1. G.R. No. 103525.

March 29, 1996

MARCOPPER MINING CORPORATION, Petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and
NATIONAL MINES AND ALLIED WORKERS UNION (NAMAWU-MIF), Respondents.
Facts:  On 23 August 1984, Marcopper Mining Corporation, a corporation duly organized and existing under the
laws of the Philippines, engaged in the business of mineral prospecting, exploration and extraction, and private
respondent NAMAWU-MIF, a labor federation duly organized and registered with the Department of Labor and
Employment (DOLE), to which the Marcopper Employees Union (the exclusive bargaining agent of all rank-and-
file workers of petitioner) is affiliated, entered into a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) effective from 1 May
1984 until 30 April 1987.
  The COMPANY agrees to grant general wage increase to all employees within the bargaining unit. It is expressly
understood that this wage increase shall be exclusive of any increase in the minimum wage and/or mandatory living
allowance that may be promulgated during the life of this Agreement. Prior to the expiration of the aforestated
Agreement, petitioner and private respondent executed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) wherein the terms of
the CBA, specifically on matters of wage increase and facilities allowance, were modified as the COMPANY grants
a wage increase of 10% of the basic rate to all employees and workers within the bargaining units.This will mean
that the members of the bargaining unit will get an effective increase of 10% from May 1, 1986.
 In compliance with the amended CBA, petitioner implemented the initial 5% wage increase due on 1 May 1986.
 On 1 June 1987, Executive Order (E.O.) No. 178 was promulgated mandating the integration of the cost of living
allowance into the basic wage of workers, its effectivity retroactive to 1 May 1987. Consequently, effective on 1
May 1987, the basic wage rate of petitioners laborers categorized as non-agricultural workers was increased by
P9.00 per day.
 Petitioner implemented the second five percent (5%) wage increase due on 1 May 1987 and thereafter added the
integrated COLA. Private respondent, however, assailed the manner in which the second wage increase was
effected. It argued that the COLA should first be integrated into the basic wage before the 5% wage increase is
computed.
 Consequently, the union filed a complaint for underpayment of wages before the Regional Arbitration Branch IV,
Quezon City. Labor Arbiter promulgated a decision in favor of the union. Petitioner appealed the Labor Arbiters
decision and the NLRC rendered its decision sustaining the Labor Arbiters ruling. Petitioners motion for
reconsideration was denied by the NLRC in its resolution.Hence,the present petition.
Issue: What should be the basis for the computation of the CBA increase, the basic wage without the COLA or the
so-called "integrated" basic wage which, by mandate of E.O. No. 178, includes the COLA.
Held: The principle that the CBA is the law between the contracting parties stands strong and true. However, the
present controversy involves not merely an interpretation of CBA provisions. More importantly, it requires a
determination of the effect of an executive order on the terms and the conditions of the CBA. This is, and should be,
the focus of the instant case. It is unnecessary to delve too much on the intention of the parties as to what they
allegedly meant by the term "basic wage" at the time the CBA and MOA were executed because there is no question
that as of 1 May 1987, as mandated by E.O. No. 178, the basic wage of workers, or the statutory minimum wage,
was increased with the integration of the COLA. As of said date, then, the term "basic wage" includes the COLA.
This is what the law ordains and to which the collective bargaining agreement of the parties must conform.
 There is evidently nothing to construe and interpret because the law is clear and unambiguous. Unfortunately for
petitioner, said law, by some uncanny coincidence, retroactively took effect on the same date the CBA increase
became effective. Therefore, there cannot be any doubt that the computation of the CBA increase on the basis of the
"integrated" wage does not constitute a violation of the CBA.
 While the terms and conditions of the CBA constitute the law between the parties, it is not, however, an ordinary
contract to which is applied the principles of law governing ordinary contracts. A CBA, as a labor contract within
the contemplation of Article 1700 of the Civil Code of the Philippines which governs the relations between labor
and capital, is not merely contractual in nature but impressed with public interest, thus, it must yield to the common
good. As such, it must be construed liberally rather than narrowly and technically, and the courts must place a
practical and realistic construction upon it, giving due consideration to the context in which it is negotiated and
purpose which it is intended to serve.
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 2. G.R. No. L-24711     April 30, 1968
BENGUET CONSOLIDATED, INC., Plaintiff-Appellant, vs. BCI EMPLOYEES and WORKERS UNION-
PAFLU, PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF FREE LABOR UNIONS, CIPRIANO CID and JUANITO GARCIA,
Defendants-Appellees.
Facts: On June 23, 1959, the Benguet-Balatoc Workers Union ("BBWU"), for and in behalf of all BENGUET
employees in its mines and milling establishment entered into a Collective Bargaining Contract, with BENGUET.
Pursuant to its very terms, said CONTRACT became effective for a period of four and a half  years. It likewise
embodied a No-Strike, No-Lockout clause.
