Foreword

The South Asian region remains divided by intra-regional and intra-state conflicts diverting valuable human resources from development of the people to less productive uses and causing considerable disharmony and violence. This does not augur well for South Asia which accounts for about a Iifth of all humankind. The failure of the political regimes in resolving conflicts and bringing South Asia closer has prompted civil society and concerned citizens of the region to take an initiative in trying to bring together a critical mass of opinion making elites including political leaders, diplomats, scholars, media persons, activists and artists towa.:ds realizing the goal of forging a South Asian community. The Centre for Policy Research (CPR) has a long-standing commitment towards promoting the cause of regional cooperation in South Asia. It undertook a project in this area of research in 1983, even before SAARC was born. Thereafter, CPR has pursued this agenda, in collaboration with scholars and institutions from other South Asian countrles, on issues such as governance in South Asia and common approaches to water resource management and water sharing in the Eastern Himalayan Rivers. The present volume is yet another step in that direction.

DI

Foreword

Perspecttues on fuLrth Asra is a product of a collective inlflatlve called South Asia Dialogues, undertaken by eminent men and women in the subcontinent desirous of making South Asia a peaceful and cooperative reg;ion. Spanning a perlod of seven years from lggl to 1992, the South Asia Dlalogues brought together some of the best minds in the regton with a common concer:n and vtsion. This volume presents a compendium of selected papers presented at these five dlalogues, containing A basketful ofideas, concepts and concrete propositions. If these are adopted and pursued by those who operate the levers of political power that will determine the destiny of over 1.3 billion people in South Asia, it could transform the region through a shared endeavour for peace, progress and development. The hope is to realise a collective vision of creaflng a South Asian community in the flrst decade of the 2lst century. The efforts of the CPR and its partners in this movement will be amply rewarded if this hope is fulfilled. The South Asian Dialogue was made possible by sustained flnancial support from the Ford Foundaflon, New Delhi. As usual the Ford Foundation was not involved in tlle structure or organisation of the Dialogue. The country coodinators who were involved in designing and organising these Dialogues were Prof. Rehman Sobhan at Centre for policy Dialogue, Dhaka, Dr. Devendra Raj Panday at the Nepal South Asia Centre, Kathmandu, Dr. Mubashir Hasan at itre Independent Planning Commission, Lahore and prof. Kingsley de Silva at International Centre for Ethnic Studies, Colombo. The contribution of the Ford Foundation and of

acknowledged.

these eminent persons of South Asia is

gratefullv

At the CPR, Dr. Navnita Chadha Behera took considerable pains to put together the present volume. CpR recopds its deep appreciation of her contribution to this llnal volume.
Centre Jor PolicV Research

New Delhi March 2OOO

V.A. PAI PANANDIKER President

The Contributors

Khaled Ahmed, is an educationist and intellectual who joined the foreign service ofPakistan, resigning in ttre l970s. He has worked extensively as a journalist in the Nafioru as Chief Editor, F-rontier Post and is now Executive Editor of the Ftidry Titls. He is a frequent participant in international conferences on matters of national security.
Anlsuzzaman, is Professor of Bengali, at Universit5r of Dhaka. He has authored many books in Bengali and English tncludtng Musltr* Manas O Bangla Sahitga (Dhaka, f 964), Swanrper Sandhane (Dhaka, 19751, Purono Bangla Gadga (Dhaka, 1984), Factory Correspondence and Other Bergali Docurnerrts in the Indin Ofice l;ibrarg and Records (l,ondon, 198 I), Creahuitg, ReaIiU ondldenfitU (Dhaka, 1993), Crrltural Plwalism (Calcutta, 1993) and ldentitg, Religion and" Recent History (Calcutta, 1995). He has been a recipient of the Bangla Academy.award for research (1970) and the Ekushe Padak, an award given by the state, for his contribution to education (1983). He was a Member of the Planning Commission to the Government of Bangladesh during the Iiberation rtrar and is currently the president of the Bangla
Academy.

Shabana Azml,

is a well-known film personality and a

uul

The Contributors

social and human rights activist. She has acted in both Indian and international films. She has won several awards for her socially meaningful roles in Indian Cinema. presentlv, she is also a member of the RaJya Sabha, Upper Hotrse Lf the Indian Parliament.

