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Nuguid vs. Nuguid

17 SCRA 449 June 23, 1966

J. Sanchez:

FACTS: Felix = Paz


Rosario Nuguid Remedios Other brothers and sisters

Rosario died without descendants. She was survived by parents and 6 siblings. Remedios, a siter, filed for the probate of
the H will of Rosario, executed some 11 years before her death. The parents opposed alleging that the institution of
Remedios as universal heir would illegally preterited them as compulsory heirs in the direct ascending line and therefore,
said institution is void.

CFI: null and void

HELD: Affirmed. In a proceeding for the probate of a will, the court’s area of inquiry is limited to an examination of, and
resolution on, the extrinsic validity of the will, the due execution thereof, the testamentary capacity and the compliance
with the requisites or solemnities prescribed by law. However, where practical considerations demand that the intrinsic
validity of the will be passed upon, even before it is probated, the Court should meet the issue.

Where the deceased left no descendants, but she left forced heirs in the direct ascending line – her parents, and her H
will does not explicitly disinherit them but simply omits their names, the case is one of Preterition and not a case of
ineffective disinheritance since there is no specific legacies or bequest.

Preterition consists in the omission in the ‘OR’s will of the forced heirs or anyone of them, whether because they are not
mentioned therein or though mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited.

Disinheritance in turn, is a testamentary disposition depriving any compulsory heir of his share in the legitime for a cause
authorized by law. The former is presumed to be involuntary, while the latter is always voluntary. Preterition shall annul
the institution of heir with the exception of the devises and legacies. In ineffective disinheritance, such shall annul the
institution of heirs but only insofar as it may prejudice the person disinherited.
Neri v. Akutin
72 Phil 323; June 3, 1934

J. Moran:

FACTS: AGRIPINO Neri died on December 12, 1931. During his 1st marriage, he had six children: Agripino, Agapito,
Eleuterio, Rosario, Celerina and Getulia who predeceased him eight years ago and was survived by seven children.
During his second marriage with Ignacia Akutin, he had five children.

His will was admitted for probate. He willed that his children by the first marriage shall have no longer any participation in
his estate as they had already received their shares during his lifetime. TC found to the contrary, excluding Eleuterio.
Thus TC declared children by the 1st and 2nd marriage as intestate heirs without prejudice to the ½ of the improvements
introduced as conjugal which should belong to Ignacia. CA: modified; as to the 2/3 which could be freely disposed of.

HELD: TC- affirmed.

The CA misapplied Art. 851. Thus, the testator expressly denied them any share but the denial was predicated not upon
the desire to disinherit but upon a mistaken belief that they had already received their share.

Preterion consists in the omission in the testator’s will of the forced heirs or anyone of them, either because they are not
mentioned therein or though mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited. In this case,
while they are mentioned in the will, they are not accorded any share, without expressly disinheriting them. Also, there
are no legacies or betterments as to fall to the exceptions.
Neri v. Akutin
74 Phil 185; May 21, 1943

J. Moran:

FACTS: Agripino Neri [+] in his will left all his property by universal title to his children by the 2nd marriage [herein
petitioners] and that the sic children of the 1st marriage are preterited. The TC and CA annulled the institution of heirs and
declared total intestacy. Petitioners alleged that (1) there is no preterion as they have received their shares in the
property left by the testator; (2) assuming that there is, it would only result to reduction of the bequest made to them.

HELD: CA- affirmed

(1) As found by the TC and CA, since all the parcels that corresponded to the testator are now in the administrators
possession, as appears in the inventory, the property has remained intact and that no portion had been given to the
children of the 1st marriage. And since the testator left all his property by universal title to the children by his 2 nd marriage,
and that without expressly disinheriting the children by his 1st marriage, this is a case of preterion, hence, the institution of
heirs should be annulled and intestate succession should be declared open.