 About three years later, a certification election was conducted by the Department of Labor among all the rank and
file employees of BENGUET in the same collective bargaining units. UNION obtained more than 50% of the total
number of votes, defeating BBWU, and accordingly, the Court of Industrial Relations, certified UNION as the sole
and exclusive collective bargaining agent of all BENGUET employees.
 Subsequently, separate meetings were conducted respectively by UNION. The result thereof was the approval by
UNION members of a resolution directing its president to file a notice of strike against BENGUET
 The Notice of Strike was filed on December 28, 1962. Three months later, UNION members who were BENGUET
employees in the mining camps at Acupan, Antamok and Balatoc, went on strike. The strikers forming picket lines
bore placards with the letters BBWU-PAFLU written thereon. As a general rule, the picketers were unruly,
aggressive and uttered threatening remarks to staff members and non-strikers who desire to pass thru the picket
lines. On some occasions, the picketers resorted to violence by pushing back the car wherein staff officers were
riding who would like to enter the mine working area. The picketers lifted one side of the vehicle and were in the act
of overturning it when they were prevented from doing so by the timely intervention of PC soldiers, who threw tear
gas bombs to make the crowd disperse. Many of the picketers were apprehended by the PC soldiers and criminal
charges for grave coercion were filed against them before the Court of First Instance of Baguio.
 There was a complete stoppage of work during the strike in all the mines. After two weeks elapsed, repair and
maintenance of the water pump was allowed by the strikers and some of the staff members were permitted to enter
the mines, who inspected the premises in the company of PC soldiers to ascertain the extent of the damage to the
equipment and losses of company property.
 On May 2, 1963, the parties agreed to end the raging dispute. Accordingly, BENGUET and UNION executed the
AGREEMENT. PAFLU placed its conformity thereto and said agreement was attested to by the Director of the
Bureau of Labor Relations. About a year later, a collective bargaining contract was finally executed between
UNION-PAFLU and BENGUET.
 Meanwhile, as a result, allegedly, of the strike staged by UNION and its members, BENGUET had to incur
expenses for the rehabilitation of mine openings, repair of mechanical equipment, cost of pumping water out of the
mines, value of explosives, tools and supplies lost and/or destroyed, and other miscellaneous expenses, all
amounting to P1,911,363.83. So, BENGUET sued UNION, PAFLU and their respective Presidents to recover said
amount in the Court of First Instance of Manila, on the sole premise that said defendants breached their undertaking
in the existing CONTRACT not to strike during the effectivity thereof .
 In answer to BENGUET's complaint, defendants unions and their respective presidents put up the following
defenses: (1) they were not bound by the CONTRACT which BBWU, the defeated union, had executed with
BENGUET; (2) the strike was due, inter alia, to unfair labor practices of BENGUET; and (3) the strike was lawful
and in the exercise of the legitimate rights of UNION-PAFLU under Republic Act 875.
 Issues having been joined, trial commenced. On February 23, 1965, the trial court rendered judgment dismissing the
complaint on the ground that the CONTRACT, particularly the No-Strike clause, did not bind defendants. The
latters' counterclaim was likewise denied. Failing to get a reconsideration of said decision, BENGUET interposed
the present appeal.
Issue: Whether or not the Collective Bargaining Contract executed between BENGUET and BBWU bind UNION-
PAFLU upon its certification as sole bargaining representative of all BENGUET employees?
Held: BENGUET's reliance upon the Principle of Substitution is totally misplaced. This principle, formulated by the
NLRB  as its initial compromise solution to the problem facing it when there occurs a shift in employees' union
allegiance after the execution of a bargaining contract with their employer, merely states that even during the
effectivity of a collective bargaining agreement executed between employer and employees thru their agent, the
employees can change said agent but the contract continues to bind them up to its expiration date. They may bargain
however for the shortening of said expiration date. In formulating the "substitutionary" doctrine, the only
consideration involved was the employees' interest in the existing bargaining agreement. The agent's interest never
entered the picture.
 Stated otherwise, the "substitutionary" doctrine only provides that the employees cannot revoke the validly
executed collective bargaining contract with their employer by the simple expedient of changing their bargaining
agent. And it is in the light of this that the phrase "said new agent would have to respect said contract" must be
understood. It only means that the employees, thru their new bargaining agent, cannot renege on their collective
bargaining contract, except of course to negotiate with management for the shortening thereof.
 The "substitutionary" doctrine, therefore, cannot be invoked to support the contention that a newly certified
collective bargaining agent automatically assumes all the personal undertakings - like the no-strike stipulation here -
in the collective bargaining agreement made by the deposed union. When BBWU bound itself and its officers not to
strike, it could not have validly bound also all the other rival unions existing in the bargaining units in question.
BBWU was the agent of the employees, not of the other unions which possess distinct personalities. To consider
UNION contractually bound to the no-strike stipulation would therefore violate the legal maxim that res inter alios
nec prodest nec nocet.