Navnlta Chadha Behera, is Assistant Research Dlrector, Women in Security, Conflict Management and peace
{WISCOMP) based at FoundaUon for Universal Responsibility, New Delhi. She completed her doctoral studies at University of Kent at Canterbury (U.K.) and was an Assistant Research Professor at Centre for Policy Research from Ig94 to lgg8. She has published several research papers in edited volumes

and academic Journals in India and abroad, Dr. Behera is co-author of Begond. Bor;ltdaries: A Report on tte State oJ Non-Offrcial Dialogues on Peore, Seatrytg anil Cooperation in South Asicr" published by University of Toronto, Canada, 1997 and hcr forthcoming book is State, Iden@ and.Violence: Jammu, Kashmir and" Lo.dakh (Manohar Publishers).
Durga llrasad Bhandarl, is Professor of English at Tribhuvan

University, Kathmandu. He has been Head of the Department, English, Tribhuvan Universit5r, Executive
Director, Centre for Nepal and Asian Studies and President of Nepal Universitj Teachers' Association. He has also been a Visifing Scholar at Tokyo University and Sardar patel University in India. Dr. Bhandari has contributed numerous articles to popular and professional journals on literature, culture, education, politics and society.

Pran Chopra, a former Editor of The Stotesman, served as Chief News Editor of All India Radio and Editorial Director of the Press Foundatlon of Asia. He is presently a newspaper columnist and Honorary Professor with the Centre for policy
Research.

Radhtka Coomaraswamy, BA [Yale), JD (Colombia), LLM (Harvard). She serves on the Board of Directors of the

Tle Contributors
International Centre for Ethnic Studies, Sri Lanka and is United Nations Special Rapporteur on Violence against
Women.

Dcv RaJ Dahal, is Associate Professor at the Central DepArtment of Political Science, Tribhuvan University'
Kathmandu. He is also an Executive Member of Coalition for Acilon on South Asian Cooperation (CASAC) and of Nepal South Asia Centre, Kathmandu. Mr. Dahal is the author of numerous articles and books on subjects such as governance, development, decentralZation and civil society.

K.M. de Stlva, Ph.D. (London), D.Litt (London) is Executive Director. International Centre for Ethnic Studies, Sri Lanka and former Professor of Sri Lanka History, University of Peradeniya, Sri Lanka.

Meghra Guhathakurta, is a Professor and Chairperson,

Department of International Relations at University of Dhaka. She is the Associate Editor of tte JournaL oJ Socirtt Studies, published by the Centre for Social Studies, Dhaka. She has contributed numerous articles in journals, edited volumes and newspapers and has authored and edited several books in English and Bengali. Her major publications include The Politics oJ British Aid Policg Formatinn : tle Case oJ Brttish Aidto Bottgtadcsh, 1972-1986, SAARC BegondState Centric Cooperutian Nari Rastro Motadorslo NVomen, State and Ideolog|,.N ari: Protinidhitta O Rqjniti Nvomen: Representation and Potitics), Comparatiue Feminist Perspectiue, and Liuing on the Mge: Essags on tte Chittagong HiLI Tracts.

Mubashir Hasrim, is an engineer, author, political leader and peace promoter between India and Pakistan. He is a frequent contributor to national newspapers of his country. He was arrested and jailed by all the military dictators of
Pakistan.

Nazrul Islam, is Professor of Geography at the University of Dhaka and Director ofthe Centre for Urban Studies, Dhaka.

The Contributors

He has also taught at the Asian Institute of Technologr, Bangkok. Fiis major publications include Dhaka Metropohtatt Ftinge Land and. Housing Deuelopment, UpgradtE a Slum in Dhaka, Urban l-and. Manage\rrcnt in Banglad.esh, The IJrbon Poor in Bangladesh and Urban Research in Bangladesh He is Editor of Bangladesh Urban" Studres, Dhaka Universitg Shrdrles in Bengali, and member of Habitat International's Board of Directors. Currently; he is the Chairman of the Board of Dhaka Water and Sewerage Authority (WASA). Roushaa Jahan, a literary scholar, researcher and women's rights activist, graduated frorn the universities of Dhaka and Chicago and taught at the University ofDhaka. As a cofounder and former President of Women for Women, the

first

autonomous women's research organization in

Bangladesh and the vice-president of Bangladesh Mahila Parishad, she has been a part ofthe dynamic and continuous process of the Bangladesh and international women's movement for the last three decades. She is the author of numerous books and articles on the position of women in education, employment, culture and movement. Her publications include Sultana's Dream and Selections Jrom the Secluded Ones {New York : The Feminist Press, lg88).

