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The 24 hr.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 Reviewer


A compilation of case digests, agabin lectures and commentaries from bernas & cruz etc.
rjcasis gegnebab 2005c

The compilers shall not be liable for the users passing (or failing) the course
W hat Constitutional law is about? It is the balancing of state power against the individuals rights and deals with the Limitation of Political Power. There exists an internal conflict between 1) Police Power, Eminent Domain and Taxation against 2) the Rights of Individual to Life, Liberty and Property.

Disclaimer

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Positive rights what state ought to do Negative rights what state ought not to do

W hat are the various approaches to resolve the conflict? 1. Balancing 2. Preferred Freedom Approach There are freedoms that are Inherent (ex. freedom of speech, assembly and freedom to assemble for grievance.) The Preferred freedom doctrine is a hierarchy: 1) the preferred freedom 2) freedom of belief and conscience and 3) right to property. 3. Absolutist Approach Some freedoms are considered absolute that no balancing is necessary or permissible (ex speech) and the absolute rights may override preferred freedoms

1. Due Process in General


the embodiment of the sporting idea of fair play - Justice Frankfurter kinds: 1) substantive 2) procedural 3) administrative The Due Process Clause ONLY embraces 1. LIFE 2. LIBERTY 3. PROPERTY Person includes both natural (citizens and aliens alike) and artificial persons. But for artificial persons, only their property rights are constitutionally guaranteed since their life and liberty are created by law and thus subject to the legislature Life- integrity of the physical person and the enjoyment of all God-given faculties that makes ones life worth living. Liberty- freedom to enjoy all of his faculties tempered by reasonable regulations and prohibitions imposed in the interest of the community. ELEMENTS (LAUREL): 1) Right to Labor 2) Right to Contract 3) Right to choose ones employment 4) Right to Locomotion Property anything that can come under the right of ownership and be subject of a contract. It includes all things within the commerce of men.

A. Hierarchy of Rights
It is an erroneous impression that the Constitution gives the same degree and quality of protection that it gives to life and liberty. This is not to say, however, that the right to property is not a basic right. Property has an intimate relation with life and liberty (ex. for the poor, regard property the same way as life and liberty). Property is more closely regulated not in order to oppress the owner but in order to impress upon him the social character of what he holds; Thus it is that property must also enjoy the protection of the due process clause.

B. Substantive Due Process


The due process clause must be interpreted both as a procedural and substantial guarantee. It must be a guarantee against the exercise of arbitrary power even when the power is exercised according to proper forms and procedure. requisites: 1. VALID OBJECTIVE-the law must have a valid governmental objective 2. LAWFUL MEANS- the objective must be pursued in a lawful manner. It originated from the concept of laissez-faire, it was translated by the court into freedom of contract protected by the Constitution under due process. In laissez-faire, freedom of contract was upheld over police power since there was an assumption of equality between contracting parties. In a welfare state, the wealth and power have become concentrated to those who have the capital. Legal realism woke up to this reality. When parties are not in equal footing, there is no real freedom of contract and the concept of equality becomes an illusion. The state was given the mandate to equalize the bargaining power of the parties within its territory. During this time, the freedom of contract was limited by the states police power. From the very beginning, the Phil. S.C. gave generous latitude to designation to promote public health, public safety, or public welfare. The Court clearly considers itself as competent arbiter of the objective reasonableness of legislative action, but it also allowed such competency to be limited by the recognition of the presumptive reasonableness of governmental action (principle of presumptive validity of official action) In substantive due process, be aware of the social context, economic dogma and prevailing ideologies since these usually influence judges on what is reasonable or unreasonable restrictions.

C. Procedural Due Process


The right to be heard in a court of law ELEMENTS: 1) NOTICE & 2) HEARING REQUIREMENTS: 1. IMPARTIAL & COMPETENT COURT every litigant is entitled to the cold neutrality of an impartial judge a competent court is one vested with jurisdiction over a case as conferred upon it by law 2. JURISDICTION In actions in personam, the court acquires jurisdiction over the defendant by its voluntary appearance or through service of summons upon him/her. In actions in rem or quasi in rem, the jurisdiction of the court is derived from the power it may exercise over property. It refers to: 1. Authority of the court to entertain a particular kind of action or to administer a particular kind of relief 2. Power of the court over the parties 3. Power of the court over properties that is subject of the litigation. HEARING Notice to a party is essential to enable it to adduce its own evidence and to meet and refute the evidence submitted by the other party. A judicial decision without a hearing is null and void ab initio and may be attacked directly or collaterally However, due process is not violated where is a person is not heard because he has not chosen to be heard. One may be heard through pleadings; A full-blown trial is not necessary

3.

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EXCEPTIONS: 1) Nuisance per se and 2) Presumptions of law. JUDGMENT no judgment shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based (Art VIII Sec.14) It was understood in the early American constitutional law to relate chiefly to the mode of procedure which government agencies must follow. Among early decisions in Philippine jurisprudence, many of them are generalized definitions which fuse together the elements of both procedural and substantive due process as well as elements of equal protection. However, this concept was not a fixed and static one was clearly acknowledged Due process, however is not always judicial process since it includes quasi-judicial bodies of administrative agencies. Although these agencies are not always bound by the finer points of judicial due process, it is bound by the due process clause. 4.

D. Administrative Due Process


The power of administrative agencies are regulatory in nature Due Process was introduced in administrative agencies, specifically its administrative tribunal, so that they do not exceed their regulatory power. Due Process applies only in adjudicative/quasi-judicial functions of the administrative agencies. In its regulatory function, procedural due process does not apply; however, substantive due process may come into play in its regulatory functions. REQUISITES: (Ang Tibay vs CIR) 1. The right to a hearing, which includes the right to present ones case and submit evidence in support thereof 2. Tribunal must consider the evidence presented 3. The decision must have something to support itself 4. Evidence must be substantial, meaning reasonable evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion 5. The decision must be based on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the affected parties 6. The tribunal or any of its judges must act on its own independent consideration of the law and the facts of the controversy 7. The tribunal should, in all controversial questions render its decision in such manner that the parties to the proceedings can know the various issues involved, and the reason for the decision rendered.

2. Equal Protection Clause


Equal Protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. Similar subjects should not be treated differently, so as to give undue favor to some and unjustly discriminate against others It also requires that the law be enforced and applied equally. Every person, both natural and juridical can avail of the equal protection clause; however, artificial persons are entitled ONLY to protection of their property since they are legislative creations. CLASSIFICATION: 1. The equal protection clause DOES NOT REQUIRE UNIVERSAL APPLICATION OF LAWS since it could result to unequal protection. 2. The law is NOT required to provide for equality among all persons if they are not similarly situated. 3. Classification has been defined as the grouping of persons or things similar t o each other in certain particulars and different from all others in these particulars 4. Classification must not be arbitrary. For it to be reasonable, it must conform to the ff requirements:

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REQUIREMENTS OF A VALID CLASSIFICATION

1. It must be based on substantial distinctions 2. It must be germane to the purpose of the law 3. It must not be limited to the existing conditions only 4. It must apply equally to all members of the class Substantial Distinction should be: 1. Natural or a substantive difference 2. Reasonable There are two equalities under the Equal Protection Clause: 1. Procedural equality in the eyes of the law 2. Substantive intrinsic equality between 2 classes Affirmative action is taken by the government to balance unequal footing.

3. SEARCHES & SEIZURES


Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. Section 3. The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise as prescribed by law. Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. This right against unreasonable search and seizure is PERSONAL and may be INVOKED ONLY BY THE PERSON ENTITLED TO IT. Simply put, unreasonable searches and seizures are constitutionally prohibited and the evidence from the search is generally inadmissible, except when the accused did not raise its inadmissibility because it was the fruits of an illegal seizure. This omission is considered a waiver of the protection granted by Art. III sec. 3(2) (see Hizon vs. CA). So what is an unreasonable search and seizure? As a general rule, whenever there is an arrest o search and seizure, if there is NO validly issued search warrant or warrant of arrest, the search and seizure is unreasonable. (exception: warrantless search and seizure, which will be tackled later on.) When does a search warrant or an arrest warrant become validly issued? A validly issued warrant presupposes the existence of PROBABLE CAUSE. (which is also one of the requirements for the narrowly drawn instances for warrantless search and seizure) What then is probable cause? Probable cause must be defined in relation to the action it justifies. Probable cause for an arrest or for the issuance of an arrest warrant would mean such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent person to believe that an offense has been committed by the person sought to be arrested. Probable cause for a search would mean such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. In either case, what is required is probable cause and not proof beyond doubt. What are the elements of probable cause? Reasonable ground of suspicion Such suspicion is supported by facts and circumstances strong enough to warrant a cautious man in believing accused to be committing the offense or to be guilty of the offense.

DETERMINATION OF PROBABLE CAUSE Who then determines probable cause? Judge PERSONALLY determines; However, the Immigration Commissioner may order the arrest of an alien in order to carry out a deportation order that has become final. (note: judge is NOT required to personally examine witnesses and the complainant [Soliven vs. Makasiar]) On what basis should the judge determine probable cause? Prosecutors report If on the basis of the report, he finds no probable cause, he can disregard it and require the submission of witnesses supporting affidavits to aid him in arriving at a certain conclusion, possibly to the existence of probable cause. According to Rule 126, Sec. 4 of the Revised Rules of Court (2001), a search warrant can only be issued if probable cause in connection with ONE OFFENSE is personally determined by the judge. Obiter1: The prosecutor determines whether there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty and should be held for trial and NOT probable cause. Obiter2: This constitutional prohibition is for arrest orders in the exercise of judicial power as a step preliminary or incidental to prosecution or proceedings for a given offense or administrative action, NOT as a measure indispensable to carry out a valid decision of a competent official. (EX. Carrying out a SC decision) EXAMINATION OF COMPLAINANT According to Rule 126, Sec. 5 RROC (2001), judges must personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in writing and under oath, the complainant and the witnesses he may produce on facts personally known to them and attach to the record their sworn statements, together with the affidavits submitted.