 Since defendants were not contractually bound by the no-strike clause in the CONTRACT, for the simple reason
that they were not parties thereto, they could not be liable for breach of contract to plaintiff. The lower court
therefore correctly absolved them from liability.
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3. G.R. No. 97237 August 16, 1991
FILIPINAS PORT SERVICES, INC., Petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION,
PATERNO LIBOON, SEGUNDO AQUINO, JOVITO BULAY, DOMINGO NAVOA, DELFIN BERMEJO,
CELEDONIO MANCUBAT, ALBERTO MAHINAY, SR., TEODULO SILAYA, SANTOS ARGUIDO,
JUANITO LABANON, FLORENCIO MIRANTES, LUCIO BARRERA, VICENTE GILDORE, LEON
FUENTES, CASIMIRO MAGSAYO, FERNANDO MORIENTE, MATIAS ORBITA, SR., FRANCISCO
PARDILLO, ILDEFONSO JUMILLA AND JOSE CANTONJOS, Respondents.
Facts: In view of the government policy which ordained that cargo handling operations should be limited to only one
cargo handling operator-contractor for every port the different stevedoring and arrastre corporations operating in the
Port of Davao were integrated into a single dockhandlers corporation, known as the Davao Dockhandlers, Inc.,
which was registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission.
 Due to the late receipt of its permit to operate at the Port of Davao from the Bureau of Customs, Davao
Dockhandlers, Inc., which was subsequently renamed Filport, actually started its operation. As a result of the
merger, Section 118, Article X of the General Guidelines on The Integration of Stevedoring/Arrastre Services (PPA
Administrative Order No. 13-77) mandated Filport to draw its personnel complements from the merging operators.
Thus, Filport's labor force was mostly taken from the integrating corporations, among them the private respondents.
 Private respondent Paterno Liboon and 18 others filed a complaint with the Department of Labor and Employment
Regional Office in Davao City, alleging that they were employees of Filport since 1955 through 1958 up to
December 31, 1986 when they retired; that they were paid retirement benefits computed from February 16,1977 up
to December 31, 1986 only; and that taking into consideration their continuous length of service, they are entitled to
be paid retirement benefits differentials from the time they started working with the predecessors of Filport up to the
time they were absorbed by the latter in 1977.
 Finding Filport a mere alter ego of the different integrating corporations, the Labor Arbiter held Filport liable for
retirement benefits due private respondents for services rendered prior to February 16, 1977. Said decision was
affirmed by the NLRC on appeal.
 Filport filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court, claiming that it is an entirely new corporation with a
separate juridical personality from the integrating corporations; and that Filport is not a successor-employer, liable
for the obligations of private respondents' previous employers, as shown clearly in the memorandum dated
November 21,1978 of PPA Assistant General Manager Maximo S. Dumlao, Jr.
 Filport filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court.This Court, through the First Division, rendered a
decision, holding that petitioner (Filport) cannot be held liable for the payment of the retirement pay of private
respondent (Josefino Silva) while in the employ of DAMASTICOR ... who is held responsible for the same as the
labor contract is in personam and cannot be passed on to the petitioner."
 This Court, through the Second Division, dismissed the petition "for failure to sufficiently show that the questioned
judgment is tainted with grave abuse of discretion."  Per entry of judgment, said resolution became final and
executory. Hence, the instant petition for clarification.
Issue: Whether or not Filport is answerable to the lawful obligation of the predecessor employers as a result of the
merger?
Held: Thus, granting that Filport had no contract whatsoever with the private respondents regarding the services
rendered by them prior to February 16, 1977, by the fact of the merger, a succession of employment rights and
obligations had occurred between Filport and the private respondents. The law enforced at the time of the merger
was Section 3 of Act No. 2772 which took effect on March 6, 1918.
 As earlier stated, it was mandated that Filport shall absorb all labor force and necessary personnel complement of
the merging operators, thus, clearly indicating the intention to continue the employer-employee relationships of the
individual companies with its employees through Filport.
 The alleged memorandum of the PPA Assistant General Manager exonerating Filport from any liability arising
from and as a result of the merger is contrary to public policy and is violative of the workers' right to security of
tenure. Said memorandum was issued in response to a query of the PMU Officer-in-Charge and was not even
published nor made known to the workers who came to know of its existence only at the hearing before the NLRC.
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4. G.R. No. 87700 June 13, 1990
SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION EMPLOYEES UNION-PTGWO, DANIEL S.L. BORBON II, HERMINIA
REYES, MARCELA PURIFICACION, ET AL., Petitioners, vs. HON. JESUS G. BERSAMIRA, IN HIS
CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF BRANCH 166, RTC, PASIG, and SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION,
Respondents.