Asma Jahanglr, is a most prominent and internationally famous human rights activist of Pakistan. She was a cofounder of the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan and served irs its secretary-general and chairperson for slxyears. Known to young and old as Asma, a target for the obscurantist forces, she is a valiant fighter for the rights of women, both in courts and in public. At present she is United Nations Rapporteur for Human Rights.

Slrima Klrlbamune, B.A. (Ceylon), M.A. fCeylon), Ph.D. (London), is Senior Research Fellow, International Centre
for Ethnic Studies, Kandy, Sri Lanka and former Professor of History, University of Peradeniya, Peradeniya, Sri Lanka. V.A. Pal Panandlker, Ph.D. University of Michigan, Ann

Tte Cont'ibutors
Arbor, U.S.A., has been President and Chief Executive of the Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi since 1973. Earlier he was Special Of{icer in the Ministry of Finance and was associated with the Government of India as Chairman, Population Policy Committee, Planning Commission and as Chairman of the Expenditure Commission's Committee on Industry. In 1997, he was appointed by the Prime Minister as member of the Group of Eminent Persons on SAARC.

international academlc and cultural institutions, he is also a Life Trustee of the Population Foundatlon of India and the International Centre, Goa. Dr. Pai Panandiker is the author of more than 24 books, a large number of research reports and sweral articles in prominent English language dailies in the country. Dcvcndra RaJ Paaday, is a former finance secretary and finance mlnlster of Nepal. Currently' he is engaged in civil soclety acttvities related to the promotion of democracy, development and reglonal cooPeration' He is associated, among other insututions, with the Nepal South Asia Centre' Kathmandu, Rural Self-Reliance Development Centre, Kathmandu, Forum of Democratic Leaders-Asia/Pacific, Seoul, and Transparency International, Berlin. In additlon, Dr. Panday ls the author and editor of a number of articles and books on the poliUcal economy of Nepal' its democratic development, good governance, corruption, and regional
cooperatlon,

A member on the Boards of several national and

G.II. Pclrk, Ph.D. (Cambridge), Professor of

GeograPhy,

University of Peradeniya, Peradeniya, Sri Lanka and Senior Research Fellow, lnternational Centre for Ethnic Studtes' Kandy, Srl Lanka.

Atlur Rahman, is a Senior Research Fellow & Chief' Human Resource Division at Bangladesh Institute of Dwelopment Studies (BIDS), Dhaka. He has been a Visiting Professor at

The Contributors

Universtty of Manitoba. Dr. Rahman is also a Fellow, at Centre for Pollcy Dialogue and Editor of EcoJtle, an environmental Journal since 1995. He has participated in more than two hundred national and fifty internaflonal workshops and semlnars. He has authored and edited eighteen books in Engltsh and Bengali. His maJor publications include Beel Dakalia : Tle Enulronmentol Consequernes oJ o. Deuelopment Dtsaster Demond. and, Marketing Aspects oJ Groneen Bank : A Closer Look, Political Ecornmg oJSAARC and Peasants and Classes : A Shtdg in Di;fferentlation in Bongladestt
leading lntellectual of Pakistan for liberal and peoples' causes. H6 was chief editor of the group of newspapers that lncluded Pakistan ?imes and Imroze. I A Rehman is Director of the Human R:lghts Commission of Pakistan and Chairman of Paldstan-lndla Peoples'Forum for Peace and Democracy.
S.W.R. de rL Samaraslnghe, Graduated in Economics from the University of Sri Lanka, Peradeniya, Sri L,anka (1g67)

of London and Commonwealth Development Fellow at

University of Lethbrldge, Post.Doctoral Fellow at University

I.A. Rehman, is a well-known journalist and

and holds a Ph.D. in Economics from St. John's College, University of Cambrtdge, England (1980). While functioning as Director of the International Centre for Ethnic Studies, he continues to be a member of the Facult5r of the University of Ttrlane, New Orleans, l.ouisiana. He is Director of T\rlane Institute of International Development (TIID), Arlington, Virgfnia. Hts publications include Historical Dtctionary oJ Sri Ianka (Lond,on, 1998), Demrcratlsallon rn South Asio. The first I'UtU Years (Kandy, l9OB), Economic Dimenstons oJ Etfuric ConJlict : Internatlonal Perspecthses (London, 1997),
SecessicnJst Morrements in Comparatirse Perspctrbe (London, I 996) , and Peace Accords ond. Etluaic ConJlict(London , I 99S) .