(2) Petitioners confused Preterion with those of diminishing the legitime (Art. 817) and disinheritance without a statement
of cause (Art. 851). Art. 817 is merely a general rule inapplicable to specific cases provided by law, such as Art. 814 and
Nullity of the institution of heirs is Nullity is PARTIAL, in so far only as
TOTAL that affects the legitime

Of course, the annulment of institution of heirs in cases of Preterion is subject to exceptions: in cases of preterion is
subject to exceptions: in cases of devices or legacies in so far as they are not innoficious or excessive. As to the
argument that the bequest to the children by the 2 nd marriage should be treated as legacies and devices and not be
entirely annulled but merely reduced is without merit. If this theory would be adopted, it would result in the complete
abrogation of Art. 814 and 851. if every case of institution of heirs may be made to fall into concepts of legacies and
devices, Art. 814 and 851 would be absolutely meaningless. Thus, instead of construing we would be destroying the
provisions of law.

GRN 137287, February 15, 2000

J. Vitug:

+ Nov. 15, ’85 +Oct. 20, ‘82

Julian Viado ♥ Virginia Viado

+ +
(Res.) Alicia ♥ Nilo Leah Rebecca Delia

Cherri Fe Fides

FACTS: Spouses Julian and Virginia owned several pieces of property, among of which the Isarog property at La Loma,
QC. Pet. and Res. since 1977 shared a common residence at the property involved. Rebecca demanded to divide
equally the property, but Alicia claimed absolute ownership over it. Hence pet, asserting co-ownership filed for a

Res. claim of ownership is evidenced by two docs. (1) deed of donation executed by Julian Viado, covering his ½
conjugal share of the prop. in favor of Nilo in Aug. 26, 1983 & (2) deed of extrajudicial settlement in which Julian, Leah,
and Rebecca waived in favor of Nilo the share from the property inherited from Virginia dated on Aug. 26, 1983. Property
was registered in the name of the heirs of Nilo on Jan. 7, 1988. Petitioner attacked the validity of the instruments alleging
forgery and undue execution and the exclusion of the retardate sister Delia which resulted in the latter’s preterition that
should warrant the extrajudicial settlement’s annulment.
CFI- for Res. Alicia CA- affirmed

When Virginia died intestate in 1982, her part of the conjugal property, was transferred to her heirs- her husband
Julian and their children Nilo, Rebecca Leah, and Delia. The inheritance, which vested from the moment of the death of
the decedent, remained under co-ownership regime among the heirs under partition. Every act intended to put an end to
indivision among co-heirs and legatees and devisees would be a partition although it would purport to be a sale, an
exchange, a compromise, a donation, or an extrajudicial settlement.
The attack of the due execution of the two documents by petitioner cannot be well taken as the evidence
presented are wanting, consisting of self-serving testimonies. And as to the contention that she signed the deed of
extrajudicial settlement on the mistaken belief that the instrument pertained to the administration of properties is to
tenuous to accept. It is difficult to believe that Rebecca, a teacher could have made such mistaken belief.
The exclusion of Delia, alleged to be retardate from the extrajudicial settlement verily has had the effect of
preterition. This kind of preterition, however, in the absence of proof of badfaith, does not justify a collateral attack of the
TCT. Remedy Art. 1104- preterited heir shall be paid the value of the share pertaining to her. Hence, the case is
remanded to the TC to determine the amount due to petitioner.
Perez v. Gachitorena
54 Phil 431; February 13, 1930
J. Romualdez:

FACTS: Ana Maria Acantara (+) died single without any forced heir. She left among others, a sum of money in deposit
with La Urbana in the name of Carmen de Perez, trustee of her estate. In her will, it contains the following clauses:
9th- instituted Carmen Gachitorena, niece-in-law and married to Joaquin Perez-Alcantara, as the sole and universal
heiress to the remainder of the estate after payment of all the debts and legacies, so that after probate of her will, she will
receive from her executrix the property, that she may enjoy them;
10th- should Carmen die, her whole estate shall pass unimpaired to her surviving children (in such wise that my estate
shall never pass unimpaired to my relatives;
11th- should Carmen die after her while her children are still minor, however estate shall be administered by her executrix,
Josefa Laplana.