 Facts: Sometime in 1983 and 1984, SanMig entered into contracts for merchandising services with Lipercon and
D'Rite. These companies are independent contractors duly licensed by the Department of Labor and Employment
(DOLE). In said contracts, it was expressly understood and agreed that the workers employed by the contractors
were to be paid by the latter and that none of them were to be deemed employees or agents of SanMig. There was to
be no employer-employee relation between the contractors and/or its workers, on the one hand, and SanMig on the
other.
 Petitioner San Miguel Corporation Employees Union-PTWGO is the duly authorized representative of the monthly
paid rank-and-file employees of SanMig with whom the latter executed a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA).
Section 1 of their CBA specifically provides that "temporary, probationary, or contract employees and workers are
excluded from the bargaining unit and, therefore, outside the scope of this Agreement."
 Union advised SanMig that some Lipercon and D'Rite workers had signed up for union membership and sought the
regularization of their employment with SMC. On the ground that it had failed to receive any favorable response
from SanMig, the Union filed a notice of strike for unfair labor practice, CBA violations, and union busting.The
Union again filed a second notice of strike for unfair labor practice
 As in the first notice of strike. Conciliatory meetings were held on the second notice. Subsequently, the two (2)
notices of strike were consolidated and several conciliation conferences were held to settle the dispute before the
National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) of DOLE. Series of pickets were staged by Lipercon and
D'Rite workers in various SMC plants and offices. SMC filed a verified Complaint for Injunction and Damages
before respondent Court to enjoin the Union.
 Respondent Court found the Complaint sufficient in form and substance and issued a Temporary Restraining Order
for the purpose of maintaining the status quo, and set the application for Injunction for hearing. In the meantime,the
Union filed a Motion to Dismiss SanMig's Complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the case/nature of
the action, which motion was opposed by SanMig. That Motion was denied by respondent Judge in an Order.
 After several hearings on SanMig's application for injunctive relief, where the parties presented both testimonial
and documentary evidence, respondent Court issued the questioned Order granting the application and enjoining the
Union from Committing the acts complained of. Accordingly, respondent Court issued the corresponding Writ of
Preliminary Injunction after SanMig had posted the required bond.
 In issuing the Injunction, respondent Court rationalized the absence of employer-employee relationship negates the
existence of labor dispute.
 The Union went on strike. Apparently, some of the contractual workers of Lipercon and D'Rite had been laid off.
The strike adversely affected thirteen (13) of the latter's plants and offices.
 National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) called the parties to conciliation. The Union stated that it
would lift the strike if the thirty (30) Lipercon and D'Rite employees were recalled, and discussion on their other
demands. Effected eventually was a Memorandum of Agreement between SanMig and the Union that "without
prejudice to the outcome of this case and the case below the laid-off individuals shall be recalled to their former jobs
or equivalent positions under the same terms and conditions prior to "lay-off". In turn, the Union would immediately
lift the pickets and return to work.
Issue: Whether or not the case at bar involves, or is in connection with, or relates to a labor dispute.
Held: A "labor dispute" as defined in Article 212 (1) of the Labor Code includes "any controversy or matter
concerning terms and conditions of employment or the association or representation of persons in negotiating,
fixing, maintaining, changing, or arranging the terms and conditions of employment, regardless of whether the
disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee."
 While it is SanMig's submission that no employer-employee relationship exists between itself, on the one hand, and
the contractual workers of Lipercon and D'Rite on the other, a labor dispute can nevertheless exist "regardless of
whether the disputants stand in the proximate relationship of employer and employee"  provided the controversy
concerns, among others, the terms and conditions of employment or a "change" or "arrangement" thereof. Put
differently and as defined by law, the existence of labor dispute is not negativated by the fact that the plaintiffs and
defendants do not stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee.
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5. G.R. Nos. L-16292-94, L-16309 and L-16317-18            October 31, 1960
KAPISANAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY Petitioner,
vs.
YARD CREW UNION, STATION EMPLOYEES UNION, RAILROAD ENGINEERING DEPARTMENT
UNION, MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY, and COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, Respondents.
Facts: Kapisanan Ng Mga Manggagawa Sa Manila Railroad Company,filed a petition, praying that it be certified as
the exclusive bargaining agent in the Manila Railroad Company. A decision was promulgated affirmed by the Court
en banc, in which the respondent Court found three unions appropriate for purposes of collective bargaining.To
these 3 units, the following unions were respectively certified as the exclusive bargaining agents: (1) The Union de
Maquinistas, Fogoneros, Ayudantes y Motormen; (2) Union de Empleados de Trenes (conductors); and (3) the
Kapisanan Ng Mga Manggagawa Sa Manila Railroad Company.