Bccna Sarwar, is a promlnent human rights worker and peace activist of Pakistan. She is a leader of several organizations worlidng for the rights of women and children.

The Contributors

xiii

She has l'isited several countries in the cause of nuclear non-proliferation and for inrprovement of relations between India and Paldstan.

Lala RuLh Sclln, is an Assistant Professor, Department of Sculpture, Dhaka University. She is the Founding Editortn-Chief of ART, a registered quarterly Journal. She has published extensively in Journals and edited volumes and held numerous exhibiUons of her works at Shtlpakala Academy, Ban$adesh, Alliance Francaise and Institute of Fine Arts, University of Dhaka.

Bhab.nl Scn Gupta, is a leading scholar tn political science, polttical sociologr, internatlonal politics and South Asia. Author of 16 books and more than 25 chapters . in co-author' publications, he is also a leading columnist in Indian and South Asian newspapers and Journals. In his three decades of academic scholarship, he has worked at Columbla Unlversity of New York City, Jawaharlal Nehru
_

University, New Delhi and Centre for Policy Research, New Delhl. He now heads the New Delhi based Centre for Studies tn Global Change. Under the pseudon5rm of Chana$a Sen, he is the author of 35 novels in Bengali, six of which have been translated into Hindi and other Indian languages.

Rchnan Sobhan, is currently the Executive Chalrman,

Centre for Poltry Dialogue. He has held a number of important

professlonal positions, which include Member, Bangladesh Planning Commission, Director General, BIDS, Member, of the Advtsory Council of the President of Bangladesh, hesldent, Bangladesh Economic Associadon, Member, U.N. Commlttee for Dwelopment Planning, Member, Governing Councll of the U.N. University, Tolryo, Member of the Commisslon for a New Asia, Kuala l,ampur, Member of the Board of tl.e Untted Nations Research Ins tute for Social Dwelopment, Geneva, and is a Member of the Executive Committee of the International Economic Association. He has recently been elected as Chairman of the Board of Grameen Bank and is presently serving as a Member of the

The Contibutnrs

Group of Eminent Persons appointed by the SAARC Heads of State to address the future of SAARC. Professor Sobhan has published extensively. His most recent books include BarEladesh : Problems oJ Gouernance, Agrarian ReJorm and Social Trans-;brrmtion" AId Dependerrce cutd Dorar Policg: The Case oJ Tanzcnia and Toudrds aTteory oJ Gouerrwnce and. Deuelopmertt : With Lessons jFom East AsicrVtJay Tcndultar, is a well-known Marathi playwright. He began his career as a Journallst, but his Marathi plays on important social and political issues made him a wellknown flgure all over the country. As recog;nition of his contdbuflon to Indian theatre, he has received several commendatlons including the Fadma Bhushan in 1984. B.C. Vetgherc, now a Research Professor of the CPR, was formerly Press Advisor to the Hme Minister of Indta, Edttor of The lrtdian Express and ??te Hindustan Times. He is a member of the National Comrnission on Integrated Water Resources Development Plan.
Sara Zalcr, has been an actress in theatre and on televlsion since 1973. She belongs to Nagorik Natya Sampradaya, the foremost theatre group of Bangladesh and has acted ln nineteen of the group's plays for over a thousand nights. Some of the prominent international plays of these are the adaptation of Moliere's Intellechtal Ladies, Edward Albee's Evergthirrg in tlte Garden, Albert Camus's Cross Pt rpose, Bertolt Brecht's Good Womon oJ Setzuan atd Herr Arntilla and tds Man MallL Carl Zuchmayar's The Captain oJ Kopenick, Wtlliam Shakespeare's Macfuth,Irwin Shaw's Btny the Dead and Anton Chekhov's The ka Gull. Sara has also acted in

orlgtnal Bangla plays by eminent Bangla playwrights poets like Rabindranath Tagore, Syed Shamsul Huq and Humayun Ahmed and directed several plays on the stage.
Sara Zaker is Presidium member of the Bangladesh Group Theatre Federation, and Executive Committee member of the Bangladesh Centre of the International Theatre Institute and Nagorik Natya Sampradaya.

