Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
TA M A R H E R Z O G
Defining Nations
IMMIGRANTS AND CITIZENS
I N E A R LY M O D E R N S P A I N
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.
The paper in this book meets the guidelines for permanence and durability of the
Committee on Production Guidelines for Book Longevity of the Council on
Library Resources.
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
Contents
Acknowledgments vii
1. Introduction 1
2. Vecindad: Citizenship in Local Communities 17
3. Vecindad: From Castile to Spanish America 43
4. Naturaleza: The Community of the Kingdom 64
5. Naturaleza: From Castile to Spanish America 94
6. The Other: Conversos, Gypsies, Foreign Catholics,
and Foreign Vassals 119
7. The Crisis of an Empire 141
8. Was Spain Exceptional? 164
9. Conclusions and Afterthoughts 201
Abbreviations 209
Notes 211
Glossary 271
Bibliography 275
Index 323
Acknowledgments
I would like to thank David Nirenberg, Juan Pro Ruíz, Tom Cummins,
Mireille Peytavin, Piero Ventura, John Brewer, Cornell Fleischer, Julius Kirsh-
ner, Steve Pincus, Claudio Lomnitz, Jan Goldstein, Richard Kagan, Jeremy
Adelman, Jim Amelang, and Antonio Manuel Hespanha, each of whom dis-
cussed aspects of this manuscript with me and gave me wise suggestions. S. N.
Eisenstadt, Luis Roniger, and Mario Sznajder asked good questions. The
anonymous readers of the press carefully read the manuscript and advised me
what to change and how. I also thank Jorge and Anahi Myers, José Carlos
Chiaramonte, Marta Valencia, Orense Carlos Cansanello, Guillermo Ban-
zato, Luciano Andrenacci, and the staff at the Archivo General de la Nación,
most particularly Liliana Crespi, Gabriel Taruselli, and Fabián Alonso, who
made my stay in Argentina possible, interesting, and agreeable; José Frank
Ragas Rojas, who assisted me in the Archivo General de la Nación in Lima,
and Carole Leal Curiel, who helped in Caracas; José Manuel Pérez Prendes,
Magdalena Rodríguez Gil, and Clara Alvarez Alonso, who did the same in
Madrid; María Inés Carzolio, Orense Carlos Cansanello, Marcela Ternavasio,
and María Elena Martínez, who allowed me to read and cite their unpublished
papers; Federica Morelli, Gabriela Gómez Cárcamo, and David Nirenberg,
who called my attention to different sources and citations; María Gómez
Garrido, Susan Allan, and Eliza Childs, who edited parts of the manuscript;
viii Acknowledgments
Byron Hamann, who prepared the index; Laura Lobera Argüelles, who of-
fered me her house and plotted a visit to Minorca; and Yuval Erlich, for being
there.
Born in Lima, this book first took shape as a research project at the Institute
for Advanced Study at Princeton. It matured at the University of Chicago and
saw completion at the European University Institute in Florence, Italy. Its
different parts were discussed in the meetings of the Society of Spanish and
Portuguese Historical Studies, the American Historical Association, the
Forum on European Expansion and Global Exchange, and the Association of
European Latin American Historians, and in the seminars of Juan Carlos I of
Spain Center at New York University, Johns Hopkins University, the Interna-
tional House of the University of Michigan–Ann Arbor, the Center for Early
Modern History of the University of Minnesota–Twin Cities Campus, the
University of Kansas at Lawrence, the University of Toulouse–Le Mirail, the
Autonomous University of Madrid, the Max Weber College in Erfurt, Ger-
many, and the Truman Research Institute of the Hebrew University, Israel. I
would like to thank the faculty, students, and staff of these institutions for
their support and encouragement. I would also like to thank the Yad Hanadiv
Foundation and the Social Sciences division of the University of Chicago for
supplying the funds necessary to conduct the archival research.
This book is dedicated to the memory of Francisco Tomás y Valiente and
Luis Castro Leiva, professors and friends, and to that of Jorge Díaz Giménez,
whose love for Spain and the Hispanic world accompanies me despite his
absence.
1
Introduction
1
2 Introduction
distinction between ‘‘good’’ and ‘‘bad’’ immigrants was also applied to people
of different ethnicities, races, religions, or vassalage. It justified the rejection of
converso Jews, the persecution of the Gypsies, the exclusion of individuals of
African descent, and on the contrary, the welcoming to Spain of foreign vas-
sals and foreign Catholics. Distinguishing good from bad immigrants involved
defining good and bad and determining who had the authority to decide these
issues. It was in this realm, of believing or not the good intentions of migrants
and making their integration easier or harder, that most debates took place.
In order to illuminate these questions, I trace the evolution of vecindad and
naturaleza as categories of belonging in early modern Castile, Spain, and
Spanish America mainly during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. I
identify the relation between these categories, the theories explaining them,
and the communities created as a result of these distinctions. I argue that the
classification of people as good or bad was a byproduct of the need to decide
who could enjoy rights and who could be forced to comply with duties. This
was the crucial issue. The decision constituted people as bearers of rights at the
same time it defined them as members of a community. In a period that pre-
dates the elaboration of formal definitions of nationals and citizens (categories
that generally arise at the end of the eighteenth century or the nineteenth
century), belonging to these communities and enjoying these rights constituted
the main mechanism by which citizens and Spaniards were distinguished from
foreigners.
These claims differ from those supported by most contemporary scholar-
ship. Historians who studied early modern communities in the past consis-
tently engaged in debates that were largely modeled according to present-day
perceptions. Anderson, Hobsbawm, and Greenfeld affirmed the legal and po-
litically constructed or even imagined character of nations; Armstrong, An-
thony Smith, and Hastings argued instead that nations were naturally created
as a result of linguistic or ethnic commonalties.∞ For the first, nations were a
modern phenomenon, a byproduct of the emergence of modern states and
modern means of communication; for the second, they existed in the Middle
Ages and they preceded and were independent of the state. The conceptual
difference between ‘‘constructed communities’’ and ‘‘natural communities’’
was also helpful to other historians who instituted a distinction between pa-
triotism and nationalism. Godechot, Brading, and Viroli classified patriotism
as a natural identity, emerging among people who knew one another and who
lived within the boundaries of small communities.≤ They identified national-
ism, on the contrary, with a larger social and geographical unit where collec-
tive identities were indeed willfully invented. Whereas patriotism was a prod-
uct of the past, nationalism was a modern invention. The first was based on
‘‘community’’ (gemeinschaft), the second on ‘‘association’’ (gesellschaft).≥
Introduction 3
Since most people living in early modern Europe felt attached to a local com-
munity, an abstract ‘‘national’’ identity could emerge only when this local
attachment disappeared, indeed, once the modern state came into being. In
spite of recent criticism by such scholars as Peter Sahlins and José María
Portillo Valdés, this analysis still presents both nation and state formation as
antagonistic processes.∂ They confronted an expansionist and artificial state
with ‘‘natural’’ and older peripheral bodies who resisted the penetration of the
state. After their defeat, older and natural communities were replaced by a
sense of belonging to a wider, unified, artificial, national society.
The literature on the development of early modern categories of belonging
largely supports this narrative linking state and nation and affirming that both
were contemporaneous and both emerged as a result of confrontation between
state organs and local communities. Historians of Europe affirm that during the
early modern period the distinction between being of one country or the other
depended on subjection to a sovereign power.∑ Although horizontal ties, inte-
gration, and acceptance were important in determining the way individuals
were actually treated, all treatment that differed from formal legal categories
based on subjection was interpreted as a simple proof for the dissociation
between law and its application and between legal and social categories.∏
Whereas the community of subjects was constructed through vertical ties,
horizontal ties defined a citizenship regime in local communities.π This regime
had no direct bearing on the construction of either state or nation. Local
citizenship existed only in a few privileged municipalities and included only a
minority of men.∫ By the eighteenth century, local status was indicated by
largely honorary titles that were often associated with duties (to be avoided)
rather than with rights (to be obtained). In some cases, such as Spain, local
citizenship was a widespread status, yet it bore no relationship to the classifica-
tion of people as Spaniards or foreigners.Ω In short, in early modern Europe two
community levels coincided: the local community and the community of sub-
jects. According to most research, each of these communities operated on a
different level and had its own implications as well as criteria. Because the local
experience was either irrelevant or unfit for the construction of states and
nations, modern citizenship could be viewed (and reconstructed) only through
the lens of antiquity.∞≠ For precisely the same reason, even historians who did
look at the relation between local communities and central authorities could
pursue their research with little attention to the ways participation in local
communities defined membership in the larger units that eventually became
states or nations. And, although the state was often perceived as a city (re-
public), this did not imply that actual practices in local communities were
applied to the realm of the state.∞≤
I believe that the insistence on distinct community levels and the focus on
4 Introduction
subjection result from the way historians have reconstructed the past. Most
research has centered either on local communities or on national structures,
either on law and doctrine or on social practices. The assumption was that
early modern communities were fundamentally similar to our own. Historians
studied communities with the aim of affirming that they were national or not,
artificial or not, state generated or not. This method reduced communities to
legal definitions, which depended on a dichotomy between a law of birth (that
ascribed individuals to a community by virtue of birth in a given territory) and
descent (that classified individuals in accordance to their genealogy).∞≥ People
participating in the debates about the natural or constructed nature of nations
viewed communities as ensembles whose membership could be reconstructed
and defined conclusively. They gathered that the identification of people as
insiders or outsiders was stable rather than contingent, and they assumed the
transhistorical nature of identity politics. They also supposed that answering
the question of who was a member of the community and who was not was
important to contemporaries a priori and irrespective of conjuncture and cir-
cumstances, and that individuals and local and state authorities invested time
and energy in the identification of people and in establishing their rights.∞∂
If we consider that early modern communities were profoundly different
from our own, then answering the questions currently asked by historians,
and engaging in the above-mentioned debates, is both impossible and unnec-
essary. Instead of asking when the current structures emerged, we need to ask
what kinds of communities existed in the past, how people belonging to them
perceived their participation in them, and how they argued in favor of exclud-
ing or including others. This task is especially important given the nature of
the primary sources at our disposal. Most historians considered letters of
citizenship and naturalization as the only method by which individuals could
obtain classification as insiders or outsiders. Yet, unlike today, early modern
categories of belonging were not embodied in legal definitions or in acts of
authority. Instead they were generated by the ability to use rights or to be
forced to comply with duties. The question was never who was a Spaniard,
who was a Frenchman, or who was a citizen of a local community. At stake
was always the question of who could enjoy a specific right or be obliged to
perform a certain duty. Under such a system, the use of rights of citizens and
natives implied the claim that one was a citizen or a native, and the silence of
those allowing it (both the authorities and other individuals) implied consent.
This meant that most people acted as citizens and as natives and were allowed
to do so without their status ever being questioned or affirmed.∞∑ Indeed, by
enacting the role of citizen or native they created a public image that they were
citizens or natives, and this image in turn allowed them to become citizens or
Introduction 5
natives. The ability to act as citizens or natives and thus become citizens or
natives without any formal declarations explains why citizen lists in European
cities were short in comparison to the actual number of people who identified
or acted as citizens.∞∏ It also explains how the majority of natives were in fact
natives without formal declarations or the elaboration of lists. Indeed, under
such a system, the issuing of formal declarations of citizenship or nativeness,
such as those embodied in letters of citizenship and letters of naturalization,
was the exception and not the rule. Formal declarations were issued only in a
small minority of cases, in which a conflict either occurred or was imminent,
or in which the authorities wished to grant status to people whose circum-
stances did not allow them to make a legitimate claim to membership. In these
cases, the authorities used the letters as both instruments and proofs of their
sovereignty. The letters enabled the municipal authorities or the king to dis-
regard normal procedures and to intervene by constituting as citizens or na-
tives people who were not, or by aiding others whose status was questioned. It
should therefore not surprise us that, as historians have affirmed, most letters
of naturalization were granted to wealthy people who were interested in ob-
taining a certain right. Far from being the only foreigners acting, or wishing to
act, as natives, as other scholars have assumed, wealthy people simply tended
to encounter opposition where other people did not.∞π They therefore invested
the effort and resources needed to secure an official recognition that other
foreigners found unnecessary. And, since the question of who was worthy of
which treatment could be pursued in certain moments and abandoned in
others, and since it could become meaningful under certain circumstances, or
be completely irrelevant in others, the status of certain people could be consen-
sual at one moment and questioned at others. This is why people who had
lived in a community for twenty, thirty, or even forty years without their status
being an issue suddenly had to prove they were citizens or natives.
Since the documents at our disposal describe the exceptions, not the rule, in
each case we must ask ourselves why status was questioned and what agents
and interests were involved. Yet, first and foremost, we must ask what hap-
pened in other cases, indeed, in most cases, where consensus reigned. Moving
beyond existing documentation will, as a rule, enable us to avoid overempha-
sizing the importance of formal procedures and state structures and to discover
the power of implicit social categorizations and ongoing social negotiations in
the creation and definition of early modern communities. This move will dem-
onstrate that, rather than a status leading to entitlement to rights, as would be
the case with citizenship and even nationhood today, belonging to a local
community or the community of the kingdom in the early modern period was a
process.∞∫ As Margaret Sommers has noted, this process was contingent upon
6 Introduction
In this book I look at these questions by analyzing the case of Spain and
Spanish America and trace the evolution of two categories of rights: vecindad
(which denoted the rights of citizens) and naturaleza (which captured the
relationship people had with the community of the kingdom). Vecindad was a
term that originated in Castile in the eleventh and twelfth centuries during the
reconquest and resettlement period. It initially designated the privileges and
duties of individuals who were willing to abandon their communities of origin
and come to settle in lands recovered from the Muslims and now under Chris-
tian control. By the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the vecindad status
lost its immediate relation to immigration on one hand, and to a factual
situation of residence on the other. Instead, it came to imply a wide range of
fiscal, economic, political, social, and symbolic benefits in return for the fulfill-
ment of certain duties. These rights and duties varied from one community to
the next and changed over time. In most communities vecinos could use the
communal property, especially communal pastureland. In small communities,
they participated in managing local affairs through their membership in the
local council (concejo). In large communities, only individuals who purchased
their office, or responded to special criteria of ‘‘honor’’ or seniority, partici-
pated in the local council. Vecinos, however, could still influence local politics
by electing their representatives to the council, by being elected to certain
offices, or by participating in public meetings (concejo abierto). In some cases,
vecinos also enjoyed special commercial privileges, such as lower tariffs or the
right to introduce certain products into the local markets. Among the duties of
vecinos was the obligation to submit to the local authorities. Vecinos had to
pay their fair share of the taxes levied on the community as a whole (most
taxes) and contribute to other public expenses, such as hiring a professional
surgeon or subsidizing public works. They were expected to join the local
militia and reside in the community.
Introduction 7
eign competitors received better treatment in Spain.≤∏ They enjoyed the pro-
tection of their national laws and consuls and could produce, buy, or sell
goods without being members of a guild. Most important, they did not have to
pay royal or local taxes.
As happened in the case of vecindad, most historians have assumed that
nativeness had a clear legal definition.≤π They reproduced the few legal enact-
ments that mentioned nativeness, without taking into account the fact that
they all referred to specific situations and specific rights or duties. They dis-
regarded all contemporary mention of rules absent in the legislation and re-
fused to take seriously a discourse emphasizing the importance of love among
community members. They also considered all failures to observe the require-
ments enumerated in the laws as cases of corrupt and illegal practices.≤∫ Al-
though historians argued that nativeness was a condition denoting integration
in a political community, one that in contemporary terms would embody the
idea of ‘‘nationality,’’ they maintained that it operated separately in each Span-
ish kingdom.≤Ω Historically, there were natives of Castile, natives of Aragon,
natives of Catalonia, but never ‘‘natives of Spain.’’ During the early modern
period, they concluded, ‘‘Spain’’ was meaningful only as a religious creed and
as a community of descent.
When the evidence is studied it becomes apparent that the few cases pre-
sented by historians are more the exception than the rule. It becomes clear that
contemporaries considered legal enactments and formal declarations as exam-
ples. Rather than a fragmentary regime suggested by the various legislative
pieces, or a regime totally dependent on the king as letters of naturalization
indicated, nativeness had a logic of its own. This logic determined that people
who were integrated in the community and were willing to comply with its
duties were indeed natives, independent of their place of birth or descent and
independent of formal declarations.
Despite their different genealogy and origin, and despite representing dif-
ferent interests and apparently different community levels, in the early mod-
ern period vecindad and naturaleza came to be associated with one another. In
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, vecindad, which originally defined
only local immigration policies, influenced nativeness, which designated a
relation to the kingdom. During this period vecindad was instituted as a mech-
anism of naturalization, allowing foreigners to become natives and inducing
the classification of natives who lost their vecindad as foreigners. It was
through their relation to a local community that people took their places in
the kingdom, and it was the lack of such a connection that made them for-
eigners. Although religion was important, and Catholicism was indeed a
precondition for achieving recognition as citizen or native, religion was not
10 Introduction
sufficient on its own. Vassalage, on the contrary, was the result of, and not a
condition for naturalization.
Spain, therefore, was not defined solely by reference to religion, vassalage,
or even descent as historians have argued in the past. Rather than constituting
a ‘‘nation,’’ naturaleza constituted a community that defined who could enjoy
the rights of Spaniards. This definition depended on implied categorizations
and norms, and it varied according to the interests of individual agents or
groups and the specific circumstances of time and place. Reconstructing the
boundaries of the community by examining who was allowed to use which
rights enables us to step aside from most affirmations concerning the nature of
both state and nation in early modern Spain and Spanish America.≥≠ In Spain,
these affirmations confront a first group of historians who argue that during
the early modern period ‘‘Spain’’ was only a geographical idea or a political
project, and a second group who believes that ‘‘Spain’’ had always existed.
According to the first, until the eighteenth century, and possibly even later, the
only bond among the different Spanish kingdoms and communities, which
were politically, culturally, legally, and linguistically differentiated, was a com-
mon allegiance to the monarch and the Catholic church.≥∞ According to the
second, inherent and natural ties connected Spaniards to one another from as
early as the fifth century.≥≤ In twentieth-century Spain, these visions led to
debates between regional nationalists, who affirmed the existence of separate
nations in each of the Iberian kingdoms, and Spanish nationalists, who denied
it.≥≥ It allowed claiming that local communities and the state were antagonists,
and that only when local allegiances were suppressed could a national identity
come into being.≥∂ The importance of integration as a mechanism by which
people could become worthy of rights and communities could be defined also
led to a well-known controversy between Américo Castro and Claudio Sán-
chez Albornoz. The former attested that Spaniards forged themselves histor-
ically by mixing with other cultures and races, and the latter insisted that a
‘‘Spain’’ existed since the early Middle Ages and that it had constantly fought
against all external influences, including but not limited to the presence of
Jewish and Moorish populations.≥∑ In the Spanish American case, claims were
made for the existence of a ‘‘national’’ discourse during the colonial period, or
on the contrary, for the construction of nations only after independence. It was
generally assumed that people were classified according to their place of birth
and not according to their activities or wishes.≥∏
If vecindad and naturaleza operated on a daily level in social settings where
the ability of individuals to use rights could be consensual or not, affirmed or
denied by a multiplicity of agents, some of whom were ‘‘official,’’ and some not,
how can one speak of an ‘‘invented’’ or a ‘‘natural’’ community? How can local
Introduction 11
to the documents I had studied in Spain and realized how important and how
pervasive naturalization by integration was. I ‘‘suddenly’’ discovered it in the
legislation and in court cases. I ‘‘suddenly’’ understood that debates in the
Spanish parliament (cortes) dealt only with one type of naturalization (by
royal letter), but not another (by integration). Without comparative cases,
such insight would not have been possible. Comparison was also the motiva-
tion behind looking at the Iberian world on both sides of the Atlantic. Rather
than wanting to explain New World orders, I perceived Spain and Spanish
America as a single space, and I attempted to understand developments in
both by constantly looking at one side and the other. Although I learned that
Castilian practices changed in the New World, I often discovered that these
changes illuminated what was happening in Spain as much as they told about
the conditions in Spanish America.
Another way to reconstruct the rule by using the exceptions was to consult a
wide array of sources—legislation, legal and political literature, administrative
records, administrative correspondence, and political debates, especially those
taking place in the parliament (cortes) and among cities with voting rights in
parliament. I studied some 3,500 cases in which the classification of people as
citizens or natives became necessary, including formal petitions for citizenship
or nativeness and instances where the status of individuals was called into
question when they sought to do something that was restricted to citizens or
natives. These sources proceed from municipal records and from the archives of
merchant guilds and other economic bodies, such as the juntas of agriculture
and commerce. They are included in the documentation generated by the
Council of the Indies, the Council of Castile, and the Council of State, the
House of Trade (Casa de Contratación), and the local American authorities. I
also considered a wide array of other materials, such as lists of citizens, tax-
payers, and militiamen and letters of citizenship and naturalization.
Throughout this book, I translate vecindad as ‘‘citizenship.’’ In doing so I
follow the path already taken by other historians.∂≤ This translation does not
imply that vecindad was identical to present-day citizenship. Within the scope
of Old Regime societies, however, vecindad was certainly similar to other
contemporary institutions that described the relationship between individuals
and local communities, such as citizenship in Italian city-states.∂≥ Translating
vecindad as citizenship is also authorized by the fact that the Spanish term
currently indicating citizens (ciudadano) was completely absent in early mod-
ern legal and administrative records.∂∂ In contemporary political literature,
this term was either used as a synonym for ‘‘subject,’’ or it was modeled
according to classical authors. In the first case, it designated a relationship
with the monarch, one that in legal, administrative, and social settings corre-
Introduction 15
sponded to the term vasallo (vassal).∂∑ In the second case, it designated the
perfect citizen who lived in a city and who had certain moral and behavioral
traits that were considered essential for the well running of a perfect repub-
lic.∂∏ On both accounts, ciudadano fails to describe citizenship as practiced in
early modern Castile; vecindad, on the contrary, does so perfectly.
In this book I write about Castile, Spain, and Spanish America. By ‘‘Castile’’
I mean the crown of Castile. I use this term mainly to study the local commu-
nities included in the jurisdiction of this crown or to examine the evolution of
nativeness (naturaleza) before the early eighteenth century. ‘‘Spain’’ designates
the collectivity of the Spanish kingdoms as defined in Spanish America in the
late sixteenth century (‘‘natives of the kingdoms of Spain’’) and as created in
the Iberian peninsula in the beginning of the eighteenth century. By ‘‘Spanish
America’’ I refer mainly to the Spanish territories in the Southern Hemisphere.
Wishing to circumscribe the object of my inquiry, I decline to explore the
specific ways by which the Spanish community interacted with the Indian one.
This interaction, I believe, is well covered in contemporary research, as well as
in different studies centered on the formation of purity of blood (limpieza de
sangre) and mestizos categories in Spanish America. Instead, I center my atten-
tion on the processes by which Spaniards distinguished themselves from one
another and from other Europeans, and the ways they justified giving member-
ship privileges to certain people. For lack of space and because of the highly
casuistic nature of the privileges attached to citizenship and nativeness, I de-
cline to analyze their material ramification in each individual case. Instead, I
study debates about the ability to enjoy privileges not in order to evaluate
these privileges, but in order to examine processes of identification. For the
same reason, I use no quantitative analysis, nor do I necessarily mention the
specific results obtained in each case. My goal is not to determine how fre-
quently this or that opinion was pronounced or who was successful in his
claims. Instead, I look at the ways communities were described in social pro-
cesses of inclusion and exclusion.
Although centered on early modern Spain and Spanish America, this book
calls into question our understanding of other early modern communities.
There are many indications in the literature on Italy, France, and England that
status was just as ambiguous and contingent in these countries as well; that on
most occasions status was neither requested nor acknowledged but was in-
stead a byproduct of the enjoyment of rights; that a direct relation existed
between membership in a local community and in the kingdom. It was also
clearly the case that in all three countries formal rules were modified by so-
cial practices. The rules themselves were highly complex, and they included
both local and royal laws as well as a great diversity of other norms, such as
16 Introduction
‘‘natural law,’’ ‘‘common law,’’ or ‘‘Roman law,’’ which seriously modified the
nature and extent of rights, and thus of status. Indeed, a preliminary review of
the existing literature on Italy, England, and France (chapter 8) suggested that
Spain was exceptional. A closer reading indicates that it was not. The need to
redefine the object of study, the questions asked, and the methodology used is
thus as pertinent to other cases as it is to Spain and Spanish America. Further
research needs to be done if we wish to fully understand the way early modern
European communities were formed over time. This understanding will clarify
the relation between local communities, citizenship, state, and nation. Observ-
ing the intersection between state and nation and between social practices and
legal enactments in this way, we can provide an alternative vision of European
history, one that explores the (neglected) connection between horizontal and
vertical social ties and that looks at the construction of communities from
both below and above.
2
17
18 Vecindad: Local Communities
legal standards between one community and the other was substantial, and a
variety of local laws existed, each replicating the conditions under which the
specific community was created. With the consolidation of royal authority and
the introduction of ius commune (revived Roman law) in the kingdom, mostly
from the late fourteenth century onward, many communities began defining
the ways citizenship could be achieved and the conditions for its achievement.∂
In most cases, they presented citizenship as a legal tie that could have external
manifestations, such as residence, but contrary to the reconquest period, it no
longer depended on them. Instead, citizenship was formulated as a contract in
which the newcomer agreed to certain obligations (mainly to reside in the
community and to pay taxes) in return for receiving certain benefits (usually
access to communal lands and office holding).∑ By the sixteenth century, this
citizenship regime extended to all Castilian communities. Whether under
royal or seigniorial jurisdiction, whether rural or urban, the people of all three
estates were divided between citizens (vecino) and noncitizens (residentes or
forasteros).∏ Citizens enjoyed a wide array of privileges and were obliged to
comply with many duties from which noncitizens were excluded. Principal
among their rights was the privilege of using communal property and, in most
communities, of voting and being elected to office. Principal among their
duties was the obligation to reside in the community, pay taxes and other
public expenses, and serve in the local militia.
Local citizenship in Castile is well documented for the medieval period, and
dozens of studies describe the ways it was obtained or lost, as well as the rights
and duties attached to it.π Covering the thirteenth to the fifteenth centuries,
these studies tend to focus on a specific community and argue that citizenship
was highly localized in scope and differed dramatically from one place to
another. Each community defined citizenship differently, through its local laws
and constitutions ( fueros), and attributed citizens with different sets of rights
and obligations.
Although studies of medieval citizenship are numerous, hardly any research
had been done on early modern Castilian citizenship.∫ This is surprising given
that many scholars refer to Castilians as vecinos and habitually affirm the
importance of local communities to the governing of Spain, on one hand, and to
the generation of collective identities, on the other.Ω In general, it is assumed
either that medieval practices, which were highly fragmented and locally based,
continued into the early modern period or that during the early modern period
citizenship became a flexible regime, with no particular or clear guidelines.
The idea that early modern Castilian citizenship continued to be a highly
fragmented and locally based practice is due to the fact that Castilian local
laws and constitutions ( fueros) enumerate the conditions required to exercise
Vecindad: Local Communities 19
the rights attached to citizenship, yet these conditions differ for each commu-
nity, time, and the type of privilege or duty involved.∞≠ The ordinances of Avila
(1487), for example, determine that in order to use the communal pasture, one
had to be a citizen, and that citizens are defined as individuals who live in the
community continuously or the largest part of the year, own a house, and pay
taxes.∞∞ According to the ordinances of Jaén (1573), citizens are individuals
who reside in the city with their family or who establish domicile in the juris-
diction. Citizens who wish to use the communal pasture have to request for-
mal admission into the community by petitioning the local council to recog-
nize them as citizens and by promising to reside in Jaén for the next ten years.∞≤
In Archidona (1598), ‘‘no one would be considered a citizen . . . without first
being received by the council, guaranteeing his compliance with citizenship’s
duties, and buying a house and a vineyard within a year of his reception to the
community.’’ Citizens of Archidona must also bring their families to the juris-
diction and live there for at least ‘‘four continuous years.’’∞≥
If local laws and constitutions indicate the highly fragmented nature of
citizenship, laws pertaining to the kingdom as a whole—such as the Siete
Partidas, Fuero Viejo, Fuero Real, the Recopilación, and the Novísima Recop-
ilación—hardly make any mention of citizenship, let alone define it. Although
they affirm the liberty of all vassals to change their place of residence and
become citizens of new communities, these laws fail to explain the mechanism
allowing this change. They simply state that ‘‘any person who lives and re-
sides in any city, town or village of our kingdoms . . . that wishes to live in
another . . . can do so and become a citizen of a new community,’’ and they
stress that prohibiting such a movement would be ‘‘against justice and reason
and against their liberty, which is notorious to all.’’∞∂
This lack of explanation and the specificities of local legislation has led some
historians to the conclusion that during the early modern period no Castilian-
wide citizenship existed. This conclusion was further encouraged by the lack
of reference to citizenship in the legal literature. This literature describes some
of the rights and privileges of citizens, yet it fails to define who the citizens are
and how citizenship can be obtained.∞∑ Castilian political literature is also
silent on issues of citizenship. Alonso de Castrillo, Diego de Guerra, and
Sebastián de Covarrubias address the ciudadano rather than the vecino. They
describe only the urban citizen, who symbolizes both virtue and order, and use
him to portray the ‘‘perfect republic’’ rather than the existing one.∞∏ Juan de
Mariana and Martín González de Cellorigo see the kingdom as a community
of people subject to a king and so portray the ciudadano as a vassal rather than
as a citizen.∞π In both cases, early modern political literature fails to illuminate
citizenship (vecindad) as practiced in Castilian local communities.
20 Vecindad: Local Communities
Citizenship in Seville
According to documents stored in Seville’s municipal archives, people
who wanted to become citizens of the city had to petition the local council. In
the seventeenth century and until the 1710s, those born in the city presented
Vecindad: Local Communities 21
their baptismal record and an affidavit stating that they intended to remain in
the jurisdiction. Newcomers had to prove, also by affidavit, that they had
resided in the city for at least ten years as heads of households. During this
period, it was explicitly asserted that the affidavit was sufficient: candidates
did not have to present any other form of proof, and witnesses were heard only
in cases of doubt. A standing committee (caballeros diputados de vecindades)
studied the petitions and advised the city council on how to proceed. In some
cases, third parties—for example, the guild to which the candidate belonged
or would join if admitted—also expressed their views regarding the candi-
date’s acceptability to the community.∞Ω
After 1710, gradual changes were introduced in this regime.≤≠ Codified in
1743, these changes required that all candidates present proof of their resi-
dence in the city and their condition as heads of households. Possible proofs
included the testimony of a parish priest or the submission of original receipts
for rental fees. After these documents were collected, the candidates presented
witnesses. These witnesses, usually friends and neighbors, would testify that
the petitioner had expressed in words and acts his desire to remain in Seville
permanently. Parallel procedures were instituted for newcomers married to
local women. These newcomers had to present marriage certificates and orally
identify their place of residence, and they had to promise to remain perma-
nently in the community.≤∞ In these cases, and those of other newcomers, once
the files were completed the representative of municipal interests ( procurador)
advised the council how to proceed. If and when citizenship was granted,
newcomers took an oath that they would maintain residence in the city, back-
ing it by a security deposit called fianza de guardar vecindad.≤≤ Also according
to the 1743 ruling, those born in Seville could continue to request citizenship
in the old way, by submitting only a petition and an affidavit. Native-born
petitioners were not required to take an oath or to secure financially their
continued residence in the community.≤≥
Further modifications in the citizenship acquisition procedures occurred in
the 1770s. During this period authorities in Seville expressed their concern re-
garding the presence in the city of a great number of wealthy inhabitants, many
of them foreign merchants who, despite their prolonged residence, had never
requested citizenship. Their lack of commitment to the community had impor-
tant consequences. As noncitizens, they paid no local taxes. In a system where
taxes were levied on the community as a whole but were distributed among
and paid only by those recognized as citizens, individuals classified as citizens
had to carry an unfair tax burden. Citizenship, the municipal authorities now
claimed, was both a privilege and a duty.≤∂ An interested party could request it,
but the authorities could also impose it on people who did not wish to claim it.
22 Vecindad: Local Communities
and the 1770s. Because these were also the periods during which citizenship
practices were modified, it is possible to argue that a link existed between
socioeconomic circumstances, immigration policies, and municipal regulation
of citizenship. As long as Seville served as the main port of communication with
Spanish America, the local authorities allowed immigrants to become citizens
simply by petitioning and by personally ensuring that they had resided in the
city for more than ten years. As Seville’s special privileges faded, and the fight to
preserve them failed (1710s–1740s), the authorities adopted a more restricted
vision of citizenship. The easy integration of newcomers was no longer encour-
aged, and the authorities created obstacles to citizenship by demanding that
candidates present more proofs (such as witnesses and written receipts for rent
paid) and by requiring a longer administrative process. By the 1770s, with the
complete breakdown of the monopoly system and as the city plunged into
economic crisis, the main objective of the authorities was to ease economic
pressure by extending citizenship to all permanent, wealthy residents.
This analysis leaves many questions unanswered. For example, we don’t
know why until the early eighteenth century ten-year residence could trans-
form inhabitants into citizens. Nor do we know why after 1743 candidates for
citizenship had to prove that they wished to remain in the community perma-
nently or how the municipality could force some inhabitants into citizenship
in the 1770s against their will. This forcing of citizenship was justified by
Seville’s authorities on the grounds that ‘‘Castilian law’’ clearly indicated who
should be considered a citizen. Persons who met the prerequisites for citizen-
ship could be considered citizens whether they requested this status or not. Yet
the Castilian law mentioned by Seville’s authorities is nowhere to be found. It
is not enumerated in Castilian legal codes, nor is it included in Castilian legal
and political literature.
The search for this ‘‘missing’’ law becomes especially important once we
establish that on many occasions Seville’s authorities accepted as citizens peo-
ple who did not comply with the normal requirements for citizenship. For
example, in 1735 Seville’s council granted citizenship to Antonio Joseph de
Saavedra, whose grandparents, once citizens of Seville, had left the city, and
who resided elsewhere.≤∏ Was this decision a simple proof of illegal and cor-
rupt practices, a gap between law and its implementation? Antonio Joseph
testified that his family originated from Seville and that its individual members
continued to act as citizens of Seville. The members of the city council gave
credit to his allegations. They noted that Antonio Joseph’s parents and grand-
parents paid some local taxes and they agreed that their continuing engage-
ment with the community demonstrated that despite their absence from the
city they did not renounce their citizenship. What were they talking about?
24 Vecindad: Local Communities
The mixing of ius commune with local understanding, practices, and needs
produced an unwritten yet frequently invoked Castilian common law. This
law, which did not depend on legislation, nor was reproduced in it, was never-
theless cited by litigants in defense of their citizenship rights and by commu-
nities in their efforts to forcibly enroll citizens as well as in their refusal to
accept ‘‘undeserving’’ applicants. Jurists were aware of the fact that this law
originated in ius commune.≥∑ Yet for most people citing it, this law depended
on natural law, rather than on man-made legal arrangements. It was common
to all humanity, it had been practiced since antiquity, and it was based on the
way God created this world (see chapter 8).
political unit, the (extended) family. This usually implied that they resided in
an independent residence—whether as proprietors or as renters,—and that,
preferably, they were married and had children.∂≠ Women and minors (under
age twenty-five) were not eligible for citizenship. In the case of women, it was
generally understood that, as members of a household, they obtained some of
the benefits of citizenship by way of dependence. They first enjoyed the rights
attached to the citizenship status of their fathers and, upon marriage, they
attained some of the privileges attached to the citizenship status of their hus-
bands. This state changed only when women became independent heads of
households. In these cases, women gained a full legal capacity and, among
other things, could express a legally binding intention, such as the intention to
acquire citizenship.∂∞ This reality was evident in the documents I consulted:
only women who were widows or solitary spinsters petitioned for citizenship.∂≤
The case of minors (persons under twenty-five) was much more complex.
Unlike women, minors had no legal capacity at all and, as a result, their ability
to declare their intention to become citizens was legally impaired. Because
they were under the protection of legal guardians, it was questionable whether
minors could express an independent intention to become citizens. Neverthe-
less, the ability of minors to acquire citizenship was an extremely important
issue in cases where they owned cows, sheep, and the like and wished to use
the communal pasture. When the minors lived in the same community as their
guardians, and it was in this community that they owned property, the ques-
tion of their ability to use communal pastures was seldom raised because they
could exercise the privileges of citizenship (use of pastures) as members of a
citizen’s household. But when the guardian was not a citizen of the community
where the minor owned property, a decision was needed regarding the minor’s
ability to acquire an independent citizenship. Certain municipalities allowed
minors to obtain (or retain) citizenship despite the foreignness of their guard-
ians and even despite their physical absence from the jurisdiction, yet other
communities refused to do so.∂≥
community excluded all people who were not ‘‘of the noble estate of hidalgo,
with letters and orders to prove it.’’∂Ω Santiago could be acknowledged as
citizen only if he proved ‘‘his quality as a nobleman.’’
Genealogy could also intervene in other cases. In 1758, the council of Tres-
paderne (jurisdiction of Burgos) refused to grant citizenship to Santiago Gar-
cía because of his family’s employment in ‘‘mechanical or vile occupation.’’∑≠
All other members of the community were ‘‘pure of blood,’’ and none of them
was ever employed in such low offices. Admitting a person who did not re-
spond to these characteristics would endanger the collective well-being by
destroying the reputation of the community and introducing divisions among
its citizens. Thereafter, citizens would no longer be equal to one another and
would no longer be able to ‘‘drink from the same cup.’’ The council of Tres-
paderne also stressed that whereas people of different characteristics, status,
and estates could easily coexist in a big community, in a small settlement like
their own, such a practice would be disastrous.
single person not enjoy citizenship rights in two communities, nor be required
to comply with citizenship obligations twice. The notion that people could be
citizens of only one community at the time also justified the 1798 exclusion of
Manuel Rojo Martín y Néstor from the town meeting of Arensena de Abajo
(jurisdiction of La Rioja).∑∂ Manuel was a citizen of Villarejo and as a ‘‘true’’
and complete citizen of that other village, he could not also be a citizen
of Arensena.
Obtaining Citizenship
People seeking recognition as citizens had to petition the local council
and to supply the necessary proofs. Such was the case in Seville, but this
practice was also followed in many other contemporary communities in Cas-
tile in which the council—or the entire citizen body in cases of small commu-
nities—could grant or refuse to grant citizenship to newcomers.∑∑ But if com-
munities were forced to accept people who requested status as citizens, what
was the meaning of formal citizenship acquisition procedures?
In spite of the formal proceedings, it is clear that in Castile the role of local
councils and communities in the classification of citizens was limited. For
example, when the status of individuals was discussed as a by-product of their
wish to enjoy certain rights or their duty to obey certain obligations, it was
often apparent that the citizenship status of individuals who had no previous
official recognition could be acknowledged. On these occasions, formal ad-
mission into the community was not at stake. In spite of the absence of a
formal declaration, these individuals were considered citizens and therefore
worthy of treatment as citizens, their citizenship coming into being even be-
fore the community and its organs intervened. The local judge told Agustín
Vázquez, who had resided with his family in Pozo Antiguo (jurisdiction of
Zamora) for nine years that, in his condition as noncitizen, he could no longer
use the communal pasture.∑∏ In response, Agustín obtained from the provin-
cial judge (corregidor) a ruling that he had always been a citizen although he
had never obtained formal recognition. The authorities of Villarramiel (juris-
diction of Palencia) told Melchor Pardo in 1791 that he could not receive a
land plot because his citizenship was unclear.∑π He appealed the decision to the
royal court (chancillería) and presented proofs that he was a ‘‘true and legiti-
mate citizen.’’ These proofs included his residence in an open house, and his
willingness to remain in the community and contribute to its finances. Mel-
chor specifically stated that to be recognized as a citizen, there was no need for
a formal reception. Indeed, the community and its authorities did not confer
citizenship as much as recognize its existence. Although the authorities of
30 Vecindad: Local Communities
Villarramiel agreed that this might be the case in some communities, they
insisted that in their community only those formally acknowledged as citizens
could enjoy the rights of citizenship. Melchor, the authorities explained, knew
about this custom. The fact that he had not requested to be formally admitted
as citizen until the present demonstrated that he did not want to become a
citizen. The appellate court (chancillería) disagreed and declared Melchor a
citizen from the day he first became worthy of this status.
The practice of a posteriori recognition demonstrated that other mecha-
nisms for acquiring citizenship existed parallel to the formal procedures.
These mechanisms constituted citizenship without the intervention of the au-
thorities. They allowed citizenship to come into being by persons enacting the
role of citizens, thereby proving themselves worthy of citizenship. This auto-
matic conversion of people from foreigners to citizens was the natural result of
a theory that determined that people became citizens by virtue of their inten-
tion, and their intention alone. Although this intention had to be verified and
embraced by the receiving community, in both theory and practice, the activity
of the community and its organs was limited to this verification.
Many petitioners explicitly stated this fact. They insisted that local councils
did not constitute them as citizens but only recognized that they were already
citizens. Indeed, citizenship acquisition procedures only declared what was
established beforehand. As Agustín Cordovilla Sánchez, who defended his
right to use the communal pasture, put it: ‘‘Even without the solemnity of an
expressed reception to the community, effectuated by the council, he should be
considered strictly as a citizen, because of his continuous residence and the
settled house that he owned.’’∑∫
This understanding of citizenship did not stop many Castilian communities
from maintaining formal procedures for citizenship acquisition. These com-
munities, for example, Cordobilla (jurisdiction of Salamanca), Villarramiel
(Palencia), Ojacastro (La Rioja), Jaén, and Archidona, stated that, unless their
authorities issued formal declarations, no one should be allowed to enjoy the
rights of citizenship.∑Ω But even in these cases communal recognition was a
political rather than a legal necessity. Formal reception allowed the commu-
nity to identify its citizen body, and it served to limit the discussion about the
correct classification of individuals.
The idea that citizenship was a status that was recognized, rather than
created, by local authorities allows us to understand how these authorities
were able to force people into citizenship. In the 1770s, the council of Seville
argued that the people it targeted, indeed, forced to act as citizens by paying
taxes, were citizens whether they had requested citizenship or not. Their cit-
izenship came into being by way of prescription and by the fact that they acted
Vecindad: Local Communities 31
as citizens. Since they were citizens, they were required to comply with citizen-
ship duties. Hence, despite municipal insistence on maintaining formal pro-
cedures for citizenship acquisition, even in Seville citizenship could be con-
stituted on its own without municipal intervention. It could be created by a
public perception that certain individuals behaved as citizens. Individuals who
were perceived as citizens of Seville had to clarify their wish to dissociate with
the community if they wanted to remain outsiders. Only such an open and
explicit clarification would counter the general rule according to which he
who acted as a citizen, or was reputed to be a citizen, was indeed a citizen. The
discussion in Seville in the 1770s pointed directly to this question: ‘‘He who
lives in a settled house in these kingdoms must be considered citizen . . . he has
against him the presumption and it must be his duty to establish, by some facts
or cases, that he had been here with no intention to remain.’’ Silence would
imply consent.∏≠
Loss of Status
The duality between a formal regime of citizenship by declaration and
an implied reception into the community by enacting the role of citizen was
paralleled by the ability to lose—formally or implicitly—the status of citizen.
In some communities, such as Madrid, formal procedures existed allowing
citizens to terminate their relationship with the community by petitioning
their desavecindamiento (literally, the undoing of citizenship).∏∞ Unless such
petitions were made, people continued to be citizens, independent of their
activities and wishes. Yet, in most communities, people could lose their status
as citizens if they transferred their residence to another jurisdiction where they
acted as citizens, or if they failed to comply with citizenship duties. No petition
or formal declaration was required in these case, and people who considered
themselves citizens could thus find out one day that they were no longer
citizens. The authorities of San Miguel de la Ribera (jurisdiction of Zamora)
did not allow Baltazar Delgado to use the communal pasture in 1769 because
his citizenship had expired once he refused to comply with citizens’ obliga-
tions, the last straw being his unwillingness to serve as a local judge (alcalde
ordinario) the previous year.∏≤ From the moment Baltazar failed to act as a
citizen, the authorities said, he demonstrated that he no longer felt a member
of the community and thus he was no longer a citizen. Manuel Rojo Martín y
Néstor was told in 1789 that the authorities of Arensena de Abajo (jurisdic-
tion of La Rioja) no longer considered him a citizen.∏≥ To publicly demonstrate
that he was still a citizen, Manuel attended the council meeting, in which only
citizens were allowed to participate. Alas, the other members refused to admit
32 Vecindad: Local Communities
Verifying Intentions
Intention to become a citizen was thus sufficient to constitute citizen-
ship, and its absence was a cause to terminate the relationship between an
individual and a community. But who verified the existence of this intention
and when did verification take place? As mentioned earlier, the local authori-
ties verified citizenship when they exercised their power to declare formally
that certain individuals were citizens. Verification, however, could also be
implicit in the activities of these authorities. Their willingness to accept taxes
paid by certain individuals was considered an implicit recognition of citizen-
ship.∏∂ Those allowed to act as citizens—for example, those who were em-
ployed in local offices or used the communal pasture—were also tacitly ad-
mitted as citizens.∏∑ In some cases, the identification between the exercise of
rights and the subsequent acquisition of citizenship was such that people con-
fused one with the other. In 1776, Vicente de Saura asked the authorities of
Valladolid whether his nomination as a rural judge (alcalde de la hermandad)
implied that he was accepted as a citizen or whether he was still required to
request formal admission to the community.∏∏
Status verification was not limited to the local authorities. Other members
of the community could also exercise it by implicitly recognizing people as
citizens when they tolerated their behavior as citizens. Once allowed to act
as citizens, people were reputed as citizens and were instituted as citizens.∏π
These processes involved in acting as a citizen were social rather than legal or
political. They silently operated in day-to-day interactions. People could lead
their goats to the communal pasture, participate in local assemblies, and pay
taxes without asking for recognition as citizens or having to prove that they
were citizens. Their acceptance into the community and their transformation
into citizens were implicit. In the absence of conflict or fear of conflict, there
was no reason for things to happen differently.
Formal decisions were required only in exceptional cases when conflicts
occurred. Conflicts could be generated by the municipal wish to control immi-
gration. The authorities of Uruñuela (jurisdiction of La Rioja) refused to recog-
Vecindad: Local Communities 33
nize Jorge García as a citizen in 1748 because the community was ‘‘so small and
limited, that it was insufficient even to contain the existing citizens, their cattle
and fields.’’∏∫ In 1770, Arisgotas (jurisdiction of Toledo) explained that Pedro
de los Infantes could not become a citizen because communal resources could
not support an additional member.∏Ω Occasionally, councils paired restricted
local resources with the conviction that a specific newcomer would contribute
nothing to the community. This was the case in 1782 when Valverde de la Sierra
(jurisdiction of León) refused to recognize Joseph Corvillos as a citizen. Joseph
was a poor man who had no interest in remaining in the jurisdiction where he
owned nothing. His presence in the community was ‘‘burdensome to the com-
mon in this sterile land, that suffered annually from heavy snows because of its
narrowness and its high elevation, and in which during the four months of the
winter we often cannot leave our own houses.’’π≠ The matching of local circum-
stances with the specific characteristics of certain candidates also happened in
contrary cases: communities sometimes feared that newcomers would monop-
olize the use of communal property or that their citizenship would limit munici-
pal liberty. Such fears motivated attempts to exclude Agustín Vázquez from his
community of residence in 1784, judging that he was too wealthy and would
use too much pastureland.π∞ Jorge García was rejected for the same reason in
1748: he was much too affluent and had too many properties and animals.π≤
Conflicts concerning the citizenship of individuals could also be motivated
by other considerations. In 1684, the authorities of Villamayor de Campos
(jurisdiction of Zamora) refused to admit Pedro de Luaces Seijas to citizenship
on the grounds that his character was questionable and that he did not get along
with his neighbors.π≥ His occupation as a barber did not help his petition; the
community had already contracted the services of another barber, and it was
too small to employ both. In 1753, Estepar (jurisdiction of Burgos) refused to
admit José Quintanillas to citizenship, explaining that he was a litigious person
who acted proudly and pretended to dominate his fellow men.π∂ The local
council narrated how, during the time he resided in the community, he mal-
treated and often insulted the other members whom he considered ‘‘simple
folk.’’ Similar allegations were also made in 1784 against Agustín Vázquez and
his wife, who were accused of having bad tempers and a family that was far too
large to support within the confines of a small settlement.π∑
Some cases give us a clear indication of the importance of personal ani-
mosities in the generation of conflicts regarding the citizenship of individ-
uals. In 1678, Marcelo de Zancada explained that he failed to obtain recog-
nition as a citizen because of a debt two councilmen owed to his current
employee. According to Jerónimo Francos, Aguilar de Campos (jurisdiction of
Valladolid) imposed new conditions on his citizenship in 1735 because of the
34 Vecindad: Local Communities
animosity of the local judge. In 1782, Agustín Sánchez pointed to Nicolás Sán-
chez as the person responsible for his exclusion from the community of Cor-
dobilla (jurisdiction of Salamanca). Nicolás, who hated Sánchez and his fam-
ily, made sure that the local authorities would not permit him to use the
communal pasture. He did so by arguing that Sánchez was not a citizen despite
the fact that his citizenship had previously been an accepted fact.π∏
There are many other examples of the way personal animosities led to
questioning the status of individuals whose citizenship was already acknowl-
edged. Whether the animosity was new, or whether rotation in local office
holding suddenly allowed old-time competitors (or friends) to have a say in
local affairs, it was clear that a person’s citizenship could be contested at
certain periods, consensual in others.ππ Froyan Rodríguez, who lived in Fuente
del Fresno (jurisdiction of Madrid) for more than twenty years, was told one
day that he no longer belonged to the community. Like other people involved
in these kinds of confrontations, he argued that this request was new and
unexpected. He had been recognized as a member before and was unsure what
had happened.π∫
The questioning of status was considered a social, as well as a legal, affair. In
1760, Zacarías de la Torre was ordered to leave the room where the annual
communal office-holding election was held.πΩ His protests, that he was a cit-
izen with voting rights, were silenced, as were the allegations of his supporters.
The damage done to his honor was irreparable. In order to defend his reputa-
tion and prestige, he was forced to file a complaint against Alonso Crespo, the
councilman who initiated his expulsion from the meeting. Honor and reputa-
tion were also central to Manuel Rojo Martín y Néstor, who in 1798 was
expelled from the meeting of the council of Arensena de Abajo (jurisdiction of
La Rioja).∫≠ The scene was so powerful, and so public, he later said, that after
it took place his wife refused to set foot in the village.
The exchange between Germán Salcedo—marquis of Fuertehijar, caballero
of the military order of Carlos III, and a judge of the appellate court (chan-
cillería) of Valladolid—and the community of Buitrago de Lozoya (juris-
diction of Madrid) was extremely revealing of such tensions.∫∞ Germán was
granted citizenship in the community in 1788 under the condition that he
reside in the settlement and pay taxes. The following year, the council refused
to continue to recognize him as a citizen. According to Germán, he was re-
jected because several local cattle-raisers viewed him as a competitor and
wanted him expelled from the community. Admitting that Germán was using
‘‘too much’’ pastureland for their liking, the authorities of Buitrago explained
their refusal differently: by virtue of his noble estate Germán was exempt from
tax payment, and because of his services to the crown, he resided first in
Vecindad: Local Communities 35
Valladolid and then in Madrid. His initial promises to pay taxes and reside in
the community remained unfulfilled, although in both cases his refusal to
comply could be legally justified. Yet the most powerful allegation against
Germán was that his original acceptance as a citizen was made under duress.
He arrived in the jurisdiction one morning on an unannounced visit. He came
to the council meeting and, aided by the local judge (alcalde mayor) who was
his ally, influenced the members into recognizing his citizenship. There was no
room for discussion or time to organize opposition. The whole question sur-
prised the community, and the process itself was heavily influenced by the
‘‘quality’’ of the petitioner, his ‘‘circumstances,’’ and the ‘‘respect’’ the local
council owed him as a nobleman, a jurist, and a member of the court. From the
perspective of the local council, the whole affair was ‘‘violent.’’ The physical
presence of the petitioner literally left the members with no choice but to
accede. The appellate court, where Germán served as a judge, agreed with
him. It accepted Germán’s position that he had always been a citizen of the
community and that he had meant to be one. It also implicitly adhered to his
understanding that the refusal to recognize him as a citizen was not genuine
but only represented the economic interests of a few powerful citizens.
simply too disrespectful of the local community. This had a direct effect on the
formation of the local citizenry. Many longtime residents never requested
formal citizenship, nor claimed to have obtained it by way of performance.
Luis Manuel de Quiñones arrived in Madrid as a child in 1662.∫∑ Having
studied there and then married a native-born wife, he was employed first as a
solicitor ( procurador) in the royal councils and then as a public notary. After
some fifty years of residence in the court, he requested the town council to
declare that he had been a citizen of Madrid for at least thirty years. The
reason for his request was openly confessed: he now wished to obtain a seat in
the parliament (cortes), a seat available only to people with at least six years of
formal citizenship in the community. According to the municipal authorities,
his lack of interest in being recognized as a citizen earlier on represented a lack
of commitment to the town, which was an attitude shared by many people
residing in Madrid. This attitude was also denounced in the 1720s and again
in the 1790s, when the members of the local council complained that the habit
of requesting citizenship was fading away. Frequently practiced in the ‘‘old
days,’’ it was no longer commonly exercised. The authorities reasoned that
most newcomers did not request admission into Madrid’s community either
because they did not recognize the utility of citizenship or because of the
‘‘confusion of the court.’’∫∏
Proving an Intention
One question remains unanswered. People could become citizens by
virtue of their decision and without the need for a formal declaration. But how
was this decision communicated to the local community? How could commu-
nities, their councils, and citizens know that a decision to become a citizen had
been made?
As mentioned earlier, according to the ius commune, newcomers could
make their intentions known through their behavior. People demonstrated by
their actions their wish to become citizens. This implied that communities
were forced to interpret the meaning of certain activities in order to determine
a person’s state of mind. Ius commune jurists argued that a ten-year residence
or marriage to a local woman could serve as adequate proofs of the new-
comers’ intentions, and these views were adopted in Castilian communities as
demonstrated by the case of Seville.∫π Following the conviction that citizen-
ship depended on intentions rather than external acts, however, Castilian
individuals, corporations, communities, and authorities constantly battled
with how to identify the behavior that would lead to citizenship in a particular
case given the circumstances of each candidate and community.
Vecindad: Local Communities 37
Take for example the most common claim—that intention could be proved
by a prolonged residence. Individuals who lived in a community for a long
period could be thought of as people who tied their future to that community
and, by implication, as people that wanted to become citizens. This was the
opinion of ius commune jurists, who argued that a ten-year residence was the
best proof for the newcomer’s intentions, and this rule was frequently adopted
in Castilian local legislation, that included a requirement that candidates re-
side in the community for several years before they could acquire citizenship.
However, residence, which during the resettlement period was a necessary
condition and the raison d’être of granting privilege to people, was now pre-
sented as a legal presumption. During the early modern period, it could be
used to discover the newcomer’s intentions, but its use was neither necessary
nor sufficient to prove those intentions. People who did not reside in the
community but who could prove their attachment to it in other ways could be
considered citizens. For example, Tomás del Corrral successfully argued that
he was a citizen of Soto (jurisdiction of Cantabria) despite not residing in the
community because he had ‘‘a house, with family and servants capable of
complying with all municipal demands and tax payment. . . . No one can be
forced to live and reside personally in a place, because this would be against
natural liberty, and is prohibited by law.’’∫∫ In question was not behavior, but
its meaning: ‘‘As intention is an internal act, only known by God . . . it can only
be manifested or discovered by observing external acts, which in this case
demonstrate that my client had a continuous wish to remain in the village.’’∫Ω
The interpretation communities gave to residence usually depended on local
circumstances and on local perceptions concerning the character and inten-
tions of the people seeking recognition as citizens or noncitizens. On occa-
sions, individual activity was interpreted according to the classification of
petitioners as members of certain groups. People born in the community were
entitled to the presumption that they wanted to be citizens. It was generally
agreed that natives implicitly expressed their desire to be citizens by virtue of
their continued residence in the jurisdiction. In most cases, this was sufficient
to demonstrate that they were citizens; the native born were not generally
required to perform any formal act, or to reside in the community for a specific
length of time. Indeed, only exceptional communities forced native-born per-
sons to request admission to the community by proving their intentions.Ω≠
Royal servants enjoyed a similar presumption. By definition and unless
otherwise proved, their absence from the community did not indicate their
desire to sever ties with it. In their case, absence was considered involuntary,
since royal service was a duty they could not refuse. It was often unclear,
however, whether all members of the court and all officials could claim this
38 Vecindad: Local Communities
Palencia) in 1761 when he was hired to serve as the local pharmacist (boti-
cario).ΩΩ Excluded from land partition by virtue of his foreignness, in 1791 he
requested formal recognition that he was a citizen. According to his version, he
was a citizen because he had acted as a citizen. He had resided in the community
with his family for more than thirty years and had the intention to remain
permanently, which is why he joined several local confraternities. The laws
required neither formal declaration nor special reception, and his behavior was
sufficient to transform him into a citizen. The authorities of Villarramiel dis-
agreed. They argued that he resided in the community as a professional by
virtue of a contract and that, since his immigration was not voluntary, it could
not transform him into a citizen. Rather than a citizen, he was a simple resident.
This was why the community was willing to pay for his relocation, and why it
allowed him to enjoy a tax exemption. Since the day he arrived, Melchor had
done nothing to change this situation, and there was no reason to consider him
differently. Local customs instructed that newcomers request their formal ad-
mission as citizens. Melchor was familiar with this custom, and if he did not
request his citizenship earlier, it was because he did not want to be considered a
citizen. The royal court (chancillería), which first ruled in favor of the Villar-
ramiel, later changed its verdict and declared Melchor a citizen.
An exact opposite stand was adopted by Santibañez de Zarsaguda (jurisdic-
tion of Burgos) in 1790. Rufino Vivanco, a noble (hidalgo) and a pharmacist,
established his residence and commercial headquarters in this settlement in
1787.∞≠≠ Three years later, he was notified that he could either become a tax-
paying citizen or leave the jurisdiction. Rufino responded by arguing that he
wished to remain in Santibañez and to continue to enjoy the status of both
hidalgo and noncitizen. As a ‘‘public servant’’ (servidor del público), his resi-
dence in the community could never constitute citizenship; as a nobleman, he
had no obligation to pay taxes. His position rejected, he was literally thrown
out of the village together with his family and merchandise. While Rufino
claimed that the campaign against him was motivated by personal rivalries—
his father was the local tax farmer and his business competed with another—
the council of Santibañez argued that such was not the case. Explaining that
their community, a behetría cerrada, possessed special privileges that pro-
hibited noblemen from becoming citizens, and that permanent residence neces-
sarily implied citizenship, it required Rufino to either renounce his rights as a
noble and became a citizen or to leave the community. Using arguments similar
to the ones voiced by Seville’s council in the 1770s, the local authorities insisted
that citizenship was not only a privilege but also a duty that could be imposed
on people who lived in the community. They further argued that local practices
prescribed that all people of competent age and situation should become cit-
Vecindad: Local Communities 41
izens; there was no reason to create an exception in Rufino’s case. In fact, except
for Rufino, all other residents—both natives and newcomers—obeyed this
rule, and all of them were accepted as citizens. The practice of becoming
citizens was so well rooted in the community that the authorities expected
Rufino to conform to it, and they attempted to persuade him extrajudicially. It
was only after their peaceful attempts failed that they removed him physically
from the community. The authorities also explained that although they toler-
ated Rufino’s presence in the jurisdiction for more than three years, they were
no longer willing to do so. At stake were not only compliance with local laws
and customs, but also the need to adhere to justice: people who enjoyed citizen-
ship’s benefits must also be subjected to its corresponding obligations.
The employment of presumptions linking behavior to intentions also ex-
plains why the authorities of Seville could recognize Antonio Joseph de Saave-
dra as a citizen in 1735. This recognition was not illegal, nor did it indicate a
distance between law and its application. It was based on the idea that resi-
dence was a presumption and that, as with all other presumptions, it could be
replaced by other factors that indicated the existence of the intention to be a
citizen. In Antonio Joseph’s case, intention could be deduced from the close
relationship between the candidate’s family and the community, as well as
through the payment of taxes.
Yet the use of presumptions also sheds light on the changes introduced in
Seville’s citizenship policies. These changes did not modify the conditions for
citizenship. Instead, they effected only the method by which petitioners’ inten-
tion to become citizens could be proved. Before 1743, petitioners were re-
quired to prove their intention by submitting an affidavit, attesting that they
had resided in Seville for more than ten years and intended to remain in the city
permanently. After 1743, petitioners had to supply the council with the testi-
mony of the local priest, affirming their residence in Seville, and with rental
receipts. Petitioners were also required to present witnesses who could testify
that in speech and action they behaved like citizens.
Conclusions
The first legal definition of local citizenship in Spain dates from the early
1800s. Included in legal dictionaries, which were elaborated in order to facili-
tate the work of jurists and administrators, this definition specifies vecino as:
‘‘a person who is domiciled in a place with intention to remain there. Accord-
ing to the law, this intention can be presumed and reputed as proved by the
passing of ten years, although it can also be proved by other facts that manifest
it without the need for the passage of ten years, for example, if one sells his
42 Vecindad: Local Communities
possessions in one place and buys others in the place to where he transfers his
residence, or if one is received as a vecino by the local community, promising
to remain there ten years and paying taxes.’’∞≠∞
The product of an early nineteenth-century obsession with legal categories,
this definition nevertheless summarizes with precision eighteenth-century
views of Castilian citizenship. First, it stresses that citizenship is based on
individual intention rather than on formal declarations. People are citizens by
virtue of their activities, and they lose their condition as citizens if they fail to
enact the citizen role. Status is thus socially negotiated and socially recognized.
Second, this definition specifies that intention could be proved by legal pre-
sumptions that link behavior to a state of mind. Such factors as residence,
marriage, and the possession of property, whether detailed in the laws or not,
are meaningful only as reflections of an internal decision to become a citizen.
This combination of factors created in Castile citizens by performance, that
is, people whose citizenship depended on their behavior and reputation and
not on formal declarations. Yet, the obligation to demonstrate an internal
decision by performing certain external acts guaranteed that only people who
were able to convince the community of their goodwill ‘‘good’’ immigrants
would be recognized as citizens. This ability, in turn, depended on the con-
cerned parties, but also on local circumstances and perceptions. Different
requirements were elaborated, demanding people in different periods to pro-
vide a diverse range of proofs. On occasion, citizenship was portrayed as a
privilege. At other times it was presented as an obligation. The story of local
citizenship in Castile thus reveals the existence of common perceptions, often
leading to individual local arrangements. Rather than a fragmentary and
highly localized regime, as portrayed in the legislation and as assumed by most
historians, citizenship was based on doctrine and practices common to all
Castilians. Examining citizenship petitions in a single community and tying
them to local circumstances and immigration policies thus potentially im-
poverishes our understanding of what citizenship meant. It ignores the exis-
tence of citizens who were not formally admitted by local communities, and it
does not explain how and why did people become worthy of rights in the local
sphere.
3
Soon after their arrival in the New World, and even before the territory
was under their actual control, Spanish conquistadors proclaimed royal juris-
diction over the land and founded new settlements.∞ Standing in open territory
and in the presence of notaries when these were available, expedition com-
manders announced that, under the authority received from the king, viceroy,
or governor, they were founding a settlement. They then set the territorial
jurisdiction of the community, nominating the local authorities and dividing
the land by plots, assigning sites for the main square ( plaza mayor), local
council hall, and jail. Asking those present if they wished to become citizens
(vecinos), commanders announced that they could do so by presenting them-
selves to the authorities in the following days. Through this ceremony, new
communities came into being—with territory, authorities, urban plan, and
citizens—before the first cornerstone was ever laid. Similar procedures were
carried out where Indian enclaves were already in existence. In all of them—
for example, Mexico City, Quito, and Cuzco—the community was reinvented
as a Spanish enclave, as though the previous settlement had ceased to exist. By
1571, there were some two hundred Spanish settlements in the American
continents and adjacent islands, and by 1580 the colonial settlement network,
which survived to the nineteenth century, was firmly in place.
At first, the Spanish American urban experience appeared to be a repetition
43
44 Vecindad: Spanish America
of the Castilian experience during the Middle Ages.≤ Settlement was perceived
as a process by which communities, rather than individual houses, were
founded, and this process of founding could ignore such facts as the presences
of existing communities that were populated and governed by other tradi-
tions. The role of communities was also similar, as in both cases their founda-
tion confirmed Spanish control over not only territory but also its non-Spanish
inhabitants. As was the case for participants of the reconquest and resettle-
ment of Spain, citizenship (vecindad) could be obtained by the mere fact of
being part of the group that founded the community. All that was required of
the conquistador—now made citizen—was to be present at the foundational
act or to come to the community in subsequent days.≥ Once this first phase was
completed, most Spanish American communities developed procedures that
enabled newcomers to petition for citizenship. Newcomers had either to allege
their wish to establish permanent ties with the community or to supply proofs
for the existence of such a wish.∂ During this period, most requests were tied to
the desire to obtain land grants, which were available only to citizens. Another
motivation for requesting citizenship was the wish to be employed in munici-
pal offices.
Petitions for citizenship in Spanish American communities were very com-
mon during the sixteenth century, but they gradually disappeared from munic-
ipal records by the second, third, or fourth decade of the seventeenth century.