Thereafter, Mariano Gachitorena held a judgment for payment of money against Joaquin Alcantara. Sheriff levied an
attachment on said amount deposit with La Urbana. Plaintiff; secured for a preliminary injunction alleged said deposit
belongs to the Fideicommisary heirs of Ana Maria. Defendant contends that plaintiff is a universal heiress.
TC- deposit belongs to plaintiff’s children as fideicommisary heirs, hence cannot be attached. Appellant: simple
substitution. Appelle: Fideicommisary substitution.


Requisites of Fideicommisary Substitution:

1) A first heir called primary to the enjoyment of the estate; (#9)
2) An obligation clearly imposed upon him to preserve and transmit to a third person the whole or part of the estate;
3) A second heir. (#10 and #11)

Although clause #9 says, SOLE HEIR, it does not necessarily exclude the idea of substitute heirs. Taking all the three
clauses together, Carmen is the sole heiress in the first instance.

Ramirez v. vda de Ramirez
111 SCRA 704; Feb. 15, 1982

J. Abad-Santos:

FACTS: Jose Eugenio Ramirez [+], a Filipino national died in Spain on Dec. 11, 1964, with only his widow Marcelle
Demoron [French] as compulsory heir. His will was admitted for probate. The administratrix Ma. Luisa Palacios
submitted a project of partition which state as follows: ½ to widow Marcelle Demoron as legitime and ½ to Jorge and
Robert Ramirez in which 1/3 of the same is subject to the widow’s usufruct (substitution in the person of Wanda de
Wrobleski) and 2/3 of the same as usufruct in favor of Wanda de Wrobsleski, an Australian who live in Spain.

Jorge and Robert opposed: (1) the provision on vulgar substitution in favor of Wanda with respect to the widow’s usufruct
and in favor of Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horacio Ramirez, with respect to Wanda’s usufruct are invalid because the first
heir survived the testator; (2) fideicommisary substitution is also void because 1 st heir is not related to 2nd heir; (3) Art. III
sec. 5. CFI approved the project of partition.

HELD: (1) As to the widow’s legitime: ½ legitime is proper. But the 1/3 usufruct over the free portion should not be
granted. The will contained such disposition, but her legitime was impaired by such disposition. So much so that the ½
legitime would be enough and give her more than her legitime will run counter to the testator’s intention for as stated, his
disposition even impaired her legitime.

(2) Substitution is the appointment of another heir so that he may enter into the inheritance in default of the heir originally

Dying before the testator is not the only case for VULGAR SUBSTITUTION for it also includes refusal or incapacity to
accept the inheritance as provision in Art. 859 hence, vulgar substitution is valid. As to the substitution with respect to 1/3
of the widow, moot, as the widow is not entitled to usufruct.

Fideicommisary substitution is void. The substitutes are not related to Wanda, the heir originally instituted. Art. 863
requires one degree from the heir originally instituted, so it’s either parent or a child of the 1st heir.
(3) What the 1935 Constitution prohibits is the vesting of the title to land in favor of aliens.
½- widows legitime
½- Roberto and Jorge- naked ownership. Wanda- usufruct with a simple substitution in
favor of Juan Pablo and Horace.

Kilayco v. Tengco
GR No. 45965; March 27, 1992

J. Romero:

FACTS: ma. Lizares died leaving a will in the possession of her niece Eustaquia Lizares. Eustaquia filed a petition for
the settlement of the estate of Maria.the required publication has been made and the CFI ordered the probate of the will
and appointed Eustaquia as executrix. The latter then filed for a project of partition which was granted by the court and
declared the heirs, devises, legatees, and usufructuaries mentioned therein as the only heirs; adjudicated to them the
property assigned to and every one of them ordered the Register of Deed to effect the corresponding transfer of title, as
well as the corresponding transfer of shares, stocks and dividends.

Thereafter, Eustaquia filed a motion to reopen in order that some of the property of Maria which had been omitted in the
partition be adjudicated to her. This was granted and the court adjudicated to her certain shares of stock, revolving funds
certificate, plantation certificate, and sugar quota allocations and real/ personal properties which were not given by Maria
in her last will and testament.