PARTICULARITY OF DESCRIPTION Section 2 and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. Failure to fulfill this constitutional requirement may result in an erroneous or arbitrary enforcement of the warrant. (ex. police searching you or your house using a general warrant) General Rule 1: Person to be seized should be identified by name Exception: If there is some descriptio personae that will enable the accused to be identified by the officer. (ex. may paa sa noo ang suspek!) General Rule 2: Place to be searched should be particularly described, which includes the exact address Exception: A description of the place is deemed sufficient if the officer with the warrant can with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place to be search. [ex. ang gingerbread house ng witch (yung kumidnap kay Hansel at Gretel) sa loob ng gubat ] Obiter: Only the articles particularly described in the search warrant can be seized, and no other property can be taken unless the law allows it. But not all illegally seized objects shall be returned to its owner. Under Rule 126, Sec. 3 RROC (2001), a search warrant may be issued for the search and seizure of PERSONAL PROPERTY: 1. Subject of the offense

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2. 3. Stolen or embezzled and other proceeds or fruits of the offense Property used or intended to be used as means of committing an offense

To make things very simple and easier to remember, see requisites below: REQUISITES OF A VALID SEARCH WARRANT [Rule 126, Sec. 4 RROC (2001)] 1. Based on Probable Cause 2. Probable Cause was personally determined by the judge 3. Judges determination was made after the examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce 4. Particularity of description of the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. However, there are exceptions: EXCEPTIONS TO WARRANT REQUIREMENT OF SEARCHES AND SEIZURES: 1. Search incidental to arrest Rule 126 sec. 13, RROC (2001) A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may have been used or constitute proof in the commission of an offense without a search warrant 2. Search of moving vehicles (see People vs. Malmstedt) 3. Seizure of evidence in plain view (see California vs. Ciraolo) 4. Customs searches (ex. sea-going vessels docked at seaports checked for contraband) 5. Waiver of the right against unreasonable search and seizure. (see Hizon vs. CA) Obiter: Agabin includes the following as exceptions to the warrant requirement: 1) Stop and Frisk search limited to: a) the protective search for concealed weapons [see Terry vs. Ohio] b) the search within the permissible area of search or the place with the immediate control of the accused to prevent the destruction or loss of evidence [see Cupp vs. Murphy] 2) Abandoned property (see California vs. Greenwood) 3) Administrative searches (ex. those conducted by public health officers)

ARRESTS
While an arrest is a seizure, not all seizures are arrests. An arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he may be bound to answer for the commission of an offense [Rule 113, sec.1 RROC 2001] Warrants of arrest must satisfy the same requirements imposed on search warrants. Hence, what has been said about probable cause, its determination, the examination of complainant and particularity of description in the discussion of search warrants can with equal truth be said of arrest warrants. As with search warrants, there are exceptions to the warrant requirement to arrests: EXCEPTION TO THE WARRANT REQUIREMENT: (Rule 113, sec. 5 RROC 2001) 1. When, in the presence of a peace officer or a private person, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing or is attempting to commit an offense; [a.k.a. IN FLAGRANTE DELICTO RULE] 2. When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE of facts and circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed; and 3. When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another

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A common application of the in flagrante delicto rule is the buy-bust operations to enforce the Dangerous Drugs Act; It is also applied, albeit controversially, to continuing crimes like rebellion. In continuing crimes, the offender is assumed to still be committing the offense, even if he is fornicating. Thus, he could be arrested for rebellion while in the act of fornication. A person may waive his right to be arrested by warrantless arrest PROVIDED that he enters a plea without having challenged the validity of the arrest (assuming of course he knew he had that right and actually intended to relinquish it). Note, too that in the prosecution of peace officers for illegal detention or arrest the defense of good faith is frequently used by peace officers and liberally applied by the courts.

PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATION & CORRESPONDENCE


Section 3. The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise as prescribed by law. Invasion of communication and correspondence is one kind of search In the Olmstead case, the doctrine formulated was that search and seizure did not prohibit wire-tap that did not trespass. In this case, there is no actual trespass there is no search, and where the object is not tangible it cannot be seized. (Tangibles only rule: house, persons, papers and effects were the tangibles). This doctrine has been overruled in Katz vs. U.S. which placed wiretapping per se under the ban of the search and seizure clause

Exclusionary rule
Section 3(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.

This exclusionary rule bars admission of illegally obtained evidence and is applicable to evidence under sections 2 and 3(1). The inadmissibility of the evidence, however, does not mean that it must be returned where it came from.(ex contraband).

4. FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
Section 4 No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the Government for redress of grievances. Section 8. The right of the people, including those employed in the public and private sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged. Section 18. (1) No person shall be detained solely by reason of his political beliefs and aspirations.

Freedom of expression consists of cognate rights to insure free and effective communication of ideas to enhance intelligent political decision-making in society. It is available insofar as it is exercised in the discussion of public matters (Besides, its difficult to externally control private thoughts). It is important to safeguard such freedom because sovereignty, which supposedly resides in the people, would be all for naught if the people would be denied their right to participate in public matters.

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The freedom of expression is not limited to ideas which is acceptable to the majority, or to the powers-that-be, for this freedom is meant to invite fomenting and discussing of different ideas in the public arena. Modes of expression : 1) Verbal& Written Language 2) Symbols Elements: 1) Freedom from prior restraint/censorship Prohibits the unlawful curtailment of the of the flow of ideas Prohibits censor from applying it own subjective standards in determining whats good or not There need no be a total suppression; even the restriction of circulation is an unconstitutional restraint 2) Freedom from subsequent punishment This freedom is included and as important like the first, for it would be absurd that one can be allowed to express yet be held liable for such expression; however, it is subject to certain limitations as discussed below. Limitations of Freedom of Expression 1. Subject to POLICE POWER and can be regulated to protect public interest 2. Does not include ideas offensive to public order or decency, or reputation of persons To be able to know whether or not an expression is protected or not, certain tests have been developed by the courts: 1. CLEAR & PRESENT DANGER TEST-liberty over authority If the words or utterances used are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about substantive evils that the state has the right to prevent, such utterance is not protected. Thus, it is a question of proximity and degree since Clear means that there must be a causal connection between danger and the utterance while Present refers to time in relation to Danger that is extremely serious and highly imminent. This gives way to States right to self-preservation Differs from Dangerous Tendency with regards to proximity 2. DANGEROUS TENDENCY TEST-authority over liberty Also known as Clear and Probable Danger If the words or utterances create a dangerous tendency that the state has a right to protect, such utterance is punishable. It is sufficient if the natural tendency and probable effect of the utterance is to bring about the substantive evil that the legislative body seeks to prevent. 3. BALANCING OF INTEREST TEST-liberty or authority When a specific act or conduct is regulated in the interest of public order but such regulation results in an indirect, conditional and partial abridgment of expression, it is the courts duty to determine which of the two conflicting interest it should protect. It resolves the issue in light of the peculiar circumstances of the case. It has an inherent weakness in that it allows the courts freedom to choose which interest to protect. Criticism of Official Conduct People have the right to criticize or commend the conduct of elected officials since the public servants acts are legitimate subjects of public discussion. As long as the comments are made in good faith and with justifiable ends (ex. better public service), such comments are protected. This rule is applicable to both public officers and public figures (ex. Joyce Jimenez or Tom Welling). However, such criticism must always be in respectful language.

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Art & Obscenity Obscenity is not constitutionally protected, but the problem is, what the hell obscenity means. There have been various tests enunciated in the cases in freedom of the press of this compilation. ASSEMBLY & PETITION FOR REDRESS The right to lawful assembly is important because there are certain issues better resolved after exchanging views in a meeting for that purpose. Such public meeting is effective in airing ideas or concerns affecting the public. This right is not subject to prior restraint (ex. the need for a permit) unless the meeting takes place in a public area (ex. Rizal Park). Tests for a lawful assembly: 1. Lawful purpose 2. The group/association holding the meeting is not illegal (ex.ElShaddai) An untoward incident (ex. riot) in a lawful assembly does not make the assembly unlawful, only unruly. However, the law-enforcers can intervene in such incidents in name of public safety.

5. FREEDOM OF & FREEDOM FROM RELIGION


Section 5. No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights. 2 Aspects: 1) Freedom to Believe (or Disbelieve)- However absurd ones belief is, even if it is deemed by society as heretical or hostile it cannot be punished as long as it remains in the realm of thought. 2) Freedom to Act on Ones Belief As soon as one externalizes his belief, his/her freedom becomes the subject of States inherent police power if it the exercise of police power is inimical or beneficial to society (ex. Prevention of a cults mass suicide)

6. LIBERTY OF ABODE AND TRAVEL


Section 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided by law. The purpose of this right is to further emphasize individual liberty as safeguarded in the general terms of the due process clause. This right includes the right to choose ones residence, leave it whenever he/she pleases , and travel where he wants. This right, as in all rights have limitations; This is limited by a lawful order of the court and can be impaired in the interest of public safety, security, health as provided by law. Obiter: The Marcos v. Manglapus Case is unique & is not a precedent for normalcases, kung baga pan-diktador lang.

7. ACCESS TO PUBLIC INFORMATION


Section 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.

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Access to public info is essential in the exercise of freedom of expression, for every citizen has a right to know what is happening in his/her country and his/her govt so that he/she can express her views intelligently. It can be limited if the info being sought would endanger national interest or security (ex. The plan of attack against Abu Sayyaf) As enunciated in the Tanda v. Tuvera case, a law will only be effective upon publication in the Official Gazette, or alternatively in 2 newspapers of general circulation.

8. FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION
Section 8. The right of the people, including those employed in the public and private sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged. RIGHT TO ASSOCIATION It is deemed embraced in the freedom of expression because a lawful association or organization can be used as a vehicle to express views that affect the public, which can be more effectively disseminated by an organization. Art. 3 Sec 8 guarantees private and public employees the right to form unions so long as it is lawful. However in the SSS vs. SSSEA, govt employees were not allowed to strike.