Although people continued to refer to themselves as vecinos in notarial acts, in
legal declarations, and in their social interactions, the archives tell us nothing
about how they achieved or maintained this status. As a result, like their
colleagues studying early modern Spain, historians of Spanish America simply
ignored the issue of citizenship.∑ They assumed either that late medieval Cas-
tilian practices continued to operate in the Americas or that, in the Americas,
vecindad was an honorary title and no longer attached to notions of citizen-
ship and belonging.
Nevertheless, until the end of the colonial period, Spanish American citizen-
ship remained a tie among people forming part of the same community. It was
a status that implied both privileges and duties, and people who acted as and
were reputed to be citizens could obtain citizenship. Yet in contrast with
Castile, in Spanish America citizenship was converted fully from a legal cate-
gory into a classification based on social reputation. Instead of maintaining
both formal and implicit citizenship, as was the case in the Old World, in the
New World implicit citizenship prevailed. New forms of exclusion that were
particular to Spanish America also emerged. Most important among them was
the tendency to exclude Indians and persons of mixed blood or African de-
scent from citizenship. Another was the introduction of restrictions on the
Vecindad: Spanish America 45
Caracas
The transformation of citizenship from first a legal category into a classi-
fication based on social reputation and then as a status not available to non-
Spaniards, is best exemplified by the case of Caracas, which serves here as
the first model for how Castilian citizenship was modified in the Americas.
Caracas was founded in 1567 as a military garrison.π Until the 1580s, its
permanent population was very small, and in 1578, only 14 of the 136 people
who participated in its founding still lived in the community. Protected by a
mountain range yet close to the sea, Caracas soon became a trading post for
agricultural products coming from the hinterland. From the 1580s to the first
decade of the seventeenth century, and coinciding with the pacification of the
46 Vecindad: Spanish America
territory, wheat, tobacco, and cattle hides provided its inhabitants with profit-
able export. In the following decades, the local economy gradually shifted to
the exportation of cacao to Mexico. This export trade, which sustained the
growth of the city for two hundred years, transformed Caracas into a major
slave labor economy. At the end of the sixteenth century there were some 90
citizens; by 1633 this number had virtually doubled in size.
Formal petitions for citizenship in Caracas were fairly frequent until the
1620s. In accordance with the Castilian tradition, these petitions were pre-
sented to the city council, whose members decided whether the person should,
or should not, be recognized as vecino. Petitions expressed the Castilian belief
in freedom of immigration and included a declaration by the newcomer of his
intention to reside in the jurisdiction and to establish his home there.∫ It was
often clear in municipal records that many petitioners had just arrived in the
city and that their citizenship requests were a first step towards integration in
the local community. Their promise to tie themselves to Caracas was deemed
sufficient to secure their recognition as citizens and to enable them to enjoy
citizens’ rights. During this period, most people requesting admission into the
community petitioned to receive land (solar), and in most cases, the authori-
ties, recognizing them as citizens, granted them land, thus enabling them to
establish themselves in the city both legally and materially.Ω Also during this
period, people who left Caracas continued to be considered citizens as long as
they delegated the exercise of their obligations to another person. Caracas was
also willing to admit absentee members: in 1597, Nofre Carrasques, repre-
senting Fernán de Zárate, requested that his client be recognized as a citizen.∞≠
His petition was granted even though there were many indications of Fernán’s
absence and his representative made no promise that Fernán would ever come
to the city. Attempts to force compliance with citizenship obligations, espe-
cially the obligation to reside in the jurisdiction, were also sidetracked, as
affluent members continued to disobey municipal orders and responded in-
stead with the casual payment of penalties.∞∞ This became a frequent practice
beginning in the 1610s; by the 1650s, the council exempted certain people
from citizenship duties—residence included—because they were willing to
routinely pay the authorities certain sums.∞≤
At this early stage of its history, it was clear that Caracas gave less weight to
actual residence and integration into the community than did its Castilian
counterparts. Also noteworthy was the lack of a clear definition of what was
municipal, what was provincial, and what was Spanish. People residing in the
province could claim that they were integrated into the local community, and
services to the crown were also considered to constitute ties between the indi-
vidual and the city.∞≥ Perhaps because the jurisdiction of Caracas stretched for
dozens of miles with no other Spanish settlement nearby, and because the city
Vecindad: Spanish America 47
represented all that was Spanish, as opposed to what was Indian or simply
foreign, the distinction between what was local, provincial, and Spanish was
weak from the start.∞∂
The demise of formal citizenship procedures in Caracas began at the end of
the sixteenth century. By that time, people requesting the allocation of dif-
ferent resources described their attachment to the community in qualitative
terms rather than by simply asserting that they were citizens. For example,
Tomás de Aponte, who requested a land grant in 1597, explained that he had
come to the city with his wife, sons, and family, and that he intended to live
and to remain in the jurisdiction.∞∑ Francisco Carbajar declared that he had
been living in Caracas for more than seventeen years, that he had occupied a
house with his wife and children, and that he had always complied with all
citizenship obligations.∞∏ Although some people continued to request formal
admission to the community by petitioning for citizenship, and others men-
tioned their citizenship when petitioning for rights, both practices were dimin-
ishing. By the 1640s, the traditional association between citizenship and land
grants was also fading away. During the second half of the century, people
petitioning for land no longer mentioned their citizenship, and those petition-
ing for citizenship no longer necessarily requested land.∞π At this time, land
grants had ended, and a new regime allocated land by virtue of monetary
payments. As access to land was increasingly independent of citizenship, the
recording of citizenship petitions virtually ceased.
By the middle of the seventeenth century, formal citizenship criteria were
thus giving way to implicit categorizations. Although individuals continued to
argue that they were citizens and thus worthy of rights, they no longer needed
to obtain a formal declaration of citizenship. Citizenship was now implicitly
recognized when rights were allocated. Instead of maintaining a regime in
which citizenship was formally acknowledged by the local authorities, the
ability to use rights usually reserved to citizens now rested on personal reputa-
tion and on the idea that people who acted as citizens were in fact citizens.
Reputation determined whether the person was indeed integrated in the com-
munity and whether the other members considered him worthy of the rights of
a citizen. In 1650, for example, Francisco López stated that ‘‘it was well
reputed and established’’ (es notorio y consta) that he had been a citizen of
Caracas for more than thirty years. In 1652, Juan Rodríguez argued that his
citizenship could not be doubted, since both in the city and its province ‘‘he
must be taken as such’’ (debe ser habido por tal ) because of his many services
to the crown.∞∫
Despite its novelty, citizenship by reputation had Castilian roots. As men-
tioned in chapter 2, Castilian citizenship could be acquired without the inter-
vention of the authorities. It came into being once a newcomer behaved as a
48 Vecindad: Spanish America
citizen and this behavior was interpreted and validated by the other members of
the community or by communal organs. Yet while Castilian communities
fought against these practices and, in the name of good government attempted
to constitute a monopoly over the classification of people as citizens and non-
citizens, the authorities of Caracas did nothing of the sort. I could not find even
one attempt to support the continuation of formal procedures for citizenship
and to ensure municipal control over the classification of people as citizens.
The disappearance of formal citizenship in Caracas in the 1620s and 1630s
could be explained by local developments, such as the gradual disassociation
between land grants and citizenship and the passage from free allocation of
land to a monetary payment. Perhaps this disappearance was tied to Caracas’s
coming of age. In the early 1600s Caracas was already a self-sustaining city,
with a stable population, a fairly flourishing economy, and stable institutions.
Under these circumstances, it no longer required an aggressive immigration
policy, and as an established community, it could close ranks by linking cit-
izenship (and rights) to reputation rather than to abstract legal categories.
The shift from a formally recognized citizenship to a socially reputed one
allowed for the introduction of new factors of exclusion, most important
among them the ineligibility of Indians and people of mixed blood (mestizos
and mulattos) to obtain citizenship. Castilian citizenship practices found that
origin and genealogy were irrelevant to citizenship acquisition, and they
lacked mechanism for examining the candidate’s ethnicity. In theory, there-
fore, Indians, mestizos, and mulattos should have been eligible for citizenship
in Spanish American communities despite the aspiration to constitute two
separate republics, one ‘‘Spanish’’ and the other ‘‘Indian.’’∞Ω Officially, the
república de indios was established to protect Indians from Spanish influences
as long as they needed such a protection, and it was mainly embodied in the
prohibition of Spaniards in Indian communities. This establishment did not
explicitly prohibit the integration of Indians into Spanish communities, and,
indeed, soon after its installation, Indians began immigrating to Spanish settle-
ments, where they established a permanent residence.≤≠ This fact was evident
in early Caracas, when Indians and mestizos were at times granted citizenship
and admitted into the purportedly Spanish community.≤∞ Nevertheless, fol-
lowing the transformation of citizenship from a formal category to a socially
reputed status, the presence of Indians, mestizos, and mulattos was virtually
eliminated. It was also during this period that Indians, mestizos, and mulattos
were treated as ‘‘miserable’’ and in need of help, rather than as integrated
members of the community. They now received land not because they were
citizens but because of their poverty, their weakness, and in the case of Indians,
because of recent royal decrees favoring the native population.≤≤
Vecindad: Spanish America 49
Buenos Aires
and this was even more surprising, the authorities of Buenos Aires insisted that
under normal circumstances only ‘‘natives of the kingdoms of Spain’’ could be
accepted as citizens.≤π This demand was a clear departure from the Castilian
precedent; Castilian communities easily and frequently admitted foreigners as
citizens (chapter 2). In Buenos Aires, on the contrary, only exceptional for-
eigners who were very ‘‘useful’’ to the community and highly immersed in its
society could be granted citizenship.≤∫ Some leniency was demonstrated to-
wards Portuguese residents during the union of the crowns of Portugal and
Castile (1580–1640), yet this leniency evaporated in the following years.≤Ω
People requesting citizenship in Buenos Aires had to prove that they were
‘‘natives of the kingdoms of Spain,’’ and the inclusion of candidates’ birthplace
in citizenship petitions became the usual practice in the city by 1618.≥≠ When
the actual place of birth was unknown, the petition at least formally stated
that the person’s arrival to the Americas was legal, and that, as a result, he was
necessarily a ‘‘native of the kingdoms of Spain.’’
In contrast to the situation in Caracas, land distribution was seldom men-
tioned in Buenos Aires, and it was only in the 1610s that newcomers’ duties
were formally extended from having arms to also possessing a house. During
this period both requirements were integrated into a formal oath that all
candidates for citizenship had to take.≥∞ Nevertheless, as late as 1619 and
1620, Buenos Aires still admitted absentee citizens.≥≤ By the late 1620s, the
number of citizenship petitions was dropping, and in the next few decades,
citizenship petitions practically disappeared from municipal records.
In spite of differences in the particular development of these two cities and in
their understanding of citizenship, formal petitions for citizenship in Buenos
Aires disappeared from the records around the same time they declined in
Caracas. Once again, local circumstances may explain this development. Like
Caracas, Buenos Aires came of age in the beginning of the seventeenth century
as its population stabilized and it began to flourish economically as a port. Yet
contrary to Caracas, in the case of Buenos Aires we lack indications on how the
growing dissociation between citizenship and rights brought about the demise
of formal citizenship. We also lack a clear vision of what the results of this
demise were.
Lima
Whereas certain similarities existed between Caracas and Buenos Aires,
developments in Lima, my third model for how Castilian practices changed in
the New World, were very different. Established in 1535 in a fertile valley near
the sea and populated by many Indians, Lima, until the late 1540s, suffered
Vecindad: Spanish America 51
Buenos Aires, and Lima, citizenship could be acquired by petitioning the town
council, and success depended on the establishment of, or the promise to
establish, ties with the community. Newcomers had to express their desire to
become citizens, which could be proved by residence, the establishment of a
house, or compliance with citizens’ duties. The distinction introduced in Lima
between vecinos-encomenderos and simple vecinos was new, as was the ill-
defined frontier between the local community and the community of the king-
dom, which were often used synonymously. This led in Caracas to the exclu-
sion of Indians, mestizos, and mulattos, and in Buenos Aires to the demand
that citizens be natives of the kingdoms of Spain. The abandonment of formal
procedures for citizenship acquisition and the total dependence on reputation
also marked a change from Castilian practices.
The way Caracas, Buenos Aires, and Lima developed helps explain this
trajectory. Caracas gradually became a slave labor economy, leading to height-
ened ethnic awareness. Because of the presence of many non-Spanish Euro-
peans, especially the Portuguese, Buenos Aires experienced ongoing social
tension. Lima suffered vice-regal intervention in municipal affairs, and many
encomenderos were among its oldest and most important citizens. Yet not-
withstanding these explanations, similar processes were happening elsewhere.
Although we lack precise information, we do know that the division of citizens
into encomenderos and non-encomenderos was not particular to Lima but
was practiced in other Peruvian cities, such as Popayán, Jujuy, Cuzco, and
Arequipa.∂∂ This division was also mentioned in the main compilation of
Spanish American colonial legislation (Recopilación de Indias), which re-
produced a 1554 decree stating that both ‘‘normal citizens’’ and vecinos enco-
menderos could be elected to municipal offices.∂∑ Historians have affirmed
that Indians, mestizos, and mulattos could become citizens of Spanish Ameri-
can communities in the sixteenth century, but that this was no longer true in
the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. They assumed that throughout
Spanish America, in order to be a citizen, one had to be Spanish.∂∏ The aban-
donment of formal citizenship procedures in the beginning of the seventeenth
century was also a general trend. By the 1620s, formal citizenship petitions
disappeared from the town records of Mexico City.∂π In seventeenth-century
Popayán (present-day Colombia), citizenship was a highly informal status and
did not depend on the inclusion of a resident’s name in official registries. It was
constituted socially and granted automatically to people who integrated into
the community.∂∫ In eighteenth-century Quito and Cuenca (present-day Ec-
uador), citizenship was instituted by ‘‘public knowledge,’’ which required no
proof.∂Ω These findings indicate that the exclusion of non-Spaniards from
54 Vecindad: Spanish America
discern how this common development came about is to compare the practical
implications of citizenship in Castile and Spanish America, on one hand, and
the frequency of conflicts (or potential conflicts) regarding citizenship, on the
other. As I indicated in the introduction and in chapter 2, citizenship was an
important issue in Castile because it allowed people to enjoy a wide array of
privileges and obligated them to comply with many duties. Despite this fact,
citizenship was registered and debated in Castile only in cases of conflict or
potential conflict. In all other cases, it operated silently, and people were classi-
fied and allowed to exercise rights and duties without their status being ex-
plicitly discussed. Was this the case in Spanish America?
There are many indications that by the beginning of the seventeenth century
Spanish American communities no longer maintained a discriminatory regime
that clearly distinguished between the rights of citizens and noncitizens. There
are hundreds of cases where noncitizens in Spanish American communities
enjoyed rights that in Castile would have been reserved for citizens. In many
Spanish American communities communal property was open to both citizens
and noncitizens, and noncitizens could be employed in municipal offices.∑∞ In
some jurisdictions, taxation and military duty were imposed equally on both
citizens and noncitizens.∑≤ Indeed, once land grants ceased, Spanish American
practices no longer substantially discriminated against noncitizens. Emptied
of most of its pragmatic implications, by the mid-seventeenth century, Spanish
American citizenship embodied only the social and cultural recognition that
one was a permanent member of the community. Once this was the case, the
struggle to define who was a citizen lost much of its importance; it probably
became less frequent, less urgent, less conflictual, and thus less often recorded.
The relation between the demand for rights, on one hand, and formal ac-
knowledgement of citizenship, on the other, can be exemplified by reviewing
the few occasions when citizenship did matter in Spanish America. In the late
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, when obtaining citizenship enabled in-
dividuals to enjoy a particular regime of rights and duties, discussions on
citizenship reappeared. In these situations, citizenship was argued according
to the Castilian tradition that linked behavior to intention: people who acted
as citizens were in fact citizens. The opposite was also true. Those no longer
acting as citizens were considered to have expressed implicitly a desire to
severe ties with the community. Yet, in the late seventeenth and eighteenth
century, two important factors, which were present in early Caracas and
Buenos Aires, became especially apparent. These factors were (1) the growing
identification between domicile and citizenship and (2) the close association
between citizenship and nativeness.
One example for late seventeenth-century and eighteenth-century Spanish
56 Vecindad: Spanish America
where candidates were merchants and needed to look after their business
affairs.∏π Elected to office, these people claimed that they were too poor, too
busy, or simply unworthy of the honor bestowed on them. This wish to avoid
office holding became an epidemic in late eighteenth-century Buenos Aires.∏∫
Alleging different circumstances and needs, on occasion, those elected to office
also argued that they were noncitizens and that, as a result, they could not be
obliged to comply with citizenship duties. Jacinto de la Fuente argued that he
was a citizen of Arrecife and not Pergamino, which was where he was elected
to office.∏Ω His citizenship in Arrecife was based on the fact that he was a
native of the jurisdiction, where he had established his domicile together with
his wife and children. The authorities disagreed. Jacinto resided in Pergamino
the greater part of the year, and his business operation was located in that
community. As a result, he should ‘‘be reputed and held’’ (reputado y tenido)
as a citizen of Pergamino. Other people were more successful in making the
same claims. Joseph Fortunato Ruíz de Arellano requested that his nomina-
tion in Buenos Aires as a local judge (alcalde ordinario) be revoked because he
was, in fact, a citizen of Asunción (Paraguay).π≠ His citizenship in Asunción,
he said, was tied to the fact that he was a native of that jurisdiction: there he
had property and had recently married an Asunción native by way of proxy.
He also served as a judge in Asunción in 1760 and had always wished to return
to that city. According to his claims, his case was radically different from those
other petitioners who refused office but had resided in Buenos Aires continu-
ously for many years. Unlike him, these people were citizens, and they could
be forced into office.π∞ The authorities agreed with him.
and the mixed-blood were rejected, the need to discriminate against people
who were Spanish disappeared. Indeed, once citizenship was identified with
Spanishness, all Spaniards could be admitted as citizens, or, at least they could
enjoy a common regime of rights and privileges. At the same time, discrimina-
tion was maintained, even enforced, with regards to ‘‘true’’ outsiders: the
Indians, mestizos, mulattos, and, to a certain degree, non-Spanish Europeans.
One could say that in their joint opposition to foreign and seemingly hostile
elements, in Spanish America all Spaniards were citizens of a single commu-
nity and all non-Spaniards were classified as aliens. As a result, in this hectic
and constantly changing world, there was an overpowering sense of famil-
iarity. People acted as if they knew who the others were, and individuals
moved across dozens, hundreds, and thousands of miles behaving as if they
were in a familiar territory.π≤
In addition to the growing identification between Spanishness and citizen-
ship, the abandonment of a discriminatory regime could also be explained by
the structural and legal differences between Castile and Spanish America. In
Castile, citizenship was defined at the same time in which the kingdom itself
was created. The coincidence guaranteed a regime that was initially very lo-
calized and that admitted great differences between one community and the
other. Processes of homogenization within the kingdom gradually closed the
distance between the practices of different communities, yet until the end of
the Old Regime, some differences, especially with regard to formal require-
ments and procedures, remained in place. It was also clearly the case that in
Castile municipal entities were contemporaneous to the kingdom. Their resi-
dents forged an identity of their own at the same time in which they were
gradually inserted into the kingdom.
The contrary was true with regard to Spanish America. The settlement of
the New World happened after the kingdom of Castile had consolidated.
While the kingdom was a fact, the local community was a project. In the
Americas, new communities were formed, and they initially had no local his-
torical traditions, nor a clear local identity, nor a law of their own.π≥ Indeed,
Spanish American enactments—whether local or common to the entire terri-
tory—lacked instructions concerning citizenship.π∂ This lack could be supple-
mented because Spanish American law determined that Castilian law would
be adopted in cases of legal lacuna. There was, however, no single or simple set
of Castilian laws that Spanish Americans could adopt. As noted earlier and in
chapter 2, a common Castilian citizenship regime existed, but it depended on
doctrine and practices. Castilian local legislation, on the contrary, included
different rules with regard to the acquisition of formal citizenship. At certain
places and times, the king instructed Spanish American communities to adopt
Vecindad: Spanish America 61
Conclusions
The relation between Castilian and Spanish American practices was
highly complex. A superficial study would indicate that Spanish American
citizenship differed dramatically from the Castilian example. In early modern
Castile, citizenship was a category both formal and explicit and with wide-
reaching social, economic, honorary, cultural, and institutional implications.
In Spanish America, citizenship became a status based on reputation, which
implied no clear discriminatory regime and that had mostly a social—rather
than legal—significance. A thorough investigation nevertheless demonstrates
that the distance between the Castilian and the Spanish American experience
was in some respects more apparent than real and in others, more real than ap-
parent. On one hand, despite the disappearance of formal procedures, Spanish
American citizenship still included the basic Castilian premise that people
could become citizens by virtue of deciding to do so, and that this decision
could best be proved by behavior as citizen, mainly through residence. Spanish
American citizenship thus remained a measure of the person’s integration in
Vecindad: Spanish America 63
Spain emerged from the Middle Ages as a highly complex and frag-
mented political entity. It included two crowns (Castile and Aragon); various
kingdoms, provinces, and principates; and thousands of local communities.∞
The kingdoms included in the crown of Aragon, whose units—Aragon, Cata-
lonia, Valencia, and Majorca—each maintained their autonomous legal and
political structures, had their own governing and representative institutions
and their own laws. Some of the kingdoms and principates included in the
crown of Castile, for example, León, Asturias, and Galicia, were integrated
into a single system and were subjected to the same institutions and laws.
Others, such as Navarre and the Basque provinces, conserved many of their
separate structures.≤
People living in the different Spanish kingdoms were legally classified in
different ways. They belonged to separate groups, each enjoying a particular
regime of rights and duties as defined by the legal system of their kingdom or
crown. Most important among these rights was the monopoly on office hold-
ing (reserva de oficio), which restricted the use of public office and ecclesi-
astical benefices to natives (naturales) of the jurisdiction. According to this
monopoly, only natives of Castile could hold offices in Castile, only natives of
Catalonia could hold offices in Catalonia, and so on.≥ Since implementing
this monopoly required that foreigners (extranjeros) be distinguished from
64
Naturaleza: Community of the Kingdom 65
and the right to hold offices and benefices in Castile and other parts of Spain.
For the sake of convenience, I have separated developments in Castile and
Spain from developments in Spanish America. Despite this material separa-
tion, the two debates, which are explored below and in chapter 5, should be
viewed as complementary.
this kingdom and are averse to their fathers’, though they hear nothing else at
home but his native language. This does not surprise me, when I consider what
effect the place of birth usually has, the great influence of the first acquaintance
and society we contract in the world.’’≤∫
The native born could be trusted, but foreigners could not. They were re-
jected because they ‘‘were not obliged to the community, neither with faith,
nor with love.’’≤Ω Because foreigners did not love the community they were
‘‘dangerous.’’ Foreigners did not identify with local interests, and they hoped
to benefit from their association with Castile while planning to later return to
their community of origin: ‘‘These foreigners who have dignities and benefices
in our kingdoms want to be in their lands more than in a foreign land. They
will take out the money [they earn] from our kingdoms, leaving them with
great damage and poverty and enriching foreign kingdoms, even enemy king-
doms. . . . When prelates and other beneficiaries are natives, they help us . . . in
the war against the Moors and the defense of the royal crown of our king-
doms. All of this is not true when the prelates and beneficiaries are not our
natives.’’≥≠
People who loved the community could thus be considered natives. People
who did not love the community were classified as foreigners. Yet, as Baltasar
Alamos de Barrientos, Gerónimo de Uztariz, and Pedro Fernández Navarrete
pointed out, foreigners who fixed their domicile in Castile, where they owned
a house or were married to a native, no longer posed a threat.≥∞ Although they
may ‘‘not afford us the affection and reliance of native and loyal subjects,’’
they were still worthy of nativeness.≥≤ The presumption was that their lengthy
or close association with the community created a ‘‘sufficient sense of loy-
alty.’’≥≥ As trustworthy people, they could be granted the rights of natives.
Implied in these observations was the idea that certain foreigners went
through some sort of conversion that allowed them to abandon their condi-
tion as outsiders. This conversion transpired without the intervention of the
authorities. It was a by-product of the association between a person and a
community, an association that could be established in a variety of ways. It
could depend on residence, but it could also be generated by other factors,
such as birth in the jurisdiction, marriage to a native, or owning property.
It could be demonstrated by the fact that the foreigner severed all ties to
his community of origin because he no longer hoped to return there. What
was important was not the specific way this association came about, but
the guarantee it supplied for the person’s good intentions. In the words of a
seventeenth-century observer: ‘‘Almost all the foreigners who live in this city
[Seville?] are very naturalized in it, some of them for the many years in which
they had lived here, others also for having been born in it, others because they
72 Naturaleza: Community of the Kingdom
were married in many cases with natives, or their daughters married natives,
reasons for which they have established deep roots that made them love and
desire the best for these kingdoms.≥∂’’ Indeed, certain foreigners could be con-
sidered natives ‘‘because most of them lived in Cádiz for 20, 30, 40, and 50
years, and they are married with natives, and they have their estate and family
there, without having any dependency on Portugal.’’≥∑ These foreigners, al-
though not formally declared natives, were ‘‘connaturalized,’’ their residence
being ‘‘in substance the same as if they were declared natives.’’ Their conver-
sion to natives was both legal and social. Indeed, it even affected their nature.
For example, according to some authors, Frenchmen who were sufficiently
integrated in Spain acted in a way that combined ‘‘Spanish grave-character’’
with ‘‘French Lightness.’’≥∏
Because of this understanding that permanent resident foreigners, many of
whom were citizens of local communities, no longer posed threat to the Cas-
tilian and Spanish communities, legal enactments became less important than
the intentions that they sought to reproduce. The conditions stipulated by the
laws governing nativeness and naturalization were interpreted as legal pre-
sumptions. Similar to their role in the local sphere, these presumptions aimed
to help the authorities distinguish between true outsiders and integrated for-
eigners who had attained nativeness. The presumptions did not prescribe the
only way foreigners could be transformed into natives. Indeed, individuals
could be declared natives even when they did not fulfill the conditions stipu-
lated in the laws if other indications proved that they had tied themselves to
the community. For example, in 1769, Ignacio Barra obtained recognition that
he was a native on the grounds that he was ‘‘well rooted’’ in Spain and would
probably never leave the country.≥π In the same year, Antonio Rafael Mengs
was able to demonstrate his love of Spain by establishing a school of arts in
Madrid and training many disciples.≥∫ Despite being married to an Irish com-
patriot and thus lacking one of the requirements for naturalization, Roberto
White was granted naturalization because he had purchased a house and
obtained citizenship in Cádiz, and the authorities believed that he wanted to
establish a permanent domicile in Spain.≥Ω
People who lacked the legal requirements could obtain their naturalization,
as often as others were denied the status of natives despite fulfilling these
requirements if their loyalty was questioned. Juan Jerónimo Burgué, a French-
man, resided in the Iberian peninsula for many years and was occupied in
different commercial undertakings first in Cádiz and then in San Sebastián.∂≠
According to the local authorities, despite this permanence and his status as a
local citizen, it remained unclear whether he was truly tied to Spain. He had no
Naturaleza: Community of the Kingdom 73
There could be a case, in which all the circumstances [enumerated in the laws]
would be present, yet by law it would be impossible to declare the person
native. . . . This would be the case of foreigners who had resided in the
kingdom for a sufficient time, yet who must be considered transients because
they lack the wish to remain or to establish domicile. . . . This is the way we
must understand the Partida law, which establishes that a ten-year residence is
sufficient to obtain nativeness. This law must be interpreted in the following
way: the ten-year residence operates a presumption that the petitioner wishes
to remain in the country permanently. If there is a contrary presumption, or
contrary proofs, the ten-year residence is insufficient to grant nativeness.
Indeed, ‘‘if one is to pay attention to the wording of the Partida it is clear that a
ten-year residence does not convert foreigners into natives. What converts
foreigners into natives is the wish to remain.’’∂∂
The idea that foreigners could become natives based on proof that they
felt loyal to the community established a close association between nativeness
and citizenship. Foreigners who obtained citizenship could easily demonstrate
their nativeness and, indeed, citizenship acquisition was a common proof of
integration in the community of natives. Faustino Borgnis Desbordes came to
Puerto Santa María in the early 1760s.∂∑ Fifteen years later he requested recog-
nition as native of Spain. This was owed to him because he was a citizen and
because he came to the country ‘‘with the intention to establish domicile.’’ This
intention, Faustino argued, could be proved by the fact that he had married
74 Naturaleza: Community of the Kingdom
a native-born spouse, had children, and had established his business there.
Through this activity, he had become ‘‘connaturalized’’ (connaturalizado) and
‘‘rooted’’ (arraigado) in Spain.
Given the importance of integration, and the understanding that integration
always happens on a local level and within the boundaries of a specific com-
munity, local authorities became involved in processes of naturalization. They
were asked to render judgment regarding the status of foreigners residing in
their district, and their affirmation that these foreigners acted as Spaniards and
were attached to the local community was essential to the recognition that
these foreigners were already natives, or merited naturalization.∂∏
Persons who lost their citizenship risked becoming nonnatives. This was the
opinion of Gregorio López de Tovar and Juan de Hevia Bolaños, according to
whom ‘‘if a native of the kingdom, or anyone reputed as native, leaves the
kingdom and resides in a foreign kingdom, where he establishes domicile, if he
later pretends to be a native, he is no longer considered native.’’∂π Benito
Gerónimo Feijóo agreed with them, pointing out: ‘‘Spain is the object of love of
all Spaniards. This rule applies when migration to another country does not
convert Spaniards into members of another society, in which case they must
love that other society more than the country where they were born. This
obligation [to love] the republic does not depend on birth in the district, but on
being a component of its society. Therefore, people who legitimately emigrate
from their country of birth and fix their domicile in another dominion owe the
same obligation to the new republic as to the one they had to the republic where
they were born, and they must regard this new republic as their patria.’’∂∫
Natives who severed their ties with the local community, who established a
permanent residence outside Castile or Spain, or who married a foreigner
while residing abroad could lose their status as natives. These people and
especially their sons could not hold public offices or emigrate to Spanish Amer-
ica.∂Ω If they wished to remain natives despite their detachment from the com-
munity, they had to prove that their cases were exceptional. Joseph Larrugia
was born in Baza (jurisdiction of Granada) to parents who were natives of the
kingdom of Castile.∑≠ At a young age, he was sent to Malta, where he was
educated in the seminary of the Order of San Juan to which he now belonged.
In 1786, Joseph requested the royal council to declare him a ‘‘true Spaniard’’
(verdadero español ), eligible to receive an ecclesiastical benefice. Joseph ex-
plained that the other members of the order suspected he was a foreigner, and
they therefore refused to grant him the privileges that were rightfully his.
Despite his absence from Spain, he declared, he never renounced his condition
as native. In another case, Octavio Ximénes Aldeano presented to the royal
council letters from two Spanish overseas officials who considered him ‘‘of the
Naturaleza: Community of the Kingdom 75
Spanish nation, despite having been born in Sicily.’’∑∞ He insisted on his wish
to ‘‘return to the primitive privileges of his great-grandfather’’ and requested a
declaration that he was a native. He attempted to demonstrate that his family
—whose genealogy he presented—had always been employed in royal service.
As a result, despite their physical absence from the kingdom, its members
never intended to severe their relationships with the community.∑≤ They en-
joyed the exception, reproduced in the Recopilación de Castilla, according to
which ‘‘if the parents . . . were outside these kingdoms in our service, or
according to our order, or as transients and without establishing domicile
outside these kingdoms, their sons born abroad would be considered natives
of these lands.’’∑≥
Although Octavio’s request was denied, other candidates were more fortu-
nate. The father of Ignacio Aguirre had emigrated to Rome, where he obtained
an ecclesiastical office and married a Roman woman. These factors apparently
indicated that he had decided to establish domicile in that city and that his
membership in the Spanish community had expired. Nevertheless, his son
asserted that such was not the case. Before the ten years required to establish
domicile had passed, Ignacio’s father was nominated as a secretary of the
Spanish postman in Rome. ‘‘In this way, he conserved the nativeness of Spain,
which he could retain as a royal servant.’’ Because his father, abroad on royal
service, was Spanish, so was he. Furthermore, Ignacio himself was employed
in the same office and his attachment to the Spanish community was demon-
strated by his membership in the Spanish confraternity of Rome, with which
he ‘‘credited the same possession [of nativeness] and proved his wish and
intention to retain and conserve it.’’∑∂ Upon his request, Ignacio was declared
native.
Being eligible to rights and obligations in the kingdom was, therefore, inde-
pendent of formal declarations and of formal circumstances, such as birth and
descent. People were natives or foreigners by virtue of their internal decision to
be a permanent member of the community. This decision was assumed in the
case of natives who continued to live in the jurisdiction. After all, natives
naturally loved their place of birth. Yet an internal decision could also be
deduced by observing the behavior of foreigners who resided in Spain or
natives of Spain who left it. The idea that integrated foreigners underwent a
conversion that truly effected their nature was clear in their designation as
‘‘natives’’ rather than ‘‘naturalized.’’ Their nativeness, it was said, was con-
stituted by the ‘‘passage of time’’ (mediante el tiempo) or simply by ‘‘prescrip-
tion’’ (naturaleza por vía de prescripción).
People living in seventeenth-century Castile and eighteenth-century Spain
requested formal declaration that they were natives when they feared conflict
76 Naturaleza: Community of the Kingdom
or were experiencing one. Among them were natives who were suspected of
foreignness. In 1624, Guillermo Bequer explained that although according to
the law he was native, he did not dare to act as native because of the ‘‘contin-
uous hustle he suffered, as well as his designation as a foreigner.’’∑∑ Joseph
Larrugia asked to be declared ‘‘truly Spaniard’’ (verdadero español ) in order
to prove to his colleagues of the Order of San Juan that he was worthy of an
ecclesiastical benefice.∑∏ Other people who requested to be formally declared
natives were foreigners who, having been naturalized in Spain by way of
prescription, found it necessary to obtain also a formal declaration. Juan
Olavide, born in France, arrived to Spain as a child in 1746.∑π He completed a
university degree in Alcalá and became a candidate (opositor) for a fellowship.
Those competing with him raised the issue of his foreignness, which would
make him ineligible. Although the university rejected these claims, ‘‘these pre-
cedents did not diminish his fear that he would be unable to receive ecclesiasti-
cal benefice in these kingdoms unless he proceeded to request a formal declara-
tion that he was native. Nor is he assured by the fact that his brother Miguel de
Olavide, who lives in Lima, was allowed to trade in the Indies.’’ He had spent
so much money in his academic degree that it would be highly prejudicial to
him if he had to abandon the Spanish kingdoms. Furthermore, abandoning
these kingdoms would be ‘‘impractical, since he was so connaturalized in them
and would have difficulty in any language other than Spanish.’’∑∫ Juan’s re-
quest was granted on the grounds that he virtually grew up in Spain. Antonio
María Benchi wished to obtain a formal naturalization ‘‘so that no one will
ever consider him a foreigner.’’∑Ω Faustino Borgnis explained that he was al-
ready connaturalized in Spain, and now all he required was a formal declara-
tion of this fact.∏≠
parties (the king and kingdom) were willing to modify the agreement, the king
requesting permission to naturalize foreigners and the kingdom acceding, they
could not do so. As a ‘‘third party,’’ any individual living in the kingdom could
make a claim against such a modification and compel the king and kingdom to
enforce the original agreement.π≥ The Recopilación de Castilla recognized this
right, setting the rule that ‘‘we [the kings] order and give faculty to all and each
one of our subjects and natives that they may oppose and resist on these issues
[naturalization], because this opposition concerns the privileges and honors
and it guards the preeminence of the king and patria.’’π∂
Although the kingdom and the cities with a vote in parliament argued
against royal naturalization policies in the seventeenth and eighteenth cen-
turies, they did not once invoke the need to change the definition of nativeness
and foreignness. Implicitly, they accepted the idea that foreigners could be
transformed into natives through their activities, which proved their loyalty.
What they rejected was the notion that foreigners who were not integrated in
the community could be given the rights of natives solely because the king
wished it so.
This willingness to accept foreigners naturalized by integration and to reject
those naturalized by the king can also be seen in the fact that when the king
naturalized integrated foreigners there was little or no challenge at all. For
example, in 1783, there was general agreement that Antonio Krasa merited his
letter of naturalization as he had resided in the court since 1772, preaching
and hearing confession in some six different languages as well as teaching
music.π∑ The same thing was true of Angel Saviana, who served as a chaplain
first in Naples, then in Barcelona. He was well known in the jurisdiction and
was famous for the number of Protestant ‘‘heretics’’ he converted to the Cath-
olic faith.π∏ By the same token, conflict was especially intense when candidates
for royal naturalization clearly lacked an attachment to Spain, either because
their residence in the jurisdiction was deemed temporary or because they
resided elsewhere.ππ
The conflict between the king and the kingdom regarding naturalization
policies encouraged royal officials to develop a clearer distinction between
naturalization by integration (prescription) and naturalization by royal grant.
This distinction became a standing feature of eighteenth-century political de-
bates and was now advocated by both the kingdom and the king. The cities
with votes in parliament used it to distinguish between foreigners who were
worthy of naturalization (by integration) and those who were not (by royal
letter). Royal officials used it to establish when the kingdom could oppose a
candidate’s naturalization. Approval of the kingdom to depart from the terms
of the tax agreement, royal official argued, was required only in cases where
Naturaleza: Community of the Kingdom 79
The degree to which legal traditions could circumscribe the power of the
king to define the community was reaffirmed in other ways as well. In 1707–
16 the Aragonese kingdoms were subjected to obedience to Castilian law. One
of the most important measures included in this reform was the unification of
many communities of natives (natives of Castile, natives of Aragon, and so on)
into a single community that was defined according to Castilian law. Castilian
traditions determined who was a native of the kingdoms of Spain, and Cas-
tilian practices, such as requesting the permission of the kingdom to naturalize
exceptional foreigners, were implemented in non-Castilian kingdoms, where
foreigners were now identified as natives according to the Castilian doctrine.
Yet, despite royal wishes, in the years following its enactment, the formation
of this united community ran into problems. Ecclesiastical benefices, for ex-
ample, were regulated by both local and papal legislation. In Catalonia, the
monopoly of natives was embodied in local legislation, which recognized the
principle of reciprocity. Foreigners, it stipulated, were excluded from benefices
only as long as their countries of origin followed the same policy with regard
to Catalans. Under these circumstances, the creation of a single community of
Spanish natives posed no particular challenge. Such a community could be
established either by changing the Catalan laws (which depended on local
legislation) or by stipulating that—now that Catalans could hold benefices
anywhere in Spain—other Spaniards should be able to do the same in Cata-
lonia. The situation in Aragon was similar and posed no problems. In Valen-
cia, however, the exclusion of nonnatives from ecclesiastical benefices won
papal approval. Because the exclusion was embodied in papal legislation,
neither the king nor the local authorities could modify it. Nevertheless, Valen-
cia’s legal arrangements recognized the principle of reciprocity. Consequently,
although the law itself could not be modified, its practical effect could, by
making sure that natives of Valencia would be allowed to hold offices through-
out Spain.∫∂ In Majorca the restrictions were based on papal bulls, which did
not include the principle of reciprocity. This meant that there was no mecha-
nism allowing the king or the local authorities to intervene in the status quo
and end the monopoly of natives. In spite of the application of Castilian law
on the island and the royal wish to end the coexistence of various communities
of natives in Spain, natives of Majorca would remain the only ones allowed to
hold ecclesiastical benefices in the jurisdiction. Because of reciprocity—recog-
nized elsewhere in Spain—they would also be barred from exercising similar
privileges in the other Iberian kingdoms.∫∑
Candidates for offices who suffered the consequences of this arrangement
lamented this conclusion. Natives of Majorca were isolated geographically by
the sea that separated them from the Spanish mainland.∫∏ Tied to an island,
82 Naturaleza: Community of the Kingdom
which they rarely left, Majorcans falsely believed that other Spaniards were
different from themselves. They were convinced that if they ever left their
homes monstrous things would happen to them. Majorcans were like a ‘‘ca-
daver’’: instead of allowing a natural circulation in their community and en-
couraging mutual correspondence and participation with other Spaniards,
they were left on their own, without the stimulation of exchange. The isolation
of Majorca was also distasteful to royal officials. The representative of royal
interests ( fiscal ) in the Council of Castile believed that the good of the state
required that all differences between Majorca and the rest of Spain ‘‘imme-
diately cease to exist.’’∫π Linguistic differences—Majorca being a Catalan-
speaking region—were insufficient to justify excluding Castilians from eccle-
siastical benefices. On the contrary, linguistic differences justified forcing a
Castilian presence on Majorca as this presence would guarantee that the lin-
gua franca of Spain would finally be used in that region.
These difficulties could be resolved only by moving away from the monop-
oly on office and focusing instead on the community for whom offices were
reserved. In Catalonia, the eighteenth-century royal decrees were interpreted
as a measure of collective naturalization that converted all non-Catalan Span-
iards into Catalans.∫∫ It was as ‘‘Catalans’’ rather than as ‘‘Spaniards’’ that
these people could now obtain benefices reserved to natives. In Aragon, a
different interpretation was used. The turn-of-the-century decrees did not
abolish the monopoly on office holding, but rather changed the definition of
the community enjoying its protection.∫Ω Whereas the previous community
included only natives of Aragon, the current community was composed of all
natives of all Spanish kingdoms. In 1772, similar arguments were made with
regard to Majorca.Ω≠ Although one could not modify the monopoly on office
holding as practiced in the island, one could claim that the community pro-
tected by it had changed. According to Castilian law, now in force in Majorca,
there was only a single community of natives in Spain. As a result, offices in
Majorca should indeed be reserved to natives, but nativeness should now
embrace all Spaniards of all kingdoms.
and needs: ‘‘Although it is true that many of these merchants are Irish in ori-
gin, although they enjoy all privileges as if they were of this country, they
are angry when one considers them Spanish.’’Ω∞ These foreigners, it was
now claimed by intellectuals, local communities, and merchant associations
throughout Spain, enjoyed the best of all worlds. As outsiders, they were
exempt from tax payment and from subjection to the local authorities and to
most restrictions on trade.Ω≤ As permanent residents, they were treated as
natives and enjoyed all that Spain had to offer. In the words of the junta of
commerce and agriculture of Valencia:
[They] participate (though they do not want to admit it) in the same benefits
as the natives in the interior of this kingdom, and even if they do not achieve
other benefits than that of coming to the kingdom with a humble and low
beginning, working their way up in prejudice of your vassals, who if it were
not for them would have done the same and taken this work, it would seem
that this would be sufficient in order to have them happily embrace the funda-
mental laws of this kingdom and obey blindly your soft and sovereign pre-
cepts. On the contrary, Señor. They resist them with all their forces and they
do not omit any measure, even the most irregular, in order not to obey them.
Resentment was accompanied by the demand that those benefiting from priv-
ileges be induced to comply with duties: ‘‘May the clear and happy day come,
Señor, in which the old and flourishing commerce of our Spain be reborn; may
foreigners come to Spain, merchants, artisans, and the hard-working, and they
will subject themselves to our laws and to the obligations of the state and enjoy
with us the benefits.’’ Indeed, ‘‘reason and good political maxims state . . . that
he who participates in the benefits of the republic, must also participate in the
obligations.’’Ω≥ Foreigners should be allowed to come to Spain and ‘‘should be
admitted as other members are to the pastureland and other communal prop-
erties.’’ They should be able to hold public offices and participate in the local
militia.Ω∂ Yet in return, they must obey Spanish law, declare their allegiance to
the Spanish monarch, and pay taxes.
The opinion that Spanish practices favored foreigners at the expense of
natives encouraged the crystallization of a distinction between extranjeros
transeuntes (transient foreigners) and extranjeros avecindados y arraigados
(integrated citizen foreigners). This distinction, formally elaborated in 1716
by the junta de extranjeros (a dependency of the Council of State) in order to
define its jurisdiction, was now used to identify people who despite their
foreign origin were natives.Ω∑ It established the rule that transient foreigners
would enjoy the fuero de extranjería and would be treated as aliens, while
integrated citizen foreigners would be compared to natives in both privileges
84 Naturaleza: Community of the Kingdom
and obligations and would be considered ‘‘vassals of this crown and subjects
to the status and laws of Spaniards.’’Ω∏ Among integrated citizen foreigners—
now considered natives—were people who received naturalization letters or
who were born in Spain. Also included were foreigners who had converted to
Catholicism in Spain (which was equal to a spiritual rebirth in Spain), had
established a domicile there, had received citizenship (vecindad) in a Spanish
local community, had married a Spaniard, had bought property, had worked
as an independent artisan or retail merchant or were employed in honorary
posts (all of which were theoretically reserved for natives of the kingdom), had
acted as vecinos using municipal property, had resided in Spain for more than
ten years with an open house, or had, according to common or royal law,
obtained nativeness or citizenship (vecindad) in Spain.Ωπ These people shared a
common behavior indicating that they wished to establish permanent ties with
the Spanish community. In some cases, this behavior included a formal admis-
sion—for example, the acquisition of naturalization or citizenship letters. In
others, it was implicit in the candidates’ behavior. Candidates who acted as a
citizens of local communities by using the communal pasture, for example, or
as natives of the kingdom by holding offices reserved to natives, could be
declared natives because they acted as citizens or as natives.
The 1716 instruction followed the rules of the traditional Castilian pre-
sumption regime. It explained the circumstances under which foreigners
would be recognized as natives, circumstances it adopted first for administra-
tive purposes (to define the jurisdiction of the junta de extranjeros in 1716)
and then throughout Spain (in order to distinguis natives from foreigners in
the second half of the eighteenth century). This system replicated the duality of
formal declarations, on one hand, and implicit categorizations, on the other.
Formal declarations included letters of naturalization and letters of citizen-
ship. Implicit categorizations were based on the activities of each candidate
that theoretically demonstrated his decision to become a member. Citizenship
in a local community was formally instituted as a mechanism of conversion
that allowed foreigners to become natives. Indeed, independent of their origin
and descent, people who were citizens of local communities, through either
formal or implicit means, were now by extension clearly natives. The 1716
ruling thus formally acknowledged the existing relationship between vecindad
and naturaleza.
In the second half of the eighteenth century, and coinciding with the above-
mentioned complaints about foreign residents who refused to comply with the
duties of Spaniards, the 1716 instruction became a powerful tool. Instead of
waiting for foreigners to affirm their integration in the community either by
requesting their naturalization or by simply exercising the rights of natives,
Naturaleza: Community of the Kingdom 85
beginning in the 1750s the authorities, using the criteria established in 1716,
proceeded to classify aliens on their own initiative. Motivated by the wish to
facilitate knowledge of who was who, and who was worthy of which treat-
ment, they ordered local authorities to elaborate lists of both transient and
domiciled citizen foreigners.Ω∫ The central authorities hoped that, after the
lists were complied, it would be possible to ensure that each person received
the treatment he deserved. True foreigners (transient aliens) would be ex-
cluded from the rights of natives, and natives (integrated citizen foreigners)
would be forced to comply with the duties that corresponded to them.ΩΩ
The idea that transient aliens could be distinguished systematically from
integrated foreigners was easy to conceive but hard to apply. The complexity
of the question came to light when the local authorities attempted to elaborate
the desired lists.∞≠≠ The foreign community in Spain refused to cooperate with
this effort and denounced the measure as tyrannical. Many foreigners of long
standing wished to conserve their status as aliens and refused to be treated as
‘‘vassals of Spain.’’∞≠∞ Juan Bautista Valerino, a municipal judge (alcalde de
barrio) in Seville, claimed he had no domicile in the city. Antonio de Arbone,
who was a member of a local dynasty of foreign merchants and served as the
French consul, also pretended to reside in the jurisdiction only temporarily. In
Orán, Juan Pedro Prats, who was married to a Spaniard, had fathered five
children, and had a retail shop and a house, declared his wish to remain vassal
of the French king and to be considered a transient foreigner. Others who had
only recently arrived to Spain claimed that they were integrated and thus
natives.∞≠≤ A third group of foreigners moved between one position and the
other. Miguel Charles and Pedro Constayns claimed they were citizens when
they petitioned their admission to the local guild, yet they insisted they were
transients when they were asked to pay taxes.∞≠≥ In Valencia, French mer-
chants who were members of the local guild suddenly requested to be classified
as transients.∞≠∂
Perplexed, the local authorities wrote to the central administration in Ma-
drid.∞≠∑ Were they obliged to examine the circumstances of each case and
decide whether the foreigner was truly integrated or not? Should the presump-
tions enumerated in the decree constitute proof against foreigners, or could
they be contradicted? Was the inclusion in a list evidence for future reference,
or were foreigners allowed to change their minds, alternately requesting dif-
ferent legal statuses? In question was not only the correct classification of
foreigners, but also the adequate definition of jurisdictional spheres. Accord-
ing to the laws, transient foreigners were under the authority of military com-
manders, and integrated foreigners (now considered natives) were subject to
the ordinary local authorities. Disagreement about the classification of people
86 Naturaleza: Community of the Kingdom
explained that ‘‘the aim of the legislation is that the census will clarify the
doubts with respects to the Frenchmen [the largest foreign community in
Spain] living in Spain, whether they are transitory or naturalized, leaving it to
their own decision on that occasion to chose the concept according to which
they would like to be treated, so that after this election they could be treated
with the corresponding distinction according to the class they elected and the
laws of these kingdoms in both the favorable and the unfavorable.’’∞∞∞ The
wish for clarity was such that it justified suspending the power of ordinary
laws (the presumption regime) and allowing foreigners to choose freely the
category to which they would belong. As a result of the new arrangement,
recently arrived foreigners could be recognized as integrated if they formally
requested it, while, in some cases at least, established aliens could maintain
their foreignness.
Not all Spaniards welcomed this reality. After reviewing the case of a
Frenchman who declared himself a transient foreigner, the local judge (teni-
ente) of Seville expressed his bewilderment and requested the Council of State
to reexamine its policies. It could not have been the royal intention, he wrote,
to allow foreigners to classify themselves as they chose. It was the authorities’
duty to decide who was a native of Spain and who was not, and in their
decision, the authorities had to follow the traditional presumption regime.
Although this regime gave some value to the foreigner’s verbal expressions,
verbal expressions were never sufficient on their own. Oral claims had to be
verified by external facts. Any other solution was inconceivable. It was utterly
unthinkable that foreigners could determine who should be considered a na-
tive of Spain and therefore vassal of the Spanish king. Such a matter was for
Spaniards to decide. Furthermore, the lists were originally created because of
the wish to no longer permit foreigners to freely choose their status. The lists
aimed at identifying foreigners who, by virtue of their behavior, were indeed
natives, forcing them to act as natives, thus ensuring the rights of both com-
munity and king. Adopting a regime based only on oral declarations guaran-
teed the contrary. In short, it was a ‘‘great novelty,’’ and ‘‘exorbitant alteration
that must always be avoided.’’∞∞≤
Similar arguments were invoked by Valencia’s Junta de Comercio y Agri-
cultura in 1773, yet most other people were willing to allow foreigners to
classify themselves.∞∞≥ Among other things, they hoped that this autoclassi-
fication would allow ‘‘useful’’ foreigners to integrate into the Spanish commu-
nity. It was in Spanish interests, the royal councils argued, to define nativeness
in the widest possible way, as this would open the community to beneficial
newcomers. The more people classified as integrated foreigners and thus na-
tive, the better the situation in Spain would be.∞∞∂ Indeed, by the 1770s the
88 Naturaleza: Community of the Kingdom
intolerable was the presence of people who enjoyed the benefits of residing in
the community but who refused to act as true members of it, that is, accept its
obligations.
The late eighteenth-century passage from legal presumption to oral declara-
tion changed the balance of power between local communities, the kingdom,
and the king. Under the presumption regime, communities played an impor-
tant role in the acceptance of foreigners into the kingdom. The presumptions
tied citizenship to nativeness and determined that people who were formally
accepted as citizens, or who acted as citizens, were also by extension natives.
Foreigners could become part of the community of the kingdom through an
integration that could be achieved only by establishing ties with a concrete
local community. Under a regime based on oral declarations, admission of
foreigners by local communities was no longer required, and foreigners could
be classified as integrated by declaring their intentions to remain in Spain
before they actually established themselves in the community. At the same
time, integrated aliens—who were true members of local communities—were
allowed to remain foreigners. The fact that by the end of the eighteenth cen-
tury nativeness could no longer depend on citizenship or local integration was
specifically stipulated in a 1791 decree ordering local communities to accept as
citizens all foreigners who had already obtained recognition as natives.∞≤≥
Such foreigners-made-into-natives now enjoyed the freedom of all Spaniards
to immigrate and settle where they wished. Rather than making integration a
precondition for their acceptance as natives, their status as natives now al-
lowed these foreigners to claim integration in local communities. Indeed, in-
stead of citizenship giving persons the right to nativeness, nativeness now gave
foreigners the right to citizenship. In short, under the new regime, the inclu-
sion of foreigners in both the local and the Spanish community came to de-
pend only on their wishes, on one hand, and on the king—who gave them the
power to do so—on the other. Once again, the royal administration justified
these developments by presenting naturalization as a royal prerogative. The
king, royal officials argued, could change the rules governing nativeness and
naturalization because the conversion of foreigners into natives was a regalía,
a faculty that depended only on the monarch: ‘‘Because of his pure moderation
and justice, the king wanted to grant it [the right to declare intentions]. The
laws of Spain identify foreigners who should be reputed as natives, and the
king could have ordered that foreigners will subject themselves to all payments
and obligations as such . . . which would have been part of is sovereignty,’’ but
he did not. Instead, he allowed foreigners to choose the treatment that they
would receive.∞≤∂
The discussions between the king and kingdom regarding the monopoly on
90 Naturaleza: Community of the Kingdom
Conclusions
The construction of a community of natives first in Castile and then in
Spain was a long historical process that depended on different interests and
actors. This process involved a concern for office holding and the use of eccle-
siastical benefices, and it caused a confrontation between Spanish and foreign
merchants. The same process also created conflicts between the king and the
kingdom over issues of sovereignty and the right to classify people as natives
or foreigners. The construction of a community of natives required determin-
ing whether nativeness and naturalization depended on natural law or civil
law, and it brought into light two different understandings of the community:
one perceived the kingdom as a community of the king’s vassals; the other saw
the community as made up of individuals tied to one another and to specific
local communities. By the eighteenth century, discussions on nativeness in
Castile were extended to the rest of Spain. This extension was not void of
difficulties, precisely because the king’s power to change the existing situation
was limited. By that period, confrontation over the identification of people
worthy of offices and benefices was paralleled by the wish to protect local
merchants against ‘‘unloyal’’ foreign competition, and the desire to force all
those permanently residing in Spain to act as natives. It was also during this
period that pressure from merchant and local communities alike led the au-
thorities to search for a more straightforward regime that would eliminate
ambiguities and would classify people once and for all. Their success at ob-
taining such a regime was limited. Until the end of the eighteenth century, the
distinction between foreigners and natives was still highly debatable, and in
practice foreigners could act as natives on some occasions and as foreigners in
others.
Initially representing a complex relationship between people, their lord, and
the land, by the early modern period nativeness mainly depended on the estab-
lishment of a relationship between individuals living on the same space. As
José María Alvarez put it in 1818, nativeness represented the ‘‘natural inclina-
tion that people who are born or live in the same place and under the same
government feel to one another. This consideration has so much power, that it
perfectly imitates nature: as one can admit adopted children to the group of
relatives, one can also accept foreigners who legitimately established domicile
in the community.’’∞≥≠ Because both birth and residence allowed people to
92 Naturaleza: Community of the Kingdom
gration and not on birthright. The community it portrayed was organic rather
than artificial.
Royal interventions were always presented as extraordinary. The king inter-
vened in order to change the existing rules. Yet, his right to do so, and to act on
the margin of communal traditions, was continuously questioned. Contempo-
raries presented society as a natural mechanism that could run perfectly on its
own. According to them, people could be converted from natives into for-
eigners and vice versa without official intervention. A ‘‘discourse of love’’ was
central to this argument. People naturally loved the community where they
were born, and foreigners could naturally come to love the community where
they resided for a lengthy period and where they had established roots. The
king and the state were external to these processes. They were called to inter-
vene only when problems emerged, and when conflict could not be resolved
within the community. In these instances they were requested to declare of-
ficially that certain integrated foreigners were already natives, either to enable
them to enjoy rights or to force them to comply with duties. Indeed, it was only
when society’s self-regulating and natural processes broke down that royal
action became legitimate. In all other cases, the king and his administration
were expected to do nothing, and their claim that they could and must act—
for example, by naturalizing foreigners—was completely rejected.
5
Soon after the Spanish arrival in the New World, the Spanish king began
regulating the relationship between the Old World and this overseas domain. In
a series of laws dating from the early sixteenth century, the crown instituted a
legal monopoly: only natives of the kingdoms of Spain could immigrate, settle,
and trade in Spanish America.∞ Also, only certain certified Castilian ports—
mainly Seville—could maintain contacts with similarly certified American
ports, and only Spanish ships, manned by Spaniards, could travel between
them.≤ In the following decades, the presence—despite these prohibitions—of
foreigners in Spanish America set about an endless chain of royal decrees
demanding that local authorities locate these illegal immigrants and expel them
from the continent.≥ As a result of these measures, whenever people wanted to
immigrate or trade in the New World, and whenever they were included in lists
of foreigners to be expelled, a conflict arose that could be resolved only through
their formal classification as natives or foreigners.
The way discussions on the right to immigrate and trade in the New World
contributed to the formation of a Spanish community is to a large degree a story
untold. Many historians have assumed that for purposes of trade and immigra-
tion, nativeness was a straightforward category whose interpretation varied
because of illegal practices or ‘‘human’’ understandings that permitted ‘‘a
94
Naturaleza: Spanish America 95
candidates for immigration. Its role was so preeminent that crown officials
voiced their disappointment when the guild failed to express its view. This
rarely happened. In most cases, the merchants responded eagerly to their
newly acquired function and, on their own initiative, even produced lists of
foreigners to be expelled from Spanish America. Whenever a person’s classi-
fication was debated, individual merchants or the guild acting for them, per-
sonified in the courts, wrote allegations, presented petitions, and did every-
thing possible to ensure that nativeness was acknowledged in people who met
with their approval.
Most parties to the discussion on ‘‘nativeness in order to immigrate and
trade in Spanish America’’ were thus merchants, and commercial interests
were foremost on their minds. These interests could be local and have as their
goal the classification of business competitors as foreigners. Such a decision
would ensure the competitor’s expulsion from the Americas or disqualify him
from participating in transatlantic trade. These interests also might include
wider economic concerns, such as the wish to protect the internal market or to
ensure the accumulation of precious metals.∞≤
Seville and then proceeded to request recognition as native.∞∂ But as the six-
teenth century drew to a close, and as the commercial power of foreign (natu-
ralized) transatlantic merchants became evident, this understanding of native-
ness gradually came under attack. Under the continuing pressure of Seville’s
merchant guild, new regulations were enacted, eventually creating important
differences between Castilian and Spanish American practices.
Although the first indications of this separation in practices were present at
the end of the sixteenth century, it was only in the early seventeenth century
that Seville’s guild was able to achieve important gains.∞∑ As happened in
Castile during the same period, these gains were tied to negotiations concern-
ing the collection and payment of taxes. In 1591, the guild agreed to collect the
avería, the tax that financed the military escort for the annual fleets from
Seville to Spanish America.∞∏ This agreement implied that the guild promised
to hand over to the royal treasury a certain sum. Theoretically the guild was
charged with collecting this money, but it would have to pay the sum whether
the collection was successful or not. As was customary under tax farming, the
guild received important concessions in return for its willingness to collabo-
rate with the crown. It obtained jurisdiction over bankruptcy litigation, as
well as a decree that instructed royal authorities to stop granting foreigners
licenses of passage to Spanish America. The guild reasoned that if foreigners
were not allowed to cross the Atlantic, they would not be able to obtain
naturalization by integration there. This would put an end to naturalization
by prescription in Spanish America, as people could no longer acquire rights
by exercising them. It would guarantee the immediate cessation of the in-
tervention of naturalized aliens in the transatlantic trade because foreigners
would no longer be allowed to attain the status of natives.∞π
When the guild refused to take on the collection of avería in 1598, the
crown was forced to contract with a group of individual merchants, a solution
that turned out to be impractical and unfortunate. In 1608, when the guild
was once again willing to administer the same tax, the crown was ready to
make considerable concessions.∞∫ These concessions, enacted in 1608 and
later reproduced in the main compilation of Spanish American law (Recopila-
ción de Indias), were tied to the definition of nativeness and foreignness in
order to immigrate and trade in Spanish America.∞Ω At the guild’s request, the
king explicitly revoked the sixteenth-century decrees that allowed foreigners
naturalized by integration to immigrate and trade in the New World. The king
then determined that foreigners who wished to be considered natives in order
to immigrate and trade in the Americas would be required to seek a formal
recognition of their status as natives. The Council of the Indies, which received
Naturaleza: Spanish America 99
information from the municipality where the foreigners lived, would grant
this recognition by issuing a letter of naturalization. Before such a document
could be issued, the council had to examine whether the foreigner resided in
Spanish territories for at least twenty years (instead of the ten years required in
Castile), and whether he was married and had a sufficient amount of property.
These modifications meant that from 1608 onward the path for implicit and
automatic naturalization—so common in Castile—was no longer available to
those claiming nativeness in order to immigrate or trade in Spanish America.
In their case, it was no longer sufficient to prove their citizenship in a local
community, or to assert in any other way that they were integrated in the
kingdom and thus natives. What was required, instead, was a formal letter of
naturalization. The adoption of more stringent requirements, the merchants
claimed, was essential to the verification of the ‘‘true intentions’’ of foreigner
merchants. It was common practice among merchants to live in foreign coun-
tries for a prolonged period, to marry local women, and to purchase proper-
ties. As a result, residence, marriage, and property, which in cases involving
nonmerchants were sufficient to ascertain their intentions, were for merchants
almost useless.≤≠ Furthermore, in the case of merchants, the common assump-
tion was that their residence depended on their trade; once this trade was
completed, they would leave the jurisdiction.≤∞ Rather than allowing the pre-
sumptions of residence, marriage, and property to work on their own, it was
essential in the case of foreign merchants to institute formal procedures to
verify whether what appeared to be integration was indeed integration. Be-
cause so many foreigners wanted to participate in the Spanish American trade,
and because this participation was considered prejudicial to Spanish interests,
it was crucial to maintain formal procedures to verify the status of individuals
in the Spanish American case. These procedures were designed to guarantee
that only foreigners worthy of nativeness would indeed be allowed to trade in
the colonies.
The merchant guild insisted on the strict application of these new rules, and
its organs and individuals constantly stressed the differences between Cas-
tilian and New World practices. They repeated that in the Americas there was
no need to distinguish transient from integrated foreigners because, in the
Americas, foreigners were either legal because they were formally naturalized,
or not. ‘‘How different is the law of residence in the Indies, than in the king-
doms of Spain! In the kingdoms of Spain a ten-year residence, marriage, and
the owning of property allow to consider the foreigner a native, nativeness
being introduced by way of prescription when the requisites for it are met. But
in the Indies, marriage, property, and a ten- or even a twenty-year residence do
100 Naturaleza: Spanish America
not produce nativeness. They only produce merits, which allow the king in his
supreme council to grant naturalization by issuing a letter of naturalization,
which is the only way it is possible to acquire nativeness.’’≤≤
The delegation of responsibility on this issue to the Council of the Indies
was typical. The royal administration was divided by councils, each having a
jurisdiction over certain matters or territories. It was thus natural that only the
Council of the Indies could issue letters concerning the New World, and that
letters granted by other councils—for example, the Council of Castile—could
have no effect in Spanish America. Therefore, foreigners who wanted to be
considered natives in Spanish America had to address the Council of the In-
dies. Their recognition as natives of Spain by, say, the Council of Castile was
insufficient to guarantee immigration and trade rights in the New World.
Although enjoying the status of natives in Spain, in the New World these
people were considered foreigners.
Despite mercantile efforts, the eradication of Castilian naturalization by
integration was only partially successful. There are several indications that the
viceroy of New Spain and the metropolitan authorities exchanged letters on
this issue from 1670 to 1693.≤≥ The viceroy argued that naturalization by
prescription was still available to foreigners who wished to reside in Spanish
America; the 1608 decision should be applied only to foreigners who wished
to engage in the transatlantic trade. He saw this not only as the correct legal
interpretation of the 1608 decision, but also as a just solution according to the
‘‘law of nations,’’ which admitted integrated foreigners into communities. On
this occasion the Council of the Indies disagreed, but in 1680 its members
voted in favor of recognizing integrated foreigners as natives.≤∂ Responding to
a royal decree that criticized the council for allowing too many foreigners to
naturalize in Spanish America, the council explained that the presence of
foreigners in Spanish America was indeed prohibited, but despite all efforts
many foreigners were able to cross the Atlantic and settle there. ‘‘Well rooted’’
in the continent, they married local women, raised sons, and owned property.
According to the council, these factors indicated that they ‘‘no longer had love
for their motherland, and that they established perpetuity and domicile in
these provinces, so that much of the fear and many of the disadvantages
usually associated with their temporary settlement, ceased to exist.’’≤∑
In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the same opinion was held by
Spanish American communities that distinguished between foreigners who
were integrated and trustworthy and those who were not. On different occa-
sions the councils of Santiago de los Caballeros (Santo Domingo), Cartagena
de Indias (Nueva Granada), and Guayaquil (Quito) indeed asked the authori-
ties to allow their foreign citizens to remain on the continent despite the
Naturaleza: Spanish America 101
necessary nor sufficient to achieve one’s deserved status. What was required
instead was to prove one’s wish to become a Spaniard and to demonstrate
one’s commitment to the local community. Following this logic, Luis Vacaya
asserted in 1697 that he was already ‘‘conaturalized’’ in the community. He
had rendered many services to the crown, more than most other natives did.