Then, the heirs of Maria executed a deed of partition, thereby terminating their co-ownership over four lots of the cadastral
survey of Talisay.

Eustaquia died intestate. Herein petitioner, Celsa vda. de Kilayko [sister of Maria] et. al. filed a motion to reopen the
estate of Maria alleging that paragraphs 10 and 11 of the will contains a simple substitution. This was denied by the court
and held that settlement of the estate being in rem, is binding against the whole world. The motion for reconsideration
was likewise denied. Petitioners thereafter filed a complaint for recovery of ownership and possession against the
administrator Eustaquia- lis pendens. The administrator of the estate of Eustaquia moved for dismissal alleging that the
same was barred by prior judgment and for the cancellation of lis pendens. Granted.

Respondents alleged that claim of Celsa, Encarnacion and Remedios was goundless because paragraph 10 and 11
where they base their claim conceived of fideicommisary substitution. Petitioners however allege that it is an invalid
fideicommisary substitution. It is only a conditional substitution.

HELD: Dismissed. In testate succession, there can be no valid partition among the heirs until after the will has been

The probate court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to distribute the estate has the power to determine the portion or parts
to which each distribute is entitled. A project of partition is merely a proposal which a court may accept or reject. In this
case, records shows that the property subject for recovery were included in the partition as property and assigned
exclusive to Eustaquia as a devisee. In accordance with such project of partition, the heir executed a deed of partition.
The project of partition shows that the Lizares sisters recognized the decree of partition and in fact reaped the fruits
thereof. They are therefore precluded from attacking the validity.

Assuming that they are not precluded or no res juridicata, paragraphs 10 and 11, wherein the testator merely names an
heir and provides that if such heir should die and a second heir also designated shall succeed, cannot be considered as
fideicommisary since no obligation is imposed upon Eustaquia to preserve the same. The substitution should them be
construed as a VULGAR or SIMPLE SUBSTITUTION under Art. 859 but it shall be effective only of the first heir dies
before the testator. In this case, Eustaquia survived the testatrix, hence no substitution. Thus, the property involved
unconditionally devolved upon Eustaquia.

Morente v. dela Santa
9 Phil 387; December 19, 1907

J. Willard:

FACTS: Consuelo Morente died leaving a will which states that (1) all her real setate shall pass to her husband,
Gremersindo dela Santa; (2) that the husband shall not leave her brother after her death and not he shall not marry
anyone; should he have children by anyone, he shall not convey any portion of the property except 1/3 thereof and 2/3
should be given to her brother Vicente or his children if any; (3) after her death, husband should live in which the bakery
id located.

Four months after her death, Gremersindo married again. Elena Morente, sister of the testatrix filed a petition in the
probate alleging 2nd marriage of Gremersindo and asked for the annulment of the legacy. The CFI denied the petition.

HELD: Affirmed. Testamentary provision made conditional and prohibitive against another marriage may be valid against
a widow or widower.

Hewever, under the will of the testatrix, there are several directions given to the husband, but no one of these orders is
attached that condition that he fails to comply with them, he shall lose the legacy. It is only in one event- having children-
the disposition will change.

The will should be construed with reference to all the clauses and with reference to such surrounding circumstances.
There being no express condition attached to the legacy in reference to the second marriage, there can be no implied
condition from the context of the will. In order to make a testamentary provision conditional, such condition must fairly
appear from the language used in the will.

Natividad v. Gabino
36 Phil 663; March 31, 1917

J. Torres:

FACTS: +1867
Tiburcio ♥Anselma Nicasio
Higinia ♥ Clemente Natividad

Emilio Purificacion

Tiburcio Salvador executed a notarial will and instituted his grandchildren Emilio and Purificacion as sole heirs. However,
clause six is as follows: “I bequeath to Basilia Gabino, the ownership and dominion of the urban property, consisting of a
house and lot in Calle Lavezares… If the said legatee should die, Lorenzo Salvador shall be obliged to deliver the same
to my grandson Emilio, upon payment of the latter to the former P4,000.00. Executor Emilio presented a project of
partition wherein it was stated therein that the clause six should be interpreted as giving the right of usufruct only to
Basilia, and a general legacy in favor of Lorenzo Salvador of P4,000 whenever Basilia should die, but that the ownership
belongs to Emilio. Basilica, though counsel, opposed claiming ownership over the legacy. CFI- ownership and dominion
should be given to Basilia, subject to reservation mabe in behalf of Lorenzo and Emilio.