9. EMINENT DOMAIN
Section 9. Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. Also known as the power of expropriation (that is govt buying private property to be used publicly), it is primarily lodged in the national legislature. But can be validly delegated and exercised to other govt entities (President, local legislative bodies, certain public corporations, like NAPOCOR) even private companies serving essential public needs or operates public utilities (PLDT or Bayantel) Eminent Domain is different from destruction from necessity in that the latter: 1) property may be taken by private individuals; 2) no need to convert taken property to public use; 3) there is no requirement for just compensation Questions of necessity or wisdom of the exercise of the power of expropriation are essentially political and not usually subject to judicial review. But when these questions are decided by a delegate of the national legislature (ex. Local city council), the Supreme Court has assumed the power to inquire into it, whether the delegated authority has been correctly or properly exercised, by looking into the wisdom or necessity of the expropriation. All real and personal, tangible and intangible properties can be subject to expropriation except money and choses in action (Choses in action- personal right not reduced into possession but recoverable by a suit at law ex. Right to demand & recover a debt). Property already devoted to public use is still subject to expropriation, as long as it is done by Congress or under a specific grant of authority to the delegate. It should be observed that the to-be expropriated property must be by its nature and condition wholesome, as it is intended for public use. This differs from property taken under police power, because the property destroyed, or sought to be destroyed is noxious to the general welfare. Just compensation-a full and fair equivalent of the property taken from the private owner by the expropriator. The property taken is assessed as to the time of the taking , which usually coincides with the commencement of the expropriation proceedings. Only the judiciary has the right to ascertain whether or not the compenastion was just (see EPZA vs. Dulay)

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10. CONTRACTS CLAUSE


X. Contracts Clause Section 10. No law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed. The purpose of the impairment clause is to safeguard the integrity of valid contractual agreements against unwarranted interference by the State. The degree of dimunition is immaterial. As long as the original rights of either parties are changed to his/her prejudice, there is an impairment of the obligation of the contract. This clause, however, is not absolute. If the law is a proper exercise of police power, a contract valid at the time of its execution can be completely invalidated or modified.

11. EXPOST FACTO LEGISLATION


Section 22. No ex post facto law or bill of attainder shall be enacted. EX POSTO FACT LAW- operates retroactively to affect antecedent facts. Characteristics: 1) Refers to Criminal matters; 2) Retroactive application; 3) Prejudicial to Accused. BILL OF ATTAINDER-legislative act inflicting punishment without trial. A statue that applies either to named individuals or easily ascertainable members of a group in such a way as to inflict punishment without trial.

12. NON-IMPRISONMENT FOR DEBT


Section 20. No person shall be imprisoned for debt or non-payment of a poll tax. Although a debtor cannot be imprisoned for the failure to pay his debt, he can still be punished in a criminal case if he contracted his debt through fraud. In suc case, the act he is being penalized is the fraud employed to secure the debt not in the default of payment.

13. INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE


Section 18. (2) No involuntary servitude in any from shall exist except as punishment for a crime whereof the party shall be duly convicted. The concept includes slavery (absolute power of one over the other in their civil relation) and peonage (condition of enforced servitude in which one is compelled to labor in liquidation of some debt against his will.). Exceptions: 1) Punishment for a crime where one is duly convicted; 2) Compulsory Military Training

14. WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS


Section 15. The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended except in cases of invasion or rebellion when the public safety requires it.

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It is the prerogative writ of liberty employed to test the validity of a persons detention. The petition for habeas corpus must be acted upon immediately. It is the privilege itself, and not the writ, which may be suspended. It is available when he is subject to: 1) physical or moral restraint; 2) sentenced to a longer penalty than that is subsequently meted out to another for the same offense; 3) questions courts jurisdiction; 4) unlawful denial of bail. Procedure: As soon as application is filed and the court finds it in the proper form, the issuance of the writ follows. It is only when the person in custody is being held for a crime mentioned in the proclamation suspending the privilege of the writ and in a place where it is effective such petition is denied. In the absence of invasion or rebellion, when public safety requires it, privilege of the writ cannot be suspended. The President has the power to suspend the privilege of the writ and the SC has the power to annul such suspension if not based on the 2 grounds (Art7, Sec. 18).

15. RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED


Sec. 11 Free access to the courts and quasi-judicial bodies and adequate legal assistance shall not be denied to any person by reason of poverty. Sec. 12 (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. (2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the free will shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are prohibited. (3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Sec. 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him. (4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violations of this section as well as compensation to and rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar practices, and their families. Section 14. (1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law. In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable Sec. 16 All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative bodies.

A. COLD NEUTRALITY

Accused must be tried in an impartial and competent court in accordance with the rules on criminal procedure; His/her constitutional rights must be observed at all applicable times. The basic ingredient is that the trial be conducted in accordance with the rudiments of fair play.

B. AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION
Section 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. 2 Fold Purpose:

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1) Humanitarian to prevent the State, using its coercive power, from extracting from the suspect testimony which would furnish the missing evidence necessary for his conviction. 2) Practical-Suspect would usually be under the compulsion to commit perjury to protect himself. This rule is mandatory and applicable in all other government proceedings. It can also be claimed by any witness to whom an incriminating question is addressed. If it is the accused himself/herself, s/he can refuse at the outset to take the stand as a prosecution witness, on the reasonable presumption that interrogations purpose is to incriminate him. The right is limited to a prohibition against compulsory testimonial self-incrimination, and thus excludes urine, hair and blood samples, even ocular inspection of the suspects body on the proviso that force and torture was not used. This right can be validly waived if the waiver is certain, unequivocal and made by the accused willingly, intelligently and understood the consequences of his action.

C. RIGHT TO COUNSEL
The right to competent and independent counsel, prefereably choice of accused can be waived so long as it is written and upon counsels presence and advice of the consequences of his action. Such right attaches upon the start of the investigation, when officer asks questions that elicit information, confession or admissions of the accused thus has begun to focus on a particular suspect. (please read RA 7438 and the 2001 Rules on Criminal Procedure)

D. RIGHT TO BE INFORMED OF ACCUSATION


This necessarily includes the prohibition of changing crime charged in the information without court approval. The information filed must necessarily include the specific crime committed and the acts/evidences which tends to show the ones guilt.

E. RIGHT TO BAIL
Section 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required. It cannot be impaired even with the suspension of the privilege of the writ.

F. CRUEL PUNISHMENTS
Section 19. (1) Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment inflicted. Neither shall death penalty be imposed, unless, for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter provides for it. Any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua. The employment of physical, psychological, or degrading punishment against any prisoner or detainee or the use of substandard or inadequate penal facilities under subhuman conditions shall be dealt with by law. Mere fines and imprisonment are not violative unless the penalty is barbarous or shocking to the senses or conscience and such cruelty is inherent in the penalty. But where an unforeseeable event adds to convicts suffering, penalty is still valid .

15 G. AGAINST DOUBLE JEOPARDDY


Section 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act. It prohibits the prosecution again of any person for a crime which he has been previously acquitted or convicted. Requisites: Valid complaint conmplaint filed before competent court Complaint to which defendant had pleaded Of which he had been previously acquitted or convicted or otherwise terminated without his consent Crimes covered Doctrine of supervening event-accused may be prosecuted for another offense if a subsequent development changes the character of the 1st indictment which he may have been charged or convicted. Doctrine of inseparable offense-when one offense is inseparable from another and proceeds from the same act, they cannot be subject of separate prosecutions. However, it is possible for 1 act to give rise to several crimes, in which case separate prosecutions for each crime may be filed, provided that the elements of the several crimes are not identical.

16. CITIZENSHIP
ARTICLE IV Citizenship Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines : Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution; Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines; Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and Those who are naturalized in accordance with law. Section 2. Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship. Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens. Section 3. Philippine citizenship may be lost or reacquired in the manner provided by law. Section 4. Citizens of the Philippines who marry aliens shall retain their citizenship, unless by their act or omission they are deemed, under the law, to have renounced it. Section 5. Citizenship Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law.

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A personal and more or less permanent membership in a political community Denotes possession within that particular political community of full civil & political rights subject to special disqualifications

3 Modes of Acquiring Citizenship: 1. jus sanguinis = acquisition of citizenship on the basis of blood relations 2. jus soli = acquisition of citizenship on the basis of place of birth 3. naturalization = legal act of adopting an alien and clothing him with the privilege of a native born citizen Who are citizens of the Philippines? 1. Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of the 1973 Constitution. 2. Those children of Filipino fathers or mothers based on the principle of jus sanguinis applies only to natural filiation and not to filiation by adoption 3. Those born on January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority mother must be a Filipino citizen, either by birth or by naturalization, at the time of her marriage. Proof of election may include participating in elections and campaigning for a candidate With the adoption of the 1973 Consti, a child born under the 1973 Consti of a Filipino mother would not have to make the election in order to acquire Philippine citizenship. He is already a Filipino citizen by birth. 4. Those who are naturalized in accordance with law. Naturalization may be done: Through a general law of naturalization applied through a judicial process [i.e. Revised Naturalization Law] (CA 473) Through a special act passed by the legislature. Natural-born Citizen 1. Those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship 2. Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3), Section 1 of Consti A natural born citizen who loses his citizenship by renunciation or any other mode recognized by law would no longer be considered a natural born Filipino even if he reacquires citizenship Loss of Citizenship Commonwealth Act No. 63 applies to both natural-born and naturalized citizens citizenship is lost by naturalization in a foreign country, by express renunciation of citizenship, by oath of allegiance to a foreign country, by rendering service in the armed forces of a foreign country and by being a deserter of the armed forces Commonwealth Act applies to naturalized citizens only a certificate of naturalization may be cancelled when found to have been fraudulently or illegally obtained, or by permanent residence in the country of origin within 5 years from naturalization, or when the petition is found to have been made on an invalid declaration of intent, or upon failure to comply with the requirements for the education of minor children, or if the person allows himself to be a dummy for aliens.