He thus demonstrated in his behavior his wish to remain in the kingdoms,
which was the only important fact for deciding his case.≥∑ Other candidates for
Spanish American naturalization demonstrated that they severed their ties
with their community of origin, and they argued that they were integrated in
Spain. In the words of Valerio Martino, native of Naples and merchant in
Cádiz: ‘‘Since the first moment, I resisted participating in the national meetings
of the Neapolitans and contributing to their association, without allowing my
name be included in their lists, and having always behaved as a true Spaniard
in commercial dealings, negotiations, and other activities.’’≥∏
As in Spain, Spanish American naturalization was only a formal recognition
of a situation that had been generated earlier on its own. Rather than convert-
ing foreigners into natives, naturalization verified that certain foreigners were
already integrated and were thus worthy of treatment as natives. This verifica-
tion required interpreting the meaning of an external behavior. Again, as in
Spain, this interpretation could be consensual or it could provoke debate. The
House of Trade and the merchant guild often disagreed about how certain
facts should be interpreted and evaluated.≥π In these cases, although formally
what mattered was the interpretation of the intentions of foreigners, the re-
sults also depended on the balance of power between these two institutions, as
well as the role played by the Council of the Indies, royal secretaries, and the
king. On occasion, the king insisted that the decision was his to make. He
demanded a complete and detailed file on each candidate, and he asserted his
independence by stating that he could reject the recommendation of the mer-
chants, the House of Trade, and royal ministers.≥∫ The merchant guild and the
House of Trade argued the contrary. Contesting the power of the Council of
the Indies and even the king, they attested that only they knew who was
worthy of which treatment. Foreigners requesting naturalization in order to
trade in the Indies were usually well known either in Cádiz or in Seville. The
House of Trade and the guild were thus best placed to examine their petitions
and attest to the true nature of their intentions. Their value as eyewitnesses
was enhanced by their capacity as expert witnesses who knew merchants and
understood them best. Indeed, in most cases, the recommendation of the guild
or the House of Trade was crucial to the success or failure of a petition.
Favorable recommendation by the House of Trade and the guild usually as-
sured naturalization, and disapproval barred it.
104 Naturaleza: Spanish America
Conflicts between the king and the merchant guild were not limited to
arguments over who could best understand foreign merchants. At times the
guild pressured the monarch to cancel all letters of naturalization issued to
foreigners they considered unworthy. In the mid-seventeenth century, the guild
claimed that of 126 foreigners naturalized by letters, only 13 met the legal
criteria and only 21 others ‘‘almost did.’’≥Ω The guild was particularly militant
in cases of naturalization issued for services rendered to the monarch or pur-
chased by some means. In 1622, for example, Jorge de Paz de Silvera, a Por-
tuguese merchant, included the receipt of an American naturalization letter as
one of his conditions for lending the crown 1,000 escudos for the ‘‘needs of the
war in Flanders.’’ Not only did Jorge not meet the legal requirement for natu-
ralization, but when he renounced his intention of using this grant, he re-
quested that it be extended to Domingo de Herrera, a partner of his.∂≠ The
guild insisted, as did Castilian local communities, that the king could not
admit foreigners to the community at will. It argued that, according to natural
and royal laws, only integrated foreigners were worthy of treatment as na-
tives. Royal officials, echoing their response in Castile, were divided about
how to proceed. Some ministers felt that the grant of letters to total foreigners
was so pernicious that the matter was serious enough to justify revoking all
letters given in the past. Other ministers sympathized with the protest yet
recommended against revoking the letters. They determined that letters of
naturalization were a contract between the king and the foreigners and that, as
for all other royal obligations, they could not be withdrawn unless justified by
a compelling ‘‘public interest.’’ This second group of ministers recommended
that the letters remain in force because revoking them would cause social
upheaval. However, the king should avoid granting similar letters in the
future.∂∞
Needless to say, the king continued to issue naturalization letters to noninte-
grated foreigners, and merchant opposition only served to limit the effects of
some of these grants.∂≤ As in peninsular Spain where four different types of
naturalization existed, in Spanish America naturalization letters often distin-
guished between foreigners allowed only to settle in the continent, and those
allowed to trade.∂≥ Because the effect of these letters was restricted to the
privileges enumerated in them, Gaspar Escalona y Agüero concluded that
foreigners allowed to reside or trade in Spanish America were not eligible for
public offices or ecclesiastical benefices in Spanish America or in Spain.∂∂
Eventually, Spanish American naturalization letters were classified as dis-
pensas, that is, as special letters including dispensation from certain legal
requirements. They were enumerated among gracias al sacar, which were
royal grants allowing people to do things that were otherwise prohibited.∂∑
Naturaleza: Spanish America 105
Recipients were charged different prices, according to whether they had all the
required attributes, some of them, or none at all.
In Spanish America as in Spain, the communities and merchants opposed
royal policies and insisted on natural ways for foreigners to become natives.
Whereas the king wished to assert his sovereignty and to push his right to
naturalize foreigners, the communities and merchants argued in favor of up-
holding the traditional regime of integration. Once again, two different mod-
els for the Spanish community were at stake. The first, advocated by the king,
perceived the community as a collection of vassals. The second, advocated by
the communities and the merchants, presented Spain as an association of
people tied to one another.
The sons of foreigners rejected these claims. They stressed their commitment
to Spain and their worthiness. This commitment depended on ‘‘their birth,
establishment, and other circumstances that ensured their permanence, having
never known another sovereign, or paid another sovereign taxes, having never
known another patria, domicile, citizenship, or settlement. They have the
prerequisites of birth, establishment, and others, without ever experiencing
that any of them had revoked or returned to the dominions from where his
forefathers came.’’∏∞ The Council of the Indies agreed. It stated that the allega-
tions of the guild and the representative of royal interests were absurd, and it
determined that privileges could not be granted on the basis of antiquity in
Spain. ‘‘No one can prove that he is a descendent of the companions of Tuval,
who because of the confusion of the languages [Tower of Babel] came to live in
110 Naturaleza: Spanish America
Spain, Spain having been so flooded with innumerable nations that even the
most genealogical person cannot boast an origin previous to the Goths, who
came to Spain after many other nations dominated it. . . . Until now, no one had
imagined or thought to form a genealogical tree that would declare his degree
of antiquity in Spain only to obtain license to trade in the Indies.’’∏≤
Official insistence that sons of foreigners were true natives and merited
treatment as such continued through the following decades. In 1774, respond-
ing to a naturalization petition presented by Juan Andrés de Prasca, the Coun-
cil of the Indies declared that Juan Andrés was already a ‘‘true native.’’∏≥ His
nativeness did not depend on formal declarations but arose from the fact that
he was born in Spain, that his father and two uncles had resided in Spain since
1720, and that both he and his father had already obtained Castilian natural-
ization. In doing so, he and his other relatives demonstrated their unwavering
and permanent wish to remain in the kingdoms, a wish that was sufficient to
transform Juan Andrés into a true native.
Litigants and the authorities often lamented the distinction between dif-
ferent types of natives (‘‘natives’’ and ‘‘naturalized’’ or ‘‘true natives’’ and
other ‘‘natives’’) and the construction of two different communities in the New
and the Old Worlds. Most of them, however, pointed out that despite some
differences, nativeness still had the same core meaning in both Spain and
Spanish America. In both places the authorities wished to examine the ‘‘true
intentions’’ of newcomers, and in both places nativeness was granted to people
who were loyal to the community and who wanted to establish permanent ties
with its members. From this perspective, the differences between Spain and
Spanish America were similar to the variations between the practices of dif-
ferent municipal communities. Although all municipalities in Castile shared
similar notions regarding citizenship (vecindad), each one of them invoked it
according to local needs and understandings, thus bringing about different
consequences. Like some municipalities, the Spanish peninsular community
facilitated the entry of new members by granting them the status of natives
with relative ease in order to encourage needed immigration. Like other mu-
nicipalities, the Spanish American community made procedural requirements
for those wishing to become natives extremely rigorous in order to exercise
control over admissions.∏∂
1790, a financial conflict between the Conde de Casa Jijón and his French
employee in Otavalo (present-day Ecuador) was also transformed into an
administrative procedure against the rebellious worker now classified as a
foreigner.πΩ On occasion, expulsion decrees were issued against people who
had lived in the jurisdiction for ten, twenty, and even thirty years without
being challenged.∫≠ And because the activities of merchants were so pre-
dominant in these procedures, nonmerchant foreigners had a better chance of
avoiding these inquiries. Since the same was true of aliens who were willing to
promise not to engage in commercial activities, expulsion proceedings fre-
quently depended on the question of whether certain people were artisans or
merchants. The expulsion of Arturo Alejandro Gordón in 1761 hinged on
whether he was a merchant (to be expelled) or a surgeon (to remain as a
professional in Spanish America). Felix Conforto was classified as a merchant
of silver and gold, but he was allowed to stay in Lima after agreeing that he
would cease ‘‘commerce in metals.’’∫∞
When individuals included in expulsion rolls contested their classification as
foreigners, a judge of the royal court (audiencia) heard their case. On many
such occasions, it became clear that proofs of foreignness were extremely frail.
They might consist, for example, of the testimony of a single witness received in
a secret hearing. The witness was not required to explain how he came to be-
lieve that the accused was an alien. People were classified according to their sur-
names, appearance, behavior, dress, or speech, and witnesses openly admitted
that their testimony was based on ‘‘public opinion’’ or simple rumors. Some
employed ‘‘commonsense’’ presumptions, such as the belief that employees of a
well-known French Huguenot family must themselves be foreigners.∫≤
Yet distinguishing natives from foreigners was not a simple affair. Don
Ventura Mariño Barriero y Figueroa, who was ‘‘of Galician origin and a Span-
ish hidalgo,’’ was labeled in 1762 as a foreigner because of the ‘‘foreignness’’ of
his surname. When he was ordered to leave Peru, he protested to the local
courts: ‘‘I was born in the city of Cangas in the kingdom of Galicia subject to
the Catholic kings of Spain to parents notoriously qualified and known . . .
both natives of this city.’’ He further claimed that the allegations that he was a
foreigner were ‘‘an injury to him and his parents . . . since it suspected their
nature and nobility, which was among the best in the kingdom.’’∫≥ Bernardo
García, a native of Valencia, suffered the same fate because of his ‘‘foreign’’
pronunciation of Spanish.∫∂ Bartolomé Guillén, born in San Clemente, was
classified as a foreigner: ‘‘One does not need, in order to know that he is
French, other proofs than his signature, which he drew on the petition . . .
because it uses a style so foreign, as is his speech, so that in his speech and in his
written-letter he has two conclusive witnesses of his foreignness.’’∫∑ In 1764,
114 Naturaleza: Spanish America
Francisco Carte y Linze was included on expulsion rolls because his ‘‘foreign-
ness is notorious, in the first place . . . because even though he speaks Castilian,
he does not speak it fluently . . . and this lack of vocabulary is typical of those
who have acquired the language in an older age.’’∫∏
All these people were later recognized as natives. In discussing their cases,
the courts, royal officials, and litigants were forced to admit that cultural and
linguistic tests were not necessarily helpful in distinguishing natives from for-
eigners. There was in fact no single way of being a ‘‘native of the kingdoms of
Spain’’ because the Spanish kingdoms each possessed their own culture and
language.∫π Catalans were often mistaken as French, and the fate of those born
in Valencia and the Basque provinces was similar. In fact, even the identity of
some Castilians—for example, natives of Galicia—could be questioned be-
cause they did not conform to expected habits, linguistic capacities, or other
external traits.
The presentation of a genealogical tree was not a guarantee against persecu-
tion. Ventura Mariño Barriero y Figueroa, whose case is mentioned above,
went through long judicial proceedings in 1756 to prove his hidalguía (no-
bility). For that end, he supplied ample proof of his genealogy and place of
birth. The results of these proceedings were communicated to the local mer-
chant guild, but only five years later, in 1761, and on a basis of a single witness,
he was classified as a foreigner.∫∫
Certainty about a person’s nativeness was very hard to establish, and people
suspected of foreignness, third parties, and the authorities all suffered the
consequences. Foreigners could be treated as natives because no one suspected
they were aliens, and true natives could be wrongly accused of foreignness.∫Ω
In some cases, public opinion classified the same people as both native and
foreign. In 1795 Buenos Aires, different people who wished to bar José Man-
uel Rebelo from the office of local judge (alcalde ordinario) classified him as a
foreigner. On that occasion the local authorities explained that José Manuel
was elected to office because no one suspected that he was a foreigner. The fact
that other foreigners had exercised this office was irrelevant, since they were
able to do so only because they were considered natives. Indeed, on many
occasions the authorities confessed their permanent confusion: ‘‘Finding out
truth in this matter is very difficult, as in the Indies very few or none of those
wishing to remain there confess that they are French, English, Dutch, or of
another nation, instead, they say that they are Castilian, Andalusians, Navar-
res, or from Vizcaya, and they are careful to change their names, in case their
patria is ever examined.’’Ω≠
But how could one prove one’s nativeness in an early modern world? Most
litigants ended up doing what their detractors did. They enlisted their public
Naturaleza: Spanish America 115
reputation as their aid, and they swore that their condition as natives was a
fact that could not be doubted. Ordered to leave Spanish America because of
his alienness, in 1763 Bernardo García protested that despite the contrary
information ‘‘he was a Spaniard and a native of the city of Valencia.’’Ω∞ To
back this claim, he presented to the judge commissioned to review his case in
Lima a copy of his license-of-passage to the Americas, which attested that he
was a ‘‘native of the kingdoms of Spain.’’ The merchant guild of Lima, acting
as an interested party in the proceedings, rejected this proof. It explained that
licenses-of-passage were not a conclusive proof of nativeness because they
were automatically given to all those allowed to sail to Spanish America.Ω≤
From a formal point of view, the license was not Bernardo’s; it was issued to
the master with whom Bernardo arrived in the New World. Many foreigners
falsified their names and genealogies in order to receive these licenses, and
Bernardo could well be one of them. The merchant guild explained that in the
hearings it held to produce lists of foreigners, one witness declared that García
was not Bernardo’s true surname, and many others attested that by ‘‘public
fame’’ he was a foreigner. The guild insisted that the burden of proof was now
on Bernardo, who needed to demonstrate that despite all these indications he
was nevertheless a Spaniard. Bernardo presented seven witnesses before the
judge. Some declared that it was ‘‘public and notorious’’ that he was a native
of Valencia, as were his parents. Categorizing their information as facts that
needed no proof and could not be legally contradicted ( público y notorio),
they protested that it was utterly unthinkable to conclude otherwise.Ω≥ Other
witnesses met him and his parents in Valencia or saw him associate with other
natives of this Spanish kingdom. One attested that he spoke perfect Valen-
ciano, and another reported that his kinsman, who recommended Bernardo,
told him that he was a native of Valencia. The merchant guild remained un-
satisfied. It classified these proofs as ‘‘very weak’’ because none of the wit-
nesses present in Lima could actually attest to Bernardo’s identity, birthplace,
and genealogy. Bernardo had no documents, such as a baptismal record, to
support his claim, and whatever was affirmed by way of ‘‘public knowledge’’
could be contradicted by the same knowledge that attested that he was a
foreigner. Nevertheless, the judge declared Bernardo a Spaniard and allowed
him to remain in Spanish America.
Similar discussions took place in other Spanish American enclaves. In 1749
in Buenos Aires, Fernando Arentavegaray attempted to refute allegations that
he was French. He presented three witnesses who attested that they had met
him in Cádiz and that they had always held him (lo han tenido y tienen) to be a
native of either Navarre or Vizcaya. The witnesses also stated that they had no
doubt that he was a Spaniard (español ), which is why the House of Trade
116 Naturaleza: Spanish America
allowed him to sail to Spanish America in the first place. In order to avoid
further complications, the representative of the local merchant community
opted to consider Fernando a native and to allow him to stay in the city.Ω∂
The nature of the hearing granted to those included on expulsion roll was
unclear. According to the merchant guild, these hearings were administrative
and not judicial. They were granted by way of ‘‘grace,’’ and the authorities
were not legally required to hold them. This implied that individuals wishing
to contest their classification had no right to due process: they had no right to
be heard, to see the proofs against them, or to claim legal exceptions.Ω∑ Most
litigants, realizing the fragility of their situation, limited their arguments to
proving their nativeness or asking for mercy. Only a few litigants were willing
to confront the guild on these issues. In 1723, Bernardo Coghen y Montefrío
refused to defend himself against merchant allegations that he was a foreigner
because, according to him, the merchant guild was not a party to the discus-
sion. Even if it were, the guild—rather than he—carried the burden of proof.
Pedro Juan de Ripa adopted a similar line of defense. As he had already proved
his nativeness in the House of Trade, he argued that the merchant guild had
neither the authority nor the cause to force him to prove his status again.Ω∏ In
1764, Francisco Carte y Linze also complained against the practice of placing
the burden of proof on those accused of foreignness: ‘‘This process attempts to
distinguish foreigners from natives, which cannot be done without proof and
the case cannot be decided according to the opinion of the guild only because
the court had committed errors in the list and included in them many that are
not foreigners.’’Ωπ Accordingly, the information supplied by the merchant
guild should be treated as an accusation the guild had to prove rather than one
requiring the so-called foreigner to demonstrate his nativeness.
Conclusions
Spanish American practices were both similar to and different from
Castilian traditions. On both sides of the Atlantic, integration, which was
verified by presumptions, was the main criterion for the conversion of for-
eigners into natives. Also similar was the confrontation between the king and
the community, with the role of the community represented in Spanish Amer-
ica mainly by merchants and the merchant association. This confrontation
involved the questions of whether the community was natural or artificial, and
whether its constitution depended on the king or on organic processes of
integration and convergence. Last but not least, in Spanish America as in
Spain, late eighteenth-century discussants expressed a growing frustration
with the presumption regime, which allowed foreigners either to obtain a
Naturaleza: Spanish America 117
status that they did not deserve (in Spanish America), or to act alternatively as
foreigners and natives (in Spain). As a result of these perceptions, demands
were made on both sides of the ocean for the adoption of a clearer system that
would depend on formal declarations. In Spain, this led to the adoption of a
regime that first codified the different ways people could become natives, and
then allowed foreigners to choose their own status. In Spanish America, the
same demand produced a contrary result. It first justified the suppression of
naturalization by prescription and the adoption of a regime of naturalization
by formal declaration. It then required that authorities deciding on the natu-
ralization of foreigners go beyond the verification of facts to interpret their
true meaning.
If similarities were important, so were differences. Whereas in Castile the
evolution of nativeness and foreignness was tied mainly to office holding and
to debates concerning the sovereignty of the king and the structure of the
community, in Spanish America this process was closely related to mercantile
interests and mercantile agency. These interests and agency were responsible
for the legal modifications introduced in the seventeenth and eighteenth cen-
turies. Yet, although in 1608 naturalization by integration (prescription) was
banned, local communities, the authorities, and even the merchants them-
selves continued to tolerate the presence of integrated foreigners. At times,
these foreigners were allowed to remain in the jurisdiction because they were
willing to pay fees (composición). Yet on most occasions, foreigners were
simply left alone. Foreigners were most likely to be persecuted when they were
wealthy merchants or when their engagement in the Spanish American trade
seemed unfavorable to the ambitions of individual merchants or the guilds. In
these cases, the distinction between natives and foreigners suddenly became
meaningful. The distinction between true natives and other natives also be-
came very important because it allowed the merchants to claim that those
naturalized in Castile were not necessarily naturalized in Spanish America and
it lay basis to the claim that ‘‘old’’ natives should always be preferred to ‘‘new’’
(naturalized) natives. Merchants and mercantile agency were thus crucial in
the identification and expulsion of foreigners. People were classified as for-
eigners even when they were true natives and their inclusion in the list de-
pended more on their wealth and the state of their affairs than it did on their
alienness. Indeed, in Spanish America more than in Spain, the link between
conflict or potential conflict on one hand, and status verification on the other,
was extremely clear: there was a direct relationship between those fighting to
exclude foreigners and those benefiting from this exclusion. Under these cir-
cumstances, the monopolist merchants came up with new ideas on how to
exclude people; those singled out for exclusion responded by defending their
118 Naturaleza: Spanish America
rights. This conversation, often taking place between neighbors and competi-
tors, lasted for two hundred years. It repeatedly utilized a discourse of the
natural love of patria, and it frequently questioned the ability of natives to
trust foreigners. It was in this nexus between natural love (obtained at birth
and reinforced by descent) and elected love (arising from the decision to inte-
grate in a new community), between natural inclination (birth) and choice
(immigration), that Spanish American debates were carried out. In Spanish
America more than in Spain, the right of people to choose their community
was reaffirmed at the same time it was repeatedly questioned.
6
119
120 The Other
with foreign and nonvassal Catholics, but that was practically impossible to
achieve in the cases of ‘‘heretic’’ Christians (Protestants) and non-Christians.
As I will argue in this chapter, the restriction of membership in local com-
munities and in the community of the kingdom to Catholics alone did not
mean that the Spanish community was defined only by reference to religion as
historians have maintained.∞ Although Catholicism defined many of the laws
governing the behavior of Spaniards, and although it embodied in certain
ways the constitution of the Spanish community and state, Catholicism does
not explain the appearance of both community and state.≤ The cases of foreign
Catholics and converso Jews living in Majorca (Chuetas), which I review in
this chapter, demonstrate that Catholicism was indeed essential to the accep-
tance of individuals into the community. It was, however, insufficient.
The second factor that limited natural processes of integration was the idea
that individuals existed as part of groups. Individuals were trusted because
they behaved in certain ways that were acknowledged by the authorities or by
community members. Belief in a person’s intentions and trusting in their loy-
alty could depend on individual circumstances, yet, on occasion, belief and
trust depended on group affiliation. The belief that natives were naturally
disposed to favor the community of their birth is an example of this practice
(chapter 2). Another example is the treatment accorded merchants or con-
tracted professionals whose residence could not sufficiently prove their inten-
tion to integrate into the community (chapters 2 and 5). Although the impor-
tance of membership in a group was admitted in these cases, in other cases
authorities and litigants treated individuals as components of groups yet de-
nied they were doing so. Such was the case of settled Gypsies and converso
Jews living in eighteenth-century Majorca (Chuetas) who were rejected as
citizens and natives by invoking their individual behavior when, in fact, their
behavior was not considered individually but instead was constructed by ref-
erence to their membership in a group whose constituents, ‘‘it was well
known,’’ behaved in certain ways. The Gypsies, born and raised in Spain, were
classified as foreigners or semiforeigners because by definition they were not
integrated in local communities. Gypsies who were citizens of local commu-
nities found it hard, not to say impossible, to demonstrate that they were
Spaniards. The same was true of Majorcan converso Jews. Because they were
Chueta, individuals belonging to this group were stigmatized as heretics and
were accused of maintaining practices that rejected all association with the
local community.
Through the Gypsies and the Chuetas we can also examine the degree to
which integration in a local community was essential to the classification of
people as Spaniards and foreigners. The importance of integration is further
The Other 121
Religion
Early modern Spaniards envisioned themselves first and foremost as
Christians.≥ This vision found expression in the adoption of Catholicism as a
political theme by kings who called themselves ‘‘Catholic,’’ a label carried by
all Spanish kings beginning with Ferdinand and Isabel in the fifteenth century.∂
The Spanish crown instituted the protection of the ‘‘true faith’’ as a social
ideal—as expressed by the reconquest and the military orders—and fought to
preserve and augment the Catholic world.∑ The importance of Catholicism to
the construction of Spain justified the persecution of religious minorities and
the rejection of heretics. For early modern Spaniards, Catholicism was a cul-
ture and an identity: ‘‘Religion is the tie of human society, and it sanctions and
sanctifies the alliances, the contracts, and even the society itself.’’∏ Religion
supplied Spaniards with a moral code, a prescription for behavior, and a key to
understanding the world. These codes, behaviors, and understandings were
shared with Catholics outside Spain and thus allowed Spaniards to feel con-
nected to a wider community. Spaniards frequently asserted that apparent
cultural, linguistic, and behavioral differences between themselves and foreign
Catholics were inconsequential. What mattered was not what separated Cath-
olics from one another, but what united them.π Church institutions encour-
aged the creation of this pan-Christian community and supplied a common
patria (the ‘‘city of God’’), a common structure (the church), and a common
bureaucracy (clergy and orders).
The fact that the community of Spanish natives was by definition a Catholic
community was rarely discussed. It was so obvious to contemporaries and so
consensual in nature that there was no need to spell it out. Protestants could
not reside in Spain or Spanish America unless special privileges allowed it, and
in these cases they were tolerated rather than integrated.∫ No matter how long
they resided in the community, they were external and their presence was
122 The Other
Some petitioners suggested that their Catholic faith made them immediate
members of the Spanish community because the Spanish community was first
and foremost a community of faith.∞π Accordingly, the laws that declared them
‘‘natives of Spain’’ simply recognized their previously existing condition as
natives by virtue of Catholicism. As a result, they were ‘‘true and original’’
natives, rather than naturalized foreigners, which meant that they should be
able to immigrate and trade in Spanish America (chapter 5) and not be re-
quired to choose status as transient or integrated citizen foreigners (chapter 4).
The Spanish authorities, courts, and merchant guilds rejected these claims.
They asserted that persecuted Catholics were naturalized in Spain because
Spain in Europe wished to guarantee that Catholics could freely practice their
religion; however, this naturalization did not make them ascribed members of
the community.∞∫ Persecuted Catholics who wanted to immigrate and trade in
Spanish America needed a Spanish America naturalization letter and, if they
wished to continue their residence in Spain, they had to choose whether they
wanted to be treated as integrated or transient foreigners.∞Ω
Although Catholicism alone was not sufficient to turn foreigners into na-
tives, not adhering to this faith could bar people (who otherwise would be
considered natives) from integrating into the community. One example is the
status of converso Jews living in Majorca. In the 1770s members of this group,
also called Chuetas or de la calle (of the street) addressed the royal council in
Madrid and requested an end to their isolation and discrimination.≤≠ Accord-
ing to their plea, they were excluded from most offices and occupations, hon-
ors, and privileges enjoyed by all loyal vassals and native Spaniards. This
discrimination was motivated by their classification as ‘‘Chuetas,’’ a classifica-
tion that alluded to their Jewish origin. The Chuetas insisted that they had been
loyal vassals of the king and good Christians since 1435, the year their fore-
fathers converted to Catholicism. As had other conversos before them, they
argued that postconversion discrimination must cease. Humanity in its en-
tirety descended from either Jews or Gentiles, and many Spaniards were of
Jewish origin, making it unclear why the Chueta should be treated differ-
ently.≤∞ Spain had to encourage conversion, and there was no better encourage-
ment than the promise of equality. The Chuetas also asked the king to recog-
nize that they were faithful to the patria, useful to the state, good citizens, and
exemplary in their conduct. In short, as natives of the land and vassals of the
king, they were true members of the community and merited equal treatment.
Asked to give their opinion on this petition, the authorities of Majorca
expressed their opposition and concern. Although the local royal court (au-
diencia) could not justify the discrimination of the Chueta on legal grounds, it
nevertheless explained that anti-Jewish legislation dating from the preconver-
sion period (thirteenth and fourteenth centuries) could be applied in this case if
The Other 125
case.≤∑ Declaring that both legislation and legal and political theory favored
the petition of the Chuetas, he also explained that all states must strive to unify
their inhabitants and mould them into a single body. In this case, nothing
stood in the way of unification except the aversion of the inhabitants of Ma-
jorca for the Chuetas. This aversion was bad for the state and completely
unjust; it must be immediately reversed. Suspecting that his recommendation
would be bitterly resented, Rodríguez Campomanes suggested a second round
of consultations with the authorities of Majorca. In response to his invitation,
the authorities sent different pleas to Madrid in the following months. The
ecclesiastical chapter and the university requested that the monarch place the
well-being of the local community above that of the Chuetas. They insisted
that the Chuetas were not true Christians and that they could not be trusted.
They also personally attacked the six deputies appointed by the Chuetas to
represent them in Madrid, claiming they were all crypto-Jews.
The pleas for continued discrimination fell on deaf ears. In 1775, Rodríguez
Campomanes clarified once again that the discrimination of the Chuetas was
illegal and unjust.≤∏ Descent was irrelevant to the classification of royal sub-
jects as ‘‘good’’ or ‘‘bad’’: guilt could not be inherited, and individuals could
not be stigmatized by their family genealogy. The discrimination of the Chue-
tas severely obstructed the social, economic, and political progress of Majorca
and had to be remedied for the island’s sake. The Council of Castile agreed
with this analysis. In 1778, it condemned the discrimination of the Chuetas as
‘‘contradictory to reason, to evangelical and political law and to the well-being
of the state and the city of Palma.’’≤π It reprimanded the local authorities for
having adhered to their practice for such a long time and for having supported
the popular misjudgment instead of correcting it.
Only two ministers voted against this decision. They did not deny its legal
foundation, but they expressed concern about its political consequences.
Treating the Chuetas as ‘‘original Christians’’ (cristianos originarios) could
‘‘light a violent fire and a nonextinguishable hate.’’≤∫ This hate, which was
legally unjustifiable, was nevertheless socially understandable. The Chuetas
promoted it by continuing their heretic practices and by mocking Christianity
and Christian dogma, and also by their exclusionary social practices. They
separated themselves from the rest of society and acted as an independent
corporate body. Their transformation into truly good and useful citizens and
into true natives could be achieved only by breaking their internal solidarity
and by forcibly integrating them into mainstream society. The two ministers
suggested that the Chuetas should be resettled all over Spain, allowing a maxi-
mum of two families per community. They further stated that, once the Chue-
tas fully integrated into local communities, their bad name would automati-
cally die out and ‘‘their problem’’ would be solved.
The Other 127
to follow this path. Adopting a different approach, they admitted that some
Chuetas might indeed have failed to be good Christians, but they concluded
that the attitudes of the few should not incriminate the whole. Christian atti-
tudes were a question of fact that should be examined in each individual case,
and neither descent nor past conviction was a sufficient indication that all
Chuetas were invariably heretic. Even the two ministers who voted against the
majority opinion refused to surrender to genealogical determinism. Like their
colleagues in Madrid, they believed that, rather than condemned forever, the
Chuetas were ‘‘correctable.’’ Otherwise, there was no point in ensuring their
dispersal across Spain, no hope that, through integration, their ‘‘problem’’
would be solved.
Possessing a defective faith was therefore the first argument against the in-
clusion of the Chuetas in a community of natives, which theoretically included
only orthodox Catholics. Yet, besides their faith, the Chuetas were also re-
jected because of their internal solidarity ties and their subsequent isolation
from the rest of society. According to the allegations of the local authorities,
despite being born in the city and continuing to reside there, the Chuetas
were not truly integrated. Instead, they constituted a distinct group. They
threatened society not as individuals, but as members of a foreign entity.
Whenever admitted into guilds and associations, their ‘‘union, wealth, and
industry’’ soon dominated these organizations to the exclusion of other mem-
bers. The Chuetas were responsible for their own isolation. Society discrimi-
nated against them only to protect itself, and only in reaction to the Chuetas’
exclusionary practices. This was the reason why the two dissenting ministers
proposed to ‘‘solve’’ the Chueta ‘‘problem’’ by forcing their integration into
Spanish society by dividing the group and sending them individually to differ-
ent local communities. This perception of the Chuetas as outsiders and for-
eigners was also accompanied by resentment. Constituting a separate group, it
was feared that, if granted the rights of natives, they would dominate society.
They were simply too successful, too rich, and too powerful.
Integration
The importance of integration and the indication that its absence made
people foreigners despite the fact that were born, raised, and resided in Span-
ish territories is especially clear in the case of the Gypsies. Anti-Gypsy legisla-
tion was common in Castile during most of the early modern period. As early
as 1499 and again in 1539, 1586, 1619, and 1633, Gypsies were ordered to
abandon their nomadic way of life and establish a permanent domicile.≥≤
From the late seventeenth century onward, Gypsies were also ordered to pre-
The Other 129
sent themselves periodically to the local authorities to register their names and
places of residence, as well as to give information about their families, occupa-
tions, and properties.≥≥ A general expulsion of the Gypsies was decreed in
1695, and only Gypsies permanently residing in municipalities of at least 200
vecinos and occupied in farming activities were exempt. Local authorities
were charged with overseeing the implementation of these measures, and they
were ordered by the royal administration to conduct regular inspections of
Gypsy places of residence and to collect information about their activities.
Gypsies were not allowed to reside in separate neighborhoods, to use special
clothing, or to speak any language other than Spanish. Any Gypsy caught in a
group of three or more would be sentenced to death unless he denounced his
fellow kinsmen and their activities.
Similar orders were issued in 1717, 1726, 1738, 1745, 1746, 1749, 1783,
and 1784 and were applied throughout Spain.≥∂ A list of places permitted for
Gypsy residence was elaborated in 1738 and extended in 1746. A ratio was set
according to which a single Gypsy family could be accommodated for each
one hundred (non-Gypsy) citizens (vecinos).≥∑ Gypsies were also barred from
immigrating to Spanish America.≥∏ Repeated orders demanded their immedi-
ate expulsion from that continent, alleging that their presence was detrimental
both to the effort to convert the Indians and to the general well-being.≥π Their
potential harassment of the Indians and their possible collaboration with for-
eign nations against Spanish interests were considered especially dangerous.≥∫
There were other concerns as well, such as the Gypsy’s alleged vagrancy and
criminal way of life.
Why were Gypsies treated this way? According to the decrees, the aim was
to ensure that the Gypsies changed their way of life. They were to abandon
their ‘‘vagrancy,’’ as well as all traits that distinguished them from other mem-
bers of society, such as clothing and language. Instead of allowing them to
maintain their isolation—which was viewed as self-inflicted—these orders
would force them to integrate into local communities and to sever the ties that
connected them to one another. If they refused to do so, they would auto-
matically lose the right to remain in Spain. Gypsies who insisted on main-
taining a separate existence would be incarcerated, expelled, or even sen-
tenced to death.
Who were the Gypsies? According to the seventeenth- and eighteenth-
century anti-Gypsy legislation, there was no Gypsy nation, only the Gypsy
people.≥Ω If there had ever been a Gypsy nation, either it did not reach the
Iberian peninsula, or its members were no longer there.∂≠ Instead, in Castile
and in other parts of Spain, it was believed that Gypsiness was taken on
voluntarily by people who sought out a bad life (mal vivir). These people were
130 The Other
ordinary citizens. Born on the peninsula as vassals of the king, they neverthe-
less chose to behave in an antisocial and illegal manner.∂∞
The Gypsy community was thus a ‘‘normal’’ political community. Like
other contemporary political communities, its members had no natural, as-
cribed, or ethnic characteristics that compelled them to come together: ‘‘Those
who are called and who identify themselves as Gypsies are not Gypsies by
origin or nature, nor do they proceed from any infected root.’’∂≤ Instead,
membership in the Gypsy community depended on choice and on individual
adhesion. Paradoxically, anti-Gypsy legislation also appealed to fairness. It
ascertained that it was unfair that the Gypsies, who were an undistinguishable
segment of society, were allowed to adopt an antisocial behavior while other
members were required to remain obedient. It determined that because Gyp-
sies were natives, decency required that they should behave as natives and,
among other things, should pay taxes.∂≥
Constructing Gypsiness in this manner undermined society’s role in stig-
matizing the members of the group.∂∂ Gypsiness, the laws stated, was a self-
appropriated denomination. The identification, isolation, and discrimination
of the Gypsies were the sole responsibility of the members themselves. If and
when individual Gypsies stopped behaving as they did (a thing the decrees
wished to obtain), their Gypsiness would automatically disappear and they
would be integrated as full members of the community.
Despite its internal coherence, this definition of Gypsiness clashed with
reality. Eighteenth-century administrative correspondence and judicial rec-
ords continuously admitted this fact by making abundant reference to ‘‘good
Gypsies,’’ who were citizens of local communities. Were these people really
Gypsies? Should the restrictive measures be applied against them? What could
‘‘good Gypsies’’ do if they wished to avoid prosecution?∂∑ As the eighteenth
century drew to a close, two answers emerged. On one hand, people classified
as Gypsies could attempt to prove that, despite their initial classification, they
were ordinary natives. On the other, ‘‘good Gypsies’’ could claim that because
of their behavior and despite their Gypsiness, they were exempt from the anti-
Gypsy measures.
The reclassification of individuals initially identified as Gypsies was prac-
ticed, for example, in 1745, when several families from Jerez de la Frontera
claimed that by virtue of their citizenship (vecindad) and nativeness they were
ordinary Spaniards (españoles).∂∏ Their petition was backed by the local coun-
cil who declared that—on the basis of their occupation as agricultural la-
borers, their usefulness to the local society, their adherence to the general code
of dress, their use of Spanish, and their dissociation from other Gypsies—they
should be classified as castellanos viejos (old Castilians) rather than as Gyp-
The Other 131
sies. Thus, people who acted as ‘‘normal’’ Spaniards and who showed no signs
of ‘‘antisocial behavior’’ were indeed Spaniards, or old Castilians, rather than
Gypsies. Similar affirmations were made in other cases. The Moreno family,
for example, had obtained recognition in 1709 that its members were cas-
tellanos viejos, given that they descended from a mixed union of old and new
Castilians, had a permanent domicile, were hard working, and paid taxes.∂π
Nevertheless, under similar circumstances, less fortunate individuals failed to
obtain the desired declaration. In the 1790s, Baltazar Vargas and his family
attempted to establish a domicile in Madrid. When the city council refused to
admit them on the basis of their Gypsiness, they addressed the royal council
and requested a declaration that they were Castilians (castellanos) rather than
Gypsy ( gitanos).∂∫ As all other Castilians, they were free to choose their place
of residence and citizenship (vecindad), and Madrid could not refuse to admit
them. According to their petition they were Castilian rather than Gypsies
because they were born to parents with domicile and citizenship in Orihuela
(kingdom of Valencia). They were agricultural laborers, born and raised in
that village, where their family had resided for many generations. They were
educated to be ‘‘good people’’ and were instructed in the ‘‘mysteries of the
Catholic faith.’’ They later moved to the city of Valencia, where they con-
tinued in the same vein, working the land and being ‘‘useful members of
society.’’∂Ω Always tied to a specific local community, they had no bad repu-
tation, and no one ever considered them Gypsies. In short, since they did
not behave as Gypsies, they should not be considered Gypsies. Their petition
was denied.
Similar decisions were reached in other cases where ‘‘well-behaved Gypsies’’
were classified as Gypsies despite their exemplary lives. In many such cases, the
only concession made towards these people was to allow them, as ‘‘good
Gypsies,’’ to remain in the jurisdiction despite the prohibitions invoked by the
anti-Gypsy measures. Francisco Vargas was a ‘‘quiet man’’ who had lived in
Villafranca for more than thirty years and was one of two blacksmiths working
in the jurisdiction; he was allowed to stay in the settlement. Motivated by
similar considerations, Veléz requested the intervention of the royal admin-
istration with regard to some seventeen Gypsy families whose members were
born and raised in the community. Motril and Cádiz expressed identical con-
cerns and also sought to enable certain ‘‘good Gypsies’’ to remain in their
territory.∑≠ In all these cases, admitting that petitioners were indeed hard-
working and law-abiding members of society, both the royal administration
and the local authorities continued to consider them Gypsies. The royal admin-
istration was especially inflexible, declaring that communities who wanted to
keep ‘‘good Gypsies’’ in their jurisdiction would be made responsible for their
132 The Other
behavior. Since it was their personal recommendation that allowed these Gyp-
sies to remain in the territory, they would be accountable for any mischief that
might result. Overwhelmed with the flood of petitions, the royal council set a
general rule: Gypsies who had resided in a community for more than ten years
could remain if the local authorities considered their presence beneficial.∑∞
Why require a ten-year residence? Why allow Gypsies who had a permanent
domicile to remain in the jurisdiction? In spite of the official discourse that
censured Gypsies for their behavior, customs, and linguistic habits, the most
essential point of contention between Gypsies and non-Gypsies was domicile-
establishment.∑≤ Gypsies were considered ‘‘dangerous’’ and external to the
Spanish commonwealth because of their lack of permanent ties with local
communities. Eighteenth-century discussions stressed this point. They stipu-
late that all people must be tied to an identifiable community, asserting that no
one can live on his or her own (chapter 2). They argued that local citizenship
was a condition for membership in the Castilian community and the kingdoms
of Spain and that local citizenship implied, by extension, nativeness (chapters
4 and 5). The conclusion that people who were not tied to local communities
—such as Gypsies—were necessarily foreign to the community of Spanish
natives was thus immediate. The adoption of a ten-year residency rule demon-
strated this point. According to Castilian and eventually Spanish law, a ten-
year residence was the period required of foreigners before they could be
considered citizens and natives. Thus, as with all foreigners, Gypsies could be
considered natives and be allowed the rights of natives only after they had
resided in the community for a sufficient period.
The Gypsies themselves understood the direct relation between the absence
of domicile and foreignness. In their petitions to acquire the status of cas-
tellanos viejos many of them argued that citizenship and nativeness were the
same thing. They requested recognition as castellanos, even when they had
been born and had resided in other Iberian kingdoms. They also petitioned to
receive ‘‘local citizenship letters’’ (cartas de vecindad), assuming that once they
were recognized as citizens they would automatically be accepted as natives.
Local citizenship, they argued, was necessary in order to be included in the
‘‘constitutions, exemptions, and privileges of the natives of these kingdoms.’’∑≥
Indeed, obtaining citizenship was the only method by which they could guar-
antee their reception as natives rather than foreigners. People classified as
Gypsies also identified Gypsiness with foreignness: ‘‘the name that they were
given as Gypsies was untrue, because in reality they were not Gypsies since
they were not foreigners.’’ They argued that they were ‘‘originals of the king-
doms and not of the Gypsy nation.’’∑∂ These petitioners stressed that people
were either vecinos and naturales or they were Gypsies: those belonging to the
The Other 133
first category could not belong to the second and vice versa.∑∑ Foreign ob-
servers also held these perceptions, which were shared by the legislation, the
royal and local administrations, and the Gypsies themselves. For example, in
1749 the French consul in Cádiz argued that Spanish Gypsies could be consid-
ered ( peuvent être regardés) natives, but he asserted that they were usually not
included in this category as long as they remained vagabonds and practiced
their ‘‘bad habits.’’∑∏
The idea that Gypsies were both ordinary (although badly behaved) natives
and foreigners persisted throughout the eighteenth century. This duality ex-
plained why ‘‘well-behaved’’ Gypsies were nevertheless considered Gypsies,
and why Gypsy residence—like all other foreign residence—was ‘‘tolerated’’
rather than permitted.∑π During this period, and consistent with the treatment
of other foreigners, Gypsies were identified by way of reputation. Common-
sense standards—such as, ‘‘if he associates with Gypsies then he must be a
Gypsy’’—were very influential. Confusion and cases of mistaken identity also
occurred. This confusion and the uncertainties that naturally arose from the
dependence on reputation led the local judges of Buenos Aires to conclude in
the late eighteenth century that it was impossible to determine with certainty
who was a Gypsy and who was not.∑∫ Nevertheless, and as happened in the
cases of other foreigners, many people believed that Gypsies could be easily
distinguished from other Spaniards. In 1757, the local judge of Vera expressed
such a belief. He received information that several men with torn and dirty
clothes and dark complexions were seen in the jurisdiction.∑Ω Assuming that
this description could fit only a Gypsy, he then proceeded to look for them
(and indeed found them) in the house of a local Gypsy. Last but not least, like
other foreigners, persons assumed to be Gypsies carried the burden of proof if
they wanted to establish that they were either ‘‘good Gypsies’’ or not Gypsies
at all. Obtaining recognition as a non-Gypsy did not guarantee the same result
on another occasion. Suspicious individuals, even those who held certificates
attesting that they were castellanos viejos, were required to prove their status
each time an anti-Gypsy campaign was initiated.∏≠
Vassalage
Medieval legal thought in Castile distinguished between vassalage and
nativeness.∏∞ Vassalage was a personal tie created by virtue of mutual consent.
It was based on a pact between the king and his vassals, and this pact could not
be unilaterally revoked. Nativeness, on the contrary, was a political tie that
subjected a person to a jurisdiction. This subjection could be created at birth
without the consent of the interested party, or it could be acquired later in a
134 The Other
in Malta also asserted that their island was ‘‘reputed to be an aggregated part
of the crown of Aragon,’’ and as a result they were ‘‘natives of Spain.’’∏Ω Luis
Melloni, born in Sardinia, suggested that having been a royal vassal, he was
not truly a foreigner. Instead, by virtue of a ‘‘certain type of justice and old
memories’’ and because he spoke Spanish, he should be assimilated as a Span-
iard.π≠ Natives of the Lowlands also participated in this debate. In the 1720s
they asserted that, as vassals who continuously served the king, they were
‘‘true natives’’ of Spain ( propiamente naturales españoles) rather than natu-
ralized foreigners. This meant that they did not need to naturalize if they
wished to immigrate and trade in Spanish America (chapter 5):
For various centuries they had been vassals of this crown and always won the
first esteem among all subjects for the special appreciation that earlier kings
had for their country. History books would tell the merits that they had in
halting the violence of their princes, but on this occasion they must mention
the many services that they rendered to the crown in their country and the
only slightly inferior [services] that they had done since in Castile. Their zeal
and service were demonstrated clearly in the happy reign of your majesty,
with the contributions that they had given, as well as in their decision to
abandon their patria and their interests [and come to Spain]. So peaceful and
profound were their relationships with Spaniards, that they were never called
foreigners in this land, and the Spaniards always lived in Flanders as natives.π∞
Although the king and his foreign vassals insisted that an immediate rela-
tionship existed between vassalage and nativeness, the local communities, the
parliament, the merchants, and some royal administrators disagreed. Accord-
ing to them, aliens could not be transformed into natives by royal decree, and
nativeness could not be established solely through ties with the king.π≤ Assert-
ing, time and again, that a community of allegiance consisting of all those
subject to the Spanish king and even foreigners subject to his rule did exist,
they nevertheless insisted that this community was not identical to the com-
munity of Spanish natives. The Spanish monarchy included many kingdoms
and was composed of different communities, each with their own constitu-
tions, laws, and natives. Membership in one kingdom did not automatically
produce membership in another. This was the situation as long as the various
kingdoms and holdings were under royal domain, and it was certainly true
after a holding was lost. As a result, natives of Sicily were deemed foreigners in
Spain even when their island was still under royal control, and they clearly
remained aliens after its secession. The fact that the monarch continued to
ceremoniously invoke among his titles that of king of Sicily was irrelevant to
the question.π≥ The only thing that mattered were the terms under which
each kingdom joined the monarchy.π∂ Kingdoms that were made an accessory
136 The Other
This question became important in later years when these people attempted
to hold offices reserved to natives, or when they sought the right to reside and
to trade in Spanish America. Natives of Colonia could be considered natives of
Spain by virtue of conquest if their homeland was inserted into Spain and
subjected to the same rights and obligations as other Spanish territories. They
could be considered natives by integration and or by reputation if in the years
following the annexation they acted as natives and were accepted as natives.
But at the same time, they could be considered foreigners if the normal Spanish
American laws were applied. These stipulated that in Spanish America people
could be naturalized only by receiving a formal naturalization letter. In this
case, natives of Colonia would be vassals of the king but not natives of Spain.
Although the authorities invoked the distinction between vassalage and
nativeness and examined the ways these people could be transformed into
natives, the natives of Colonia adopted a different approach.∫≥ They explained
that their association with Spain was voluntary. Territorial conquest, they
claimed, only implied domain over land. It allowed those living on the land to
chose whether to remain in their old society or to become members of the new
one: ‘‘No one is forced to subject himself to more than what he had consented,
and a citizen who agreed in a free and independent state to live in a society,
can, if this society changes its nature and submits to a foreign dominion,
abandon it . . . since submission to a foreign dominion ends the social ties and
the obligation that one has with society. In one word, one remains wholly and
naturally free to chose and submit to the empire and domination that he
wishes.’’ Just as natives of Spain who remained in territories ceded to Portugal
implicitly accepted their new condition as Portuguese and freely chose to sever
ties with their community of origin, so did the Portuguese who, of their own
will, stayed in territories ceded to Spain. Indeed, nativeness depended on
choice. It consisted of the willingness to love the community, and people could
choose whether to love one community or another. The theoretical debate
persisted while practical solutions prevailed. The natives of Colonia easily
obtained letters of naturalization in both Spain and Spanish America and were
rarely asked to fulfill any requirement aside from submitting a petition.∫∂
Conclusions
Religion or vassalage alone were insufficient to transform foreigners into
natives. Although by the early modern period both became fundamental char-
acteristics of all Spaniards, in was nevertheless clear that they were not identi-
cal to nativeness. What made people natives was their integration in the com-
munity. This community had a common faith and a common monarch. Yet
140 The Other
In 1808, the Iberian peninsula was invaded by French troops. The Span-
ish king was forced to abdicate in favor of Napoleon, who instituted his
brother Joseph as the new monarch of Spain. Many Spaniards refused to
recognize Joseph as their king and maintained allegiance to Fernando, the cap-
tive monarch. Adopting early modern contractualist theories to nineteenth-
century conditions, they claimed that in Fernando’s absence sovereignty re-
turned to the ‘‘people’’ and was now to be exercised by local assemblies
( juntas), established throughout Spain and Spanish America.∞ After a short
period of anarchy, during which each junta acted on its own, claimed sov-
ereignty, and refused to cooperate with the other juntas, in late 1808 the juntas
were joined in a single institution, the Junta Central. This was an incomplete
solution to the crisis of government: it was unclear whether the central junta
spoke for the kingdoms of Spain or whether it was only an assembly of juntas
with no sovereign power of its own. Also problematic was the fact that Span-
ish American juntas were not represented in the central junta, which led some
of the New World juntas to claim that they were equally sovereign and need
not obey the instructions of the central junta. Conservatives and royalists in
both Spain and Spanish America, who attested that the only body that could
replace an absent king was a regency, also criticized the central junta. In
1820, as French troops stormed south, meeting little military resistance, and
141
142 The Crisis of an Empire
stated Old Regime structures in both Spain and Spanish America. Some Span-
iards resented these measures, and eventually Fernando was forced to rein-
state the Constitution of Cádiz in 1821. The return to Old Regime structures
also brought about a break with the liberal, autonomy-seeking Spanish Amer-
ican juntas, which in the late 1810s adopted republican forms of government
and declared their independence.∂ The king reacted by sending troops to Span-
ish America and mobilizing the local militias. The war, which is often por-
trayed as a civil war between Spanish Americans, ended in 1826, leaving Spain
stripped of its colonies, with the exception of Cuba, the Philippines, and Pu-
erto Rico. Some areas experienced widespread popular uprisings, and dif-
ferent regions struggled to affirm their sovereignty or even supremacy. Ter-
ritorial fragmentation followed, leading to the creation of new states by way
of pacts between cities and regions.
The literature that analyzes these events usually portrays them as instances
of national affirmation that also marked the transition from Old Regime to
new liberal forms of government. In the Spanish American case, the French
invasion of peninsular Spain in the early nineteenth century and subsequent
developments in Europe initiated wars for national independence, fought
against European Spaniards who were seen as foreign invaders and illegiti-
mate rulers. This view of the European Spaniards was the natural result of the
emergence of a distinct Spanish American identity, an identity reaffirmed dur-
ing the struggle for independence.∑ Often called ‘‘Creolism,’’ it emerged in
many fields, such as culture, language, and religion. Yet it was essentially
social and political in orientation. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries,
Creolism was a vehicle through which Spanish Americans expressed their
desire for a greater local autonomy and equality with other Spaniards. In the
seventeenth and particularly in the eighteenth century, it allowed Spanish
Americans to affirm their distinction from European Spaniards. By the early
nineteenth century, Creolism led Spanish Americans to seek their indepen-
dence. Presented as a national or protonational identity, Creolism was used by
the nascent Spanish American states to consolidate their collective identities.∏
There were several reasons for interpreting Creolism as a national sentiment
in spite of its spread throughout diverse regions of Spanish America. Accord-
ing to the literature, Creolism was an identity automatically given (or taken—
this is seldom clarified) by people born in the New World.π Initially it coex-
isted with a Spanish identity, and indeed Creoles stressed that nothing distin-
guished them from other Spaniards. But by the late seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries, Spanishness and Creolism became antagonistic notions, and Euro-
pean and American Spaniards were placed in opposition to one another.∫
Initially a local and urban identity, by the early nineteenth century Creolism
144 The Crisis of an Empire
immigrated to Spanish America from Spain and had lived there most of their
lives, shared the local customs, married native wives, acquired properties in
the jurisdiction and who were in all other ways ‘‘well rooted’’ in the continent.
According to him, these factors indicated that these individuals transferred
their loyalties from Spain to Spanish America. They learned to love their
adoptive community, and this love eventually became as strong, or even
stronger, than their love for their community of origin. Spaniards who had
decided not to return to Spain but to reside permanently in Spanish America
were therefore Creoles. Their decision to do so could be inferred, Teresa de
Mier said, from a ten-year residence in the jurisdiction.
Explained in this way, the distinction between Creoles and European Span-
iards perfectly replicated Castilian and Spanish debates on both local citi-
zenship (vecindad) and nativeness (naturaleza). It attested that status de-
pended, first and foremost, on individual integration in a local community
(citizenship), and it specified that this integration also transformed people into
members of a larger community (the community of natives). Like all other
foreigners, European Spaniards who immigrated to Spanish America could
undergo a civic conversion. This conversion required that they abandon their
previous condition as European Spaniards and become American Spaniards.
European and American Spaniards were thus placed in opposition to one
another, and individuals were either European, or they were American. Among
other things, this meant that individuals permanently living in Spanish Amer-
ica could no longer maintain their citizenship or their nativeness in Spain.
Servando Teresa de Mier openly confessed this fact when he argued that Span-
iards could be converted into Creoles and Creoles could be converted into
Spaniards and then classified these persons as ones who had ‘‘naturalized.’’ He
concluded that the Creole community was formed and maintained by the free
association of people. What really mattered was not where an individual was
born, but his decision to associate himself permanently with the Spanish Amer-
ican community.
This idea of transformation was also invoked in a local journal in 1810 in
Buenos Aires. It was then argued that the political community had two types
of members: some members were ‘‘natural,’’ while others were ‘‘members by
adoption.’’≤∑ Among the first were individuals born in the province; among the
second were persons who came to Buenos Aires at a later stage. In both cases,
membership required being part of the community and regarding it as one’s
own. These attitudes could be demonstrated by giving the community per-
sonal as well as financial services, observing the local laws and customs, and
respecting the local government. European Spaniards who truly transferred
their loyalty from their community of birth to Buenos Aires would be wel-
The Crisis of an Empire 149
comed as members of this community.≤∏ Indeed, the patria was not a place of
birth; instead it was a community to which one belonged.≤π
But how could the Creole community be distinguished from the Castilian
community if Spanish America was formally and legally integrated within the
later? The need to create new boundaries and to insist on an independent
Spanish American citizenship and nativeness dramatically influenced the Cre-
ole discourse. Instead of simply reproducing the existing legal categories, as
early as the middle of the seventeenth century Creoles claimed that natural
law, as well as divine law and the law of nations, distinguished between people
born in one territory and those born in the other, even if by civil law they be-
longed to the same kingdom.≤∫ ‘‘Spain’’ was a conglomerate of many different
communities, each with its own laws, institutions, and natives. All Spaniards
were tied to the monarch, but they were foreigners to one another. This reality
persisted even if civil law did not recognize it. The conclusion was clear:
because Spanish America was a territory with its own traditions, laws, and
institutions, it therefore, by implication, had its own community of natives.
Implied in these ideas was the claim that Creoles were no longer Castilians;
they were now instituted as natives and citizens of an independent and distin-
guishable Spanish kingdom (or perhaps various kingdoms; this issue was
never truly resolved). This independent existence was supported by natural
law, and therefore it could not be denied.
Since the power of civil law does not reach the sphere of natural effects, we
experience that sons of the Old Spain are foreign to the New Spain, even if this
is not recognized by civil law. Among these natural effects we include, with
much reason, the love that people have to the land in which they were born
and their lack of care to all others, these motives being two solid principles
that argue in favor of granting offices to natives and not foreigners. . . .
Although they [European Spaniards] are not considered by civil law for-
eigners in the Indies, the truth is that they did not obtain their nature in them.
They have in the Old Spain, and not in the New, their houses, fathers, broth-
ers, and all that is capable of influencing the inclination of a man. When they
are exiled to this distant land to serve an office, they do not change their
nature, nor do they become insensitive to the impulses with which they were
born. Because of these impulses by necessity they do not lose sight of nor
[discontinue] attention to their own people by being here, and because they
wish to consult and help them (if not enrich them), they regard themselves as
temporary in America, and they wish to return to the quietness of their patria
and the comfort of their home.≤Ω
freely decide whether to obey the central junta, the regency, or the parliament.
Contrary to accepted wisdom, Spanish Americans were not fighting simply for
equality. During the crisis, Spanish Americans affirmed their uniqueness and
stressed their refusal to follow the path taken by other Castilians. All this
happened without Creoles ever negating their Spanishness. In the words of
Camilo Torres, recorded in 1809: ‘‘We are as Spanish as the descendants of
Don Pelayo and, because of it, we are worthy of all distinctions, privileges, and
prerogatives as the rest of the nation.’’≥∂ Or, as one of the Spanish American
delegates to the cortes of Cádiz proclaimed: ‘‘We Americans, as sons of Euro-
peans, suckle from birth a love of the peninsula, and since childhood we call
and consider ourselves its children. Its names and the names of its town and
villages sound well to our ears, and we are not only Spaniards, but we are
proud of being ones.’’≥∑ As happened before, Spanishness also meant entitle-
ment to office. Yet the question of how Spanish Americans could be eligible for
offices in Spain (as they demanded) while peninsular Spaniards were excluded
from offices in the Americas was never confronted.≥∏
The most problematic aspect of this Creole discourse was found in the ill-
defined borders of the new, natural community it instituted. In some cases, this
community seemed to embody the entire American continent, as the con-
frontation between ‘‘American’’ and ‘‘European’’ Spaniards would indicate. In
others, the boundaries enclosed possibly a vice-royalty, a province, or even a
single city. This lack of clarity was possible because the new kingdom was
instituted by natural and not civil law. This allowed those proposing it to
ignore formal definitions and boundaries and to place emphasis instead on the
‘‘natural ties’’ that united people who loved one another. Most such ties were
created through daily association and were instituted by residence and integra-
tion in a specific local community. This would indicate that Creolism was a
municipal identity, with a limited extension. Yet love was not necessarily re-
stricted to this local sphere. As I argued in previous chapters, in both Spain and
Spanish America integration in a local community was always, by extension,
an act of integration into larger structures, such as the kingdom.≥π Love of the
local community and citizenship could thus lead to nativeness. But nativeness
of what?
The question of scope thus remained unsolved. This was evident in the
parliamentary debates in Cádiz, where Spanish American delegates disagreed
about what constituted a political unit worthy of representation and self-
government. The boundaries of the new natural community were equally frail
during the Spanish American wars of independence. In some cases, these wars
were not fought against a European power but instead pitted Spanish Ameri-
can communities against one another.≥∫ Each community struggled to assert
152 The Crisis of an Empire
its autonomy, and in some cases its supremacy. Yet none wanted to be isolated
from the others. While insisting on their natural right to a separate existence,
most Spanish American communities tried to construct the larger political
structures that they considered as natural and normal. This tension between
local aspirations and global constructions, and the belief that beyond the
municipal realm was a wider community to which one belonged, was present
in the colonial period, but it was particularly difficult to manage during the
independence period when the organization of polities was justified by a dis-
course that constructed communities by natural and not civic law, and that
stressed, above all, love and natural ties. Indeed, the early nineteenth-century
disintegration of a once united Spanish America began in the eighteenth cen-
tury with the introduction of what came to be known as Creolism.
ciled in Spain who had never left the kingdom without license and who—
when reaching twenty-one years of age—had obtained citizenship (vecindad)
in a Spanish municipality and were exercising a useful profession, office, or
industry (art. 21).∂≠ Naturalized foreigners who wished to obtain citizenship
letters were required to meet one of several conditions: to have brought to
Spain some important invention or industry, to have purchased taxable prop-
erty in Spain, to have established commerce there with their own capital, or to
have rendered services to the Spanish nation (art. 20).∂∞ Citizenship was re-
quired for office holding (art. 25) and in order to participate in elections. The
cortes also defined the right to be represented in the national assembly, as only
citizens were considered worthy of representation (art. 29). Citizenship could
be legally suspended for moral and educational reasons (art. 25), but it could
not be easily revoked.∂≤ It could be lost only through acquiring another native-
ness (they use the term naturaleza), by living for five consecutive years outside
Spain without a government commission or a permit, the acceptance of em-
ployment by a foreign government, or following certain criminal convictions
(art. 24).∂≥
Whereas Spanishness as defined in Cádiz adopted nativeness as a guide,
citizenship as outlined by the cortes was a new invention that included a
variety of traits. The maintenance of a domicile was still a main consideration,
as was its abandonment, which continued to be interpreted as an act that
terminated the relationship between the individual and the community. Also
important was the traditional idea that people could be loyal to only one
community at a time. Obtaining another nativeness or serving another gov-
ernment were therefore sufficient reasons to revoke an individual’s citizenship.
In all these cases, the early modern idea that held certain external acts to prove
the existence of an internal decision was still operative. Abandoning one’s
residence and establishing a relationship with a foreign community or a for-
eign government demonstrated (by way of legal presumption) that the citizen
no longer loved his homeland and had established permanent ties with a
foreign community. In early modern terms, he was no longer a native; in
modern terms, he ceased to be a citizen.
The continuity with the past and the association between nativeness and
modern citizenship were noteworthy.∂∂ Persons born of Spanish parents and
who, according to the Constitution of Cádiz, were worthy of automatic cit-
izenship, would have been referred to in early modern debates as ‘‘old,’’ ‘‘legit-
imate,’’ ‘‘properly original,’’ and ‘‘true’’ natives of Spain. In these debates,
however, the councils and courts consistently insisted that they were equal to,
not preferable to, all other natives. The status of sons of foreigners, who were
included in the category of Spaniards but whose citizenship depended on the
154 The Crisis of an Empire
contribute efficiently with their property and persons to conserve our indepen-
dence.’’∑Ω The practical difficulties inherent in distinguishing European from
American Spaniards was also invoked: ‘‘We have used their soil, as they did
ours, we exchanged products, they contributed and obeyed as was requested
of them, we have there and they have here a large ascendance and descendants,
and a common language, interests and religion . . . they are our brothers,
Spaniards of 300 years.’’∏≠
Although this was the majority opinion, some delegates believed that Euro-
pean and American Spaniards did not form part of the same nation. Spanish
Americans were vassals of the same king but not natives of Spain. Once the
monarch was absent there was nothing necessary or natural about their asso-
ciation with European Spaniards. This view was mainly motivated by preju-
dice. At stake was the question of whether the Spanish nation could include
‘‘people of color and mixed blood’’ who were abundant in the New World.
The admission of such people, these delegates argued, would introduce con-
fusion into a nation which was ‘‘homogeneous and without internal rival-
ries.’’∏∞ Following the debate, a compromise was reached (October 1810)
according to which the European and American territories were participants
in the same monarchy, and their ‘‘natives and originals’’ were members of the
same nation.∏≤
When the parliament turned to deal with Spanishness and Spanish citizen-
ship on September 1811, the stage was therefore set for the acceptance of
Spanish Americans as both Spaniards and citizens. But which Spanish Ameri-
cans would qualify and according to what criteria? The question had impor-
tant practical consequences. All those participating in the debate were aware
of the fact that the Spanish American population was much larger than the
European one. Therefore, if Creoles, Indians, mestizos, mulattos, and Africans
were all admitted as full members to the community, the majority of Spaniards
would be American.∏≥
Spanish Americans who were descendants of Spanish families posed no
problem. During the early modern period Spaniards born in Spain formed one
and the same community with Spaniards born in Spanish America. By defini-
tion, they both equally loved the Iberian peninsula and were both equally loyal
to the monarch.∏∂ They could therefore be easily admitted as both Spaniards
and Spanish citizens. They were true and original natives of Spain and Spanish
America and, indeed, were always considered part of the community of Span-
ish natives. But what about the Indians?
Since the middle of the sixteenth century it was generally agreed that Indians
were rational human beings and free vassals of the king.∏∑ As they had con-
verted to Catholicism, theoretically there was nothing to bar them—even
The Crisis of an Empire 157
office holding.π≤ ‘‘Nothing new do I find in these decrees, because our laws of
the Indies considered them equal in all respects to the Spaniards, and allowed
them to hold offices and honors.’’π≥ This was the correct legal interpretation,
but it was also a compelling moral and political solution. Because of their
condition as true natives, Indians necessarily loved their homeland, which
was also the homeland of their forefathers. This love guaranteed their obe-
dience, fidelity, and ‘‘good intentions’’ towards Spain.π∂ Most discussants in-
deed pointed out that Indians were ‘‘natives and originals’’ of the Americas,
and they expressed the opinion that they had to be accepted as original mem-
bers of a ‘‘national’’ community that now formally extended to the New
World. The existence of an Indian republic during the colonial period demon-
strated that Indians were capable of taking upon themselves membership priv-
ileges and duties. As both original and qualified members of the community,
there was no reason to deny them citizenship. Linguistic and cultural differ-
ences should not stand in their way. These differences also existed in European
Spain, yet no one pretended that the Basques or the Galicians should be denied
citizenship on account of them. There was no reason to believe that a native of
Galicia and a native of Andalusia were not as different, or even more different,
than a Spaniard and an Indian.π∑ Some deputies, fearing the practical con-
sequences of the inclusion of Indians among Spanish citizens, suggested a
‘‘separate but equal’’ regime.π∏ Others, despite recognizing the nativeness of
Indians, simply stated that Indians were unworthy of citizenship.ππ Neverthe-
less, the majority opinion ruled that Indians and American Spaniards together
formed a single community with European Spaniards and all were Spaniards
and citizens.
