
reported overpayments of 7 hours in January 1986 and 6
hours in June 1986 to Supervisor R.W. who said he
would take care of it, and did for the first instance. (At the
UC hearing he had testified to receiving one
overpayment for 4 hours.)
It was his understanding that Management had hired a
graphologist who had determined that he - J.B. - had

written the door sheets in question. His attorney had
retained another handwriting expert who concluded that
the writing was not his.
By agreement, the parties incorporated into this case their arguments, as well as a
considerable part of the testimony in Umpire Decision U-7. In addition, the Union makes
these points:
1. The badge reading system is not foolproof, as the testimony of J.T. shows.
2. Had the grievants engaged in a conspiracy - which they did not – all their
names would have appeared on all the forged door sheets. But that did not
occur. It is more likely, in fact, that the grievants were framed because of
friction between the shifts. How else explain day shift Supervisor M.M.'s interest
in investigating an employee from a different shift (the June 11 incident)?
3. It is not surprising that the grievants were unable to recall what happened on
specific days a year or more ago. Management's blanket charge, moreover,
was defectively unspecific.
4. The Union was disadvantaged in its presentation because Management had

failed to provide sufficient information. In any event, the records which were
provided, such as Supervisor R.W.'s logs and Equalization Sheets, reveal
numerous errors and are therefore not reliable. Moreover, Management did not
give any correction door sheets to the Union during the course of the
investigation.
5. The Union was not shown any proof that Grievant J.B. had written any of the
door sheets in question, notwithstanding Management's assertion in its
Statement of Unadjusted Grievance that "a qualified expert in criminalistics and
handwriting" had concluded that J.B. had forged all those sheets.
6. The penalty in similar cases has been a 20-day DLO.
7. Management stopped payment on the overtime reported for June 11, 13, and
17; and it could have recovered the overtime payments for May 2, 6, 7 and 8
pursuant to Paragraph (49). Why didn't it do so?
8. Supervisor R.W.'s logs and Overtime Equalization Sheets contain several

errors and did not accord with payroll records. Some examples:
- Overtime sheets for four of the five grievants show

fewer hours as of W/E May 4 than W/E April 27. They
should be the same because, according to the log, no
overtime was offered or worked during the week ending
May 4.
- The log and payroll records differ in some instances as

illustrated in the table below in which figures contained in
the Union's Umpire Brief have been compiled.
TABLE V
Hours In
Log Payroll
R.W. 3/6 10.0 8.0 12.0
3/7 10.0 7.9 12.0
3/8 6.0 7.9 4.0
3/24 12.0 4.0
3/28 4.0
3/30 4.0
4/22 8.0
5/1 8.0
J.R 1/24 8.0 0.0 0.0 12.0
1/27 8.0 8.5
1/28 4.0 (R) 12.0
1/29 8.0 (R) 6.0
1/30 12.0 11.3
3/25 8.0 7.9
4/21 8.0 7.9
4/28 8.0 9.0
5/5 8.0 8.8
5/6 8.0 12.5
5/9 8.4
F.D. 4/29 8.0 7.9 0.0
5/1 8.0 7.9
5/5 8+8 (R) 4.0
5/9 8.0
J.B 1/27 8.0 0.0 0.0
1/30 12+4 11.3

(R)
5/5 7.9
8+8 (R)
5/9 7.9
8.0 (R)
K.P. 5/5 8.0 (R) 0.0
Management adds these comments and arguments to those previously submitted:
1. The detailed testimony regarding the badge reading system reveals that
once a ring has been entered it cannot be eliminated or changed. Had the
grievants rung out on the days in question their rings would have been
recorded. It must have been more than coincidence that none of the grievants
rang out on any day on which a forged door sheet was turned in.
2. The grievants' explanations are not credible and, to some extent, differ from
their responses at disciplinary interviews where no one asserted positively that
he had worked on the days in question. The dimensions of the scam were not
insubstantial, ranging from seven to thirteen occasions (and averaging ten per
grievant).
3. Discrepancies which might have occurred concerning other employees (or

even some of these) on other days have no bearing on the issue at hand. As
for attendance logs, they are not used for pay purposes and, since the
grievants had good attendance records, it is likely that Supervisor R.W. did not
feel a compulsion to make them letter perfect. The Overtime Charts, similarly,
were not used for pay purposes. Rather, they were informational documents
which were posted for the constant scrutiny of employees.
4. Paragraph (49) relates to inadvertent errors, not to employee fraud.

Moreover, it can be utilized only during a relatively short period following an
overpayment.
5. Although Management did not establish a foolproof system of double-checks

to protect against a scheme of this kind - probably because of the high level of
trust in the community - that did not excuse the grievants, who were
appropriately disciplined for their misconduct.
The Union's (76) and (76a) contentions here are like its contentions in Umpire Decision U-
7 and the facts are similar as well. My conclusions, therefore, are the same as those in the
preceding case.
One matter raised in both cases, however, was not previously discussed, namely, the
Union's "wrong rule" contention. As reported in Decision U-7, the Union has suggested that
Management should have invoked Shop Rule #4 if it believed some improprieties had
occurred. (Under that rule, which bars "ringing the I.D. badge or signing the door sheet for
another, or permitting another to do so for you", the evidence discloses that 20-day DLOs
have been imposed at this plant.)
Interestingly, in Decision M-88, which has been referred to at some length in Decision U-7,
the Umpire dealt with a similar contention. The facts there were also similar: several
employees, who were found to be "ringing each other in and/or out", were not discharged.
The Umpire, however, distinguished those instances, each of which apparently involved a
single act, from the pattern of conduct which was reflected in the case before him. It was
"the repeated resort to the scheme" which, the Umpire emphasized, justified the
employee's termination. The same distinction is applicable in the case at hand if the
documentary evidence stands up.
As noted in Decision U-7, the Umpire, in Decision M-88, dealt with the question of
circumstantial evidence at some length. In that case, a committeeman had repeated the
alleged fraudulent acts on twelve different occasions within a five-month period, thus
establishing what the Umpire concluded was a pattern of misconduct. The figures here are
strikingly similar, as shown in Table 1.
There is no reference in M-88 to the amount of pay the committeeman had improperly
obtained. But in the case at hand it is likely that the amounts were greater because of the
premium pay and the not insubstantial number of hours involved, which ranged from 28.5
to 53 over a fifteen week period. And that does not include an additional 12 to 16 hours in
June for which no payment was made although the hours were "authorized" by falsified
door sheets.
A key element in this proceeding, certainly, is the badge ring procedure. As the testimony
discloses, there may be 400 to 600 instances a day when no rings are recorded for various
reasons in a plant population of about 6,000. What is the likelihood, then, that any
employee would have an in ring but no out ring on the very day that his name appeared on
a falsified door sheet? And what is the probability that such combination would be repeated
on fifteen separate days for five persons for a total of approximately 50 instances within
fifteen weeks? One need not be a statistician to conclude that the chances that these
events would occur by accident or sheer coincidence is infinitesimal.
Were additional analyses required, one might compare the no-out-ring days in question
with other days during the same weeks. Some examples:
- For K.P., during the week which included January 22 and 23, those were the only days
on which he had no out rings; during the week which included January 28, that was the
only day for which there was no out ring and for which overtime was claimed; during the
week which included March 8, that was the only day (a Saturday) on which there was no
out ring.
- For J.R., during the week which included January 22 and 23, those were the only days on
which there were no out rings; the same held true for the week that included January 28;
and once again for the week that included March 8.
- For R.W., during the week which included January 22 and 23 those were the only days
for which there was no out ring; the same was true for the weeks that included March 8
and March 15.
These types of relationships existed in the other grievants' records as well.
When this recorded information is added to the rest of the evidence, it is not possible to
conclude that the grievants did not knowingly participate in a scheme designed to exploit
one of the weaknesses in the payroll system in order to obtain additional pay.
It is true, as the Union has pointed out, that all of the Company records are not accurate.
Table V shows some of the discrepancies which came to light. The supervisors' Overtime
Equalization Charts, in particular, appear to contain errors. There are other discrepancies,
too, such as the record which shows that J.R. was paid overtime for 12.5 hours on May 6
although the door sheet (which was falsified) "authorized" only 12. There are also some
unanswered questions, such as why J.R. and J.B. were not actually paid for January 21
while F.D. was, although all of their names appeared on the falsified door sheet; or why
J.R. was paid for 4.5 overtime hours for May 16 although the door sheet "authorized" 4
hours.
But these errors and discrepancies do not constitute a sufficient basis for challenging the
overwhelming evidence which is reflected in Table I and described in detail in this Opinion.
When consideration is given to the June door sheets - although payments were stopped - it
becomes even more evident that the grievants were engaging in their activities during the
entire first half of 1986, except for February. Unlike the situation in the preceding case, the
evidence here does demonstrate the kind of oft-repeated pattern which, as held in
Decision M-88, justifies discharge.
The Union's Paragraph (49) contention is not persuasive. A similar argument, as it

happens, was made in M-88 (the provision was then Paragraph (48a)) and the Umpire's
finding there is equally applicable here:
"... the Umpire is not disposed to treat this case as one involving
erroneous and recoverable wages. He sees it as a case involving a
gross act of fraud and he does not believe that Paragraph (48a) was
ever intended to be applied as excusing such conduct."
The Union has suggested that the grievants may have been "framed" because of friction
between the third and first shifts. Farfetched as that may sound, I recognize that truth is
sometimes stranger than fiction. But I have carefully reviewed the voluminous record and
the evidence presented at two long days of hearings and can find no testimony or
documentary evidence to support that theory.
Management's decision to withhold the findings of a handwriting analyst, while

unexplained, does not detract from the conclusions here which are in no way based on
information as to who actually filled out and signed the door sheets in question. Nor has
Management charged any individual grievant or grievants with that act.
In its Umpire Brief the Union asserts that Management breached fundamental principles of
full disclosure and due process by "withholding this information from the Union and only
after the 'Third Step Meeting' was the Union given all copies of information requested."
This was the claim, worded in a slightly different way, which was covered by the
amendments to the grievances that were submitted on July 2, 1986.
In Decision M-36 the Umpire reviewed the line of cases upholding or explaining the
principle of full and immediate disclosure, which included Decisions A-15, A-25, B-29, C-
175, C-204, D-56, E-132, F-53, F-97, F-98, G-12, and G-13. More recent cases are
Decisions T-3, U-2 and U-5.
The Union has referred to Decisions F-97 and T-3 as being particularly relevant. In F-97
the local parties had refused to disclose to each other the names of witnesses to an
altercation, prompting the Umpire to comment that there was no justification "for the
withholding of information by either party from and after the time it is discovered." In T-3
Local Management had obtained a written statement, represented to be a confession, from

a supervisor who had allegedly participated with the aggrieved employee (whose
discharge was being appealed) in a scheme to collect pay for time not worked. At Step 1,
and at all succeeding steps, Management refused to show the statement to the Local
Union or to provide the Union with an opportunity to interview the supervisor.
The situation in the instant case is quite different, however. There was no absolute
withholding of information although, as the evidence discloses, assurances as to when
certain documents would be provided were not fulfilled. The irritation of Union
representatives about delays in receiving information is certainly understandable, as is
their perturbance about the legibility of some documents. But, as the weight (several
pounds) of the material given to the Umpire shows, the documents in these five cases
(along with the companion case) were voluminous, difficult to reproduce, and not easy to
read or comprehend. It was not unreasonable, moreover, for Management to decline to
produce a batch of documents covering months prior to the 1986 period here in question.
There is no evidence, finally, that Management withheld any genuine correction door
sheets covering the days in question. The testimony indicates that none had been found
until February 1987 when preparations were being made for a hearing before another
tribunal (the UC Board); the records were re-examined at that time and two such sheets
turned up. Their contents were not withheld from the Union. Under all the circumstances,
then, the grievances will be denied.
DECISION
Grievances Nos. 680801, 680802, 680803, 680804 and 680805 are denied.
Arthur Stark
Umpire
No. U-10
November 28, 1988
Discharge;
Paragraph 64(d) of the National Agreement
Decision U-10 is to be considered a Memorandum Decision under the provisions of

Paragraph (46a) of the 1987 GM-UAW National Agreement.
T. E. Utter
ARBITRATION
GRIEVANCE:
I strongly protest mgmt contractually terminating me for alleged viol of Para 64D of the
N/A. I am innocent of the above charge inasmuch I did have proper verification for all time I
was absent from the plant. I therefore demand full redress.
Signed: Melvin Bell
Dated: 11-22-85
AMEND TO READ: Omit the word "contractually" from the body of the grievance.
In the Matter of:
General Motors Corporation, Truck & Bus Group, Baltimore, Maryland, Employer
and
file://C:\Users\bobology\AppData\Local\Temp\Framework\u-010_13BF97A4.htm 3/22/2011
Appeal Case U-298
International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace, and Agricultural Implement Workers of