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Reacquisition of Citizenship Commonwealth Act No. 63 provides that a Filipino woman loses her Philippine citizenship upon her marriage to a foreigner if, by virtue of the laws in force in her husbands country, she acquires his nationality. Repealed by 1973 Constitution the fact alone of marriage to an alien cannot strip a Filipino woman of her Philippine citizenship. Only acts and omissions, which Congress may prescribe, constitute explicit or implicit renunciation of citizenship. If foreign woman, marries a Filipino, she is does not need to go through the ordinary naturalization procedure and is considered ipso facto naturalized as long as she possess none of the disqualification written in the immigration law. Dual Citizenship Possible under the present Constitution A condition which arises from the fact that Philippine law cannot control international law and the laws of other countries on citizenship However, if Philippine citizenship is acquired by naturalization and not by operation of the Constitution, it is well within the power of Philippine law to require prior renunciation of foreign nationality as a condition Dual Allegiance Refers to that unsettled kind of allegiance of persons who are already Filipinos but who, by their acts, may be bound by a second allegiance to a foreign country.

C2005

ART.III BILL OF RIGHTS

Sec. 1 No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws. HIERARCHY OF RIGHTS
PBM Employees Association v PBM Property rights occupy a lower position in the hierarchy of rights than human rights. (This doctrine however, should be taken with a grain of salt. Sir Agabin)

SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS


US v Ling Su Fan There is 1. 2. 3. 4. judicial due process if there is: a written accusation hearing before an impartial tribunal with jurisdiction accused was heard; and judgment was rendered only after trial

Lochner v NY

A statute violates due process when there is no reasonable relation between the statutes purpose and the means with which it plans to achieve such purpose. A statute setting the maximum hours a baker may work does not have a reasonable relation with either health or the quality of bread. A statute setting a minimum wage for women is not violative of due process. Women have less bargaining power and are in need of protection. Statute is a reasonable regulation. A statute granting paid pregnancy leaves to women violates due process for impairing the parties right to contract. An intervention in the name of due process presupposes that there is inequality between parties. In this case, an employer and a woman employee were considered on equal footing, which does not justify intervention. A statute regulating alien participation in the retail business is reasonable for wanting to protect the national economy from alien control and domination, especially when an alien posts only the right to property as a defense. But had Ichong put up his rights to life and liberty (for not being allowed to engage in a lawful profession and calling) in arguing against the validity of the statute, he would have won the case Sir Agabin A statute herding Mangyans in reservations is a reasonable regulation. The purpose is to educate Mangyans and to make them as close as possible to their civilized Filiipino brothers. The Bill of Rights does not apply to people who have do not understand what freedom and liberty truly mean. A right to due process is a personal right that may be invoked only by a person whose rights are affected by the statute. A statute is presumed constitutional in the absence of a showing of invasion of a personal right. A statute that prohibits prescribing contraceptives to unmarried persons is unnecessary and oppressive and raises no reasonable relation between means and objective.

West Coast Hotel v Parrish People v Pomar

Ichong v Hernandez

Rubi v Prov. Board of Mindoro

Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Assocation v City of Manila Grisworld v Connecticut

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Yu Cong Eng v Trinidad People v Fajardo Ynot v IAC A statute prohibiting the keeping of books of accounts in any language other than English, Spanish or the local dialect violates due process for impairing a persons right to engage in a lawful profession or calling. Aesthetic purposes are not sufficient to justify depriving a person of the right to use his property without just compensation. A statute prohibiting the transportation of carabaos and carabeef between provinces violates due process for impairing a persons right to use his property while having no reasonable relation with its avowed purpose supposedly to protect a valuable beast of burden. A law allowing for the expropriation of lands to distribute to the poor may not be unconstitutional on its face but it violates due process as applied when what is to be distributed is a small parcel of land to benefit a few families. In such a case, the means will not anymore have a reasonable relation with the purpose of the statute the distribution of landed estates to facilitate agrarian reform.

Guido v RPA

PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS


Marcos v Sandiganbayan Animas v Min. of National Defense Tanada v Tuvera People v Salas A decision rendered in violation of procedural due process is void. The elements of procedural due process differ. It depends on the nature of the proceedings involved whether judicial, military, legislative, administrative, quasi-judicial or regulatory. It is unjust to punish a citizen for violation of a law of which he had not notice, not even a constructive one especially in the case of presidential issuances as opposed to legislative acts where the people would have been free to watch legislative hearings if they desired. Trial in absentia is allowed provided: 1. the accused has been arraigned 2. the accused has been duly notified of the trial and of subsequent hearings 3. the accuseds failure to appear is unjustified In a trial in absentia, the accused is said to have waived: 1. right to present evidence in his behalf 2. right to be informed of subsequent hearings Publication is indispensable in proceedings in rem to satisfy the requirements of procedural due process. The assumed failure of a clerk of court to notify defendant of the proceedings does not amount to such an irregularity as to be equal to a denial of due process when constructive notice has been served. When a decision is rendered in violation of due process, it is as if there had no decision at all. It may be attacked directly or collaterally and even when the period for appeal has lapsed. In proceedings in persona where court acquires jurisdiction over the person of an accused, an accused has to be included in the information to be prejudiced by a decision. When a person has committed indirect contempt of court, it is required that he be charged with the offense and a trial be had to determine his guilt; as opposed to when a person is charged with direct contempt, where the judge may summarily convict him.

Banco Espanol v Palanca

David v Aquilizan DBP v Bautista People v Peralta

ADMINISTRATIVE DUE PROCESS


Ang Tibay v CIR The cardinal primary rights in administrative proceedings are: 1. right to a hearing, to present ones cause and adduce evidence to defend such cause 2. the decision must have something to back it up 3. evidence must be substantial, which means such relevant facts and circumstances which to a reasonable mind would suffice to support a

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conclusion evidence must be considered by the tribunal decision must be rendered on evidence adduced at the trial or at least attached to the record and disclosed to the parties the administrative official must render judgment based on his independent evaluation of the facts and issues of the case and not merely rely on the decisions of subordinate officials decision must be written so as to allow the parties to the case to identify the issues and the reasons behind the decision

4. 5. 6. 7. De Bisschop v Galang

Right versus privilege test when an action is based on a right, due process is required; when based on a privilege, due process is not required A license granted to an alien allowing him to stay in the Philippines is a privilege, not a right. To revoke it would not require compliance even the minimum requirements of due process notice and opportunity to be heard. Severe injury test variation of the nature of interest test used in Goldberg Welfare benefits, although only a privilege, would require a full-blown trial before revocation because of its import to beneficiaries who are mostly oppressed. Hearings are required but they need not judicial. Nature of interest test when interest is substantial, such as that which partakes of life, liberty and property, state would have to accord due process To determine whether due process requirements apply, look not into the weight but into the nature of the interests at stake. A universitys decision not to rehire a professor does not cause any prejudice to the professors status nor to his property interests, which in this case are only abstract. Balancing of interests test -> Due process is flexible and requires for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands. The revocation of social security benefits does not require the same processes as the revocation of welfare benefits it may be revoked absent full-blown hearings. In arriving at the this conclusion, the court considered several factors: 1. private interest affected by official action 2. risk of an erroneous deprivation 3. fairness and reliability of existing pre-termination procedures + probable value of additional and substitute procedural safeguards 4. public interest involved The decision in an administrative case must be rendered based on evidence presented at the trial and disclosed to the parties. The minimum requirements of due process are applicable to administrative proceedings: 1. notice 2. opportunity to be heard Due process in administrative proceedings does not require trial type hearings.

Goldberg v Kelly

Board of Regents v Roth

Matthews v Eldridge

Go v Napolcom

Agabin v CA

EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE


Philconsa v Jimenez Yick Wo v Hopkins DECS v San Diego Brown v Board of Education People v Vera Eisenstadt v Baird A statute granting retirement benefits to legislators is violative of equal protection for being unduly discriminatory in favor of lawmakers without raising any substantial distinction that would justify treating them differently from from other elective officials. A statute prohibiting the operation of laundry services in buildings made of wood may not be unconstitutional on its face but may violate equal protection as applied. The law guarantees equality among equals. The three-flunk rule in NMAT is constitutional for being based on a substantial distinction between med students, other students and NMAT flunkers. The separate but equal doctrine does not apply to educational institutions. Racial segregation in schools is inherently unequal as measured by intangibles. There exists no difference between a law which denies and a law which permits denial of equal protection. A probation law, which allows unequal treatment for persons convicted under the same penal code, is unconstitutional. A law which regulates the distribution of contraceptives, limiting it to married couples, is unconstitutional for being overbroad with respect to the married and discriminatory with respect to the unmarried.

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Smith Bell v Natividad Aliens enjoy the same rights as citizens. But a law that limits the use of common carriers to citizens does not violate equal protection. Common carriers, as matters of public interes,t are proper subjects of regulation. The law, in fact, does not discriminate against aliens but is instead viewed as a reasonable means to encourage local ship-building. A law that prohibits non-Christian inhabitants from possessing liquor does not violate equal protection. It rests on a distinction that is: 1. substantial 2. germane to the purpose of the law 3. not limited to existing to conditions 4. applies equally to members of the same class A law that disqualifies highly urbanized cities from participating in provincial elections is constitutional. A distinction based on the income of a city is substantial. It is a measure of a citys capability to exist as a separate unit apart from the province to which it belongs. A distinction should not be limited to existing conditions but to should also apply to future conditions substantially identical with the present. The creation of the Sandiganbayan is constitutional. There exists a substantial distinction between common criminals and public officers who commit crimes in relation to their offices. General provisions in the Constitution, regarding due process and equal protection, should give way to more specific provisions such as the one creating the Sandiganbayan.

People v Cayat

Ceniza v Comelec Ormoc Sugar v Treasurer Nunez v Sandiganbayan

Sec. 2 The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. Sec. 3 (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise as prescribed by law. (2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.

SEARCHES AND SEIZURES


People v Malmstedt Olmstead v US Katz v US Terry v Ohio Manalili v CA An arrest of a person carrying dried marijuana from Sagada, in flagrante does not require a warrant. A search made incidental to such arrest is equally lawful. Tangibles only rule -> The constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and seizures applies only to material things: houses, persons, papers and effects. When there is no entry, there can be no unlawful search nor seizure. Constitution protects people not places. Whatever a person reserves as private should be considered private whether it be tangible or not. Stop and frisk rule -> A reasonably prudent officer, warranted by circumstances of a given case, in believing that his safety or that of others is endangered, may make a reasonable search for weapons of a person he believes is armed and dangerous. The stop and frisk rule is an exception to the general rule against a search without warrant. Its application however, presupposes the minimum requirement of probable cause. An accused who fails to raise the issue of the illegality of a search during trial, is considered to have waived his right against such unreasonable search and seizure. The search of vessels, aircrafts and motor vehicles has been an exception to the constitutional requirement of a search warrant. These may be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the search warrant must be sought and secured which makes securing a warrant impracticable.