Introduction
At the commencement of the 2lst century, many in South Asia are re-discovering each other with a new outlook and a new mindset, exploring a new South Asian identity. South Asia is a well-defined geographical region with a shared social, cultural and civilizational past; but its post-colonial history, mired in inter-state conflicts, has deeply divided the region. Driven by the ideologr of nationalism, the primary goal of its post-colonial leadership waq to create natlonstates. New national borders were demarcated along with new symbols of sovereignty like separate armed forces and visa controls which looked at people across the newly created boundaries as 'alien nationals'. The search for a 'national identity' generated considerable hatred and hostility which dominates South Asia after more than 5O years. The entire nation-building project sundered the integrated social, economic, political and strategic unity perspective of the Indian subconflnent, making South Asia a unique region that "entered the 2oth century as a communit5r and leaves this century as seven nation-states divided by their historical
inheritance".
t

It was only in the 1980s that changing power equations, global economic realities and the growing voices of civil society in South Asia restored an agenda of re-creating a

nJi

Introduction

South Asian community. The end of the Cold War and the blpolar gllobal dtvide gave way to a multipolar world charactertzed by the increasi:ng power and influence of regional groupings over nation-states. With the formation of trading blocs like the European Union (EU), NAFTA and APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation) and the creation of global instltutlons like WTO (World Trade OrganizaUon), forging regional alllances was rrot a matter of chorce.
SAARC (South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation) was born in 1985 but has not been a pace-setter in changtng

the poltilcal or social dlmamics of intra-regional relations. As the polttical leadership failed to meet the challenge, civil soclety began to take the initiative in forging links and communication channels at the people-to-people level. Several developments within the region have facilitated this task.

With all seven states set on the path of economic liberallzatlon, market forces are "overtaking ttre state as an arbiter of intra-South Asian econornic relatons".2 The private sector is a new catalyst for change. Conscious of the enormous potenilal of intra-regional trade and the increasing . importance of regfonal economic blocs in global trading, private enterprise and business associations are setting the pace in transforming regional relationships and establlshing an institutional framework for regional coopera on and networklng. In May 1997, bypassing the national
governments, FPCCI (The Federaflon of Paldstan Chambers of Commerce and Industry) agreed to give preference to Indian buslnessmen for imports and FICCI (The Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry) agreed to evaluate Pakistani bids before importing goods from any other countr5r.s Significantly, informal trade between India and Palrdstan far exceeds the formal trade, and in the case of India and Bangladesh, the two are evenly balanced. Illicit trade is serviced by an increasingly efficient informal capital market, operating outside the purview of the monetary

Inffirrction
authorities; it not only flnances $2 to 3 btllion worth of intra-regional transactions in goods and services but also lntegrates capital markets spanning West and South Asla'4 Ltkewise. the labour markets of South Asta are being integrated 'far beyond the understanding and lndeed the poltttcal tolerance of their respective Home Mlnlsters"'s The large-scale llliclt movements of people across borders, in search of better ltvelthood, have undercut the barriers of national boundaries' Cross-border trafltcking in women and children, the smuggltng of arms and drugs, and most imPbrtant, the
spill-over of ethnic conflicts causing huge outllows of refugees such as Tamils from Sri lanka into India, Bhutanese refugees into Nepal, Chakmas from Bangladesh into India, Afghan refugees into Pakistan and so on have exposed the porosity of state boundaries that cut across communities, tribes and ethnic groups, Likewise, the three maJor river systems-the Indus, Ganga and the Brahmaputra-divided between India, Paliistan, Nepal and Ban$adesh have resulted in disputes over water-sharing. Such transnational problems defu national solutions and should comtriel the concerned governments to develop regional management strategies. The communicatlons revolution has also challenged the notion of state sovereignty including the power to control radio waves and television sigpals within a na on's borders' Thts has drastically undercut the governments' monopoly control over information flows. The ability of the media to reach beyond naUonal frontiers and across the $obe has far-reaching implications for transforming national identltles that may no longer remaln a 'preserve of the national governments'. It cannot be treated as a'sacrosanct given", either as an abstracted, unified identity for the cultural, ethnic and linguistic diversities within a nation or by ftnng in a rigid fashion, relationships between "imagined (national) communities".6 A second lmplication is that people in South Asia are learning about each other through satellite channels,