American, Local Union 239, Union.
I. APPEARANCES
On Behalf of the Employer On Behalf of the Union
Mr. Ronald E. Newton Mr. Henderson Slaughter
Mr. Carl V. Matzelle Mr. Jack Brown
Labor Relations Umpire and Review Section
9-146 GM Building United Automobile Workers
3044 W. Grand Blvd. 8000 East Jefferson
Detroit, MI 48202 Detroit, MI 48214
II. INTRODUCTION
This particular dispute arises due to the termination of the grievant under paragraph 64(d)
of the Collective Bargaining Contract between the parties effective November 13, 1985. At
the time, the grievant, with a seniority date of March 11, 1966, was assigned to the
assembly classification on first shift in the Chassis Department 25 at the employer's Truck
and Bus Plant in Baltimore, Maryland. A grievance was filed protesting this action. Despite
the diligence of the parties, this grievance was not able to be settled through the first three
steps of the grievance procedure. As a result, it was appealed to the impartial umpire in
accordance with Step 4 of the grievance procedure. Your undersigned umpire was jointly
selected by the parties in October of 1988, to hear evidence and render a final and binding
decision. An evidentiary hearing was held on November 7, 1988, at a neutral site in
Baltimore, Maryland. At that time, both parties were ably represented and had the full
opportunity of presenting testimony and exhibits. They presented hearing briefs and
summarized their respective positions. This matter is now ready for decision and award.
III. FACTS
The majority of facts in this case are not in dispute. The grievant was working in the
Assembly classification on the first shift in the Chassis Department at the General Motors
Truck and Bus Section in Baltimore, Maryland. He had a seniority date of March 11, 1966.
His last date of work was October 17, 1985. On the following day, October, 18, 1985, the
grievant reported to the Stem-Ross walk-in clinic and medical surgical center in Essex,
Maryland. On that date, he received a disability certificate which was submitted to the
employer covering the period October 18, 1985, to October 21, 1985 (Exhibit A).
On October 21, 1985, the grievant returned to the clinic and received a second disability
certificate indicating treatment and noting that the grievant should be able to return to work
on October 25, 1985 (Exhibit B). Both of these certificates were given to management of
the employer on October 22, 1985.
The grievant did not report for work on October 25, 1985. Instead, on October 28, 1985,
the grievant was treated by a Doctor Leopoldo Gruss, M.D., of Baltimore, Maryland, who
submitted a disability certificate explaining that the grievant had been under Dr. Gruss'
professional care from October 28, through October 31, 1985 (Exhibit C). This certificate
was given to management on October 29, 1985.
On November 1, 1985, the grievant did not return to work but, instead, was once again
seen by the Stem-Ross walk-in clinic. The grievant presented the disability certificate to
management on November 4, 1985 (Exhibit D). That certificate indicated that the grievant
had been under professional care from November 1, 1985, and should be recovered
sufficiently to return to work on November 4, 1985.
On November 4, 1985, the grievant was, once again, seen by Dr. Leopoldo Gruss, M.D., of
Baltimore, Maryland. A disability certificate was given to management (Exhibit E) stating
that the grievant was under his professional care from November 4, extending to
November 13, 1985, for "contusion of toes, left foot".
Dr. Gruss testified at the hearing. He said that the grievant had been an on and off patient
of his since August of 1983. He testified that he examined the grievant on November 4,
1985. One week prior to that time, the grievant had been complaining about stomach
aches and diarrhea symptoms. On that particular day, the grievant indicated that he had hit
his foot on a couch. Dr. Gruss taped the toes together. At that time, Gruss testified that he
told the grievant that he could go back to work "in a couple of days".
Dr. Gruss identified the certificate that was issued on November 4, 1985, (Exhibit E) as
coming from his office and having been prepared by his receptionist. Dr. Gruss testified
that up to November, 1985, the normal practice was for the patient to tell the receptionist
the dates to be inserted on the disability certificate. According to Gruss, he believed that
the grievant had told her November 4, 1985, through November 13, 1985. Gruss testified
this was contrary to his statement to the grievant that he could go back to work "in a couple
of days".
Gruss explained that, subsequently he received a phone call from a General Motors
representative who asked him about the disability certificate. He explained to the GM
representative that he had only authorized the grievant an additional couple of days of
leave, Gruss, at the GM representative's suggestion, wrote out a new disability certificate
indicating that the grievant was incapacitated from November 4, 1985, only through
November 6, 1985 (Exhibit F). According to Gruss, the grievant should have been capable
of reporting to work on November 6, 1985. Gruss emphasized that, on past occasions

when he had treated the grievant on ten different occasions, he had always told the
grievant when he could return to work. In turn, the grievant would tell the receptionist who
put the dates down on the disability certificate. Because of this particular incident, Gruss
said his present practice now is to go to the desk personally and tell the receptionist
directly what is to be placed on the disability certificate.
On cross-examination, Dr. Gruss admitted that he did not call the grievant to tell him of the
change of disability certificates. Gruss says he did not do so because he was "mad and
upset". According to Gruss, in speaking of the grievant, "he broke a trust we had". Gruss
said he asked his receptionist and she told him that the grievant had told her the dates to
be inserted. As a result, he felt the matter was in the care of General Motors to notify the
grievant. Dr. Gruss acknowledged that he treats a great number of patients for subjective
illnesses. He further acknowledged that his receptionist had authority to sign the disability
certificates for him at the time they were executed.
With this development in the case, GM management attempted to contact the grievant by
sending a Western Union telegram. The message read as follows:
THIS IS YOUR NOTIFICATION, TO REPORT TO WORK ON 11-6-

85. FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THIS NOTICE, OR PRESENT A
SATISFACTORY REASON FOR NOT REPORTING AS
INSTRUCTED, CAN RESULT IN YOUR LOSS OF SENIORITY.
A. G. CROCKETT
EMPLOYMENT SUPERVISOR
G.M. TRUCK AND BUS BALTIMORE
Apparently, Western Union was unsuccessful in delivering the telegram on November 5,

1985. On November 6, however, it did communicate with the grievant's brother, William,
who was staying at the grievant's home. The telegram message was read to William on
that date. The grievant did not report for work between November 6, and November 13.
On November 15, 1985, a disability certificate from the Stem-Ross clinic, on behalf of the
grievant, was received at the plant (Exhibit G). This certificate indicated that the patient
had been under professional care for the period from November 14, 1985 to continue
through November 20, 1985.
Upon receipt of this certificate, a second telegram was dispatched to the grievant. It read
as follows:
IN REGARDS TO THE DOCTOR'S SLIP SUBMITTED TO THE PLANT ON 11-15-85,

PLEASE BE ADVISED YOU HAVE BEEN CONTRACTUALLY TERMINATED UNDER
THE PARAGRAPH 64-d PROVISION OF THE N.A., EFFECTIVE THE END OF THE
PREVIOUS NOTIFICATION TO YOUR ADDRESS OF RECORD. YOU HAVE NO
MEDICAL COVERAGE FROM 11-6-85 THROUGH 11/13/85; NOR DID YOU REPORT
FOR WORK AS YOU WERE INSTRUCTED. IF YOU HAVE ANY QUESTIONS, YOU MAY
CONTACT THE LABOR RELATIONS SECTION. T. M. DEL BELLO, SR. PERSONNEL

ADMINISTRATOR G. M. TRUCK AND BUS BALTIMORE
The telegram was never received because the grievant refused acceptance.
On November 22, 1985, the grievance, which is the subject matter of this proceeding, was
filed on the grievant's behalf.
On November 21, 1985, the grievant was again seen by the Stem-Ross clinic. He received
a disability certificate covering the period from November 14, 1985, through November 29,
1985 (Exhibit H). This certificate was submitted to the Employer on November 25, 1985.
On December 2, 1985, the grievant was given a certificate from the Stem-Ross Clinic
indicating that he was eligible to return to work on December 3, 1985 (Exhibit I). On
December 3, 1985, the grievant reported to the plant and turned in this disability certificate
(Exhibit I). At that time, management representative, Tom Del Bello, explained to the
grievant that his seniority had been broken and his employment terminated. According to
the grievant, he told management that there was a mistake and that he had coverage for
the days in question from Dr. Gruss and later the Stem-Ross clinic and, as a result, he was
not required to report for work.
The grievant, testified in this case that he saw Dr. Gruss on November 4, 1988. At that
time, he complained to Gruss about contusions of the toes. Dr. Gruss taped the toes
together and told him to keep his weight off his foot. According to the grievant, Dr. Gruss
did not give him a specific return to work date. In the past, the nurse had always given him
verification. Upon receiving the note, he read that he was off medically until November 13,
1985.
The grievant emphasized that Dr. Gruss never contacted him after November 4, 1985.
Moreover, he never got word from General Motors to report for work before November 11,
1985. The grievant admitted that his brother told him around November 11, that a phone
call had come in from General Motors telling him to report for work. Later, a letter was sent
from General Motors but the grievant said he refused to accept the receipt of that
document. According to the grievant, the contusion of the toes ailment continued for
approximately six days.
On cross-examination, after questioning, the grievant acknowledged that there were 17

past occasions when he received notices concerning paragraph 64(d) of the labor
agreement.
The grievant acknowledged filing a grievance dated November 22, 1985. After first stating
that he probably signed that grievance on December 3, 1985, the grievant later in his
testimony recalled that it was probably signed on November 22, 1985, at the Union hall. It
was on December 3, 1985, that he became aware of Dr. Gruss' statement concerning his
disability certificate. The grievant said he had his attorney contact Dr. Gruss but that the
Doctor ignored his phone calls. The grievant said he received official notification of his
termination on December 3, 1985. Between November 13, and December 3, 1985, the
grievant said that he had virus and flu problems which kept him from working.
IV. RELEVANT CONTRACTUAL LANGUAGE
Loss of Seniority
(64) Seniority shall be broken for the following reasons:
A. If the employee quits.
B. If the employee is discharged.
D. If the employee fails to return to work within five

working days after being notified to report for work, and
does not give a satisfactory reason, such notice shall be
clear in intent and purpose. A copy of Management's
notification of such loss of seniority will be furnished
promptly to the Chairman of the Shop Committee.
Sick Leave of Absence
(106) Any employee who is known to be ill supported by satisfactory evidence, will be
granted sick leave automatically for the period of continuing disability. Except as otherwise
provided in paragraph (111)(c), seniority of such employees shall accumulate during sick
leave and shall be broken, figured from the date the sick leave started, on the same basis
as provided in Paragraph (64)(e) for laid off employees breaking seniority. Not later than
10 days prior to such loss of seniority, Management will send a letter to the employee's last
known address as shown on the Company records reminding him of the fact that his
seniority is subject to being broken as provided above. A copy of such letter will be
furnished promptly to the Chairman of the Shop Committee. However, failure through
oversight to send the letter to the employee or furnish a copy to the Chairman of the Shop
Committee will not be the basis for any claim.
Leave of Absence for Public Office
(111) All of the above leaves of absence including sick leaves are
granted subject to the following conditions:
(b) Any employee who fails to report for work within three
working days after the date of expiration of the leave,
shall be considered as having voluntarily quit unless he
has a satisfactory reason; provided, however, that in the
case of failure to report for work within three working
days after the expiration of leaves of absence granted
under Paragraphs (104), (105), (109), (109a), (110),
(110a) and (113), and in the case of leaves of absence
granted under Paragraph (106) where Management has
refused to grant a requested-renewal of the leave,
Management will send clear written notification to the
employee's last known address as shown on the

Company records, that his seniority has been broken
and that it can be reinstated if, within three specified
working days after delivery or attempted delivery of such
notice, he reports for work or properly notifies
Management of his absence. A copy of such
Management notification will be furnished promptly to the
Chairman of the Shop Committee. If the employee
complies with the conditions set forth in the notification,
his seniority will be reinstated if it has not otherwise been
broken; however, such reinstatement shall not be
construed as limiting the application to his case of the
Shop Rule regarding absence without reasonable cause.
V. CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES
A. For the Union
The Union first submits that the language of paragraph 64(d) of the Agreement is clear and
that the intent and purpose of this paragraph has been discussed between the parties on
numerous occasions. As a result, the Union submits that paragraph 64(d) is not applicable
in the instant case. The purpose of this paragraph is to permit management to be aware of
the composition of its inactive work force and removed from the rolls employees who
abandoned interest in employment with the Company. This certainly is not the case with
the present grievant.
The Union outlines a history of paragraph 64(d) beginning with its first appearance in the
1940 National Agreement and continuing through 1967 when it was amended to require
the prompt furnishing of copies of notices of loss of seniority to the chairman of the shop
committee. In 1976 the contract and language was amended when the "three working
days" period was increased to "five working days" and specifying that the notice to return
to work must be clear in intent and purpose. The Union points out that, since 1976,
paragraph 64(d) has remained unchanged.
As a result of that contract language, before an employee's seniority can be severed,

several conditions must be present:
There must be a clear written notice to report sent to the employee. This notice must be
sent to the employee's last known address. There must be delivery or attempted delivery of
the notice. The five working day period only begins after the date of notification or delivery
attempt. Finally, the employee must not report for work within five working days and lastly
a satisfactory reason is not provided for the employee's absence.
According to the Union, management did not meet these conditions. First and foremost, it
points out that management had no grounds to send a 64(d) notice. The grievant had
submitted medical statements covering him from October 18, through December 2, 1985,
with the only possible exception of November 13, 1985. These should have been accepted
by management. Yet, on November 5, 1985, management caused a notice to be sent the
grievant. At the very least, the matter should have been treated as management's refusal
to extend the paragraph 106 leave and the procedures specified in paragraph 111(b)
implemented.
Additionally, the Union submits that the notice was not a proper notice and was not
properly delivered. Instead, the message was given to the grievant's brother, William. The
Union also points out that the notice must be clear in purpose and fulfill the requirements of
paragraph 64(d). That notice did not spell out that the grievant had five working days to
report. Instead, it told him to report to work on November 6, 1985. Any prior incidents
involving the grievant and 64(d) notices, is irrelevant to this notice.
The Union also argues that the grievant had a satisfactory reason for not reporting to work.
He had submitted satisfactory medical evidence of his disability. The grievant had never
been advised by his doctor that this coverage had changed. Thus, as far as he was aware,
he was covered.
In summarizing, the Union submits that management violated the National Agreement
between the parties and that, by way of remedy, the grievant's seniority be reinstated along
with all benefits and monies lost.
B. For the Employer
The Employer submits that the grievant's seniority was properly broken pursuant to the
provisions of paragraph 64(d) of the GM - UAW National Agreement. As a result, this is not
a case involving discharge for misconduct, but instead, is a case involving loss of seniority
by reason of failure to comply with contractual obligations. As a result, the Arbitrator is
precluded from setting aside a contractual interpretation on the basis of equity. In making
that determination, the Arbitrator must decide whether the grievant provided a "satisfactory
reason" for his failure to report for work from November 7, through November 13, 1985.
While acknowledging that a legitimate disabling illness or injury constitutes a satisfactory