HELD: Affirmed. A person is entirely free to make his will in such a manner as may best please him provided the
testamentary provision conform to law and meet its requirements. The testator may impose a condition in his will touching
either the institution of heirs or the designation of legatees. And when the condition imposed upon the latter do not fall
with the provision of the articles of the CC relative to heirs and legatees, such conditions shall be governed by the rules
for conditional obligation.

Double legacy: condition: depends upon the happening of the event constituting the condition- death of the legatee
Basilia, a perfectly legal condition as it is not impossible of performance and is not contrary to law or public morals. 1st
legacy: voluntary reservation to Basilia of the ownership. 2nd legacy: conditional legacy of P4,000 to Lorenzo.

Testator provided in his will that the dominion [ownership and possession shall be delivered to Basilia subject to the
condition that upon her death it would revert to testator’s grandson, provided the latter pays P4,000 to Lorenzo. It cannot
be understood that the legacy covered on the usufruct because the plain and literal meaning of the words employed by
the testator clearly shows beyond all doubt the express wishes that the legatees right of dominion should end at her

Mangulabnan v. IAC
185 SCRA 760; May 31, 1990

J. Gancayco:

FACTS: Elena Mangulabnan, as guardian ad litem of minor Alfie Angeno Acero, filed in the RTC an action for support,
actual and moral damages for her child Alfie. Pending litigation an application support pendente lite against Ambrosio
Tan Chew Acero-opposed.
RTC: ordered Ambrosio Tan to pay monthly support of P1,500. MOR denied
CA: RTC’s decision was annulled.
●While the child’s paternity appears to have been
established by the affidavits of Elena Mangulabnan as well as affidavit of two
witnesses, this fact alone is not sufficient to order Ambrosio to pay support. It is
necessary that Ambrosio has recognized the child.
●Refused to accept the birth certificate constituted voluntary recognition since its
probative value was impaired by the verified opposition of Ambrosio. He claims
that the same was spurious as it was sworn before a notary public in Manila.
When the child was born in Cavite Maternity clinic in Las Pinas Rizal.
●illegitimate child to be entitled to support must be recognized whether natural or

Petitioner claims that the child is entitled to support upon proof of filiation without the need of acknowledgment,

HELD: Reversed. There must be a declaration of the status of the child from which the right to support is derived and
before support can be ordered. Such a declaration may be provisional, that is by affidavit.

The requirement for recognition by the father or mother jointly or by one of them as provision of law refers in particular to a
natural child- such a child is presumed to be natural child of the parents recognizing it who had the legal capacity to
contract marriage at the time of conception. Thus, an illegitimate child like Alfie whose father is married and had no legal
capacity to contract marriage at the time of conception is not a natural child but an illegitimate child or spurious child in
which case recognition is not required before support can be granted.

However, under Art. 887, in all cases of illegitimate children, their filiation must be proved either Voluntary or Compulsory
When made in: When by court action, the child brings out his
1) record of birth; recognition.
2) will;
3) statement before a court;
4) any authentic writing.

The affidavits, as well as the birth certificate had provisionally established the status of the child.
Noble V. Noble
18 SCRA 1104; Dec. 17, 1966

J. Barrera:

FACTS: Don Vicente Noble died in 1959. The notarial will he executed in 1957 was presented for probate wherein Juan
Noble was designated as executor. Maria Noble, claiming as the illegitimate child of the deceased born out of an illicit
relationship between the latter and Lucia Sinag in July 22, 1923, opposed the probate of the will. She prays for the
disallowance of the will and be declared as the only surviving illegitimate daughter or in the alternative, in case the will be
probated, the institution of heirs made therein be declared null and void. Simultaneously, she filed a motion asking for
permission to present evidence on her alleged filiation, stating therein that she is in continuous possession of status of a
child of the late Don Vicente Noble by the direct acts of the latter and/or his family, and that she has in her favor evidence
and/or proof that the deceased is her father. This motion was opposed by Judge Noble on the ground that the claim was
in effect an Action for Compulsory recognition, and that since it was brought after the death of the putative father, and
when she was already of majority age, the right to bring the same has already prescribed.
CFI: admitted the will for probate and the claim of Maria had been barred by

