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A pro se plaintiff files this COMPLAINT against Plainfield Asset management, LLC and the Alpine Group, Inc. He alleges that the proposed First Amended Joint Plan should not be approved. A hearing before This Court regarding the joint Plan and any related objections is scheduled for June 2, 2011.
A pro se plaintiff files this COMPLAINT against Plainfield Asset management, LLC and the Alpine Group, Inc. He alleges that the proposed First Amended Joint Plan should not be approved. A hearing before This Court regarding the joint Plan and any related objections is scheduled for June 2, 2011.
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A pro se plaintiff files this COMPLAINT against Plainfield Asset management, LLC and the Alpine Group, Inc. He alleges that the proposed First Amended Joint Plan should not be approved. A hearing before This Court regarding the joint Plan and any related objections is scheduled for June 2, 2011.
Copyright:
Attribution Non-Commercial (BY-NC)
Verfügbare Formate
Als PDF, TXT herunterladen oder online auf Scribd lesen
PLAINFIELD ASSET MANAGEMENT, LLC and THE ALPINE GROUP, INC.
COMPLAINT
John Wust III, a pro se plaintiff, hereby files this Complaint against Plainfield Asset
Management, LLC and The Alpine Group, Inc., and alleges that:
I.
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
1. The proposed First Amended Joint Plan should not be approved because the Court
should subordinate the insider creditor claims within the context of the Bankruptcy Code, as
defined under 11 U.S.C. § 510(c), in order to remedy the specific harm to the equity interests of
the Common Stockholders from egregious inequitable conduct by Plainfield Asset Management,
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LLC and its Affiliates ("Plainfield") and The Alpine Group, Inc. and its affiliates (including, but
not limited to Exeon, Inc.) ("Alpine"), as controlling parties or "insiders" of the Debtors.
II.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
2. On November 1, 2010, Wolverine Tube, Inc. and four affiliates (collectively, the
"Debtors") filed for chapter 11 bankruptcy protection in this Court. This Court ordered joint
administration of the Debtors' chapter 11 cases for procedural purposes under Case No. 10-
13522 (PJW).
3. On April 13, 2011, the Debtors' proposed First Amended Joint Plan of
Reorganization ("Joint Plan") was filed.
4. A hearing before this Court regarding the Joint Plan and any related objections is
scheduled for June 2, 2011.
III.
PARTIES
5. John Wust III ("Wust") is an individual who resides in Brooklyn Park, Minnesota.
Wust is a common stockholder of Wolverine Tube, Inc. who owns 1,500,000 shares. Wust
purchased his shares from August 17, 2006 through November 1, 2010 at a total price of
$495,874.16.
6. Alpine is a corporation organized under the laws of the State of Delaware with
principal offices at One Meadowlands Plaza, Suite 801, East Rutherford, New Jersey.
7. Plainfield is a limited liability company organized under the laws of the State of
Delaware with principal offices at 333 Ludlow Street, Stamford, Connecticut.
IV.
RELATED INDIVIDUALS
2.
8. Harold M. Karp is the President and COO of the Debtors, and was also the
President of Exeon, Inc. an affiliate of Alpine.
9. David A. Owen is Senior Vice President, Chief Financial Officer and Secretary
of the Debtors, shareholder of Alpine and was also the Chief Financial Officer of Exeon, Inc. an
affiliate of Alpine.
10. K. Mitchell Posner is a Director of the Debtors and also was the Executive Vice
President of Alpine.
11. Steven Solomon Elbaum is a Director of Debtors and the Chairman and Chief
Executive Officer of Alpine.
12. Brett Young is a Director of the Debtors and a Director of Plainfield.
13. Max Holmes is the founder, majority owner and chief investment officer of
Plainfield and a 10% Owner of Plainfield Special Situations Master Fund Ltd.
V.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
A. Preferred Stock Purchase Agreement
14. On January 31, 2007, the Debtors entered into a Preferred Stock Purchase
Agreement (the "Preferred Stock Purchase Agreement") with Alpine and Plainfield (together, the
"Purchasers"), which included a Management Agreement (the "Alpine Agreement") in which
Alpine was paid a management fee in the amount of $1 ,250,000 per year by the Debtors.
15. The Purchasers controlled over 49% of the voting rights at all times from January
31, 2007 thru December 14, 2009. The Purchasers were granted the right to designate an
aggregate of four (4) nominees ("Purchaser Designees") of the total of not more than seven (7)
members, and the Debtors agreed to use reasonable efforts to ensure that at least four (4)
Purchaser Designees remained on the Board at all times.