reason for failing to report for work, the Employer in this case submits that the grievant has
not demonstrated such a condition. It asserts that the Union has the responsibility to show,
beyond a reasonable doubt, that the grievant was, in fact, disabled to the point where he
was physically prevented from complying with the notice to report for work. In this case, the
employer submits that the Union has not met that burden.
The employer mentions several umpire decisions defining the term "satisfactory reason"
within the context of paragraph 64 and 111. In the cases cited, it is necessary for the
grievant to substantiate the claim of illness. Where that has not been accomplished, the
umpires have dismissed the grievances. From all of these cases, the employer submits
that the only question to be answered is whether the grievant was, in fact, disabled to the
point where he could not reasonably have reported as instructed? In this case, the answer
to that question is clearly no. The medical statement noting a return to work of November
13, 1985, was issued in error and was corrected by Dr. Gruss. Gruss testified that he had
personally advised the grievant that he would be able to return to work on November 6,
1985.
The employer asks the umpire to give little weight to the Union argument that management
has always accepted medical statements from employees on face value. In this case, and
as in all others, local management has a legitimate right to verify the authenticity of any
documents submitted. Each case should be dealt with on its own individual merits. In the
past, medical statements have not been mechanically accepted but have been questioned
and investigated where appropriate. Indeed, one such case involves the same grievant.
In this case, the employer submits that paragraph 106 is not applicable inasmuch as the
grievant was not on a sick leave of absence. In addition, paragraph 106 speaks in terms of
any illness being supported by satisfactory evidence. In this case, no such satisfactory
evidence was submitted by the grievant.
In summary, the employer submits that the grievant has failed to demonstrate that he had
a satisfactory reason for failing to report for work between November 7, and November 13,
1985. As a result, paragraph 64(d) was properly applied. It, therefore, requests that the
grievance be dismissed.
VI. ISSUE
1. By applying paragraph 64(d) in this case to terminate the grievant's seniority, did the
employer violate the National Agreement between the parties?
VII. DISCUSSION AND DECISION
Both parties in this case have emphasized to the umpire the importance of precedent in
applying the terms and provisions of the National Agreement. Indeed, there appears to be
an existence of some 2,600 umpire decisions which have been issued over the span of 19
agreements between the parties since their first agreement included arbitration provisions
in 1940. Both parties agree, in particular, that, because of the force of precedent in
contractual termination cases, the Umpire does not have the authority to set aside a
contractual interpretation termination on the basis of equity. The facts determine the
consequence. Those facts necessary to make out such a termination must be clear. If the
facts are established, then the contractual consequence follows (Umpire Decision F13).
With that background, let us now examine the facts in this case.
Up through November 4, 1985, it appears that the grievant had submitted disability
certificates in a timely manner and had documented his absences (Exhibits A through D).
On November 5, 1985, the Employer received a certificate from Dr. Gruss dated November
4, stating that the grievant had been under his professional care from November 4, through
November 13, 1985, for "contusion of toes, left foot" (Exhibit E). It appears that a number
of circumstances made local management curious and skeptical of the grievant's condition.
These factors concerned the grievant's absence from work for a lengthy period of time, the
ambiguity of the medical documentation, the pattern of alternating statements from the
Stem-Ross walk-in clinic and Dr. Gruss' office, and the fact that the statements were being
delivered by unknown, unidentified individuals. Dr. Sessoms, the employer's plant medical
director, also felt that a ten day period for "contusion of the toes" seemed to be excessive.
As has been stated by other umpires in past cases, a doctor certificate raises a certain
presumption of disability. At the same time, it is not to be applied mechanically.
Surrounding circumstances can render a certificate suspicious (See Decisions F-8,
Alexander, and M-84, Vultin) and subject them to investigation. Indeed, at this same
location, the employer in other cases has investigated medical statements.
As a result of its investigation and the statements made by Dr. Gruss, the Employer
concluded that the grievant was malingering and sent a notification via Western Union
telegram to the grievant "to report for work on 11-6-85". It appears that, after an
unsuccessful attempt to deliver the telegram on 11-5-85, it was delivered to the grievant's
address to his brother, William Bell who was staying there. Mr. Bell acknowledged that he
receipted for the telegram message but testified that it wasn't until four or five days later
that he realized that he hadn't told his brother, the grievant. Hence, it was not until
approximately November 11, 1985, that William Bell told the grievant the message to
report for work. Even at that date, the grievant did not report for work or even call the
Employer. Instead, he submitted another disability certificate from the Stem-Ross walk-in
clinic for the period from November 14, 1985, through November 20, 1985, (Exhibit G).
Upon receiving the certificate, the employer sent the grievant a notice of termination under
paragraph 64(d). The grievant refused to accept this message.
In making factual determinations in this case, there obviously are differences and
contradictions in testimony between the various witnesses. In resolving this conflict in
testimony, your umpire normally utilizes the same factors that a judge or jury would use in
assessing credibility. For example, according to one authority:
Among the factors that may be considered in determining the credit

to be given the testimony of a witness are the interests of the
witness in the outcome of the trial, his bias and prejudice, his
opportunity for knowing and recollective the facts about which he
testifies, the probability or improbability of his testimony, and his
demeanor while a witness on the stand, including his appearance,
condition, and attention, his bad memory or inability to recollect, the
character of his testimony, his motive, inconsistent or contradictory
nature of his evidence, his manner of testifying intelligence or lack of
intelligence of the witness, candor or evasiveness of the witness,
and his reputation for veracity. (Conrad, Modern Trial Evidence, Vol.
2 section 1131 (1956).
The Federal Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has also set forth factors that it utilizes in
assessing credibility. According to that court:
In judging the credibility of a witness and determining the weight to

be given to his testimony, the trier of fact may consider the witness'
demeanor and manner while on the stand, the character of his
testimony as being probable or improbable, inconsistencies, patent
omissions and discrepancies in his testimony, or between the

testimony of different witnesses, contradictory testimony, his interest
in the outcome of the case, his relationship to the litigants, and
many other factors bearing upon the truthfulness or untruthfulness
of the witness' testimony. As stated in Mitsugi Nishikawa v Dulles, 9
Cir., 235 F.2d 135, at page 140, reversed on other grounds 356
U.S. 129, 78 S. Ct. 612, 2 L.Ed2d 659:
The trier of fact need not accept the uncontradicted testimony of a

witness who appears before it, and the demeanor of that witness
may be such as to convince the trier that the truth lies directly
opposed to the statement of the witness. N.L.R.B. v Howell
Chevrolet Co., 9 Cir., 204 F.2d 79, 86 affirmed sub nom; Howell
Chevrolet Co., v N.L.R.B., 346 U.S. 482, 74 S.Ct. 214, 98 L.Ed. 215;
Chow Sing v Brownell, 9 Cir. 217 F.2d 140, 142; Lew Wah Fook v
Brownell, 9 Cir. 218 F.2d 924; Mar Gong v Brownell, 9 Cir. 209 F.2d
448, 449, 450; Wigmore on Evidence, Third Ed., Vol. VII, section
0234 n. 3; Zimmer v Acheson, 10 Cir. 191 F.2d 209, 212. This rule
is particularly true where the witness is interested in the outcome of
the case, or where his testimony is improbable or contains patent
omissions and inconsistencies. (270 F.2d 338 at 341 (9th Cir. 1959).
Consistency between earlier statements and those made during the hearing will tend to
strengthen credibility of a witness, while inconsistency will tend to weaken his credibility.
(Patient Rights - Employee Rights: A Credibility Study "Who to Believe and Why"
McDonald and Daniel, 1987, Detroit College of Law Review, at page 662).
In this case, your umpire had the opportunity to observe the witnesses as they testified.
Frankly, I have some difficulty crediting Mr. William Bell and his testimony. Despite
receiving a message notifying his brother to report the following day and indicating that
failure to comply with this notice could result in a loss of his seniority, Bell said it slipped his
mind to give his brother the message. At the same time, he acknowledged, on cross-
examination that he considered the message important. Yet, he further said he did not
even leave a note for his brother. I do not regard that testimony as being creditable. In
keeping with the past precedent of the parties, November 6, 1985, is determined to be the
effective date of the notice to the grievant (Umpire Decisions F-8, Alexander, and E-140,
Seward).
In this case, the Union, in effectively representing the grievant, raised several points to be
considered. As the Union points out, its chief point is that management did not have
grounds to send out a 64(d) notice. The Union submits that, as the grievant had submitted
satisfactory evidence of his disability, for the period from November 4, 1985, through
November 13, 1985, management had no basis to send out the 64(d) notification. It
submits that the paragraph is only applicable in cases of employees who have abandoned
work or are inactive employees such as being on layoffs. It distinguishes this procedure at
under paragraph 111(b) of the National Agreement. In doing so, it cites the umpire to
Decision M-62. In that decision, Umpire Valtin pointed out that paragraph 64(d) is mainly
directly to layoff situations. In those situations, the employee has no advance knowledge of
when he will be coming back to work.
I have no difficulty with Umpire Valtin's decision. It appears that paragraph 64(d) is mainly
directed to layoff situations. At the same time, this is not exclusively the case. For example,
in case Q-3, (Stark) the grievant, a recovering alcoholic, was absent for several days for
"personal reasons". In that case, Umpire Stark said, "Each dispute, whether it concerns a
disciplinary action or a paragraph 64 termination must be decided on its own facts". He did
decide in that case that the grievant was suffering from "acute alcoholism" during the
period covered by paragraph 64(d) notice and that, as a result, that notice would not be
applied in that situation.
In Case P-49 (Stark) the grievant was on sick leave as a result of being hit on the head
and shoulders by a falling panel. In that case, the same umpire ruled that the grievant was
disabled from work on the three days in question that she received the 64(d) notice and,
hence, had a satisfactory reason for not reporting. Umpire Stark significantly did not rule
that paragraph 64(d) was not applicable but that the grievant had a satisfactory reason for
not reporting.
In Decision G-193, (Alexander) the grievant had been given an indefinite disciplinary
suspension and went deer hunting. A 64(d) notice had been sent to the grievant ordering
him to report for work. In his decision, while the umpire concluded paragraph 64(d) to be
applicable, he found that the grievant reported to work within the allotted time.
The same Umpire Alexander, in case F-13, ruled that the grievant, by being confined to a
jail, had a satisfactory reason for not reporting to work. Once again, the Umpire recognized
that paragraph 64(d) was applicable but that the grievant had met the "satisfactory reason"
basis for not reporting for work.
Finally, in Decision F-8, Arbitrator Alexander found that the grievant, who was on a sick
leave of absence, was properly given a 64(d) notification to report for work inasmuch as
the sick leave did only extend to the point where the employee was, in fact, ill and unable
to work.
These cases and others (Umpire Decision M-67) convince your Arbitrator to conclude that,
while paragraph 64(d) is mainly used to notify employees on layoff status to report for
work, it can also be used for other situations including employees who are on sick or on
disability status. In such situations the Employer would have to demonstrate probable
cause for notifying the employee to report to work.
While certainly the grievant's illness could be covered under paragraph 106 and his
termination under paragraph 111, this does not appear to be the exclusive remedy open to
the employer in a circumstance such as the one presently before this umpire. Moreover, a
"satisfactory reason" test is utilized in that situation as well.
Having concluded that paragraph 64(d) can be utilized in the factual situation in this case,
the issue remains whether the grievant did provide a "satisfactory reason" for his failure to
report to work after receiving notification to report on November 6, 1985. The Union
submits that the doctors' certificates demonstrate satisfactory reason for the grievant not
reporting to work in the days in question. Yet, the fact is that these disability certificates
only raise a presumption of disability and are not conclusive on that point. Indeed, Dr.
Gruss testified that the grievant should have been able to return to work on November 6,
1985. In keeping with past precedent, a grievant's leave would automatically be extended
only where the employee is, in fact, ill and unable to work.
In this case, it appears that after November 6, 1985, the grievant should have been able to
work. No evidence was submitted by the grievant demonstrating that he was, indeed,
disabled or was unavailable to work. Obviously, he was ambulatory inasmuch as he was
not home on several days when delivery of the telegram was attempted. The grievant
could provide no reason why he did not report for work or, at the very least, communicate
with his supervisor for the period from November 6, 1985, through November 13, 1985.
Indeed, it seems incredulous that an employee, having received notification to report for
work, would not at least be curious enough to inquire as to why he received such a
notification. Instead, it appears that the grievant was attempting to avoid any and all
contact with the employer except upon his terms. This is further substantiated by the fact
that the grievant refused delivery of a later communication terminating his employment on
November 15, 1985. Once again, no reason was given by the grievant for refusing
acceptance of any messages from his employer. All of this occurs in the context of the
grievant being quite experienced with 64(d) notices.
At the arbitration hearing, the Union raised several other contentions. These included the
allegation that the notice of November 5, 1985, was not a proper notice and was not
properly delivered. The Union submitted that the notice did not spell out clearly that the
grievant had five working days to report for work. The Employer objected to these
contentions as being brand new and not being mentioned in the previous steps of the
grievance procedure. Your Umpire took this argument under advisement and indicated that
a decision concerning that matter would be made in this written decision.
Both of the parties were in agreement that the case, which is submitted to the umpire, may
not properly contain issues which have not previously been discussed by the parties in the
previous steps of the grievance procedure. As Umpire Stark ruled in Decision P-52:
The fourth step evidence rule is designed to prevent last minute