HELD: Art. 887: In all case of illegitimate children, their filiation must be duly proved. Filiation must be acknowledged by
the alleged parent, for if the mere fact of paternity of the supposed father is all that is needed to be proved, that would
pave the way to unscrupulous individuals taking advantage of the death of the presumed parent who would no longer be
in the position to deny the allegation.

In this case, what is intended to be proved is simply the supposed naked paternity of the deceased. Her allegations
merely claimed that she is the child of the deceased, which is a ground for compelling recognition.

It is necessary to allege that her putative parent had acknowledged and recognized her as such. Such acknowledgment
is essential and is basis of her right to inherit. There being no allegation of such acknowledgment, the action becomes
one to compel recognition which cannot be brought after the death of the putative parent.

Acknowledgement is the basis of the right of a spurious child to enjoy the successional rights.

Rosales v. Rosales
148 SCRA 69; Feb. 27, 1987

J. Gancayco:
Petra Rosales ♥ Fortunado

Magna Rosales Acebes +Antonio +Carterio ♥ Irenea


FACTS: During the proceedings for the intestate estate of Petra, the CFI declared the following as legal heirs: Fortunato-
¼; Magna- ¼; Antonio: ¼ and Macikequerox- ¼. Irenea insisted in getting a share in her capacity as surviving spouse of
the deceased son of Petra, claiming that she is a compulsory heir under Art. 887.

HELD: NO. Intestate or legal heirs are classified into two:

1) those who inherit by their own right;
2) those who inherit by the right of representation.

The provisions Art. 980-982, 999 which relate to the ader of intestate succession does not include a surviving spouse of a
child as an intestate heir of the mother-in-law.

Art. 887 [3] refers to the estate of the deceased spouse in which case the surviving spouse is a compulsory heir but does
not apply to the estate of a parent-in-law. Indeed, the surviving spouse is considered a 3rd person as regards the estate of
the parent-in-law.

Nieva v. Alcala
+Juliana Nieva ♥ +++Francisco de Ocampo ♥ Manuela Alcala

Segunda Ma. Nieva ++Alfeo Jose

(illegitimate) (2 parcel of land)

FACTS: Plaintiff Segunda ma. Nieva, claiming to be an acknowledged natural daughter of Juliana Nieva [baptismal; birth]
and was reared as legal daughter, sought recovery of the property invoking Art. 811: “Any ascendant who inherits from
his descendants any property acquired by the latter gratuitously from some other descendant, or from a brother or sister,
is obliged to reserve such of the property as he may have acquired by operation of law for the benefit of relatives within
the third degree belonging to the line from which such property came.

CFI: an illegitimate relative has no right to the reserve troncal

HELD: Affirmed. Though the provision does not distinguish, the intent of the legislature shows that it applies only to
legitimate relatives.

(1) Art. 809 and 810 establish the legitime of legitimate ascendants. Therefore, the place
which Art. 811 occupies is proof that it refers only to legitimate ascendants;

(2) the principle which underlies Art. 811- property should not pas, by reason of new
marriage, out of the family to which they belonged.

Florentino v. Florentino
+ ++ +++
Antonia Faz de Leon ♥ Apolonio Florention II ♥Severina

9 children Mercedes Apolonio III

(3 died single) (posthumuous)

FACTS: In 1890, Apolonio II died leaving a notarial will. He was survived by his ten children and his widow as heirs.
Apolonio III received in the partition of the subject property. When Apolonio III died, the said property were inherited by
his mother Severina, who latter died, leaving a will instituting her only daughter as her universal heiress. Herein
appellants demands from Mercedes to deliver their corresponding share in the reservable property but Mercedes refused.
CFI dismissed the complaint of specific performance.