In spite of its importance, this conclusion was highly theoretical. Articles
25(2) and (3) of the constitution stipulated that citizenship could be sus-
pended in cases of debt, domestic servitude, lack of employment, and from
1830 onward, illiteracy.π∫ Given the social and economic conditions of most
Indians in early nineteenth-century Spanish America, it was clear from the
start that many of them could be denied the exercise of their citizenship.
Despite their formal inclusion among the category of citizens, in practice they
could still be noncitizens and therefore remain as marginal members of the
political community.πΩ
Although the status of Indians provoked relatively little debate, the inclu-
sion of individuals of mixed descent among Spanish citizens was highly con-
troversial. Many of those opposed to it insisted that most mestizos were of
illegitimate birth and that they differed from Spaniards not only in race but
also in customs. They were naturally inept to exercise political rights, which
was the reason they were traditionally excluded for many offices and occupa-
The Crisis of an Empire 159
tions.∫≠ But how could one deny citizenship to people who descended from
citizens? The solution adopted was to distinguish between mestizos, on one
hand, and mulattos and Africans, on the other. Included in the first group were
people of purely Indian and Spanish descent. These people, even when they
were ‘‘mixed blood’’ inherited the rights of their forefathers and were declared
both Spaniards and Spanish citizens.∫∞ Included in the second group were
individuals with partial or complete African descent. These individuals could
be recognized as Spaniards, but not citizens. They could acquire citizenship
only under special circumstances, which included special services to the nation
or special talents; legitimate birth; marriage to a legitimate wife; the establish-
ment of domicile; and the holding of a useful office, profession, or industry.∫≤
Why discriminate against people of African descent? During the colonial
period it was generally agreed that, as slaves, Africans’ lack of legal capacity
prevented them from obtaining citizenship and nativeness. Once freed, their
status remained unclear. Theoretically, Africans were foreigners. They were
vassals of foreign kings and ‘‘natives and originals’’ of Africa who had no ties
with the Spanish monarch or with the Spanish community. This perception of
Africans as foreigners first appeared in the sixteenth century, and it persisted to
the eighteenth century.∫≥ Writing to the king in 1796 to protest recent legisla-
tion that allowed Africans to purchase the status of whites, the city council of
Caracas espoused this idea.∫∂ Pointing to the their origin as slaves, their fre-
quent illegitimate birth, their ongoing relationships with other Africans still in
state of slavery, as well as to their ‘‘inferior state,’’ the local authorities of
Caracas expressed their opinion that persons of African descent were for-
eigners. Their loyalty to king and kingdom was doubtful because ‘‘far from
looking to Spain as the center of their interests, they keep their eyes on the dark
people of Africa (which is where they come from) to patronize them and raise
them against the Spaniards, the authors, so they say, of all their grievances.’’
The council also suggested that Africans did not contribute to the king and the
city by paying taxes as other citizens did. Since they were unburdened with
duties, they should not enjoy privileges: ‘‘the mulattos of this province, then,
enjoy the benefits of society without contributing a maravedí to its revenues
and finances, or to its public and charitable institutions. This has come about
because the laws regulating the conduct of mulattos, making them contribute
and ordering them to pay a moderate tax to the treasury, are completely
ignored, either because officials are unaware of their existence or indifferent to
their application, or ignorant of their origin.’’
The assimilation between Africans and foreigners, which was already sug-
gested in colonial documents, was reproduced in the Cádiz debates.∫∑ In their
condition as natives of another region, individuals of African ancestry never
160 The Crisis of an Empire
truly joined the Spanish community.∫∏ Like other foreigners, they were unable
to use their prolonged residence in Spain to transform them into natives.
Residence itself was meaningless unless accompanied by the intention to cre-
ate permanent ties with the adoptive community. As slaves, Africans lacked
legal capacity and could not express a legally binding wish to abandon their
community of origin and become Spanish. As freemen, they failed to do so.
Independent of the decision individual Africans might have taken, it was well
known that Africans were brought to Spanish territories against their will.
Because their immigration was involuntary, their residence in these territories
could not serve as an indication (presumption) to their intentions. Neither
could their behavior as Spaniards or as citizens. In short, Africans and their
descendants lacked both the legal capacity and the (presumed) will to be
naturalized in Spain and Spanish America. ‘‘The king always wanted to main-
tain separate this foreign caste which proceeds from different parts of Africa,
either Muslim or pagan from other classes of Americans, and without allow-
ing it even the minor access to offices and civic decorations. He prohibited the
bishops from exempting them of the impediment they had to hold ecclesiasti-
cal offices, and they were incapable in summary to a legal naturalization, or
obtaining the title of citizen. In this way, our kings used the faculty that all
nations have to fix on foreigners who were introduced into it restrictions and
impediments which lead to the best order and security.’’∫π Indeed, although by
virtue of birth and domicile Africans could be recognized as ‘‘Spaniards,’’ they
could not be included among Spanish citizens.
The argument equating Africans with foreigners first appeared during the
discussion on the right of Africans to be represented in the national assembly
(cortes). On that occasion (January 1811), some of the delegates who opposed
this concession cited examples from other European countries, but all these
examples dealt with the treatment of foreigners.∫∫ Africans were designated as
foreigners again in August 1811 during the debate on the status of freed slaves
who, according to article 5 of the constitution, would become Spaniards upon
their emancipation. One delegate expressed his surprise: it was insensible, he
determined, to ask foreigners to comply with a ten-year residence before al-
lowing them to naturalize, yet to admit Africans to Spanishness immediately
upon their freedom. Africans should not receive preference because, unlike
other foreigners, they had never manifested their wish to come to Spain and
Spanish America. Their immigration was carried out against their will, and
before they were admitted to the nation, the nation must verify that they
indeed loved it sufficiently, and that they were willing to subject themselves to
its laws. Freedom in itself was not a sufficient guarantee because it gave no
The Crisis of an Empire 161
deprived them of their natural patria would give them an adoptive one.Ω∏ A
third group of delegates stated that it was utterly unthinkable that African
descent would be waived in cases of complete foreigners—who were never
asked about their genealogy—but would hinder (true) Spaniards from obtain-
ing citizenship.Ωπ A fourth group suggested that, from a practical point of view,
distinguishing between individuals of African ancestry and all others was an
impossible task.Ω∫ This practical concern brought about the only modification
introduced in the article following the parliamentary debate. Whereas the
original project spoke about ‘‘individuals of African origin,’’ the final text
included ‘‘individuals reputed and held to be of African descent.’’ This modi-
fication was introduced largely because it was feared that unless citizenship
was tied to reputation rather than to hard facts, all Spaniards would have to
prove that they had no African blood in order to obtain citizenship. The ghost
of the limpieza de sangre debates reappeared. But relying on reputation, other
deputies said, was just as problematic.ΩΩ
This parliamentary discussion demonstrated that the solution adopted—
recognizing Creoles, Indians, and mestizos as both Spaniards and citizens and
granting individuals of African descent the status of Spaniards but not of
citizens—could be legally justified as much as it could be legally rebuffed.
Based on early modern discussions of vecindad and naturaleza, these debates
allowed different and often contradictory interpretations. As happened be-
fore, the interests at stake conditioned the interpretation adopted. At the end
of the day, the inclusion of Spaniards and Indians and the exclusion of Afri-
cans was a compromise adopted to avoid a direct confrontation between
European and American Spaniards, as well as between conservatives and lib-
erals. It ensured that the bulk of Spanish citizens would still reside within the
confines of the Old World. It established an apparent equality between Spain
and Spanish America—Africans of both jurisdictions were equally discrimi-
nated against—yet it clearly favored the Spanish European population whose
memory of African slavery and African origin was extremely dim.
The Cádiz discussions also demonstrated that legal theories could be em-
ployed to justify what were in fact racial and ethnic prejudices. The delegates
were aware of these issues, and many of them openly stated that, whether
natives or foreigners, Africans were simply inferior to both Europeans and
Indians and were unworthy of citizenship.∞≠≠ Indeed, as happened in the cases
of the Gypsies and the Chuetas, Africans could be excluded from the commu-
nity because of their condition as members of a group rather than as individ-
uals (chapter 6). As members of a group their wishes could be inferred by a
society that, independently of its declared intentions and ignoring the usual
emphasis on personal choice, simply refused to treat them equally.
The Crisis of an Empire 163
Conclusions
In both Spain and Spanish America, the distinction between permanent
members and transient foreigners remained operative in the late eighteenth
and early nineteenth centuries. In both Spain and Spanish America, this dis-
tinction defined the boundaries of new communities and distinguished insiders
from outsiders. In Spanish America, these boundaries were defined in order to
exclude European Spaniards and to institute the community as an indepen-
dent kingdom or kingdoms within Spanish structures. In Spain, the same
boundaries were used to affirm the unity of the Spanish world and to classify
Spaniards and citizens, eventually including Indians but not Africans among
the second.
The distinction between permanent members and transient foreigners
lacked references to culture, language, race, and genealogy. In both Spain and
Spanish America it presented the ‘‘nation’’ as a group of people who wanted to
live together and was subjected to the same law. Commonalities based on
language, culture, race, and genealogy were both raised and rejected in the
name of a ‘‘discourse of love’’ that naturally sprang among people sharing the
same space for a sufficient length of time. The image of the community as a
small conglomerate of people who intimately knew one another, and trusted
one other, was overpowering. It was advocated in both Spain and Spanish
America, and in both cases, the construction of a wider (‘‘national’’) commu-
nity was still based, first and foremost, on the inclusion in a local one.
The consideration of Creolism on one hand, and the constitutional debate
in Spain on the other, within a larger historical context, questions our ability
to view these instances as moments of national affirmation or as indicators for
the coming of a new age. What comes to light is, first and foremost, continuity.
This continuity was not a failure, nor was it due to an ill design. It was
intentional and meaningful, as contemporaries continued to adhere to a basic
distinction between people who ‘‘could be trusted’’ and those who could not,
and as they interpreted trust in the same old manner. What was different was
not the discourse, but whom it was applied to and how. By using the tradi-
tional criteria, late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century Spaniards and
Spanish Americans did create new divisions. They distinguished American
from European Spaniards, and they formally included the Indians, yet not the
Africans, as full members of the Spanish community.
8
164
Was Spain Exceptional? 165
Spanish Exceptionalism:
Spanish and Spanish American Contemporary Perceptions
Eighteenth-century Spaniards consistently asserted that both citizenship
and nativeness were categories based on natural law. Litigants who claimed
they were worthy of citizenship argued that they had a ‘‘natural liberty’’ to
change their adhesion from one community to another and that communities
could not refuse to admit them to citizenship.∞∞ This natural liberty preceded
the laws and was independent of them. The same was true of the relation
Was Spain Exceptional? 167
between the establishment of domicile and citizenship and the effect of absen-
teeism on communal membership. Both were universal and natural, and both
existed whether or not they were explicitly upheld in legislation. Even the ten-
year residency presumption was presented by litigants as a universal rule, since
it was ‘‘well known’’ and ‘‘accepted’’ throughout Europe; it had, after all,
originated in Roman law. The idea that Castilian practices were natural and
universal also applied to nativeness and foreignness. The distinction between
natives and foreigners was based on ‘‘natural’’ factors: it was natural that
those born in the community loved it, as much as it was natural that those
born outside it did not. This love was part of human nature and was not based
on free choice. It was automatically generated in all people once certain cir-
cumstances coincided. Similar assertions were made with regard to the pre-
sumption regime, which allowed foreigners to demonstrate their intention to
integrate into the community through their behavior. This regime was the
embodiment of a ‘‘common sense’’ that was both reasonable and necessary.
Because civil or human law, which reproduced this regime, merely expressed a
more general rule, it could be set aside or new elements could be introduced
into it. One such element, for example, was the distinction between children of
transient and integrated foreigners born in Spain. Although this distinction
was not explicitly stated in the law, it could be adopted because it was part of a
common law that was followed throughout Europe.∞≤
Seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Spanish authors provided us addi-
tional keys to this analysis. The exclusion of ‘‘dangerous’’ foreigners, espe-
cially merchants, and the inclusion of ‘‘beneficial’’ ones, they said, were pol-
icies followed ‘‘all over the world’’ and had been practiced for as long as
human memory could recall.∞≥ Spanish customs were thus presaged in a re-
mote past shared by all Europeans, and references to them were found in the
Bible and in Greek and Roman precedents. These customs were the natural
consequence of an accumulated experience about the nature of both man and
society. Rejection and inclusion were so well entrenched in human conscious-
ness and so widely practiced that they were part of both natural law and the
laws of nations.∞∂ Therefore, the king could not modify the procedures and
requirements for naturalization: since the transformation of foreigners into
natives was a matter of natural and not civil or human law, it was beyond royal
sphere of action and was independent of royal wish.∞∑
The conviction that citizenship and nativeness were categories based on
natural and consensual criteria led Spanish and Spanish Americans to say little
about them. They rarely discussed their specific contents or explained their
meaning. They were convinced that citizenship and nativeness represented a
truth too obvious to ignore and too consensual to have to be supported by
168 Was Spain Exceptional?
Spanish Exceptionalism:
The View from Italy, England, and France
Municipal communities existed in other parts of Europe, and member-
ship in them defined who could hold public office and participate in gov-
ernment and who could trade and enjoy tax reductions. These similarities
were especially noteworthy during the Middle Ages. Comparing practices in
170 Was Spain Exceptional?
England, France, Germany, and northern Italy, Susan Reynolds concludes that
a common heritage indeed existed in medieval Western Europe.≤∂ In the ter-
ritories included in her survey, communities of inhabitants consolidated in the
eleventh to thirteenth centuries. They were recognized or acted as corpora-
tions, and they received foundational charters with jurisdiction over commu-
nal lands, the right to exercise special commercial privileges, and the right to
establish local institutions and elect local officials. Both rural and urban com-
munities enjoyed these privileges, and towns, rather than having a different
institutional character than villages, simply had more privileges and freedoms.
In both towns and villages, community members were typically adult male
heads of households who resided permanently in the jurisdiction. The conces-
sion of local citizenship to newcomers depended on immigration policies and
varied according to local needs and circumstances. In many places, the resi-
dence of a year plus one day was necessary to transform potential members
into true members. In these cases, residence functioned as a legal presumption:
those who could reside in a settlement for a year without their lord seeking
them out could be presumed free—or, at least, they could be constituted as
freeman by virtue of prescription. In some communities, residence created an
obligation on the part of a newcomer to become a member, while in others it
implicated the community in an obligation to accept the newcomer. In many
areas it was held that only those complying with duties could enjoy rights.
Similarities between the different communities in medieval Western Europe
also extended to the realm of the kingdom. By the tenth century, the idea of
‘‘people’’ as a community of customs, law, and descent was well entrenched in
Western society, and individuals who permanently resided in the territory
were classified as belonging to it.
Affirming the unity of Western European political and social organization in
the Middle Ages, Reynolds leaves unexplored the relation between local com-
munities and the community of the kingdom. She also argues that the com-
monalties she describes ended with the thirteenth century. From the fourteenth
century onward, different local citizenship practices emerged in different parts
of Europe, and citizenship, which was a regime that formerly had applied to
the majority of people, became a status associated with the privileged few.
Other authors agree with this analysis.≤∑ They point out the similarity of Euro-
pean practices during the Middle Ages and suggest that by the thirteenth, four-
teenth, or fifteenth century, local citizenship underwent important transforma-
tions, leaving it impoverished (since it was granted to fewer individuals) and
highly diversified (as different practices emerged in different parts of Europe).
Nevertheless, an important group of historians argues that the citizenship
regime that evolved in Western Europe from the eleventh to the thirteenth
Was Spain Exceptional? 171
century persisted with slight modifications until the eighteenth century.≤∏ Ac-
cording to this view, municipal communities continued to be associations of
free individuals during the early modern period. These communities were de-
fined by a common legal regime that closely tied membership to the ability to
exercise rights. Village communities also continued to enroll members, main-
tain their assemblies, and operate in a way not radically different from urban
communities. During this period the distinction between rural and urban con-
tinued to be unclear: it basically denoted a difference in the number, not
the existence, of rights. Community members—usually identified as resident
heads of households possessing property—were allowed to use communal
land and could actively participate in decision making. Rather than changing,
in the early modern period local citizenship was simply overshadowed by the
appearance and consolidation of kingdoms. This development restricted the
liberty of local communities and integrated them in larger structures. These
larger structures subjected people to a sovereign power instead of allowing
them to participate in it, as was the case previously. Although still members
and citizens, individuals were now instituted first and foremost as subjects.≤π
The level of analysis adopted and the willingness to stress similarities or
differences can explain at least partially this disagreement among scholars. As
always happens with comparison, no two cases are alike. Given the diversity
of practices in each European jurisdiction, and how comparisons are generally
constructed by using a secondary literature that is highly influenced by dif-
ferent historiographical traditions, personal agendas, and types of available
sources, it is far from surprising that conclusions may vary. These difficulties
do not disappear when one attempts to compare a single country, such as
Spain, to the rest of Europe. Clearly, no other European country had institu-
tions identical to vecindad and naturaleza. It is equally clear that all of them
had categories of belonging that allowed people to enjoy a specific regime of
rights and duties in a local community on one hand, and a larger community
on the other. Comparing Spain to Europe also involves choosing some exam-
ples that would ‘‘represent’’ Europe. In the discussion that follows, my choice
of Italy, England, and France was motivated by both practical and theoretical
considerations. On the practical side, all three countries enjoy an abundant
literature covering membership in both local communities and the community
of the kingdom. On the theoretical side, each of these countries is traditionally
thought to represent a very distinct case. In Italy, local communities were
extremely powerful as expressed by the rise and persistence of the city-state.
England is usually portrayed as a centralized state where parliamentary con-
trol over the king was especially strong and local communities maintained at
least some of their vigor. France is often presented as the prototype of an
172 Was Spain Exceptional?
ITALY
In the late Middle Ages Italy was the birthplace of a new legal science,
the ius commune.≤∫ Although this science was highly influential and it guided
citizenship practices in the different Italian towns, it was insufficient to bring
these practices into conformity.≤Ω Some basic premises, such as the idea that
citizenship depended on a contract and that communities could convert non-
citizens into citizens, were common to all cities, but individual cities imple-
mented them differently. During the early modern period, in many cities sev-
eral types of citizenship coexisted, and different institutions could declare
people citizens without that declaration necessarily binding the other authori-
ties. In sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Naples, citizenship (cittadinanza)
was granted by the municipal tribunal (eletti del tribunale della città), which
was acting for the king, or in the case of clergy by the ecclesiastical authori-
ties.≥≠ It could be obtained either by ‘‘justice’’ or by ‘‘grace.’’ Citizenship by
justice depended on the fulfillment of certain requirements stipulated in the
laws. These requirements included conception and birth in the city or mar-
riage to a wife conceived and born in the city, coupled with a ten-year resi-
dence and the possession of a house. Although in most cases citizenship by
justice was acknowledged formally by the appropriate body, this process often
explicitly affirmed that citizenship was actually generated on its own by virtue
of the newcomer’s activities, his intention ‘‘to remain in the city permanently,’’
and his integration in the local community; all the municipal body did was to
recognize its preexistence. Citizenship by grace depended on the authorities’
discretion so candidates petitioning for it were not generally required to meet
any specific requirements. The proliferation of discretionary grants in the
seventeenth century provoked opposition, and by the eighteenth century,
royal authorities introduced restrictions on the power to issue these grants.
In addition to these formal mechanisms for citizenship acquisition, people
living in Naples could obtain the rights of citizens in other ways as well.
Because citizens enjoyed tax exemptions, the fiscal court (regia camera della
sommaria) had to examine whether taxpayers were citizens or not. Over the
years, this court gradually became the main authority for recognizing (or
refusing to recognize) the citizenship of individuals. Its activities gave Neapoli-
tans a second practical method by which they could obtain the privileges of
citizenship. The criteria the court employed were similar, although not identi-
Was Spain Exceptional? 173
cal, to the ones employed by the municipal tribunal. Beginning in the mid-
sixteenth century and especially throughout the seventeenth, the court gener-
ally held that permanent residence was the principal method for citizenship
acquisition. Residence had to be accompanied by an animus permanendi, that
is, by the wish to remain in the jurisdiction ‘‘for good’’ and by the promise to
establish a stable home in the territory. This wish could be orally attested, or it
could be deduced by observing the behavior of petitioners.
Citizenship practices in Naples and Castile were thus quite similar. In both
places citizenship could be obtained by either formal or implicit means. In both
places, it was essential to verify the ‘‘true’’ intentions of newcomers, which
could be done by using legal presumptions meant to help the authorities inter-
pret persons’ behavior. In both places, the authorities normally did not grant
citizenship but only issued a formal recognition of an existing condition. Nev-
ertheless, Naples was different from Castile in some respects. In Naples, sev-
eral authorities rather than a single one were qualified to determine formally
the status of individuals. Also different was the existence of citizenship by
grace. Castilian communities could elect to sell citizenship to individuals who
could never meet the standards of legal proof, yet these sales were highly excep-
tional and their practice was constantly questioned. Indeed, citizenship by
grace as practiced in Naples seemed closer to Castilian nativeness than to
Castilian vecindad. As mentioned in previous chapters, the Castilian kings in-
sisted on exercising the power to naturalize foreigners who were personally at-
tached to them. People naturalized by royal decree often could not pass the
legal tests for naturalization, so their attainment of this status was a sign of
royal sovereignty. The same could be said of Naples, whose authorities demon-
strated their sovereignty by converting ‘‘nondeserving’’ foreigners into citizens.
Fewer similarities can be found between Castile and other Italian cities. In
sixteenth-century Venice, a distinction existed between people who obtained
their citizenship after a few years or many years of residence (citizens de extra
and de intus) and between these and others who acquired it by way of a
particular grant or by birth.≥∞ Citizenship by birth was granted to individuals
born in the city of a legitimate marriage and whose father and paternal grand-
father were ‘‘original citizens.’’ Citizenship by birth could also be awarded to
persons born elsewhere if they were descendants of ‘‘old families.’’ In all these
cases, citizenship depended, above all, on the reputation of the family. Tauto-
logically defined as a condition possessed by those who descended from origi-
nal citizens, citizenship by birth was in fact a public recognition of the family’s
role and place in the city. It denoted a social status, and it became increasingly
tied to a noble way of living that could exclude people born in the city if they
exercised ‘‘vile occupations’’ or were occupied in ‘‘mercantile activities.’’ Once
174 Was Spain Exceptional?
citizenship was considered the last and most formal aspect of a social process
begun long before: citizenship was granted to foreigners who were already
well integrated in the community. In eighteenth-century Mantova, citizenship
could be acquired by a particular grant ( grazia) or by the fulfillment of certain
requirements stipulated in the laws ( per incolato).≥π Grants were given to
people whose presence in the city was deemed desirable because of their pro-
fession, wealth, or prestige. All others could acquire citizenship once they had
established domicile in the city and integrated into the community. Codified in
the early sixteenth century, this second procedure—which survived to the
eighteenth century—required a ten-year residence, a minimum economic ac-
tivity, payment of taxes, and the observance of local laws.
The existence of various types of citizenship and the emphasis on the no-
bility of citizens were lacking in Castile. Nevertheless, like Castile, Venice,
Florence, Pescia, Rome, Brescia, Torino, and Mantova stressed the impor-
tance of residence, integration, and reputation for the purpose of obtaining
citizenship. These Italian city-states maintained a duality between citizenship
by birth and citizenship by integration, and they allowed the authorities to
affirm their sovereignty by granting citizenship to people who did not comply
with the normal requirements. In some cases it was clear that, as in Castile,
citizenship was constituted on its own, and its declaration by the authorities
was only a formal act of verification, not of creation. Legal presumptions were
also used in Italy to verify the existence of integration. But in Castile the native
born were required to integrate into the community if they wished to obtain
recognition as citizens, whereas in Italy birth appears to have granted persons
this status automatically.
Historians of late medieval and early modern Italy have often questioned
the actual importance of citizenship in Italian cities, arguing that by the early
modern period most cities paid little attention to citizenship.≥∫ This lack of
interest was demonstrated by the scarcity of legislation on matters of citizen-
ship and by the absence of disputes over the correct classification of people as
citizens or foreigners. Citizenship was rarely denied to people and, at any rate,
most petitioners originated from the immediate province (contado), not from
other cities. Evidence also suggests that in some cases at least, citizenship
regulations were ignored, while in others people could claim that they were
citizens by reputation, thus bypassing all formal procedures.≥Ω One reason for
this ‘‘decay’’ of the status of citizen was the fact that citizenship became insuffi-
cient for the acquisition of many rights and unnecessary in order to have
others. Some historians have also stressed that throughout Europe, citizenship
was mainly a condition sought for economic reasons and that political rights,
176 Was Spain Exceptional?
such as the ability to vote and hold office, were less crucial aspects of it.∂≠ They
have therefore reasoned that the attraction to citizenship became weaker as
its economic benefits diminished in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.
Other historians nevertheless affirmed that citizenship continued to be an
important social and political tie in early modern Italian cities, with a meaning
broader than the individual privileges attached to it. Above all, citizenship
implied the subjection of individuals to a sovereign power or to a municipal
authority.∂∞ According to this view, most early modern Italian cities attributed
a great deal of importance to citizenship, and citizenship continued to be an
essential prerequisite for obtaining many rights.
This debate among Italian historians is useful from a comparative point of
view, because it hints that Italy, like Castile, experienced the tension between
social and implicit categorizations on one hand, and legal and formal on the
other. Indeed, the criticism the first group of historians makes when its mem-
bers describe the decay of citizenship practices reproduces with surprising
fidelity many of the claims made in the past by historians of Castile. But if we
use the Castilian case as our model, the lack of legislation, the actions contrary
to laws, and even the absence of recorded conflicts do not necessarily reflect
the demise of citizenship. Instead, in Castile they were the result of the applica-
tion of doctrines not openly confessed in the legislation. They reflected the
absence of disputes in a society that appears to have been more consensual
than we first imagine, or that had other mechanisms—oral and extralegal
means—of conflict resolution. The same factors also demonstrated the priv-
ileging of social classification and implicit identities over legal and formal
categories. One wonders, therefore, if what Italian historians describe as decay
was indeed a gradual disappearance of citizenship, or whether what they
observed can be explained in other ways. Beyond this debate it is nevertheless
clear that citizenship in Italy was a regime restricted not only to a few cities,
but also to a small portion of the population within these cities. In Castile, on
the contrary, citizenship operated in both rural and urban communities, in
places both large and small, and it was granted to all heads of households.
It has also been suggested that Italian city-states never extended their cit-
izenship regime beyond the realm of the urban enclave, and that they never
developed notions analogous to Castilian naturaleza.∂≤ Pacts existed between
cities allowing the mutual bestowal of citizenship rights to their inhabitants,
and city-states like Florence and Venice dominated other communities. But
unlike the linkages in the kingdoms of Spain, no Italian, or even a provincial,
community of natives came into existence. Instead, different communities
belonging to the same state each maintained its separate communal institu-
tions, statutes, councils, and officers and its own citizenship criteria. The in-
Was Spain Exceptional? 177
ENGLAND
seven years required in London and in the admission of the poor. Attempts to
create a public registry of freemen failed in New York, and people often
referred to themselves as ‘‘freeman by reputation.’’ There is some discussion
whether the exercise of crafts and trades in the city was indeed restricted to
freeman. According to some, it was not, and citizenship in New York mainly
implied political, not economic, privileges. Similar practices were followed in
other chartered cities, such as Annapolis, Maryland, where a five-year appren-
ticeship allowed people to become freemen.
English freedom was substantially different from the Castilian vecindad. It
mainly implied an economic insertion and, although this insertion gave rights
to other privileges, commercial interests and economic agency heavily con-
trolled it. Freedom was a formal regime that depended on formal declarations.
It existed only in chartered towns and was applied almost equally in England
and its colonies. In Castile, on the contrary, local citizenship existed in all
settlements. Although it carried with it some economic advantages—such as
the right to use the communal pasture or to introduce certain products into the
local market—the idea of citizenship as discussed within the community was
fairly distanced from these factors. Economic interests and agency might have
prompted some to question the status of certain people; yet rejection was
always couched in terms of a discourse of love. This discourse allowed declar-
ing that those who acted as members had the right to be members. As a result,
formal declarations were not required in Castile. When applied to Spanish
America, Castilian citizenship was seriously modified. As in the case of Italy, in
some odd way English freedom resembled Castilian nativeness and not citi-
zenship. This is especially true if we consider the idea of nativeness as it was
applied in Spanish America, where mercantile interests and agency dominated
the discussion. Indeed, in Spanish America the definition of nativeness was
largely controlled by the merchant guilds, which acted as both eyewitness and
expert witness. This definition implied the right to trade, and the classification
of people as merchants or artisans could determine whether they would be
accepted or rejected. Yet even in Spanish America, obtaining rights depended
on integration. Whether artisans or merchants, whether allowed to trade or
not, it was consistently claimed that people became members of the commu-
nity first and foremost by virtue of their decision, which was evident in their
activities. Royal naturalization letters only formally sanctioned a situation
that was generated on its own.
These very real differences between Castilian citizenship and English free-
dom are somewhat mitigated by a recent literature that questions the nature
and extension of English freedom. According to Jonathan Barry, in the Middle
Ages freedom was a highly localized regime that designated emancipation
Was Spain Exceptional? 181
from feudal ties of people who became citizens in free towns.∑≠ Over time,
however, freedom became an institution common to all Englishmen. In the
early modern period, freedom was claimed as a birthright and was constituted
as a key component of English political discourse and the ‘‘ancient constitu-
tion.’’ Regulated by local customs and legislation, it depended on royal orders,
parliamentary decisions, and the common law. It was meaningful in national
contexts, such as the parliamentary elections. As early as the seventeenth
century, common images if not common criteria for the admission of freemen
were consolidated. Most important among them were financial independence
and the establishment of a domicile. Freemen were now identified as those
having property in their places of residence. Eventually, a rule was set accord-
ing to which all inhabitant householders paying ‘‘scot and lot’’—the locally
levied tax—had the right to vote. Concurrent also were common law deci-
sions stipulating that those who abandoned the community also abandoned
their freedom.∑∞ Under common law, in the late seventeenth century and in the
following century, men who owned property or who served as apprentices for
seven years could be considered free even if they did not obtain a formal
admission to the community.∑≤ Indeed, common law restricted the ability of
gilds’ and municipal authorities to reject ‘‘worthy’’ candidates. A candidate’s
incapacity to comply with duties was the only consideration that could justify
exclusion. The common law courts also stated that freedom could never be
sold. Buying freedom by paying redemption fees was a fiction. Although pre-
sented as a purchase, in reality this transaction consisted of formally recogniz-
ing that people were already free. Indeed, people who were truly unfree could
not purchase their freedom in this way.∑≥ In summary, in seventeenth- and
eighteenth-century England a local, actual freeman and an abstract ‘‘national’’
freeman existed side by side. Included in the common regime of freedom were
many of the rights recognized in Castile: the right to obtain freedom, the
importance of residence and marriage to a native, and the payment of an
entrance fee, as well as the payment of taxes. Furthermore, common law
courts explained that these factors were not important on their own: their
significance was tied to the fact that they proved the willingness of newcomers
to become members of the community and to comply with the subsequent
duties. Once an applicant demonstrated his compliance with these require-
ments, communities could not refuse to grant him freedom.∑∂
This portrait of English freedom reveals a regime that had closed much of
the gap between Castilian citizenship and freedom. The English practice dem-
onstrated that, despite the importance of local arrangements, a common re-
gime could also exist. It argued that freedom (or at least the right to freedom)
could exist independent of formal declarations. It stated that what appeared to
182 Was Spain Exceptional?
late Middle Ages, this ability was restricted to individuals born in the kingdom
as a practical rather than an ideological matter.∑Ω Birth in the kingdom allowed
parties to prove their genealogy, which assured their right to inherit land. Over
the years, what was initially a rule of evidence became a substantial guideline,
and the courts began to identify those born in the kingdom as the only people
eligible to inherit. With the consolidation of state structures in the sixteenth
and early seventeenth century, emphasis on birth gave way to emphasis on
allegiance. It was now claimed that what made people born in the kingdom
‘‘English’’ was their subjection to the monarch. By the end of this process and
from the seventeenth century onward, the ability to inherit came to depend on
allegiance to the king.∏≠ This allegiance was owed to the monarch in person
and not to the crown as an institution. It ignored the division of the monarchy
into different kingdoms, and people born under allegiance to the monarch
were considered members of a single community independent of whether they
were born in one kingdom or another. As natural subjects of the king, they
could demand equal rights and equal liberties in all royal domains. Changes in
dynastic unity and territorial losses and gains could thus unite the subjects
of various kingdoms into a single community, just as it might divide them
into several.∏∞
The adoption of allegiance as the sole criterion for membership in the com-
munity also meant that sons of Englishmen born abroad would be considered
English as long as their parents did not abandon their subjection to the mon-
arch. The general assumption was that they never did, and by the seventeenth
century it was repeatedly asserted that allegiance could not be abandoned
without royal approval. Allegiance also implied that people born in royal
domains were by definition original members of the community, irrespective
of their decent. On occasions, domicile was also invoked, but mostly as a
presumption. For example, in 1576 a royal decree ordered that people who
have lived in England for more than twenty years could be ‘‘reputed natural
subjects of the realm,’’ as long as their linguistic capacities, religion, and cus-
toms did not contradict this assumption.∏≤
During the seventeenth century, two different mechanisms allowing for-
eigners to enjoy the rights of Englishmen emerged. The king on the advice of
his council granted the first, called ‘‘denization.’’ The parliament by a private
bill granted the second, titled ‘‘naturalization.’’ Both mechanisms had no fixed
formula, nor were they regulated by law. Considered acts of sovereign bodies,
they depended on the discretion of the king or the parliament, and either actor
could decide when to grant them and to whom. There were no precise pre-
requisites and no clear procedures. In most cases, however, naturalization
generated greater benefits than denization. It usually included more rights,
184 Was Spain Exceptional?
stage of their past had been aliens, whereas others insisted on a true qualitative
difference between natives and aliens. At stake was also the question whether
society was made of free, rational, and autonomous individuals or whether it
was organic in nature, grounded in natural distinctions, and headed by a
paternalist monarch.∏∑ Bills proposed in 1664, 1672, and 1694 were rejected.
A general naturalization act was passed in 1709, but it was repealed three
years later. This act promised all Protestants born outside royal allegiance
naturalization if they were willing to come and settle in England permanently,
pay a fee, take the sacraments, and swear allegiance to the monarch. Even-
tually, the first permanent general naturalization act was passed in 1740. This
act, which covered only aliens residing in the colonies, stated that Protestants
born outside royal allegiance could be considered native Englishmen all over
the empire after they had lived in the colonies for seven years without a sub-
stantial absence. Similar privileges were extended in the next decades to alien
Protestants serving in the colonial armies.
Developments in English North America closed some of the gaps between
England and Spain. In both England and Spain, people who immigrated to the
New World maintained their status as subjects and natives. In English North
America as in Spain, a close relation existed between local integration and
the rights and privileges of natives. Similarly, both local communities were
willing to define the rights of individuals with regard to the king and king-
dom. Yet, the English authorities reacted against these developments. To limit
their effects, they ruled that American naturalization was merely a local license
to enjoy the rights of an Englishmen. This had the effect of making North
American naturalization in English colonies equivalent to the Spanish Ameri-
can composición. This naturalization allowed people to be treated de facto
as natives without transforming them into (true) natives; their rights and du-
ties were restricted to the jurisdiction of the granting body. Discussions lead-
ing to the enactment of general naturalization acts resonate with solutions
adopted in Spain. They adhered to the idea that people of the ‘‘right’’ religion
who established a permanent domicile in the jurisdiction were worthy of treat-
ment as natives. Yet they questioned their loyalty at the same time they af-
firmed the ability of people to change their nature and come to love their
adoptive community.
FRANCE
Most studies on local citizenship in France indicate that until the four-
teenth century, citizenship (citadinage) was a condition given to inhabitants of
corporate towns (bourgs). With citizenship came local privileges and duties
and the right to hold public office.π≠ People who wanted to obtain this status
had to petition the local authorities and express their willingness to comply
with the obligations of citadinage. They were required to take an oath and to
make a deposit against their pledge to comply with duties, especially the duty
to buy or build a house within a year and a day. The French kings also created
a unified general citizenship regime by establishing the status of ‘‘royal bour-
geois’’ (burgesias regni nostri). This status was open to free single men and
women and to married couples. It implied the obligation to reside perma-
Was Spain Exceptional? 189
a year and paying taxes were eligible for citizenship. Paris, it was then argued,
was unique among French towns because it encouraged inward immigration
by allowing all ‘‘integrated’’ individuals to become bourgeois. The liberty of
Paris to define its own community was nevertheless restricted. Because citizen-
ship allowed individuals to enjoy tax exemptions, the monarchy often wished
to control who the citizens were and pursued this goal through several paths:
by attempting to change the definition of citizenship, by applying a reduction-
ist interpretation to existing statutes, and by imposing first the purchase of
letters of citizenship and then the elaboration of a public registry of bourgeois.
These measures were resented by the local authorities, who wanted to retain
control over the enrollment of citizens and who hoped for a more lax defini-
tion that would allow more people to become citizens and thus increase the
number paying the local municipal fees (boues et lanternes).
Parisian citizenship practices were modified considerably in the passage from
the Middle Ages to the early modern period. These modifications were the
result of social, economic, and bureaucratic developments. As Paris changed
from a mainly commercial center into a highly complex court society, the
bourgeois gradually became identified with a small social sector that included
individuals of independent means (rentiers). This identification was linked
initially to the idea that people of independent means were capable of paying
local taxes. By the seventeenth century, however, this identification acquired a
social meaning. Tied to the increasing importance of bureaucrats and noblesse
de robe in the city on one hand, and to the growing economic power of the
rentier class on the other, citizenship became associated with a certain type of
urban nobility. This association was also hastened by the fact that the rights of
citizens and nobles became quite similar. At the end of this process, citizenship
implied a certain lifestyle that excluded all those engaged in manual labor or in
commercial activity. It thus became divorced from its original constituency,
the merchants.
The distinction between merchants and citizens was publicly acknowledged
in 1701, when, for tax purposes, merchants were subjected to the lieutenant
general of the police, while citizens were placed under the jurisdiction of city
officials. It was again confirmed in 1714, when the royal courts stated that in
order to enjoy tax exemptions as bourgeois, individuals needed to comply
with four requirements: reside in Paris at least seven months a year, cultivate
nothing by hand except their land and vineyards, sell none other then the fruits
of their land, and do nothing to degrade the status of citizen.π≥ In 1721 and
1738, these perceptions of citizenship were again invoked when it was de-
clared that, as people living from rents, retired merchants and their widows
should be included in the tax rolls among ‘‘citizens’’ rather than ‘‘merchants.’’
Was Spain Exceptional? 191
ralization existed. The first allowed foreigners to become citizens in the munic-
ipality where they resided. The second truly naturalized them and was either
limited to the right to inherit or to enjoy ecclesiastical benefices, or it admitted
foreigners to all rights and privileges of natives.
Despite the existence of these formal criteria, the French kings insisted that
naturalization was a discretionary act. The tension between Roman law doc-
trines focused on alien integration and royal prerogatives that included the
right to an alien’s estate was constantly present. French jurists argued that
foreigners who were integrated in the kingdom had the right to receive natu-
ralization, yet even they understood that this right could be restricted by the
king. Furthermore, although foreigners had to be formally naturalized before
they were admitted to the rights of Frenchmen, in some cases at least, even the
king recognized that certain foreigners could automatically convert into na-
tives, as was the case in Spain. This happened, for example, in 1715 with
foreign soldiers who had resided in the kingdom for a sufficient length of
time.∫∞ The tension between integration and royal sovereignty also existed in
reference to other practices. As in Spain, the French king could favor for-
eigners who were royal servants and could grant them naturalization despite
the fact that they were not integrated into the kingdom. But unlike circum-
stances in Spain, the French kings could declare that certain foreigners would
be treated as natives only in certain prescribed ways without ever granting
them naturalization. For example, during the seventeenth and eighteenth cen-
turies, foreigners could obtain exemption of droit d’aubain—equating them,
de facto, to natives—by virtue of specific royal grants. Such exemptions were
granted to groups of ‘‘beneficial foreigners,’’ such as merchants coming to fairs
and natives of allied countries who enjoyed the protection of ‘‘international’’
treaties. These exemptions were also granted to individuals and to French
cities. Although they enjoyed the most important right of nativeness—the
right to inherit—foreigners benefiting from these exemptions were still con-
sidered alien. The same was true with regard to office holding. In France, yet
not in Spain, foreigners could obtain royal letters allowing them to be em-
ployed in offices and benefices ordinarily reserved for natives without this
permit implying their naturalization.
It was also the case in France that letters of naturalization and even birth in
the territory could fail to transform foreigners into natives. On different occa-
sions during the seventeenth century, for example, alien taxation was levied on
‘‘true’’ foreigners, ‘‘naturalized’’ foreigners, and native French who descended
from foreign families.∫≤ Stressing the foreignness of these individuals, many of
whom were legally French, these decrees explained that their taxation was
justified because the presence of foreigners on French soil was profoundly
196 Was Spain Exceptional?
global and between municipal statutes and kingdomwide laws. Although local
laws that defined both citizenship and naturalization existed in all jurisdic-
tions, these laws were matched by other systems that were just as efficient in
defining members. Whether called common law, Roman law, ius commune, or
simply natural law, these other systems were external to both municipal and
royal control. They were part of a communal heritage and were characterized
as ancient, widely held, and universally applicable. They operated to modify
local and regal arrangements, and without ever being formally adopted, they
were essential to the construction of communities and to the definition of their
boundaries.
The tension between authority and community in Italy, France, England,
and Spain was also expressed in the existence of citizenship and naturalization
by local and customary law on one hand, and citizenship and naturalization
by sovereign act on the other. Citizenship and naturalization by law expressed
local customs and local legal traditions, which represented the community and
its ‘‘ancient constitution,’’ which had preceded the installation of authorities
and the king. Citizenship and naturalization by sovereign act allowed the
authorities, whether local or royal, to act on the margin or even in opposition
to legal arrangements. Invoking the power to naturalize by fiat allowed the
authorities to ignore the community and to assert that they were not subject to
its laws.
In spite of these similarities, Spain was indeed exceptional in the vigor of its
local citizenship during the eighteenth century. Evidence from Italy, England,
and France suggests that local communities in these countries gradually lost or
surrendered their ability to impose a citizenship regime. Eventually, member-
ship in the community became a social or honorary title, void of immediate
practical implications. In Spain, although not in Spanish America, local com-
munities continued to examine the citizenship status of inhabitants and to
insist on the application of a regime that discriminated against noncitizens.
Also in Spain, people continued to refer to themselves as citizen and noncitizen
and to consider themselves first and foremost members of local communities
and only secondarily as part of a kingdomwide association.
Another (related) point of Spanish exceptionalism was Spanish resistance to
royal sovereignty and the inability of royal interests to recast Spain as a com-
munity of allegiance. Evidence suggests that in both early modern England
and France the community of the kingdom was gradually identified with the
monarch and the centralizing state. This identification allowed royal bureau-
crats to modify the definition of the community according to territorial gains
and losses and according to dynastic unity and dynastic inheritance. It per-
mitted English jurists to ignore the composite nature of the state and overlook
200 Was Spain Exceptional?
201
202 Conclusions and Afterthoughts
opposition between goodwilled people who were integrated into the commu-
nity, wished to remain in it permanently, and were willing to comply with its
duties and bad-intentioned people who did not. These latter were transients
who refused to tie themselves permanently to the community, who avoided
integration into it, and who wished only to benefit from privileges.
The distinction between good and bad people was reproduced on all levels.
It first appeared in Castilian and Spanish American local communities, and by
the seventeenth century, it operated throughout the realm of the kingdom of
Castile and in the Spanish kingdoms. This distinction originally defined atti-
tudes towards immigration, yet it eventually constructed notions of member-
ship and belonging. Independent of their origin and place of birth, in order to
qualify as members, people had to be want to be members, to act as members,
and to comply with duties. These requirements were applied to both new-
comers and the native born, yet those born into a community usually enjoyed
a presumption of goodwill. Although they did not receive a truly differential
treatment, on a day-to-day basis, social norms and understandings that rarely
questioned their status protected their standing. This lack of conflict made the
condition of native born as both citizens and natives appear automatic. How-
ever, such was not the case. Native-born persons could be required to prove
that they were ‘‘good’’ if and when their condition came under scrutiny. There-
fore it should not surprise us that the distinction between good and bad im-
migrants was determinant in the construction of the category of ‘‘Spaniard’’
and ‘‘Spanish citizen’’ as defined in the first Spanish constitution (1812). Nor
should it surprise us that, in Spanish America, the same distinction was helpful
to the elaboration of a Creole discourse that eventually justified the break with
Spain and the formation of new states and nations.
The distinction between good and bad immigrants allowed the easy inclu-
sion of foreign Catholics to the community, and it provided a means of ex-
plaining the rejection of other people who were classified as ‘‘bad.’’ The classi-
fication of people as good or bad depended on the identities of the parties and
their interests and on the circumstances of place and time. It was linked to the
willingness to presume the presence of goodwill or to demand that candidates
supply ample proof of their situation and intentions. In some cases people
classified as bad—for example, the Chueta, the Gypsies, and Spaniards of
African decent—were different in ethnicity, race, and customs from most
other citizens and natives. Yet even though discussants recognized the impor-
tance of these differences, their exclusion was still argued by reference to their
quality as bad. This quality did not truly depend on individual behavior but
was a byproduct of membership in a group to which Spanish society attributed
certain intentions and certain ways of being.
Conclusions and Afterthoughts 203
209
210 Abbreviations
Chapter 1. Introduction
1. Gellner, Nations and Nationalism; Anderson, Imagined Communities; Greenfeld,
Nationalism; Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism; Armstrong, Nations before Na-
tionalism; Smith, Ethnic Origin of Nations; and Hastings, Construction of Nationhood.
These issues are also treated in Tilly, ‘‘States.’’
2. Viroli, For Love of Country; Brading, ‘‘Patriotism’’; and Godechot, ‘‘Nation.’’ See
also Elliott, ‘‘Revolution,’’ 122–23; Shennan, ‘‘The Rise’’; and Bjorn, Grant, and Stringer,
Nation, Nationalism and Patriotism.
3. Tönnies, Community and Civil Society.
4. Blickle, Resistance, Representation, and Community; Te Brake, Shaping History,
15–16 and 181–86; and Tilly and Blockmans, Cities and the Rise of States in Europe.
Criticism of this model is included in Sahlins, Boundaries, 7–9, and Portillo Valdés,
Monarquía y gobierno, 36–38.
5. Vanel, Histoire de la nationalité; Wells, Law and Citizenship; Cockburn, National-
ity; Parry, British Nationality Law; and Marías, La corona y la comunidad hispánica.
6. Billot, ‘‘L’assimilation,’’ 273, and Nunn, ‘‘Naturalization,’’ 68.
7. Riesenberg, Citizenship in Western Tradition, 208, and Costa, Civitas, 76–80.
8. Clark, Small Towns; Rappaport, Worlds within Worlds; and Babeau, Les villes.
9. Pérez Collados, Una aproximación histórica, 25 and 67.
10. Nicolet, ‘‘Citoyenneté’’; Rétat, ‘‘Evolution,’’ 3; and Boone, Cerutti, Descimon, and
Prak, ‘‘Introduction,’’ 4–6.
11. Weber, General Economic History, 315–37; Dilcher, Brady, Blockmans, Van
211
212 Notes to Pages 3–10
Nierop, Issacs, and Mussi, ‘‘Urban,’’ 217–18, and Blickle, ‘‘Conclusions,’’ 325. See also
Schulze, States, Nations, and Nationalism, and Strayer, On the Medieval Origins.
12. Bossenga, ‘‘Rights,’’ 217, and Wells, Law and Citizenship, xv–xvi.
13. Brubaker, Citizenship and Nationhood.
14. Scott, Seeing Like a State, 65.
15. Nunn, Foreign Immigrants, 1–2, 111, and 113–14.
16. Cerutti, ‘‘Giustizia.’’
17. Billot, ‘‘L’assimilation,’’ 276; Nunn, ‘‘Naturalization,’’ 68; and Schultz Beerbühl,
‘‘Naturalization,’’ 512.
18. Marshall, Citizenship and Social Class; Walzer, Spheres of Justice, 36; Tilly, ‘‘Cit-
izenship,’’ 8.
19. Somers, ‘‘Citizenship,’’ 589 and 611. I disagree with Somer’s affirmation that early
modern citizenship had clear rules that were normatized by the national authorities and
then implemented locally, according to local circumstances. See also Gaudemet, ‘‘Préam-
bule,’’ 17; Tilly, ‘‘Citizenship,’’ 5 and 6; and Cerutti, Descimon, and Prak, ‘‘Premessa,’’
281–83.
20. Brubaker and Cooper, ‘‘Beyond,’’ 14–16.
21. Nader, Liberty in Absolutist Spain, 27–29.
22. Losa Contreras, El consejo de Madrid, 479–84; Fuente Pérez, Palencia, 29–33, and
Navarro de la Torre, ‘‘Avecindamientos.’’
23. Vassberg, Village and the Outside World, 14–23, and Nader, Liberty in Absolutist
Spain, 27–29.
24. Monsalvo Antón, Ordenanzas medievales de Avila, 85; and Alvarez y Valdés, La
extranjería, 186–229. The absence of similar ‘‘definitions’’ in Spanish America led schol-
ars to search for them in royal laws, where they were equally absent: Moore, Cabildo in
Peru under the Habsburgs, 15–16 and 141, and López Beltrán, ‘‘Intereses,’’ 37.
25. Ruiz Ibáñez, ‘‘Sujets,’’ 129 and 135.
26. Tomás Ortiz de la Torre, ‘‘Derecho’’; Pecourt García, ‘‘Una institución,’’ 884–93;
and González Jiménez, ‘‘Genoveses,’’ 118–23.
27. Sánchez Bella, Los reinos, 25–26, and Lalinde Abadía, ‘‘De la nacionalidad.’’
28. Nunn, ‘‘Naturalization,’’ 68.
29. García Cárcel, Historia de Cataluña, 132–35, and in ‘‘Las fronteras,’’ 71; Sesma
Muñoz, ‘‘El sentimiento’’; and Pérez Collados, Una aproximación histórica, 31–79. See
also Torres i Sans, ‘‘Nacions,’’ 84–86.
30. Pike, Hispanismo, 73–127; Fernández Albaladejo, ‘‘Les traditions’’; Barton,
‘‘Roots’’; Boyd, Historia Patria; Koenigsberger, ‘‘Spain,’’ and in ‘‘National’’; Linehan,
‘‘Religion’’; Herr, ‘‘Evolution’’; and Mar Molinero and Smith, Nationalism and the Na-
tions.
31. Marías, La corona y la comunidad hispánica; Fernández Albaladejo, ‘‘El prob-
lema,’’ 190–94; García Cárcel, ‘‘Las fronteras’’; Maravall, El concepto de España; and
Thompson ‘‘Castile and the Monarchy,’’ 127–30.
32. Menéndez Pidal, El imperio hispánico and in Los españoles en la Historia; Sánchez
Albornoz, España, un enigma histórico; Maravall, El concepto de España; and Marías,
España inteligible.
33. Herr, ‘‘Evolution,’’ and Ucelay-de Cal, ‘‘Nationalism,’’ 18–21.
Notes to Pages 10–17 213
34. Ladero Quesada, ‘‘El poder’’ and in ‘‘Monarquía’’; Fernández Albaladejo, ‘‘Cities’’;
and Thompson ‘‘Patronato.’’
35. Castro, España en su historia and in La realidad histórica de España.
36. Liss, Mexico under Spain; Pagden, ‘‘Identity’’; Demélas, L’invention politique;
Brading, ‘‘Nationalism’’; Guerra, ‘‘La nation’’; Chiaramonte, ‘‘La formación’’; and
König, ‘‘Nacionalismo y nación.’’
37. Brubaker, Citizenship and Nationhood, and Lalinde Abadía, ‘‘L’inserimento.’’
38. Martínez San Pedro, ‘‘Repobladores’’; Ruano Eloy, ‘‘La participación’’; Gautier
Dalché, ‘‘Les colonies’’; Domínguez Ortiz, Los extranjeros; Poitrineau, ‘‘La imigración’’;
Pradells Nadal, ‘‘Italianos’’; Iglesias Rodríguez, ‘‘Las colonias’’; Ozanam, ‘‘Les étrangers’’
and ‘‘La colonie’’; Gómez de Orozco, ‘‘Italianos’’; Langé, ‘‘L’immigration’’; Brito Gonzá-
lez, Extranjeros en Lanzarote; Rodríguez Vicente, ‘‘Los extranjeros’’; Armas Asin,
‘‘Herejes,’’ 362–63; Pike, Enterprise and Adventure; Kellenbenz, ‘‘Mercaderes’’; Camp-
bell, ‘‘Foreigners’’; Gómez Pérez, ‘‘Los extranjeros’’; Nunn, Foreign Immigrants; Gould,
‘‘La condición’’; Israel, ‘‘Portuguese’’; Langue, ‘‘Los franceses’’; Lavallé, ‘‘Les étrangers’’;
Varela, Ingleses en España y Portugal; García-Mauriño Mundi, La pugna entre el con-
sulado, 141–90; and Diz, Idea, 326–48.
39. Pradels Nadal, ‘‘Italianos,’’ 72 and 74; García-Baquero González and Collado
Villalta, ‘‘Les français,’’ 174, García-Baquero González, Cádiz y el Atlántico, 491–92;
Domínguez Ortiz, La sociedad española, 174; Lafuente Marchain, Los portugueses, 85–
86; and Fradklin, ‘‘Vecinos,’’ 123–47.
40. Cuneo Vida, ‘‘Extranjeros,’’ 60–61; Rosa Olivera, ‘‘Francisco,’’ 150–52; Pérez
Rodríguez, Los extranjeros en Canarias, 71–72; Poitrineau, ‘‘La imigración,’’ 106; Dom-
ínguez Ortiz, Los extranjeros, 83; Girard, Le commerce française, 203–334; and Dias
Avelino, ‘‘A naturalização,’’ 389–92.
41. Balancy, ‘‘Les immigrés,’’ 50–52; Armas Asin, ‘‘Herejes,’’ 373–85; Domínguez
Ortiz, Los extranjeros, 180–81; Molina, ‘‘La expulsión’’; and Poitrineau, ‘‘La imigra-
ción,’’ 122–28.
42. Corral garcía, Las comunidades castellanas, 203, and Nader, Liberty in Absolutist
Spain, 28–29.
43. Riesenberg, Citizenship in the Western Tradition and Costa, Civitas.
44. Chiaramonte, ‘‘Ciudadanía,’’ 99.
45. Mariana, Del rey, 552, and González de Cellorigo, Memorial de la política nec-
esaria y útil, 66. This literature is studied at some length by Carzolio, ‘‘En los orígenes,’’
7–8 and 14, and in her ‘‘Aspectos,’’ 5–6. I would like to thank the author for allowing me
to cite her work.
46. Castrillo, Tractado de república, 24–29.
‘‘Libertades urbanas’’; and Lacarra de Miguel, ‘‘Acerca.’’ The evolution of Castilian local
law is described in Pérez Prendes Muñoz Arraco, Historia del derecho español, vol. 2,
670–78.
4. Ius commune is described in Bellomo, Common Legal Past. The codification of
citizenship practices is described in Torres Balbas, ‘‘La edad’’; Ladero Quesada, Historia
de Sevilla, 128–29, 133, and 137–40; Losa Contreras, El consejo de Madrid, 479–84;
Izquierdo Benito, Un espacio desordenado, 39–47; Fuente Pérez, Palencia, 29–33; Bona-
chia Hernando, El consejo de Burgos; and Navarro de la Torre, ‘‘Avecindamientos.’’
5. Corral García, Las comunidades castellanas, 203–4, and Domínguez Lozano, Las
circunstancias, 33–59 and 221–22.
6. Vassberg, ‘‘La comunidad,’’ and in Village, 14–23; and Nader, Liberty in Absolu-
tist Spain, 27–29.
7. Gibert y Sánchez de la Vega, El consejo de Madrid; García Ulecia, Los factores de
diferenciación; Gacto Fernández, Estructura de la población; Sacristán y Martínez, Mu-
nicipalidades de Castilla, 258–63; and Carte, Del consejo medieval, 81–87.
8. Bernardo Ares, ‘‘El régimen municipal,’’ includes a survey of the most recent bibli-
ography on early modern local communities. The article briefly mentions citizenship
(vecindad) on page 51, yet it does not cite any examples of studies analyzing it. Indeed,
the only study I know of that deals with these issues is Carzolio, ‘‘La construcción.’’
9. Izquiero Martín, ‘‘Vecinos,’’ and Chiaramonte, ‘‘Ciudad, provincia, nation.’’
10. Alvarez y Valdés, La extranjería, 186–229.
11. Monsalvo Antón, Ordenanzas medievales, 85, Ordinance 17 of 1487. The original
reads: ‘‘y declaramos que los vecinos de la ciudad y su tierra se pueden llamar y llamen
para el efecto de dicha nuestra ordenanza aquel que en la dicha ciudad viviese continua-
mente y tuviese su casa poblada en la dicha ciudad o tierra, o la mayor parte del año y que
el tal contribuya y pague con los vecinos de la dicha ciudad en aquellas cosas que otros
semejantes de su estado o calidad pecheren y contribuyeren.’’
12. Porras Arboledas, ed., Ordenanzas, 94–95, Ordinance 55. The original reads: ‘‘Por
quanto algunos vecinos de fuera de la jurisdicción de esta ciudad de Jaén se vienen a vivir
y morar a esta dicha ciudad e se avezindan en ella, por ende, ordena y manda Jaén, justicia
y regimiento, que el tal vezino que nuevamente viniere a se avezindar, que venga con su
mujer, si la tuviere y casa poblada, e si no tuviere mujer por no ser casado, que tenga casa
poblada y conocida. Que si trajere ganado, que antes que coma el ganado en el término
desta ciudad, se avezinde en el cabildo, y recibido en el cabildo por vezino por la ciudad,
de fianza en que se obligue de vivir y morar en esta ciudad diez años primeros siguientes.’’
13. Espejo Lara and Morales Gordillo, Ordenanzas de Archidona, 86. The original
reads: ‘‘Ordenamos y mandamos que ninguna persona sea avido por vezino desta villa sin
que primero sea recibido por el consejo della y dado fianzas de asistir en la dicha vezindad
y comprar casa y viña dentro de un año de su recebimiento y que aya de traer y tener en
ella su casa, mujer y familia . . . y que con esto asimismo sean obligados a bivir quatro
años continuos en la dicha vezindad con casa poblada.’’
14. Recopilación de Castilla, law 1, title 9, book 7, and Novísima Recopilación, laws
1–3 and 6, title 26. The original reads: ‘‘Qualesquier personas que viven y moran en
qualesquier ciudades, villas y lugares destsos nuestros reinos y señoríos, así de realengo
como de abadengo, órdenes y señorío y behetrías, que se quisieren pasar a vivir de ellos a
Notes to Pages 19–21 215
otros lugares y partes con sus bienes y hacienda, lo puedan hacer y avecindarse en ellos y
sacar sus ganados, pan y vino y otros mantenimientos y todos los otros sus bienes mue-
bles.’’ The term ‘‘liberty’’ was specifically mentioned in a provision given by King Fer-
nando on July 5, 1477, reproduced in Cayetano Martín, Documentos del Archivo, 111–
14, which stated ‘‘each one of these, my vassals, using his liberty, [may] pass to live and
reside in the said town and its hinterland . . . [and prohibiting it would be] against justice
and reason and against their liberty, which is notorious to all.’’ The original reads: ‘‘al-
gunos de los tales sus vasallos, usando de su libertad, se pasan a vivir y morar a la dicha
villa y a su tierra [y prohibirlo es] contra justicia y razón y contra su libertad, la cual como
a todos es notorio, es cosa de mal ejemplo.’’
15. López de Tovar, Indice de las leyes, 161 and 732.
16. Castrillo, Tractado de república, 24–29; Morel d’Arleux, ‘‘El concepto’’; and the
definition of ciudadano and ciudad in Covarrubias, Tesoro de la lengua castellana, where
the term vecino is not defined. A definition of the term vecino is also lacking in Celso, Las
leyes.
17. Mariana, Del rey, 477–78 and 485, and González de Cellorigo, Memorial de la
política necesaria, 66.
18. This archival material can be found in several main depositories: the municipal
archives of Seville, Madrid, and Valladolid; the archives of the appellate court (chan-
cillería) of Valladolid (which include cases from some hundred communities in the juris-
dictions of Cantabria, Zamora, Burgos, León, La Rioja, Valladolid, Madrid, Segovia,
Cáceres, Palencia, Salamanca, Toledo, and Guadalajara); and the national archives in
Madrid. I also consulted manuscripts in the national library of Spain and the Royal
Library in Madrid.
19. The case of Simón Manino, discussed in Seville’s town meeting, dated November
29, 1655, in AGI, contratación 51B. In this case, the procurador mayor de los caballeros
viñeros was called upon to express his opinion.
20. Evidence for this practice are included, for example, in the files on ‘‘vecindades
1700–1719,’’ ‘‘vecindades 1720–1738’’ and ‘‘Vecindades de 1739 a 1474’’ in AM/S,
sección 5 (E.Cab.XVIII), vols. 294, 295, and 296, respectively.
21. The cases of Joseph Torresillas, discussed on May 18, 1767, and Miguel Martínez
Aparicio, studied on October 23, 1769, both in AM/S, sección 5 (E.Cab.XVIII), vol. 298.
22. The case of Joseph Torresillas, AM/S, sección 5 (E.Cab.XVIII), vol. 298. The oath
made by the newcomers was: ‘‘to keep domicile in this city, having a settled house in it
with his family, during the whole year, without leaving it, changing his home.’’ The
original reads: ‘‘guardar la vecindad en esta ciudad teniendo su casa poblada en ella con
su familia . . . todo el tiempo del año sin hacer ausencia mudando dicha su casa.’’
23. Petition of Juan Joseph Martín, dated December 9, 1767, in AM/S, sección 5
(E.Cab.XVIII), vol. 298, and the case of Felix Durán, discussed on May 27, 1768, in
AM/S, sección 5 (E.Cab.XVIII), vol. 298. The distinct procedures instituted for peti-
tioners who were native born, immigrants, or immigrants married to native-born spouses
were described in ‘‘Parecer del señor procurador mayor y varios apuntes sobre el modo
como han de conceder las vecinades’’ in AM/S, sección 5 (E.Cab.XVIII), vol. 298.
24. Discussions of April 1 and May 5, 1773, and the opinion of the city’s legal adviser
in AHN, estado 629–3/63.
216 Notes to Pages 22–26
25. The Spanish monopoly in the Americas and the role of Seville will be discussed in
chapter 5. Conditions in Seville during this period are described in Guichot, Historia de la
ciudad de Sevilla, and in his Historia del exmo. ayuntamiento; Aguilar Piñal, La Sevilla;
Domínguez Ortiz, Orto y Ocaso; and Pike, Aristocrats and Traders, 1–13 and 136. On
13–14, Pike studies the influence of immigration on municipal citizenship policies.
26. His petition was studied on April 27, 1735, and May 13, 1735, in AM/S, sección 5
(E.Cab.XVIII), vol. 295.
27. A brief summery of Roman law citizenship practices as implemented in Italy is
included in Bizzarri, ‘‘Ricerche’’; Quaglioni, ‘‘Legal’’; Riesenberg, Citizenship in Western
Tradition, 118–86; Dilonardo Buccolini, ‘‘Note’’; Bonfiglio Dosio, ‘‘La condizione’’;
Bowsky, ‘‘Medieval Citizenship’’; Panero, Comuni e borghi, 137–63; and Dini, Città e
corporazioni, 148–51.
28. Kirshner, ‘‘Civitas,’’ and Ullmann, ‘‘Personality.’’
29. Kirshner, ‘‘Between,’’ and Canning, ‘‘Fourteenth.’’
30. Riesenberg, ‘‘Civism,’’ 240.
31. Font Rius, ‘‘La recepción,’’ 99–102; Clavero, ‘‘Notas’’; Petit, ‘‘Derecho’’; and Al-
onso Romero, ‘‘Del amor.’’ The relation between the Castilian municipal regime and
Roman law is described in Domínguez Lozano, Las circunstancias, 57–59 and 221–28,
and Asenjo González, ‘‘Las ciudades.’’
32. Kagan, Students and Society, 135 and 212; Reig Peset, ‘‘Derecho’’; Pelorson, Les
letrados, 33–57; and Petit, ‘‘Derecho.’’
33. Bernal de Bugeda, ‘‘El derecho.’’
34. Clavero, Institución histórica, 55–56; Daza, ‘‘Los principios’’; and García Gallo,
‘‘La ciencia.’’