surprises and to insure that each party has an opportunity to
evaluate the other's facts and arguments and obtain and place
rebuttal information in the record before coming to the umpire
hearing.
In this case, I have carefully reviewed the previous steps of the grievance procedure
including the minutes and each party's respective statement of the unadjusted grievances.
With that review, I do agree with the employer that the Union did not raise either point that
the notice of November 5, 1985, was improper as to form and content or was not properly
delivered to be sure.
The Union further argues, however, that language of paragraph 64(d) clearly indicates that
the notice "... shall be clear in intent and purpose" and further mentions notification to the
employee. The language of paragraph 64(d) is clear and does mention those elements. At
the same time, if the Union felt that the notice was improper or was not properly delivered,
these points should have been specifically raised in the earlier steps of the grievance
procedure. A review of those minutes does not demonstrate any discussion of these
matters at all. Your Umpire also notes that, approximately one month before the Umpire
hearing, the parties held a supplementary third step meeting on October 5, 1988, and
again on October 12, 1988. At that time, the Union did amend its "statement of an adjusted
grievance" to include additional information. That information, however, pertained to a past
practice of the Employer accepting rubber stamped doctor verifications. Significantly,
nothing was mentioned about either a proper notice being sent to the grievant or not being
properly delivered. As a result, in keeping with past precedent, it is necessary for the
umpire to sustain the objection raised by the employer. In this way, the fourth step rule will
be preserved (See Umpire's Decision E-303, Alexander, G-16, Alexander, and P-58,
Stark).
The Union argues that, even assuming for argument purposes that paragraph 64(d) is
applicable, the grievant met the "satisfactory reason" aspect of that paragraph. It points to
the medical evidence submitted by the grievant in this case. Moreover, it mentions that the
grievant was never advised that his coverage was changed by the doctor.
Your Arbitrator has carefully considered these matters and arguments. Obviously, this is a
serious matter involving a person's livelihood and 20 years of seniority. This fact is not to
be taken lightly. At the same time, the direct testimony of Dr. Gruss is quite telling in this
case. Dr. Gruss testified that, when the grievant saw him on November 4, 1985, the
grievant had complained about stomach aches and diarrhea. Gruss said he told the
grievant that those symptoms did not appear to be of sufficient seriousness to prevent him
from working. At that point, the grievant then switched to a different tact and told him about
the "contusions of the toes on his left foot". Dr. Gruss said he examined the toes, taped
them, and told the grievant, unequivocally, that he could go back to work "in a couple of
days". More specifically, Gruss told the grievant that he could go back to work November
6, 1985.
Gruss further testified that, despite this direct communication to the grievant, it appears
that the grievant told his receptionist to make out a slip extending his disability until
November 13, 1985. Gruss believed that this was a breaking of the trust "that we had".
Significantly, the grievant did not directly refute this statement of Dr. Gruss despite being
present and having the opportunity to do so. The grievant testified only that Dr. Gruss did
not give him a specific return to work date. By this statement, was the grievant agreeing
that Gruss told him a "couple of days"? Moreover, if no specific dates were mentioned how
did November 13, 1985, get on the disability slip (Exhibit E). Considering all of these
matters including credibility, I do not find that the grievant substantiated his claim that he
could not report to work as directed.
The Union makes the point, however, that the grievant was never advised of the change in
coverage by his doctor. To be sure, this is quite true. I agree with the Union that Dr. Gruss
should have notified his patient of this significant change. At the same time, this precise
point appears to be a dispute between the grievant and his doctor's actions and not one
directly involving the employer. Indeed, the employer in this case did notify the grievant to
return to work or present a satisfactory reason for not reporting. Certainly, the grievant
would have learned of this change of events had he followed that direction and reported.
Even if he had called, the grievant would have learned of the new or changed disability
certificate. Thus, the grievant must bear much of the responsibility through his own inaction
for this turn of events.
In summary, I do conclude that the grievant did not substantiate his claim of illness and did
not demonstrate a "satisfactory reason" for not reporting to work as instructed.
AWARD
The grievance, being without merit, is dismissed.
Respectfully submitted,
Patrick A. McDonald
Dated: November 28, 1988
No. U-11
March 24, 1989
Violation of Local and National Agreements
Paragraph 56
Improper Layoff of Seniority Employees
In the Matter of:
General Motors Corporation, Saginaw Division, Saginaw Plants, Employer,
and
Appeal Case: U-33
International Union United Automobile Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of

America, Local 699, Saginaw, Michigan, Union.
DECISION AND AWARD
I. STATEMENT OF THE GRIEVANCE
Grievance 084165
Charge management with violation of the Local and National Agreements. Management
laid off employees with over 30 days seniority on Friday, 8/30/85 and hired other
employees September 3rd, 1985. Demand management return all these employees with
30 days or more to work and they be made whole in all respects including all benefits.
II. APPEARANCES
On Behalf of the On Behalf of the Union
file://C:\Users\bobology\AppData\Local\Temp\Framework\u-011_13BFA828.htm 3/22/2011
Employer
James W. LaLonde, Esq. Mr. Norman Acord
Mr. Ronald E. Newton Mr. Jerry Coville
Mr. P.J. McDonald Mr. Jack Brown
Labor Relations United Automobile

Workers
9-146 General Motors
Bldg. 8000 East Jefferson
3044 West Grand Blvd. Detroit, MI 48214
Detroit, MI 48202
III. INTRODUCTION
The grievance, which is the subject matter of this proceeding, was filed on September 6,
1985, and alleges that the employer violated the Local and National Agreements by laying
off 189 employees with over 30 days seniority while hiring 168 employees between the
period of September 3, 1985, through September 16, 1985. The third step meeting in this
case was held on November 1, 1985, and Notice of Appeal of the case to the umpire was
dated November 22, 1985. The case was then referred back to the second step on May
16, 1986. A new third step meeting was held on February 20, 1987. The matter was then
reappealed to the umpire on the date of March 24, 1987. On June 15, 1987, the parties
mutually agreed to refer the case back to the second step of the grievance procedure for
repair of the record. A third step appeal meeting was held on April 21, 1988, and the case
was reappealed, once again, to the umpire on May 27, 1988.
Thereafter, an evidentiary hearing was held before your undersigned Umpire on February
27, 1989, at a neutral site in Saginaw, Michigan. At that time, both parties were ably
represented and had the full opportunity of presenting testimony and exhibits. In accord
with the practice of the parties, they submitted post-hearing briefs and thereafter
summarized their respective positions. This matter is now ready for decision and award.
IV. FACTS
The Saginaw Division of General Motors is engaged in the manufacture and sale of
automotive components to General Motors divisions as well as to outside customers. The
divisions headquarters are in Saginaw, Michigan, where it operates six plants throughout
the City employing, at the time the grievance arose, approximately 8,000 employees
represented by the UAW. The division also operates facilities in Alabama, Detroit, New
York, England and Spain.
Both parties agree that this case began in April and May of 1985. At that time, according to
management, it conducted an analysis of its workforce needs for the Saginaw area for the
upcoming summer months. It considered such elements as increased employee vacations,
projected volumes, and overtime. According to management, overtime levels were high
and the peak summer vacation period was approaching. However, the vehicle build
requirements that were forecast indicated an anticipated reduction in the level production
beginning in late summer of that year. Management considered various options and
decided that employment should be increased for the summer months of 1985.
Both parties acknowledge that there were no General Motors employees on layoff from the
Saginaw Division's bargaining unit and no employees on layoff within the Saginaw area
hire pool as of May and June, 1985. The employer points out, however, that there were
approximately 18,000 UAW represented GM employees on indefinite layoff across the
United States. According to management, they felt that these openings were only to be
temporary for the summer of 1985, Local UAW Region 1-D Servicing Representative, Jack
Laskowski, and Shop Chairman, Jack Campbell, were approached about hiring temporary
summer help at the Saginaw location for the summer of 1985. According to the Union,
Laskowski and Campbell told GM management that they should look at the former GM
employees who had lost all contractual rehire rights at GM and who had been through the
retraining program located at the UAW-GM training center in Saginaw, Michigan, as
possible hires.
On approximately May 24, 1985, John M. Schnepf, Saginaw Division's General Supervisor
of Labor Relations, received a letter from Mr. B. P. Crane, Jr., entitled, "Employment of
Former GM Employees" (Attachment 2). The May 24, 1985, communication indicated that
an understanding had been reached between GM and the UAW with respect to
employment of former GM employees. That understanding was spelled out in that
communication.
Hiring of the new employees began on June 3, 1985, with 24 employees being hired. Of
that group, 21 were people who had lost their rehire rights. On June 10, 1985, 95 other
employees were hired. Of these, 91 had no rehire rights. On June 17, 1985, 112 people
were hired. 110 had no rehire rights. Finally, on June 24, 1985, 62 people were hired with
57 having no rehire rights. This totaled 293 with 279 being former GM employees with
rehire rights having expired. Such new employees were hired at the "new hire" wage rate
as provided in the May 24, Crane communication (Attachment 2).
According to management, all of the new hires were told by the Saginaw Regional
Personnel Center representatives that the offer of employment was temporary only for 89
days or less. This orientation occurred at a joint meeting conducted by employment
coordinator Michael O. Clayton and various UAW Local 699 benefit representatives. As the
employees began work, however, the Union maintains that a number of employees were
told by management that they would be seniority employees if they worked hard and
showed up every day.
During the regular management-union shop committee meeting of June 20, 1985, attended
by both Messrs. Schnepf and Campbell, the parties discussed the status of the employees
who had been hired for the summer months. The minutes of that meeting include in
relevant part the following:
Management then informed the Union that the 89th day for temporarily-hired hourly
employees would be August 30, 1985, for those hired on June 3, 1985. Therefore, the
layoffs of all the temporaries will be no later than August 30, 1985. The Union stated that
Management should not layoff those temporary employees with 89 days of seniority and
then hire new employees off the street to take their place.
Management informed the Union that the Appendix 'A' rehire pool will begin to fill up
beginning in late summer and early fall. CPC in Bay City intends to begin layoffs at that
time. The Union then suggested that Management inform the media of the fact that these
employees are only temporary. This will avoid panic in the community when they are
subsequently laid off.
On Friday, June 21, 1985, the Saginaw Division's Newsletter (Attachment 6) carried an
article with the following excerpt:
Summer Replacements
The 230 employees hired at SSG Saginaw Operations over the past three weeks; along
with 50 production employees who will join the division Monday; are working as temporary
summer replacement help, according to SSG's Hourly Employment section.
Clarifying a Newsletter story published yesterday, section officials said these employees
will work a maximum of 89 days as summer replacements, and will then return to their
former status.
SSG employees hired over the past three weeks and those scheduled to be hired this
summer are former Saginaw area GM employees who have lost seniority and rehire rights.
In the late summer of 1985, Management experienced previously unforecasted increases

in vehicle built requirements for the September-November period.
On July 29, 1985, approximately 38 employees of the Chevrolet-Pontiac-Cadillac Group's

Bay City plant were placed into the area hire pool for employment consideration by other
General Motors facilities within the area including Saginaw Division-Saginaw Plants. In
addition, other employees floated into the Saginaw area Appendix A pool.
The minutes of the Shop Committee meeting of August 29, 1985, received into evidence
(Attachment 7) indicate that the parties discussed the layoff of the employees who had
been hired for the summer period. At that time, management also discussed the planned
hiring of employees from the area hire pool to fill the long-term employment needs of the
division. Relevant excerpts from those minutes are quoted:
Rehires
Management informed the Union that it will soon terminate the employment of the 89-day
temporary employees and any further openings will be filled by rehires from the Appendix
'A' pool. Management further informed the Union of the International Union's dissatisfaction
with this practice throughout the Corporation.
Rehires for 9/3/85
Management informed the Union that Bay City CPC did not layoff as many employees as
they earlier had anticipated, but the forecast from both CPC and the foundry is that
approximately 220 layoffs will occur in the next few months (in addition to the 166
employees recently laid off).
Between July 22, and August 26, 1985, 79 of the above-referenced employees were laid
off with the remaining 189 being laid off as of August 30, 1985. Those lay-offs occurred as
follows:
Date Employees Laid Off
7-22-85 1
7-26-85 22
7-27-85 35
7-29-85 2
8-2-85 1
8-4-85 12
8-5-85 2
8-24-85 2
8-25-85 1
8-26-85 1
8-30-85 189
At that time, the Union protested the fact that such summer employees, with over 30 days
seniority, were to be laid off while management, at the same time, was giving Appendix A
employees physicals to begin working. Indeed, management acknowledges that between
September 3, and September 16, 1985, 168 employees were hired from the area hire pool
according to the following schedule:
DATE NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES

9/3/85 73
9/9/85 17
9/16/85 78
TOTAL 168
___
The only witness at the hearing was Mr. Larry E. Knox, a Labor Relations Supervisor with
23 years experience with General Motors. After testifying as to his extensive background
with the Company in Labor Relations with various plants, Mr. Knox testified that he was
present in national negotiations in 1984, and 1987. In addition, Saginaw was under his
responsibility for liaison purposes with the Union.
During his testimony, Mr. Knox identified document 16 which was found in the 1984
National Agreement Booklet (Attachment 4). According to Knox, document 16 enabled GM
to leave employees with seniority at other plants and not have to bring such employees to
a plant solely for temporary jobs.
Mr. Knox testified that in the spring of 1985, he reviewed with Mr. Robert Walker, the
Administrative Assistant to Vice President Donald Ephlin of the Union, a draft of what was
to become Mr. B. P. Crane, Jr.'s letter of May 24, 1985 (Attachment 2). Mr. Knox explained
that, under usual circumstances, paragraph 98B of the National Agreement would be
required regarding higher wages. That paragraph was waived. Moreover, no GATB testing
would be required.
Mr. Knox also identified a letter from Mr. Walker from Mr. Byron P. Crane, Jr., dated May
16, 1986, with an attached April 28, 1986, letter (Company Exhibits 1A and 1B). Identified
during the testimony was Company Exhibit 2 which was a memorandum of Agreement
dated April 10, 1987, between Mr. Robert Walker and the witness Mr. Knox. According to
Knox, this memorandum provided the groundwork for Appendix D-2 of the 1987 agreement
(Attachment 8).
On cross-examination, Mr. Knox was asked whether paragraph 56 of the National

Agreement was waived in either Attachment 8 or 9. Mr. Knox acknowledged that it was not
mentioned or waived by those documents.
V. RELEVANT CONTRACTUAL LANGUAGE -- SENIORITY
Acquiring Seniority
(56) Employees shall be regarded as temporary employees until their names have been
placed on the seniority list. There shall be no responsibility for the reemployment of
temporary employees if they are laid off or discharged during this period. However, any
claim by a temporary employee hired with unbroken seniority at any other General Motors
plant covered by this Agreement, rehired pursuant to Paragraph (64)(e), or any claim by
any other temporary employee made after 30 days of employment, that his layoff or
discharge is not for cause may be taken up as a grievance.
(57) Employees may acquire seniority by working ninety days during a period of six
continuous months in which event the employee's seniority will date back ninety days from
the date seniority is acquired; provided, however, that employees hired with unbroken
seniority at any other General Motors Plant covered by this Agreement or rehired pursuant
to Paragraph (64)(e) may acquire seniority by working thirty days during a period of six
continuous months in which event the employee's seniority will date back thirty days from
the date seniority is acquired except as provided in Appendix D-1. (See Also Appendix D).
WAGES
(98b) New employees hired on or after the effective date of this Agreement, who do not
hold a seniority date in any General Motors plant but were formerly employed and had
acquired seniority in a General Motors plant and who had broken such seniority pursuant
to the provisions of Paragraph (64) (e) or (64) (f) (3), shall receive a base rate upon re-
employment which has the same relative position to the maximum base rate of the job
classification as had been attained by the employee in his prior General Motors
employment. Such employee shall continue to be covered by the rate progression
provisions in effect during his prior General Motors employment. Upon such re-
employment, the credited rate progression period of the employee's prior period of
employment at General Motors shall be applied toward his rate progression to the
maximum base rate of the job classification.
VI. CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES
A. For General Motors
According to management, the facts regarding the merits of the case are not basically in
dispute. The employees in question were hired for 89 days or less. They were told this.
These employees were laid off prior to completing 89 days of work. The employer
acknowledges that there is some dispute as to whether some of these employees were
told they were permanent or temporary in duration. The fact is, however, that under
paragraph 56, the employer contends that it has demonstrated "for cause" in laying off
these employees.
Contrary to the Union assertion that the only satisfactory "causes" for the layoff are 1)
employee conduct or 2) decreases in production and associated work force reductions, the
employer submits that there are other basic reasons as well. First was the realization that
employment to handle production requirements was projected to be long-term. As a result,
there were economic benefits to the corporation to place employees back to work for
whom the corporation was incurring expenses associated with their layoff, and continuing
benefit coverages but receiving no work. This was an obviously better alternative than
continuing the temporary summer employees past their 89th work day. Thus, it was a
major economic benefit to the Corporation to lay off one group of temporary employees
and bring back to work another group of laid off employees. Between the two groups, the
equities are obviously with the laid off employees who had seniority being brought back to
work. Moreover, the Corporation had fulfilled its obligation and the legitimate expectations
of the temporarily hired summer employees as of August 30, 1985.
The Employer points out that Decision E-81 merely stands for the proposition that the sex
of an employee by itself is not "cause" for layoff. It is clearly distinguishable from this set of
facts.
The Employer asks the rhetorical question, why did the Union only object on the Local
level and not on a corporate level? Was it because the International had an understanding
with the Corporation at that level?
The Employer also asks a second question and that is why the 1987 memorandums and
agreements did not deal with the same paragraph 56 if this paragraph was not, indeed,
waived. The negotiators were veterans and experienced and knew that they had covered
paragraph 56.
The Employer asks the Arbitrator to review paragraph 56 along with other documents
including Appendix D-1 and D-2 and other documents attached to that agreement. They
submit that paragraph 56 should not be taken in isolation.
The Employer points out that the Union in this case presented no witnesses. In the
absence of such evidence by the Union, it submits that it has presented a prima facie case.
As a result, the rievance should be
dismissed if one looks at the total record.
B. For the UAW
The Union contends that it has demonstrated a clear violation of paragraph 56 in this case.
In reviewing the various cases presented to umpires regarding "for cause" and paragraph
56, they are reducible to basically two reasons. The first was that the layoffs were due to a
reduction in force or the need to cut manpower because of lack of consumer demand for
the products or parts. The second is that the grievants were severed from employment
because of a demonstrated incompetence to do the work. Neither has management
claimed that the grievant's severance was disciplinary in action or in violation of some shop
rule that would be serious enough to warrant discharge.
Instead, the Company submits that the layoff was solely due to favor one category of
employees at the expense of another. Under the precedent of Umpire Decision E-81, this
type of decision violates the National Agreement. In that case, the Umpire directed
reinstatement.
The Union also asks the Arbitrator to review Appendix A and documents 21 and 28. These
provisions, according to the Union, show that employees are hired to openings. There
were no open positions in the present case. While the Company cites economic reasons
for making these decisions, the fact is that the Company must meet contractual
requirements before it can make legitimately make such decisions. The contract
requirements are important. Nowhere has the Union waived the requirement that
paragraph 56 not be followed. Hence, it must be enforced by the Arbitrator who is
governed by the Contract. It is also clear that management cannot nullify the terms of the
National Agreement with the Union by statements or promises made to individual
employees at the time of their hire (Umpire Decision B-103).
The Union also disputes the contention that UAW, Region 1-D representative, Jack
Laskowski, and Shop Chairman, Jack Campbell, agreed to employees only being hired for
89 days and waiving the provisions of the National Agreement. This simply didn't occur.
Indeed, the document of May 24, 1985, does not waive paragraph 56 (Attachment 2). Even
if Campbell and Laskowski wished to do so, they would be prohibited from entering into
any agreement that supersedes or conflicts with a provision of the National Agreement.
Appendix A is quite clear. It states that such Appendix A employees will be given hiring
preference over other applicants. It does not give them bumping rights over lower seniority
employees or non-seniority employees.
According to the Union, Umpire Decision R-2 is distinguishable. It arose in a state where
days were holidays.
In summary, the Union submits that paragraph 56 of the National Agreement should be
upheld and enforced. If the Employer had wished to have the parties waive paragraph 56,
then certainly they would have made a determined effort to do so. This has not been
demonstrated. The Union, therefore, requests that the Arbitrator follow 50 years of
precedent and sustain the grievance and grant the remedy as requested.
VII. ISSUES
1. Whether the August 30, 1985, layoffs of non-seniority employees at the

Saginaw Division, Saginaw Plants was "for cause" within the meaning of
paragraph 56 of the 1984 GM-UAW National Agreement.
2. If not, what shall the remedy be.
VIII. DISCUSSION AND DECISION
As both parties acknowledge, most of the facts surrounding this grievance are not in
dispute. I say "most" as there are a few important matters that are still in dispute. However,
both parties agree that paragraph 56 of the GM-UAW National Agreement is the language
being interpreted in this case.
By way of background, as stated at the evidentiary hearing, it appears that the language of
Paragraph 56, presently in the National Agreement, first made its appearance in the
National Agreement in 1945 when the War Labor Board issued a directive to the parties
amending paragraph 56 to read as it now does. The phrase "for cause" was removed from
the National Agreement for a seven year period from 1948 through 1955. However, in
1955, the phrase was placed back into that section so that it read as it originally did when it
was inserted in the National Agreement in 1945.
This background is important because, in 1947, in Umpire Decision E-83, the Umpire
interpreted the "for cause" language in Section 56. Therefore, when this language was
placed back into the National Agreement in 1955, both parties had a good indication as to
how it would be interpreted.
In Decision E-81, Umpire Seward concluded that the "for cause" language included not
only disciplinary discharges but also layoffs involving bona fide reductions in force and
changes in operating methods or processes.
In Decision E-81, a large number of temporary female employees were replaced by male
employees. In that case, management claimed that the replacement of the females by
males would increase plant efficiency. The Umpire rejected that contention holding that
"good cause" for the severance of those complainants did not exist.
A second opinion interpreting paragraph 56 was the Decision N-67 by Umpire Valtin in July
of 1973. Umpire Valtin read Decision E-81 as standing for the proposition that, ... it was a
holding that not every reason advanced in support of the discharge of a probationary
employee - even a reason which does not have the defect of being plain arbitrary or
capricious - can be countenanced as adding up to 'cause' under paragraph 56.
At the same time, Umpire Valtin distinguished between "for cause" under paragraph 56
and "for cause" under paragraph 8, the discharge or discipline "for cause" section of the
agreement. Umpire Valtin used a balancing approach.
Basically, Valtin ruled that, once a probationary employee has reached the 30 day point,
but before he has completed the 90 day probationary period, Management must
demonstrate more "cause" than it did in Umpire Decision E-81 but less than it normally
does in demonstrating "cause" under paragraph 8 of the Agreement for discipline and
discharge. He illustrated this by example as he stated:
The Umpire is holding for the Company in the present case. He

agrees with the Union that not every illness or other incapacitation
which may be incurred by an employee during his or her
probationary period can serve to add up to 'cause' under paragraph
(56) - consider such clearly one - shot afflictions as a broken leg or
an appendectomy... in her (grievant's) case, there were a series of
ailments... and even assuming no factual difficulties as to any of the
asserted ailments, the ailments were so frequent as to reduce D to a
practically on again, off again employee and as to legitimately cause
Management to believe that the reservation expressed by the
Medical Department... should have been heeded.
As a result of this decision, (N-67), it would appear that the phrase "for cause", which
exists in paragraph 8, does not have the same exact meaning in paragraph 56. It would
also appear that there may be other "for cause" reasons than a layoff due to a reduction in
force, discipline for violation of a shop rule serious enough to warrant discharge or
demonstrated incompetence. Indeed, under Umpire Decision N-67, Management was not
able to demonstrate any of those three categories. What it did do was demonstrate that the
grievant's attendance record, while not serious enough to be "just cause" under paragraph
8, of the agreement was sufficient to demonstrate "for cause" under paragraph 56 as a
poor employment risk.
Having said that, however, both Umpire Seward and Umpire Valtin agreed that the burden
of demonstrating "for cause" under paragraph 56 is still upon Management.
With this background, then, let us examine the arguments of the parties as applied to this
set of facts. First and foremost, Management contends that when the grievants were hired,
they were told that their employment was only temporary. The Union is correct in stating
that, regardless of what Management told the individual employees, they could not,
through this simple device, nullify the terms of the National Agreement which might be to
the contrary (See Umpire Decision B-103, Dash, 1942). By the same token, merely
because some of the grievants were told that they were hired on a permanent basis would
likewise not nullify the terms of the National Agreement if such terms were contradictory.
The Employer emphasized that an agreement was reached with UAW Region 1-D
Servicing Representative Jack Laskowski and Shop Chairman Jack Campbell concerning
the hiring of such employees for a period of up to 89 days. No such written agreement was
mentioned in the earlier steps of the grievance procedure and none was forthcoming at the
evidentiary hearing. Instead, a communication from Mr. B. P. Crane, Jr., dated May 24,
1985, to all Personnel Directors, Labor Relations Directors, and Plant Personnel Directors,
appeared to embody the basic understanding between the parties (Attachment 2). That
communication indicated that directors were "... encouraged to hire former employees who
at one time acquired seniority at any GM plant and thereafter lost reemployment (rehire)
rights...." In doing so, directors were told that, "No GATB testing will be required" and that
"The provisions of paragraph (98b) are waived". Further, plants were encouraged to give
primary consideration to "... such employees who have participated in joint GM-UAW
training programs."
Significantly, paragraph 56 of the GM-UAW National Agreement is not mentioned or

waived. Your Umpire can, to some extent, understand how this occurred. As Management
indicated in its Step 3 statement, the level of overtime hours worked from January, 1985,
through May, 1985, was one of the factors which, "... prompted management to review
employment requirements and to consider increasing the level of employment". At that
time, according to Management, the vehicle build schedules forecasting the build
requirements for the August through November, 1985, period projected that the level of
business would diminish at the end of the summer months....
The vehicle build forecast was attached as part of the record. The conclusion Management
drew was this:
Because of the anticipated decline in vehicle build requirements,