xrJui

Infodlrction

critical role in exposing the people to diverse viewpoints and brealdng down myths about the exclusivity of naflonal
identifles.T

broadcasts and the nature of programming_mostly "cultural", with a llttle time devoted to foreign policy ancl regional security issues-the satellite medium ts playing a

independent of governmental control. Desptte limitations of reach as compared with terrestrial televlsion, tl.e quality of

The emergence and robust growth of NGOs across the South Asian reglon has opened a mul tude of communication channels, at the grassroots level, on a broad spectrum of lssues ranglng from gender, chdld labour and human rights to ecologr, agrtculture and sclence and technologr. Several NGOs like the South Asia Women's Forum, South Asla People's Action Network and Souttr Asia people's Ecologr Network are playtng an active role in civic mobiltzation and public advocacy and tn organizing acuvities across national boundaries in these areas. The last decade also witnessed a spurt in non-offlcial dialogues among signiflcant elements of the body politic in South Asia.8

It was against such a backdrop that the idea of a South Asta Dialogue was irftiated in 1990. Patterned on the Pugwash conferences, ttre baslc obJective of the dialogue was to lnfluence public opinion and policy for creating the

regional consclousness and develop a South Asian community. It was hoped that the "nationals" of India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal and Sri Lanka would, as a result of this exercise, become "$outh Asians". The Dlalogue participants were intended to ibe those once part of the opinion building process of the region, committed to improvlng the general political atmosphere in the subcontinent and willing to work to realtze that goal. The organizatlon in each country entrusted with convening the Dialogue was non-governmental, non-profit making and commanded respect in their respective countries.

riecessary political and social mflieu to forge a South Asian

Intrduction

xtx

The flve lnstltutlons involved were the Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi, India, the Centre for Policy Dtalogue,

Dhaka, Bangladesh, The Nepal South Asia Centre,

Kathmandu, the Independent Planning Commission, lahore, Pakistan and the Internatlonal Centre for Ethnic Studtes, Colombo, Sri Lanka. The South Asia Dialogue has evolved over seven years from l99l to 1997. The first Dialogue was held at the Centre for Pollcy Research in New Delhi, India in 1991, the second in Kandy, Sri t anka in 1992, the third in Lahore, Pakistan in 1993, the fourth in Kathmandu, Nepal in 1994 and the fifth in Dhaka, Ban$adesh in 1997.

The participants in the first Dialogue, which was

deliberately left unstructured. sought to understand each other better and searched for ways and means by which more posltive lmages of each other might be created wlthln South Asia through constructive media coverage to control as well as prevent conflicts, seek a resolution of political and identity cleavages withln nations, and build confldence and trust among South Asians. The second Dialogue focussed on speciflc themes like the South Asian experience in coping with structural adJustments and economic liberaltzation

policies, confllct resolution, and the process of democratlzation in South Asia. The third Dialogue was

dwoted to explorlng a new vision for South Asia and stressed the need to build a South Asian identity based on common values rooted in historical, cultural, social, ethnic and civilizatlonal traditlons. The fourth dialogue discussed strategies for strengthening democracy and empowerment in South Asia including institutionalizauon of the democratic process, electoral reforms, decentralization of power, upholding human rights and the rule of law. The fffth and concluding South Asia Dialogue sought to explore South Asia's cultural personality and notlons of communi\r inherent in the value systems shared by people in thls region. It focussed on how creative imagination in South Asia has addressed themes of social justice and human rights, women