 After the decision had become final, Case No. 491-MC was filled by the Manila Railroad Yard Crew Union,
praying that it be defined as a separate unit; Case No. 494-MC by the Station Employees' Union, praying that it be
constituted as a separate bargaining unit, and Case No. 507- MC,  by the Railroad Engineering Department Union,
praying that it be defined as a separate bargaining unit. All asked that they be certified in the units sought to be
separated. The respondent unions are legitimate labor organizations with certificates of registration in the
Department of Labor.
 The Kapisanan and the Company opposed the separation of the said three units on the following grounds: (1) That
the Kapisanan had been duly certified as the collective bargaining agent in the unit of all of the rest of the employees
and it had entered into a collective bargaining agreement and contract bar rule; (2) That the Court had denied similar
petitions for separation of unit; (3) That the three unions in question are barred from petitioning for separate units
because they are bound by the decision in Case No. 237-MC, for having been represented therein by the Kapisanan.
 After due hearing, the respondent Court,handed down an order. The Court orders a plebiscite to be conducted
among the employees in the three proposed groups. The respondent Court also declared that the collective
bargaining agreement could not be a bar to another certification election because one of its signatories, the
Kapisanan President, Vicente K. Olazo, was a supervisor.
 A motion for reconsideration of the order was presented by the Kapisanan, and same was denied in an order,
concurred in by three Judges of the Court, with two Judges dissenting, against which the Kapisanan filed its notice
of appeal. Appeals by certiorari were filed by the Kapisanan and the Company. Respondents presented motion to
dismiss the petitions on the ground that the order of the respondent court and the resolution of the respondent court
en banc to hold a plebiscite, were interlocutory, not subject to appeal.
Issue: Whether or not the proposed bargaining unit is an appropriate bargaining unit?
Held: The test in determining the appropriate bargaining unit is that a unit must effect a grouping of employees who
have substantial, mutual interests in wages, hours, working conditions and other subjects of collective bargaining.
 It is manifest, therefore, that "the desires of the employees" is one of the factors in determining the appropriate
bargaining unit. And one way of determining the will or desire of the employees is what the respondent court had
suggested: a plebiscite - carried by secret ballot. A plebiscite not to be conducted by the Department of Labor, as
contemplated in a certification election under Sec. 12 of the Magna Charter of Labor, R.A. No. 875, but by the
respondent court itself.
 In view hereof, the petitions or appeals for review by certiorari are dismissed.
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6. G.R. No. 77395 November 29, 1988
BELYCA CORPORATION, Petitioner, vs. DIR. PURA FERRER CALLEJA, LABOR RELATIONS, MANILA,
MINISTRY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT; MED-ARBITER, RODOLFO S. MILADO, MINISTRY OF
LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, REGIONAL OFFICE NO. 10 AND ASSOCIATED LABOR UNION (ALU-
TUCP), MINDANAO REGIONAL OFFICE, CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY, Respondents.
Facts: On June 3, 1986, private respondent Associated Labor Union (ALU)-TUCP, a legitimate labor organization
duly registered with the Ministry of Labor and Employment, filed with the Regional Office No. 10, Ministry of
Labor and Employment at Cagayan de Oro City, a petition for direct certification as the sole and exclusive
bargaining agent of all the rank and file employees/workers of Belyca Corporation, a duly organized, registered and
existing corporation employing approximately 205 rank and file employees/workers, the collective bargaining unit
sought in the petition for the issuance of an order authorizing the immediate holding of a certification election.
Although the case was scheduled for hearing at least three times, no amicable settlement was reached by the parties.
During the scheduled hearing they, however, agreed to submit simultaneously their respective position papers.
 Petitioner ALU-TUCP, private respondent herein, in its petition and position paper alleged, among others, (1) that
there is no existing collective bargaining agreement between the respondent employer, petitioner herein, and any
other existing legitimate labor unions; (2) that there had neither been a certification election conducted in the
proposed bargaining unit within the last twelve (12) months prior to the filing of the petition nor a contending union
requesting for certification as the sole and exclusive bargaining representative in the proposed bargaining unit; (3)
that more than a majority of respondent employer's rank-and-file employees/workers in the proposed bargaining unit
or one hundred thirty-eight (138) as of the date of the filing of the petition, have signed membership with the ALU-
TUCP and have expressed their written consent and authorization to the filing of the petition; (4) that in response to
petitioner union's two letters to the proprietor/ General Manager of respondent employer, dated April 21, 1986 and
May 8, 1 986, requesting for direct recognition as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the rank-and-file
workers, respondent employer has locked out 119 of its rank-and-file employees in the said bargaining unit and had
dismissed earlier the local union president, vice-president and three other active members of the local unions for
which an unfair labor practice case was filed by petitioner union against respondent employer before the NLRC in
Cagayan de Oro City.