3
B. Debtors' Bankruptcy Proceedings
16. The Debtors have submitted to the Court a Joint Plan to protect insider Claims
and Interests to the detriment of other Claims and Interests. The fulcrum security in the Joint
Plan is Class 3 (Plainfield Note Claims): holders of allowed Note Claims shall receive their Pro
Rata share of 100% of the New Common Stock, the New First Lien, and a distribution of Cash.
Alpine is contractually paid under the "Alpine Management Agreement" and receives an
embedded "Liquidity Event" payment, which is a contingency equity Interest. The insiders
control designation of four of the newly organized Board of Directors.
17. The Joint Plan completely impairs the Class 7 (Old Common Stock): on the
Effective Date, all Old Common Stock shall be cancelled, and Holders of Old Common Stock
Interests shall not receive or retain any Property under the Plan on account of such Old Common
Stock Interest.
VI.
MISCONDUCT ALLEGED
A. Plainfield engaged in fraud, breached its fiduciary duty and violated federal securities laws
18. Plausible material evidence of inequitable conduct, including but not limited to
multiple intentional violations of u.S. securities laws, intentional initial undercapitalization, the
use of non-public information to the detriment of Common Stockholders in the Preferred Stock
Agreement and the Rights Offering, and fraudulent transfers has been presented to the Court.
19. The Preferred Stock Purchase Agreement failed to disclose the actual face value
of the 7.375% Senior Notes due 2008 owned by Plainfield Special Situations Master Fund Ltd.
The ownership was disclosed only as Purchasers and the value was disclosed only as at least
$25,000,000. The actual value of this hedge position was $38,300,000, which was not disclosed
4
until March 10, 2008. This intentional act of omission of a material fact by Plainfield in connection with a tender offer was a violation of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
20. The Preferred Stock Purchase Agreement failed to disclose that Plainfield Special
Situations Master Fund Limited was the owner of an additional material hedge position in the amount of $9,863,000 of the Debtors 10 Y2% Senior Notes due 2009 (CUSIP No. 978093AE2). This position was not disclosed until February 25,2009.
21. Plainfield failed to disclose the material fact that Plainfield routinely promised
investors in their hedge fund a 15% rate of return.
22. Plainfield failed to disclose their intent to provide rescue financing only, rather
than the documented intent of "for investment purposes" listed in the Preferred Stock Agreement.
23. The Purchasers did not disclose their unusual and extraordinary financial intent to
rapidly liquidate the Debtors assets.
24. Plainfield did not disclose their intent of converting their Note position into an
equity or cash position within three years.
25. The Purchasers inadequately and intentionally undercapitalized the Debtors under
the conditions of their undisclosed financial plan to rapidly liquidate the Debtors assets.
26. The Purchasers did not disclose their prior client relationship between Niv
Harizman and Harold M. Karp during the negotiation of the Preferred Stock Agreement.
27. Plainfield did not disclose their egregious "trade idea" of an inverted equity
collar; acquiring control of the Debtors to intentionally design a financially unstable or "transformational" company that would either extraordinarily outperform its peers to deliver "equity ups", or under "Plan B" enter bankruptcy by design with Plainfield holding the
"fulcrum" security.
5
28. Plainfield extended a Rights Offering with the full knowledge of their undisclosed
"trade idea" that virtually guaranteed a bankruptcy by design that would cancel of all the equity
Interests of the Common Stock.
29. The Toll Manufacturing Agreement, ("Toll Agreement"), between the Debtors
and Exeon, Inc., resulted in decreased income and profitability for the Debtors. This agreement
created a balance sheet diversion of millions of dollars of revenue and at least $447,000 in profits
in the first quarter of 2010, away from the Debtors to a fully owned subsidiary of Alpine, in
violation of 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1 )(B).
30. Acquiring a controlling interest in a company, and cancelling the equity interest
of other investors using the Bankruptcy Code is a pattern of financial behavior for Plainfield.
31. This fact pattern is consistent with a premeditated, tortuous investment intent or
"trade idea" of Plainfield to: (1) intentionally undercapitalize the Debtors; (2) use the Common
Stock equity, cash from the sale of additional Common Stock, and rapid asset liquidation to pay
down any competing Class 3 (Note Claims); (3) use its controlling position as a Note Holder and
insider of the Debtor to extract extraordinary interest (15%) to create the financial instability
required to force a "transformational" event (either an urgent sale "equity ups" or default "Plan
B"); (4) if default, use the Bankruptcy Code to cancel the equity Interests of the Common Stock;
and (5) recapture the retail investors' equity either for financial gain or to mitigate any financial
loss in the future sale of the debt free reorganized Debtors.