Management concluded employment levels should be increased
only for the summer months.
Hence, it would appear that Management felt, at that time, in accord with those build
forecasts, that a workforce reduction at the conclusion of the summer would be in order.
With this occurring, management would be able to fulfill the "for cause" provisions in
paragraph 56.
The forecasted vehicle schedule changed considerably, however, as the economy in 1985,
began to rise. As a result of vehicle schedule forecast increases for the September through
November, 1985, time period, it appeared to Management that the Saginaw Division, ...
had long-term employment opportunities which needed to be filled. Based on the
contractual requirements of Appendix A, Management offered employment to employees
who had been placed in the Saginaw area hire pool. (Page 7 of Management's statement,
Third Step)
Management, in this case, contends that the "for cause" requirements of paragraph 56
were complied with because of the decision to handle production requirements was
projected to be long-term. Moreover, the economic benefits to the corporation to bring back
Appendix A employees and layoff employees who had not yet fulfilled 90 days of work
were considerable.
This argument appears to be quite similar to the one that the Company made in Umpire
Decision E-81 when it claimed economic efficiency would be furthered by the replacement
of employees in one group with those of another. As the Umpire stated in that decision, If
management desires to work toward increased efficiency by altering the composition of its
working force, it must do so within the limits established by its Agreement with the Union.
While certainly there are definite factual differences between Case E-81 and the case at
hand, your Umpire believes that there are more similarities than there are distinguishing
factors. In both cases, Management is replacing one category of employees with another
category of employees. As Umpire Seward stated, that can be done so long as it is done
within the parameters of the National Agreement. Was that done in this case? It does not
appear so. Allow me to explain.
Under Appendix A, it is clear that the parties agreed that, Employees with seniority laid off
from General Motors plants in a given community and who make application, will be given
preference over other applicants provided their previous experience in General Motors
shows that they are qualified for the job. (Emphasis added).
Appendix A makes it clear that such employees within the so-called "Appendix A pool" are
to be given preference over other applicants. In this case, however, such individuals were
given preference over other "employees" who already were working at the Saginaw
Division plants. In effect, it gave Appendix A individuals bumping rights over lower seniority
employees.
It would appear that in 1987, the Company and the Union worked out an agreement
extending the probationary period for up to 120 days. This agreement, while clarifying
matters for 1987, does not appear to have been in force in 1985. At least insufficient
evidence has been demonstrated to prove such an agreement between the parties of its
existence at that time. The Company had the burden of demonstrating such an agreement
if paragraph 56 of the National Agreement was to be modified in any manner.
In summary, I do conclude that the layoffs of the non-seniority employees at the Saginaw
Division, Saginaw plants, were not "for cause" within the meaning of paragraph 56 of the
1984 GM-UAW National Agreement as that phrase has come to be interpreted through
Umpire Decisions. The close proximity of hiring of Appendix A employees, while
simultaneously laying off probationary employees who have gone beyond the 30 day point,
took away from the Company its anticipated reason for reducing the work force – lack of
consumer demand for products or parts. It is not necessary to answer the question of what
duration of time there must be between the laying off of employees and the hiring of other
employees for such a reduction in force to be legitimate. Suffice it so say that the facts in
this case, did not justify a need for reduction in force of present employees due to lack of
work.
Having found a violation of paragraph 56 of the National Agreement between the parties,
what shall the remedy be?
In this case, the Union requests that, having sustained the grievance, an order be issued
restoring seniority, identifying those employees entitled to redress, and ordering the
employer to award such redress. It suggests that the case be remanded to the parties for
calculation with the right of re-appeal of any unresolved disputes.
On the other hand, the Company submits that the only appropriate remedy would be the
reinstatement of seniority for the affected employees.
In resolving this issue, your Arbitrator agrees with the Company that this case represents a
case of first impression in resolving this particular issue of "for cause" under paragraph 56.
In reviewing the decisions brought to the attention of the Umpire, it appears that this
contention is correct. As was stated by Umpire Seward in Decision E-81, heavily relied
upon by the Union, a case of such first instance normally does not result in backpay.
From an equitable standpoint, your Arbitrator also notes that the evidence indicates that
the grievants in this case received basically what they had been told to expect. They were
told that they were being hired as temporary employees for up to 89 days. To be sure,
some of the grievants may have been told to the contrary by Local supervision. However, it
appears that most of them came back to work with the expectation that they would be
working only for the summer. Therefore, to award the grievants more than three years
backpay, would appear to be a huge windfall. As a result, in accord with the precedent and
established principles of the parties, no backpay is being awarded.
In conclusion, this decision does the following:
1. Clarifies the term "for cause" as it is used in paragraph

56 of the National Agreement.
2. Protects the integrity and past precedent of paragraph

56 of the National Agreement.
3. While no back pay is ordered for the individual

grievants, their seniority rights are protected.
AWARD
The August 30, 1985, layoffs of non-seniority employees at the Saginaw Division, Saginaw
plants, were not "for cause" within the meaning of paragraph 56 of the 1984 GM-UAW
National Agreement.
As a result, the grievance is sustained. The Company is ordered to restore the seniority to
the 189 employees laid off on August 30, 1985, at the Saginaw plants. The case is
remanded to the parties so that the individual grievants might be identified. The Company
is ordered to reinstate the grievants to employment in accord with their seniority dating
from June of 1985.
Your Umpire will continue jurisdiction over this matter for a period s in the event
clarification of this award proves necessary.
Patrick A. McDonald
Dated: March 24, 1989
No. U-13
April 26, 1990
Arbitrability;
Necessary Continuous Seven Day Operation.
Grievance:
The Union charges management with violation of paragraphs 5-A, 86, and 87 of N.A.
Improper policy for powerhouse operators on a seven day operation. We demand that
powerhouse operators be paid in accordance with paragraph 86 of N.A. and all back pay
due.
In the Matter of:

United Automobile Workers of America -- Local Union No. 2123
and
General Motors Corporation, Delco Moraine New Departure Hyatt Division, Fredericksburg
Plant, Fredericksburg, Virginia --
I. ISSUE
Whether the powerhouse operators at the Delco Moraine NDH Fredericksburg, Virginia,
facility properly fall under the guidelines of paragraph 87 of the UAW-GM National
Agreement as being a necessary continuous operation?
II. FACTS
The Delco Moraine New Departure Hyatt Division in Fredericksburg, Virginia, commenced
operation in 1979 on 77 acres of land in Fredericksburg, Virginia. It employs approximately
327 individuals who are responsible for the manufacture of torque converter clutches for
automatic transmissions. Such clutches provide for a more economic use of motor fuel.
It appears that the first employees were hired to work in the powerhouse in June of 1980.
By the end of that same year, three additional employees had been hired as stationary
engineers or operators. Each of the four operators were scheduled Monday through Friday
on an eight hour shift. The powerhouse operated every weekend with each of the four
file://C:\Users\bobology\AppData\Local\Temp\Framework\u-013_13BFB8DA.htm 3/22/2011
operators being scheduled to work alternate weekends on 12 hour shifts. Thus, the
operators were paid time and one half for Saturday work and double time on Sunday as
well as any additional hours in excess of eight during each work day. During the Monday
through Friday schedule, two operators worked on the first shift and one operator each on
the second and third shifts. During late 1980, the waste water treatment plant was also
added to the powerhouse activities. Since late 1980 then, the following functions have
been performed by the operators:
1. Generation of steam for space heating. During the five month period from November
through March of each year, (the so called winter months) boiler operations are generally
maintained at a proper heat level to heat the plant. During such operations, the operators
monitor pressure and water levels and visually check pressure, temperature, air steam
mixture, feed water and steam drum levels.
2. Steam is provided for processing operations. This operation occurs when production is
operating for washers and dryers. Steam lines are open and the boiler automatically
manufactures steam and maintains the proper pressure.
3. River water system is operated. Operators start and stop the river water pump, add and
check chemicals, monitor and inspect the sand filtering system and water level of the
million gallon process water storage tank. This water is primarily used for production and
also as a standby system for fire protection as well as operation of the rest rooms. Fire
protection is primarily provided by electrically pumping County water into the plant for
storage with a secondary system operating on a diesel fire pump for backup purposes.
4. operation of cooling towers. Three cooling towers are associated with the powerhouse.
The air compressor cooling tower operates whenever production is scheduled and boiler
waste water treatment system or air supply houses are operating. The operator monitors
and maintains the levels in the oil reservoirs.
A chiller cooling tower is used for climate control during the so-called summer months from
April through October. When the chiller runs, the cooling tower pipes must be operated to
provide a constant flow of cool water through the pipes.
The process cooling tower is used to operate the furnaces called AJAX. This tower
generates the water required to maintain the proper heat range in the furnace. The AJAX is
a heat treating process used for a majority of the steel components assembled into the
torque converter. Each component is sent through at least one of four tanks containing
liquefied salt. These tanks are kept in operating temperatures as follows:
Tank A - 850 degrees Celsius

Tank B - 220 degrees Celsius
Tank C - 450 degrees Celsius
Tank D - 370 degrees Celsius
Temperatures must be held at the optimum standard. If they are not, either the parts will be
too soft and must be re-run or will become crispy and must be salvaged. Such equipment
must be periodically "de-sludged". This involves setting the temperature "above" operating
standards to boil off the sludge. As the sludge settles, it is removed by means of basket
and chill blocks. After de-sludging, temperatures are set at the lower settings of:
Tank A - 750 degrees Celsius

Tank B - 220 degrees Celsius
Tank C - 350 degrees Celsius
Tank D - 220 degrees Celsius
The furnaces are never shut down completely. If the salt in the tanks solidify, the brick is
subject to stress cracks and requires constant monitoring when it is re-heated.
Because of the nature of this process, there are two systems that are available to supply
water. The primary system is the processed water system from the reservoir. A second
one is county water that has been used frequently in the past. Water valves for the
operation are located in the catwalk near the AJAX heat treatment. The valves are marked
and consist of shutting down a valve in use and switching to another valve. The cooling
towers for the processed water or reservoir have two automatic pumps pushing water to
the AJAX. If one pump fails, the other pump kicks on automatically so as to avoid losing
water pressure.
If water pressure does drop in the AJAX, an alarm sounds in the security office. Security
then calls the appropriate maintenance personnel. Valves have been monitored and
switched by security officers in the past. Powerhouse operators do not do the switching
from one water system to the other. They are, however, responsible for monitoring the
water flow through the tower and to the AJAX. Abnormal conditions or readings are to be
reported by operators or recorded in the daily log book.
Effective October 31, 1983, a fifth operator was hired and a seven day schedule initiated.
With that schedule, the operators work several consecutive days with two days off but not
necessarily on weekends. The operation has three shifts with two operators on days, one
on second shift and one on the third shift and the fifth as a floater. When this schedule
initially went into operation, the operators were told they would be paid time and one-half if
they worked their first scheduled off day and double time if they worked on their second
scheduled off day. The parties agree they misinterpreted paragraph 87, of the National
Agreement and their interpretation was not consistent with the pay provisions outlined in
paragraph 87 of the National Agreement. After several months of paying the powerhouse
operators in this manner, the method of payment was changed in August of 1984.
Management, however, continued the powerhouse operators on the seven day continuous
operation. Thereafter, the grievance, which is the subject matter of this proceeding, was
filed. Despite their diligence and attempts to resolve the issue at each step of the
grievance procedure, the parties were unable to do so. Hence, this matter was presented
to the Umpire for final decision and award.
At the evidentiary hearing itself, a number of witnesses were presented. The first was Mr.
M, a stationary engineer since 1980. He identified an operator's log which was compiled on
an everyday basis during 1983. In it he noted various two day periods when the
powerhouse was "shut down". These included dates like January 8, and 9, 1983, January
16, and 17, 1983, January 23, 1983, February 6, 1983, April 2, and April 3, 1983, May 28,
29, 30, and 31, 1983, the Memorial day weekend (Union Exhibit 5). Mr. M also identified
the July 4, weekend,(July 2, 1983, through July 4, 1983,) when the plant was closed, as
well as August 7, and 8, 1983, and the Labor Day weekend on September 4, 5, and 6,
1983. According to Mr. M, the plant used the County water system until 1984 when the
plant was then put on reservoir tower processed water.
Mr. M also testified that operators are not directly involved with the operation of the AJAX
machinery. They are only concerned with the process cooling tower pump running to
supply the water to the AJAX. If the alarm goes off indicating a disruption of that system,
an electrician is usually called and an alternate pump goes on automatically. If that system
is not working, then the County water is utilized.
Mr. M also testified that the number one fire protection pump is an electric pump that
pumps County water. This is housed in a separate house away from the powerhouse and
security has the key. The number two fire pump is a diesel stand-by pump that is used in
the event of County water failure. This pump would utilize reservoir processed water only if
the County system fails. Likewise, the emergency response team that practices fire
protection on a regular basis, does not have powerhouse operators on the team. Mr. M
testified that the operators pump water into the million gallon reservoir as needed. It is
done approximately every other day. on weekends, usually the reservoir is only
replenished on one of the two days.
Mr. M testified that one of the proper functions of a powerhouse operator is to generate
steam for space heating. However, that function is not required every day. Indeed, it is not
even required for most of the year. Even during the winter months, it does not occur unless
the temperature drops below 40 degrees (See Exhibit 2).
A second witness presented was Mr. C, Chairman of the Union Committee. According to
Mr. C, the only reason given for the continuous seven day operation advocated by
management at the second step was that it was necessary to operate the powerhouse due
to the process cooling tower system supplying control water to the AJAX electrodes 24
hours per day. It was only at the third step that management raised additional arguments
concerning the continuous operation. This involved the use of the diesel fire pump when
water is required from the storage tank to provide maximum fire protection for the plant.
The Company presented several witnesses as well. The first was Mr. S, the Facility
Supervisor at the plant for ten years. He was a former Construction Supervisor and did the
installation of the AJAX equipment. He explained how the equipment operated and the
various temperatures needed for its efficient operation. According to S, when the facility
was first operating, the plant utilized river water. However, it was too polluted. As a result,
correct temperatures were difficult to maintain. The plant then switched to County water.
However, complaints were received from the County when the plant drew too much water.
As a result, the plant then went to processed water from the reservoir. That system is
presently used. County water is used for emergencies and temporary situations. It is not
used consistently. Mr. S stressed that water flow to the AJAX equipment must be
maintained 24 hours a day, 7 days a week.
On cross-examination, S acknowledged that either County water or processed tower water