 Respondent employer, on the other hand, alleged in its position paper, among others, (1) that due to the nature of its
business, very few of its employees are permanent, the overwhelming majority of which are seasonal and casual and
regular employees; (2) that of the total 138 rank-and-file employees who authorized, signed and supported the filing
of the petition (a) 14 were no longer working as of June 3, 1986 (b) 4 resigned after June, 1986 (c) 6 withdrew their
membership from petitioner union (d) 5 were retrenched on June 23, 1986 (e) 12 were dismissed due to malicious
insubordination and destruction of property and (f) 100 simply abandoned their work or stopped working; (3) that
the 128 incumbent employees or workers of the livestock section were merely transferred from the agricultural
section as replacement for those who have either been dismissed, retrenched or resigned; and (4) that the statutory
requirement for holding a certification election has not been complied with by the union.
 The Labor Arbiter granted the certification election sought for by petitioner union in his order.
 Belyca Corporation, appealed the order of the Labor Arbiter to the Bureau of Labor Relations in Manila, which
denied the appeal and the motion for reconsideration. Thus, the instant petition received in this Court by mail. The
Court resolved to give due course to the petition and to require the parties to submit their respective memoranda
within twenty (20) days from notice
Issue: Whether or not the proposed bargaining unit is an appropriate bargaining unit?
Held: This Court has already taken cognizance of the crucial issue of determining the proper constituency of a
collective bargaining unit. Among the factors considered in Democratic Labor Association v. Cebu Stevedoring Co.
Inc. (103 Phil 1103 [1958]) are: "(1) will of employees (Glove Doctrine); (2) affinity and unity of employee's
interest, such as substantial similarity of work and duties or similarity of compensation and working conditions; (3)
prior collective bargaining history; and (4) employment status, such as temporary, seasonal and probationary
employees".
 Under the circumstances of that case, the Court stressed the importance of the fourth factor and sustained the trial
court's conclusion that two separate bargaining units should be formed in dealing with respondent company, one
consisting of regular and permanent employees and another consisting of casual laborers or stevedores. Otherwise
stated, temporary employees should be treated separately from permanent employees. But more importantly, this
Court laid down the test of proper grouping, which is community and mutuality of interest.
 Coming back to the case at bar, it is beyond question that the employees of the livestock and agro division of
petitioner corporation perform work entirely different from those performed by employees in the supermarts and
cinema. Among others, the noted difference are: their working conditions, hours of work, rates of pay, including the
categories of their positions and employment status. As stated by petitioner corporation in its position paper, due to
the nature of the business in which its livestock-agro division is engaged very few of its employees in the division
are permanent, the overwhelming majority of which are seasonal and casual and not regular employees. Definitely,
they have very little in common with the employees of the supermarts and cinemas. To lump all the employees of
petitioner in its integrated business concerns cannot result in an efficacious bargaining unit comprised of
constituents enjoying a community or mutuality of interest. Undeniably, the rank and file employees of the
livestock-agro division fully constitute a bargaining unit that satisfies both requirements of classification according
to employment status and of the substantial similarity of work and duties which will ultimately assure its members
the exercise of their collective bargaining rights.
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7. G.R. No. 125195. July 17, 1997
SAMAHAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA BANDOLINO-LMLC (represented by Lauro de Leon, President)
and ROMEO REYES, LAURO DE LEON, JAIME SIBUG, ROLANDO RAMOS, FREDDIE ACAMPADO,
REYNALDO DE LA PAZ, ELIAS CABRIA, JOHNNY FLORENCIO, EMELITA BATOON, CORAZON
REYES, DANIEL MARISCOTES, REGOLITO BANAGA, JOSELITO TAPAR, JOSE TUGAY, MARCIAL B.
FRANCO, SALVADOR LLABRES, LIGAYA FRANCO, AUREA B. BONON, ADORACION C. BROZO,
CAMILA TUGA, ROMULO G. ALMONITE, JACINTO RODRIGUEZ, JR., ROSALINDA FLORENCIO, and
EMMA BROZO, Petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, BANDOLINO SHOE
CORPORATION and/or GERMAN ALCANTARA, AIDA ALCANTARA, and MIMI ALCANTARA,
Respondents.
Facts: Petitioners are former employees of private respondent Bandolino Shoe Corporation and members of
petitioner union, Samahan ng Manggagawa sa Bandolino-LMLC. Private respondents German Alcantara, Aida
Alcantara, and Mimi Alcantara are the owners and officers of Bandolino Shoe Corporation.
 Petitioners Franco, Florencio, and Reyes were directed to take a two-week leave because of a strike at the
Shoemart, Bandolinos biggest customer. Petitioners were told by management that, should the circumstances
improve, they would be recalled to work after two weeks. Later that day, petitioner Marcial Franco and his wife
were called to the personnel managers office and told that Ligaya Franco had been dismissed. Marcial Franco
pleaded with German Alcantara not to terminate his wife from employment, but his entreaties were rejected,
allegedly because of his refusal to divulge the names of the organizers and members of the petitioner union. Three
other relatives, were subsequently dismissed. Other petitioners were likewise informed by the personnel manager of
the termination of their employment and asked to turn in their identification cards.