35. Solórzano Pereira, Política Indiana, 152–55, book 5, chap. 9, points 57–68.
36. Opinion of Luis Verdugo, dated February 10, 1702, in AVM, secretaría 2–348–23.
The original reads: ‘‘conforme a la libertad que conforme a derecho natural tenemos,
cada uno puede renunciar la vecindad que tuviese en un lugar y vivir y avecindarse en otro
el que eligiese.’’
37. Opinion of Luis Verdugo, dated February 10, 1702, in AVM, secretaría 2–348–23.
The original reads: ‘‘y para admitirsele por vecino no necesita de otra circunstancia más
que la expresión de su voluntad.’’
38. Petition of Germán Salcedo, dated July 20, 1788, in ACV, PC-PA(F) 3522–1. The
original reads: ‘‘[The town] no tiene arbitrio para dejar de concederla [la vecindad] por ser
acto libre según leyes el pasarse de una vecindad a otra.’’ Santayana Bustillo, Gobierno
político, 7, citing the works of Acevedo, Avedaño, and Paz arrived at a similar conclu-
sion—that individuals ‘‘must be received as citizens.’’
39. Petition of Juan de Ocaña, dated August 14, 1717, in AVM, secretaría 2–348–32,
and ACV, PC-PA(F) 3401–3. The original reads: ‘‘el derecho permite a cualquiera avecin-
darse donde más le acomode’’ and ‘‘Para que cualquier persona que quisiera mudar de
vecindad de unos lugares a otros . . . lo pueda hacer libremente.’’
40. Those living with a mother-in-law or a brother, or as dependents in someone else’s
quarters, could not be citizens: ACV, PC-PA(F) 2656–3; PC-PA(O)173–2; PC-PA(O)
413–3; PC-PA(O) 134–7; and the case of Miguel de Zayas y Brenes of January 9, 1797, in
AM/S, sección 5 (E.Cab.XVIII), vol. 298.
Notes to Pages 26–30 217
41. García Gallo, Curso de historia, vol. 1, 87–91; Friedman, ‘‘El estatus; La condi-
ción; Muñoz García, Las limitaciones; and Bermejo Castrillo, Parentesco, 230–44 and
262–304.
42. AM/S, sección 5 (E.Cab.XVIII), vol. 295, nos. 3, 66, and 87; AVM, secretaría 2–
349–1; and ACV, PC-PA(O)34–6.
43. The city council of Seville, on April 22, 1739, in AM/S, sección 5 (E.Cab.XVIII),
libro 296, and ACV, PC-FA(F) 3059–3.
44. Alvarez y Valdés, Los extranjeros, 153 and 183–262. In 1476, Abenjamin Abenya-
hion, a Jew, became vecino of Murcia, where another Jew was also accepted in 1479:
Rubio García, Los judios, 94 and 143, docs. 908 and 1009. Similar examples can be
found in Pimenta Ferro Tavares, Os judeus, vol. 1, 224, 407, and 447n1. I would like to
thank David Nirenberg for sending me this information.
45. The cases of Bartolomé French and Diego Roberto Tolosa, discussed in the city
council meeting of May 22, 1743, in AM/S, sección 5 (E.Cab.XVIII), vol. 296 and on
January 22, 1785, in AGS, GJ 873, respectively. See also ACV, PC-PA(O) 579–10.
46. Allegations of Joseph Corvillos on January 22, 1783, in ACV, PC-PA(O) 579–10.
The original reads: ‘‘no solo a los naturales de estos reinos . . . sino aun a los extranjeros el
poderse avecindar en cualquier pueblo de estos vuestros dominios sin que los consejos en
manera alguna se lo puedan impedir ni contradecir como expresamente se previene y
manda por vuestras reales órdenes que hablan en el asunto.’’
47. Originally, behetrías were communities allowed to elect their lord. They were titled
cerradas when the electee could fall only in a member of certain lineages or in a native
born: Clavero, ‘‘Behetría.’’ Nevertheless, in eighteenth-century discussions behetrías
mainly designated communities that could exclude people of certain estates from citizen-
ship. During this period there were behetrías cerradas of nobles that excluded all simple
folk, and behetrías of simple folk that excluded nobles.
48. ACV, PC-PA(F) 2616–1. Similar arguments were also evoked in ACV, PC-FA(F)
3122–2 and ACV, PC-PA(O) 731–3.
49. ACV, PC-PA(F) 3327–2. The original reads: ‘‘de estado noble de hidalgo y tener sus
cartas y ejecutorias.’’
50. ACV, PC-PA(F) 2641–5. See also Maravall, ‘‘Trabajo.’’
51. AVM, secretaría 2–348–23.
52. Fernández Navarrete, Conservación, 87. The original reads: ‘‘Como son vagantes y
sin domicilio seguro, ni sirven la república, ni contraen matrimonio, ni pagan pechos ni
tributos, siendo solo carga y gravamen de los pueblos.’’
53. ACV, PC-PA(O) 640–6.
54. ACV, PC-FA(F) 3149–2.
55. ACV, PC-PA(O) 196–7; ACV, PC-PA(O) 413–3; ACV, PC-PA(O) 196–7; ACV, PC-
PA(O) 248–6; ACV, PC-PA(O) 156–4; and ACV, PC-PA(O) 738–2. See also Rodríguez
Fernández, Alcaldes y regidores, 34–36.
56. ACV, PC-PA(F) 3401–3.
57. ACV, PA(F) 3508–1.
58. ACV, PC-PA(F) 3401–1, pp. 15–16. The original reads: ‘‘sin la solemnidad de un
recibimiento expreso a la vecindad hecho por el consejo, se le debía considerar riguroso
vecino de continua residencia como que tenía su casa abierta poblada.’’
218 Notes to Pages 30–34
59. ACV, PC-PA(F) 3401–1, and ACV, PC-PA(F) 3508–1. In some places, formal
procedures were required by law: Merino Urrutia, Ordenanzas, 97, Ordinance 34;
Porras Arboleda, Ordenanzas, 94–95, Ordinance 35; and Espejo Lara and Morales
Gordillo, Ordenanzas, 86–87.
60. AHN, estado 629–3/63. The original reads: ‘‘el que mora con casa poblada en
estos reinos debe considerarse por vecino . . . tiene contra si la presunción y debe ser de su
cargo hacer constar, por algunos hechos o casos, el haber estado sin ánimo de per-
manecer.’’
61. The case of Joseph Sánz, discussed on July 1, 1719, in AVM, secretaría 2–348–33.
62. ACV, PC-PA(O) 406–9.
63. ACV, PC-FA(F) 3149–2.
64. Juan Mechado, petitioning on October 8, 1686, in ACV, PC-PA(F) 2889–3.
65. Joseph Corvillos, on January 22, 1783, in ACV, PC-PA(O) 579–10, and Joseph
Colmenar in 1753 according to AVM, secretaría 2–348–47.
66. His petition of July 12, 1776, in AM/V, GM caja 57–4.
67. Santayana Bustillo, Gobierno político.
68. Answer of the council of Uruñuela in ACV, PA(O) 196–7. The original reads: ‘‘es
tan corto y limitado que en él no pueden contener los vecinos que hoy le componen, los
ganados necesarios a sus haciendas y cultivo de sus haciendas y se experimentaría mayor
prejuicio dando lugar a la contraria.’’
69. ACV, PC-PA(O) 413–3.
70. Power of attorney, dated September 9, 1782, in ACV, PC-PA(O) 576–10. The
original reads: ‘‘gravamen al común su manutención en esta tierra estéril y mortificada
anualmente de copiosas nieves por su estrechez y natural elevación en que por lo mismo
sucede con frecuencia no poder salir de nuestras casas en los cuatro rigorosos meses del
invierno.’’ See also ACV, PC-PA(O) 857–5.
71. ACV, PC-PA(F) 3402–3.
72. ACV, PC-PA(O) 196–7.
73. ACV, PC-PA(F) 3062–2. According to the local authorities, he was ‘‘inquieto y
cabiloso’’ and litigious.
74. ACV, PC-PA(F) 2619–5. The council accused José of being ‘‘de genio litigioso,
soberbio, altivo y dominante, acostumbrado a injuriar gravamente de obra y palabra a
cuantos la ocasión le proporcionaba, no respetando aun los sacerdotes.’’ ACV, PC-PA(F)
3402–3 is a similar case.
75. ACV, PC-PA(F) 3401–3.
76. These cases are described in ACV, PC-PA(F) 3401–1; ACV, PC-PA(F) 2947–1; and
ACV, PC-PA(O) 134–7. See also ACV, PC-PA(F) 2656–3 and PC-PA(O) 173–2.
77. ACV, PC-PA(F) 2889–3; ACV, PC-PA(F) 3522–1; and ACV, PC-PA(O) 134–7.
78. AVM, secretaría 2–348–43. This ‘‘script’’ appeared in dozens of the cases
reviewed.
79. ACV, PC-PA(O) 298–10.
80. ACV, PC-FA(F) 3149–2.
81. ACV, PC-PA(F) 3522–1. A similar thing also happened to Juachin Alonso, resident
in Orión (Valladolid) in 1748: ACV, PC-PA(O) 200–6.
Notes to Pages 35–38 219
82. Ringrose, Madrid and the Spanish Economy; Domínguez Ortiz, ‘‘Una visión’’; Ló-
pez García and Madrazo Machazo, ‘‘Capital’’; and Ringrose, ‘‘Madrid, capital imperial.’’
83. Ringrose, ‘‘Madrid, capital imperial,’’ 196.
84. Deleito Piñuela, Solo Madrid, 125–27, and Núñez de Castro, Libro histórico.
85. His petition, probably dated 1714, in AVM, secretaría 2–348–31.
86. ‘‘Copia de la instrucción para la comisión de vecinos según la expone Marcelino de
Vergara en la recopilación que hizo,’’ inserted in a discussion that took place from July to
December 1798 in AVM, secretaría 2–348–62. The original reads: ‘‘por no saber los
forasteros la utilidad que les tiene o porque en la confusión de la corte se hace poco
aprecio de esta circunstancia.’’ There were many examples for candidates requesting their
admission as citizens some thirty or forty years after their arrival at the court, e.g., AVM,
secretaría 2–348–52 (of 1663) and 2–348–54 (of 1785). López de la Plaza, ‘‘De la
tierra,’’ 167, mentions some 100 citizenship petitions between 1480 and 1499. Ringrose,
‘‘Madrid, capital imperial,’’ 201–2 found some 600 citizenship petitions between 1600
and 1663. Whereas in the period 1600–1630 most of them came from artisans and other
service providers (68 percent), in the later period (1631–63) the percentage of these
sectors dropped (to 36 percent) and the percentage of royal officials augmented.
87. Riesenberg, Citizenship in Western Tradition, 131. The ius commune origin of
many of these presumptions is also described in Pérez Collados, Una aproximación
histórica, 24.
88. Response of January 19, 1774, in ACV, PC-PA(F) 2480–3. The original reads:
‘‘para adquirirla y conservarla [la vecindad] basta el tener casa formada con familia y
criados capaces para soportar y acudir a las cargas y obras concejiles, contribuir y pagar
como cada vecino en lo que le tocara, sin que a ninguna persona se la pueda obligar a que
habite y resida precisa y personalmente en ningún lugar, porque esto repugna a la libertad
natural y es prohibido y reprobado por derecho.’’
89. ACV, PC-PA(O) 413–3, pp. 24–26: allegations of José Martínez Izquiero. The
original reads: ‘‘como el ánimo es un acto interno que solo puede saberlo el supremo
autor a quien nada se le oculta, por lo que únicamente puede manifestarse o descubrirse
por los actos exteriores no verificándose otros en mi parte que él de una voluntad con-
tinua de permanecer en el pueblo.’’
90. In both Seville and Madrid, petitioners who were native born were required to
formally request citizenship and, on these occasions, they had to affirm orally, or prove in
another way, their continuing engagement with the community: AVM, secretaría 2–348–
36 and AM/S, sección 2 (contaduría), carpeta 336: petition of Nicolás Tersero of 1715.
In the 1750s, at least, Lozoya followed the same rule: ACV, PC-FA(F) 3059–3, p. 7. The
membership of Diego Bajarano, born in Serrejón (Cáceres) was questioned in 1752
because his intention to remain in the community was not clear: ACV, PC-PA(O) 260–1.
91. The case of Tomás del Corral, dated January 19, 1774, in ACV, PC-PA(F) 2480–3.
92. The petition of the duke of Medinaceli, presented to the town council of Seville on
September 9, 1776, in AM/S, sección 5 (E.Cab.XVIII), vol. 298. Similar allegations, both
with regard to impersonal residence and royal service, were also made by the representa-
tive of the duke of Alba according to the town meeting of April 16, 1788, in the same
archive, section, and book.
220 Notes to Pages 38–44
93. ACV, PC-PA(F) 2619–5; ACV, PC-PA(O) 738–2 and 413–3; and ACV, PC-PA(F)
2947–1.
94. Such were the allegations of the council of Arisgotas, received by the court on
October 25, 1769, in ACV, PC-PA(O) 413–3, pp. 19–23. The original reads: [The com-
munity was required to check whether the person was moved by] ‘‘motivos temporales,
amovibles y casuales que en ninguna providencia pueden estimarse por legítimos para
que mediante ellos, se entienda que dicho . . . haya adquirido derecho a la vecindad . . .
porque siendo principalísimo requisito el ánimo de permanecer, notoriamente le excluían
las puras casualidades y el contrario de que se presume de no subsistir ni continuar en
quien no ha tenido más destino que el servicial que indiferentemente se busca y se toma
donde se halla, y con la misma facilidad e indiferencia se deja.’’
95. ACV, PC-PA(F) 2480–3; ACV, PC-PA(O) 631–1; ACV, PC-PA(F) 2591–3; and
ACV, PC-PA(F) 2929–3.
96. The original expression used was: ‘‘la mayor parte del año’’: the case of Miguel de
Zayas y Brenes, in AM/S, sección 5 (E.Cab.XVIII), vol. 298; ACV, PC-PA(O) 173–2; and
ACV, PC-PA(F) 2656–3.
97. Petition of Claudio Blanco of January 15, 1678, in AVM, secretaría, 2–349–16.
98. Tomás del Corral, on January 19, 1774, in ACV, PC-PA(F) 2480–3. The original
reads: ‘‘con lo que manifiesta su ánimo de querer asistir y residir y asentar domicilio,
habitación y morada en dicho lugar.’’
99. ACV, PA(F) 3508–1.
100. ACV, PC-PA(O) 731–3.
101. Sala (Bañuls), Ilustración del derecho real, 53. The original reads: ‘‘Se llama
vecino al que tiene establecido en algún lugar su domicilio o habitación con ánimo de
permanecer en él. Conforme al derecho de las Partidas, este ánimo se presume y reputa
probado por el transcurso de 10 años aunque Gregorio López dice que también se prueba
por hechos que lo manifiestan sin necesidad de este transcurso poniendo el ejemplo de él
que vende las posesiones que tenía en un lugar comprando otras en otro al que traslada su
habitación; y todavía con más claridad si es recibido como vecino por el común de algún
lugar dándo fiadores de que permanecerá en él 10 años y sujetándose, según Acevedo, a
los tributos vecinales.’’ A similar definition is included in Escriche y Martín, Diccionario
razonado, 969.
they would keep their promise to remain in the city: town council meeting of May 27,
1541, in Rumazo González, Libro segundo, vol. 2, 255.
5. I could only find one study of Spanish American citizenship: Domínguez Compañy,
‘‘La condición.’’
6. These cases were located mainly in municipal records and in published town
council meetings (Actas de Cabildo). Some were also found in the national archives of
Peru, Argentina, and Ecuador, in the Archivo de Indias of Seville, and in the National
Library in Lima.
7. Ferry, Colonial Elites, 1–68; Lombardi, Venezuela, 70–94; and Hacienda y com-
ercio, vol. 5, 47–56.
8. Petitions of Fernando Sanz, dated June 22, 1592, and Bartolomé Masbel, dated De-
cember 7, 1592, in Actas del cabildo de Caracas, vol. 1, 192–93 and 210–11, respectively.
9. Petitions of Iñigo de Sosa and Baltazar García, of May 8 and 24, 1593, in Actas del
cabildo de Caracas, vol. 1, 258–59.
10. His petition of May 22, 1597, is in Actas del cabildo de Caracas, vol. 1, 456–57
and 459–60.
11. Petition of Lope Díaz de León on October 20, 1608, in Actas del cabildo de
Caracas, vol. 3, 141–42.
12. The case of Manuel de Lemos, studied on September 28, 1651, in Actas del cabildo
de Caracas, vol. 8, 97–98.
13. Petitions of Jorge Amaro, dated January 16, 1655, in Actas del cabildo de Caracas,
vol. 9, 13–14; Benito Hernández, dated January 12, 1609, in Actas del cabildo de Car-
acas, vol. 3, 165–66; and Bernave de Oñate Mendisabal, dated December 6, 1611, in
Actas del cabildo de Caracas, vol. 3, 332.
14. García Gallo, ‘‘Territorio,’’ 360, and Gerhard, Geografía histórica, 13.
15. His petition of May 22, 1597, in Actas del cabildo de Caracas, vol. 1, 457.
16. His petition of January 30, 1606, in Actas del cabildo de Caracas, vol. 3, 8–9.
17. Petitions of Cristóbal Martínez, dated January 16, 1649, in Actas del cabildo de
Caracas, vol. 7, 281–82; Josepha Contreras, dated August 12, 1663, in Actas del cabildo
de Caracas, vol. 11, 299; and Luis Fernández Angel, dated March 26, 1648, in Actas del
cabildo de Caracas, vol. 7, 193–94.
18. Petition of Francisco López, dated January 27, 1652, in Actas del cabildo de
Caracas, vol. 8, 147, and the discussion in the council meeting of March 11, 1652,
concerning Juan Rodríguez Agras in Actas del cabildo de Caracas, vol. 8, 154–211, esp.
163–64, 175–76, and 192.
19. Mörner, La corona española, and Morse, ‘‘Urban,’’ 179–88.
20. Lutz, Santiago de Guatemala; Mörner, ‘‘Ethnicity’’; Bouysse-Cassagne, ‘‘Etre
métise’’; and Poloni-Simard, ‘‘Formación,’’ and in his La mosaïque indienne.
21. The case of Juan Alonso of April 7, 1616, in Actas del cabildo de Caracas, vol. 4,
101–3.
22. The cases of Margarita, India, Francisca Diez, Mestiza, and Antonia, freed mulata,
dated March 11 and June 10, 1617, in Actas del cabildo de Caracas, Caracas, vol. 4, 166,
189, and 192–94, and of April 24, 1648, in Actas del cabildo de Caracas, vol. 7, 230–31,
respectively.
222 Notes to Pages 49–51
de Lima, libro 4, 185, and Pedro Sánchez, of June 19, 1553, in Libros de cabildo de Lima,
Lima, Consejo Provincial de Lima, 1935, libro 5, 423.
35. Town council of August 14, 1570, in Libros de cabildo de Lima, libro 7, 28.
36. Encomienda was a Spanish institution that subjected a group of Indians to a
Spaniard. He was supposed to defend them and ensure their conversion to Christianity,
and they were forced to work for him or pay him tribute: Lockhart, Spanish Peru, 11–37,
and Puente Brunke, Encomienda y encomenderos.
37. Solórzano Pereira, Política Indiana, book 3, chap. 27. Behind the legal requirement
of ‘‘residence’’ was the social reality that encomenderos were usually important members
of the community and often dominated the city socially, economically, and politically:
Matienzo, Gobierno del Perú, 270–72.
38. Town council meeting of September 5, 1671, in Libros de cabildo de Lima, libro 7,
169–71, and petition of April 29, 1596, in Libros de cabildo de Lima, libro 12, 481.
When the encomienda belonged to a woman, her husband had the right to be accepted as
citizen: petition of Diego Nuñez de Campoverde, dated October 9, 1598, in Libros de
cabildo de Lima, libro 13, 176.
39. The case of Lorenzo de Estupiñan, whose residence obligation (originally in Gua-
nuco) was transferred to Lima: town council of March 7, 1560, in Libros de cabildo de
Lima, libro 6/1, 271. The grant of citizenship by the viceroy was also mentioned in Moor,
Cabildo in Peru, 143.
40. His petition of January 11, 1562, in Libros de cabildo de Lima, libro 6/2, 20–21. A
somewhat similar case was debated in Lima on September 16, 1577, according to Libros
de cabildo de Lima, libro 8, 497–98.
41. Town council meeting of September 18, 1570, in Libros de cabildo de Lima, libro
7, 40, and December 1, 1590, in Libros de cabildo de Lima, libro 10, 475–76.
42. Libros de cabildo de Lima, libro 6/2, 532. Juan de Matienzo criticized the practice
of calling these people ‘‘caballeros no vecinos,’’ stating that these non-encomendero
citizens were indeed true and full citizens: Matienzo, Gobierno del Peru, 270–71. Ac-
cording to Solórzano Pereira, Política Indiana, book 3, chap. 27, point 6, in Spanish
America, vecino-encomenderos were distinguished from all other vecinos, who were
usually called domiciliarios. The usage of caballeros in order to designate vecinos was
already present in medieval Spain: García de Valdeavellano, Orígenes de la burgesía,
191–93.
43. In 1576, for example, Antonio López was admitted as an ‘‘ordinary’’ vecino of
Lima: town council of December 17 in Libros de cabildo de Lima, libro 8, 342.
44. Marzahl, Town in the Empire, 37–40; Ferreiro, ‘‘Elites’’; Levillier, Ordenanzas, 53;
and Lohmann Villena, Francisco de Toledo, 131.
45. Recopilación de Indias, law 6, title 10, book 4.
46. Domínguez Compañy, La vida en las pequeñas ciudades, 51; Rosenblat, La pobla-
ción indígena, 135; and López Beltrán, ‘‘Intereses,’’ note 37.
47. Developments in Mexico City were somewhat similar to those in Lima. Early
citizenship petitions were tied to land grants, and the municipal community suffered
from frequent vice-regal intervention. During the sixteenth century, Mexico City recog-
nized the division between citizens and vecinos encomenderos, and it permitted some
224 Notes to Pages 53–57
overlapping between the municipal and the provincial spheres, admitting people residing
in ‘‘New Spain’’ to local citizenship. Newcomers had to guarantee their residence in the
city or exchange residence for a monetary payment: petition of Francisco de las Casas,
dated December 6, 1527, in Primer libro de Actas [del cabildo de México], 154; petition
of Diego Orpesa, dated May 11, 1543, in Libro cuarto de las actas del cabildo [de México
City], 341–42; Ordenanzas de buen gobierno; and Himmerich y Valencia, Encomen-
deros of New Spain, 8–9 and 102.
48. Marzahl, Town in the Empire, 37, 70–71 and 162–64.
49. Morelli, ‘‘Territorio o nazione,’’ 171, and Poloni-Simard, ‘‘Problèmes,’’ 13.
50. The existence, despite local variations, of an ‘‘American pattern of development’’
was also noted in García Bernal, ‘‘Las elites.’’ See also Cédula of September 13, 1621,
reproduced in Konetzke, ‘‘Colección,’’ vol. 2/1, 265.
51. Town council meeting of February 1, 1549, in Libros de cabildo de Lima, libro 9,
61–63; meetings of September 23, 1558, and March 7, 1560, in Libros de cabildo de
Lima, libro 6/1, 99 and 271; meeting of June 17, 1536, in Rumazo, Libro primero de
cabildos de Quito, 173–74; and meeting of June 16, 1617, in Acuerdos del extinguido
cabildo de Buenos Aires, vol. 3, libros 2–3, 441, respectively. This practice was also
confirmed by Solórzano Pereira, Política Indiana, book 4, chap. 1, point 7, who ex-
plained that in Spanish America, local municipal judges (alcaldes ordinarios) could be
(rather than had to be) citizens.
52. Town council meeting of February 5, 1599, in Garcés, Libro del ilustre cabildo . . .
de Quito, 241–42, and Noble Cook, Numeración general.
53. Recopilación de Indias, laws 82 and 83, title 16, book 2, and cédulas of July 23,
1627, and October 2, 1764, in Konetzke, Colección de documentos, vol. 2, 301–5 and
vol. 3, 321. These questions were also treated by Herzog in ‘‘Identidades,’’ and in Ritos de
control, chap. 4, point 11.
54. AGI, EC 926A; AGI, Quito 73, cuaderno 3, 309–37; AGI, Quito 74, cuaderno 5,
25–26; AHN, CSCI 20.620, 283–95 in p. 291. I also found AGI, Quito 73, 291 and 306
helpful.
55. AGI, EC 926A, 76. The same position was adopted by Nicolás Andagoya y Ota-
lora, a witness in a 1685 case, who asserted that the lady in question was ‘‘avecindada en
esta ciudad’’: his testimony in AGI, Quito 73, cuaderno 3, 315–17.
56. Diego Inclán Valdés on December 9, 1670, in AGI, EC 926A, 3–4 and 26. The
original reads: ‘‘y siempre estuvo el dicho gobernador [who was the father of the bride]
con ánimo de volverse a los reinos de España.’’ According to the attorney of Inclán
Valdés, the father of the bride changed his place of residence ‘‘en servicio de vuestra alteza
con el oficio de gobernador de ella sin ánimo de perseverar, ante bien de partida para estos
reinos con que no se puede dudar que conservaba la vecindad y domicilio de la ciudad de
Cádiz de donde partió a servir el dicho gobierno.’’
57. Solórzano Pereira, Política Indiana, book 5, chap. 9, points 57–68, 152–55.
58. Report dated October 13, 1701, in AN/Q, gobierno 12, expediente 23.10.1723,
12. The original reads: ‘‘usando del derecho natural que les asiste, de vasallos libres de
vuestra real persona y querer voluntariamente jurar domicilio a este cabildo.’’
59. Cansanello, ‘‘De súbditos,’’ 117–18.
60. AGI, EC 914B, cuaderno 8, 308R and V and 914C, and cuaderno 9, 50V.
Notes to Pages 57–60 225
61. The original reads: ‘‘lo cierto es que habiendo ido a Lima bien mozo se mantuvo
mucho tiempo y connaturalizó en aquella ciudad, teniendo más relación y estrachez con
sus vecinos, que con los de esta ciudad.’’
62. AGI, EC 914B, cuaderno 8, fols. 311R and V and 914C, and cuaderno 9, fol. 50V.
The relation between domicile and citizenship, on one hand, and nativeness, on the other,
and the wish to institute a monopoly on office holding favoring the native born will be
explored in chapters 4 and 5.
63. Discussions of March 11 and 20, 1652, in Actas del cabildo de Caracas, vol. 8, 154,
161–69, 174–76, 178–79, 185–87, 192–94, 204, and 207–11.
64. AGN/BA, 9–17–2–1; AGN/BA 9–19–2–6; town council meetings of January 15
and 22, February 2, September 17 and 25, October 1, 9, and 22, and December 7, 1756,
as well as February 2, 1757, in Acuerdos del extinguido cabildo de Buenos Aires, ser. 3,
vol. 2, libros 30–3, 15–22, 33–34, 126–42, 147, 155–56, and 161; and Superunda,
Relación de Gobierno, 274–76 and 423. This episode was also studied by Mariluz Ur-
quijo, ‘‘El diputado.’’
65. Proceedings in Lima on June 28, 1756, in AGN/BA, 9–17–2–1. The original reads:
‘‘sin embargo de no ser casados ni viudos arraigados con casas o bienes raices, pues el
requisito único para la vecindad, no es más que la traslación del caudal y bienes de
fortuna con la persona, que viene a residir de nuevo con ánimo de vivir allí perpetuamente
y que sucediendo esto con ellos deben ser regulados por tales vecinos.’’
66. The original reads: ‘‘siendo forasteros, el destino que los trae es el de vender los
géneros y mercaderías que conducen sin ánimo de residir perpetuamente, pues expen-
didos sus frutos y cobradas sus dependencias, se vuelven a las partes de sus antiguas
residencias.’’
67. Letter written by Antonio Portier to the city council of Buenos Aires on July 8,
1789, and in the subsequent appeal by the council to the viceroy in AGN/BA 9–19–3–
11, 653, 659, and 723. See also town council on January 15 and February 4, 1789, in
Acuerdos del extinguido cabildo de Buenos Aires, ser. 3, libros 49–52, 20–24, and 35–
37.
68. Petitions of Marcos Riglos in the meeting of January 3, 1777, in Acuerdos del
extinguido cabildo de Buenos Aires, ser. 3, libros 40–44, 17; Martín de Alzaga in
AGN/BA, 9–19–3–12, 16–19; AGN/BA 9–19–4–9, 41–53; and Jerónimo Morales in
AGN/BA, 9–19–4–8. Eventually, entire groups of people requested to be exempt from
officeholding on a regular basis: meetings of October 18 and November 7, 1796, in
Acuerdos del extinguido cabildo de Buenos Aires, ser. 3, vol. 11, libros 54–57, 153–55,
and 168, and the orders of November 12, 1783, and July 8, 1784, in AGN/BA, 9–19–4–
2, 173.
69. AGN/BA, 9–19–3–12, 181–84.
70. AGN/BA, 9–19–2–8.
71. The original reads: ‘‘han tenido su mansión y residencia continua en esta ciudad y
ésta les constituye la vecindad según la misma ley.’’ The idea that a prolonged residence in
an independent house constituted citizenship remained in force as late as 1794, as is
apparent from the royal decree that instituted the local merchant guild in 1796: Fradklin,
‘‘Vecinos.’’
72. Such a feeling is expressed, e.g., in Erauso, Memoir of a Basque Lieutenant Nun.
226 Notes to Pages 60–65
73. Barrero García, ‘‘De los fueros’’; Domínguez Compañy, ‘‘Ordenanzas municipales
hispanoamericanas’’; Vázquez Pando, ‘‘Derecho’’; Tau Anzoátegui, ‘‘El derecho’’; and
Herzog, ‘‘La Recopilación.’’
74. References to citizenship were lacking, for example, in the municipal ordinances of
Quito (1568), Guayaquil (1590), and many Peruvian and Mexican communities: AMQ,
Miscelánea 00012, 63–72; the residencia of Joseph Clemente y Mora in AGI, EC 911B,
15–23; Levillier, Ordenanzas de Don Francisco de Toledo; Libros de Cabildo de Lima,
libro 11, 781–813 and libro 12, 647–88; and Ordenanzas de buen gobierno. When
citizenship was mentioned in Spanish American law, it was usually to explain its admin-
istrative and political implications, such as deciding how to count the inhabitants of a
new settlement in order to know what status it should receive: Recopilación de Indias law
6, title 10, book 4, and the Nuevas ordenanzas de descubrimiento, población y pacifica-
ción of July 13, 1573, reproduced in Solano, Normas y leyes, 208. Ordinance 93 reads:
‘‘Declaramos que se entienda por vecino el hijo o hija o hijos del nuevo poblador o sus
parientes, dentro y fuera del cuarto grado teniendo sus casas y familias distintas y apart-
adas y siendo casados y teniendo cada uno casa por sí.’’
75. Spalding, ‘‘Social Climbers’’; Sánchez Albornoz, ‘‘Una dicotomía’’; Robinson, ‘‘In-
dian Migration’’; Wightman, Indigenous Migration and Social Change; Viera Powers,
Andean Journeys; Chambers, From Subjects to Citizens; and Poloni-Simard, La mosaï-
que indienne, 153–64 and 340–46.
This affirmation won official recognition in 1647 when King Philip IV issued a royal
decree to that effect: Actas de las cortes de Navarra, book 3, 74 and 81 and books 15–16,
63–65.
7. Ladero Quesada, Los reyes católicos; España. Reflexiones; and Fusi, España.
8. García Fuentes, El comercio español con América, 37, and Campbell, ‘‘Foreign-
ers,’’ 153.
9. García Cárcel, Historia de Cataluña, 132–35, and in ‘‘Las fronteras,’’ 70–76;
Sesma Muñoz, ‘‘El sentimiento’’; and Pérez Collados, Una aproximación histórica.
10. García Fuentes, for example, specifies that nativeness was either by ‘‘origin and
birth,’’ or it was obtained through a royal naturalization letter: El comercio español con
América, 36. See also Nunn, Foreign Immigrants, 2, and Cremades Griñán, ‘‘Cartas de
naturaleza,’’ 42–44.
11. Molinari, ‘‘Naturalidad,’’ 701. The meaning of nativeness in other, non-Castilian
Iberian kingdoms is studied in Lalinde Abadía, ‘‘De la nacionalidad’’ and in his ‘‘L’inseri-
mento’’; Roca i Trias, ‘‘Unde cathalanus’’; Langé, ‘‘L’immigration’’; Sales, ‘‘Naturali-
zações’’ and in ‘‘Naturals’’; Planas Rosselló, Recopilación del derecho de Mallorca, book
1, title 1, 88; Sanz Camañez, ‘‘Algunas’’; Ginebra Molins, ‘‘L’aplicació’’; Jiménez Sureda,
‘‘Alienígenas,’’ 1110–11; Piña Homs, ‘‘La condición.’’
12. Campbell, ‘‘Foreigners,’’ 153–54, and Nunn, Foreign Immigrants, 1.
13. Recopilación de Indias, law 28, title 27, book 9. According to García-Mauriño
Mundi, La pugna, 41, ‘‘Despite doubts, the definition of foreignness was clear-cut (taj-
ante) in the Recopilación de Indias, which declared that all those who were not natives of
the kingdoms of Castile, Aragon, Catalonia [and so forth] were foreigners.’’
14. Cuarta Partida, title 24, preface and law 1. I use my own translation for the preface
and the translation of Burns and Scott, Las Siete Partidas, vol. 4, 990, for law 1. The
original reads: ‘‘Uno de los grandes debdos que los homes pueden haber unos con otros es
naturaleza; ca bien como la natura los ayunta por linage, asi la naturaleza los face seer
como unos por luengo uso de leal amor.’’ And also ‘‘Naturaleza tanto quiere decir como
debdo que han los homes unos con otros por alguna derecho razón en se amar y se querer
bien. Et el departimiento que ha entre natura e naturaleza es este, que natura es una virtud
que face seer todas las cosas en aquel estado que Dios las ordenó, et naturaleza es cosa
que semeja a la natura, et que ayuda a seer et a mantener todo lo que decende deella.’’
15. Cuarta Partida, title 24, law 2.
16. Cuarta Partida, title 25. These issues will be discussed at greater length in chapter 6.
17. Hermann, ‘‘Naturales,’’ 189–201.
18. Recopilación de Castilla, laws 14, 18, and 25, title 3, book 1; laws 1 and 2, title 10,
book 5; law 1, title 5, book 6; laws 2, title 2, book 7; and law 27, title 3, book 7. See also
García Ulecia, ‘‘Naturaleza,’’ 88–97.
19. Cuarta Partida, title 24, law 2. This law was cited, for example, by Hugo de Celso,
Las leyes, fol. CCXLIII (R) in 1538. It was invoked again in the 1720s in ‘‘Por el fiscal de
su magestad en defensa de la respuesta que dio a las pretensiones introducidas por los
hijos nacidos en España de padres extranjeros’’ in AGI, IG 2301, fol. 4R.
20. Recopilación de Castille, law 19, title 3, book 1. The original reads: ‘‘Aunque por
leyes de estos reinos esta proveído que los que no fueren naturales de ellos no puedan
tener prelacias, dignidades ni otros beneficios, porque se ha dudado y se duda cuales se
228 Notes to Pages 69–72
dirán naturales para poder tener los dichos beneficios: ordenamos y mandamos que aquel
se diga natural que fuera nacido en estos reinos y hijo de padres que ambos a dos o al
menos el padre sea asímismo nacido en estos reinos, o haya contraído domicilio en ellos y
demás de esto haya vivido en ellos por tiempo de diez años. Con que si los padres, siendo
ambos o al menos el padre, nacido y natural en estos reinos, estando fuera de ellos en
servicio nuestro o por nuestro mandado o de paso y sin contraer domicilio fuera de estos
reinos hubiere algún hijo fuera de ellos, este tal sea habido por natural de estos reinos.’’
21. Cédula of July 14, 1561, BNE MSS 20.067–12.
22. Recopilación de Indias, law 27, title 27, book 9.
23. Recopilación de Castilla, law 66, title 4, book 2, also reproduced in the Novísima
Recopilación, law 1, title 11, book 6.
24. Acevedo, in his Commentariorum iuris civilis in Hispaniae (1594), as cited in Pérez
Prendes Muñoz Arraco, ‘‘La recopilación,’’ 155; Celso, Las leyes, CCXLIII (R); Hevia
Bolaños, Curia Philipica, 266; Veitia Linaje, Norte de la contratación, 330–31; López de
Tovar, ‘‘Indice de las leyes,’’ 105 and 536–37; Antunes y Acevedo, Memorias históricas,
281 and 293; Sala (Bañuls), Ilustración del derecho real, 54–55; and Alvarez, Institu-
ciones de derecho real, 82–83.
25. Celso, Las leyes, CCXLIII (R). The original reads: ‘‘Aunque nacer o criarse o morar
por mucho tiempo en alguna tierra sean las principales naturalezas que puede haber el
hombre . . . empo de las dichas maneras de naturaleza [también] adquierese naturaleza
por vasallaje . . . y si casase allí, o si hay hubiere heredamiento, o si el señor de la tierra le
sacare de cautiverio o le librare de muerte o de deshonra . . . o si siendo mozo o turco se
tornare Christiano y por morar diez años en algún lugar.’’
26. López de Tovar, ‘‘Indice,’’ 105.
27. Castro y Bravo, ‘‘Los estudios,’’ 228.
28. Alvarez, Instituciones de derecho real, 82, and Uztariz, Theory and Practice,
39.
29. Fernández Navarrete, Conservación, 25. The original reads: ‘‘Los extranjeros no se
hallan obligados, ni con fe, ni con amor.’’
30. Recopilación de Castilla, law 14, title 3, book 1. The original reads: ‘‘Como estos
extranjeros habidas las dignidades y beneficios de las iglesias de nuestros reinos quieren
más estar en sus tierras que en la ajena, sacase para ellos la moneda de oro de nuestros
reinos en gran daño y pobreza de ellos y con la renta de nuestros reinos se enriquecen los
reinos extranjeros y aun a las veces los enemigos . . . y el otro es que estos prelados y otros
beneficiados, estando en su naturaleza socorriría a Nos . . . para la guerra de los Moros y
para la defensa de la corona real de nuestors reinos: lo cual cessa cuando los prelados y
beneficiados no son nuestors naturales.’’
31. Alamos de Barrientos, Discurso político, 14–16; Uztariz, Theory and Practice, 37–
40; and Fernández Navarrete, Conservación, 126. See also Maravall, ‘‘Del régimen,’’
120–21.
32. Uztariz, Theory and Practice, 38.
33. Fernández Navarrete, Conservación, 126. The original reads: ‘‘que fuesen prendas
seguras de su fidelidad.’’
34. ‘‘Discurso anónimo en defensa de los extranjeros y su comercio,’’ anonymous,
undated pamphlet, partially reproduced in Domínguez Ortiz, Los extranjeros, 175–78,
Notes to Pages 72–74 229
on 177. The original reads: ‘‘casi todos los extranjeros . . . están muy naturalizados en esa
ciudad, unos por los muchos años que ha que viven en ella, otros por haber nacido
también en ella, otros porque se van casando y hay muchos que lo están con hijas de
naturales, y los naturales con sus hijas, con que tienen muy grandes raíces echadas para
amar y desear el bien de estos reinos.’’
35. Lorenzo Herrera Betancur in his petition dated May 12, 1642, reproduced in
Sancho de Sopranis, ‘‘Las naciones,’’ 869–71. The original reads: ‘‘se regulan por natu-
rales porque la mayor parte de ellos viven en ella de 20, 30, 40 y 50 años a esta parte,
siendo casados con naturales, teniendo sus haciendas y familias sin tener dependencia con
las cosas de Portugal.’’
36. Antunes y Acevedo, Memorias históricas, 294–95, and José de Cadalso, as cited in
Diz, Idea, 340. The original reads: ‘‘viene a ser en sustancia lo mismo que declararles
naturales por privilegio’’ and ‘‘ha legado a formar un excelente medio entre la gravedad
española y la ligereza francesa,’’ or, in another case, ‘‘ha llegado a unir la sólidez española
con la amabilidad francesa.’’
37. Consulta of March 11, 1769, in AGS, GJ 873. The same was asserted by Gregorio
López according to Pérez Collados, Una aproximación histórica, 66.
38. Consulta of March 21, 1769, in AGS, GJ 873.
39. Consulta of September 3, 1785, ibid.
40. Decision dated November 19, 1785, and correspondence of December 8, 1785, in
ibid.
41. The original reads: ‘‘por no haber pruebas efectivas del ánimo de permanecer y tener
algunas probables noticias de lo contrario, no vengo en conceder esta naturalización.’’
42. Consulta of January 18, 1762, in AGS, GJ 873.
43. García Ulecia, ‘‘Naturaleza,’’ 96.
44. ‘‘Por el fiscal de su magestad en defensa de la respuesta que dio a las pretensiones
introducidas por los hijos nacidos en España de padres extranjeros,’’ in AGI, IG 2301,
fols. 3V, 4R, and 6R. The original read: ‘‘poderse dar caso de que aunque concurran estas
circunstancias de hecho, de derecho no se le pueda declarar la naturaleza ni concederle
licencia para el comercio como debe practicarse con aquellos extranjeros que, aunque
hayan habitado el tiempo referido, se reconoce que están transeuntes y sin ánimo de
permanecer, ni constituir domicilio’’; ‘‘Y asi entendida la disposición de la ley de partida
que prescribe la habitación de diez años para la naturaleza, tiene la inteligencia de que
esta regla corre cuando la diurna habitación hace que se presuma el ánimo de permanecer
perpetuamente. Y así, aviendo presunción o conjeturas contrarias, no se induce natu-
raleza. Con que los que habitasen en España, siempre que las presunciones manifiesten el
ánimo de volverse, no podrán obtener naturaleza’’; and ‘‘Porque la ley de Partida . . . hab-
lando de las naturalezas une estas palabras: la dezena por moranza de diez años, que faga
en la tierra maguer sea natural de otra. Y si se hubiese de atender al sonido de las
palabras, la moranza de diez años constituyera naturaleza y es indisputable que no lo
constituye sin ánimo de permanecer segun las doctrinas referidas.’’
45. His case, included in AGS, GJ 873.
46. The cases of Diego Roberto Tolosa and Juan Lastache, natives of France, discussed
on January 22, 1785, and April 23, 1758, respectively, in AGS, GJ 873.
47. López de Tovar, ‘‘Indice,’’ 536, and Hevia Bolaños, Curia Philipica, 266. The
230 Notes to Pages 74–76
original reads: ‘‘y si el natural del reino o habido por tal se fuera de él a vivir en otro
extraño donde constituye domicilio, si después pretendiere ser natural del reino, no se
dice serlo.’’
48. Feijóo y Montenegro, ‘‘Amor,’’ 145 and 147. The original read: ‘‘España es el
objeto propio del amor del español . . . esto se entiende cuando la transmigración a otro
país no los haga miembros de otro estado, en cuyo caso este debe prevalecer al país donde
nacieron’’ and ‘‘también entiendo que esta obligación no se la vincula la república porque
nacimos en su distrito, sino porque componemos su sociedad. Así, el que legítimamente
es transferido a otro dominio distinto de aquel en que ha nacido y se avecinda en él
contrae respecto de aquella república la misma obligación que antes tenía a la que le dió
cuna y le debe mirar como patria suya.’’
49. The cases of Bruno Francisco de Pereira in AGN/L, SG, varios 4, 1–20, and Juan
Francisco de Urrea described in cédula of April 16, 1719, in AGI, IG 1536. See also
Casado Alonso, ‘‘Las colonias.’’
50. His case, debated on November 11, 1787, in AGS, GJ 873.
51. His letters and petitions, as well as the letters of the marquis of Lede of May 5,
1720, and Gaspar de Narbona of May 8, 1720, in AVM, secretaría 2–348–25.
52. Royal service—considered a duty and not a right—allowed people to argue that
they maintained their membership in the community despite their actual absence: see
chapter 2 and cédula of 1565 cited in the decision of the cámara of Castile dated Novem-
ber 12, 1787, in AGS, GJ 873.
53. Recopilación de Castilla, book 1, title 3, law 19 of 1565. The original reads: ‘‘Con
que si los padres . . . estando fuera de ellos en servicio nuestro, o por nuestro mandado o
de paso y sin contraer domicilio fuera de estos reinos hubiera algun hijo fuera de ellos,
este tal sea habido por natural de estos reinos.’’
54. Consulta of the cámara of Castile, September 19, 1768, in AGS, GJ 873. The
original reads: ‘‘de lo que pudiera presumirse deliberado ánimo de establecer en ella
[Roma] su domicilio . . . antes de cumplir los diez años que se necesitan para ello fue
empleado por Vuestra Majestad como queda referido, conservando por este medio la
naturaleza de España que se retiene con el servicio de la corona’’ and ‘‘acredita la misma
posesión y convence el ánimo e intención de retenerla y conservarla [la naturaleza].’’
55. Decision of March 5, 1624, in AGI, contratación 50B. The original reads: ‘‘no se
atreve a hacerlo por las molestias que continuamente le hacen, así por el nombre extran-
jero que tiene.’’
56. Cédula of February 12, 1788, in AGS, GJ 873 reproducing his petition.
57. Consulta of November 3, 1770, in AGS, GJ 873.
58. The original reads: ‘‘Estos antecedentes no aquietan su temor de no poder obtener
con seguridad beneficio o renta eclesiástica en estos reinos sin proceder formal declara-
ción de su aptitud . . . Tampoco le aquieta que su hermano Miguel de Olavide, residente
de Lima, se le permitió comercian en Indias’’ and ‘‘impracticable por hallarse tan con-
naturalizado en ellos que con dificultad hallaría otra lengua que la española.’’
59. Consulta of February 26, 1772, in AGS, GJ 873. The original reads: ‘‘para que en
ningún tiempo se le tenga por extranjero.’’
60. His petition in AGS, GJ 873.
61. The relationships between the king and the parliament was studied by Jago, ‘‘Habs-
Notes to Pages 76–77 231
burg’’ and in ‘‘Philip’’; Thompson, Crown and Cortes; Pérez Prendes Muñoz Arraco,
Cortes de Castilla; and Dios, ‘‘Corporación.’’
62. Bello León, Extranjeros en Castilla, 18–19, 31–55 and 77–171.
63. Cremades Griñán, ‘‘Cartas,’’ 41, 47, and 56–57. Examples of such cases are in-
cluded in AVM, secretaría 2–349–23 and a note written by the marquis of Grimaldi on
September 21, 1772, in AGS, GJ 873.
64. Early episodes (1520 and 1525) of this battle are described in Belmonte Díaz, Los
comuneros, 74 and 107–8, and Pérez Prendes Muñoz Arraco, ‘‘La recopilación,’’ 153–
57. See also Dios, Gracia, merced y patronazgo, 327–28, and Pérez Collados, Una
aproximación histórica, 275–323.
65. The servicio de millones was a form of taxation introduced at the end of the
sixteenth century: Cáceres de Gea, Reforma y fraude fiscal; Andrés Ucendo, La fiscalidad
en Castilla; Fortea Pérez, Monarquía y cortes and in ‘‘Las ciudades’’; and Fernández
Albaladejo, ‘‘Cities and State,’’ 175–76. Thompson, ‘‘Castile: Polity’’ and in ‘‘Castile:
Absolutism’’ studies the institution of a series of formal contracts between the king and
the kingdom that set out the terms and conditions for the granting of fiscal services. These
contracts—in existence since the 1590s—had been applied to the millones tax since
1601. After 1618, they included conditions concerning the naturalization of foreigners.
66. Royal agreement was expressed, for example, in condition 33, of the fifth type, of
1618 that stipulated that ‘‘ninguna persona que no fuere natural de estos reinos pueda
tener las dichas venticuatrias, regimientos, juradurías ni otros oficios y que Su Majestad
en ninguna forma ni manera ni por ningunas causas ni razones, aunque se diga son por el
bien público, conceda a los dichos extranjeros cartas de naturalezas para tener los dichos
oficios, y que no se les den ni puedan dar para gozar pensiones, canonjías, dignidades ni
otros cualesquier beneficios eclesiásticos’’: Actas de las Cortes de Castilla, vol. 32, 529–
30. This condition was reproduced again in 1632 (condition 32 of the fifth type) and was
followed by a cédula of July 27, 1632, in which the king specifically determined that
‘‘mando al presidente y los de mi consejo de la cámara que desde el día de la data de esta
mi carta en adelante no me consulten ninguna de las dichas naturalezas, y al reino junto
en cortes no den en manera alguna consentimiento para ello’’: Actas de las Cortes de
Castilla, vol. 51, 54–55 and 333–36. These conditions were frequently cited. For exam-
ple, they were mentioned in the discussion on the case of Angelo Garretón, in the manifest
elaborated by Joseph de Ledesma in 1657, in AVM, secretaría 2–350–14.
67. Petition of May 25 and 26, 1632: Actas de las Cortes de Castilla, vol. 51, 47–48
and 61. Discussions in 1632 also demonstrated another point of contention: whether the
representatives of the cities were authorized to vote on this matter, or whether the deci-
sion could only be taken by the towns they represented. This question was openly de-
bated on September 22, and October 5, 1632: Actas de las Cortes de Castilla, vol. 52, 181
and 227. This discussion and the nature of ‘‘representation’’ during this period were
studied by Fortea Pérez, ‘‘Las ciudades.’’
68. The case of Juan Bapista Fini y Manzano, who was granted naturalization ‘‘in these
kingdoms’’ in order to enjoy an ecclesiastical rent in Teruel (Aragon) in ‘‘Cortes de
Madrid,’’ 339–40.
69. Letter of Agustín de Montiano y Luyando in AM/V, GM 54–2, 56–57, and the case
of José Dovia AVM, secretaría 2–348–24. The exceptionality of these cases was stressed
232 Notes to Pages 77–79
by the king in his answer to the consulta of the cámara of Castile dated February 10,
1715, in BPR, II 2832, no. 15, 279R–279V. This practice was also mentioned in Cre-
mades Griñán, ‘‘Cartas.’’
70. The naturalization of Francisco Fariña (1721) in AGS, GJ 873.
71. Novísima Recopilación, law 6, title 14, book 1.
72. Such opposition was voiced, for example, in the response of the city of Córdoba,
dated June 14, 1714, in BPR, II 1431, no. 53, fols. 332R–334V. Similar protests were also
voiced by Toledo (undated document in AGS, GJ 873), Salamanca (AM/V, GM 51–4,
85–86) and Madrid (different documents dated May 1716 in AVM, secretaría 2–394–
63; discussion of 1747 and 1755 in AVM, secretaría, 2–348–42; manifest of Joseph de
Ledesma [1657] in AVM, secretaría 2–350–14; and AM/V, GM 51–4, 85–86). The
response of the council of Murcia was studied in Cremades Griñán, ‘‘Cartas.’’ The royal
councils often agreed with this stand: consulta of the cámara of Castille of September 26,
1715, included in BPR, II 2832, no. 15, 278R–279V. See also the discussions of May 12,
1760, and February 1, 1764, in the cases of Carlos Saveli Spinola and Manuel y Genario
Conforto in AGS, GJ 873.
73. Manifest elaborated by Joseph de Ledesma in 1657, reproduced in AVM, secretaría
2–350–14, 3.
74. Recopilación de Castilla, law 14, title 3, book 1. The original reads: ‘‘otrosí man-
damos y damos facultad a todos y cualesquier nuestros súbditos y naturales que sobre
esto se pueda oponer y hacer resistencia pues la tal oposición es sobre la exepción y honra
y guarda de las preeminencias de su rey y de su patria.’’
75. Cámara of Castile on July 5, 1783, in AGS, GJ 873.
76. Discussion of October 9, 1771, in AGS, GJ 873.
77. Cámara of Castile on May 12, 1760, in AGS, GJ 873. These concerns were already
invoked in 1528 according to the Recopilación de Castilla, law 20, title 3, book 1, which
determined that the ability of naturalized foreigners to enjoy ecclesiastical benefices in the
kingdom was conditioned in their local residence. In the same legal code, law 6, title 5,
book 3, natives and residents (naturales o moradores en estos reinos) were equated in
their right to obtain seignorial jurisdiction and distinguished from people who continued
to reside elsewhere. See also the response of Madrid to the royal letter dated November 9,
1734, in AVM, secretaría 2–348–39; the manifest written by Juan de Peralta on Septem-
ber 28, 1713, in AVM, secretaría 2–394–63; and the case of Antonio Ventura, debated in
the cámara of Castile on March 28, 1770, in AGS, GJ 873.
78. The fiscal of the cámara of Castile on September 4, 1773, in AGS, GJ 873. The
original reads: ‘‘Don Bernardo de Begue goza de los privilegios de naturaleza de estos
reinos por haber tenido residencia y domicilio permanentes en ellos por muchos años . . .
y por hallarse casado con hijos y arraigado en el principado de Asturias. . . . Que la carta
de naturaleza que solicita no puede ser otra que la declaración de naturaleza . . . que
siendo esta declaración quasi debida de justicia a quien ya tiene como el don Bernardo
Buegues la participación de los privilegios de natural de estos reinos y no necesitandose
para la concesión de esta limitada gracia el consentimiento de las ciudades de voto
en cortes.’’ See also the decision of the cámara of Castile on February 4, 1778, in AGS,
GJ 873.
79. Consulta of June 21, 1776, in AGS, GJ 873. The original reads: ‘‘sera muy justo y
Notes to Pages 79–82 233
conveniente al estado que por la concesión de esta y de las demás naturalezas semajantes
no se grave con servicios alguno pecuniario a los extranjeros ya avecindados en España,
para que con este estímulo se animan otros a solicitar igual gracia y avecindarse en estos
reinos.’’
80. Consulta of February 1, 1764, in AGS, GJ 873.
81. AGS, GJ 873, for example, contains many different types of dispensas, covering the
period 1759–88, among which are naturalization letters.
82. ‘‘Razón que puede ofrecer sobre concesiones de naturaleza de estos reinos,’’ an
anonymous pamphlet, probably dated in the 1710s in AGS, GJ 873. The original reads:
‘‘es evidente que los soberanos son legisladores que según las circunstancias de los sujetos
y como más bien les agradare pueden sin nota y sí con maduro acuerdo excepcionar a
algunos extranjeros para las dignidades eclesiásticas y mandando a la cámara los natu-
ralice en vista de la gracia, porque de lo contrario se seguiría una total subordinación o
sujeción de la soberanía, lo que es absurdo y muy nocivo y por la misma razón se han
visto infinitos ejemplares en todos los reinos cristianos con singular acierto.’’ See also
opinion of the cámara of Castile dated March 21, 1769, in AGS, GJ 873, and Dios,
Gracia, merced y patronazgo, 327–28.
83. Castro y Bravo, ‘‘Los estudios,’’ 288.
84. Correspondence of the cámara of Castile with the audiencias of Barcelona, Aragon,
and Valencia in AGS, GJ 873. See also cédula of July 7, 1723, in ACV, SA-Ced/Prag.
C.10–128.
85. Discussion concerning the case of Ramón Ri, a clergyman native of Majorca who
wished to hold an ecclesiastical office in Córdoba: consulta of November 11, 1787, in
AGS, GJ 873.
86. Letter of Juan Colón dated Madrid June 26, 1788, in AGS, GJ 873. The original
reads: ‘‘[they are attached] a lo reducido del peñasco y no pueden pensar en otra parte
para su colocación . . . se quedan estancados en la isla y preocupados de un error heredi-
tario se persuaden que se les haría grave injuria si se abriese la puerta al forastero para
ocuparles su corto caudal, cuando ellos tampoco habían de disfrutar del continente
aunque se les abriera la puerta. Así discurren ya porque no han visto más tierra y se les
figura que no son aquí de la misma naturaleza los hombres, ya porque tiemblan por falta
de uso al pensar que han de salir de su casa, bien como aquel que habiendo estado toda su
vida encerrado entre cuatro paredes creyera que poniendo sólo el pie en la calle habían de
acometerle mil monstruosos. . . . Como en el cuerpo natural la circulación de la sangre, así
en el eclesiástico y político la correspondencia mutua y participación de oficios lo que
conserva su constitución sana y complexión robusta.’’
87. The opinion of the fiscal dated September 24, 1772, was included in the delibera-
tions in the case of Pedro Carlos Aball in AGS, GJ 873.
88. Jiménez Sureda, ‘‘Alienígenas,’’ 1110.
89. ‘‘Discurso contra la idea de poner en práctica los antiguados fueros del reino de
Aragón y privilegio de que sólo sus nacionales obtuviesen los empleos de administración
de justicia,’’ dated in Zaragoza on July 30, 1748, in BPR, II 2832, no. 16, 283R–290V.
90. The opinion of the fiscal, dated September 24, 1772, in the case of Pedro Carlos
Aball, in AGS, GJ 873.
234 Notes to Page 83
91. The French Council in the Canary Island, writing to the French minister of foreign
affairs in 1797: Guimerá Ravina, Burguesía extranjera, 115n57.
92. This regime was called fuero de extranjería. It included the liberty to enter and
leave Spain with or without goods, to open shops, and to carry arms. Foreigners could
also trade with enemy nations and even sell them Spanish goods. They either paid re-
duced taxes or none at all. They were exempt from lodging soldiers in their houses, could
freely decide on the price of their goods, and their shops and books could rarely be
inspected by local officials. Foreigners could also have their own lawyers, representatives,
agents, and notaries, and they usually had their own consul and judge ( juez conservador).
They could inherit and give property in inheritance. In fact, the only serious disadvantage
was their inability to engage in the Spanish American trade or to hold public office or
ecclesiastical benefice. A list of the benefits enjoyed by foreign merchants is included in
Alvarez y Valdés, Los extranjeros, 401–13; Eugenio Larruga y Boneta, ‘‘Historia de la
Real y General Junta de Comercio, Moneda y Minas y Dependencias de Extranjeros,’’
Madrid, 1799 (MSS Bell Library, University of Minnesota–Twin Cities Campus), vol. 3,
book 2, chap. 2, 133R–8R; the prologue to the ‘‘Indice cronológico de los reales decretos,
consultas, órdenes y expedientes que existen en el Archivo de la Secretaría de Dependen-
cias y Negocios de Extranjeros’’ in AHN, estado, libro 683; letter of the Junta de Com-
ercio y Agricultura of Valencia dated April 3, 1773, in AHN, estado 629–3/66; and
consulta of the Junta de Comercio, Moneda y Dependencias de Extranjeros dated De-
cember 22, 1778, in AHN, estado 5042. The origin of these privileges was mentioned, for
example, in ‘‘Indice de los capítulos de la obra Comercio de extranjeros en España . . .’’ in
AHN, estado 647/16. The importance of international treaties as guideline for the treat-
ment of foreigners was mentioned in the opinion of the teniente primero of Sevilla of
1773 in AHN, estado 629–3/63, 13–14. The fuero de extranjería was studied by Per-
court García, ‘‘Una institución.’’
93. Letter dated April 3, 1773, AHN, estado 629–3/66. The original read: ‘‘ellos
participan (aunque no lo quieren confesar) en los mismos beneficios que los naturales en
el interior del reino, y aunque no lograsen otro que venir a él con tan humildes y bajos
principios y labrarse su fortuna con perjuicio de vuestros vasallos, que en su defecto
harían lo mismo y tomarían este carrera, parece que eran suficientes para que abrazasen
gustosos las leyes fundamentales de este reino y obedeciesen vuestras suaves y soberanos
preceptos ciegamente. Al contrario, señor: los resisten con todas sus fuerzas y no omiten
medio por irregular que sea para no observarlos’’; ‘‘Llegue, pues, señor, el día claro y feliz
en que renazca el antiguo y floreciente comercio de nuestra España. Vengan en hora
buena a ella extranjeros comerciantes, artesanos e industriosos, que se sujetan a nuestras
leyes y cargas del estado y disfruten con nosotros los beneficios’’; and ‘‘La razón y las
buenas máximas de política claman y dicen que el que participa de los beneficios de la
república esté también a las cargas de ella.’’
94. Recopilación de Castilla, law 66, title 4, book 2. The original reads: ‘‘y que sean
admitidos como los demás vecinos de él a los pastos y demás comodidades.’’ See also
‘‘Indice de varias leyes . . .’’ in AHN, estado 5042 and the draft of cédula where a 1722
decree is mentioned, in AHN, estado 5042. The same issue was raised by Francisco
Cobarrus and Antonio Ponz in the early 1780s according to Diz, Idea, 335 and 339.
95. The junta de extranjeros was established in 1714, abolished in 1717, and re-
Notes to Pages 83–86 235
established in 1721. In 1748 it became part of the Junta de Comercio. The history of the
junta is described in ‘‘Indice cronológico de los reales decretos, consultas y órdenes y
expedientes que existen en el archivo de la secretaría de dependencias y negocios de
extranjeros . . .’’ in AHN, estado libro 683. See also Tomás Ortiz de la Torre, ‘‘Derecho,’’
712–13, and Alvarez y Valdés, Los extranjeros, 413–18.
96. Opinion of the fiscal of the council of state dated March 12, 1766, in AHN, estado
5042. The original reads: ‘‘Han pasado a ser vasallos de esta corona, sujetos a la clase y
leyes de españoles.’’
97. The text of the 1716 instruction was reproduced in the Novísima Recopilación, law
3, title 11, book 6. Its importance over time is evident from its continuous citation. See,
e.g., the royal order sent to the governor of Cádiz on March 10, 1762, in AHN, estado
647/17, and the letter of the Junta de Comercio y Agricultura of Valencia, dated April 3,
1773, in AHN, estado 629–3/66, 3–4.
98. Instructions were sent to different authorities in Catalonia, Valencia, Aragon, Na-
varre, Granada, Galicia, Guipúzcoa, Castile, Extramadura, Campo de Gibraltar, Ma-
jorca, Orán, Ceuta, Canarias, Bilbao, Madrid, Andalusia, Ciudad Real, and Oviedo:
AHN, estado 629–1/2. See also Villar García, ‘‘Un siglo.’’
99. Cédula of June 28, 1764, cited in ‘‘Indice de varias leyes que existen y están en
práctica en la monarquía española, relativas al establecimiento de extranjeros en estos
reinos,’’ in AHN, estado 5042, 5–6.
100. AHN, estado 629–1/3 to 629–1/19; 629–2/20 to 629–2/57; and 629–3/61 to
629–3/79. These lists cover the following municipal communities: Orán, Madrid, San
Sebastián, Jaén, Puerto Santa María, San Lúcar, Cádiz, Málaga, Teruel, Palma (Majorca),
Pamplona, Campo de Gibraltar, Tenerife, Zaragoza, Catalonia, La Coruña, León, Val-
ladolid, Tordesillas, Segovia, Zamora, Valencia, Ciudad Real, Bilbao, Seville, and Mur-
cia. The difficulties faced by municipal communities wishing to implement this classifica-
tion are described, for example, in AHN, estado 629–3/63.
101. Letter of the marquis de Croix to the Junta de Comercio, Moneda y Dependencias
de Extranjeros, dated March 16, 1765, in AHN, estado 647/21. See also discussions
concerning the cédula of June 28, 1764, in AHN, estado 629–1/2, and Larruga y Boneta,
‘‘Historia de la Real y General Junta de Comercio, Moneda y Minas y Dependencias de
Extranjeros,’’ Madrid, 1799 (MSS Bell Library, University of Minnesota–Twin Cities
Campus), vol. 3, book 2, chap. 1, 137R and V.
102. AHN, estado 629–1/4.
103. AHN, estado 629–3/63.
104. Letter of the Junta de Comercio y Agricultura of Valencia, dated April 3, 1773, in
AHN, estado 629–3/66, 11.
105. Letter of Gregorio Portora, judge (alcalde de crímen) of the court (audiencia) of
La Coruña, dated April 19, 1766, in AHN, estado 629–2/39, and Seville’s town council
meetings of April 1, 1773, and May 5, 1773, reproduced in AHN, estado 629–3/63.
106. AHN, estado 629–1/1.
107. AHN, estado 2893, and Novísima Recopilación, law 4, title 11, book 6.
108. Cédula of June 28, 1764, in ‘‘Nota de varias leyes . . .’’ in AHN, estado 5042, 5.
109. Discussion in the junta on May 25, 1765, and June 21, 1971, in AHN, estado
647/21 and 5042, respectively.
236 Notes to Pages 86–88
110. His opinion dated March 12, 1766, in AHN, estado 5042. The original reads: ‘‘si
con casa poblada, no hubieren tácita ni expresamente declarado su ánimo de permanecer,
porque como el domicilio por sí solo es un hecho equívoco que se puede verificar en el
transeunte y en el que se traslada o fija de una vez su residencia en estos reinos, no era fácil
distinguir el verdadero sistema de los domiciliados sin valerse de otras circunstancias y
conjeturas aprobadas por el derecho’’ and ‘‘si les conviene restituirse con sus padres o sin
ellos a su originaria nación, o permanecer avecindados entre los españoles declarando su
ánimo inscribiéndose en la matrícula.’’
111. Letter by Bartolomé Muños dated July 28, 1807, in AVM, secretaría 2–166–64.
The original reads: ‘‘la mente de ésta es que en los empadronamientos se aclaren las dudas
que haya con respecto a los franceses existentes en España sobre si son transeuntes o
naturalizados, dejando a su arbitrio en esta ocasión el que eligen el concepto bajo cual
quieren ser considerados, a fin de que previa dicha elección puedan ser tratados con la
distinción correspondiente a la clase elegida y según lo prescripto en las leyes de estos
reinos, asi en lo favorable, como en lo gravoso.’’