Hizon v CA

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California v Greenwood Ciraolo v California Trash searches are allowed because of the absence of a reasonable expectation of privacy on the part of the person who discarded the trash. The test of legitimacy is not whether the individual chooses to conceal an assertedly private activity but whether the governments intrusion infringes upon the personal and societal values protected by the Constitution. An area within curtilage does not bar all police observation especially in this case where there wasnt any reasonable expectation of privacy public navigable airspace which any member of the public who glanced down from a commercial plane would have seen. Saturation drives are violative of human rights. They do not require individualized suspicion (that a particular individual has committed a crime) and instead rely on guilt by association, which is prohibited. Also, individualized suspicion by itself would not suffice for lack of probable cause. It should be backed up by suspicious acts committed in the presence of an officer. It is reasonable for an officer to expect that the arrestee would use any weapon he may have or to destroy any incriminating evidence in his possession. A search or seizure in such a case would be justifiable. The minimum requirement of warrantless searches is probable cause. A waiver against unreasonable searches must be transmitted in such a language that would leave no room for doubt that the accused fully understood what he requested. An objection to unreasonable searches and seizures is a purely personal right that might be invoked only by the person prejudiced thereby. A warrant issued must satisfy the requirement of particularity of description. Exclusionary rule -> Evidence obtained in violation of the constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and seizures is inadmissible. The Bill of Rights may only be invoked against the State. Evidence obtained by a private person, acting in a private capacity, without intervention of the state authorities is valid. Except in cases of search of a dwelling house, persons exercising police authority under the customs law may effect a search without warrant to enforce such customs laws. A general warrant, which does not describe particular objects to be seized, is invalid. Checkpoints, during abnormal times, conducted within reasonable limits are constitutional as long as they are limited to visual searches; unless there exists probable cause to conduct full searches (i.e., suspicious behavior). A fiscals report must be supported by sufficient records. A judge is not required to personally examine the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. All he is required to do is to personally evaluate the fiscals report or to require the complainants and their witnesses to submit affidavits in support of the complaint if the fiscals report is inadequate. Applicants for the issuance of a search warrant and their witnesses must testify on facts personally known to them. Sec. 7 Rule 126 No search of a house, room, or any other premise shall be made except in the presence of: 1. the lawful occupant thereof or 2. any member of his family or 3. in the absence of the latter, in the presence of two witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality. Officers are also required to issue receipts for the items seized and to immediately turn over such items to the court. Subversion is a continuing crime. Warrant is unnecessary when arresting a person guilty of such because of Sec. 5(a) Rule 113 When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime. Warrantless arrests applicable in this case: 1. in flagrante 2. when a crime has just be committed and the arresting officer has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it Warrantless searches applicable in this case:

Guazon v de Villa

Cupp v Murphy People v Chua Ho San

Stonehill v Diokno

People v Marti People v CFI Burgos v Chief of Staff Valmonte v Villa Ho v People Soliven v Judge Makasiar

PICOP v Asuncion People v Gesmundo

Umil v Ramos Padilla v CA

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1. 2. 3. Aniag v Comelec Chimel v California Skinner v Railway Labor Association search incidental to lawful arrest plain view doctrine search of a moving vehicle

In the face of fourteen armed policemen, an implied acquiescence could not be more than a mere passive conformity to the search. Consent under intimidating and coercive circumstances is no consent within the purview of the constitutional right to due process. A search made incidental to arrest which went far beyond the arrestees person and the area from which he may have obtained either a weapon or something that could have been used as evidence against him is unconstitutional Whether a private party should be deemed an agent or instrument of the government for constitutional purposes, necessarily turns on the degree of the governments participation in the private partys activities. Special needs doctrine In this case there was a special need (determining liability in railroad accidents) that required having to do away with the warrant requirement. To require warrants would significantly hinder and frustrate the objectives of the statute while adding little assurances of certainty and regularity already afforded by the present regulations. Rights and duties of persons involved in detentions, arrests or custodial investigations: 1. arrestee shall be assisted by counsel at all times 2. duties of arresting officer inform arrestee of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel, in a language understood by him allow counsel to confer with arrestee in private at all times provide arrestee with a counsel if arrestee cant afford one 3. duties of investigating officer prepare the custodial investigation report which should be in writing explain the report to arrestee in a language understood by him before arrestee attaches his signature or thumbmark to the report otherwise, investigation is null and void 4. extrajudicial confession must be signed upon a valid waiver in the presence of counsel, parents, elder brothers or sisters municipal mayor, municipal judge, district school supervisor, priest, preacher of gospel otherwise, inadmissible 5. visit or conferences must be allowed persons under custodial investigation Definitions: custodial investigation practice of issuing an invitation to a person investigated in connection with an offense without prejudice to the liabilities that the inviting officer may incur assisting counsel - any lawyer except lawyer: 1. directly affected by the case 2. conducting preliminary investigation 3. charged with prosecuting offense

RA7438

Ople v Torres

A statute providing for a national ID system is unconstitutional for want of a reasonable relation between the means and the object. Sec. 4 No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances.

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FREEDOM OF SPEECH
Schenk v US Clear and present danger test when the words used are used under such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. The character of every act depends upon the circumstances in which it was done. Those, which may be said in times of peace, may be considered a hindrance to the countrys efforts in times of war. Clear and probable danger test Man must be held to have intended and to be accountable for the effects which their acts are likely to produce. Holmes (dissenting): The clear and present danger test applies in times of peace and war, although the power of the state is greater in times of war because of the dangers that do not exist in other times. The best test of truth is in the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market. Plain statement versus advocacy of action test The state punishes advocacy of action, not mere advocacy of doctrine (academic discussion not inciting to concrete action). Holmes (dissenting): The difference between expression of opinion and advocacy is the speakers enthusiasm for result. Dangerous tendency rule The law does not require that there be actual utterances. The state may punish even those utterances which may endanger public order. Language used must be understood in its plain and obvious sense. Speech may take the form of symbols. A complaint is considered to be qualified privileged communication if it is: 1. made in good faith 2. without malice 3. regarding the character or conduct of a public official 4. addressed to the proper officer or board In such a case, the plaintiff carries the burden of proving the speech to be libelous. Rational basis test -> Speech may be regulated to prevent the substantive evil of debasement of the electoral process. But the regulation should not be overbroad as to make its application oppressive. Freedom of speech must be treated with utmost respect when what may be curtailed is the dissemination of information to make more meaningful the equally vital right of suffrage. Speech is often provocative and challenging. Hence, fighting words are not sufficient to convict a person absent a clear and present danger of a serious substantive evil not just public inconvenience, annoyance or unrest. Balancing of interests test choosing between two interests as to which deserves greater weight Preferred freedoms test modification of balancing test; between two interests, that which affects liberties gets preferential treatment; had this been used in this case, Zaldivar would have been acquitted

Abrams v US

Gitlow v New York

People v Nabong

US v Bustos

Gonzales v Comelec Mutuc v Comelec Terminello v City of Chicago Zaldivar v Sandiganbayan

FREEDOM OF THE PRESS


NPC v Comelec A statute except to 1. 2. prohibiting the sale or donation of mass media print space and air time for campaign or political purposes the Comelec held to constitutional because of: limited scope, duration, character of restriction clear and reasonable relation between statute and objective

Osmena v Comelec

Content-neutral restriction involves regulation as to time, place and manner; requires a different standard of review as opposed to content-based restrictions When what is restricted is not the content of political ads but only their incidents, the application of the clear and present danger rule is inappropriate.

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Times Film Corp v City of Chicago Miami Herald Publishing Co. v Tornillo Movies may be regulated through prior restraint. They are primarily used for entertainment, as opposed to newspapers and broadcast media that are mainly used to disseminate public information which info is necessary in a democracy. Right to reply provisions are as unconstitutional as a statute which forbids or compels newspapers to publish specified matter. White (concurring): A newspaper is not a public utility subject o reasonable governmental regulation in matters affecting the exercise of journalistic judgment. Content-neutral regulations will be sustained provided: 1. regulation advances important governmental interests unrelated to suppression of free speech 2. regulation does not substantially burden free speech more than necessary to further those interests Content-neutral regulations are not invalid simply because there is some imaginable alternative that might be less burdensome to free speech. Any system or prior restraint comes to court bearing the heavy presumption against its constitutionality. A public trial is not synonymous with a publicized trial. The law prohibits reckless disregard for private reputation, to which even judges have a right. Journalists are required to exercise bona fide care in ascertaining the truth of a statement they publish. The inherent worth of the speech in terms of its capacity for informing the public does not depend upon the identity of the source. The indispensability of speech to decision-making in a democracy is not less true because the speech comes from a corporation rather than an individual. Test of obscenity: whether to the average person, applying contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole, appeals to prurient interest Even factual errors are not sufficient to remove the constitutional protection of free of speech. Actual malice test knowledge that material is false or with reckless disregard of whether or not it was false. Falsity alone does not prove actual malic. The burden of proof of proving actual malice rests on the plaintiff. Doctrine of fair comment fair commentaries, on matters of public interest, are qualified privileged and constitute a valid defense in an action for libel or slander; in the absence of actual malice, the material is not actionable Even a person who is not a public officer may be involved in a public issue and thence becomes a public figure. Truth is a valid defense in a defamatory statement made against the acts of a public official, regardless of whether or not person acted with good intentions and justifiable motives. Even when a material is found to possess the requisite prurient appeal and is found to be patently offensive ,it cant be proscribed unless it is found to be utterly without redeeming social value. Guidelines for trier of facts: 1. Roth test 2. work depicts or describes sexual conduct in a patently offensive way, which sexual conduct must be specifically defined by the applicable statute or law 3. work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value Freedom of communication applies to both source and recipient. Freedom of speech applies even to commercial transactions. Fact that the advertisers interests are purely economic does not disqualify him from constitutional protection. Alleged slander is not actionable if it could not have reasonably understood as describing actual facts. To claim damages, plaintiff must prove: 1. false statement of facts