can be utilized to cool the AJAX electrodes. The processed tower water system is a closed
loop system. The utilization of County water is not a closed loop system.
Mr. S explained that, once an alarm goes off concerning interruption of the cooling
process, management has approximately two hours to remedy this situation for the "All
tank. Additional time is available for B, C, and D tanks. He indicated that approximately
90% of the problems encountered would be electrical in nature and only 10% of a water
nature. Mr. S indicated that he supervises the operators and, particularly in 1988,
attempted to allow them time off at Christmas with their families. During that period of time,
a security officer monitored the alarm system.
The second witness for the Company was Mr. H, currently the Environmental Engineer and
former Powerhouse Supervisor. Mr. H testified that the one boiler provides steam heat for
the five month period between November and March of each year. Steam is also provided
for production. He indicated that boilers can be shut down if heat is not needed for the
plant and production does not occur. During the heating months, H stressed the fact that
boilers are running at all times. H confirmed the fact that, in 1988, he scheduled all of the
operators off at one time during the Christmas shut-down to allow them the maximum time
with their families.
He indicated that he took responsibility for monitoring the machinery during that period of
time (Union Exhibit 7). If the cooling is operating, then Security monitors the alarm system.
III. RELEVANT CONTRACTUAL LANGUAGE WORKING HOURS (For the purposes of

computing overtime premium pay)
(81) For the purpose of computing overtime premium pay, the regular working day is eight
hours and the regular working week is forty hours.
(82) Employees will be compensated on the basis of the calendar day (midnight to
midnight) on which their shift starts working, for the regular working hours of that shift. The
employee's working week shall be a calendar week beginning on Monday at the regular
starting time of the shift to which he is assigned.
(83) Hourly and piece-rate employees will be compensated as follows:
Straight Time
(84)(a) For the first eight hours worked in any continuous twenty-four hour period,
beginning with the starting time of the employee's shift.
(b) For the first forty hours worked in the employee's working week, less all time for which
daily, Saturday, Sunday or holiday overtime has been earned.
(c) For time worked during the regular working hours of any shift which starts on the day
before and continues into a specified holiday or a Saturday.
Time and One-Half
(85) (a) For time worked in excess of eight hours in any continuous twenty-four hours,
beginning with the starting time of the employee's shift, except is such time is worked on a
Sunday or holiday when double time will be paid as provided below.
(b) For time worked in excess of forty hours in the employee's working week, less all time
for which daily, Saturday, Sunday or holiday overtime has been earned.
(c) For time worked on any shift which starts on Saturday.
Double Time
(86) For time worked during the first eight (8) hours worked on any shifts that start on
Sundays and on each holiday specified in Paragraph (203); for time worked on the
calendar Sunday or specified holiday in excess of the first eight (8) hours worked on any
shift that starts on Sunday or one of the specified holidays; and for time worked on a
Sunday or specified holiday in excess of eight (8) hours worked on a shift which starts the
previous day and runs over into Sunday or one of the specified holidays.
Exceptions to Above Overtime Payment
(87) Employees working in necessary continuous seven-day operations whose

occupations involve work on Saturdays and Sundays shall be paid time and one-half for
work on these days only for time worked in excess of eight hours per day or in excess of
forty hours in the employee's working week, for which overtime has not already been
earned, except as otherwise provided:
in paragraph (1) below:
(1) Such employees shall be paid time and one-half for hours worked on the employee's
sixth work day in the week.
(2) Such employees shall be paid double time for hours worked on the 7th work day in the
calendar week if the 7th work day results from the employee being required to work on his
scheduled off day(s) in that calendar week, or for hours worked on a Sunday if that Sunday
is his second scheduled off day in that calendar week.
(3) Such employees will be paid double time and one-half (2.50 times straight time) for the
first eight (8) hours worked on any shift that starts on any of the holidays listed in
Paragraph (203) ; for time worked on the calendar holiday in excess of the first eight (8)
hours worked on any shift that starts on any such holiday; and for time worked on the
calendar holiday in excess of eight (8) hours worked on a shift which starts the previous
day and runs over into any such holiday; provided, however, that if the particular holiday
falls on the employee's regularly scheduled off day(s) and he receives holiday pay
pursuant to Paragraph (206) of the Agreement, he will be paid double time instead of
double time and one-half for such hours worked. In the case of the employees who work 6
or 7 days during the work week, the first 8 hours worked at double time and one-half or
double time, as the case may be, on shifts starting on such holidays shall be counted in
computing overtime for work in excess of 40 hours in the employee's working week.
(4) Such employees will be paid time and one-quarter (1.25 times straight time) for hours
worked on the 7th work day in the calendar week, unless such hours are payable at an
overtime premium rate under any other provision of this Agreement.
(5) If such an employee receives holiday pay pursuant to Paragraph (206) for a particular
holiday on which he does not work, that holiday will be counted as a day worked for the
purpose of computing sixth or seventh day premium under sub-paragraphs (1), (2) , and
(4) above.
(6) Such employees shall be paid an additional twenty-five cents (25) per hour for time
worked, which shall be included in computing vacation pay allowance, paid absence
allowance, holiday pay, bereavement pay, jury duty pay, short-term military duty pay,
overtime and night shift premium. Premium payments shall not be duplicated for the same
hours worked under any of the terms of this Section.
IV. CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES
A. For the Union
The Union submits that paragraphs 86 and 87 of the National Agreement were violated in
this case. It points to the definition of what constitutes a necessary continuous seven day
operation as "one that must run continuously because of the inherent technical nature of
the job and irrespective of production schedules or management's desires in the matter."
The Union asserts that those are not the facts in this case. It emphasizes that, from 1981
through 1983, the plant was run on a five day schedule and not on a continuous operation
basis. Moreover, from 1983 to the present, employees have been off on certain important
holidays.
In making this argument, the Union points out that equipment changes have not been
made. That is, the technical nature of the plant is identical to when it opened as it is today.
The only thing that has changed is that management has attempted to figure out that they
could do it cheaper in this manner. That is not sufficient justification to avoid a contractual
violation.
In supplying water systems for the AJAX, the Union points out that there are two water
systems for that purpose. one is County water that has and can be used frequently and is
quite reliable. The other is the processed water that is stored in a one million gallon
reservoir tank. That fact is, however, that the County water system is quite reliable and can
be used. There have been very few interruptions in supply of this source in the past.
Indeed, management did not mention any limitations by the County until the hearing. At
that time, it was only of a hearsay nature. As a result, it lacks credibility.
The operators in question in this case have nothing to do with the fire prevention or fire
protection system. Of the one million gallon reservoir, only the bottom 250,000 gallons is
designated to be maintained for fire protection. The number one fire pump for the
protection system is an electric pump that pumps County water. It is housed in a separate
house away from the powerhouse and only security personnel have the key. The number
two fire pump is a diesel stand-by pump in the event of a County water failure. Again, the
operators have nothing to do with that pump system. The pump is locked and only security
has the key.
The Union submits that it is not necessary to pump water into the one million gallon
reservoir every day. Indeed, from November 4, 1989, through March 7, 1990, a total of 114
days, water was pumped into the million gallon tank only 58 of those days and not pumped
56 days (Exhibit 1).
The Union contends that the operation is not a true continuous one. It is shut down for
certain holidays. Indeed, the true reason was acknowledged by management during the
course of the grievance procedure when management indicated that County water was
more expensive than taking processed water from the reservoir (Union Exhibit 7).
In closing, the Union emphasizes that the operators in this case do not really operate the
AJAX equipment and, as such, their presence is not necessary on a continuous basis. The
Union cites the Arbitrator to several Umpire decisions including B-200, E-70, E-26, and E-
161. It submits that, in accordance with the standards set by the Umpires, this Umpire will
find that the grievance is meritorious and should be sustained. It requests that the
Company be ordered to return the powerhouse to a five day operation with full back pay for
the grievants.
B. For the Employer
First, the Corporation challenges the timeliness of the grievance. In October of 1983, the
operation was changed to a seven day schedule. Despite the fact that the shop committee
was fully cognizant of the change, the Union did not protest and no grievances occurred. It
was only after overtime premium pay corrections were made in accordance with the
National Agreement for seven day operators, did the Union grieve this particular case.
By its silence, in effect, the Union was agreeing that the job was a necessary continuous
one. In 1984, and again in 1987, the local parties entered into negotiations. On neither
occasion did the Union present objections to the seven day operation. Thus, the Union is
equitably estopped from denying its consent and certainly its knowledge of the
implementation and continued existence of the seven day operation. The delay in the
presentation of the instant grievance is well beyond the realm of reasonableness. Thus,
the corporation submits that it is untimely and should be dismissed.
Even should the Arbitrator find that the grievance is timely, back pay is not applicable and
the grievance should be denied based upon its untimely presentation.
The Company in this case submits that no violation of the National Agreement has
occurred. it points out that the cooling tower operates at all times to support the AJAX
equipment. This is due to the f act that it is necessary to comply with warranty and safety
standards.
During the winter months from November through March, the operators generate steam for
space heating. These boiler operations must be maintained at the proper heat level
irrespective of production schedules. Management has no discretion. A continual and
reliable source of water is necessary. Failure in this area could result in damage to persons
and to properties.
The Employer points out that, during 1981, and 1982, there was a de-bugging time. It was
a time of adjustment. The Company found out that the best source of water was the
reservoir cooling tower. It only uses County water- as & backup. Yet, even though the
experimentation and de-bugging occurred, all the weekends were covered on a continuous
basis. Despite running a continuous operation, the Company tried to treat its employees
fairly. Hence, on holidays, the Supervisors assumed responsibility or had security

personnel monitoring the various equipment (See Umpire Decision E-218). The fact is that
this amounts to a seven day schedule and operation. The employees did not protest this
particular continuous operation between the years 1981 and 1983. They simply want to be
paid as though it were a five day period. That does not justify back pay.
Concerning information being supplied by the Employer, the Company points out that it
has not really changed its position. In accordance with Umpire Decision C-175, it is 11 ...
entirely proper to present new information at the third step." See also Umpire Decisions
338 and 240.
While management has some choices and options available to it, in terms of scheduling
production, it does not have a choice in providing coverage. There is a seven day
continuous operation. It is the operator that is important. Indeed, during the winter months,
the operator must physically run the space heating whether he wants to or not.
In summary, the Employer submits that the job qualifies as a seven day operation and that
the operators are being paid correctly according to the guidelines established in paragraph
87 of the National Agreement. The Union has failed to carry its burden of proof in this case
and, as a result, the Corporation respectfully requests the Umpire to dismiss the grievance.
V. DISCUSSION AND DECISION
The first issue to be decided in this case is the challenge by the Corporation to the
timeliness of this grievance. In support of that assertion, the Employer indicated that, in
October of 1983, the operation was changed to a seven day schedule. When this schedule
initially went into operation, the operators were told they would be paid time-and-a-half if
they worked their first scheduled off day and double time if they worked on their second
scheduled off day. The parties agreed at the hearing that they had misinterpreted
paragraph 87 of the National Agreement in reaching this understanding. The method of
payment was changed in August of 1984. The operators, however, continued on the seven
day continuous operation schedule. Hence, the grievance, which is the subject matter of
this proceeding, was filed in September of 1985. Because of the delay in filing the
grievance, the Employer contends that the actions of the parties preclude the Union from
filing a timely grievance. It cites Umpire Decision B-101 as covering this situation.
In that decision, Umpire Dash concluded that, because a Union committee failed to raise
any objection to the procedure followed accord with the method management followed.
While I do not disagree with Umpire Dash's conclusion, in-this case at hand, the facts are
somewhat different. While the operator-grievants were being scheduled on a seven day
schedule in 1984, they were being paid as if they were working a five day schedule or at
least not in accord with paragraph 87 of the National Agreement. Under these
circumstances, it does not follow that, because no grievances were filed in this interim
period, that this should be interpreted that either the grievants or the shop committee were
in accord with the method management was following.
Equally important, it appears that the nature of this alleged violation is one of a continuing
nature. That is, the grievance is a continuing one and the time limit on the filing of a
grievance recommences each day. While damages or back pay in such case would be
awarded normally only from the date the grievance was filed, the later filing of the
grievance does not preclude it being arbitrated. As a result, I do conclude that the
challenge of the Employer concerning the timeliness of the grievance to be without merit.
Before proceeding directly to the merits of the case, your Umpire notes that, at the
evidentiary hearing, the Union protested management's action in submitting new facts and
arguments that had not been presented in earlier stages of the grievance procedure. Your
Umpire did sustain such objections on three different occasions. In doing so, I relied upon
the Umpire precedent set forth in Umpire Decisions C-240 and C-338. Both of those cases
were decided by Umpire Ralph Seward. As Umpire Seward pointed out, If the grievance
procedure is to operate successfully and needless appeals to the Umpire are to be
avoided, it is of the utmost importance that the basic contentions of both sides be made
known to each other by the end of the third step meeting. That does not mean that no new
arguments will be heard by the Umpire. It does mean, however, that the contentions to
which these arguments are directed, should have been explained at the third step meeting.
Only with such a rule could either side properly weigh the strength of its position when
deciding whether to settle by agreement or bring the case to the Umpire.
In the three instances where the objections were sustained, your Umpire felt that new facts
or evidence were being presented for the first time at the arbitration hearing. In two other
situations where objections were overruled, your Arbitrator concluded that these
contentions had been alluded to at either the second or third step of the grievance
procedure and new arguments were being developed based upon those same contentions.
Under Decisions C240 and C-338, this is permissible. Hopefully, this explanation will prove
beneficial to all concerned.
On the merits of the case I note that under paragraphs 85 and 86, employees are entitled
to be paid one and one half times their normal rate for all work performed on shifts
beginning on Saturday, and double time for all shifts worked on Sunday (Joint Exhibit 1).
An exception to that overtime payment rate is set forth in paragraph 87. That paragraph
speaks in terms of:
Employees working in necessary continuous seven-day operations whose occupations