112. Teniente primero of Seville, on March 17, 1773, in AHN, estado 629–3/63, 13,
19, and 25. The original reads: ‘‘el reputarse el extranjero por domiciliado no es solo a
beneficio suyo, sino también de la corona y de los vasallos, por tener este vecino más que
les ayude a llevar las cargas y consecuentemente, una vez adquirido este derecho por los
medios que se hallan prevenidos por él, no está en su arbitrio el hacer dimisión de él,
como sucederá si se le estimase transeundo por sólo el hecho de alistarse por tal aunque
concurriese alguna de las circunstancias para reputarlo por domiciliado’’ and ‘‘es cosa
más extraña y repugnante al espíritu de la misma real cédula, y aun a la letra de ella
apenas se puede dar, que por lo propio si se verificase, no podría menos de ocupar una
gran novedad y aun alteración en el pueblo mayoritariamente que ya se ha advertido sólo
con el rumor de que se entendía e iba a practicarse asi . . . que no siendo asi la causaría una
exorbitante alteración que siempre debe evitarse.’’
113. The junta’s letter of April 3, 1773, in AHN, estado 629–3/66, 2–3 and 5.
114. The fiscal of the council of state in 1766. The fiscal also stated that among the
alleged ‘‘foreigners,’’ there were in fact many (true) Spaniards. The foreigners, he said
‘‘suponen una porción numerosa de verdaderos españoles’’: his opinion, inserted in the
consulta of the Junta de Comercio, Moneda y Dependencias de Extranjeros of June 7,
1766, in AHN, estado 5042. The wish to bring to Spain ‘‘useful’’ Catholic foreigners was
especially strong during the eighteenth century: Domínguez Ortiz, La sociedad española,
vol. 1, 249–51. Contemporary writers echoed this interest: Uztariz, Theory and Practice,
37–40, and Fernández Navarrete, Conservación, 123–33.
115. Opinion of the representative of royal interests ( fiscal ) of the council of state, as
reproduced and adopted in the consulta of February 26, 1774, in AHN, estado 5042,
fols. 75–80. The original reads: ‘‘dos naciones enemigas, en virtud de dichas leyes, se
convirtieron en una, guerrera y poderosa . . . acudían personas de toda la cristianidad
según crónicas antiguas.’’ Present-day research partially affirms this image, insisting, for
example, on the role of foreigners in both the reconquista and the resettlement of Castile.
116. This was the opinion of the council of state in a draft of a letter it wrote to the
Conde de Floridablanca in July 1791 in AHN, estado 5042. The confusion apparently
Notes to Pages 88–90 237
continued into the 1800s: see, e.g., the letter of Bartolomé Muñoz, dated July 28, 1807, in
AVM, secretaría 2–166–64.
117. A copy of the 1791 instructions is inserted in AGI, consulados 53. The 1791
instruction was also reproduced in the Novísima Recopilación, laws 8 and 9, title 11,
book 6. The implementation of the 1791 instruction was studied by Salas Ausens, ‘‘Les
Français,’’ and Ozanam, ‘‘Le recensement.’’
118. Cédula of July 20, 1791, in AHN, estado 5042. The oath was as follows: ‘‘to
observe the Catholic religion and to be loyal to it and to the king, wishing to become his
vassals and subjecting themselves to the laws and practices of these kingdoms.’’ The
original reads: ‘‘observar la religión católica y guardar fidelidad a ella y al rey Nuestro
Señor y querer ser su vasallo, sujetándose a las leyes y prácticas de estos reinos.’’
119. Letter of Conde de Floridablanca to Manuel Ximénez Bretón, dated July 12,
1971, in AHN, estado 5042. The original reads: ‘‘renunciándose a todo fuero de extran-
jería y a toda relación, unión y dependencia del país en que hayan nacido y prometiendo
no usar de la protección de él, ni de sus embajadores, ministros o cónsules.’’
120. ‘‘Instrucción que debe servir de regla para distinguir los extranjeros transeuntes y
domiciliados . . .’’ in AHN, estado 5042. The original reads: ‘‘se deben entender y reputar
en la clase de vasallos españoles, separados de su originario fuero y pabellón.’’
121. ‘‘Puntos contenidos en la real cédula . . .’’ in AHN, estado 5042. The oath of
transitory foreigners included ‘‘respecto, sumisión y obediencia al soberano y leyes del
país.’’
122. Salas Ausens, ‘‘Les Français,’’ 169, and Villar García, ‘‘Un siglo,’’ 922–23.
123. The 1791 instruction clearly stated that foreigners who had declared themselves
domiciled would have to be accepted by the municipalities where they lived: ‘‘Instrucción
que debe servir de regla . . .’’ in AHN, estado 5042. The same idea was expressed in Lar-
ruga y Boneta, ‘‘Historia de la Real y General Junta de Comercio, Moneda y Minas y De-
pendencias de Extranjeros,’’ Madrid, 1799 (MSS Bell Library, University of Minnesota–
Twin Cities Campus), vol. 3, book 2, chap. 1, 133V.
124. ‘‘Puntos contenidos en la real cédula, instrucción y declaraciones posteriores
expedidas sobre la salida de extranjeros o su permanencia en España’’ in AHN, estado
5042. The original reads: ‘‘esta libertad es una gracia particular que ha querido conceder
el rey por pura moderación y equidad, pues estando señalados en las leyes de España los
extranjeros que deben reputarse por avecindados, pudiera su majestad haber mandado
desde luego que se les sujetara a las cargas y obligaciones de tales . . . que son propios de su
soberanía.’’ A similar idea is expressed in the letter of Bartolomé Muñoz, dated July 28,
1807, in AVM, secretaría 2–166–64.
125. Letter of the legal adviser to the captain general of Málaga dated July 16, 1765,
and the answer of the junta in AHN, estado 629–2/23.
126. ‘‘Family pacts’’ were celebrated in 1733, 1743, and 1762 between the kings of
France and Spain. A summary of their contents is included in Díaz Plaza, La historia de
España, 174–75, 189–91, and 228–34. The third pact (1762), which lasted until 1793,
included direct reference to the status of individual vassals. It was studied in Pont de
Nemours, Le pacte de famille; Palacio Atard, El tercer pacto; Ozanam, ‘‘Les origines’’;
and Hernández Franco, ‘‘Del tercer.’’ The pact was invoked by litigants, e.g., by Nicolás
238 Notes to Pages 90–94
Campe, a Sicilian, in AN/Q, FE 34 vol. 94 no. 3643, 102–3. In 1782, Joseph de Copons
attested that his family immigrated to France because of the family pacts, but that despite
this immigration it continued to be Spanish: the cámara of Castile on July 20, 1782, in
AGS, GJ 873.
127. The activities of the French consul in Valencia were described in the letter of the
local Junta de Comercio y Agricultura of April 3, 1773, in AHN, estado 629–3/66, 4–5.
The response of the French community to these measures is briefly mentioned in Girard,
Le commerce française, 571–78. A similar position was adopted by the English consul in
1714 according to Carrasco González, ‘‘La colonia,’’ 334–35. The consul specifically
rejected the idea that individuals could be transformed into Spaniards without openly
expressing a desire to permanently reside in Spain.
128. Letter of the French ambassador addressed to the marquis of Grimaldi, dated
Madrid March 25, 1771, in the ‘‘Consulta General’’ of February 26, 1744, AHN, estado
5042, 18–22. The French ambassador was again active in 1807, according to the letter of
Bartolomé Muñoz dated July 28, 1807, in AVM, secretaría 2–166–64. See also Grand-
maison, L’ambassade Française, 48–54. Although the measure was general, the French
ambassador believed that it specifically targeted the French community and was moti-
vated by the fear of the spreading of revolutionary ideas. He complained that the Spanish
authorities were inflexible, and he argued that it was the end of Spanish tolerance of
foreigners. Rather than supporting integration, these measures aimed at expelling for-
eigners from Spain.
129. Consulta of February 26, 1774, in AHN, estado 5042, 73–75. A similar opinion
was expressed by the procurador general del reino, who in 1768 requested the king to
grant special privileges to domiciled foreigners: Consulta of February 26, 1774, in AHN,
estado 5042, fols. 17–18
130. Alvarez, Instituciones de derecho real, 66–67 and 82–84. The original reads:
‘‘Por naturaleza entendemos una inclinación que reconocen entre sí los hombres que
nacen o viven en una misma tierra y bajo un mismo gobierno. . . . Esta consideración tiene
tanta fuerza que hace imitar perfectamente la naturaleza; pues así como ésta admite en el
gremio de parientes a los extraños que se hacen adoptivos, así también aquella abriga en
su seno a los extranjeros que legítimamente se domicilian.’’
131. ‘‘Por el fiscal de su magestad en defensa de la respuesta que dio a las pretensiones
introducidas por los hijos nacidos en España de padres extranjeros’’ in AGI, IG 2301, 4R.
132. Fernández Navarrete, Conservación, 132.
133. Novísima Recopilación, law 3, title 11, book 6.
avecindarme en cualquier lugar que jurase domicilio sin más contradicciones ni estorbos
con pretexto de ser extranjero, pues yo no debo denominarme por tal.’’
28. His petition of October 13, 1775, in AN/Q, FE 34, vol. 94, no. 3643, 102–3.
29. Petitions of Gerardo Antonio Pose of April, 18, 1805, in AGN/BA, 9–30–7–7, and
Antonio de Quiros in Molinari, Documentos para la historia, vol. 12, 209–10.
30. Both examples are mentioned by García Fuentes, El comercio español, 53–54.
31. The case of Joseph Valois, debated in AGN/L, RTC, contencioso 252, cuaderno 77,
28–29. The original reads: ‘‘Este disimulo es limitado, concedido para aquellos que
después de 20 años arraigaron su hacienda en bienes muebles y fundaron con un matri-
monio casa y familia. Esta especie de extranjero es de otra calidad que la de los extran-
jeros no arraigados sino sueltos.’’
32. Cédula of October 17, 1743, in AGI, consulados, libro 445, 164–67. The original
reads: ‘‘este requisito lo pidiese la ley más para excluir de la naturaleza al extranjero
casado con natural de otros reinos y no de estos, como motivo que persuade el ánimo
transeunte que para negar este goce al perfecto estado de celibato, podía dispensarse
respecto de que con la edad de este interesado y demás actos externos, se manifiesta su
constante ánimo de permanecer en España.’’
33. AGI, consulados, libro 445, 176–78. The original reads: ‘‘con que ha acreditado su
ánimo de permanecer en estos dominios explicado antes por haber vivido más de 33 años
con casa poblada y estar recibido por vecino en el ayuntamiento de la mencionada ciudad
de Cádiz desde el 1739 . . . por noticias extrajudiciales [se sabe] de que el pretendiente no
era de los extranjeros transeuntes, sino es de los domiciliados . . . y de quien tenía
bastantes fundamentos para persuadirse a que no volvería a su orígen.’’
34. BPR, II 2755, no. 6, 38R–39V.
35. His petition in AGI, contratación 51B. The original reads: ‘‘estando como está
connaturalizado y con el efecto y servicios que ha hecho pues no lo excede ninguno de los
naturales en sus buenos deseos y es la disposición de las ordenanzas pues por ellos se
conoce el ánimo de permanecer, que es la razón que hubo para la prohibición.’’
36. Cédula of November 5, 1790, in AGI, IG 1536. The original reads: ‘‘obstuviste
desde el principio de asistir a las juntas nacionales de los napolitanos y contribuir a sus
gastos, sin permitir se os incluye en la matrícula de ellos y que os haveis portado siempre
como verdadero español en vuestro giro, negociaciones y demás actos.’’
37. AGI, consulados, libro 445, 164–65.
38. Nunn, ‘‘Naturalization,’’ 65–66.
39. Consulta of February 25, 1644, in AGI, IG 764; letter of the guild to the king, dated
March 15, 1645, attached to the consulta above mentioned; and royal decree of April 22,
1645, inserted in the proceedings initiated by Pedro Colarte in AGI, contratación 50B,
25–30. Veitia Linaje, Norte de la contratación, 333–34, mentions the willingness of the
merchant guild to pay compensation to these foreigners whose naturalization would be
revoked. See also Domínguez Ortiz, ‘‘La Concesión,’’ 234–35.
40. Cédula of July 28, 1634, in AGI, IG 1536.
41. The decree that eventually revoked the letters indeed caused problems in Seville, as
witnessed, for example, by the petitions of Domingo Rodríguez and the brothers Gaspar
and Antonio Reales Passano whose letters were revoked: AGI, IG 764.
42. These practices continued well into the eighteenth century: the case of Santiago
242 Notes to Pages 104–08
Garbey in BNE, MSS 19.512, 436–37. See also Domínguez Ortiz, ‘‘La Concesión,’’
236–37.
43. Ayala, Diccionario, vol. 10, 8–10. See also Morales Alvarez, Los extranjeros, 205.
44. Escalona y Agüero, Arcae limensis, 158.
45. Cédula of February 10, 1795, in AGI, IG 821. Gracias al sacar were royal decrees
that declared, for example, that a mestizo was white, or that allowed minors to act as
though they were of age: Santos, El régimen de las ‘‘gracias al sacar.’’
46. The fiscal of the audiencia of Lima on February 23, 1762, in AGN/L, RTC, conten-
cioso 252, cuaderno 61, 63–64. The original reads: ‘‘y otros nacidos en reinos y provin-
cias no sujetas al dominio y jurisdicción del rey, aunque naturalizados en España por
responder a exigencias de las leyes de Castilla o por privilegios particulares de ellos para
residir y habitar en España, para el efecto de tratar y contratar en Indias deben ser tenidos
por extranjeros.’’
47. Boissonnade, Histoire de la réunion.
48. AGN/L, RTC, contencioso 252, cuaderno 66; cédulas dated January 21, 1788, and
January 18, 1785, in AGI, IG 1536 and Morales Alvarez, Los extranjeros, 380–82. I will
return to these issue in chapter 6.
49. Recopilación de Indias, law 27, title 27, book 9. See also Hevia Bolaños, Curia
philipica, 266.
50. AGI, consulados, libros 445 and 446 and legajos 788 and 892A; AGI, IG 1538 and
2301; AGI, EC 1057A; and AGI, contratación 50B. See also consultas of the Council of the
Indies of February 9, and November 9, 1742, in BPR, II 2755, nos. 23 and 24, 149V–
160V, and the dissertation of Juan Antonio Enrique, minister of the navy in San Sebastián,
dated October 10, 1785, in BPR, II 12.868, no. 4, 39R–46V. Some of these documents
were published by Muro Orejón, Cedularios americanos, vol. 3, 303–7 and 317–19. This
conflict was studied by Gutiérrez de Rubalcava, Tratado histórico, 122–28; García Ber-
nal, ‘‘Los españoles’’; Morales Alvarez, Los extranjeros, 119–246; and García-Mauriño
Mundi, La pugna.
51. As early as 1624, Guillermo Bequer requested a declaration stating that he was
allowed to participate in the Spanish American trade despite being the son of a foreigner.
This declaration was necessary, he explained, because people believed the contrary: his
petition of March 5, 1624, in AGI, contratación 50B.
52. A summary of the guilds’ arguments is included, for example, in ‘‘Respuesta que
dan algunos hijos de Españoles antiguos a un papel que se ha divulgado con título de
noticia . . . de las vejaciones y daños que los hijos de extranjeros naturales del reino ha
hecho y causado el consulado’’ (undated and anonymous), in AGI, consulados 892A.
53. ‘‘Noticia de las diligencias hechas entre el consulado y los hijos de extranjeros en
grave dependencia que se subscitó en el año 1719 y se feneció en el de 1728’’ in AGI,
consulados 892A, 4. The original reads: ‘‘porque ni el tiempo de la residencia ni el
nacimiento dan naturaleza y solo la confiere el ánimo de permanecer continuado por el
tiempo que prescriben las leyes del reino.’’
54. The burden of proof was specifically mentioned in the ‘‘Respuesta que dan algunos
hijos de españoles los antiguos a un papel de las vejaciones y daños que a los hijos de
extranjeros naturales del reino han hecho y causado el consulado.’’ in AGI, consulados
892A, 14. This was also the regular practice in subsequent years.
Notes to Pages 108–09 243
55. The case of Feliz Linze, debated on December 15, 1727, in AGI, consulados, libro
446, 88, and the cases of Juan Francisco Agens, Francisco Derbao, and Andrian Pedro
Barnes, of 1722 and 1723 in AGI, IG 1538. The term used in Spanish was ‘‘natural y
originario de estos reinos y capaz para comerciar en Indias.’’ This was the practice until
1812: AGI, consulados 892A, and ‘‘Dictamen de Juan Antonio Enrique, ministro general
de marina . . . que explica los requisitos que deben concurrir en los genizaros para obtener
los privilegios de naturalización y que con sus embarcaciones y bandera española pueden
comerciar en Europa y América,’’ dated in San Sebastián on October 10, 1785, in BPR, II
12.868, no. 4, 39R–46V.
56. His petition discussed on April 6, 1772, in AGI, consulados 892A, carpeta 2/2.
57. Letter of Domingo Orrante to the audiencia of Lima, dated February 4, 1762, in
AGN/L, RTC, contencioso 252, cuaderno 61, 60–64, on pp. 61–62 and the discussion
that follow, especially on pp. 64 and 66–67.
58. Consulta of the Council of the Indies dated February 9, 1742, in BPR, II 2755, no.
23, 149V–153V; cédula of April 20, 1742, in AGI, consulados, libro 446, 335–40; and
different documents in AGI, consulados 892A, mostly from the 1760s. This issue was
also mentioned in the ‘‘Noticia de las diligencias hechas entre el consulado y los hijos de
extranjeros’’: AGI, consulados 892A, 30–61.
59. ‘‘Noticia de las diligencias . . . ,’’ AGI, consulados 892A, 7, 48, and 51. The original
reads: ‘‘naturaleza nativa y propiamente originaria’’ and ‘‘era mejor la naturaleza de
aquel que así él como los ascendientes de quienes venía, fueron e moraron allí en la tierra
donde es el señor.’’ The question of whether the conversion of foreigners into natives was
ever complete and whether it gave the community sufficient assurance that those who
were once external can now be trusted had already been invoked by ius commune jurists:
Riesenberg, ‘‘Civicism,’’ 240.
60. ‘‘Por el fiscal de su majestad en defensa de la respuesta que dio a las pretensiones
introducidas por los hijos nacidos en España de padres extranjeros.’’ in AGI, IG 2301, 6V
and 7R. The original reads: ‘‘Además, de que si se mira con reflexión esta materia, no es
dudable hay razón de diferencia entre los naturales originarios y los hijos de extranjeros,
pues aquellos siempre han estado en el dominio de su majestad, sirviéndole como también
sus ascendientes, sin tener conecciones extrañas y asi su amor es más radical y perfecto y
los hijos de extranjeros no pueden dejar de tener la afección al propio orígen que el
derecho le considera aun más fuerte que el de la natividad. . . . Tienen en los dominios
extranjeros los ascendientes y parientes a quienes miraran con el cariño que induce la
propia sangre. . . . De esta razón de afección, resulta otra de política de cualquiera bien
ordenada república, pues teniendo estos naturales el conocimiento con las potencias
extranjeras por las conecciones de parentezco y amistad . . . podrán participar las noticias
del estado del reino, sus disposiciones, progresos y resoluciones, lo cual debe prohibirse
como tal perjudicial al bien público.’’
61. Undated answer of the ‘‘sons of foreigners,’’ in AGI, consulados 982A, 14–15. The
original reads: ‘‘despues de su nacimiento, establecimiento y demás circunstancias que
aseguran la permenencia y sin haber conocido otro soberano ni tributándole, ni otra
patria, domicilio, vecindad o habitacion . . . por hallarse calificados con los requisitos
tocados de nacimiento, establecimiento y demás y sin experiencia de alguno que se haya
revocado o vuelto a los dominios de sus mayores y ascendientes.’’
244 Notes to Pages 110–12
62. Consulta of November 9, 1742, in BPR, II 2755, no. 24, 153V–160V, 157V. The
original reads: ‘‘nadie podrá probar ser descendiente de los compañeros de Tuval que de
resulta de la confusión de las lenguas vinieron a poblar a España, habiendo sido ésta tan
inundada de inumerables naciones que por gran timbre el más lingudo suele alegar su
orígen de la nación goda (mucho posterior a otras que dominaron la España) . . . hasta
ahora, nadie ha imaginado ni pensado en formar un árbol genealógico declarando qué
grados de antiguedad en el orígen se necesita para comerciar en Indias.’’
63. His case, discussed in 1771 and 1772, in AGI, consulados, libro 445, 338–42. The
original reads: ‘‘se le tenga y repute por español nacido y procreado en estos reinos.’’
64. The argument that different immigration policies produced a different regime in
Spain and Spanish America was included, for example, in ‘‘Noticia de los diligencias
hechas entre el consulado y los hijos de extranjeros,’’ undated pamphlet in AGI, con-
sulados 892A, 1–2.
65. Recopilación de Indias, laws 12–4 and 16–24, title 27, book 9, and title 23, book
3. The effects of these measures were studied by Rodríguez Vicente, ‘‘Los extranjeros’’;
Ortíz de la Tabla y Ducasse, ‘‘Extranjeros’’; Moreno, ‘‘Los extranjeros’’; and Herzog,
‘‘Stranger.’’ The extraordinary nature of these grants and their revocability were men-
tioned in Veitia Linaje, Norte de la contratación, 336. The relation between these grants
and naturalization was explored in Nunn, ‘‘Naturalization,’’ 62–63 and in his Foreign
Immigrants, 98.
66. Lima’s merchant guild on December 16, 1761, in AGN/L, RTC, contencioso 252,
cuaderno 61, 1–5, on pp. 3–4.
67. Cédula of October 14, 1676, in AGI, IG 1536.
68. Cédula of September 15, 1784, in AGN/BA 9–30–3–5.
69. Lima’s guild was studied by Moreyra y Paz Soldán, El tribunal del consulado de
Lima, sus antecedentes and in El tribunal del consulado de Lima: Quaderno de juntas;
Malca Olguín, ‘‘Gobierno’’ and in his ‘‘El tribunal’’; Rodríguez Vicente, El tribunal del
consulado de Lima en la primera mitad; Melzer, Bastion of Commerce; and Smith,
‘‘Estudio histórico del consulado.’’ In pp. 139–44 and 155 Smith studies the guild’s
involvement in the prosecution of foreigners during the eighteenth century. Mercantile
activities in other parts of the Spanish America are described in: AGI, consulados 788;
AGN/BA, 9–33–3–7; AGN/BA, 9–39–7–3; Town council meetings of February 6, July
1, November 24, 1730, and October 23, 1732, in Acuerdos del extinguido cabildo de
Buenos Aires, ser. 2, vol. 6, libros 11–13, 17–18, 241, 294, and 554–58; meetings of
April 12, 1734, and June 9 and 17, 1738, in Acuerdos del extinguido cabildo de Buenos
Aires, ser. 2, vol. 7, libros 23–24, 51, 63–66, 281, 470, and 472–73; meetings of June 30,
July 6 and 14, 1740, and May 24 and July 1, 1743, in Acuerdos del extinguido cabildo de
Buenos Aires, ser. 2, vol. 8, libros 14–25, 151–55, 420–21, and 427–28, and so forth.
See also Nunn, ‘‘Naturalization,’’ 61.
70. AGN/L, RTC, contencioso 252, cuaderno 61, 51–52; document of March 1, 1760,
in AGI, consulados 892A; and the guild’s letter of March 1, 1759, in AGI, consulados
794. See also Campbell, ‘‘Foreigners,’’ 156.
71. Cédula of May 10, 1761, in AGN/L, SG, varios 4, cuaderno 122 (another copy of
the same cédula is inserted in AGN/L, RTC, contencioso 252, cuaderno 61, 53–56), and
decision of February 23, 1764, in AGN/L, RTC, contencioso 252, cuaderno 77, 10–11.
Notes to Pages 112–14 245
In his memoirs, Viceroy Manuel de Amat y Juniet recognized the guild’s contribution to
the expulsion campaigns: Rodríguez Casado and Pérez Embid, Manuel de Amat y Juniet,
225–26. Examples of lists elaborated by the guild are found in AGN/L, RTC, conten-
cioso 252, cuaderno 61. See also the representation of the merchant guild of Cádiz, dated
1789 in AGI, consulados 62, 6 bis, and AGI, consulados 92, no. 3.
72. AGN/L, SG, varios 4, cuaderno 148.
73. AG/L, RTC, contencioso 252, cuaderno 66. The original reads: ‘‘Qué daño es el
que hago yo al tribunal del consulado ni al comercio de esta ciudad y reino, cuando desde
que vine de España la mayor parte del tiempo la he ocupado en asistir y ayudar a los
principales mercaderes.’’
74. Cédula of March 11, 1723, in AGI, consulados, libro 445.
75. Document dated October 13, 1775, in AN/Q, FE 34, vol. 94, no. 3643, 102–3; AN/
Q, gobierno 26, expediente 31.5.1777; and AN/Q, gobierno 29, expediente 31.10.1780.
Campe himself used similar strategies. In 1795 he invoked the military fuero in order to
avoid paying his own debts: AN/Q, gobierno 46, expediente 9.2.1795.
76. AGN/L, RTC, contencioso 252, cuaderno 61, 3.
77. Ibid.
78. Ibid., 2 and 46–49.
79. Allegations of Carlos Magron in AN/Q, gobierno 42, expediente 22.10.1790.
80. Nunn, Foreign Immigrants, 110–13.
81. AGN/L, RTC, contencioso 252, cuaderno 61, 2, and AGN/L, RTC, contencioso
252, cuadernos 67. Although the Recopilación de Indias, law 10, title 27, book 9, ruled
that artisans with ‘‘useful offices’’ could be allowed to remain in Spanish America, more
important than the legal authorization was the fact that merchants and mercantile inter-
ests were not threatened by the presence of artisans.
82. AGN/L, RTC, contencioso 252, cuaderno 61, 35–36 and 43, respectively.
83. His petition, presented in Lima on January 8, 1762, in AGN/L, SG, varios 3,
cuaderno 107, 1–2. The original reads: ‘‘Pues mi nacimiento fue en la villa de Cangas del
reino de Galicia sujeta al rey católico de las Españas, y nacido de padres notoriamente
calificados e ilustres por serlo del capitán de granaderos don Pedro Mariño y de doña
María Barrieros y Figueroa, naturales de dicha villa . . . este testimonio denigrativo a mi
persona y haciendo injuria a mis padres cerca a su naturaleza y nobleza que es de la
primera jerarquía en el reino de Galicia y que mis padres y abuelos han servido a su
majestad.’’
84. AGN/L, SG, varios 3, cuaderno 107, and AGN/L, RTC, contencioso 252, cua-
derno 77.
85. AGN/L, RTC, contencioso 252, cuaderno 61, 1–2. The same allegation was also
reproduced in AGN/L, SG, varios 4, cuaderno 122. The original reads: ‘‘no se necesita
para saber que es francés más ejecutoria que la firma que pone en el escrito de dicha
hoja . . . porque es letra tan extranjera, como es su habla, de modo que en habla y letra
tiene dos irrefragables testigos de su extranjería.’’
86. AGN/L, RTC, contencioso 252, cuaderno 76, 14–16, on p. 14. The original reads:
‘‘es notoria su extranjería en primer lugar . . . no porque no habla el castellano, sino
porque no lo habla seguido, tropieza en las palabras sin que esto venga de defecto en las
articulaciones y le falta aquella extensión de términos que es propia de quien los ha
246 Notes to Pages 114–16
adquirido después de la edad mayor.’’ Similar claims were made against Francisco Vasalo
in the same cuaderno, 38–41 on p. 42. Another example is the case of Juan Bautista
Placert, narrated in AGI, Quito 126, 224–25. Juan was suspected of foreignness because
of his surname. But following legal procedures, he was declared native. In 1722, Andrian
Pedro Barnes was classified as a foreigner because of his surname. It was later made clear
that he was the son of foreigners born in Spain and thus, a ‘‘true Spaniard’’: his case,
discussed on August 1722, in AGI, IG 1538. The case of Guillermo Béquer was similar:
decision of March 5, 1624, in AGI, contratación 50B.
87. The problems inherent in using cultural traits as proofs for membership was openly
discussed in the allegations of the merchant guild of January 21, 1762: AGN/L, SG,
varios 3, cuaderno 107. See also AGN/L, RTC, contencioso 252, cuaderno 61, 51, and
AGN/L, SG, varios 4, cuaderno 122, especially the opinion of the fiscal dated December
10, 1761. This was also the conclusion of the Cádiz merchant guild according to ‘‘Acu-
erdo del comercio de Cádiz,’’ August 21, 1721, in AGI, consulados 892A, 10.
88. AGN/L, SG, varios 3, cuaderno 107.
89. Town council meetings of January 3, and June 27, 1795, and meeting of January
12, 1796, in Acuerdos del extinguido cabildo de Buenos Aires, ser. 3, vol. 10, libros 49–
54, 465 and 515 and vol. 11, libros 54–57, 16, respectively.
90. Letter of the interim viceroy of Peru to the king, dated August 11, 1681, in AGI,
Lima 81, cuaderno 4, no. 20. The original reads: ‘‘la averiguación de esta materia es muy
dificultosa, pues en las Indias pocos o ningunos solicitan mantenerse en ellas confesando
ser franceses, ingleses, holandeses ni de otra nación, sino la de castellanos, andaluces,
navarros y vizcaínos, usando la cautela de mudarse el nombre por si llegase el caso de la
pesquisa de averiguarles la patria.’’ The complaint of Lima’s merchant guild on December
16, 1761 was similar, according to the information it supplied the viceroy in AGN/L,
RTC, SG, varios 4, cuaderno 122. An additional copy of this information is inserted in
AGN/L, RTC, contencioso 252, cuaderno 65, 10–20.
91. AGN/L, RTC, contencioso 252, cuaderno 77, 1–9. The original reads: ‘‘porque yo
soy español, siendo nativo de la ciudad de Valencia.’’
92. Other authorities, under different circumstances, were nevertheless willing to ac-
cept licences of passage as proofs. For example, in 1678 Buenos Aires, the city council
refused to proceed against several ‘‘Greek merchants’’ because the licences they carried
certified that they were Spaniards: Acuerdos del extinguido cabildo de Buenos Aires, vol.
15, libro 10, 216–17.
93. ‘‘Public fame’’ and ‘‘public knowledge’’ were categories of proof: Lévy, La hiér-
archie des preuves; Ghisalberti, ‘‘La teoria’’; and Herzog, La administración, 255–78.
94. AGN/BA, 9–39–7–3.
95. The case of Joseph Labordiva in AGN/L, RTC, contencioso 252, cuadernos 61, 3
and 77, and cuaderno 65, 15.
96. Carta ejecutoria of March 20, 1723, in AGI, consulados, libro 446, and AGI,
consulados, libro 445, unattached document.
97. AGN/L, RTC, contencioso 252, cuaderno 76, 32–36. The original reads: ‘‘lo que se
trata en este proceso es distinguir el extranjero del natural, lo que no puede hacerse sin
prueba y no porque el tribunal cometa algún error de lista en que se incluyen muchos que
no son extranjeros se puede resolver sobre sola su consulta.’’
Notes to Pages 119–23 247
privilegios que gozen en España los naturales irlandeses,’’ dated May 4, 1792, in AGI,
consulados 53.
16. AN/Q, gobierno 21, expediente 19.11.1763. The original reads: ‘‘una vez he log-
rado el hallarme distante del riesgo de que huí, y he conseguido el seguro de la tran-
qulidad en mi cristiana profesión, gozando de este beneficio el espacio de 10 años a que
moro entre españoles y sus tierras, prentendo y protesto jurar domicilio y vecindad en el
lugar que más cómodo me fuese de este provincia’’ and ‘‘a más de lo que decí lleva la
religión y el derecho natural y el amparo y protección que de más de católico de un sujeto,
que desde sus tiernos años huyendo de que lo infestasen las diversas sectas de herejía, ha
que se hallaba expuesto en un reino y nación protestante.’’
17. The cases of Juan Valois, Diego Poner, and Arturo Alejandro, who defended their
right to remain in Peru in 1761: AGN/L, RTC, contencioso 252, cuadernos 64 and 77,
and AGN/L, SG, varios 4.
18. The opinion of the fiscal of Quito, dated March 1, 1763, in AN/Q, gobierno 21,
expediente 19.11.1763. The same position was also adopted by Antunes y Acevedo,
Memorias históricas, 293–95.
19. This became the common practice: AGI, consulados, libro 445, 244–46 and 262–
65.
20. The Spanish version identified the Chueta as ‘‘de estirpe hebraica.’’ Eighteenth-
century Chuetas are studied in Paz, ‘‘Reclamaciones’’; Moore, Those of the Street, 153–
54; Cortés Cortés, Historia de los judíos mallorquines, vol. 2, 333–47; Selke, Conversos
of Majorca; Isaac, Els jueus de Majorca, 58–59; González Esquerdo, ‘‘Orígines’’; and
Poqueres i Gené, Lourde alliance, 244–51. Their petition dated February 12, 1773, as
well as the proceedings that followed it, are found in AGS, GJ 1021. Many of these
documents were published by Pérez Martínez, Revindicación de los judíos mallorquines.
Their contents are also summarized in Riera, Carlos III y los Chuetas mallorquines.
21. Petition of the Chuetas of February 12, 1773, in AGS, GJ 1021. The original reads:
‘‘todos los hijos de Adán descienden de judíos o gentiles’’ and ‘‘Cuál era la causa para la
exclusión . . . que si por a caso era el que viniesen los suplicantes de un orígen que tal vez
es común a toda la nación y sin duda a la mayor parte.’’
22. The report of the audiencia dated May 4, 1774, in AGS, GJ 1021.
23. The original reads: ‘‘denigran en general a la nación española, con uno de los
mayores demuestros que conocían las leyes, afirmando en su memorial que el orígen de
que ellos venían era tal vez común a toda la nación y sin duda a la mayor parte? Qué se
podía prometer de los que tenían la loca osadía de suplicar a su rey que los sacase de su
bajesa y los enlasase a todos los honores reputándole precisado a ello, cuando ni los
vasallos del más alto carácter hablan en este tono a su soberano?’’
24. The original reads: ‘‘humillados . . . los individuos de la calle aspirarían siempre a
ser conservados en la patria en que nacieron, por medio de una conducta justificada,
porque a tales gentes solo les contenía el temor de perder sus intereses y conveniencias y
no el amor al príncipe que les defendía ni al estado con cuya substancia vivían, ni tenían
por honor otro objeto que su interés.’’
25. Opinion of July 2, 1774, in AGS, GJ 1021. Pedro Rodríguez Campomanes (1723–
1803) was a well-known figure in Spanish enlightened circles and was personally respon-
Notes to Pages 126–29 249
sible for many eighteenth-century reforms: Rodríguez Díaz, Reforma e ilustración; Llom-
bart, Campomanes; and Vallejo García-Hevia, Campomanes, 143–52.
26. Opinion of March 1, 1775, in AGS, GJ 1021.
27. Consulta of November 15, 1778, in AGS, GJ 1021.
28. The original reads: ‘‘encender un violento fuego de emulación y odio inexinguible
porque en la aprehensión de la gente popular se interpreta como una mancha de honor.’’
29. Opinion of October 1, 1782, in AGS, GJ 1021. The status of Minorca during that
period is described in Piña Homs, La reincorporación de Menorca and the cédula of
March 11, 1799, in AN/Q, gobierno 51, expediente 21.10.1799.
30. The discrimination of converso in late medieval and early modern Spain was the
subject of innumerable studies. For my purpose, I found the following most useful:
Sicroff, Les controverses des status de ‘‘pureté de sang’’; Domínguez Ortiz, Los judeocon-
versos; Riandiere la Roche, ‘‘Du Discours’’; Contreras, ‘‘Limpieza’’; Molas Ribalta, ‘‘El
exclusivismo’’; Gutiérrez Nieto, ‘‘El reformismo’’; Kamen, ‘‘El ámbito’’ and in his ‘‘Lim-
pieza’’; Cuart Moner, Colegiales mayores y limpieza de sangre; Hernández Franco, Cul-
tura y limpieza de sangre, 11–21 and 175–78; and Netanyahu, Origins of the Inquisi-
tion, 351–661 and 1003–4.
31. Dedieu, ‘‘Hérésie.’’
32. These orders were mentioned in a cédula of November 11, 1692, in ACV, SA-
Ced/Prag. C.8–66. The literature on anti-Gypsies legislation in Spain is abundant. Some
of the most important titles are: Sánchez Ortega, Documentación sobre la situación and
Los gitanos españoles; Leblon, ‘‘Les gitans dans la péninsule,’’ in Les gitans d’Espagne,
and in ‘‘Les gitans: Une société fermée?’’; and Peñafiel Ramón, ‘‘Gitanos.’’ Anti-Gypsies
perceptions were also mentioned by Herrero García, Ideas de los españoles, 641–55, and
García Martínez, ‘‘Otra.’’
33. Pragmática of June 12, 1695, in ACV, SA-Ced/Prag. C.8–88.
34. Pragmáticas of January 14, 1717; October 1, 1726; October 30, 1745; July 19,
1746; October 28, 1749; and February 28, 1784, citing that of September 19, 1783, in
ACV, SA-Ced/Prag. C.10–88; C.10–139; C.12–8; C.12–18; and C.12–53, and in AGS,
GJ 1004, respectively. The contents of many of these pragmáticas are enumerated in the
Novísima Recopilación, title 16, book 12. AGS, GJ 1005 and 1006 include additional
information about the prosecution of Gypsies. See also Alvarez Valdés y Valdés, La
extranjería, 491–96.
35. According to the legislation, a Gypsy family could include three generations, as
long as the younger ones were unmarried.
36. Recopilación de Indias, law 20, title 26, book 9 and law 5, title 4, book 7. Law 5
states that Gypsies could easily trick the Indians because of their natural simplicity, and
that because of the great distances in Spanish America, they would be virtually uncontrol-
lable. The original reads: ‘‘entre los indios a los cuales engañan facilmente por su natural
simplicidad . . . y conviene que, en las Indias, por las grandes distancias que hay de unos
pueblos a otros y teniendo mejor ocasión de encubrir y disimular sus hurtos, apliquemos
el medio más eficaz para librarlas de tan perniciosa comunicación y gente mal inclinada.’’
37. Veitia Linaje, Norte de la contratación, 300.
38. These considerations were still present in the eighteenth century: Gómez Alfaro,
‘‘La polémica.’’
250 Notes to Pages 129–33
39. Petition of the cortes of Castile in 1619, reproduced in the cédula of November 11,
1692, in ACV, SA-Ced/Prag. C.8–66.
40. Cédula of November 11, 1692, in ACV, SA-Ced/Prag. C.8–66. Gómez Alfaro, La
gran redada, 13, also reproduces a 1677 opinion according to which there were once
‘‘legitimate Gypsies’’ in Spain, but none of them had survived to the present.
41. Sancho de Moncada (1619), as cited by Borrow, Zincali, 98–106. Other contem-
porary opinions are cited by Leblon, Les gitans d’Espagne, 226–27 and 229–31.
42. Chapter 1 of the pragmática of September 19, 1783, cited in the pragmática of
February 28, 1784, in AGS, GJ 1004. The original reads: ‘‘declaro que los que llaman y se
dicen gitanos no lo son por orígen ni por naturaleza ni provienen de raíz infecta alguna.’’
43. Pragmática of July 19, 1746, in ACV, SA-Ced/Prag. C.12–18. The original reads:
‘‘pues habiendo nacido tales [vasallos] y debiendo ser comprehendidos en todos los
tributos y cargas reales y personales, no es justo parezcan otra cosa.’’
44. Martínez Martínez, La minoría gitana, 47–48 and 54–62.
45. Some of these questions are treated in the reports of the audiencias of Aragon,
Valencia, Catalonia, and Granada dated 1783 and cited by Sánchez Ortega, Documenta-
ción sobre la situación, 188–218.
46. Petition of December 16, 1745, cited by the royal delegate and council of Jerez de la
Frontera and inserted in the pragmática of July 19, 1746, in ACV, SA-Ced/Prag. C.12–
18.
47. Martínez Martínez, La minoría gitana, 119–21.
48. Petition of Baltazar Vargas, dated May 1797 in AVM, secretaría 2–348–62.
49. The original reads: ‘‘modelo del buen ciudadano y leal vasallo.’’
50. This petition and many others were included in the discussions that preceded the
issuing of the pragmática of July 19, 1746, in ACV, SA-Ced/Prag. C.12–18. These types
of petitions were not new. They were already voiced as early as the 1590s according to
ACV, PC-PA(F) 561–4. Apparently, Seville also reacted against the strict implementation
of anti-Gypsy measures in 1749: Guichot, Historia de la ciudad de Sevilla, vol. 4, 378–
79.
51. A similar decision was included in a decree dated October 28, 1749, in ACV, SA-
Ced/Prag. C.12–53, that determined that anti-Gypsy measures should have never been
applied to ‘‘good Gypsies.’’ On that occasion, ‘‘good Gypsies’’ were classified as those
with a fixed domicile who were well behaved or Gypsies already holding royal decrees
classifying them as Castilians.
52. The faith of the Gypsies was thus similar to that of other itinerant people: Geremek,
Truands et misérables, 69–110, and Pérez Esteve, El problema de los vagos.
53. Sánchez Ortega, Los gitanos españoles, 159–60 and 163–65.
54. Undated petition by Manuel Blas Ortíz, cited in Sánchez Ortega, Documentación
sobre la situación, 248–50. The original reads: [their petition to include them in the]
‘‘fueros, excepciones y privilegios de naturales de estos reinos’’ [and to recognize that] ‘‘el
nombre que les había querido dar de gitanos había sido por el pretexto, no porque en la
realidad lo fuesen, pues no eran extranjeros’’ and the 1718 decree that agreed that they
were ‘‘originarios de nuestros reinos y no de nación de gitanos.’’
55. Petition of Cayetano Diez Montoya and his wife in 1739, cited in Saborit Banderas,
‘‘Gitanos,’’ 310–12.
Notes to Pages 133–35 251
56. Vaux de Foletier, ‘‘La rafle,’’ 6–7. Similar considerations also guided the authorities
of Seville in 1745–46 according to Pérez de Guzmán, Los gitanos, 75.
57. This expression was used, for example, in the pragmática of June 12, 1695, in ACV,
SA-Ced/Prag. C.8–88. Gypsy ‘‘foreignness’’ was also mentioned by Vassberg, Village,
143–46.
58. Obliged to proceed despite their protest, the judges came up with five names. Two
of them were elderly and sick, and the other three were classified as useful members of the
local community: AGN/BA 9–19–2–10, and Acuerdos del extinguido cabildo de Buenos
Aires, ser. 3, vol. 5, libros 36–60, 70–71 and 424–25.
59. Martínez y Martínez, La minoría gitana, 102–4. The original reads: ‘‘con traje
desaliñado, poca limpieza en el vestido, moreno color y dichas señales les daban de
gitanos.’’
60. Gómez Alfaro, La gran redada, 48 and 54–55; and Martínez y Martínez, La
minoría gitana, 106–8 and 119–29.
61. This distinction is clear in the Siete Partidas, which dedicates different titles (titles
24 and 25, partida 4) to vassalage and nativeness. See also Fuero Viejo, book 1, title 3,
law 1, and Celso, Las leyes, 243 (R and V) and 353 (R).
62. Siete Partidas, law 2, title 24, partida 4.
63. Maravall, ‘‘Del régimen,’’ 120–26, and Pérez Prendes Muñoz Arraco, ‘‘Los crite-
rios,’’ 1041–53, and ‘‘La obsesión.’’
64. Lalinde Abadía, ‘‘L’inserimento,’’ 52–53. Early modern Spanish legislation and
legal and political practice continued to refer to people as ‘‘vassals,’’ rather than as
‘‘subjects’’ of the king.
65. Naturalization letter of November 5, 1740, in AGI, IG 1536. The original reads:
‘‘nació en ella [Milán] . . . cuando estaba en mi legítimo dominio, siendo su padre . . . uno
de mis más fieles vasallos y natural de ella. Luego que se apoderaron de aquel estado las
armas de Alemania (1707) por no querer reconocer ni tener otro soberano que a mí, dejó
su patria y adandonándola se vino a España, avecindado en Cádiz, trayendo su familia y
al suplicante muy niño con él.’’
66. Naturalization letter of March 31, 1708, in AVM, secretaría 2–345–26. The origi-
nal reads: ‘‘a lo que ha padecido por fiel vasallo de Su Majestad habiendo salido dester-
rado de aquella ciudad por el principe Eugenio . . . sacrificando su persona, bienes y
hacienda al furor de los enemigos.’’
67. The case of Pedro de la Mesta (s/f) in AN/Q, gobierno 12, expediente 25.6.1731.
The original reads: ‘‘con el ardor de fiel vasallo, porque en mi primera edad, servía vuestra
real persona con toda la fidelidad necesaria, con las tropas, en los reinos de España, en las
campañas de los años de 6, 7, y 8 de este siglo, en los sitios de Barcelona, Lérida,
Cartagena de Levante y en otras funciones de guerra a que en el transcurso de dichas
campañas se ofrecieron, arriesgando sangre y vida en defensa de vuestros derechos y de
vuestras banderas reales.’’
68. AN/Q, FE 34, vol. 94, no. 3643, 102–31, expediente 13.10.1775. An identical
claim was made by Francisco Lafariña y Madrigal in 1720 according to the consulta of
the cámara of Castile, dated December 11, 1720, in AGS, GJ 873.
69. Petition of Juan and Joseph Benavides, of April 6, 1740, in AGI, IG 1536. The
original reads: ‘‘que se reputa por agregado a la corona de Aragón.’’
252 Notes to Page 135
70. Petition of Luis Melloni, cited by the cámara on August 27, 1777, in AGS, GJ 873.
The original reads: ‘‘le favorecía también y persuadía una especie de equidad y memoria
antigua a que no se entendiera con los sardos tan rigorosamente como con otros extran-
jeros la disposición de la ley 14, título 3, libro 1 de la recopilación.’’
71. ‘‘Súplica hecha a S.M. por los flamencos establecidos en Sevilla que se les recon-
ociera tener los mismos derechos que los españoles’’ in AGI, EC 1057A, 428R–431R on
fols. 428V–429R and discussed by the Council of the Indies in 1722 and 1723. An
additional copy of the same súplica can be found in BNE MSS 18.649–62. The original
reads: ‘‘Los flamencos han sido de algunos siglos a esta parte vasallos de esta corona,
lograron siempre la primera estimación entre cualesquiera súbditos por el singular ap-
recio que los predecesores de Vuestra Majestad han hecho de su dominio. Queda al
escrutinio de los anales los méritos que tuvieron para desfrenar la violencia de sus prín-
cipes, pero no pueden omitir la representación que hacen de los muchos servicios que
frequentaron en su país a la corona y de los poco inferiores que han repetido sus indi-
viduos en Castilla. En el feliz reinado de vuestra majestad se ha visto con más claridad su
celo y su servicio, asi en las contribuciones que han ejecutado, como en el dictámen con
que resolvieron abandonar su patria y sus intereses. . . . Tan conforme y tan genial ha sido
su trato con los españoles siempre, que jamás han oído en este país el nombre de extran-
jeros y los españoles han vivido siempre en Flandres como naturales.’’ The same question
was also studied in ‘‘Explicación de la última determinación del rey y superior consejo de
las Indias en el pleito entre el comercio de España y los hijos de extranjeros nacidos en
estos dominios’’ in AGI, consulados 892A, 1 and 7 and in the opinion of the representa-
tive of royal interests ( fiscal ) in the Council of the Indies dated March 6, 1723, in AGI,
EC 1057A, pieza 5, 416R–7V.
72. Vietia Linaje, Norte de la contratación, 329–30, and Solórzano Pereira, Política
Indiana, book 4, chap. 19, point 37.
73. It was literally asserted ‘‘que la denominación solo que usa Su Magestad de ser
señor de aquel reino [Sardinia] no es suficiente como se verifica en otros varios y habría la
misma razón a favor de los naturales de Milán y Flandres’’: letter of Manuel de Rodó to
Manuel Figueroa, dated September 5, 1777, in AGS, GJ 873. Similar assertions were
made in the cases of Francisco de la Fariña and Luis Melloni, debated on July 1721 and
August 27, 1777, respectively, both in AGS, GJ 873 and in the literature, e.g., Alamos de
Barrientos, Discurso político, 8–11.
74. ‘‘Noticia de las diligencias hechas entre el consulado y los hijos de extranjeros en
grave dependencia que se subscitó en el año 1719 y se feneció en él de 1728’’ in AGI,
consulados 892A, 17. The original reads: ‘‘aun cuando los países de Flandes de que eran
naturales sus padres se conservasen en el dominio de la corona de España y no estuviesen
ocupados por las armas del señor emperador conforme a la ley que queda citada que
previene cual hayan de estimarse naturales de España para el comercio de las Indias, no lo
podrían ser los flamencos, como ni los napolitanos, milaneses ni demás, para lo que
acordó la distinción legal que hay entre los estados, que se unen accesoriamente y los que
aquae principaliter se agregan, pues los primeros perdiendo todos sus fueros, privilegios y
leyes se hacen un cuerpo indiviso e indistinto con el resto de la monarquía en sus orig-
inarios dominios para gozar y padecer sin diferencias los mismos privilegios contribu-
ciones y cargas como que es conexo y consiguiente lo uno a lo otro, y los que aquae
Notes to Pages 135–38 253
principaliter se agregan, como que se retiene las excepciones y privilegios que o tenían
antes o se les concedieron al tiempo de admitirlos y que no están gravados con las
pensiones y cargas que los naturales, no deben gozar de sus privilegios bien, si solo de los
que se les hubieren concedido en fuerza de gracia o pacto al tiempo de su agregación, los
que sirven de limitación para que queden excluidos los demás.’’ The same view was also
expressed in ‘‘Por el fiscal de su majestad, en defensa de la respuesta que dió a las
pretensions introducidas por los hijos nacidos en España de padres extranjeros.’’ AGI, IG
2301, 7R: ‘‘Y la razón de vasallos, aunque hoy están debajo de diverso dominio, no les da
privilegios alguno, como no le han tenido y pretendido napolitanos, sicilianos y mila-
neses, porque estos se unieron a la corona de Castilla aquae principaliter y asi, conser-
varon sus fueros y privilegios y los mismo sucedió a los flamencos.’’ This point was also
treated by the representative or royal interests on March 6, 1723, in AGI, EC 1057A,
416R–417V, and by Dedieu, ‘‘Los gobernadores,’’ 493–95.
75. These terms were mentioned in Puerto Santa María: the cases of Guillermo Mac-
Donnel and Wencenlau Helm in AHN, estado 629–1/8. See also the draft of a consulta,
based on the decree of November 24, 1763, and a cédula of June 28, 1764, in AHN,
estado 5042, and AHN, estado 629–1/2.
76. These terms were used in Orán and San Sebastian according to AHN, estado 629–
1/4 and 1/6.
77. The case of Domingo French in AHN, estado 629–1/10.
78. Consulta of February 26, 1774, in AHN, estado 5042, 155. Pérez Collados, Una ap-
roximación histórica, 67, and Castro, ‘‘la legislación,’’ 247–51, express similar opinions.
79. Pedro Vidarte and Juan Atey in 1761 in AGN/L, RTC, contencioso 252, cuaderno
66, and Francisco Aguirre on January 18, 1785, in AGI, IG 1536. According to Pedro:
‘‘aunque ésta se separó de las otras [merindades] cuando el santo rey don Fernando el
católico desposeyó de Navarra la alta a Juan III de Navarra, pero con todos los reyes de
España, nunca han querido perder su derecho a esta merindad, haciendo y ejecutando
actos positivos de dominio para conservarla en él. . . . El rey es dueño de sus dominios y el
mejor autor de los límites de su corona . . . [y por su decisión] los naturales de Navarra la
Baja no son extranjeros sino españoles y sujetos a los dominios de España.’’ According to
Francisco: ‘‘desde que se incorporó el reino de Navarra con los de Castilla, se han conser-
vado en ellos todos los derechos de españoles a los naturales de la sexta merindad,
llamada comúnamente Navarra la Baja que actualmente se halla bajo denominación de
los reyes de Francia.’’ Other Lower Navarres accepted their classification as foreigners:
e.g., Juan Pablo Carrense and Bernardo Cros, whose cases were discussed on January 21,
1788, and May 5, 1798, both in AGI, IG 1536.
80. Consulta of the cámara dated July 20, 1782, in AGS, GJ 873. The original reads:
‘‘virtualmente se contemplan iguales a los naturales de España o comprendidos bajo el
dominio de esta corona, y aun por esto conservan la recepción en la orden militar de San
Juan bajo el concepto de naturales o caballeros de la lengua de Aragón.’’
81. Consulta of the cámara of Castile, June 16, 1770, in AGS, GJ 873. Minorca was
ceded to Britain in the Treaty of Utrecht (1713) and was formally incorporated to Spain
only in the Treaty of Versalles (1783). It was briefly reoccupied by Britain in 1798: Piña
Homs, La reincorporación de Menorca, 45–47. See also cédula of March 11, 1799, in
AN/Q, gobierno 51, expediente 21.10.1799.
254 Notes to Pages 138–43
82. Assadourian, Beato, and Chiaramonte, Historia de Argentina, 159, 167–68, 248,
and 282–86.
83. The case of Manuel Zipirana de Melo, debated in 1786 in Buenos Aires in AP/LP
7–3–115–6, esp. 40V–42V, 46V–47V, and 63R–66R. The originals read: ‘‘Nadie está
obligado a sujetarse a más de lo que ha convenido y un ciudadano que se constituyó a
vivir en sociedad en un estado libre e independiente, puede muy bien mudado ésta de
naturaleza y sometiéndose a dominio extraño, abandonarla y ausentarse de ella . . .
porque se rompieron y cortaron por este medio los lazos de la sociedad y la obligación
que esto ha con ésta. En una palabra: quedó entera y naturalmente libre para elegir y
someterse al imperio y dominación que le plazca’’ and ‘‘Naturaleza . . . es aquella obliga-
ción de amarse y quererse bien por algún justo motivo. Extranjería por el sentido opuesto
es una precindencia de aquella calidad introducida por derecho de gentes, de que nació la
distinción de dominios, establecimientos de reinos, fundación de pueblos y separación de
provincias. De suerte que a no ser esta división, todos seríamos naturales de todas tierras
y de ninguna extranjeros. La obligación de amarnos sería una misma en todos y se
conociera la pertenencia de unos a los otros. El hombre, para cuyo servicio, utilidad y
recreo formó Dios esta gran máquina del universo, tiene derecho natural de habitar y
vivir en todas y cada cual de sus partes. Toda la tierra es su patria y de toda ella es
originario y natural. Ahora pues, este derecho que puso raya a las naciones y sujeta a cada
cual de ellas dentro de los términos de su pertenencia, aunque hijo primogénito de la
razón, está sujeto a las contigencias del tiempo y puede padecer sus alteraciones, quiero
decir, que la división o separación de dominios que inventaron hoy, puede enmendarse
mañana por nueva determinación de sus autores y como esta circunstancia hace en el
hombre la cualidad de nacional o extranjero, siempre que ellas se muden o se alteren los
dominios se muda también la condición o estado civil del hombre hablando en términos
jurídicos y el que ayer fue natural puede ser hoy extranjero o viceversa.’’
84. The cases of Antonio Rivero de los Santos and Manuel Ferreiro de la Cruz in
AGN/BA 9–35–3–3, expediente 105, and cédula of April 30, 1773, in AGI, IG 1536,
respectively. AGI, IG 1536 contains many other examples.
des, provincias, estados; and Guerra, Modernindad e indepenencia and in his most recent
‘‘Implosion.’’
5. Liss, Mexico under Spain; Pagden, ‘‘Identity Formation’’; Lavallé, ‘‘Hacia’’; and
Lynch, ‘‘Introduction,’’ 34–37.
6. Brading, Origins; Guerra, ‘‘La nation’’; and Harwich Vallenilla, ‘‘Construcción.’’
Criticism of this analysis can be found in Bertrand, ‘‘Comment,’’ 99–101. Creolism won
prominence in the Anglo-speaking world in the 1980s after its inclusion in Benedict
Anderson’s Imagined Communities, where it was classified as an early example of a
modern national identity. Lomnitz, ‘‘Nationalism,’’ includes a critique of his use and
understanding of Creolism.
7. Lavallé, Las promesas, 25; Lafaye, Quetzalcoátl et Guadalupe, 20; Pietschmann,
‘‘Los principios,’’ 88; and Pastor, ‘‘Criollismo,’’ 265.
8. Lavallé, ‘‘Hispanité’’; Pagden, ‘‘Old Constitutions’’; and Alberro, Les espagnols,
11. Recently some historians have affirmed that until the independence Creoles perceived
themselves as Spaniards: Brading, ‘‘Nationalism’’; Guerra, ‘‘Implosion’’ and in his ‘‘Iden-
tidad,’’ 221–24.
9. Minguet, ‘‘Nationalisme’’; Lavallé, ‘‘Conception’’ and in his Las promesas, 105–
27 and 129–41; Clément, ‘‘La connaissance’’; and Brading ‘‘Patriotism,’’ 30–33 and
39–40.
10. See note 1 and 3, above.
11. Guerra, ‘‘El soberano,’’ 41–44 and 47–48.
12. Liss, Mexico under Spain, 25–26.
13. Tibesar, ‘‘Alternative,’’ and Lavallé, Recherches sur l’apparition and in his Las
promesas ambiguas.
14. Lavallé, ‘‘Hispanité,’’ 96–99.
15. Burkholder and Chandler, From Impotence. Current research indicates that, de-
spite Creole vindications, Creoles did obtain many offices and in fact controlled most of
the local church, government, and judicial institutions: Kicza, ‘‘Social’’; Brading, ‘‘Gov-
ernment,’’ 400–405; Pérez Herrero, ‘‘Beneficiaries’’; and Morelli, ‘‘Las reformas.’’
16. ‘‘Representación hecha por los americanos a nuestro rey Carlos III lamentándose
de que no se les mira y distingue como sus méritos piden solo por residir allí,’’ an anony-
mous pamphlet dated Madrid May 30, 1774, in BN/L, MSS C4321 and ‘‘Discurso del
abad Don Ramón Dios . . . sobre la oposición que los escritores extranjeros fingen y
exageran entre los españoles europeos y americanos,’’ undated pamphlet in BPR II 2851,
no. 10, 270R–296R. Similar issues were raised in British North America: Breen, ‘‘Ideol-
ogy,’’ 23 and 26–30.
17. ‘‘Representación hecha por los americanos a nuestro rey Carlos III lamentándose
de que no se les mira y distingue como sus méritos piden solo por residir allí,’’ an anony-
mous pamphlet dated Madrid May 30, 1774, in BN/L, MSS C4321. The original reads:
‘‘los originarios privilegios de sangre con que pasaron a aquellos reinos sus abuelos’’ and
‘‘a fin de que asi formasen un solo cuerpo político, sin alguna diferencia en el goze de sus
antiguos prerrogativas de Castilla.’’ See also Alonso de Solórzano y Velasco, ‘‘Discurso
legal e información en derecho a favor de los nacidos en los reinos del Perú y convenien-
cias para que en él, sin el obice de haber nacido allí, pueden obtener plazas de oidor y
demás que les están prohibidas,’’ (1652) in BPR MSS 2848, 27R–57V.
256 Notes to Pages 146–49
18. Manzano Manzano, La incorporación and in his ‘‘La adquisición’’; Konetzke, ‘‘La
condición’’; and Pietschmann, ‘‘La resistencia.’’
19. This rule was affirmed on many different instances. It was clear from the treatment
of native Spaniards in Spanish America, but was also clearly stated in legislation, e.g.,
cédula of January 2, 1788, reproduced in Konetzke, Colección de documentos, vol. 3/1,
434–35.
20. Pagden, ‘‘Identity,’’ 60–65.
21. Pedro de Bolívar y de la Redonda, ‘‘Memorial, informe y discurso legal, histórico y
político . . . en favor de los españoles que en ellas nacen, estudian y sirven’’ (Madrid,
1667), the Lilly Library, Indiana University, Bloomington, 3V, 25R, 32R-V, 45V, 53R and
56R.
22. Juan Antonio de Ahumada, ‘‘Representación político-legal a la majestad del señor
don Felipe V en favor de los empleos políticos, de guerra y ecclesiásticos’’ (1725), re-
produced in Documentos selectos el centro de estudios, 87–105. Another intervention by
Ahumada, this time affirming the Spanishness of Creoles, is described in Baeza Martin,
‘‘La Condena,’’ 461.
23. Letter of November 28, 1796, reproduced in Blanco, Documentos para la historia
de la vida pública, 267–75, on 269–70 and 272. Among the quotations are: ‘‘y cuando ya
se saben [las leyes], impede a los magistrados aquella natural flojedad con que mira el
hombre los intereses ajenos y de un país en que solo se halla transeunte y a que solo se
condujo por el deseo de adquirir bienes suficientes para concluir su carrera en su propio
país o en otra parte . . . manifestando su desaplicación o dificultad en ordenar las cosas y
remediar los males, sin otro motivo que él de no tener necesidad de permanecer aquí y de
que habiendo de dejar la América, importa poco su destrucción.’’ The king has to main-
tain the loyalty of ‘‘los naturales y vecinos españoles que por estar casados o tener sus
bienes en ella, procuran vivir en paz y en la religión y subordinación en que nacieron y
solo solicitan de V. M. los conserve con el honor de sus ascendientes.’’ A similar distinc-
tion, which divided the Franciscans of Mexico into ‘‘Spaniards,’’ ‘‘sons of the province’’
(persons who were born in Spain, yet were ordained in the New World), and ‘‘Creoles,’’
was examined by Morales, Ethnic and Social Background, 45–75.
24. Teresa de Mier, Memorias, 281, and in his Historia de la Revolución, 524–25 and
462. I would like to thank Gabriela Gómez Cárcamo for calling to my attention to these
sources, which she analyzed in a seminar paper titled ‘‘Fray Servando de Mier: Meaning
and Nuance,’’ presented to the Department of History of the University of Chicago in
1999. A similar affirmation was made with regard to the English in British North Amer-
ica: Wahrman, ‘‘The English,’’ 1256.
25. Gaceta de Buenos Aires, September 17, 1810, cited in Vogel, ‘‘New Citizens,’’ 111.
26. Galmorini, ‘‘La situación.’’ Although this situation continued in early 1811, as
demonstrated by the town council records of March, April, and May 1811 in Acuerdos
del extinguido cabildo de Buenos Aires, ser. 4, vol. 4, libros 65–67, 427–31, 433–35,
437, 445–54, 460–64, and 470, at a later date the distinction between natives and
naturalized reemerged, and the council affirmed the exclusive right of those born in the
city to be deputies in the congress.
27. Mariano Beristáin de Souza, cited in Brading, ‘‘Patriotism,’’ 32.
Notes to Pages 149–50 257
28. The political use of natural law in colonial and republican Spanish America was
also analyzed by Chiaramonte, ‘‘Fundamentos.’’
29. ‘‘Representación que hizo la ciudad de México al rey don Carlos III en 1771 sobre
que los criollos deben ser preferidos a los europeos en la distribución de empleos y
beneficios de estos reinos,’’ dated March 2, 1711, and reproduced in Hernández Dávalos,
Colección de documentos para la historia, vol. 1, no. 195, pp. 427–55, quotation on pp.
429–30. The original reads: ‘‘Pues obran contra ellos las mismas razones, porque todas
las gentes han defendido siempre el acomodo de los extraños. Lo son en lo natural,
aunque no en lo civil en la America los europeos; y como no alcance la fuerza civil a la
esfera de los efectos naturales, hemos de experimentar estos de los hijos de la antigua
España, por más que civilmente se entiendan no extraños de la nueva. Entre los efectos
naturales se cuenta con mucha razón el amor que tienen los hombres a aquel suelo, en que
nacieron y el desafecto a todo otro, siendo estos dos motivos los más solidos principios,
que persuaden la colocación del natural y resisten la del extraño.’’
‘‘Representación que hizo la ciudad de México al rey don Carlos III en 1771 sobre que
los criollos deben ser preferidos a los europeos en la distribución de empleos y beneficios
de estos reinos,’’ dated March 2, 1711, and reproduced in Hernández Dávalos, Colección
de documentos para la historia, vol. 1, no. 195, 427–55, quotation on p. 430. The
original reads: ‘‘Estos por más que no se consideren civilmente extranjeros en Indias, los
cierto es que no recibieron el ser en ellas: que tienen en la antigua España, y no en la
nueva, sus casas, sus padres, sus hermanos y quanto es capaz de arrastrar la inclinación de
un hombre; que cuando a esta distancia se destierran a servir un empleo, no muden de
naturaleza, ni se hacen insensibles a los impulsos de la con que nacieron y por todo ello es
fuerza, que desde estas regiones no pierdan de vista la atención a los suyos, y sobre
consultar a socorrerlos (si ya no es a enriquecerlos) se contemplan pasajeros en la Amér-
ica, teniendo por objeto el volverse a la quietud de su patria, y casa acomodadas.’’
30. Juan Pablo Viscardo y Guzmán, ‘‘Carta a los españoles americanos,’’ (1792) re-
produced in Sánchez, Fuentes documentales sobre la ideología, 41–59, quotation on pp.
44–46.
31. ‘‘Representación que hizo la ciudad de México al rey don Carlos III en 1771 sobre
que los criollos deben ser preferidos a los europeos en la distribución de empleos y
beneficios de estos reinos,’’ dated March 2, 1711, reproduced in Hernández Dávalos,
Colección de documentos para la historia de la guerra, vol. 1, 427–55, quotation on p.