TBS v FCC

NY Times Co. v US In Re: Request Radio-TV Coverage In Re: Emil P. Jurado 1st National Bank v Belloti

Roth v US NY Times Co. v Sullivan

Borjal v CA

Vasquez v CA Memoirs of a Women of Pleasure v Atty.Gen. of Massachusetts Miller v California

Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumers Council, Inc. Hustler Magazine v Fallwell

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2. actual malice (with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether or not it was false)

FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY
US v Apurado Thomas v Collins Primicias v Fugoso An orderly, peaceful assembly enjoys constitutional protection. Clear and present danger test Any attempt to restrict liberties must be justified by clear public interest threatened by clear and present danger. Officers may only regulate (not suppress) public assemblies with respect to time and place in the interest of public order and safety. In addition, regulation must not be arbitrary. To justify suppression, there must exist a clear and present danger of a serious injury and power to suppress must not be uncontrolled. Freedoms of speech and assembly are governed by the same standards justifying limitations. Procedures for acquiring permits: 1. applicant should inform authority, ahead of time, where and when assembly will take place to allow for reasonable period of appraisal 2. if application is denied or modified on the basis of existence of a clear and present danger, the applicant should be heard 3. applicant should be notified of the decision of the officer ahead of time so he could have proper recourse to judicial authorities The grant of permits to assemble should be based on the purpose of the speech, not the applicant for the permit, otherwise there would be discriminatory access. Authorities may modify place where assembly is to be held in the proper exercise of police power. NOTES: The validity of a modification depends on the test used by the court. 1. preferred freedoms test requires existence of a clear and present danger before allowing modification 2. others (balancing of interests, dangerous tendency) requires only proof of public convenience and sufficiency of cause In this case, convenience was sufficient to validate modification. CPP an illegal association with principal object of overthrowing the present government. Refusal to grant permit to assemble is justified because the state should not be required to wait until the apprehended danger (of sedition) becomes certain. Principles for guidance of school authorities: 1. right to peaceable assembly and free speech guaranteed to students only a showing of clear and present danger would justify previous restraint or subsequent punishment peaceable character is lost by advocacy or disorder 2. if an assembly is to held in school premises, a permit must be sought from school authorities may not be denied unreasonably or arbitrarily may indicate the conditions of time and place in case of breach of terms, penalty to be imposed should be proportionate to the offense

Reyes v Bagatsing

Ignacio v Ela

Evangelista v Earnshaw Malabanan v Ramento

Sec. 5 No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights.

FREEDOM OF AND FREEDOM FROM RELIGION


West Virginia Board of Education v Barnette Rights may be impaired only to prevent grave and immediate danger. National unity is not a sufficient justification for compelling Jehovahs Witnesses to perform the flag salute against their religious beliefs. Unity may not be obtained through compulsion. There are no threats to public safety when students are exempted from attending the flag ceremony on the basis of religious beliefs. Therefore, the exemption is valid.

Ebranilag v Division Superintendent of Schools

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Students may be disciplined however, should they disrupt the patriotic exercises and commit breach of peace. Aglipay v Ruiz Centeno v Villalon-Pornillos Austria v NLRC The influence of religion on human affairs cant be denied. The printing of postage stamps on the occasion of a Catholic celebration, when not religiously motivated, is not unconstitutional, even when the Catholic Church received incidental propaganda thereby. A general regulation of solicitation, which does not involve any religious test nor obstruct or delay solicitation of religious funds, is constitutional. There exists a legitimate government interest in regulating solicitation. The state will not interfere with ecclesiastical affairs (involves the relations between the Church and its members; relate to matters of faith, religious doctrines, worship and governance of Congregation); but the Labor Code is comprehensive enough to include religious corporations in case labor disputes arise which would require government intervention. The non-establishment clause does not depend upon any showing of direct governmental compulsion. It is violated by the enactment of laws, which establish an official religion, whether or not these laws operate directly to coerce non-observing individuals. The fact, therefore, that a prayer recited in public schools was denominationally neutral and voluntary is immaterial. The non-establishment clause does not prevent a state from extending the benefits of state laws to all citizens without regard to their religious affiliation. The grant of secular textbooks to all schools, even when it includes parochial schools, is therefore constitutional. RA3350 closed-shop agreements shall not cover members of any religious sect which prohibits affiliation of their members with any labor organization does not violate Art. III Sec. 5 because: 1. purpose is secular upholding the constitutional right of freedom of religion 2. no positive act is required, therefore not a religious test for the exercise of a civil right 3. no privilege granted to INC merely places them on an equal footing with members whose religions do not prohibit them from joining Exercise of religious freedom (as opposed to realm of religious belief) can be regulated by the state when it will bring about the clear and present danger of some substantive evil which Congress has a duty to prevent. The non-establishment clause also prohibits any act of the state favoring any religion, by protecting it against attack by another religion. A flat license tax, payment of which is a condition of the exercise of the constitutional privilege of religion, is unconstitutional. Public welfare legislation, passed to satisfy a public need (the general education of all children) is constitutional even when it coincides with the personal desires of certain religions. Constitution requires the State to be neutral in its relationship with groups of religious believers and non believers. It does not requires the state to be their adversary. The states interest in universal education has to be balanced against the traditional interest of parents in the religious upbringing of their children. Since there is no showing that Amish children would become burderns to society minus two extra years of compulsory education, the free exercise clause should prevail over state interests. Sec. 6 The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided by law.

Engel v Vitale

Board of Education v Allen 1968 Victoriano v Elizalde Rope Workers Union 1974

INC v CA 1996

American Bible Society v City of Manila 1957 Everson v Board of Education 1947

Wisconsin v Yoder 1972

LIBERTY OF ABODE AND TRAVEL


Rubi v Provincial Board of Mindoro Civil liberties should be enjoyed only in civilized communities.

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1919 Villavicencio v Lukban 1919 Lorenzo v Dir. of Health 1927 Manotok v CA 1986 Marcos v Manglapus 1989 Philippine Association of Service Exporters v Drilon 1988 Prostitutes, despite being in a sense lepers, are not chattels but Philippine citizens, protected by the same constitutional guarantee of freedom of abode. They may not be compelled to change their domicile in the absence of a law allowing such. Laws for the segregation of lepers have been provided the world over and is supported by high scientific authority. Such segregation is premised on the duty to protect public health. Bail posted in a criminal case, is a valid restriction on the right to travel. By its nature, it may serve as a prohibition on an accused from leaving the jurisdiction of the Philippines where orders of Philippine courts would have no binding force. The liberty of abode and the right to travel includes the right to leave, reside and travel within ones country but it does not include the right to return to ones country. NOTE: Court warned that this case should not create a precedent because Marcos was a class in himself. Right to travel may be impaired in the interest of national security, public health or public order, as may be provided by law. An order temporarily suspending the deployment of overseas workers is constitutional for having been issued in the interest of the safety of OFWs, as provided by the Labor Code.

Sec. 7 The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.

ACCESS TO PUBLIC INFORMATION


Valmonte v Belmonte 1989 Baldoza v Dimaano 1976 Legaspi v Civil Service Commission 1987 Chavez v PCGG 1998 The people have a right to access official records but they cant compel custodians of official records to prepare lists, abstracts, summaries and the like, such not being based on a demandable legal right. Judges cannot prohibit access to judicial records. However, a judge may regulate the manner in which persons desiring to inspect, examine or copy records in his office, may exercise their rights. Personal interest is not required in asserting the right to information on matters of public concern. What matters constitute public concern should be determined by the court on a case to case basis. Public concern (def.) writings coming into the hands of public officers in connection with their official functions Ill-gotten wealth is, by its nature, a matter of public concern. Sec. 8 The right of the people, including those employed in the public and private sectors, to form unions, associations or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged.

FREEDOM OF ASSOCATION
PAFLU v Sec. of Labor 1969 People v Ferrer 1972 Dennis v US In Re: Edillon The right to self-organization does not include the right to be given legal personality. A legislative determination that the CPP is an illegal organization is a justified proscription of the preferred position of freedom of association. Congress was able to show the existence of a substantive evil: an organized conspiracy to overthrow the Government to establish a totalitarian regime dominated by alien power. Act declaring the CP an illegal organization is constitutional for being passed in response to a clear and present danger: conspiracy that was ready to make the attempt to overthrow the government, even without acts committed in pursuance of the conspiracy. Overriding considerations of public interest and welfare justify intrusion into the personal interests and convenience of individual lawyers.

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1978 NAACP v Alabama 1958 UPSU v Laguesma 1998 A lawyers freedom of association is not violated when he automatically becomes a member of the IBP upon admission to the Bar. He is already a member of an unorganized group of lawyers, the integration of the bar just provides for official and national organization. Privacy in ones associations is indispensable to the preservation of the freedom of association, especially where a group espouses dissident beliefs. The right of association guaranteed in the Constitution is subject to the condition that its exercise should be for purposes not contrary to law. The Labor Code prohibits managerial employees from joining, assisting or forming any labor organization. As such, supervisors are banned from organizing with rank and file employees. They may however, form separate labor organizations of their own, in accordance with RA6715. Sec. 9 Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.