B. Plainfield's claims should be subordinated under Section S10(c) of the Bankruptcy Code
32. Equitable subordination allows the Court to look beyond the form of a dispute or
transaction to its substance, and to rearrange the priorities of Claims based on the conduct of the
creditors in "common law fashion."
6
33. Insiders are held to a higher standard of fidelity, and the insiders' dealings with
the Debtor should be subjected to more exacting scrutiny.
34. The Purchasers were insiders as defined by the Bankruptcy Code as a "person in
control of the Debtor" with "voting rights." 28 U.S.C. §101(31)(vi).
35. Plainfield was a person in control of the Debtor, had voting rights, did seek to
benefit itself at the expense of others, did mislead public investors and did not act in good faith, therefore exceeding the necessary criteria for the drastic and unusual remedy of equitable subordination under 11 U.S.c. § 510(c)(i).
36. Plainfield should only be able to rescue their Note Claims from subordination or
recharacterization by proving beyond doubt to the Court its good faith and fairness in its dealings with the Debtors and the retail investors of the Debtor. Moreover, once some inequity is demonstrated vis-a-vis an insider, the insider has the burden of proof in demonstrating the underlying fairness of the transaction(s).
37. The Joint Plan fails to remedy the specific harm to the retail investors caused by
the inequitable conduct of the Purchasers. The inequitable conduct caused specific harm in the amounts of $16,500,000 and $27,995,498 respectively to the equity Interests of the Common Stockholders that existed at the time of the Preferred Stock Purchase Agreement and the cash value of the Common Stock sold in the Rights Offering.
38. The Plainfield Note Claims (Class 3) are the "fulcrum" security in the Joint Plan
were obtained prior to the Preferred Stock Purchase Agreement, were a voluntary risk investment transaction contractually exchanged for Senior Notes due in 2009 in the "Preferred Stock Purchase Agreement" or acquisition event, and then voluntarily exchanged again for the Note Claims in the "Exchange Offer."
7
39. The substance of this complicated series of transactions was to "not to pay a
dividend" but to "make an acquisition." Acquisitions are equity transactions by definition. The
Eleventh Circuit in Estes v. N & D Properties. Inc. held that insider loans should be deemed
capital contributions under circumstances of: (1) initial undercapitalization; or (2) when no other
disinterested lender would have extended credit.
40. The (Class 3) Note Claims of Plainfield, whose substance and intent was an
acquisition event, may be deemed equity capital by law.
41. As a result of Plainfield's improper conduct, the Court should apply its authority
under § SI0(c) to equitably subordinate Plainfield's claims.
VII.
PRAYER
For the forgoing reasons, Wust, a pro se plaintiff, respectfully requests that this Court
stay confirmation of the proposed Joint Plan of Reorganization of Wolverine Tube, Inc. until this
matter may be heard. Plaintiff further respectfully requests that this Court enter an order of
judgment:
1. Recharacterizing either all or part the Plainfield Note Claims (Class 3) as equity capital
(Class 6 or 7) and/or equitably subordinate either all or part of the Plainfield's Note Claims
(Class 3) and all Interests (Classes 6 & 7) and all of the Alpine Interests (Classes 6 & 7) to the
status of equity capital (Class 7) on a pari passu basis with the Common Stockholder Interests;
2. Avoiding the fraudulent transfers to Alpine in the "Toll Agreement";
3. Removing the Assumption of Alpine Agreements clause, Joint Plan, Section 9.3 with its
Alpine payments and embedded Liquidity Event payment which is a contingency equity Interest
; and
8
4. Modifying the first sentence of the Board of Directors of Reorganized Debtors clause,
Joint Plan, Section SA, to "On the Effective Date, the board of directors of Reorganized WTI
shall be composed of a newly organized five member board of directors selected by the US
Trustee."