HELD: REVERSED. Even if Severina left in her will said property together with her own property to her only daughter,
nevertheless, this property had not lost their reservable nature in as much as it originated from the common ancestor of
herein appellants. The property was inherited by the son and was transmitted by operation of law to his mother.

Any ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property while there are living within the 3 rd degree relative of the
latter, is nothing but a life usufructuary or a fiduciary of the reservable property received. But if afterwards, all of such
relative die, the said property become free property by operation of law, and is thereby converted into the legitime of the
ascendant heir who can transmit it at his death to his legal succession.

There are seven reservatoris who are entitled to the reservable property left at the death of Apolonio III:
(1) 3 children of the 1st marriage;
(2) 3 children who are represented by their own children (nephews/ nieces);
(3) Mercedes

All of the appellants are the relatives of the posthumous son within the third degree. Hence, they are entiled as
reservatarios to the property which came from the common ancestors.

Sumaya v. IAC

FACTS: Raul Balantakbo inherited from two different ascendants two sets of property: (1) 1/3 pro-indiviso in Liliw,
Laguna from his father Jose; and (2) 1/7 pro-indiviso in 10 parcels of land from his maternal grandmother. He died single
and was survived by his mother, Consuelo and five brothers and three nephews and nieces. The mother was the sole
surviving compulsory heir and adjudicated unto herself the said property in an affidavit stating therein that she was the
sole heir/ ascendant of Raul, who died leaving property inherited from other ascendant. Thereafter, she sold 1/3 of the
property to Marquita Sumaya, who later on sold the same to Villa Honorio Dev. Corp. VHDC thereafter sold the property
to Agro-Industrial Cooperative. The other 1/7 of the property was likewise sold to Villa which later on sold the same to

The certificates of title do not contain any annotation of its reservable character. The five brothers and three nephews and
nieces filed a case for recovery as the property was subject to a reserva troncal in their favor.

RTC: in favor of Balantakbos

CA: affirmed

HELD: Affirmed. It was established during the trial that the reservista, Consuelo, caused the registration of an affidavit of
self-adjudication of the estate of Raul, wherein it was clearly stated therein that the property were inherited by Raul from
his father and grandmother. Although the certificate of titles were free from any liens and encumbrance at the time of
sale, the fact remains that the affidavit which was registered with the register of deeds Laguna, constitute a sufficient
notice to the whole world. Under the rule of notice in the Property Registration Decree, it is presumed that the purchaser
has examined every instrument of record affecting the title. Such presumption is irrebutable.

The failure of the register of deeds to annotate the reservable character of the property in the certificate of title cannot be
attributed to Consuelo. Moreover, it is sufficient proof that the buyers had actual knowledge of the reservable character of
the property. Such fact appeared in the deed of sale.

Unless the registration of the limitations is effected, no third persons shall be prejudiced thereby.

Prescription: only when the reservoir dies does the reservee acquire the reserved property. The cause of action
commence upon the death of the reservoir, Consuelo on June 3, 1968 and not upon the death of the propositus Raul on
June 13, 1952. Action= March 4, 1970.

Riosa v. Rocha
Mariano Riosa ♥ Maria Corral

+ + +
Francisca ♥ Santiago Jose ♥ Marcelina Casas Severina
(during infancy)

Magin Consolacion 1 child (died before Mariano)

FACTS: In the will of Mariano, he divided his property between Santiago and Jose, giving the latter the 11 parcels of
land, the subject property in this controversy. Upon the death of Jose, he named his wife Marcelina in his will as his only

The probate of the will was opposed on account of preterion of Maria Coronel. Being the mother and legitimate heir,
Maria and Marcelina executed a contract/deed (dated May 16, 1917 and approved on Nov. 12, 1920) dividing between
themselves Jose’s property, the 11 parcels of land being assigned to Maria Corral. Maria sold eight thereof to Marcelina
on Oct. 26, 1920 evidenced by a public document recorded in the registry of deeds on Nov. 6, 1920. Marcelina sold the
same to Pablo Rocha, nephew of Maria on Nov. 3, 1920. on Sept. 24, 1921, Rocha returned six of said lots to Maria
stating therein that the same was erroneourly included in the sale made by Maria to Marcelina.
CFI: denied the probate
SC: annulled the will for probate. Maria and Marcelina then submitted the deed of
extrajudicial partition at the partition of and was approved by the court on Nov. 20, 1920.