Inffitrction
ln society and fundamentalism and communallsm through various art forms includlng theatre, literature, the electronic medla, clnema, patnting, sculpture, dance and music.
Thls volume puts together 28 out of 83 papers presented and to that extent, may not do Justice to ttre extraordlnary range ofsubJects, ideas and perspectives shared by Dtalogue partlclpants, We do hope, howwer, that by placing the ' results of this collectlve endeavour in the public domain, it will become an Input in national and regional debates on confllct resoluflon and dweloprnental cooperatlon. The volume ts dtvtded tnto ffve parts. Part One presents an alternatlve vlslon of South Asia arUculated by the civil soclety that ls rooted ln the common lnherltance of hlstory, culture and social ethos and driven by a shared imaglnation of the people of the reglon. Mubashir Hasan criticizes the imperialist legacies, particularly the divisive tdeologr of nationalism and top-down structures of governance and argues that a new vision of South Asia must redeftne nationalism, remodel state structures and adopt new political, social and economic agendas in a truly democratlc set-up. Devendra RaJ Panday examines the conflictual dimensions of South Asian history and outlines the guldelines of a'New Order in South Asta' including the need to tap internal resources, de-ltnking natlonalist ideologies from religion and redeflnlng 'security' ln term$ of human security, that is, a nation's capaclty to fulfll its diverse needs and aspiraflons rather than such military strength. In Bhabani Sen Gupta's paper, a detatled analysis of lntra-state and inter-state conflicts ts followed by a discussion of conflict resolution strategles. He advocates that South Asian governments colnmlt themselves to seven inviolable principles that should govern thelr btlateral and regional relations. The next paper deals wlth three related and vitally important issues of

politicized ethnicity and conflict resolution, problems of human rtghts and environmental issues. K.M. de Silva, in the first part, addresses the international, national and

Introdttction
sub-national conflicts rooted in social' economic and political problems. The resulting violation of human rights by are analysed lovernments, opposition and separatist forces Coomaraswamy in the second part' G'H' Petris by Radhika

discusses the political conflicts emanating from

envlronmental degradation, particularly the mismanagement of natural resources and increasing population pressure and debates the possibilities and limitations of available opuons for protecting the environment in the region' Khalid Ahmed stresses the need to save the SAARC process defined as a thought process militating against the ideologr of natlonalism ttrat has kept the region divided. The SAARC mind, according to him, provides an alternative intellectual construct of South Asian civilization' visualizing a regional sovereignty rather than a cluster of conflicttng national sovereignfles. Durga Prasad Bhandari explores the shared values of the South Asian region expressed through the medium of theatre, painting, literature and television from a Nepalese perspec ve' Vijay Tendulkar delves into ttre same theme and highlights the shared social ethos, experienced in his personal interactions with Muslims.

the South Asian states. These were, mostly, a collective

endeavour from each country and a critique of their respecflve

Part TWo of the volume presents five countr5r reports from

countries' policles in political, economic, social and foreign policy arenas, presented at the First Dialogue. While the Indian and Nepalese country reports have been revised' the Pakistani, the Bangladeshi and the Sri Lankan country reports appear in their original form and should be, therefore' read for their contemporary historical value'

In Part Three, Asma Jahangir examines the threats to

democracy especially from religious fundamentalism. She acknowledges the leading role and contribution of judicial activism in democratizing society in many South Asian countries and argues in favour of parliamentary activism that may open new doors to fresh ideas and encourage

Introdtrction

socleties. Pai Panandiker identiftes violence and corruption as two key problems threatening the sanctity of the Indian electoral process. He recommends state funding for elecuons and dlscusses alterna ve mechartisms for controlling election flnances. AUur Rahman and Dev RaJ Dahal present a detailed analysis of experiments in decentralization and local self_ government in Ban$adesh and Nepal respectively.

greater popular participation. I.A. Rehman examines pressures on the political systems of the South Asian countrles from ethnic demands, religious ideologies and ideological challenges to democracy in India, pakistan and Bangladesh. He concludes with the need to strengthen poliucal lnstituUons and processes in the respective civil