Dated: May 20, 2011 Brooklyn Park, MN
Respectfully submitted,
J. HN 8T III
260891 st Crescent North Brooklyn Park, MN 55443 (763) 438-8315
jwust@obgynconsult.com
9
B 104 ADVERSARY PROCEEDING COVER SHEET ADVERSARY PROCEEDING NUMBER
(Rev. 5.00) (Instructions on Reverse) (Cou rt Us e On Iy)
PLAINTIFFS DEFENDANTS
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CAUSE OF ACTION (WRITE A BRIEF STATEMENT OF CAUSE OF ACTION,INCLUDING All. U.S. STATUTES INVOLVED)
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NATURE OF SUIT
(Chec k lhe one mas l appropriate j _454 To Rec over Money or Prop erty _435 To Determ ine Validity, Priority, or Extent of a Lien or Other ~terest in Property
_458 To obtain app roval for the sale of both the interest of the estae and of a co-owner in property
_ 424 To object or to revoke a discharge 11 U.S.C. § 727
ORIGIN OF X 1 0 riginal
PROCEEDINGS
Proceedilg
(Check One Box 0 nly)
_455 To revoke an order of confirm ation of a Chap. 11, Chap. 12, or Chap. 13 Plan
_426 To determ ine the disc hargeability of a debt 11 U.S.C. §523
_434 To obtain an inju nction or other equitable relief
~ 457 To s ubordin ate any allowed claim or ilterest except where such subordin ation is provided in a plan
_2 Removed
4 Reinstaed
__ 456 To obtail a declaratory judgment relating to any of foregoing,causes of action
_459 To determ ine !i,~laim or cat!.'Se of acton remoli~!9. a bankruptcy
wurt -"0
DEMAND
NEAREST THOUSAND
Proceedilg
or Reopened
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5 Trmsferred
CHECK IF THIS IS A CLASS
from Another F.R.C.P.23 Bankruptcy
ACTION UNDER
Court
OTHER RELIEF SOUGHT JURY DEMAND
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NAME OF DEBTOR
j,,/ 'V t"t'')! ~J -l _Lv.. e+-oV J
rv'"" . , +'" I ) BANKRUPTCY CASE NO.
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DISTRICT IN WHICH CASE IS PENDING DIVISIONAL OFFICE
RELAT ED AD VERSA RY PRO CEED ING (IF ANY)
DEFENDANT
DIVISIONAL OFFICE
FEE ATTACHED
FEE NOT REQUIRED
BANKRUPTCY CASE IN WHICH THIS ADVERSARY PROCEEDING ARISES
/0- /_3." Z L (PJiW)
PLAINTIFF
DISTRICT
ADVERSARY PROCEEDING NO.
NAME OF JUDGE
FILING (Chec k one box only.) FEE
I ,
DATE
M~y /912tJl
FEE IS DEFERRED
PRINT NAME
P A!l. h/ast:..III
Local Form 109
IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELA WARE
In re:
WOLVERINE TUBE, INC., ET AL.,
Debtors.
) ) ) ) ) ) ) )
Case No. 10-13522 (PJW) (Jointly Administered)
Hearing Date: June 2 @2 :00 p.m Responses Due: May 23 @ 5 :00 p.m.
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned, common stockholder, on a pro se basis, hereby certifies that a true
and correct copy of the accompanying Complaint was served this May 20, 2011 to these
parties listed below by the means specified.
Cozen O'Connor
1201 North Market Street, Suite 1400 Wilmington DE 19801
Attn: Mark E. Felger, Esq. mfelger@cozen.com, mmillis@cozen.com Counsel to Debtors
Via CM and email
Sidley Austin LLP
One South Dearborn Chicago, Illinois 60603
Attn: Matthew A. Clemente, Esq. mclemente@sidley.com Counsel for the Ad Hoc Group Via eM and email
Alpine Group, Inc.
One Meadowlands Plaza, Suite 801
East Rutherford, New Jersey 07073-2100 Attn: Stewart H. Wahrsager
swahrsager@alpine-group.com Counsel for the Alpine Group, Inc. Via eM and email
Proskauer Rose LLP Eleven Times Square
New York, NY 10036 Attn: Scott K. Rutsky, Esq. srutsky@proskauer.com
Corporate and Tax Counsel to Debtors Via eM and email
U.S. Trustee
844 King Street, Suite 2207, Lockbox 35 Wilmington, DE 19801
Attn: Richard L. Schepacarter USTPREGION03.WL.ECF@USDOJ.GOV United States Trustee
Via eM and email
Kramer Levin Naftalis & Frankel LLP 1177 Avenue of the Americas
New York, NY 10036
Attn: Douglas Mannal, Esq. dmannal@kramerlevin.com
Counsel for Plainfield Asset Management Via eM and email