involve work on Saturdays and Sundays, shall be paid time and one half for work on these
days only for time worked in excess of 8 hours per day or in excess of 40 hours in the
employee's work week....
Hence, as the parties agreed, the question is whether the Powerhouse operators, or
grievants in this case, work in a necessary continuous seven day operation so as to fall
within the exception of paragraph 87 or whether they would be eligible for over-time rates
as set forth in paragraphs 85 and 86. According to past Umpire decisions, 11 ... the test of
a necessary continuous seven day operation is the inherent technical nature of the
operation itself and not the work schedule of the employees performing it." (See Umpire
Decisions A-126, B-151 and E-Z18). With this test in mind, let us now examine the facts in
this case.
During the so-called winter period from November through March of each year, the
Powerhouse operators maintained the boiler operations at the proper heat levels in order
to generate steam for space heating. When such heat is being generated, the operators
are obligated to check the pressures, temperatures, air steam mixture, feed water and
steam drum levels. Any discrepancies are either corrected or reported to the maintenance
department or management. During this five month period when the Power plant provides
space heating during the winter months! it appears that the work of the Powerhouse
operators is a necessary continuous seven day operation (See Umpire Decision A-126).
What of the remaining seven months of the year, however, when temperatures in Virginia
would not mandate space heating? The issue remains for these seven months whether the
operations involve necessary continuous seven day manning of the positions.
During the course of the presentation of evidence in this case, witnesses testified
concerning the Powerhouse operators providing steam for processing operations. Now, it
is clear that many times production will be run on Saturday and Sunday. The fact,
however, that production may operate on Saturdays or Sundays during the summer
months and process steam and compressed air is necessary, does not make the operation
a necessary continuous one. This is because production of the steam for processing is
dependent upon the schedule of the production departments. Hence, that particular
function of the Powerhouse operators would not make their job between April and October
of each year a necessary continuous seven day operation.
The Powerhouse operators also operate the river water system. In doing so, they start and
stop river water pumps, add and check chemical levels and monitor and inspect the sand
filtering system and the water level of the million gallon water reservoir. This is not done
every day. Once again, this operation is not one that is continuous in nature or would make
this operation a necessary continuous seven day operation.
Yet, another function of the Powerhouse operators is to treat processed water. In this
situation, water is pumped in from the river water system for use in fire protection,
production and operation of the rest rooms. If the plant is not in production, however, there
is basically very little need to pump. Generally speaking, this would occur only if production
operations were scheduled for weekend over-time. Again, the inherent nature of the
operation is not one that would be a necessary continuous seven day situation. Much the
same can be said for waste water treatment in which the Powerhouse operators check the
level of the holding tanks and pumps are monitored each hour whenever production runs
occur. Again, because of the basic connection between production and this operation, I do
not find it to be a "necessary continuous seven day operation."
This brings us, then, to the operation of the cooling towers by the Powerhouse operators.
Three cooling towers are associated with the Powerhouse. The air compressor cooling
tower is operated whenever production is scheduled. By its very nature, compressors are
basically only needed when production or maintenance personnel are working. If the
compressors are not run, there is no need for this cooling water. Obviously, then, this work
is not a continuous necessary seven day operation.
The chiller cooling tower is the second tower operated by the grievants. It is used for
climate control during the so-called summer months from April through October. It,
basically, provides air conditioning for the plant during the excessively hot days. It appears
from the testimony of the witnesses, that this tower would generally only be in operation
when the plant is in production or operation. once again, this fails to meet the test set forth
in past Umpire decisions as being a necessary continuous seven day operation.
This brings us, then, to the process water cooling tower. It is so-called because this tower
generates water required for an operation which maintains a proper heat range in the
furnaces which are called AJAX. Whether in production use or not, the AJAX furnaces are
maintained within rather narrow ranges of degrees. As set forth earlier in the facts, tank A
is to be kept at 850 degrees Celsius while tank B is to be kept at 220 degrees Celsius. The
same goes for tanks C and D which are basically kept at 450 degrees and 370 degrees
respectively, while production is occurring. Temperatures are to be maintained within these
standards so as to produce parts that are of a proper hardness. Most important, however,
it appears from the testimony of witnesses in this case that the furnaces are never shut
down completely. When production is not occurring, the furnaces are kept in an "idling"
mode. In that mode, tank A is kept at 750 degrees Celsius. Tank B would continue to be
maintained at 220 degrees Celsius. Tank C is kept at approximately 100 degrees less than
its normal operating temperature of 450 degrees. Tank D, which is normally kept at 370
degrees Celsius, is idle at 220 degrees Celsius. Hence, the operation of the process water
cooling tower by the Powerhouse operators, would appear to be a continuous necessary
seven day operation.
The Union, however, asserts two arguments that must be carefully considered. The first is
that the AJAX machinery could be switched to County water and, hence, there would be no
need to operate the cooling tower on weekends by Powerhouse operators. When the
facility was first- started, the Employer utilized river water. They found, however, that it was
too polluted and did not provide correct temperatures. The operation was then switched to
County water. Because of the large amounts of County water utilized, however, by this
Plant, it was found that even this source was not as reliable as the processed water from
the Plant reservoir. The Facilities Supervisor at the Plant mentioned three examples when
County water could not be used consistently. Hence, it is now only used as a backup
source. By using processed tower water, a closed loop system is utilized which is much
more uniform than would be the case if County water were used. Hence, water pressure
and temperatures are much more consistent.
I do find this Employer explanation to be a reasonable one and, considering the cost of the
AJAX furnaces, to be one that makes good common sense.
The Union points out correctly that the Powerhouse operators do not directly operate the
AJAX equipment. They only operate the process water tower which generates the water
required for the operation of the AJAX furnace equipment. While the Employer's arguments
would be even stronger if the Powerhouse operators were directly involved with the AJAX
equipment, the fact is that these employees supply the water cooling source which must be
monitored even when the AJAX equipment is not being operated but is in an "idle state".
One final point by the Union also deserves discussion. Witnesses testified that, from 1980
through 1983, and on a few holiday occasions such as Christmas of 1988, all the
Powerhouse operators were given such time off. The Union submits that this proves that
their presence was not necessary and that the operation was not a necessary continuous
seven day one. The response by the former Powerhouse Supervisor was that particularly
during holiday situations, he did his best to allow the Powerhouse operators the maximum
amount of time off to be with their families. During that holiday period of time, he took the
responsibility along with security personnel, to monitor the operations. In this case, it is
important to keep in mind the test of a necessary continuous seven day operation is the
inherent technical nature of the operation itself and not the work schedule of the
employees performing it. As Umpire Saul Wallen noted, the fact that the complainants
previously did not work a schedule and were not paid in the manner typical of employees
working in necessary continuous seven day operations, does not alter the fact that the
operation of this equipment is "necessarily" continuous (See Umpire Decision E-218).
I believe that is the case in this situation. The Powerhouse operators, even from 1980
through 1983, while being paid on a five day basis, were still operating the Powerhouse
continuously. That is, each of the four operators were scheduled Monday through Friday
on eight hour shifts each day. The Powerhouse was also basically operated every
weekend with each of the four operators being scheduled to work alternate weekends on
12 hour shifts. This provided 24 hour weekend coverage. These operators accepted this
type of scheduling even though it engendered a great amount of overtime. From 1983,
onward, the Powerhouse has continued to be operated on a continuous seven day basis.
From 1983, through 1985, the continuous operation did not result in grievances being
raised by the Powerhouse operators until the grievance in this case. This may well have
been because the operators were being paid differently from that called for under
paragraph 87 of the National Agreement. The fact is, however, that the inherent nature of
this operation appears to have been one of a continuous necessary seven day operation
and the employees appeared to recognize this. Since 1985, while there have been a few
occasions such as Christmas, when management has attempted to accommodate
Powerhouse operators to be home with their families, these have been rare. Again, such
an exception, by itself, would not change the technical nature of the operation. Finally, I
have reviewed the Umpire decisions cited by the Union (B-200, E-70, E-26 and E-161) but
do not find them controlling in this fact situation. In summary, then, I do find that the work
of the Powerhouse operators or grievants in this case, to be one of a necessary continuous
seven day operation.
DECISION AND AWARD
1. The grievance is deemed arbitral.
2. The Employer did not violate the National Agreement because the Powerhouse
operators work is deemed a necessary continuous seven day operation, and therefore,
falls within the exception of paragraph 87 of the Agreement.
3. As a result, the grievance is deemed without merit and is dismissed.
Patrick A. McDonald
Dated: April 26, 1990

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Uaw GM Umpire Decisions

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UMPIRE DECISION A-1 Page 1 of 5

OFFICE OF THE UMPIRE

Decision on Issue of Alternate Committeemen’s Preferential Right to Work

Chevrolet Bay City—Case No. 1

Chevrolet Bay City—Case No. 2

Chevrolet Bay City—Case No. 4

Chevrolet Flint—Case No. 14

Chevrolet Gear & Axle—Case No. 17

Chevrolet Gear & Axle—Case No. 26

Chevrolet Gear & Axle—Case No. 27

The UMPIRE ruled that:

The verbatim decision of the UMPIRE is as follows:

In the Matter of:

The Union’s Interpretation of the Agreement and Its Contentions

The Corporation’s Interpretation of the Agreement

The Umpire’s Observations and Decision

October 28, 1940.

UMPIRE DECISION INDEX

OFFICE OF THE UMPIRE

Claim for Plant-Wide Seniority

(Chevrolet Toledo—Cases Nos. 1 and 2)

The UMPIRE ruled that:

The verbatim decision of the UMPIRE is as follows:

In the Matter of:

United Automobile Workers of America—C.I.O.

General Motors Corporation, Chevrolet-Toledo Division, Case Nos. 1 and 2.

Facts of the Case

Analysis by Umpire and Decision

Claim for Plant-Wide Seniority

UMPIRE DECISION INDEX

OFFICE OF THE UMPIRE

Chevrolet Muncie—Case No. 56.

"Grievance No. 79556, discrimination, coercion, refusing me a hammer, stating I am not

The UMPIRE ruled that:

The verbatim decision of the UMPIRE is as follows:

In the Matter of:

United Automobile Workers of America—C.I.O.

General Motors Corporation—Chevrolet-Muncie

Division—Case No. 56.

In answering the grievance filed by A. on December 16, management replied on December

new aluminum job opens up."

Analysis of the Issues

Preference in Promotion to a Temporary Employee

unblemished, not a single convincing reason has been advanced by management to

The Rate Payable on the Upset Job

has to be applied to certain Forge Shop jobs.

Conclusion and Decision of the Umpire

resume his former job.

Signed GEORGE W. TAYLOR,

UMPIRE DECISION INDEX

OFFICE OF THE UMPIRE

Question Relating to Promotion Procedure

Fisher Flint No. 1 -- Case No. 83

In February 1941, it became necessary to transfer several employees to the "Lower

The UMPIRE ruled that:

The question of whether consideration to seniority in making transfers between

The verbatim decision of the UMPIRE is as follows:

In the Matter of:

United Automobile Workers of America—C.I.O.

General Motors Corporation, Fisher Body No. 1 -- Flint—Case No. 83.

In February 1941, it became necessary to transfer several employees to the "Lower

Observations and Decision of the Umpire

Although it is undesirable, as recognized by management in this case, to transfer or