 The petitioners tried to return to work after two weeks, but they were refused entry into the company premises.
Subsequent efforts to return to work were likewise thwarted. The management refused to allow them to return to
work allegedly to prevent any untoward incident between the petitioner union and the Bandolino Shoes Independent
Labor Union.
 Petitioners filed a notice of strike. A conciliation conference was held but it was unsuccessful. Although petitioners
did not strike, they staged a picket for one hour each on two successive Saturdays to protest their dismissal.
 They filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, unfair labor practice, underpayment, overtime pay, and holiday pay.
The Labor Arbiter decided the case in favor of petitioners. He found that petitioners had been illegally dismissed
because of their union activities and that private respondents had committed unfair labor practice. Pursuant to the
decision of the labor arbiter, private respondents sent telegrams to the petitioners ordering them to report to work
immediately. Failure to do so within 10 days shall be interpreted that they are no longer interested to work.
 In a letter, petitioners responded, that while all the complainants are ready and willing to return to work at the
soonest time possible and while we do not in any way reject the scheduled reinstatement, it may not be possible
within the time frame stated in the telegram. In response, private respondents state that there is no justifiable reason
why they should not immediately return to work and cause unnecessary delay.
 Private respondents appealed to the NLRC, contending that the rotation of petitioners was not a termination of
employment; that petitioners did not report for work although they had been reinstated; and that the labor arbiters
finding that the company imposed illegal conditions was based upon an off the record offer which was privileged in
nature and therefore could not be used in evidence against private respondents.
 In its decision, the NLRC reversed the labor arbiter. It ruled that except for Jaime Sibug, petitioners were all piece-
rate workers entitled only to 13th month pay for three years. It held further that there was no evidence showing
specific instances of coercion or restraint committed by the private respondents to justify a finding of ULP.
 Hence, this petition for certiorari.
Issue: Whether or not Private respondents committed Unfair Labor practice ?
Held: In this case, the labor arbiters finding of illegal dismissal was based not only upon the private respondents off
the record offer containing illegal conditions but also on facts of record found by the arbiter which the NLRC
disregarded. These are: (1) that following the order for rotation, some of the petitioners were made to surrender their
IDs and (2) that although the rotation scheme was ostensibly implemented because of the Shoemart strike, even after
the strike had ended, petitioners attempts to return to work were thwarted. In truth, private respondents claim that
petitioners, who were regular employees, were put on rotation while the casual workers were not because petitioners
were skilled and it was much easier for them to find new jobs only succeeds in revealing their real intention.
 Even disregarding evidence of the illegal conditions imposed by private respondents for petitioners return to work,
there was substantial evidence remaining in the record to sustain the labor arbiters decision that private respondents
were guilty of ULP. There was evidence to the effect that Franco had been asked to disclose the names of the
members of the union and that the management had shown interest in the unionizing activities of the petitioners.
What is more, it appears that only alleged members of the petitioner union were put on rotation. The labor arbiters
observation during the hearing that the private respondents had shown hostility towards petitioners for their union
activities is a determination of fact which is based on the totality of private respondents conduct, indicating anti-
union bias. Nor is it disputed that private respondents opposed petitioners petition for certification election when this
matter should be the sole concern of the workers. Private respondents interest belies their claim that they were not
aware of petitioners organizational and union activities prior to the unions registration. An employer may be guilty
of ULP in interfering with the right to self-organization even before the union has been registered.
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8. Colegio de san Juan De Letran vs. Association of Employees and Faculty of Letran, G.R. No. 141471, September
18, 2000.
Facts: Salvador Abtria, then President of respondent union, Association of Employees and Faculty of Letran,
initiated the renegotiation of its Collective Bargaining Agreement with petitioner for the last two (2) years of the
CBA’s five (5) year lifetime from 1989-1994. On the same year, the union elected a new set of officers wherein
private respondent Eleanor Ambas emerged as the newly elected President.
 Ambas wanted to continue the renegotiation of the CBA but petitioner claimed that the CBA was already prepared
for signing by the parties. The parties submitted the disputed CBA to a referendum by the union members, who
eventually rejected the said CBA.
 Petitioner accused the union officers of bargaining in bad faith before the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC). Labor Arbiter Edgardo M. Madriaga decided in favor of petitioner. However, the Labor Arbiter’s decision
was reversed on appeal before the NLRC. The union notified the National Conciliation and Mediation Board
(NCMB) of its intention to strike on the grounds of petitioner’s: non-compliance with the NLRC order.
 The parties agreed to disregard the unsigned CBA and to start negotiation on a new five-year CBA. The union
submitted its proposals to petitioner, which notified the union six days later that the same had been submitted to its
Board of Trustees. In the meantime, Ambas was informed through a letter from her superior that her work schedule
was being changed from Monday to Friday to Tuesday to Saturday. Ambas protested and requested management to
submit the issue to a grievance machinery under the old CBA.