429. A copy of the same document is found in BN/L, MSS C4321. The originals read:
‘‘trae su antigüedad desde antes de la ley evangélica y el mismo dios la reconoció alta-
mente impresa en los corazones de su pueblo’’ and ‘‘Es una máxima apoyada por las leyes
de todos los reinos, adoptada por todas las naciones, dictada por sencillos principios, que
forman la razón natural e impresa en los corazones y votos de los hombres. . . . Es un
derecho, que si no podemos graduar de natural primario, es sin duda común de todas las
gentes y por esto de sacratísima observancia.’’
32. Brading, ‘‘Patriotism,’’ 22–23 and 29–30.
33. Guerra, ‘‘Identidad y soberanía,’’ 225. On February 11, 1812, an article published
in the newspaper El Censor (Buenos Aires) and cited by Ternavasio, ‘‘Política,’’ chap. 1, n.
11, declared that ‘‘las provincias de la América española están declarads por ley iguales en
258 Notes to Pages 150–53
todo con las de España. En virtud de esto se niegan varias de ellas, a reconocer por
soberano a un gobierno constituído en la península por las provincias españolas, y sin la
anuencia de las americanas.’’ I would like to thank Marcela Ternavasio for allowing me
to cite her work.
34. Torres, Memorial, 9. The original reads: ‘‘Tan españoles somos como los descen-
dientes de Don Pelayo y tan acreedores, por esta razón, a las distincciones, privilegios y
prerrogativas del resto de la nación.’’
35. Guridi y Alcocer on January 9, 1811, DDACC, vol. 2, 318. The original reads: ‘‘Los
americanos como hijos de los europeos, mamamos al nacer el amor a la península y desde
la niñez nos llamamos y nos tenemos por hijos de ella. Suenan bien en nuestros oídos sus
nombres y hasta los de sus villas y lugares y no solo somos españoles, sino que nos
gloriamos de serlo.’’
36. The decree of February 9, 1811, reproduced in Armellada, La causa indígena, 59,
declared the rights of Spanish Americans to hold public offices in the court and anywhere
else in the monarchy.
37. Annino, ‘‘Ciudadanía,’’ 68, and Carmagnani and Hernández Chávez, ‘‘La ciuda-
danía,’’ 374–76.
38. Rieu-Millan, Los diputados americanos, 246–50; Ramos, ‘‘Las cortes,’’ 437–53;
Fisher, ‘‘Monarquismo’’; Guerra, Modernidad e independencia and in his ‘‘Identidades y
soberanía’’; Estrada Icaza, La lucha; Chiaramonte, ‘‘Modificaciones’’ and in Ciudades,
provincias, estados, 371–73; Annino, ‘‘Soberanías’’; Morelli, ‘‘Territorio’’ and in her ‘‘El
espacio.’’ The way rivalries between Spanish American jurisdictions propelled both local-
ism and Creolism is described in Liss, Atlantic Empires, 88–90, and Lafaye, Quetzal-
coátl, 22–24.
39. The original reads: ‘‘La nación española es la reunión de todos los españoles de
ambos hemisferios,’’ (art. 1) and ‘‘los españoles son: primero, todos los hombres libres
nacidos y avecindados en los dominios de las Españas y los hijos de estos. Segundo: los
extranjeros que hayan obtenido de las Cortes carta de naturaleza. Tercero: los que sin ella
lleven diez años de vecindad, ganada segun la ley en cualquier pueblo de la monarquía.
Cuarto: los libertos desde que adquieren la libertad en las Españas’’ (art. 5).
40. ‘‘Son ciudadanos aquellos españoles que por ambas líneas traen su orígen de los
dominios españoles de ambos hemisferios y están avecindados en cualquier pueblo de los
mismos dominios’’; ‘‘Es también ciudadano el extranjero que gozando ya de los derechos
de español, obtuviere de las cortes carta espacial de ciudadanía’’; and ‘‘Son asi mismo
ciudadanos los hijos legítimos de los extranjeros domiciliados en las Españas, que hab-
iendo nacido en los dominios españoles, no hayan salido nunca fuera sin licencia del
gobierno, y teniendo veinte y un años cumplidos, se hayan avecindado en un pueblo de
los mismos dominios, ejerciendo en él alguna profesión, oficio o industria útil.’’
41. ‘‘Para que el extranjero pueda obtener de las cortes esta carta, deberá estar casado
con española, y haber traído o fijado en las Españas alguna invención o industria aprecia-
ble, o adquirido bienes raíces por los que pague una contribución directa o estableciendo
en él comercio con un capital propio y considerable a juicio de las mismas cortes o hecho
servicios señalados en bien y defensa de la nación.’’
42. Citizenship could also be suspended for physical or moral incapacity, bankruptcy,
Notes to Pages 153–55 259
unemployment, employment in domestic service, criminal charges and, from 1830 on-
wards, illiteracy in the case of new citizens: ‘‘El ejercicio de los mismos derechos [de
ciudadanía] se suspende, primero: en virtud de interdicción judicial por incapacidad física
o moral. Segundo: por el estado de deudor quebrado, o de deudor a los caudales públicos.
Tercero: por el estado de sirviente doméstico. Cuarto: por no tener empleo, oficio o modo
de vivir conocido. Quinto; por hallarse procesado criminalmente. Sexto: desde el año
1830 deberán saber leer y escribir los que de nuevo entren en el ejercicio de los derechos
de ciudadano.’’
43. ‘‘La calidad de ciudadano español se pierde: primero: por adquirir naturaleza en
país extranjero. Segundo: por admitir empleo de otro gobierno. Tercero: por sentencia en
que se imponga penas aflictivas o infamantes si no se obtiene rehabilitación. Cuarto: por
haber residido cinco años consecutivos fuera del territorio español sin comisión o licencia
del gobierno.’’
44. This continuity was also noted by historians, e.g., Castro, La revolución liberal,
71–73.
45. Gutiérrez de la Huerta and García Herrero on September 3, 1811, DDACC, vol. 8,
135–36; Uría on September 4, 1811, DDACC, vol. 8, 148; and Larrazábal on September
6, 1811, DDACC, vol. 8, 198–99. Argüelles answered this question arguing that Spanish-
ness and citizenship were two different things and that each promised a different regime
of rights. Explaining the consequences of this distinction, he nevertheless failed to address
the issue of how would these categories be distinguished and why should they be distin-
guished: DDACC, vol. 8, 136–37.
46. Gutiérrez de la Huerta on September 3, 1811, DDACC, vol. 8, 140, and Fernández
De Leyva on September 6, 1811, DDACC, vol. 8, 195.
47. Guridi y Alcocer on August 25, 1811, DDACC, vol. 8, 16.
48. Oliveros on September 4, 1811, DDACC, vol. 8, 146–47. The original reads: ‘‘los
hombres no sólo reciben el ser por el nacimiento, sino muy principalmente por la educa-
ción. Siempre se conserva inclinación aun más decidida hacia aquel país en el que se han
perfeccionado nuestras potencias y en los hábitos que duran por toda la vida influyen
particularmente las ideas recibidas en la educación.’’
49. Gutiérrez de la Huerta on September 3, 1811, DDACC, vol. 8, 135–36 and 138–
40. Somewhat similar was the intervention of Guridi y Alcocer in the same session.
50. Gutiérrez de la Huerta on September 3, 1811, DDACC, vol. 8, 139–40. The
original reads: ‘‘la necesidad de arraigo, que han considerado siempre las leyes como el
fundamento menos equívoco de presumir en el extranjero la intención de permanecer, la
fidelidad y adhesión a los intereses nacionales.’’
51. Feliú on September 5, 1811, DDACC, vol. 8, 187. The original reads: ‘‘Es de
suponer que conservará [el extranjero] siempre por su país nativo una predilección que
puede en ocasiones ser opuesta a los intereses de España y que se contrabalanceará por el
arraigo o apego que es natural contraiga respecto al suelo español en que ha nacido su
mujer.’’
52. Terreros and García Herrero on August 31, 1811, DDACC, vol. 8, 100–101.
53. Aner on August 31, 1811, DDACC, vol. 8, 99. Argüelles, responding, argued that
this rule was well known and was not abrogated by the constitution: 99–100.
260 Notes to Pages 155–56
54. Veladiez, Muñoz Torrero, Castillo, and Argüelles, on August 31, 1811, DDACC,
vol. 8, 100.
55. Castillo on September 3, 1811, DDACC, vol. 8, 134, and Villafañe’s answer in the
same session, 134–35.
56. King, ‘‘Colored’’; Ramos (Pérez), ‘‘Las Cortes’’; Armellada, La causa indígena;
Pérez Guilhou, La opinión pública; Berruezo, La participación americana; Rieu-Millán,
Los diputados americanos; Castillo Meléndez, Figallo Pérez, and Serrera Contreras, Las
Cortes de Cádiz; Blanco Valdés, El problema americano; García Godoy, Las cortes de
Cádiz y América; and Chust, La cuestión nacional.
57. Session of October 3, 1810, ASSCE, 8 and DDACC, vol. 1, 26–27. The relation
between Spain and Spanish America was also discussed on January 9 and 11, 1811,
DDACC, vol. 2, 316–30 and 346–72. This question was included in the consulta al país.
The consulta al país was a round of consultation with royal councils, juntas, authorities,
municipalities, tribunals, universities, ecclesiastics, and other individuals, concerning
some of the most important issues facing Spaniards in the beginning of the nineteenth
century. It was sent on June 1809 to some 150 entities. Of the 68 answers currently
available, about 40 refer to question 8 concerning the (future) status of America. Most of
these answers suggest that the inhabitants of the Americas were native Spaniards, cit-
izens, and members of the same political community: Pérez Guilhou, La opinión pública,
47–58.
58. Morales Duárez on January 11, 1811, DDACC, vol. 1, 370, and Fernández de
Leyva on January 16, 1811, DDACC, vol. 2, 432–34. The ‘‘Castilianness’’ of Spanish
America was studied by Manzano Manzano, La incorporación and in his ‘‘La adquisi-
ción’’; Pietschmann, ‘‘La resistencia’’; Levene, Las Indias; and Pagden, Lords of All the
World, 126–36.
59. Answer of Fernando Andrés Benito, relator de crímen in the royal court of Granada
to the consulta al país, dated November 23, 1809, reproduced in Artola, Los orígenes de
la España, vol. 2, 416–34, in 432. The original reads: ‘‘Su fidelidad, su entusiasmo, su
religión, su confraternidad, su unión íntima con la metropoli son otros tantos títulos que
los hacen acreedores a tan justa consideración. Son ciudadanos de una misma nación,
llenan todos los deberes de vasallos, contribuyen eficazmente con sus bienes y personas a
conservar la independencia.’’
60. Quintana on January 11, 1811, DDACC, vol. 1, 361 and 363. The original reads:
‘‘nosotros hemos utilizado su suelo y ellos el nuestro. Hemos cambiado nuestros prod-
uctos. Nos han contribuído y obedecido cuanto se les ha mandado. Tenemos allá y ellos
aquí una larga serie de ascendencia y descendencia, idioma, interés y religión igual . . .
señor: que son hermanos nuestros, españoles de 300 años.’’
61. Argüelles literally said on January 23, 1811, DDACC, vol. 3, 66 that ‘‘la población
de España europea no ofrece estos inconvenientes, porque toda ella es homogénea. No
hay aquí rivalidades, esas diferencias de castas de donde dimana el espíritu funesto de
partido.’’ Other delegates such as Guridi y Alcocer resented this implication and argued
that Spain was just as diversified as Spanish America: his opinion on January 25, 1811,
DDACC, vol. 3, 90.
62. Sessions of October 3, 10, 11, and 14, 1810, in ASSCE, 8–19, quotation on p. 19.
Notes to Pages 156–57 261
The resolution voted upon on October 14, 1810, stated: ‘‘las cortes generales y extraor-
dinarias confirman y sanccionan el inconcluso concepto de que los dominios españoles en
ambos hemisferios forman una misma y sola monarquía, una misma y sola nación y una
sola familia y que por lo mismo los naturales que sean originarios de dichos dominios
europeos y ultramarinos, son iguales en derechos a los de esta península.’’
63. This consideration was openly mentioned, e.g., by Argüelles on January 9, 1811,
DDACC, vol. 2, 323. According to ‘‘El Observador,’’ a local paper covering the sessions,
it produced highly theatrical scenes. In one of them, an American delegate (Mexia)
kneeled and implored for his miserable compatriots. Answering him, a peninsular dele-
gate (Muñoz Torrero) resented this theatrality and complained that Americans simply
wanted to achieve a majority in the parliament: Castro y Rossi, Cortes de Cádiz, 178–79.
64. Guridi y Alcocer on January 9, 1811, DDACC, vol. 2, 318. The original reads: ‘‘los
americanos como hijos de los europeos, mamamos al nacer el amor a la península y desde
la niñez nos llamamos y nos tenemos por hijos de ella. Suenan bien en nuestros oídos sus
nombres y hasta los de sus villas y lugares y no solo somos españoles, sino que nos
gloriamos de serlo. . . . [Los americanos] se quejan, no de las leyes, no de la nación, no de
los monarcas cuyo paternal amor han experimentado. Se quejan de su desgraciada situa-
ción, de que separados de la península en tan grande distancia se forman ideas erradas de
todas las cosas, no se conoce a los sujetos de mérito y aun cuando son conocidos, quedan
postergados por no estar cerca de la fuente.’’ According to Quintana (a peninsular dele-
gate), ‘‘we give them [Spanish Americans] nothing which isn’t already theirs by recogniz-
ing that they are equal to us’’ (nada que no sea suyo les damos con igualarles en todo a
nosotros): his intervention on January 1, 1811, DDACC, vol. 1, 363.
65. Solórzano Pereira, Política Indiana, book 2, chap. 1; Llaguno, La personalidad
jurídica; and García Gallo, ‘‘La condición.’’
66. Alamos de Barrientos, Discurso político, 14.
67. Mörner, ‘‘La política,’’ in La Corona española, and ‘‘Ethnicity’’; Lutz, Santiago de
Guatemala; and Solórzano Pereira, Política Indiana, book 2, chap. 26, point 44; chap.
30, points 18–57; and book 4, chap. 20. The permissibility of mixed marriages and the
equal treatment of mestizos, as long as of legitimate birth, were guaranteed by a series of
royal decrees, e.g., those dated October 19, 1514; March 19, 1525; February 27, 1549;
June 1, 1549; and November 1, 1591, reproduced in Konetzke, Colección de docu-
mentos, vol. 1, 61–63, 77, 256, 259, and 617–19.
68. Solórzano Pereira, Política Indiana, book 2, chaps. 28–29; Bayle, El protector de
indios; Borah, Justice by Insurance; and MacLeod, ‘‘La situación.’’ The hope that Indians
would ‘‘grow’’ was expressed in Solórzano Pereira, Política Indiana, book 2, chaps. 25–
26, and Mörner, ‘‘La difusión.’’ This hope was described in the Laws of Burgos (1512–
13). Article 4 of the amendment dated July 28, 1513, declared: ‘‘and whereas it may so
happen that in the course of time, that with their indoctrination and association with
Christians, the Indians will become so apt and ready to become Christians, and so civi-
lized and educated, that they will be capable of governing themselves and leading the kind
of life that the said Christians lead there, we declare and command and say that it is our
will that those Indians who thus become competent to live by themselves and govern
themselves, under the direction and control of our said judges . . . shall be allowed to live
262 Notes to Pages 157–59
by themselves and shall be obliged to serve [only] in those things in which our vassals in
Spain are accustomed to serve, so that they may serve and pay the tribute which they [our
vassals] are accustomed to pay to their princes.’’ In this quotation, I used the translation
included in Gibson, Spanish Tradition, 81.
69. Solórzano Pereira, Política Indiana, book 2, chap. 29, points 25–34.
70. Cédulas of December 19, 1696; March 26, 1697; November 27, 1703; February
21, 1725; and September 11, 1766, in Konetzke, Colección de documentos, vol. 3/1, 64–
69, 93–94, 186, and 333–34. See also Muro Orejón, Cedulario Americano, vol. 1, 602–
5. The struggle to reaffirm Indian eligibility to office was studied by Muro Orejón, ‘‘La
igualdad,’’ 268–69 and 367–75, and Olaechea Cabayen, ‘‘Política’’ and in his ‘‘La ciuda-
danía.’’ A similar decision was reached by the Supreme Council of the Inquisition around
the same time: Martínez, ‘‘Religion.’’ I would like to thank María Elena for allowing me
to cite her paper.
71. Feliú on January 30, 1811, DDACC, vol. 3, 163–68.
72. Guridi y Alcocer on January 25, 1811, DDACC, vol. 3, 92, and Castillo on August
21, 1811, DDACC, vol. 7, 461–62.
73. Castillo on August 21, 1811, DDACC, vol. 7, 461–62. The original reads: ‘‘nada
encuentro nuevo en este decreto porque nuestros leyes de Indias los consideran iguales en
todo con los españoles y les abren la puerta a los empleos y a los honores.’’
74. Morales Duárez on January 11, 1811, DDACC, vol. 2, 370–72.
75. Pérez de Castro and Feliú, both in the session of January 30, 1811, DDACC, vol. 3,
159 and 161–62. According to the first, ‘‘me hace fuerza que los indios, generalmente
hablando, ignoran el castellano . . . y si eso no pudiera ser un óbice, no sé que diríamos del
pueblo vascongado, que en general, hablando de las clases bajas, no sabe más que vas-
cuence que ciertamente no es más inteligible que las lenguas de los indios.’’ According to
the second, ‘‘y no puedo dejar de decir de paso, que son igualmente si no más hetero-
géneos un gallego y un andaluz que un español y un indio.’’ Guridi y Alcocer also men-
tioned the heterogeneity of peninsular Spain, where there were—according to him—also
Gypsies and Africans: His opinion in the session of January 25, 1811, DDACC, vol. 3, 90.
76. Quintana on January 9, 1811, DDACC, vol. 2, 317.
77. Valiente on January 23, 1811, DDACC, vol. 3, 75–76.
78. Article 25(2) spoke about ‘‘el estado de deudor quebrado o de duedor a los caudales
públicos,’’ article 25(3) mentioned ‘‘estado de sirviente doméstico,’’ and article 25(4)
spoke about those who have no ‘‘oficio o modo de vivir conocido.’’ From 1830 onwards,
suspension could also come about because of illiteracy: article 25(6).
79. Apparently, despite this rule, at least in some jurisdictions, such as New Spain,
about 91 percent of the population was considered citizens in the immediate aftermaths
of these decrees: Guerra, ‘‘El Soberano,’’ 45.
80. Valiente on January 23, 1811, DDACC, vol. 3, 75–76.
81. The distinction between Spaniards, Indians, and the mixed blood, on one hand,
and people with even partial African descent, on the other, was invoked with regards to
both citizenship and the right for representation. It was declared on October 15, 1810,
and February 7, 1811, and was commonly cited by different delegates, for example,
Morales Duárez on January 11 and February 7, 1811, DDACC, vol. 2, 367–68, and vol.
3, 281, and Guridi y Alcocer on January 25, 1811, DDACC, vol. 3, 90–95. A decree
Notes to Pages 159–60 263
dated January 26, 1814, inserted in AM/Q, MMHCQ 001210, vol. 3, 8–9, stipulated
that participating in the parliament were Spaniards but also ‘‘los domiciliados y avecin-
dados en aquellos países [América y Asia] y así mismo los indios y los hijos de españoles y
así mismo los indios y de los hijos de españoles e indios.’’
82. Article 22, which dealt with Spaniards of African descent, stipulated: ‘‘A los es-
pañoles que por cualquiera línea son habidos y reputados por originarios del Africa les
queda abierta la puerta de la virtud y el merecimiento para ser ciudadano. En su conse-
cuencia, las cortes concederán carta de ciudadano a los que hicieren servicios calificados a
la patria, o a los que se distinguen por su talento, aplicación y conducta, con la condición
de que sean hijos de legítimo matrimonio, de padres ingenuos, de que estén casados con
mujer ingenua, y avecindados en los dominios de las Españas, y de que ejerzan alguna
profesión, oficio o industria útil con un capital propio.’’
83. Parry, Age of Reconnaissance, 317; Bernand, ‘‘Negros, esclavos y libres,’’ 9–10 and
50–51. Martínez, ‘‘Space,’’ also clarifies the different treatment given to individuals of
African descent.
84. Letter of November 28, 1796, reproduced in Blanco, Documentos para la historia
de la vida, vol. 1, 267–75. In the citation, I used the translation of Lynch, Latin American
Revolutions, 181–87. The originals read: ‘‘y ha de creerse que la intención de V. M. es
entregar la confianza y dejar la seguridad de los derechos a unos hombres que lejos de
mirar hacia España como al centro de su felicidad han de fijar su vista en los oscuros
habitantes del Africa, de donde proceden para protegerlos y sublevarlos contra los es-
pañoles de quienes dicen que han recibido mil agravios? Podrán acaso ser más fieles los
blancos nuevos que los viejos? Por ventura procurarán el bien de España aquellos de
orígen africano que éstos de orígen español?’’ and ‘‘Luego los mulatos gozen en esta
provincia de los beneficios de la sociedad, sin contribuir un maravedí para sus rentas y
fondos, establecimientos públicos y píos: y si se procura saber de qué depende esto, siendo
ellos dos veces más que los blancos, se hallará que el orígen es el no uso de las leyes que
arreglan la conducta de los mulatos, previenen los remedios para lo futuro y los hacen
contribuyentes, mandándoles que tributen una moderada pensión a favor del real fisco, lo
cual no ha tenido efecto, o porque lo han ignorado los que debieran ejecutarlas, o por el
poco interés que se ha tomado en este punto tan sustancia.’’ The purchase of ‘‘whiteness’’
was possible by obtaining a royal decree called gracias al sacar, meaning, literally, ‘‘thanks
for rescuing me’’: Santos, El régimen, and Langue, ‘‘El indiano.’’
85. The term ‘‘foreigner’’ (extranjero and casta extranjera) was used by Morales Du-
árez on February 7, 1811, DDACC, vol. 3, 282; Fernández de Leyva on September 3,
1811, DDACC, vol. 8, 134; and Guridi y Alcocer on September 4, 1811, DDACC, vol. 8,
150–51.
86. Aner on September 5, 1811, DDACC, vol. 8, 181–84.
87. Morales Duárez on February 7, 1811, DDACC, vol. 3, 281–82. The original reads:
‘‘Su voluntad [del rey] era mantener siempre a esta casta extranjera procedente de varios
puntos de Africa o mahometanos o gentilicios, en prescindencia de las otras clases amer-
icanas sin el menor acceso a los empleos o decoraciones civiles, prohibidos los obispos de
dispensar el impedimento que tenían para todo orden sacro, incapacitada en fin para una
naturalización legal o el logro de título de ciudadano. En este plan nuestros reyes han
usado aquella facultad de toda nación para fijar a los extranjeros introducidos en su seno
264 Notes to Pages 160–62
las restricciones y trabas que entiendan conducentes a su mejor orden y seguridad.’’ These
questions were also discussed by Cisneros on September 6, 1811, DDACC, vol. 8, 200–
204 and Calatrava on September 10, 1811, DDACC, vol. 3, 241–43.
88. Espiga on January 9, 1811, DDACC, vol. 2, 327–28.
80. Borrull on August 31, 1811, DDACC, vol. 8, 101–2.
90. Gallego on August 31, 1811, DDACC, vol. 8, 102.
91. Guridi y Alcocer on September 4, 1811, DDACC, vol. 8, 150, and Ostolarza on
September 10, 1811, DDACC, vol. 8, 239–40.
92. Espiga on September 7, 1811, DDACC, vol. 8, 219–20. The Gypsies were also
invoked by Señor el Inca during the same debate, 222, and by Fernández de Leyva on the
previous day, DDACC, vol. 8, 195.
93. Uría and Fernández de Leyva on September 4 and 6, 1811, respectively, DDACC,
vol. 8, 148–50 and 195–96. Guridi y Alcocer on January 25, 1811, DDACC, vol. 3, 91,
was willing to distinguish between Africans who were worthy of citizenship and those
who were not.
94. Castillo on October 9, 1811, DSCGE, 1810. The original reads: ‘‘porque España,
como otros países del mundo, ha padecido sus revoluciones y se ha mezclado con na-
ciones extranjeras.’’ Guridi y Alcocer used a similar argument on September 4, 1811: in
their origin, he said, the English are Saxons and the Spaniards are Goths, and we are all
sons of Noah and Adam: DDACC, vol. 8, 151. The original reads: ‘‘Si hubiéramos de
atender a éste y remontarnos en su inquisición, a los ingleses los llamaríamos saxones, a
los españoles diríamos godos . . . y a todos los hombres los tendríamos por naturales de la
patria de Noa sino es que también subíamos hasta Adán.’’
95. Guridi y Alcocer and Castillo on September 4 and 10, 1811, DDACC, vol. 8, 152–
53 and 238–39.
96. Guridi y Alcocer on August 31, 1811, DDACC, vol. 8, 102. The original reads: ‘‘es
muy justo que ella [la nación] le dé una patria adoptiva en su nacimiento civil, cuando lo
despojó de la natural.’’
97. Uría and Gordoa, on September 4, 1811, DDACC, vol. 8, 148 and 159–60; Feliú
on September 5, 1811, DDAACC, vol. 8, 187; and Terreros on September 5, 1811,
DDACC, vol. 8, 179. Other delegates, on the contrary, thought that foreigners had to be
preferred to Africans: whereas Africans were totally different than Spaniards, European
foreigners were of the same education, customs, and religion as Spaniards and could
easily integrate into Spain: Aner on September 5, 1811, DDACC, vol. 8, 184, and Creus
on September 10, 1811, DDACC, vol. 8, 233.
98. Castillo on September 4, 1811, DDACC, vol. 8, 162, and Salazar on September 5,
1811, DDACC, vol. 8, 176.
99. These considerations were openly invoked in the session of September 10, 1811,
DDACC, vol. 8, 231–46, where some of the delegates, e.g., Ramos Arispe, Mendiola, and
Ostolarza, also expressed their fear of the contrary situation: the practical consequences
of relaying on reputation.
100. Dou on September 5, 1811, DDACC, vol. 8, 173; Espiga and García Herrero on
September 7, 1811, DDACC, vol. 8, 215–20 and 223–25; Creus on September 10, 1811,
DDACC, vol. 8, 233–34. Lisperguer also mentioned these prejudices in his intervention
of September 15, 1811, DDACC, vol. 8, 329.
Notes to Pages 164–68 265
19. Vitoria, Derecho natural y de gentes, 113–40, and Hamilton, Political Thought,
43–58.
20. Costa, Gobierno del ciudadano; Sánchez Arévalo, Summa de la política; Solórzano
Pereira, Política Indiana, book 2, chap. 24, points 1–10; Alvarez, Instituciones de de-
recho real, 46–50; Maravall, La teoría española del estado; Rommen, La teoría del
estado; Brufau Prats, El pensamiento político; Noroña, Studies in Spanish Renaissance
Thought; Fernández Albaladejo, Fragmentos de monarquía, 76–84; and Fernández San-
tamaría, La formación de la sociedad.
21. Herzog, ‘‘Sobre.’’ The relation between law and justice is also described in Mar-
avall, ‘‘Del Régimen,’’ 120–21.
22. Herzog, ‘‘Letrado’’ and in La administración, 40–45.
23. The persistence of these views in eighteenth-century Spain was also mentioned by
Portillo Valdés, Revolución de nación, 78–146. Portillo Valdés insists on the importance
of a superior (Catholic) order in Spanish (even enlightened and liberal) thought.
24. Reynolds, Kingdoms and Communities and in Introduction to the History.
25. Berengo, ‘‘La città’’ and in L’Europa delle città; Pauffin, Essai sur l’organisation,
92–94; Benedict, ‘‘French,’’ 19–20; Viollet, ‘‘Les communes’’; Petit-Dutaillis, Les com-
munes françaises; Vermeesch, Essai sur les origines, 79–183; and Dini, Città e corpo-
razioni, 148–51.
26. Dietrich, ‘‘City,’’ 65–68; Friedrichs, Early Modern City, 48–51 and 143–44; Dil-
cher, Brady, Blockmans, Van Niereop, Issacs, and Musi, ‘‘Urban’’; Blum, ‘‘Internal’’ and
in ‘‘European’’; Manning, ‘‘Rural’’; Follain, ‘‘Les communautés,’’ 35–38; and Clark,
Small Towns.
27. Costa, ‘‘A propósito,’’ and in Civitas.
28. Bellomo, Common Legal Past; Robinson, Fergus, and Gordon, European Legal
History, 42–123; and Lewis and Ibbetson, Roman Law Tradition, 1–14.
29. Bizzarri, ‘‘Ricerche’’; Riesenberg, Citizenship in Western Tradition, 118–86; Kirsh-
ner, ‘‘Civitas’’ and in ‘‘Between’’; Canning, ‘‘Fourteenth’’; Ullmann, ‘‘Personality’’; and
Quaglioni, ‘‘The Legal.’’ These issues are described in greater length in chapter 2.
30. Capasso, Catalogo ragionato, parte 2, 75–84; Ventura, ‘‘La ambiguità’’ and in
‘‘Mercato’’; and Peytavin, ‘‘Aduanas.’’
31. Casini, ‘‘La cittadinanza’’; Zannini, Burocrazia e burocrati; Molà and Mueller,
‘‘Essere’’; Mueller, ‘‘Veneti’’; Bellavitis, ‘‘Per cittadini’’; and Trivellato, ‘‘Intorno.’’
32. Guidi, Il governo, vol. 1, 113–25.
33. Martelli, ‘‘Cittadini.’’
34. Mori, ‘‘Tot reges.’’
35. Cerutti, ‘‘Giustizia.’’
36. Tedoldi, ‘‘Servizio,’’ 84–89.
37. Belfanti, Mestieri e Forastieri, 21–24.
38. Waley, Italian City Republics, 64–67.
39. Dilonardo Buccolini, ‘‘Note.’’
40. Riesenberg, ‘‘Citizenship and Law,’’ and the essays included in Rossetti, Dentro
della città.
41. Quaglioni, ‘‘Legal.’’
Notes to Pages 176–83 267
42. Bizzarri, ‘‘Ricerche,’’ 72–75; Chittolini, La formazione dello stato and in ‘‘Cities’’;
Fasano Guarini, ‘‘Potere’’; and Zorzi, ‘‘Material.’’
43. Storti Storchi, Ricerche sulla condizione and in ‘‘Legal.’’
44. Capasso, Catalogo ragionato, parte 2, 76–78; Bellomo, Società e istituzioni, 111–
15; Peytavin, ‘‘Españoles’’ and in ‘‘Aduanas’’; and Ventura, ‘‘Privilegi,’’ and in ‘‘Mer-
cato,’’ 279–83. Chittolini, ‘‘Poteri’’ also argues that the introduction of a princely
authority in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries led to important transformations in
Italian regional states, which reorganized the relation between the capital city and other
enclaves.
45. Villari, Per il re.
46. Kahil, ‘‘Apprenticeship’’; Kellett, ‘‘Breakdown’’; Veale, ‘‘Craftsmen’’; Barron,
‘‘Government’’; Pearl, ‘‘Social’’; and Rappaport, Worlds within Worlds. In the earlier
period, citizenship in English corporate municipalities was called ‘‘burgesship’’ (in bor-
oughs) or ‘‘citizenship’’ (in cities): Stephenson, Borough and Town, 136–37 and 143–44,
and Tait, Medieval English Borough, 194–220.
47. Rappaport, Worlds within Worlds, 76–77.
48. Kramer, English Craft Guilds, 139–44 and 197–98; Clark and Slack, ‘‘Introduc-
tion,’’ 24 and 37–38; Dyer, City of Worcester, 181–82; Dobson, ‘‘Admissions’’; Palliser,
‘‘Crisis,’’ 116–17; Found, ‘‘Validity’’; Rappaport, Worlds within Worlds, 29–31: Kraus-
man Ben Amos, ‘‘Failure’’; Gauci, Politics and Society; and Patterson, Urban Patronage.
49. Miller, ‘‘Legal’’; Seybolt, Colonial Citizen; and McAnear, ‘‘Place.’’
50. Barry, ‘‘I significati.’’
51. Merewether and Stephens, History of the Boroughs, vol. 1, 103, and vol. 3, 1746–
47 and 1968.
52. Ibid., vol. 1, 102–8.
53. Ibid., vol. 3, 1487.
54. Ibid., vol. 1, 536–41, and vol. 3, 1487.
55. Scouloudi, ‘‘Alien’’; Lloyd, Alien Merchants; Thrupp, ‘‘Aliens’’; and Kim, Aliens in
Medieval Law, 23–59. The situation in Colchester might have been different: Goose,
‘‘The Dutchy,’’ 92–94.
56. Barron, ‘‘Government,’’ and Rappaport, Worlds within Worlds, 45–47, 54–55,
and 57–60.
57. Statt, ‘‘City,’’ 58.
58. Other restrictions on foreigners included the inability to obtain freedom, hold
office, address the royal courts, and even trade with the North American colonies: Kim,
Aliens in Medieval Law, 60–88. Trading rights as an incentive to naturalization was
mentioned in Schulte Beerbühl, ‘‘Naturalization,’’ 511–12.
59. Kim, Aliens in Medieval Law.
60. Cockburn, Nationality; Haycraft, ‘‘Alien’’; Carpenter, ‘‘Naturalization’’; Shaw,
Letters of Denization; Thomas and Bellot, Thomas and Bellots Leading Cases, 68–76;
Parry, British Nationality Law; Robbins, ‘‘Note’’; Kettner, The Development of Ameri-
can Citizenship; Resnik, ‘‘John Locke’’; Statt, ‘‘Birthright,’’ in ‘‘City,’’ and in Foreigners
and Englishmen; Clark, Language of Liberty, 46–54 and 93–110; Price, ‘‘Natural’’; and
Baseler, Asylum for Mankind.
268 Notes to Pages 183–95
61. Campbell, ‘‘From’’; Russel, ‘‘Gran Bretaña’’; and Brockliss and Eastwood, Union
of Multiple Identities.
62. Sales, ‘‘Naturalizações,’’ 46.
63. Morris, Studies in the History, 11–15 and 62–68; Beloff, ‘‘British’’; Greene, Periph-
eries and Center; Kettner, Development of American Citizenship; and Baseler, Asylum
for Mankind.
64. Start, ‘‘Naturalization’’; Hoyt, ‘‘Naturalization’’; Miller, ‘‘Legal’’; and Kettner, De-
velopment of American Citizenship, 83 and 86–89.
65. Resnik, ‘‘John Locke,’’ 374–81. Statt, ‘‘The Birthright’’; O’Reilly, ‘‘Naturalization
Act,’’ 493–94.
66. Stitt Robinson, ‘‘Legal’’; Merrell, ‘‘Custom’’; Berman, ‘‘Perspectives’’; and Berkey,
‘‘United States.’’
67. Lien, ‘‘Acquisition’’; Smith, ‘‘History’’; Berman, ‘‘Concept’’; Frickey, ‘‘Marshall-
ing’’; Harring, Crow Dog’s Case; and Smith, Civic Ideals, 59–67.
68. Russel, Free Negro; Tannenbaum, Slave and Citizen; Litwach, North of Slavery;
Jordan, ‘‘American’’; and Berlin, Slaves without Masters.
69. See note 68.
70. Babeau, La ville sous l’ancien régime, 18–26; Perrin, ‘‘Le droit’’ and in ‘‘La bour-
geoisie’’; Petit-Dutaillis, Les communes françaises; Vovelle, Ville et campagne, 137–43:
Chevalier, Les bonnes villes de France, 66–67; Peronnet, ‘‘Bourgeois’’; Small, ‘‘Royal’’;
and Rigaudiere, ‘‘Universitas.’’
71. Gascon, Grand commerce, 365–66 and Dubost, ‘‘Les Italiens,’’ 92–93.
72. Vidier, ‘‘Les origines’’; Corcia, ‘‘Bourg’’; Descimon, ‘‘Paris,’’ in ‘‘Bourgeois,’’ in
‘‘Milice,’’ in ‘‘Le corps,’’ and in ‘‘Corpo cittadino.’’
73. Corcia, ‘‘Bourg,’’ 224.
74. Billot, ‘‘L’assimilation.’’
75. Foreigners were restricted in office and land holding, and they could not serve as
tutors, adopt French children, marry natives, or engage in the colonial trade: Laprat,
‘‘Aubains,’’ vol. 1, 1332–79, and Emmanuelli, Etat et pouvoir, 102–3
76. Vanel, Histoire de la nationalité française; Hildesheimer, ‘‘Aubains’’; Nicolet, ‘‘Cit-
oyenneté’’; Benoehr, ‘‘Le citoyen’’; Billot, ‘‘Les italiens’’; Bayard, ‘‘Naturalization’’; Du-
bost, Significations de la lettre de naturalité, in Les étrangers en France, and in La France
Italienne; Lequin, Histoire des étrangers; Lefebvre-Teillard, ‘‘Ius sanguinis’’; Sahlins,
‘‘Fictions,’’ and ‘‘La nationalité’’; Brubaker, Citizenship and Nationhood; Wells, Law and
Citizenship; Bossenga, ‘‘Rights’’; Bonner, ‘‘French’’; Dubost and Sahlins, Et si on faisait
payer les étrangers.
77. The degree by which the boundaries of this territory were unclear is explored in
Nordman, Frontières de France.
78. Gascon, Gran commerce, 366–67.
79. Vanel, Histoire de la nationalité française, 93–94; Dubost, Significations de la lettre
de naturalité, 31–33; Sahlins, ‘‘Fictions’’ and in ‘‘La nationalité,’’ 1086 and 1103; and
Merrick, ‘‘Conscience.’’
80. Labourdette, La nation française à Lisbonne, 27–35.
81. Sales, ‘‘Naturalizações,’’ 45.
Notes to Pages 195–201 269
82. Dubost, Significations de la lettre de naturalité, 23–25, and Dubost and Sahlins, Et
si on faisait payer les étrangers.
Chapter 9
1. ‘‘Noticias del Guiñol,’’ Canal Plus, February 7, 2001.
2. ‘‘Contamíname,’’ words and music by Pedro M. Guerra and interpreted by Ana
Belén and Víctor Manuel in 1994. The original reads: ‘‘Contamíname pero no con el
humo que asfixia el aire. Ven pero sí con tus ojos y con tus bailes. Ven pero no con la rabia
y los malos sueños. Ven pero sí con los labios que anuncian besos. . . . Contamíname,
mézclate conmigo que bajo mi rama tendrás abrigo.’’
Glossary
271
272 Glossary
Council of the Indies (consejo de Indias)—A council charged with overseeing the administra-
tion of the Spanish American territories and also acting as a court of appeal.
Dispensa—A legal instrument that exempted people from certain requirements and enabled
them to carry out a certain activity. Dispensas could allow minors to act as if they were of
age, allow illegitimate children to inherit as if they were legitimate, and so forth.
Domicile—A legal residence. According to Spanish law, it required the intention to remain in
the community permanently.
Encomienda—A Spanish institution that subjected a group of Indians to a Spaniard (called
encomendero), who was supposed to defend them and ensure their conversion to Chris-
tianity while they were forced to work for him or pay him tribute.
Forastero—A foreigner. In Castile this term designated people who were foreign to the local
community. In Spanish America it designated nontribute-paying Indians who no longer
belonged to or resided in their community of origin.
Fuero de Extranjería—The rights and obligations inherent to the status of foreignness in
Spain.
Genízaros—Sons of foreigners born in Spain.
Gracias al sacar—Another name for dispensas.
Hidalgo—A member of the minor nobility, gentry.
House of Trade (Casa de Contratación)—The royal court charged with directing and control-
ling communication and trade between Spain and Spanish America, located first in Seville
and then in Cádiz.
Ius commune—A European legal science originating in the twelfth century that combined
Roman, cannon, and feudal law and adapted them to contemporary circumstances.
Junta de Extranjeros—A dependency of the Council of State, established in 1714, abolished in
1717, and reestablished in 1721. In 1748 it became part of the Junta de Comercio and from
then on it was called Junta de comercio y de extranjeros. The junta was charged with
overseeing the treatment of foreigners in Spain.
Local Community—An urban or rural community with some measure of self-government.
The term includes lugares, aldeas, pueblos, villas, and ciudades.
Merchant guild (consulado)—A corporation comprising all merchants legally trading in a city,
acting as court for commercial litigation and as a commercial lobby.
Monopoly (Spanish)—A series of laws and regulations allowing only natives of the kingdoms
of Spain to immigrate and trade in Spanish America, only certified ports to maintain com-
munication between these territories, and only Spanish ships manned by Spaniards to travel
between them.
Naturaleza—The status of native (natural ), a member of the community of the kingdom.
Naturalization by integration or prescription (naturaleza por vía de prescripción)—Natural-
ization automatically obtained by foreigners by virtue of integration in a local community
or in the community of the kingdom.
Open house (casa abierta)—A house where one lives with his family most of the year.
Pechero—A tax-paying folk.
Presumptions—A legal regime linking behavior to a state of mind and allowing people to
prove their intentions by acting in certain ways.
Público y notorio—Evidence, including facts that needed no proof and that could not be
legally contradicted.
Glossary 273
Purity of blood (limpieza de sangre)—A Spanish doctrine allowing only people whose geneal-
ogy included no heretics (to the third generation) and no Jewish or Muslim ascendancy to
belong to certain corporations.
Recopilación de Indias—The main recompilation of Spanish American law, dated 1680.
Regalía—A faculty dependent only on the monarch and which he could dispose of at his free
will.
Representative of royal interests ( fiscal )—An official existing in most Spanish councils and
courts, charged with representing royal interests.
Reserve of offices (reserva de oficio)—Translated here as monopoly on office holding. A
medieval rule shared by all peninsular kingdoms that restricted the use of public offices and
ecclesiastical benefices to natives of the jurisdiction.
Siete Partidas—A thirteenth-century Castilian code, also implemented during the early mod-
ern period.
Vecindad de indios—Citizenship dependent on an encomendero status. People whose citizen-
ship was acquired in this way were called vecinos encomenderos.
Vecino—Member of a local community, a citizen.
Bibliography
275
276 Bibliography
AGN/L RTC, contencioso 252 (cuadernos 61–67 and 76–80); 253 (cuadernos 69–
73, 75, 81–84, and 86–89); and 255
AGN/L SG, contencioso 10 C206, varios 3 and 4; and acuerdos de justicia 4
AGN/L SG, varios 3, cuaderno 107; and varios 4, cuaderno 122
AGS GJ 873; 1004; 1005; 1006; and 1021
AGS Consejo Supremo de Hacienda 386
AGS Secretaría de Marina 701
AGS Secretaría y Superintendencia de Hacienda 555
AHN Estado legajo 629–1; 629–2; 629–3; 637/17; 647; 859; 3954; and 5042;
and libro 229 and 683
AHN CSCI 20.620
AM/Q Miscelánea 00012
AM/Q MMHCQ 001210 vol. 3
AM/S Sección 4 (E.Cab.XVII), vol. 38 (microfilms nos. 250 and 251)
AM/S Sección 5 (E.Cab.XVIII), vols. 294; 295; 296; 297; and 298
AM/S Sección 2 (Contaduría), carpeta 336
AM/V GM 51–4; 54–2; 56–3; 57–2; 57–4; 61–1; 62–2; 64–2; 65–2; and 65–3
AN/Q Gobierno 12; 15; 21; 26; 27; 29; 42; 46; 50; 51; and 63
AN/Q Notaría primera 24
AN/Q FE 21; 26; and 34
AP/LP 7–2–113–43; 7–2–113–46; 7–3–115–6; and 7–3-115–11
AVM Secretaría 2–166; 2–345; 2–348; 2–349–1; 2–350–14; and 2–374–92
BNE MSS 2989; 3045; 4321; 11.326; 13.112; 18.647–62; 19.512; and 20.067–
12
BPR II 2755; II 2832; II 2848; II 2851; II 2868; and II 12.868
DSCGE vol. 1
Eugenio Larruga y Boneta, ‘‘Historia de la Real y General Junta de Comercio, Moneda y
Minas y Dependencias de Extranjeros,’’ Madrid, 1799 (MSS Bell Library, University of
Minnesota–Twin Cities Campus)
Published Sources
Actas del cabildo de Caracas. Caracas: Elite, 1943.
Actas del cabildo de Caracas. Caracas: Consejo Municipal del Distrito Federal, 1950–69.
Actas de las Cortes de Castilla. Madrid: Imprenta de archivos, bibliotecas y museos,
1910.
Actas de las Cortes de Castilla. Madrid: Imprenta de archivos, bibliotecas y museos,
1932–33.
Actas de las Cortes de Navarra, ed. Luis Javier Fortún Pérez de Ciriza. Pamplona: Parla-
mento de Navarra, 1991–95.
Acuerdos del extinguido cabildo de Buenos Aires. Buenos Aires: Archivo General de la
Nación, 1907–34.
Aguilar Piñal, Francisco. La Sevilla de Olavide (1767–1778). Seville: Ayuntamiento de
Sevilla, 1966.
Bibliography 277
Belmonte Díaz, José. Los comuneros de la Santa Justa: La ‘‘Constitución de Avila.’’ Avila:
Caja de Ahorros de Avila, 1986.
Beloff, Max. ‘‘The British Background of American Constitutionalism.’’ In The Constitu-
tion of the United States, 1787–1962, ed. Putnam F. Jones, 5–22. Pittsburgh: Univer-
sity of Pittsburgh Press, 1962.
Benedict, Philip. ‘‘French Cities from the Sixteenth Century to the Revolution: An Over-
view.’’ In Cities and Social Change in Early Modern France, ed. Philip Benedict, 7–64.
London: Unwin Hayman, 1989.
Bennassar, Bartolomé. The Spanish Character: Attitudes and Mentalities from the Six-
teenth to the Nineteenth Centuries, trans. Benjamin Keen. Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1979 [1975].
Benoehr, Hans Peter. ‘‘Le citoyen et l’étranger en droit romain et droit français.’’ In La
nozione di ‘‘romano’’ tra cittadinanza e universalità: Seminario internazionale di studi
storici da Roma alla terza Roma, 175–93. Naples: Edizioni Scientifische Italiane,
1982.
Berengo, Marino. ‘‘La città di antico regime.’’ Quaderni Storici 9, no. 27 (1974): 661–92.
———. L’Europa delle città: Il volto della società urbana europea tra medioevo ed età
moderna. Turin: Einaudi, 1999.
Berkey, Curtis G. ‘‘United States–Indian Relations: The Constitutional Basis.’’ In Exiled
in the Land of the Free: Democracy, Indian Nations, and the U.S. Constitution, ed.
Oren R. Lyons and John C. Mohawk, 189–225. Santa Fe: Clear Light, 1992.
Berlin, Ira. Slaves without Masters: The Free Negro in the Antebellum South. New York:
Pantheon Books, 1974.
Berman, Howard R. ‘‘The Concept of Aboriginal Rights in the Early Legal History of the
United States.’’ Buffalo Law Review 27 (1977–78): 637–67.
———. ‘‘Perspectives on American Indian Sovereignty and International Law, 1600–
1776.’’ In Exiled in the Land of the Free: Democracy, Indian Nations and the U.S.
Constitution, ed. Oren R. Lyons and John C. Mohawk, 125–88. Santa Fe: Clear Light,
1992.
Bermejo Castrillo, Manuel Angel. Parentesco, matrimonio, propiedad y herencia en la
Castilla altomedieval. Madrid: Universidad Carlos III, 1996.
Bernal, Antonio Miguel. La financiación de la Carrera de Indias (1492–1824): Dinero y
crédito en el comercio colonial español con América. Seville: Fundación El Monte,
1992.
Bernand, Carmen. ‘‘Negros, esclavos y libres en las ciudades hispanoamericanas.’’ In
Nuevas Aportaciones a la historia jurídica de Iberoamérica [CD-ROM], ed. José An-
drés Gallego. Madrid: Fundación Tavera, 2000.
Bernardo Ares, José Manuel. ‘‘Las ordenanzas municipales y la formación del estado
moderno.’’ In La ciudad hispánica durante los siglos XIII al XVI: Actas del coloquio
celebrado en La Rábida y Sevilla del 14 al 19 de septiembre de 1981, vol. 3, 15–38.
Madrid: Universidad Complutense, 1987.
———. ‘‘El régimen municipal de la corona de Castilla.’’ Studia Storica 15 (1996): 23–61.
Bernal de Bugeda, Beatriz. ‘‘El derecho romano en el discurso de Antonio de León Pinelo
sobre la importancia, forma y disposición de la recopilación de las leyes de las Indias
occidentales.’’ Anuario histórico jurídico ecuatoriano 5 (1980): 147–71.
280 Bibliography
Brubaker, Rogers, and Frederick Cooper, ‘‘Beyond ‘Identity,’ ’’ Theory and Society 29 no.
1 (2000): 1–47.
Brufau Prats, Jaime. El pensamiento político de Domingo de Soto y su concepción del
poder. Salamanca: Universidad de Salamanca, 1960.
Burdiel, Isabel. ‘‘Myth of Failure, Myths of Success: New Perspectives on Nineteenth
Century Spanish Liberalism,’’ Journal of Modern History 70 (1988): 892–912.
Burkholder, Mark A., and D. S. Chandler. From Impotence to Authority: The Spanish
Crown and the American Audiencias, 1687–1808. Columbia: University of Missouri
Press, 1977.
Burns, Robert I., ed. Las Siete Partidas. Volume 4: Family, Commerce and the Sea: The
World of Women and Merchants, trans. Samuel Parsons Scott. Philadelphia: University
of Pennsylvania Press, 2001.
Cáceres de Gea, Beatriz. Reforma y fraude fiscal en el reinado de Carlos II: La sala de
millones (1658–1700). Madrid: Banco de España, 1995.
Campbell, Ian. ‘‘From the ‘Personal Union’ between England and Scotland in 1603 to
the European Communities Act 1972 and Beyond—Enduring Legal Problems from a
Historical Viewpoint.’’ In Legal Visions of the New Europe, ed. B. S. Jackson and
D. McGoldrick, 37–104. London: Graham and Trotman, 1993.
Campbell, Leon G. ‘‘The Foreigners in Peruvian Society during the Eighteenth Century.’’
Revista de historia de América 73–74 (1972): 153–63.
Canning, J. P. ‘‘A Fourteenth Century Contribution to the Theory of Citizenship: Political
Man and the Problem of Created Citizenship in the Thought of Baldus de Ubaldis.’’ In
Authority and Power: Studies on Medieval Law and Government Presented to Walter
Ullmann on His 70th Birthday, ed. Brian Tierney and Peter Linehan, 197–212. Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980.
Cansanello, Oreste Carlos. ‘‘De súbditos a ciudadanos: Los pobladores rurales bo-
narenses entre el antiguo régimen y la modernidad.’’ Boletin del Instituto de Historia
Argentina y Americana Dr. Emilio Ravignani 11, no. 1 (1995): 113–39.
Capasso, Bartolomeo. Catalogo ragionato dei libri, registri e scritture esistenti nella
sezione antica o prima serie dell’Archivio Municipale di Napoli. Naples: Giannini,
1899.
Carmagnani, Marcello, and Alicia Hernández Chávez. ‘‘La ciudadaanía orgánica mex-
icana, 1850–1910.’’ In Ciudadanía política y formación de las naciones: perspectivas
históricas de América Latina, ed. Hilda Sábato, 371–404. Mexico: Colegio de Mexico,
1999.
Carpenter, A. H. ‘‘Naturalization in England and the Colonies.’’ American Historical
Review 9 (1903–4): 288–303.
Carrasco González, María Guadalupe. ‘‘La colonia británica de Cádiz entre 1650 y
1720.’’ In Monarquía, imperio y pueblos en la España moderna: Actas de la IV reunión
científica de la Asociación Española de Historia Moderna (Alicante 27–30 de mayo de
1996), ed. Pablo Fernández Albaladejo, 331–42. Alicante: Universidad de Alicante,
1997.
Carte, María del Carmen. Del consejo medieval castellano-leonés. Buenos Aires: In-
stituto de Historia de España, 1968.
Bibliography 283
Carzolio, María Inés. ‘‘En los orígenes de la ciudadanía en Castilla: La identidad política
del vecino durante los siglos XVI y XVII.’’ Hispania (forthcoming).
———. ‘‘Aspectos de continuedad y de descontinuedad entre vecindad y ciudadanía es-
pañola del siglo XVII a la constitución de 1812.’’ In Actas de las II jornadas de historia
de España [CD-ROM], 2002.
———. ‘‘La construcción de identidades políticas en los siglos XVI y XVII. Súbditos y
vecinos en Liébana.’’ Anales de historia antigua, medieval y moderna 35 (2003).
Casado Alonso, Hilario. ‘‘Las colonias de mercaderes castellanos en Europa (siglos XV y
XVI).’’ In Castilla y Europa: Comercio y mercaderes en los siglos XIV, XV y XVI, ed.
Hilario Casado Alonso, 15–56. Burgos: Diputación Provincial de Burgos, 1995.
Casini, Matteo. ‘‘La cittadinanza originaria a Venezia tra i secoli XV e XVI: Una linea
interpretativa.’’ In Studi veneti offerti a Gaetano Cozzi, ed. Gino Benzoni, Marino
Berengo, Gherardo Ortalli, and Giovanni Scarabello, 133–50. Venice: El Cardo, 1992.
Castelnau, Charlotte de. ‘‘Les étrangers protestants dans l’Espagne moderne (16e–17e
siècles).’’ In Recherche sur l’histoire de l’état dans le monde ibérique (15e–20e siècle),
ed. Jean Frédéric Schaub, 143–62. Paris: Presses de l’Ecole Normale Supérieur, 1993.
Castillo Meléndez, Fernando, Luisa Figallo Pérez, and Ramón Serrera Contreras. Las
Cortes de Cádiz y la imágen de América (La visión etnográfica y geográfica del nuevo
mundo). Cádiz: Universidad de Cádiz, 1994.
Castrillo, Alonso de. Tractado de República. Madrid: Instituto de Estudios Políticos,
1958 [1521].
Castro, Américo. España en su historia: Cristianos, moros y judíos. Buenos Aires:
Losada, 1948 (The Spaniards: An Introduction to Their History. Berkeley: University
of California Press, 1971).
———. La realidad histórica de España. Mexico: Porrúa, 1954 (The Structure of Spanish
History. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1954).
Castro, Concepción de. La revolución liberal y los municipios españoles (1812–1866).
Madrid: Alianza, 1979.
Castro (y Bravo), Federico. ‘‘La legislación sobre nacionalidad y el sentido nacional.’’
Anuario de la asociación Francisco de Vitoria 6 (1943–45): 235–59.
———. ‘‘Los estudios históricos sobre la nacionalidad (Apostillas y comentarios).’’ Re-
vista española de derecho internacional 8 (1955): 217–33.
Castro y Rossi, Adolfo de, ed. Cortes de Cádiz: Suplementos de las sesiones verificadas en
la isla de León y en Cádiz. Madrid: Secretaría del Congreso de Diputados, 1913.
Cayetano Martín, María del Carmen, ed. Documentos del Archivo de la Villa: Reyes
Católicos I (1475–1479). Madrid: Ayuntamiento de Madrid, 1992.
Celso, Hugo de. Las leyes de todos los reinos de Castilla, abreviadas y reducidas en forma
de repertorio decisivo [1538], In Textos clásicos para la historia de Castilla y León II
[CD-ROM], ed. Luis Miguel Enciso. Madrid: Fundación Histórica Tavera, 1999.
Cerrera Pery, José. La casa de contratación y el consejo de Indias (las razones de un
superministerio). Madrid: Ministerio de Defensa, 1997.
Cerutti, Simona. ‘‘Giustizia e località a Torino in età moderna: Una ricerca in corso.’’
Quaderni Storici 30, no. 89 (1995): 445–86.
Cerutti, Simona, Robert Descimon, and Maarten Prak. ‘‘Premessa.’’ Quaderni Storici 30,
no. 89 (1995): 281–86.
284 Bibliography
———. ‘‘La Concesión de ‘naturaleza para comerciar en Indias’ durante el siglo XVII.’’
Revista de Indias 19, no. 76 (1959): 227–39.
———Los extranjeros en la vida española durante el siglo XVII. Madrid: CSIC, 1960
(also published as Los extranjeros en la vida española durante el siglo XVII y otros
artículos. Seville: Diputación de Sevilla, 1996).
———. ‘‘Una visión crítica del Madrid del siglo XVIII.’’ In Hechos y figuras del siglo
XVIII español, ed. Antonio Domínguez Ortiz, 151–76. Madrid: Siglo XXI, 1980.
———. Orto y Ocaso de Sevilla. Seville: Universidad de Sevilla, 1981.
———. Los judeoconversos en la España moderna. Madrid: Mapfre, 1992.
Dubost, Jean François. Significations de la lettre de naturalité dans la France des XVIe et
XVIIe siècles. Florence: EUI Working Papers in History, 1990.
———. Les étrangers en France XVI siècle—1789: Guide des recherches aux archives
nationales. Paris: Archives Nationales, 1993.
———. ‘‘Les Italiens dans les villes françaises: XVIe–XVIIe siècles.’’ In Les immigrants et
la ville: Insertion, intégration, discrimination (XIIe–XXe siècles), ed. Denis Menjot
and Jean Luc Pinol, 91–105. Paris: L’Harmattan, 1996.
———. La France Italienne XVIe–XVIIe siècle. Paris: Aubier, 1997.
Dubost, Jean François, and Peter Sahlins. Et si on faisait payer les étrangers? Louis XIV,
les immigrés et quelques autres. Paris: Flammarion, 1999.
Durán Montero, María Antonia. Lima en el siglo XVII: Arquitectura, urbanismo y vida
cotidiana. Seville: Diputación de Sevilla, 1994.
Dyer, Alan D. The City of Worcester in the Sixteenth Century. Leicester: Leicester Univer-
sity Press, 1973.
Eastwood, David, Lawrence Brockliss, and Michael John. ‘‘Conclusions. From Dynastic
Union to a Unitary State: The European Experience.’’ In A Union of Multiple Identi-
ties: The British Isles, c. 1750–1850, ed. Lawrence Brockliss and David Eastwood,
193–212. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1997.
Eisenstadt, S. N., and Bernhard Giesen. ‘‘The Construction of Collective Identities.’’
European Journal of Sociology 36 (1995): 72–102.
Elliott, J. H. ‘‘Revolution and Continuity in Early Modern Europe.’’ In The General
Crisis of the Seventeenth Century, ed. Geoffrey Parker, 110–33. London: Routledge,
1978.
———. ‘‘A Europe of Composite Monarchies.’’ Past and Present 137 (1992): 48–71.
Emmanuelli, F. X. Etat et pouvoir dans la France des XVIe–XVIIIe siècles: La méta-
morphose inachevée. Paris: Nathan, 1992.
Erauso, Catalina de. Memoir of a Basque Lieutenant Nun: Transvestite in the New
World, trans. Michele Stepto and Gabriel Stepto. Boston: Beacon Press, 1996.
Escalona y Agüero, Gaspar. Arcae limensis gazophilacium regium. Madrid, 1647.
Escriche y Martín, Joaquín. Diccionario razonado de legislación civil, penal, comercial y
forense. México: Libería de Galván, 1842 [1831].
España: Reflexiones sobre el ser de España. Madrid: Real Academia de la Historia, 1998.
Espejo Lara, Juan Luis, and Eva Morales Gordillo, eds. Ordenanzas de Archidona
(1598). Málaga: Universidad de Málaga, 1998.
Estrada Icaza, J. La lucha de Guayaquil por el estado de Quito. Guayaquil: Banco Cen-
tral, 1984.
Bibliography 289
Fagel, Raymond. ‘‘Cornelis Deque: Un mercader flamenco en la Castilla del siglo XV. Un
debate sobre el concepto de ‘vecindad’ y ‘naturaleza’ entre mercaderes.’’ In Castilla y
Europa: Comercio y mercaderes en los siglos XIV, XV y XVI, ed. Hilario Casado
Alonso, 241–63. Burgos: Diputación Provincial, 1995.
———. ‘‘Charles Quint comme ‘Roi Catholique’: Les nominations d’évêques originaires
des Pays-Bas en Espagne (1516–1555).’’ Publications du Centre Européen d’Etudes
Bourguignonnes 38 (1998): 207–27.
Fasano Guarini, Elena. ‘‘Potere centrale e comunità soggette nel granducato di Cosimo
I.’’ Rivista storica italiana 89 (1977): 490–538.
Feijóo y Montenegro, Benito Gerónimo. ‘‘Amor a la patria y pasión nacional.’’ In
Obras escogidas del Padre fray Benito Jerónimo Feijóo y Montenegro, ed. Agustín
Milares Carlo, 141–48. Madrid: Rivadeneyra, 1883 (Biblioteca de autores españoles,
vol. 56).
Fernández Albaladejo, Pablo. ‘‘Cities and the State in Spain.’’ Theory and Society 18
(1989): 721–31 (also published in Cities and the Rise of States in Europe A.D. 1000–
1800, ed. Charles Tilly and Wim P. Blockmans, 168–83. Boulder: Westview Press,
1994).
———. Fragmentos de monarquía: Trabajos de historia política. Madrid: Alianza, 1992.
———. ‘‘Les traditions nationales d’historiographie de l’état: L’Espagne.’’ In Visions sur le
développement des états européens: Théories et historiographies de l’état moderne, ed.
Wim Blockmans and Jean Philippe Genet, 219–33. Rome: Ecole Française de Rome,
1993.
———. ‘‘ ‘Rey católico’: Gestación y metamorfosis de un título.’’ In Repubblica e virtú:
Pensiero politico e Monarchia Cattolica fra XVI e XVII secolo, ed. Chiara Continisio
and Cesare Mozzarelli, 109–21. Rome: Bulzoni, 1995.
———. ‘‘Católicos antes que ciudadanos: Gestación de una ‘política española’ en los
comienzos de la edad moderna.’’ In La imágen de la diversidad: El mundo urbano en la
corona de Castilla (siglos XVI–XVIII), ed. José Ignacio Fortea Pérez, 103–27. San-
tander: Universidad de Cantabria, 1997.
———. ‘‘El problema de la ‘‘composite monarchy’’ en España.’’ In Identities: Nations,
Provinces, and Regions, 1550–1900. Proceedings of the Third Anglo-Spanish Histor-
ical Studies Seminar 25–6 October 1996, ed. Isabel Burdiel and James Casey, 185–
201. Norwich: University of East Anglia, 1999.
Fernández Navarrete, Pedro. Conservación de monarquías y discursos políticos, ed. Mi-
chael D. Gordon. Madrid: Instituto de Estudios Fiscales, 1982 [1792].
Fernández Santamaría, J. A. La formación de la sociedad y el orígen del estado: Ensayos
sobre el pensamiento político español del Siglo de Oro. Madrid: Centro de Estudios
Constitucionales, 1997.
Ferreiro, Juan Pablo. ‘‘Elites urbanas en la temprana colonia: La configuración social de
Jujuy a principios del siglo XVII.’’ Jahrbuch für Geschichte von Staat, Wirtschaft und
Gesellschaft Lateinamerikas 33 (1996): 63–98.
Ferry, Robert J. The Colonial Elites of Early Caracas: Formation and Crisis, 1567–1767.
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989.
Fisher, John ‘‘Monarquismo, regionalismo y rebelión en el Perú colonial, 1808–1815.’’
Historia y Cultura 15 (1982): 117–39.
290 Bibliography
Fleming, Peter, Anthony Gross, and J. R. Lander. Regionalism and Revision: The Crown
and Its Provinces in England, 1200–1650. London: Hambledon Press, 1998.
Fletcher, Richard. The Quest for el Cid. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991.
Floristán, Alfredo, ‘‘Conquista o restauración? La incorporación de Navarra a la monar-
quía española,’’ Hispania 59, no. 202 (1999): 457–91.
Follain, Antoine. ‘‘Les communautés rurales en France: Definitions et problèmatiques
(Xve–XIXe siècle).’’ Histoire et sociétés rurales 12, no. 2 (1999): 11–62.
Font Rius, José María. ‘‘La recepción del derecho romano en la peninsula ibérica durante
la edad media.’’ In Recueil des mémoires et travaux publiés par la Société d’Histoire du
Droit et des Institutions des Anciens Pays de Droit Ecrit 6 (1967): 85–104.
Fontana i Lázaro, Josep. La crisis del antiguo régimen, 1808–1833. Barcelona: Ariel,
1979.
Fortea Pérez, José Ignacio. Monarquía y cortes en la corona de Castilla: Las ciudades ante
la política fiscal de Felipe II. Salamanca: Cortes de Castilla y León, 1990.
———. ‘‘Las ciudades, las cortes y el problema de la representación política en la Castilla
moderna.’’ In Imágenes de la diversidad. El mundo urbano en la corona de Castilla
(siglos XVI–XVIII), ed. José Ignacio Fortea Pérez, 421–45. Santander: Universidad de
Cantabria, 1997.
Found, J. F. ‘‘The Validity of the Freemen’s Lists: Some Norwich Evidence.’’ Economic
History Review 34, no. 1 (1981): 48–59.
Fradklin, Raúl, ‘‘Vecinos, forasteros y extranjeros: Las élites locales coloniales y su identi-
dad social (Buenos Aires a fines de la era colonial).’’ In El otro en la historia: El
extranjero, ed. Susana Murphy, 123–47. Buenos Aires: Universidad de Buenos Aires,
1995.
Frickey, Philip P. ‘‘Marshalling Past and Present: Colonialism, Constitutionalism, and
Interpretation in Federal Indian Law.’’ Harvard Law Review 107, no. 2 (1993): 381–
440.
Friedman, Ellen G. ‘‘El estatus jurídico de la mujer castellana durante el antiguo régi-
men.’’ In Ordenamiento y realidad social de las mujeres, siglos XVI a XX, ed. María
Carmen García Nieto, 41–53. Madrid: Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, 1986.