EMINENT DOMAIN
City of Manila v Chinese Community 1919 A municipal corporation exercises only a general authority granted by the legislature to appropriate private property for public use. In every case, the court has a duty to ensure that a municipal corporation exercises the rights conferred to it in compliance with imposed conditions: 1. that law exists for the exercise of eminent domain 2. that authority is exercised in accordance with such law On the other hand, the legislature possesses general power to exercise the right of eminent domain, which it may confer upon a municipal corporation. In such a case, the necessity of conferring is beyond judicial review. There is no taking when the statute permits continued reasonable use of the site as it was used before the regulation and when statute affords opportunities to enhance the property. The report of commissioners on the valuation of land for expropriation is not final. The court may increase or decrease the valuation if it is grossly excessive or grossly insufficient even when there is no showing of fraud or prejudice on the part of the commissioners. Just compensation is a constitutional right to be protected by the judiciary. As such, the valuation submitted by commissioners is just a guiding principle in determing what is just compensation. Other factors to be considered are: 1. condition of the property 2. surroundings 3. improvements and capabilities Just compensation in land expropriation proceedings should be determined in the light of social justice. PD42 Judge can only choose between the value of the property according to tax declarations or as declared by owner or administrator, whichever is lower. The Constitutional provision on expropriation should be liberally construed. Whereas it uses lands instead of landed estates, it should be deemed to include even lands located in urban areas. Congress is free to follow a system of priorities to determine what lands would be the first to be the subject of expropriation. The taking of property owned by a municipality in its proprietary character requires just compensation. Expropriation does not require information on land size or area. The test is the number of people to be benefited by the expropriation and the degree of social reform achieved thereby. Public use includes public utility and advantage not just use by the general public in its literal sense. The power of eminent domain is exercised even when the taking of private property is for the development of housing projects and pilot centers etc. The owner property expropriated should be compensated for what he actually losses. Compensation should be based on the value of the land at the time of taking, not at the time of the filing of the claim, but with legal interest. Compensation payable only in money applies to traditional exercise of the power of the eminent domain. The Comprehensive Agrarian

Penn Central Trans. Co. v New York 1978 MRR v Velasquez 1915 EPZA v Dulay 1987

NHA v Reyes 1983 JM Tuason v Land Tenure Administration 1970 City of Baguio v NAWASA 1959 Mataas na Lupa v Dimayuga 1984 Province of Camarines Sur v CA 1993 Ansaldo v CA 1990 Association of Small Landowners v Adiong

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1989 Adiong v Comelec 1992 Reform Program is not traditional but revolutionary, where the mode of compensation need not be in cash. When the right to property is joined by a liberty interest, the burden of justification on the part of the government that justifies intrusion must be exceptionally convincing and irrefutable. Sec. 10 No law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed.

CONTRACTS CLAUSE
Clemons v Nolting 1922 The following impair the obligation of a contract: 1. A law which changes the terms of a legal contract with respect to: a. time or mode of performance b. conditions that which imposes new or dispenses with expressed conditions 2. A law which authorizes for the satisfaction of a contract something different from that provided in its terms A law which compels a creditor to accept Philippine pesos when a debt in US currency is owing impairs the obligation of the contract. The state is never presumed to surrender its police power. A franchise granted to a company to collect tolls from a bridge is subject to the duty and power of the state to provide for the improvement of an important line of travel. The legislature cant bargain away public health, morals & safety. The police power is considered a reserved power. The legislature may not impair the obligation of a contract but may modify, according to its wisdom, the remedy with which the obligations may be enforced. remedy modes of proceeding and forms to enforce the contract provided it does not seriously impair the value of the right The reservation of state authority is read into and deemed part of contracts. A statute which subsequently outlaws gambling does not impair the obligation of contract. A lottery charter is only a privilege which may be revoked by the exercise of the police power of the state, gambling being an appropriate subject of regulation. There is no vested right in remedies or modes of procedure. The legislature may modify particular remedies for the enforcement of a contract without interfering with the obligation of the contract. Police power may only be invoked against the impairment of contracts if: 1. justified by an emergency furnished the proper occasion for the exercise of the reserved power of the state 2. temporary in nature operation limited to the exigency which called it forth, which period may be reduced by the court 3. exercised upon reasonable conditions 4. impairment refers only to remedy and not to substantive right 5. addressed to a legitimate purpose the protection of the basic interests of society The prohibition in the Constitution refers only to contracts with respect to property. It does not apply to statutes relating to public subjects within the domain of the general legislative powers of the state and involving the right and public welfare of the entire community affected by it. A law which allows tenants to change their contracts from tenancy to leasehold system does not impair the obligation of contracts because it was enacted pursuant to social justice precepts of the constitution. Zoning laws, promulgated in the exercise of police power, justify nullification of contractual obligations. Contracts of labor are explicitly subject to the police power. CC1700: Relations between capital and labor are not merely contractual but are impressed with public interest and must yield to

Charles River Bridge v Warren Bridge 1837 Home Building & Loan Assoc. v Blaisdell 1934

Stone v Mississippi 1879 Manila Trading v Reyes 1935 Rutter v Esteban 1953

Ilusoria v CAR 1966

Ortigas v Feati Bank 1979 Conference of Maritime Manning Agencies v POEA 1995

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the common good

Sec. 11 Free access to the courts and quasi-judicial bodies and adequate legal assistance shall not be denied to any person by reason of poverty. Sec. 12 (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. (2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the free will shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are prohibited. (3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Sec. 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him. (4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violations of this section as well as compensation to and rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar practices, and their families. Sec. 13 All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required. Sec. 14 (1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law. (2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable.

Sec. 16 All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative bodies.

Sec. 17 No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.

RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED COLD NEUTRALITY


People v Opida Galman v Sandiganbayan Martelino v Alejandrino Marcos v Sandiganbayan A judge should refrain from examining witnesses and should limit himself to clarificatory questions. A dictated, coerced, and scripted verdict of acquittal is a void judgment. In legal contemplation, it neither binds nor bars anyone. Publicity does not invalidate a trial in the absence of a clear showing that the judges would not have been able to render impartial judgment. A judgment is invalid when the judges behavior did not manifest cold neutrality required of officers of court: discussed case at lunch, not all members were present, a non-member was with group, discussed case outside proper venue.

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AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION
Gutang v People 2000 The constitution prohibits testimonial compulsion or the extortion of communication from the accused. It does not prohibit inclusion of an accuseds body in evidence when it may be material and what is involved is only a mechanical act meant to ascertain physical attributes determinable by simple observation. Urine samples voluntarily given by the accused are admissible in evidence and do not violate the constitutional prohibition against self-incrimination. An accused, unlike an ordinary witnesses, may not only refuse to answer incriminating questions but may also refuse to take the witness stand altogether. The waiver of the constitutional right against self-incrimination must be certain and unequivocal. On a proper showing and upon order by the court, an ocular inspection of the body of an accused is permissible provided torture or force is not used. The privilege is not limited to testimonies, but extends to all giving or furnishing of evidence. An order requiring a fiscal to take dictation in his own handwriting to compare with specimens is unconstitutional. It requires not just a mechanical but a positive act and compels the accused to create evidence which would otherwise not be in existence. Officers cant extract by force what is in an accuseds mind. They also cant extract by force what is in his stomach.

Chavez v CA 1968 Villaflor v Summers 1920 Beltran v Samson & Jose 1929 Rochin v California 1952

RIGHT TO COUNSEL
Escobedo v Illinois 1964` The right to counsel attaches from the time the investigation moves from a general investigation to one which has begun to focus on the guilt or innocence of the accused. It applies even during interrogation, where legal advice is most critical. It would exalt form over substance to say that the right to counsel would depend on whether or not the authorities had already secured a formal indictment. NOTE RA7438 which requires assistance of counsel [de parte] even at the early stage of arrest. In-custody interrogations contain inherently compelling pressures. Statements obtained during such interrogations, without observing the proper procedural safeguards, are inadmissible in evidence. Procedural safeguards and guidelines: 1. prior to any questioning, accused must be informed that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says may be used as evidence against him 2. at any stage during the investigation, if the accused indicates that he wishes to consult an attorney before answering, the interrogation must be stopped 3. if the accused is alone and indicates that he does not wish to be interrogated, there can be no interrogation 4. warning does not depend on the background of the accused nor on his request. It must be accompanied by a meaningful explanation. 5. waiver of the rights must be knowingly and intelligently given 6. these rights do not distinguish between exculpatory and inculpatory statements Miranda rights apply to suspects under custodial investigation by the police. Oral statements made by a person, while he was yet a suspect, are admissible in evidence although he has not been warned of his rights. Requisites for admissibility of extra-judicial confessions: 1. voluntarily made 2. with the assistance of a competent and independent counsel Counsel for the accused need not be retained by the accused himself. The lawyer may be: 1. engaged by anyone acting on behalf of the person under investigation

Miranda v State of Arizona 1966

People v Logronio 1992 People v Espiritu 1999

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2. People v Continente 2000 People v Hatton 1992 People v Obrero 2000 People v Sevilla 2000 appointed by the court upon petition by person under investigation or someone acting on his behalf

A mere enumeration to the accused of his custodial rights does not satisfy the requirement required by law. There has to be the transmission of meaningful information as to the nature of the investigation with warnings and advice to the accused. Effective communication and a full understanding of ones rights are required. The presence of counsel is indispensable in a post-indictment line-up. But while the accusatory process in a line-up has not yet set in, the right to counsel does not attach. NOTE: Line-up in this case was invalidated however, because it was filled with suggestive influences. An independent counsel cant be a special counsel, public or private prosecutor, municipal attorney or counsel of the police whose interest is admittedly adverse to the accused. Statements acquired during a custodial investigation, without the assistance of counsel, are invalid even when third degree methods are not employed. Uncounselled extra-judicial confessions are likewise inadmissible when made without a waiver of the right to an attorney.

RIGHT TO BE INFORMED OF ACCUSATION Webb v De Leon People v Bugayong Pecho v People People v Pailano An accused has the right to move for production or inspection of material evidence in the possession of the prosecution. When time is not an essential element in the crime charged, an information that does not specify a precise date does not violate the right to be informed of accusation. An accused may be convicted of a crime, which although not the one charged, is necessarily included in the latter. When an accused is charged under one paragraph of a statute, he may no be convicted of an offense under a different paragraph without violating his right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.

Gladys G. Nebab
Comment:

RIGHT TO BAIL
De la Camara v Enage Bravo v Borja Herras Teehankee v Rovira The constitution prohibits the imposition of excessive bail. The amount of bail is not a penalty but a mere guarantee that accused will not flee. To determine whether or not an offense is bailable, one should inquire into the penalty prescribed by law and not the penalty actually imposed after all aggravating and mitigating circumstances have been applied. Persons detained without having been charged with any offense, also enjoy the right to bail subject to a hearing to determine whether or not evidence of guilt is strong.