 Due to petitioner’s inaction, the union filed a notice of strike. The parties met before the NCMB to discuss the
ground rules for the negotiation. The union received petitioner’s letter dismissing Ambas for alleged
insubordination. Hence, the union amended its notice of strike to include Ambas’ dismissal.
 Both parties again discussed the ground rules for the CBA renegotiation. However, petitioner stopped the
negotiations after it purportedly received information that a new group of employees had filed a petition for
certification election.
 The union finally struck. The Secretary of Labor and Employment assumed jurisdiction and ordered all striking
employees including the union president to return to work and for petitioner to accept them back under the same
terms and conditions before the actual strike. Petitioner readmitted the striking members except Ambas.
 Public respondent issued an order declaring petitioner guilty of unfair labor practice on two counts and directing the
reinstatement of private respondent Ambas with backwages. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was
denied. Having been denied its motion for reconsideration, petitioner sought a review of the order of the Secretary of
Labor and Employment before the Court of Appeals. The appellate court dismissed the petition and affirmed the
findings of the Secretary of Labor and Employment.
 Hence, petitioner comes to this Court for redress.
Issue: :  (1) whether petitioner is guilty of unfair labor practice by refusing to bargain with the union when it
unilaterally suspended the ongoing negotiations for a new Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) upon mere
information that a petition for certification has been filed by another legitimate labor organization?
 (2) Whether the termination of the union president amounts to an interference of the employees’ right to self-
organization?
Held: Article 252 of the Labor Code defines the meaning of the phrase “duty to bargain collectively,” It is the
requirement on both parties of the performance of the mutual obligation to meet and convene promptly and
expeditiously in good faith for the purpose of negotiating an agreement. Undoubtedly, respondent Association of
Employees and Faculty of Letran (AEFL) lived up to this requisite when it presented its proposals for the CBA to
petitioner. On the other hand, petitioner devised ways and means in order to prevent the negotiation.
 Petitioner’s utter lack of interest in bargaining with the union is obvious in its failure to make a timely reply to the
proposals presented by the latter. More than a month after the proposals were submitted by the union, petitioner still
had not made any counter-proposals. This is a clear violation of Article 250 of the Labor Code governing the
procedure in collective bargaining.
 As we have held in the case of Kiok Loy vs. NLRC,[5] the company’s refusal to make counter-proposal to the
union’s proposed CBA is an indication of its bad faith. Where the employer did not even bother to submit an answer
to the bargaining proposals of the union, there is a clear evasion of the duty to bargain collectively. In the case at
bar, petitioner’s actuation show a lack of sincere desire to negotiate rendering it guilty of unfair labor practice.
 In order to allow the employer to validly suspend the bargaining process there must be a valid petition for
certification election raising a legitimate representation issue. Hence, the mere filing of a petition for certification
election does not ipso facto justify the suspension of negotiation by the employer. The petition must first comply
with the provisions of the Labor Code and its Implementing Rules. Foremost is that a petition for certification
election must be filed during the sixty-day freedom period. The “Contract Bar Rule” states that “No petition for
certification election for any representation issue may be filed after the lapse of the sixty-day freedom period. The
old CBA is extended until a new one is signed. The rule is that despite the lapse of the formal effectivity of the CBA
the law still considers the same as continuing in force and effect until a new CBA shall have been validly executed.
Hence, the contract bar rule still applies.
 In the case at bar, the lifetime of the previous CBA was from 1989-1994. The petition for certification election by
ACEC, allegedly a legitimate labor organization, was filed with the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE)
only on May 26, 1996. Clearly, the petition was filed outside the sixty-day freedom period. Hence, the filing thereof
was barred by the existence of a valid and existing collective bargaining agreement. Consequently, there is no
legitimate representation issue and, as such, the filing of the petition for certification election did not constitute a bar
to the ongoing negotiation. In view of the above, there is no doubt that petitioner is guilty of unfair labor practice by
its stern refusal to bargain in good faith with respondent union.
 Admittedly, management has the prerogative to discipline its employees for insubordination. But when the exercise
of such management right tends to interfere with the employees’ right to self-organization, it amounts to union-
busting and is therefore a prohibited act. The dismissal of Ms. Ambas was dearly designed to frustrate the Union in
its desire to forge a new CBA with the College that is reflective of the true wishes and aspirations of the Union
members. Her dismissal was merely a subterfuge to get rid of her, which smacks of a pre conceived plan to oust her
from the premises of the College. It has the effect of busting the Union , stripping it of its strong-willed leadership.
When management refused to treat the charge of insubordination as a grievance within the scope of the Grievance
Machinery, the action of the College in finally dismissing her from the service became arbitrary, capricious and
whimsical, and therefore violated Ms. Ambas’ right to due process.”