Friedrichs, Christopher R. The Early Modern City, 1450–1750. New York: Longman,
1995.
Fuente Pérez, María Jesús. Palencia: Cien años de vida y gobierno de la ciudad (1421–
1521) a través de las actas municipales. Palencia: Diputación Provincial de Palencia,
1987.
Fusi, Juan Pablo. España: La evolución de la identidad nacional. Madrid: Temas de Hoy,
2000.
Fusi, Juan Pablo, and Jordi Palafox. España, 1808–1996: El desafío de la modernindad.
Madrid: Espasa, 1997.
Gacto Fernández, María Trinidad. Estructura de la población de la Extremadura leonesa
en los siglos XII y XIII. Salamanca: CSIC, 1977.
Galmorini, Hugo Raúl. ‘‘La situación de los comerciantes españoles de Buenos Aires
después de 1810.’’ Revista de Indias 44, no. 173 (1984): 273–90.
Garcés, Jorge A. Libro del ilustre cabildo, justicia y regimiento de este muy noble y muy
leal ciudad de San Francisco de Quito. Quito: Archivo Municipal, 1937.
Bibliography 291
García, Juan Agustín. La ciudad indiana. Buenos Aires: Ciudad Argentina, 1998 [1900].
García-Baquero González, Antonio. Cádiz y el Atlántico, 1717–1778: El comercio colo-
nial español bajo el monopolio gaditano. Seville: Escuela de Estudios Hispanoameri-
canos, 1976.
García-Baquero González, Antonio, and Pedro Collado Villalta. ‘‘Les français à Cadix au
XVIIIe siècle: La colonie marchande.’’ In Les français en Espagne à l’epoque moderne
(XVIe–XVIIe siècle), 173–96. Paris: CNRS, 1990.
García Bernal, Manuela Cristina. ‘‘Los españoles, hijos de extranjeros en el comercio
indiano.’’ In La burguesía mercantil gaditana (1650–1868): Ponencias en el XXXI
Congreso Luso-Español para el Progreso de las Ciencias, 175–82. Cádiz: Instituto de
Estudios Gaditanos, 1976.
———. ‘‘Las elites capitulares indianas y sus mecanismos de poder en el siglo XVII.’’
Anuario de estudios americanos 57, no. 1 (2000): 89–110.
García Cárcel, Ricardo. Historia de Cataluña, siglos XVI–XVII: Los carácteres orig-
inales de la historia de Cataluña. Barcelona: Ariel, 1985.
———. ‘‘Las fronteras mentales y culturales: Los problemas de identidad de la España
moderna.’’ In Fronteras y fronterizos en la historia, by Emilio Mitre Fernández,
Ricardo García Cárcel, Manuel Lucena Giraldo, Friedrich Edelmayer, and Borja de
Riquer i Permanyer, 63–82. Valladolid: Universidad de Valladolid, 1997.
———. La leyenda negra: Historia y opinión. Madrid: Alianza, 1998.
García Cortázar, José Angel, ed. Organización social del espacio en la España medieval:
La corona de Castilla en los siglos VIII a XV. Barcelona: Ariel, 1985.
García de Valdeavellano, Luis. Orígenes de la burgesía en la España medieval. Madrid:
Espasa-Calpe, 1969.
García Fuentes, Lutgardo. El comercio español con América, 1650–1700. Seville: Es-
cuela de Estudios Hispánoamericanos, 1980.
García Gallo, Alfonso. Curso de historia del derecho español. Madrid: Gráfica Admin-
istrativa, 1950.
———. ‘‘La ciencia jurídica en la formación del derecho hispanoamericano en los siglos
XVI al XVIII.’’ Anuario de historia del derecho español 44 (1974): 157–98.
———. ‘‘La condición jurídica del indio.’’ In Antropología de España y América, ed.
Miguel Rivera Dorado, 281–92. Madrid: Dosbe, 1977.
———. ‘‘Territorio y término en el ámbito local castellano e indiano (notas sobre su
naturaleza).’’ In VII congreso del Instituto Internacional de Historia del Derecho Indi-
ano: Actas y estudios, vol. 1, 357–72. Buenos Aires: Pontificia Universidad Católica,
1984.
———. ‘‘De la ciudad castellana a la indiana.’’ In Los orígenes españoles de las institu-
ciones americanas: Estudios de derecho indiano, ed. Alfonso García Gallo, 1005–23.
Madrid: Academia de Jurisprudencia y Legislación, 1987.
García Godoy, Teresa. Las cortes de Cádiz y América: El primer vocabulario liberal
español y mejicano (1810–1814). Seville: Diputación Provincial de Sevilla, 1998.
García Martínez, Sebastián. ‘‘Otra minoría marginada. Los gitanos en Valencia bajo
los Austrias.’’ In Primer congreso de historia del país valenciano celebrado en Va-
lencia del 14 al 18 de abril de 1971, vol. 3, 251–65. Valencia: Universidad de Valencia,
1976.
292 Bibliography
———. The Black Legand: Anti-Spanish Attitudes in the Old World and the New. New
York: Knopf, 1971.
Gil Bermejo García, Juana. ‘‘Naturalizaciones de italianos en Andalucía.’’ In Presencia
italiana en Andalucía, siglos XIV–XVII: Actas del I coloquio hispano-italiano, 175–
86. Seville: Escuela de Estudios Hispanoamericanos, 1985.
Gildas, Bernard. ‘‘La casa de contratación de Sevilla y luego de Cádiz en el siglo XVIII.’’
Anuario de estudios americanos 12 (1955): 253–86.
Giménez López, Enrique. Gobernar con una misma ley: Sobre la nueva planta borbónica
en Valencia. Alicante: Universidad de Alicante, 1999.
Ginebra Molins, Esperança. ‘‘L’aplicació del dret civil de Catalunya: La qualitat juridica
de catalá.’’ Ph.d. diss., Derecho Civil-Universitat de Barcelona, 1998.
Girard, Albert. Le commerce française à Séville et Cadix au temps des Habsbourgs:
Contribution à l’étude du commerce étranger en Espagne au XVI et XVII siècles. Paris:
Boccard, 1932.
———. La rivalité commerciale et maritime entre Séville et Cadix jusqu’à la fin du XVIIIe
siècle. Paris: Boccard, 1932.
Godechot, Jacques. ‘‘Nation, patrie, nationalisme et patriotisme en France au XVIII
siècle.’’ Annales historiques de la révolution française 63, no. 206 (1971): 481–501.
Gómez Alfaro, Antonio. ‘‘La polémica sobre la deportación de los gitanos a las colonias
de América.’’ Cuadernos hispanoamericanos 386 (1982): 308–36.
———. La gran redada de gitanos. España: La provisión general de gitanos de 1749.
Madrid: Presencia Gitana, 1993.
Gómez de Orozco, Federico. ‘‘Italianos conquistadores, exploradaores y pobladores en
México en el siglo XVI.’’ Memorias de la Academia de la Historia 8, no. 3 (1949): 190–
210.
Gómez Pérez, Carmen. ‘‘Los extranjeros en la América colonial: Su expulsión de Car-
tagena de Indias en 1750.’’ Anuario de estudios americanos 37 (1980): 279–97.
González, Alfonso F. Instituciones y sociedad guipuzcoanas en los comienzos del cen-
tralismo (1680–1730). San Sebastián: Diputación Foral de Guipuzkoa, 1995.
González, Julio. Repoblación de Castilla la Nueva. Madrid: Universidad Complutense,
1976.
González de Cellorigo, Martín. Memorial de la política necesaria y útil restauración a la
república de España y estados de ella y del desempeño universal de estos reinos.
Madrid: ICI, 1991 [1600].
González de San Segundo, Miguel Angel. ‘‘Sobre los aragoneses y la provisión de oficios
de Indias en el reinado de Felipe II.’’ In Centralismo y autonomismo en los siglos XVI–
XVV: Homenaje al profesor Jesús Lalinde Abadía, ed. Aquilino Iglesia Ferreiros and
Sixto Sánchez Español, 195–212. Barcelona: Universidad de Barcelona, 1989.
González Esquerdo, Alejandro. ‘‘Orígines del problema Chueta.’’ Historia y vida 24, no.
275 (1991): 30–36.
González Jimenez, Manuel. ‘‘Genoveses en Sevilla.’’ In Presencia italiana en Andalucía,
siglos XIV–XVII: Actas del I coloquio hispano-italiano, 114–30. Seville: Escuela de
Estudios Hispanoamericanos, 1985.
Goose, Nigel, ‘‘The Dutch in Colchester in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries:
Opposition and Integration.’’ In From Strangers to Citizens: The Integration of Immi-
294 Bibliography
grant Communities in Britain, Ireland, and Colonial America, 1550–1750, ed. Ran-
dolph Vigne and Charles Littleton, 88–98. Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 2001.
Gould, Eduardo Ricardo. ‘‘La condición del extranjero en América: Los portugueses en
Córdoba del Tucumán entre 1573 y 1640.’’ Revista de historia del derecho 19 (1991):
245–79.
Grandmaison, Geoffroy de, L’ambassade française en Espagne pendant la révolution
(1789–1804). Paris: Plon, 1892.
Greene, Jack P. Peripheries and Center: Constitutional Development in the Extended
Polities of the British Empire and the U.S., 1607–1788. Athens: University of Georgia
Press, 1986.
Greenfeld, Liah. Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity. Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1992.
Guerra, François Xavier. Modernidad e independencia: Ensayos sobre las revoluciones
hispánicas. Madrid: Mapfre, 1992.
———. ‘‘Identidades e idependencia: La excepción americana.’’ Cuadernos de historia
latinoamericana 2 (1994): 93–134.
———. ‘‘Identidad y soberanía: una relación compleja.’’ In Revoluciones hispánicas: Inde-
pendencias americanas y liberalismo español, ed. François-Xavier Guerra, 207–39.
Madrid: Editorial Complutense, 1995.
———. ‘‘La nation en Amérique Espagnole: Le problème des origines.’’ In La pensée
politique: La nation, 85–106. Paris: EHESS, 1995.
———. ‘‘El soberano y su reino: Reflexiones sobre la génesis del ciudadano en América
Latina.’’ In Ciudadanía política y formación de las naciones: Perspectivas históricas de
América Latina, ed. Hilda Sábato, 33–61. Mexico: Colegio de México, 1999.
———. ‘‘The Implosion of the Spanish American Empire: Emerging Statehood and Collec-
tive Identities,’’ In The Collective and the Public in Latin America: Cultural Identities
and Political Order, ed. Luis Roniger and Tamar Herzog, 71–94. Brighton: Sussex
Academic Press, 2000.
Guerra, François-Xavier, and Mónica Quijada, ed. Imaginar la nación: Cuadernos de
historia latinoamericana 2 (1994).
Guichot, Joaquin. Historia de la ciudad de Sevilla y pueblos importantes de su provincia.
Seville: Josée María Ariza, 1882.
———. Historia del exmo. ayuntamiento de la muy noble . . . ciudad de Sevilla. Seville: La
Región, 1897–98.
Guidi, Guidubaldo. Il governo della città-repubblica di Firenze del primo quattrocento.
Florence: Leo S. Olschki, 1981.
Guimerá Ravina, Agustín. Burguesía extranjera y comercio atlántico: La empreza comer-
cial irlandesa en Canarias (1703–1771). Tenerife: CSIC, 1985.
Gutiérrez de Rubalcava, Joseph. Tratado histórico, político y legal del comercio de las
Indias occidentales. Primera parte: compendio histórico del comercio de las Indias
desde su principio hasta su actual estado. Cádiz: Imprenta Real de la Marina, 1750.
Gutiérrez Nieto, J. F. ‘‘El reformismo social de Olivares: El problema de la limpieza de
sangre y la creación de una nobleza de mérito.’’ In La España del conde duque de
Olivares: Encuentro internacional sobre la España del conde duque de Olivares, cele-
Bibliography 295
brado en Toro los días 15–18 de septiembre de 1987, ed. John Elliott and Angel García
Sanz, 417–41. Valladolid: Universidad de valladolid, 1987.
Hacienda y comercio de Venezuela en el siglo XVII, 1601–1650. Caracas: Banco Central
de Venezuela, 1986.
Halizcer, Stephen. ‘‘Inquisition Myth and Inquisition History: The Abolition of the Holy
Office and the Development of Spanish Political Ideology.’’ In The Spanish Inquisition
and the Inquisitorial Mind, ed. Angel Alcalá, 523–49. Highland Lakes, N.J.: Atlantic
Research and Publications, 1987.
Halperín Donghi, Tulio. Reforma y disolución de los imperios ibéricos 1750–1850.
Madrid: Alianza, 1985.
Hamilton, Bernice. Political Thought in Sixteenth Century Spain: A Study of the Political
Ideas of Vitoria, De Soto, Suárez, and Molina. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963.
Hamnett, Brian R. La política española en una época revolucionaria, 1790–1820. Mex-
ico: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1985.
Hampe Martínez, Teodoro. ‘‘Sobre encomenderos y repartimientos en la diócesis de
Lima a principios del siglo XVII.’’ Jahrbuch für Geschichte von Staat, Wirtschaft und
Gesellschaft Lateinamerikas 23 (1986): 121–43.
Hanke, Lewis. ‘‘A Modest Proposal for a Moratorium on Grand Generalizations: Some
Thoughts on the Black Legend.’’ Hispanic American Historical Review 51 (1971):
112–27.
Hardoy, Jorge E. El proceso de urbanización en América Latina. Havana: Oficina Re-
gional de Cultura para América Latina y el Caribe, 1974.
———. ‘‘European Urban Forms in the Fifteenth to Seventeenth Centuries and their Utili-
zation in Latin America.’’ In Urbanization in the Americas from Its Beginning to the
Present, ed. R. Schaedel, J. E. Hardoy, and N. Scott Kinzer, 215–48. The Hague:
Mouton, 1978.
Haring, Clarence H. Trade and Navigation between Spain and the Indies in the Time of
the Habsburgs. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1918.
Harring, Sidney L. Crow Dog’s Case: American Indian Sovereignty, Tribal Law and the
United States Law in the Nineteenth Century. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1994.
Harwich Vallenilla, Nikita. ‘‘Construcción de una identidad nacional: El discurso histo-
riográfico de Venezuela en el siglo XIX.’’ Revista de Indias 54, no. 202 (1994): 637–53.
Hastings, Adrian. The Construction of Nationhood. Ethnicity, Religion, and National-
ism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997.
Haycraft, Thomas W. ‘‘Alien Legislation and the Prerogative of the Crown.’’ Law Quar-
terly Review 13 (1897): 165–86.
Heras, José Luis de. ‘‘La problemática incorporación de los territorios de la corona de
Aragón a las Cortes de Castilla en el marco de las reformas administrativas de Felipe
V.’’ In El mundo hispánico en el siglo de las luces, vol. 2, 771–87. Madrid: Universidad
Complutense, 1996.
Heredia Herrera, Antonia. ‘‘Apuntes para la historia del consulado de la universidad de
cargadores a Indias en Sevilla y Cádiz.’’ Anuario de estudios americanos 37 (1970):
219–74.
296 Bibliography
Jover Zamora, José María. ‘‘Sobre los conceptos de monarquía y nación en el pensamiento
político español del XVII.’’ Cuadernos de historia de España 13 (1950): 101–15.
Juderías y Loyot, Julián. La leyenda negra: Estudios acerca del concepto de España en el
extranjero. Valladolid: Junta de Castilla y León, 1997 [1914].
Kagan, Richard. Students and Society in Early Modern Spain. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1974.
———. ‘‘Prescott’s Paradigm: American Historical Scholarship and the Decline of Spain.’’
American Historical Review 101, no. 2 (1996): 423–46.
Kahil, William F. ‘‘Apprenticeship and the Freedom of London Livery Companies, 1690–
1750.’’ Guildhall Miscellany 7 (1956): 17–20.
Kamen, Henry. ‘‘El ámbito jurídico de la oposición a la limpieza de sangre en España.’’ In
Perfiles jurídicos de la inquisición española, ed. J. Antonio Escudero, 627–32. Madrid:
Universidad Complutense, 1989.
———. ‘‘Limpieza and the Ghost of Américao Castro: Racism as a Tool of Literary
Analysis.’’ Hispanic Review 64, no. 1 (1996): 19–29.
Keen, Benjamin. ‘‘The Black Legend Revisited: Assumptions and Realities.’’ Hispanic
American Historical Review 49 (1969): 703–19.
———. ‘‘The White Legend Revisited: A Reply to Professor Hanke’s ‘Modest Proposal.’ ’’
Hispanic American Historical Review 51 (1971): 336–55.
Kellenbenz, Herman. ‘‘Mercaderes extranjeros en América del sur a comienzos del siglo
XVII.’’ Anuario de estudios americanos 28 (1971): 377–403.
Kellett, J. R ‘‘The Breakdown of Gild and Corporation Control over the Handcraft and
Retail Trade in London.’’ Economic History Review 10, no. 3 (1958): 381–94.
Kettner, James H. The Development of American Citizenship. Chapel Hill: University of
North Carolina Press, 1978.
Kicza, John E. ‘‘Patterns in Early Spanish Overseas Expansion.’’ William and Mary Quar-
terly 49 (1992): 229–53.
———. ‘‘The Social and Political Position of Spanish Immigrants in Bourbon America and
the Origins of the Independent Movement.’’ Colonial Latin American Review 4, no. 1
(1995): 105–28.
Kim, Keechang. Aliens in Medieval Law: The Origins of Modern Citizenship. Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000.
King, James F. ‘‘The Colored Castes and American Representation in the Cortes of Cá-
diz.’’ Hispanic American Historical Review 33 (1953): 33–64.
Kirshner, Julius. ‘‘Civitas Sibi Faciat Civem: Bartolus of Sassoferrato’s Doctrine on the
Making of a Citizen.’’ Speculum 48 (1973): 694–713.
———. ‘‘Between Nature and Culture: An Opinion of Baldus of Perugia on Venetian
Citizenship as Second Nature.’’ Journal of Medieval and Renaissance Studies 9 (1979):
179–208.
———. ‘‘Donne maritate altrove: Genere e cittadinanza in Italia.’’ In Tempi e spazi di vita
femminile tra medioevo ed età moderna, ed. Silvana Seidel Menchi, Anne Jacobson
Schutte, and Thomas Kuehn, 377–429. Bologna: Il Mulino, 1999.
Koenigsberger, Helmut. ‘‘Spain.’’ In National Consciousness, History, and Political Cul-
ture in Early Modern Europe, ed. Orest Ranum, 144–72. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1975.
Bibliography 299
guiridico.’’ In Dentro de la città: Stranieri e realtà urbane nell’Europa dei secoli XII–
XVI, ed. Gabriella Rossetti, 47–60. Naples: Liguori Editore, 1989.
Langé, Christine. ‘‘L’immigration française en Aragon XVIe siècle et première moitié du
XVIIe siècle,’’ In Les français en Espagne à l’époque moderne (XVIe–XVIIIe siècles),
25–44. Paris: CNRS, 1990.
Langue, Frédérique. ‘‘Los franceses en Nueva España a finales del siglo XVIII: Notas
sobre un estado de opinión.’’ Anuario de estudios americanos 46 (1989): 219–41.
———. ‘‘ ‘El indiano de la comedia es moreno’ ou de la multitude servile à l’aristocratie
blanche: Venezuela, XVIe–XVIII siècle.’’ In Transgressions et stratégies du métissage
en Amérique coloniale, ed. Bernard Lavallé, 223–48. Paris: Presses de la Sorbonne
Nouvelle, 1999.
Laprat, R. ‘‘Aubains (incapacité bénéficiales des).’’ In Dictionnaire de droit canonique,
ed. R. Naz, vol. 1, 1332–79. Paris: Librairie Letouzey, 1935.
Lavallé, Bernard. ‘‘Les étrangers dans les Régions de Tucuman et Potosi (1602–1610),’’
Revue Hispanique 76 (1974): 125–41.
———. ‘‘Conception, représentation et rôle de l’espace dans la revendication créole au
Pérou.’’ In Espace et identité nationale en Amérique Latine, ed. Joseph Perez, 67–93.
Paris: CNRS, 1981.
———. Recherches sur l’apparition de la conscience créole dans la vice-royauté du Pérou:
L’antagonisme hispano-créole dans les ordres religieux (XVI-XVII). Lille: Université
de Lille, 1982.
———. ‘‘Hispanité ou americanité? Les ambiguïtés de l’identité créole dans le Pérou colo-
nial.’’ In Identités nationales et identités culturelles dans le monde ibérique et ibér-
oamericain: Actes du XVIIIeme congrès de la société des hispanistes français, Perpig-
nan 20–22 mars 1982, 95–107. Toulouse: Université de Toulouse–Le Mirail, 1983.
———. ‘‘¿Hacia una ‘demanda de nación?’ (Aportes, perspectivas e hipotecas del criol-
lismo colonial en los siglos XVI y XVII).’’ In America Latina: Dallo stato coloniale allo
stato nazione, ed. Antonio Annino, Marcello Carmagnani, Gabriella Chiaramonti,
Alberto Filippi, Flavio Fiorani, Alberto Gallo, and Giovanni Marchetti, vol. 2, 11–26.
Turin: Franco Angeli, 1987 (also published in Elementos para un balance del criollismo
colonial, ed, Bernard Lavallé, 11–26. Quito: Editora Nacional, 1992).
———. Las promesas ambiguas. Criollismo colonial en los Andes. Lima: Pontificia Uni-
versidad Católica del Perú, 1993.
Leblon, Bernard. ‘‘Les gitans dans la péninsule ibérique.’’ Etudes Tsiganes 10, no. 1
(1964): 1–24.
———. Les gitans d’Espagne: Le prix de la différence. Paris: Presses Universitaires de
France, 1985.
———. ‘‘Les gitans: Une société fermée?’’ In Les Sociétés Fermées dans le Monde Ibérique
(XVI–XVIII siècles): Actes de la table Ronde des 8 a 9 Février 1985, 223–35. Paris:
Maison des Pays Ibériques, 1986.
Lefebvre-Teillard, Anne. ‘‘Ius sanguinis: L’émergence d’une principe (éléments d’histoire
de la nationalité française).’’ Revue critique de droit international privé 82, no. 2
(1993): 223–50.
Lequin, Yves, ed. Histoire des étrangers et de l’immigration en France. Paris: Larousse,
1992.
Bibliography 301
Levene, Ricardo. Las Indias no eran colonias. Buenos Aires: Austral, 1951.
Levillier, Roberto. Ordenanzas de Don Francisco de Toledo, Virrey del Perú, 1569–
1581. Madrid: Juan Pueyo, 1929.
Lévy, J. P. La hiérarchie des preuves dans le droit savant du moyen âge depuis la renais-
sance du droit romain jusqu’à la fin du XIVe siècle. Paris: Sirey, 1939.
Lewis, A. D. E., and D. J. Ibbetson. The Roman Law Tradition. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1994.
Libro cuarto de las actas del cabildo (de México City). Mexico: Municipio Libre, 1859.
Libros de cabildo de Lima. Lima: Consejo Provincial de Lima, 1935–62.
Lien, Arnold J, ‘‘The Acquisition of Citizenship by the Native American Indians.’’ Wash-
ington University Studies—Humanistic Series 13, no. 50 (1925): 121–79.
Linehan, Peter. ‘‘Religion, Nationalism, and National Identity in Medieval Spain and
Portugal.’’ In Religion and National Identity: Papers Read at the 19th Summer Meeting
and 20th Winter Meeting of the Ecclesiastical History Society, Studies in Church His-
tory 18, 161–99. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1982.
Liss, Peggy K. Mexico under Spain, 1521–1556: Society and the Origins of Nationality.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975.
———. Atlantic Empires: The Network of Trade and Revolution, 1713–1826. Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983.
Litwack, Leon F. North of Slavery: The Negro in the Free States, 1790–1860. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1961.
Llaguno, José A. La personalidad jurídica del indio y el III concilio provincial mexicano
(1585). Mexico: Porrúa, 1963.
Llombart, Vicente. Campomanes: Economista y político de Carlos III. Madrid: Alianza,
1992.
Lloyd, T. H. Alien Merchants in England in the High Middle Ages. Sussex: Harvester,
1982.
Lockhart, James. Spanish Peru, 1532–1560: A Social History. Madison: University of
Wisconsin Press, 1994 [1968].
Lohmann Villena, Guillermo. Francisco de Toledo: Disposiciones gubernativas para el
virreinato del perú, 1575–1580. Seville: Escuela de Estudios Hispanoamericanos,
1989.
Lombardi, John V. Venezuela: The Search for Order. The Dream of Progress. New York:
Oxford University Press, 1982.
Lomnitz, Claudio. ‘‘Nationalism as a Practical System: A Critique of Benedict Anderson’s
Theory of Nationalism from a Spanish American Perspective.’’ In In the Other Mirror:
Grand Theory Through the Lens of Latin America, ed. Miguel Angel Centeno and
Fernando López Alvarez, 329–59. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000.
Loomis, Louise R. ‘‘Nationality at the Council of Constance: An Anglo-French Dispute.’’
American Historical Review 44 (1938–39): 508–27.
López Beltrán, Clara. ‘‘Intereses y pasiones de los ‘vecinos’ de La Paz durante el siglo
XVII: La élite provinciana en Charcas, virreinato del Perú.’’ Anuario de estudios amer-
icanos 52, no. 1 (1995): 37–56.
López de la Plaza, Gloria. ‘‘De la tierra a la villa. Desplazamientos de corto alcance
vinculadas a la función administrativa de Madrid: Las vecindades.’’ In Caminos y
302 Bibliography
caminantes por las tierras de Madrid medieval, ed. Cristina Segura Graíño, 165–72.
Madrid: Al Mudayna, 1994.
López de Tovar, Gregorio. Indice de las leyes y glosa del mismo. In Los códigos españoles
concordados y anotados, vol. 5. Madrid: La Publicidad, 1848 [1757].
López García, José Miguel, and Santos Madrazo Machazo. ‘‘A Capital City in the Feudal
Order: Madrid from the Sixteenth to the Eighteenth Century,’’ In Capital Cities and
Their Hinterland in Early Modern Europe, ed. Peter Clark and Bernard Lepetit, 119–
42. Hants: Scholar Press, 1996.
Losa Contreras, Carmen. El consejo de Madrid en el tránsito de la edad media a la edad
moderna. Madrid: Dykinson, 1999.
Luque, Miguel. ‘‘La avería en el tráfico marítimo mercantil indiano: Notas para su es-
tudio (siglos XVI–XVIII).’’ Revista complutense de historia de América 24 (1998):
113–45.
Lutz, Christopher H. Santiago de Guatemala, 1541–1773: City, Caste, and the Colonial
Experience. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1994.
Lynch, John. The Hispanic World in Crisis and Change, 1593–1700. Oxford: Blackwell,
1994 [1969].
———. Bourbon Spain, 1700–1808. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989.
———. ‘‘Introduction.’’ In Latin American Revolutions, 1808–1826: Old and New
World Origins, ed. John Lynch, 5–38. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1994.
Lynch, John, ed. Latin American Revolutions, 1808–1826: Old and New World Origins.
Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1994.
MacKay, Agnus. Spain in the Middle Ages: From Frontier to Empire, 1000–1500. Lon-
don: Macmillan, 1977.
MacLeod, Murdo. ‘‘La situación legal de los indios en América central durante la colonia:
Teoría y práctica.’’ América indígena 45, no. 3 (1985): 485–504.
Madden, Marie R. Political Theory and Law in Medieval Spain. New York: Fordham
University Press, 1930.
Malca Olguín, Oscar. ‘‘Gobierno colonial: Tribunal Mayor del Consulado de la Ciudad
de los Reyes.’’ Revista del Archivo Nacional del Perú 20 (1956): 3–41 and 273–88.
———. ‘‘El Tribunal del Consulado y los grandes servicios prestados con sus entradas y
empeños a la corona española.’’ Revista del Archivo Nacional de Perú 20 (1956): 6–
10.
Maltby, William S. The Black Legend in England: The Development of Anti-Spanish
Sentiment, 1558–1660. Durham: Duke University Press, 1971.
Manning, Roger B. ‘‘Rural Societies in Early Modern Europe.’’ Sixteenth Century Journal
17, no. 3 (1986): 353–60.
Manzano Manzano, Juan. La incorporación de las Indias a la corona de Castilla. Ma-
drid, Cultura Hispánica, 1948.
———. ‘‘La adquisición de las Indias por los reyes católicos y su incorporación a los reinos
castellanos.’’ Anuario de historia del derecho español 21 (1951): 5–170.
Maravall, José Antonio. La teoría española del estado en el siglo XVII. Madrid: Instituto
de Estudios Políticos, 1944.
———. El concepto de España en la edad media. Madrid: Instituto de Estudios Políticos,
1954.
Bibliography 303
Mori, Elisabetta. ‘‘ ‘Tot reges in urbe roma quot cives’: Cittadinanza e nobiltà a Roma tra
cinque e seicento.’’ Roma moderna e contemporanea 4, no. 2 (1996): 379–401.
Mörner, Magnus. ‘‘La política de segregación y el mestizaje en la audiencia de Guate-
mala.’’ Revista de Indias 24, nos. 95–96 (1964): 137–51.
———. ‘‘La difusión del castellano y el aislamiento de los indios: Dos aspiraciones contra-
dictorias de la corona española.’’ In Homenaje a Jaime Vicens Vives, 435–46. Bar-
celona: Universidad de Barcelona, 1967.
———. La Corona española y los foráneos en los pueblos de indios de América. Madrid:
Cultura Hispánica, 1999 [1970].
———. ‘‘Ethnicity, Social Mobility, and Mestizaje in Spanish Colonial History.’’ In
Iberische Welten. Festschrift zum 65. Geburtstag von Günter Kahle, ed. Felix Becker,
Holger M. Meding, Barbara Potthast-Jutkeit, and Karin Schüller, 301–14. Cologne:
Böhlau Verlag, 1994.
Morris, Richard B. Studies in the History of American Law. New York: Columbia Uni-
versity Press, 1930.
Morse, Richard M. ‘‘Introducción a la historia urbana de Hispanoamérica.’’ Revista de
Indias 32, nos. 127–39 (1972): 9–53.
———. ‘‘Urban Development.’’ In Colonial Spanish America, ed. Leslie Bethell, 165–202.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987 (also published in Cambridge History
of Latin America, vol. 2, 67–104).
Moya Pons, Frank. El cabildo y la vida local de Lima en el siglo XVI (1534–1553). Santo
Domingo: Corripio, 1985.
Mueller, Reinhold C. ‘‘Veneti facti privilegio: Les étrangers naturalisés à Venise entre
XIVe et XVIe siècle.’’ In Les étrangers dans la ville: Minorité et espace urbain du bas
moyen age à l’époque moderne, ed. Jacques Bottin and Donatella Calabi, 171–81.
Paris: Maison des Sciences de l’Homme, 1999.
Muñoz García, María José. Las limitaciones a la capacidad de obrar de la mujer casada,
1505–1975. Madrid: UNED, 1991.
Muro Orejón, Antonio. Cedulario americano del siglo XVIII. Seville: Escuela de Estudios
Hispanoamericanos, 1956–77.
———. ‘‘El ayuntamiento de Sevilla modelo de los municipios americanos.’’ Anales de la
Universidad Hispalense 20 (1960): 69–85.
———. ‘‘La igualdad entre indios y españoles: La real cédula de 1697.’’ In Estudios sobre
política indigenista española en América, vol. 1, 365–86. Valladolid: Universidad de
Valladolid, 1975.
Nader, Helen. Liberty in Absolutist Spain: The Habsburg Sale of Towns, 1516–1700.
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990.
Navarro de la Torre, Luisa. ‘‘Avecindamientos en Huete al comenzar el siglo XV.’’ In
1490. En el umbral de la modernidad: El mediterráneo europeo y las ciudades en el
tránsito de los siglos XV–XVI, ed. José Hinojosa Montalvo and Jesús Pradells Nadal,
vol. 2, 693–711. Valencia: Generalitat Valenciana, 1994.
Netanyahu, Benzion. The Origins of the Inquisition in Fifteenth Century Spain. New
York: Random House, 1995.
Nicolet, Claude. ‘‘Citoyenneté française et citoyenneté romaine: Essai de-mise-en per-
spective.’’ In La nozione di ‘romano’ tra cittadinanza e universalità. Seminario inter-
Bibliography 307
nazionale di studi storici da Roma alla terza Roma, 145–73. Naples: Edizioni Scien-
tifische Italiane, 1982.
Noiriel, Gerard. La tyrannie du national: Le droit d’asile en Europe (1793–1993). Paris:
Calman-Lévy, 1991.
Nordman, Daniel. Frontières de France: De l’espace au territoire, XVIe–XIXe siècle.
Paris: Gallimard, 1998.
Noroña, Carlos G. Studies in Spanish Renaissance Thought. The Hague: Martirus Hi-
jhoff, 1975.
Nuix, Juan. Reflexiones imparciales sobre la humanidad de los epsañoles en las Indias
contra los pretendidos filósofos y políticos, trans. Pedro Varela y Ulloa. Madrid, 1782.
Núñez de Castro, Alonso. Libro histórico político solo Madrid es corte y el cortesano en
Madrid. Madrid, 1669.
Nunn, Charles F. ‘‘Naturalization in New Spain, 1700 to 1760: The Case of Jean Mal-
ibran.’’ SECOLAS Annals 8 (1977): 61–71.
———. Foreign Immigrants in Early Bourbon Mexico, 1700–1760. Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 1979.
Olaechea Cabayen, Juan B. ‘‘Política social y política racial de España en orden a los
indios.’’ Revista internacional de sociología 27 (1969): 101–22.
———. ‘‘La ciudadanía del indio en los dominios hispanos.’’ Cuadernos de investigación
histórica 5 (1981): 113–33.
Oliva Melgar, José María. ‘‘Realidad y Ficción en el monopolio de Indias: Una reflexión
sobre el sistema español en el siglo XVII.’’ Manuscrits 14 (1996): 321–55.
———. ‘‘La negociación del nuevo asiento de la avería (circa 1643–1667).’’ In Actas del
XI congreso internacional de AHILA (Liverpool, 17–22 de septiembre de 1996), ed.
John R. Fisher, vol. 2, 44–69. Liverpool: University of Liverpool, 1998.
Ordenanzas de buen gobierno dadas por Hernando Cortés para los vecinos y moradores
de la Nueva España 1524. Madrid: José Porrúa, 1960.
‘‘Ordenanzas del consulado de Sevilla.’’ Archivo Hispalense 173 (1973): 171–73.
O’Reilly, William, ‘‘The Naturalization Act of 1709 and the Settlement of Germans in
Britain, Ireland, and the Colonies.’’ In From Strangers to Citizens: The Integration of
Immigrant Communities in Britain, Ireland, and Colonial America, 1550–01750, ed.
Randolph Vigne and Charles Littleton, 492–502. Brighton: Sussex Academic Press,
2001.
Ortega y Gasset, José. Invertebrate Spain, trans. Mildred Adams. New York: W. W.
Norton, 1937 [1921].
Ortiz de la Tabla, Ducasse. ‘‘Extranjeros en la audiencia de Quito (1595–1603).’’ In
América y España del siglo XVI: Homenaje a Gonzalo Fernández de Oviedo, ed.
Francisco Solano and Fermín del Pino, 93–113. Madrid: CSIC, 1983.
Ozanam, Didier. ‘‘Les origines du troisième pacte de famille (1761).’’ Revue d’histoire
diplomatique 75, no. 2 (1961): 305–40.
———. ‘‘La Colonie Française de Cadix au XVII siècle d’après un document inédit
(1777).’’ Mélanges de la Casa de Velázquez 4 (1968): 259–348.
———. ‘‘Le recensement des étrangers en 1791: Une source pour l’histoire des colonies
étrangers en Espagne.’’ In Les français en Espagne à l’époque moderne (XVIe–XVIIIe
siècle), 197–214. Paris: CNRS, 1990.
308 Bibliography
———. ‘‘Les étrangers dans la haute administration espagnole au XVIII siècle.’’ In Pouvoir
et société dans l’Espagne moderne: Hommage à Bartolomé Bennasar, ed. Jean-Pierre
Amalric, 215–29. Toulouse: Presses Universitaires du Mirail, 1993.
Pagden, Anthony. ‘‘Identity Formation in Spanish America.’’ In Colonial Identity in the
Atlantic World, 1500–1800, ed. Nicholas Canny and Anthony Pagden, 51–93. Prince-
ton: Princeton University Press, 1987.
———. ‘‘Old Constitutions and Ancient Indian Empires: Juan Pablo Viscardo and the
Language of Revolution in Spanish America.’’ In Spanish Imperialism and the Political
Imagination: Studies in European and Spanish American Social and Political Theory,
1513–1830, Anthony Pagden, 117–32. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990.
———. Lords of All the World: Ideologies of Empire in Spain, Britain, and France, c.
1500–c.1800. Yale: Yale University Press, 1995.
Pagden, Anthony, and Jeremy Lawrance eds. Francisco de Vitoria: Political Writing.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991.
Palacio Atard, Vincente. El tercer pacto de familia. Madrid: CSIC, 1945.
Palliser, D. M. ‘‘A Crisis in English Towns? The Case of York, 1460–1640.’’ Northern
History 14 (1978): 108–25.
Pan-Montojo, Juan, ed. Más se perdió en Cuba: España, 1898 y la crisis de fin de siglo.
Madrid: Alianza, 1998.
Panero, Francesco. Comuni e borghi franchi nel Piemonte medievale. Bologna: Cooper-
ativa Libreria Universitaria Editrice, 1988.
Parrón Salas, Carmen. ‘‘El nacionalismo emergente y el comercio. La expulsión de extra-
njeros de América: Perú, 1745–1778.’’ In Actas del XI congreso internacional de
AHILA: Liverpool 17–22 de septiembre de 1996, ed. John Fisher, vol. 1, 200–218.
Liverpool: University of Liverpool, 1998.
Parry, Clive. British Nationality Law and the History of Naturalization. Milan: Giuffré,
1954.
Parry, J. H. The Age of Reconnaissance: Discovery, Exploration, and Settlement, 1450–
1650. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981 [1963].
Pastor, María Alba. ‘‘Criollismo y contrareforma: Nueva España entre 1570 y 1630.’’
Ibero-Amerikanisches Archiv 22, nos. 3–4 (1996): 247–66.
Patterson, Catherine F. Urban Patronage in Early Modern England: Corporate
Bouroughs, the Landed Elite and the Crown, 1580–1640. Stanford: Stanford Univer-
sity Press, 1999.
Pauffin, Henry. Essai sur l’organisation et la jurisdiction municipales au moyen âge. Paris:
Ernest Thorin, 1886.
Payne, Stanley G. Spanish Catholicism: An Historical Overview. Madison: University of
Wisconsin Press, 1984.
Paz, Julián. ‘‘Reclamaciones de los mallorquines llamados de la calle sobre su condición
social.’’ Revista de archivos, bibliotecas y museos 16 (1907): 184–200.
Pearl, Valerie. ‘‘Social Policy in Early Modern London.’’ In History and Imagination:
Essays in Honor of H. R. Trevor-Roper, ed. Hugh Lloyd-Jones, Valerie Pearl, and Blair
Worden, 115–31. New York: Holmes and Meier, 1982.
Pelorson, Jean-Marc. Les letrados. Juristes castillans sous Philippe III: Recherches sur
leur place dans la société, la culture, et l’état. Poitiers: Université de Poitiers, 1980.
Bibliography 309
Peñafiel, Ramón Antonio. ‘‘Gitanos en Murcia en la primera mitad del siglo XVIII:
¿Integración o extinción?’’ Anales de historia contemporánea 4 (1985): 7–34.
Percourt García, Enrique. ‘‘Una institución singular en la historia del derecho internacio-
nal privado español: El ‘fuero de extranjería.’ In Estudios de derecho internacional
público y privado: Homenaje al prof. Luis Sela Sampil, vol. 2, 883–904. Oviedo:
Universidad de Oviedo, 1970.
Pérez Collados, José María. Una aproximación histórica al concepto jurídico de na-
cionalidad. Zaragoza: Fernando el Católico, 1993.
Pérez de Guzmán, Torcuato. Los gitanos herreros de Sevilla. Seville: Ayuntamiento de
Sevilla, 1981.
Pérez Esteve, María Rosa. El problema de los vagos en la España del siglo XVIII. Ma-
drid: Confederación Española de Cajas de Ahorros, 1976.
Pérez Guilhou, Dardo. La opinión pública española y las cortes de Cádiz frente a la
emancipación hispanoamericana, 1808–1814. Buenos Aires: Academia Nacional de la
Historia, 1981.
Pérez Herrero, Pedro. ‘‘The Beneficiaries of the Bourbon Reforms: Spain versus the New
Spain Elite.’’ In Economic Effects of the European Expansion, 1492–1824, ed. José
Casas Pardo, 333–86. Stuttgart: F. Steiner, 1992.
Pérez Martínez, Lorenzo, ed. Revindicación de los judíos mallorquines (Documentos
para su estudio I). Palma de Majorca: Fontes Rerum Balearius, 1983.
Pérez Prendes Muñoz Arraco, José Manuel. Cortes de Castilla. Barcelona: Ariel, 1974.
———. ‘‘La ‘Recopilación’ de las leyes de los reinos castellano-leoneses. Esbozos para un
comentario a su libro primero.’’ In Felipe II y su época: Actas del simposium en San
Lorenzo del Escorial 1/5–IX–1998, vol. 2, 127–215. Escorial: RCU Escorial María
Cristina, 1998.
———. ‘‘Los criterios jurídicos de Cristóbal Colón.’’ In José Manuel Pérez Prendes Muñoz
Arraco—Pareceres (1956–1998), ed. Magdalena Rodríguez Gil. Interpretatio: Revista
de historia del derecho 7, no. 2 (1999): 1035–62.
———. Historia del derecho español. Madrid: Universidad Complutense, 1999.
———. ‘‘La obsesión de la ‘nueva planta.’ ’’ Revista de la facultad de historia de la Univer-
sidad Complutense de Madrid 94 (2001): 129–50.
Pérez Rodríguez, Manuel J. Los extranjeros en Canarias: Historia de su situación jurí-
dica. Laguna: Universidad de la Laguna, 1990.
Peronnet, Michel. ‘‘Bourgeois, Bourgeoisie: Les définitions du Dictionnaire de l’Aca-
démie (1762–1802).’’ Il pensiero politico 19, no. 1 (1986): 103–12.
Perrin, Edmond. ‘‘Le droit de bourgeoisie et l’immigration rurale à Metz au XIIIe siècle.’’
Annuaire de la société d’histoire et d’archéologie de la Lorraine 30 (1921): 513–85 and
33 (1924): 148–52.
———. ‘‘La bourgeoisie dauphinoise d’après les chartes de franchise.’’ Annales de l’Uni-
versité de Grenoble 2 (1925): 155–250.
Peset Reig, Mariano. ‘‘Derecho romano y derecho real en las universidades del siglo
XVIII.’’ Anuario de historia del derecho español 45 (1975): 273–339.
Petit, Carlos. ‘‘Derecho común y derecho castellano. Notas de literatura jurídica para su
estudio (siglo XV–XVIII).’’ Tijdschrift Voor Rechtsgeschiedenis 50, no. 2 (1982): 157–
95.
310 Bibliography
Petit-Dutaillis, Charles. Les communes françaises des origines au XVIIIe siècle. Paris:
Albin Michel, 1947.
Peytavin, Mireille. ‘‘Naples au miroir espagnol: Une contemplation amoureuse.’’ In Ob-
servation and Communication: The Construction of Realities in the Hispanic World,
ed. Johannes Michael Scholz and Tamar Herzog, 271–98. Frankfurt: Vittorio Kloster-
mann, 1997.
———. ‘‘Españoles e italianos en Sicilia, Nápoles y Milán durante los siglos XVII y XVIII.
Sobre la oportunidad de ser nacional o natural.’’ Relaciones 19, no. 73 (1998): 85–
114.
———. ‘‘Aduanas locales y privilegios de ciudadanía. Tentativas de intervención institu-
cional de la monarquía española en las provincias de Nápoles.’’ In Felipe II y su tiempo:
V reunión científica de la Asociación Española de Historia Moderna, ed. José Luis
Pereira Iglesias, vol. 1, 329–34. Cádiz: Universidad de Cádiz, 1999.
Pietschmann, Horst. ‘‘Los principios rectores de organización estatal en las Indias.’’ In De
los imperios a las naciones: Iberoamérica, ed. Antonio Annino, Luis Castro Leiva, and
François Xavier Guerra, 75–103. Zaragoza: Ibercaja, 1994.
———. ‘‘La resistencia española al imperio: Las Indias en los años iniciales del reinado de
Carlos V.’’ In Estudios de historia del derecho europeo. Homenaje a A. G. Martínez
Diez, vol. 2, 13–30. Madrid: Universidad Complutense, 1994.
Pike, Fredrick B. Hispanismo, 1898–1936: Spanish Conservatives and Liberals and
Their Relations with Spanish America. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press,
1971.
Pike, Ruth. Enterprise and Adventure: The Genoveses in Seville and the Opening of the
New World. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1966.
———. Aristocrats and Traders: Sevillian Society in the Sixteenth Century. Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1972.
Pimenta Ferro Tavares, José María. Os judeus em Portugal no século XV. Lisbon: Univer-
sidade Nova, 1982–84.
Piña Homs, Román. La reincorporación de Menorca a la corona española, 1781–1798
(Medidas de gobierno y administración). Majorca: Universidad de Palma de Mallorca,
1983.
———. ‘‘La condición de natural del reino de Mallorca: Base para una aproximación
histórica a la ciudadanía mallorquina.’’ Anuario de historia del derecho español 55
(1985): 307–32.
Planas Roselló, Antonio, ed. Recopilación del derecho de Mallorca 1622 por los doctores
Pere Canet, Antoni Mesquida y Jordi Zaforteza. Majorca: Miquel Font, 1996.
Poitrineau, A. ‘‘La imigración francesa en el reino de Valencia (siglos XVI–XIX).’’ Mon-
eda y Crédito 137 (1976): 103–33.
Poloni-Simard, Jacques. ‘‘Formación, desarrollo y configuración socio-étnica de una
ciudad colonial: Cuenca, siglos XVI–XVIII.’’ Anuario de estudios americanos 54, no. 2
(1997): 413–45.
———. ‘‘Problèmes et tentatives d’identification des métis à travers la documentation
coloniale: L’exemple de Cuenca.’’ In Transgressions et stratégies du métissage en Amér-
ique coloniale, ed. Bernard Lavallé, 11–21. Paris: Presses de la Sorbonne Nouvelle,
1999.
Bibliography 311
Rubio García, Luis. Los judíos de Murcia en la baja edad media (1350–1500). Murcia:
Universidad de Murcia, 1992.
Rucqoi, Adeline. ‘‘Genèse médiévale de l’Espagne moderne: Du pouvoir et de la nation
(1250–1516).’’ In L’état modene: Genèse. Bilans et perspectives. Actes du Colloque
tenu au CNRS à Paris les 19–20 septembre 1989, ed. Jean Philippe Genet, 17–31.
Paris: CNRS, 1990.
Ruiz Ibáñez, José Javier. ‘‘Sujets et citoyens: Les relations entre l’état, la ville, la bour-
geoisie, et les institutions militaires municipals à Murcie (XVIe–XVIIe siècle).’’ In
Statuts individuels, statuts corporatifs, e statuts judiciaries dans les villes européenes
(moyen âge et temps modernes), ed. Marc Boone and Maarten Prak, 129–57. Leuven:
Garant, 1996.
Ruiz Rivera, Julián B., and Manuela García Bernal. Cargadores a Indias. Madrid:
Mapfre, 1992.
Rumazo González, José. Libro primero de cabildos de Quito. Quito: Archivo Municipal,
1934.
———. Libro segundo de cabildos de Quito. Quito: Archivo Municipal, 1934.
Russel, Conrad. ‘‘Gran Bretaña a comienzos del siglo XVII: Monarquía compuesta y
reinos múltiples.’’ In Las monarquías del antiguo régimen, ¿monarquías compuestas?,
ed. Conrad Russell and José Andrés Gallego, 31–43. Madrid: Editorial Complutense,
1996.
Russel, John Henderson. The Free Negro in Virginia, 1619–1865. Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1913.
Saborit Banderas, Pere. ‘‘Gitanos en Castellón, 1717–1745.’’ Estudios castelloneses 1
(1982): 291–312.
Sacristán y Martínez, Antonio. Municipalidades de Castilla y León: Estudio histórico-
crítico. Madrid: Instituto de Estudios de Administración Local, 1981.
Sáenz de Santa María, Carmelo. Libro viejo de la fundación de Guatemala. Guatemala:
Academia de Geografía e Historia de Guatemala, 1991.
Sahlins, Peter. Boundaries: The Making of France and Spain in the Pyrenees. Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1989.
———. ‘‘Fictions of a Catholic France: The Naturalizaiton of Foreigners, 1685–1787.’’
Representations 47 (1994): 85–110.
———. ‘‘La nationalité avant la lettre: Les pratiques de naturalisation en France sous
l’Ancien Régime.’’ Annales ESC 55, no. 5 (2000): 1081–1108.
Sala (Bañuls), Juan. Ilustración del derecho real de España. Mexico: Imprenta de Galván,
1831 [1803].
Salas Ausens, José Antonio. ‘‘Les Français en Espagne dans le second moitié du XVIIIe
siècle.’’ In Les français en Espagne à l’époque moderne (XVIe–XVIIIe siècle), 155–71.
Paris: CNRS, 1990.
Salas Ausens, José Antonio, and Encarna Jarque Martínez. ‘‘Extranjeros en España en la
segunda mitad del siglo XVIII.’’ In Coloquio Internacional Carlos III y su Siglo. Actas,
vol. 2, 985–97. Madrid: Universidad Complutense, 1990.
Sales, Núria. ‘‘Naturalizaçães catalãs sécolos XV a XVIII.’’ Ler História 9 (1986): 41–
63.
———. ‘‘Natuals i alienígenas: Un cop d’ull a algunes naturalizacions dels segles XV a
Bibliography 315
Scott, James C. Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condi-
tion Have Failed. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998.
Scouloudi, Irene. ‘‘Alien Immigration and Alien Communities in London, 1558–1640.’’
Proceedings of the Huguenot Society of London 16, no. 1 (1941): 1937–41.
Selke, Angela S. The Conversos of Majorca: Life and Death in a Crypto-Jewish Commu-
nity in Seventeenth Century Spain. Jerusalem: Magness Press–Hebrew University,
1986.
Sesma Muñoz, José Angel. ‘‘El sentimiento nacionalista en al corona de Aragón y el
nacimiento de la España moderna.’’ In Realidad e imagenes del poder: España a fines
de la edad media, ed. Adeline Rucquoi, 215–31. Valladolid: Ambito, 1988.
Seybolt, Robert Francis. The Colonial Citizen of New York City: A Comparative Study of
Certain Aspects of Citizenship Practice in Fourteenth Century England and Colonial
New York. Madison: University of Wisconsin, 1918.
Shaw, William A., ed. Letters of Denization and Acts of Naturalization for Aliens in
England and Ireland, 1603–1700. Ipmington: Huguenot Society of London, 1911.
Shennan, J. H. ‘‘The Rise of Patriotism in the Eighteenth Century.’’ History of European
Ideas 13, no. 6 (1991): 689–710.
Sicroff, Albert A. Les controverses des status de ‘pureté de sang’ en Espagne du XVe au
XVIIe siècle. Paris: Didier, 1960.
Small, Carola M. ‘‘The Royal Bourgeoisies in the Dutchy of Burgundy.’’ Proceedings of
the Annual Meeting of the Western Society for French History 13 (1986): 1–9.
Smith, Anthony D. The Ethnic Origin of Nations. Oxford: Blackwell, 1986.
Smith, Michael T. ‘‘The History of Indian Citizenship,’’ Great Plains Journal 10, no. 1
(1970): 25–35.
Smith, Robert Sidney. The Spanish Guild Merchant: A History of the Consulado, 1250–
1700. Durham: Duke University Press, 1940.
———. ‘‘Estudio histórico del consulado de Lima, 1593–1887.’’ In El índice del archivo
del tribunal del consulado de Lima con un estudio histórico de ésta institución, ed.
Robert Sidney Smith. Lima: Ministerio de Hacienda y Comercio, 1948.
Smith, Rogers M. Civic Ideals: Conflicting Visions of Citizenship in U.S. History. New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1997.
Solano, Francisco de, ed. Normas y leyes de la ciudad hispanoamericana (1492–1600).
Madrid: CSIC, 1996.
Solórzano Pereira, Juan. Política Indiana. Madrid: Compañía Iberoamericana de Pub-
licaciones, 1972 [1648] (also published in Biblioteca de Autores Españoles, vol. 255).
Somers, Margaret R. ‘‘Citizenship and the Place of the Public Sphere: Law, Community,
and Political Culture in the Transition to Democracy.’’ American Sociological Review
58, no. 5 (1993): 587–620.
Sospedra, Manuel. La constitución española de 1812: El constitucionalismo liberal a
principios del siglo XIX. Valencia: Universidad de Valencia, 1978.
Spalding, Karen. ‘‘Social Climbers: Changing Patterns of Mobility Among the Indians of
Colonial Peru.’’ Hispanic American Historical Review 50, no. 4 (1970): 645–64.
Start, Cora. ‘‘Naturalization in the English Colonies in America.’’ Annual Report of the
American Historical Association, 1893, 319–23.
Statt, Daniel. ‘‘The Birthright of an Englishmen: The Practice of Naturalization and
Bibliography 317
Denization of Immigrants under the Later Stuarts and Early Hanoverians.’’ Proceed-
ings of the Huguenot Society of Great Britain and Ireland 25, no. 1 (1989): 61–74.
———. ‘‘The City of London and the Controversy over Immigration, 1660–1722.’’ His-
torical Journal 33, no. 1 (1990): 45–61.
———. Foreigners and Englishmen: The Controversy over Immigration and Population,
1660–1760. Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1995.
Stephenson, Carl. Borough and Town: A Study of Urban Origins in England. Cambridge:
The Medieval Academy of America, 1933.
Stitt, Robinson W. ‘‘The Legal Status of the Indian in Colonial Virginia.’’ Virginia Maga-
zine of History and Biography 61, no. 3 (1953): 247–59.
Stoetzer, Carlos O. The Scholastic Roots of the Spanish American Revolution. New York:
Fordham University Press, 1979.
Storti Storchi, Claudia. Ricerche sulla condizione giuridica dello straniero in Italia dal
diritto comune all’età preunitaria: Aspetti civilistici. Milan: Guiffré, 1990.
———. ‘‘The Legal Status of Foreigners in Italy (Fifteenth to Sixteenth Centuries): General
Rules and their Enforcement in Some Cases Concerning the Executio Parata.’’ In Of
Strangers and Foreigners (Late Antiquity—Middle Ages), ed. Laurent Mayali and
Maria M. Mart, 97–135. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993.
Strayer, Joseph R. On the Medieval Origins of the Modern State. Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1970.
Suárez, Federico. El proceso de la convocatoria a Cortes (1808–1810). Pamplona: Uni-
versidad de Navarra, 1982.
Superunda, Conde de. Relación de gobierno—Perú (1745–1761), ed. Alfredo Moreno.
Madrid: CSIC, 1983.
Tait, James. The Medieval English Borough—Studies on Its Origin: A Constitutional
History. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1936.
Tannenbaum, Frank. Slave and Citizen: The Negro in the Americas. New York: Vintage
Books, 1946.
Tau Anzoátegui, Víctor. ‘‘El derecho municipal del Perú: Apuntes sobre su configuración.’’
In IX congreso del Instituto Internacional de Historia del Derecho Indiano, Madrid, 5 a
10 de febrero de 1990, vol. 1, 111–36. Madrid: Universidad Complutense, 1991.
———. ‘‘Una defensa de los extranjeros en el Buenos Aires de 1743.’’ In La ley en la
América hispana: Del descubrimiento a la emancipación, 277–91. Buenos Aires: Real
Academia Nacional de la Historia, 1992.
Te Brake, Wayne. Shaping History: Ordinary People in European Politics, 1500–1700.
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998.
Tedoldi, Leonida. ‘‘Servizio pubblico e cittadinanza: Il caso degli zerlotti bresciani dal
seicento al settecento.’’ In Le regole dei mestieri e delle professioni: Secoli XV–XIX, ed.
Marco Meriggi and Alessandro Pastore, 75–98. Milan: Franco Angeli, 2000.
Teresa de Mier, Servando. Cartas de un americano, 1811–1812. Mexico: SEP, 1987.
———. Memorias, 1818–1819. Madrid: Ed. América, undated.
———. Historia de la Revolución de la Nueva España, antiguamente Anahuác. Paris: La
Sorbonne, 1990 [1813].
Thomas, Ernst Chester, and Hugh H. Bellot. Thomas and Bellots Leading Cases in
Constitutional Law, ed. E. Slade. London: Sweet and Maxwell, 1934.
318 Bibliography
Trueba, Eduardo. Sevilla: Tribunal de Océanos (siglo XVI). Seville: Gráficas del Sur,
1988.
Ucelay-Da Cal, Enric. ‘‘Nationalism in Spain: Some Interpretative Proposals.’’ In Identi-
ties: Nations, Provinces, and Regions, 1550–1900. Proceedings of the Third Anglo-
Spanish Historical Studies Seminar 25–6 October 1996, ed. Isabel Burdiel and James
Casey, 31–40. Norwich: University of East Anglia, 1999.
Ullmann, Walter. ‘‘Personality and Territoriality in the ‘Defensor Pacis’: The Problem of
Political Humanism.’’ In Law and Jurisdiction in the Middle Ages, ed. George Garnett,
chap. 10. London: Variorum, 1988.
Uztariz, Gernónimo de. The Theory and Practice of Commerce and Maritime Affairs,
trans. John Kippax. Dublin: George Faulkner, 1752 [1742].
Vallejo García-Hevia, José María. Campomanes y la acción administrativa de la corona
(1762–1802). Oviedo: Real Instituto de Estudios Asturianos, 1998.
Vanel, Marguerite. Histoire de la nationalité française d’origine: Evolution historique de
la notion de français d’origine du XVe siècle au code civil. Paris: Imprimerie de la Cour
d’Appel, 1945.
Varela, Javier. La novella de España: Los intelectuales y el problema español. Madrid:
Taurus, 1999.
Varela Suánzes-Carpegna, Joaquín. La teoría del estado en los orígines del constitu-
cionalismo hispánico (las Cortes de Cádiz). Madrid: Centro de Estudios Constitu-
cionales, 1983.
Vassberg, David E. Land and Society in Golden Age Castile. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1984.
———. ‘‘La comunidad rural en España y en el resto de Europa.’’ Mélanges de la Casa de
Velázquez 28, no. 2 (1992): 151–66.
———. The Village and the Outside World in Golden Age Castile: Mobility and Immigra-
tion in Everyday Rural Life. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
Vaux de Foletier, François de. ‘‘La rafle des gitanos d’Andalousie en 1749 d’après des
documents français.’’ Etudes Tsiganes 23, nos. 1–2 (1977): 5–9.
Vázquez Pando, Fernando Alejandro. ‘‘Derecho español en América, derecho castellano
vulgar y derecho indiano (una posible interpretación histórica).’’ Revista de la facultad
de derecho de México 26, nos. 101–2 (1976): 785–94.
Veale, Elspeth M. ‘‘Craftsmen and the Economy of London in the Fourteenth Century.’’
In Studies in London History Presnted to Philip Edmund Jones, ed. A. E. J. Hollaender
and William Kellaway, 135–51. London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1969.
Veitia Linaje, Joseph de. Norte de la contratación de las Indias occidentales. Buenos
Aires: Comisión Argentina de Fomento Interamericano, 1945 [1672].
Ventura, Piero. ‘‘La ambiguità di un privilegio: La cittadinanza napoletana fra cinque e
seicento.’’ Quaderni Storici 30, no. 89 (1995): 385–416.
———. ‘‘Privilegi, identità urbana e politica: Le capitali dell’Italia spagnola durante il
regno di Filippo II.’’ In Felipe II (1527–1598), Europa y la monarquía católica, ed. José
Martínez Millán, 739–71. Madrid: Parteluz, 1998.
———. ‘‘Mercato delle risorse e identità urbana: Cittadinanza e mestiere a Napoli tra XVI
e XVII secolo.’’ In Le regole dei mestieri e delle professioni: Secoli XV–XIX, ed. Marco
Meriggi and Alessandro Pastore, 268–304. Milan: Franco Angeli, 2000.
320 Bibliography
Vermeesch, Albert. Essai sur les origines et la signification de la commune dans le nord de
la France (XI et XII siècles). Huele: Commission Internationale pour l’Histoire des
Assemblées d’États, 1966.
Vidier, A. ‘‘Les origines de la municipalité parisienne.’’ Mémoires de la Société d’Histoire
de Paris 49 (1927): 250–91.
Viera Powers, Karen. Andean Journeys: Migration, Ethnogenesis, and the State in Colo-
nial Quito. Alburquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1995.
Vila Villar, Enriqueta. ‘‘Extranjeros en Cartagena (1593–1630).’’ Jahrbuch für Geschicte
von Staat, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft Lateinamerikas 16 (1979): 147–84.
Vilar, Pierre. ‘‘Patria y nación en el vocabulario de la independencia española.’’ In Hidal-
gos, amontinados y guerilleros: Pueblos y poderes en la historia de España, Pierre Vilar,
211–52. Barcelona: Crítica, 1982.
Villar García, María Begoña. Los extranjeros en Málaga en el siglo XVII. Córdoba:
Monte de Piedad y Caja de Ahorros de Córdoba, 1982.
———. ‘‘Un siglo de control sobre los extranjeros de Málaga: Matrícula y listas consulares
entre 1765 y 1863.’’ In Migraciones internas y medium-distance en la península ibérica,
ed. Antonio Eiras Roel and Ofelia Rey Castelao, vol. 2, 921–44. Santiago: Xunta de
Galicia, 1994.
Villari, Rosario. Per il re o per la patria: La fedeltà nel seicento. Bari: Laterza, 1994.
Viollet, Paul. ‘‘Les communes françaises au moyen âge.’’ Mémoires de l’Institut National
de France 36, no. 2 (1901): 345–502.
Viroli, Maurizio. For Love of Country: An Essay on Patriotism and Nationalism. Ox-
ford: Clarendon Press, 1995.
Vitoria, Francisco de. Escritos políticos. Buenos Aires: Depalma, 1967 [1539].
———. Derecho natural y de gentes. Buenos Aires: Emecé, 1946.
Vogel, Hans. ‘‘New Citizens for a New Nation: Naturalization in Early Independent
Argentina.’’ Hispanic American Historical Review 71, no. 1 (1991): 107–31.
Vovelle, Michel. Ville et campagne au 18e siècle, Chartres et la Beauce. Paris: Editions
Sociales, 1980.
Waley, Daniel. The Italian City Republics. London: Longman, 1988.
Wahrman, Dror, ‘‘The English Problem of Identity in the American Revolution.’’ Ameri-
can Historical Review 106, no. 4 (2001): 1236–62.
Weber, Max. General Economic History, trans. Frank H. Knight. Glencoe: Free Press,
1950.
Wells, Charlotte C. Law and Citizenship in Early Modern France. Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1995.
Walzer, Michael. Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality. New York:
Basic Books, 1983.
Wightman, Ann M. Indigenous Migration and Social Change: The Forasteros of Cuzco,
1570–1720. Durham: Duke University Press, 1990.
Yergas Cobos, Juan Alonso. ‘‘La naturalización en Cádiz por ley y por nacimiento en el
siglo XVIII,’’ Tésis de Licenciatura, Departmento de Historia de América, Universidad
de Sevilla, 1984.
Zannini, Andrea. Burocrazia e burocrati a Venezia in età moderna: I cittadini originari
(sec. XVI–XVIII). Venice: Istituto Veneto di Scienze, Lettere ed Arti, 1993.
Bibliography 321
184, 194–96; in Spanish America, 180, Roman law. See Ius commune
186. See also Naturalization Royal servants, 37–38, 69, 75, 77–78,
Natural communities, 2, 10 155
Natural law, 11, 25, 77, 90, 144–45,
149–50, 166–69, 199 Salaried professionals, 38–40
Naturaleza. See Nativeness Slaves. See Spaniards of African descent
Naturalization and citizenship, 9, 55–57, Spain, concept of, 8–10, 15, 65, 67–68,
74, 84, 92, 97, 101, 148, 153–54 144, 149–50, 164–66, 205–06
Naturalization: in England, 183–84; in Spaniards of African descent, 13, 44, 48,
English North America, 185–86; in 53–54, 145, 159–62, 188
France, 191–92, 194–96 Spanish monopoly in the Americas, 22
Naturalization: as royal prerogative, 11, Subjecthood: in England, 182–83; in En-
65–68, 76–82, 90–91, 93, 96, 98, glish North America, 184–89; in
100–01, 103–04, 134, 136, 204–05; France, 188–89, 191, 193–95
in England, 183–94; in France, 191–
92, 194–96 Transients, 57, 83, 85–86, 99, 101, 144,
Nobles, 27, 34, 40 147, 163, 167. See also Gypsies
Nueva planta decrees, 200
Vassalage, 10, 15, 19, 67–69, 87, 91,
Patriotism, 2, 11 124, 156–57
Permanent residents, 57 Vassals, foreign, 11, 68, 76–82, 120–21,
Presumption regime, 24, 29, 41–42, 47– 133–39, 159–60
48, 72, 75, 89, 92, 167; in Spanish Vecindad. See Citizenship
America, 95, 98, 101, 107, 116, Vile occupation, 28, 173