This action was broght by Margin for whom the property should have been reserved against Maria, Marcelina and Pablo
praying that: (1) property be declared reservable property; (2) that this reservation be noted in the registry of deeds (3)
that the sale be subject to the right of reservation.

HELD: there is no doubt of the reservable character of the property.

In case of testate succession, as in this case, wherein extrajudicial partition was made and submitted to the court which
the latter approved, for the purposes of reservation and the rights and obligation created thereby, in connection with the
relatives benefited, the property must not be deemed transmitted to the heirs from the time the extrajudicial partition was
made, but from the time said partition was approved by the court.

In this case, the reservoir, according to law, is obliged to have the reservation noted in the registry of deeds within 90 days
from the acceptance of inheritance, that is, from the adjudication of the property by the court to the heirs. Only after the
expiration of the period may the reserves demand compliance with the obligation.
But the land was sold even before the court’s approval on the partition, hence, appellant could not compel Maria even
after the expiration of the 90 days. But, the land was sold with the obligation that the law imposes upon Maria. The
buyers could not have acquired a better title (obligation to register) that held by the seller.

The fact that the reservable character of the property was not recorded at the time of the sale cannot affect the right of
reserve, because the transfers were made at the time when the obligation of the reservoir to note only such reservation
and the reserves did not then have any right to compel her to fulfill such obligation.

Moreover, Marcelina and Pablo knew of the reservable character of the property as Marcelina was the one who entered
with the contract of partition and a daughter-in-law and Pablo drafted the deeds of sale and a nephew.

Where a reservable property is sold by the reservor, without having registered its reservable character, the obligation to
register the same is transferred to the buyer, when the latter knew of the fact of the property’s reservable character.
De Papa v. Camacho

Marciana Felix ♥ Balbino Tioco Romana Tioco
(donated 4 parcels of land to Toribia)

4 plaintiffs Toribia ♥ Eustacio Dizon

+1937 +1939
Faustino Trinidad ♥ Primo Tongco
Dalisay Camacho (defendant)

FACTS: Romana donated four parcels of land to Toribia. When Toribia died in 1915, she left the said property to
Faustino and Trinidad, her children. When Balbino died in 1928, three percels of land were adjudicated to Toribia and
since she predeceased her father, the same was given to her children Faustino and Trinidad. Faustino died in 1937 and
left his ½ pro-indiviso share in the seven lands to his father Eustacio Dizon, subject to reserve troncal. When Trinidad
died in 1939, all her ½ pro-indiviso share were inherited by Dalisay, subject to usufruct of Primo Tongko. Eustacio died in
1965, survived by his only granddaughter Dalisay. Dalisay claims the ½ by virtue of the reserva troncal implied by law
upon the death of Faustino. Plaintiffs, as uncles and aunts, also clain ¾ of the ½ pro-indiviso share, being a third relative
of Faustino.
CFI: plaintiffs and defendant are all entitled as reservatarios

HELD: Reversed. Reserva Troncal merely determines the group of relatives [reservatarios] to whom the property should
be returned. But within that group, the individual right to the property should be decided by the applicable rules of
ordinary intestate succession, since Art. 891 does not specify otherwise. This condition strengthened by the
circumstances that the reserve being an exceptional case, its application should be limited to what is strictly needed to
accomplish the purpose of the law. Hence, reservation of the reservable property being governed by the rules on
intestate succession, plaintiffs-appellee must be held without any right thereto because, as aunt and uncles of Faustino
[propositus], they are excluded from the succession by his niece, the latter being the nearest relative. {the nearest relative
excludes that of the one more remote]