Sec. 15 The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, shall not suspended except in cases of invasion or rebellion when the public safety requires it.

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS


Lansang v Garcia Garcia Padilla v Enrile Aquino v Enrile The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus may be suspended in cases of invasion or rebellion when the public safety requires it. The suspension of the privilege of the writ suspends a persons right to bail even after charges have been filed in courts against him. The declaration of martial law automatically suspends the privilege of the writ. NOTE: This ruling does not hold anymore in view of the explicit constitutional provision that the declaration of martial law does not automatically suspend the privilege of the writ.

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Moncupa v Enrile Ilusorio v Bildner In re: Garcia The writ of habeas corpus is available as long as a person has been deprived of complete freedom such as when his freedom of movement, liberty of abode etc. are curtailed, despite being technically free from physical confinement. The purpose of the writ is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint. It may not issue to compel a husband to live with his wife. Habeas corpus is not a writ of error. Mere errors of fact or law must be corrected on appeal in the form and manner prescribed by law and not by habeas corpus. A person already convicted by final judgment may not avail himself of the privilege of the writ. Sec. 18 (1) No person shall be detained solely by reason of his political beliefs and aspirations. (2) No involuntary servitude in any form shall exist except as a punishment for a crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted. INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE US v Pompeya An Act providing for the method by which the people of the town may be called upon to render assistance for the protection of the public and the preservation of peace and good order is constitutional. It was enacted in the exercise of the police power of the state and does not violate the constitutional prohibition on involuntary servitude. No indebtedness warrants a suspension of the right to be free from compulsory service, and no state can make the quitting of work any component of a crime, or make criminal sanctions available for holding unwilling persons to labor. Sec. 19 (1) Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor curel, degrading or inhuman punishment inflicted. Neither shall the death penalty be imposed, unless, for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress, hereafter provides for it. Any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua. (2) The employment of physical, psychological, or degrading punishment against any prisoner or detainee or the use of substandard or inadequate penal facilities under subhuman conditions shall be dealt with by law.

Pollock v Williams

CRUEL PUNISHMENTS
People v Echagaray 1997 Cruel, unjust, excessive or unusual punishment involves more than the mere extinguishment of life. For punishment to be cruel, it has to be inhuman or barbarous, involving torture or a lingering death. The death penalty is not excessive per se. What is prohibited is discretionary death penalty where arbitrariness, prejudice and discrimination pervade its imposition. An order by the court temporarily suspending the execution of its judgment does not encroach upon the executive power of clemency. The prohibition against cruel punishments likewise applies to bails and fines. Theory of proportional punishment > to determine whether a punishment is excessive, standards in other jurisdictions should be taken into account The death penalty, although not unconstitutional per se, may be unconstitutional if it discriminates against a defendant by reason of his race, religion, wealth, social position or class and if it is imposed under a procedure that gives room for the play of such prejudices. US SC decision regarding the constitutionality of the death penalty: 4 justices (not unconstitutional per se but may be unconstitutional in its application) 2 justices (unconstitutional per se) 3 justices (unconstitutional as applied, no need to decide whether it is unconstitutional per se) Following the courts ruling in Furman, the Georgia legislature adopted the bifurcated scheme, consisting of the guilt, pre-sentencing and automatic review stages, in the imposition of the death penalty. Because of these revised procedural safeguards against discrimination, Georgias statute was upheld and the death penalty was declared constitutional. Cruelty prohibited by the constitution is cruelty inherent in the method of punishment, not the necessary suffering involved in any method employed to extinguish life humanely.

Echegaray v Sec. of Justice 1999 Weems v US 1910 Furman v Georgia 1972

Gregg v Georgia 1976 Louisiana v Resweber 1947

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The fact that an unforeseeable accident prevented the prompt consummation of a convicts sentence, does not make the subsequent execution cruel and excessive. The constitution cant prevent. People v Dionisio 1968 People v Ching Kuan 1942 It takes more than being harsh, excessive, out or proportion or severe for a penalty to be obnoxious to the constitution. The penalty, to be cruel, must be flagrantly and plainly oppressive or wholly disproportionate to the nature of the offense so as to shock the moral sense of the community. In imposing fines, the wealth of the culprit must be taken into account.

Sec. 20 No person shall be imprisoned for debt or non-payment of a poll tax.

NON-IMPRISONMENT FOR DEBT


Lozano v Martinez 1986 Ganaway v Quillen 1922 Serafin v Lindayag 1975 Ajeno v Inserto 1976 BP20 (Bouncing Checks Law) is not unconstitutional for violating the constitutional prohibition on non-imprisonment for debt. It punishes not the failure to pay the cheque but the act of making a worthless cheque, which is an offense against public order. Cheque are not mere contracts but are commercial instruments which form part of the banking system. They are not entirely free from the regulatory power of the state. The Phil. Constitutional prohibition contains no exception (not even fraud on the part of the debtor) to non-imprisonment for debt. An information which merely recites the failure to pay a simple indebtedness does not charge estafa and is purely civil in aspects. No one may be arrested and detained under such an information. The prohibition in the constitution applies to debts arising from a contractual obligation (ex-contractu) and not to debts arising from a crime (ex-delicto). NOTE however, RA5465 which allows subsidiary imprisonment only in cases of non-payment of fine, not to non-payment of civil indemnity.

Sec. 21 No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act.

AGAINST DOUBLE JEOPARDY


Kepner v US 1904 People v Quijada 1996 People v Obsania 1968 The constitutional provision is not a prohibition against twice being punished but against twice being put in jeopardy for the same offense. A defendant, whether convicted or acquitted, has already been put in jeopardy during the first trial. The state, even in appellate proceedings, cant seek reversal of his acquittal without his consent. Additional element test -> There is no double jeopardy when either of two offenses, although based on the same act, requires an additional fact which the other does not. Requisites for double jeopardy to attach: 1. valid complaint or information 2. before a competent court with jurisdiction 3. defendant has pleaded to the charge 4. defendant was acquitted, convicted or the case against him was dismissed without his express consent dismissal was based on the merits or amounts to an acquittal When a defendant moves for the dismissal of the case against him, double jeopardy does not attach because of the absence of the 4th requisite. Doctrine of supervening event -> If after the first prosecution, a new fact supervenes on which defendant may be held liable, resulting in altering the character of the crime and giving rise to a new and distinct offence, the accused cant be said to be in second jeopardy if indicted for the new

People v Adil 1977

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offense. Perez v CA 1988 People v Relova 1987 A single act may offend against two or more entirely distinct & unrelated provisions of law. If one provision requires proof of an additional fact or element which the other does not, an acquittal or conviction or dismissal under one does not bar prosecution under the other. When offenses charged are penalized: 1. by different sections of the same statute 2. by different statutes focus is on identity of offenses. If offenses are the same, double jeopardy attaches. When: 1. one of the offenses is charged under a statute 2. the other under a municipal ordinance focus is on the identity of the acts. If offenses charged are based on the same act, there is double jeopardy. Same offense means: 1. similarity of technical elements 2. one offense amounts to an attempt or frustration of the other 3. one offense is necessarily included in the other If a fact (which changes the character of the offense) was in existence at the time of the 1st prosecution, such fact may not be considered a supervening event so as to allow a 2nd prosecution.

People v City Court of Manila 1983

Sec. 22 No ex post facto law or bill of attainder shall be enacted. EX POST FACTO LEGISLATION Republic v Fernandez 1956 US v Gomez & Coronel 1908 Co v CA 1993 People v Ferrer 1974 Prohibition in the Constitution applies to criminal or penal matters, not to laws concerning civil matters. Revenue acts have traditionally had a retroactive application. To declare increase in taxes as unconstitutional, the retroactive application must be both harsh and oppressive. A law, although dealing only with procedural matters, cant be applied if prejudicial to the accused. A law allowing the fiscal to prosecute adultery absent a complaint from the offended spouse cannot be applied to a case involving n act committed at a time when adultery can only be prosecuted by the offended husband. Decisions of the courts, administrative rulings on court decisions (i.e., those issued by the Sec. of Justice) and anything which partakes of the nature and effect of penal statutes, are covered by the prospectivity principle. The Anti-Subversion Act outlawing the CPP is not a bill of attainder for applying to named individuals or to easily ascertainable members of a group. The use of the word CPP is only for definitional purposes and does not purport refer to only one communist/subversive organization. ART. IV CITIZENSHIP Sec. 1 The following are citizens of the Philippines: (1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution; (2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines; (3) Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and (4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law. Sec. 2 Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship. Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall be deemed naturalborn citizens.

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Sec. 3 Philippine citizenship may be lost or reacquired in the manner provided by law. Sec. 4 Citizens of the Philippine who marry aliens shall retain their citizenship, unless by their act or omission they are deemed, under the law, to have renounced it. Sec. 5 Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law.

CITIZENSHIP
Moya Lim Yao v Commissioner of Immigration 1971 An alien woman may be deemed a citizen of the Philippines by virtue of her marriage to a Filipino citizen if she possesses none of the disqualifications enumerated in the Philippine Naturalization Law. She is then deemed a Filipino without having to submit to naturalization proceedings and may settle the matter of her naturalization by filing a petition for the cancellation of her alien certificate of registration. The Philippine jurisdiction applies the principle of jus sanguinis (citizenship by blood) not jus soli (citizenship by birth). A minor child born of a Filipino mother before Jan.17,1973 does not automatically become a Filipino citizen upon his mothers repatriation. One cannot reacquire what one did not lose in the first place. Thus to become a Filipino, he must elect Filipino citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. An illegitimate child of a Filipino mother and a Chinese father, acquires his mothers citizenship and is likewise a Filipino. The election of Philippine citizenship may be proven by positive acts such as the exercise of the right of suffrage. Philippine citizenship may be lost through: 1. naturalization in a foreign country 2. express renunciation of citizenship 3. subscribing to an oath of allegiance to a foreign country Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by: 1. direct act of Congress 2. naturalization 3. repatriation

Tan Chong v Secretary of Labor 1947 Villahermosa v Commisioner of Immigration 1948 In Re: Florencio Mallare 1974 Labo Jr. v Comelec 1989

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