In Part Four, on human rights, Meghna Guhattrakurta argues that gender-based violence is related structurally to patriarchical norms in society and shows how religious fundamentaltsm, trafflclidng in women and children and ethnlc violence lmpact on women's rights as human rights. She also addresses the issues of ethnic and minority rtghts, state coerclon_ and freedom of speech. Anisuzzaman deals with the lssue of socialjusflce and human rlghts as reflected in Bangladeshi llterature over ddcades. The following three papers by B.G, Verghese, Beena Sarwar and I.A. Rehman analyse the working of the legal $ystems in South Asia with special reference to Indla and paltistan respecflvely and how spectal acts for comba ng lnsurgency impinge on the human rtghts of mtnortty groups. Another common thread tn these papers lies in promottng the role of NGOs in taldng up the cause of human rights. However, while Verghese feels that 'the naUonalism and sovereignty are still not obsolete., Rehman ls critlcal of the attempts to stall a reglonal view of hurhan rights "by raising the bogey of sovereignty-, Sarwar and Rehman call for setting up a reglonal court under a South Asian Human Rights Charter.
The runnlng theme of part Five on women and culture refers to traditional stereotyped images of the female, rooted

Introduction

in the patriarchical societies of South Asia, as deptcted by

male artists and writers over the years. The female authors, on the other hand, reject male-imposed gender-divisions and advocate the 'untenability of social expectations from women to conform to gender norms at all costs and the need for new ground rules for gender relations and basic soclal insUtutions and structures".s Lala Rukh Selim delves into the subJect by discussing Novera Ahmed's art-the flrst woman who made her mark in the modern art movement in Bangladesh. Roushan Jahan discusses the themes and perspec ves of Bangladeshi women wri ng-ln poetry and fiction-the differences in their world-view, the awareness of the context in which they are located and the attitude to prevalent gender ideolory. In Shabana Azmi's paper, stereotyped portrayals of Indian women in Hindi cinema are followed by a discussion on the parallel, new wave cinema that situate women in real life conditions as social beings and not as 'obJects of display or servile, statc creatures".

Likewise, Sara Zaker outlines the typical attributes of Nageekr1 the heroine of cinema and television serials in Bangladesh, and puts forward some sug;estlons to reconstruct this image. Strima Kiribamune looks at how premodern Sri Lankan creative artists have addressed the issue of the position of women in society. Nazrul Islam presents a broad proflle of artists in all South Asian countries who have deplcted themes of women in society, socialJustice and human rig;hts, communalism and fundamentalism in dtfferent art forms,
The congenial atmospherics of the South Asian region in 1999 by the Kargil war between India and Pakistan and by several subsequent developments. The promlse of a South Aslan community which looked almost possible has received a setback. It is quite obvious that the wlelders of poltttcal power in South Asia are not yet ready for peace and cooperation in the region. The legacy of the two-natlon theory which partitioned the Indian subcontinent
were badly bruised

xnv

Introdrrction

still haunts South Asia. As a result South Asia remains divlded. Suspicion and mistrust rule the region, adding untold misery to the lives of over 1.3 billion people.
The volume therefore is essentially a perspective and partly a vision for South Asia. A more extensive vision document was prepared in 1998 by the Group of Eminent Persons (GEP) appointed by the heads of South Asian Governments. Together and perhaps with the help of other efforts in the region, South Asia w'ill again come together. Thls volume is an expression of such a hope.
We wish to acknowledge the cooperatlon received from

the contributors for revising their papers and especially record our appreciation of the generous assistance of tJre
country coordinators and the five participating lnstitutlons in the completion of this work. At the CPR, we especially record our deep apprecia on ofthe tireless support from the Chief Librarian, Mr. Kamal Jit Kumar and his colleagues. Also to Mr. Pramod Malik, Mrs. Vinodini Ramachandran, Mrs. Sarala Goplnathan and Mrs. Radhika Srinivasan who laboured meticulously over word processing and to Mrs. Suhasini Ramaswamy for painstakingly editing the manuscript. The book could not have been published in such a short time without the tireless work put in by the excellent team work of Konark Publishers.
V.A. PAI PANANDIKER NAVNITA CFIADFIA BEHERA

Intro&lctlon
ENDNOTES This integrated community had emerged out of the imperial
reach of the Mughal empire and was further consolidated by the British Rqi especially over the areas under its control. Rehman Sobhan, Redisauering o South Asian Commwitg: Civil fuciety in Search oJ Its FLture, Monograph Serles: Civil Society No. 2, International Centre for Ethnic Studies' 1997'

p.2.
2.

Ibd., p. r3.

3. Economic Tbnes, 4 May 1997. 4. Sobhan, op. cit., pP. 16-I7. 5. 6.

Ibid.,p. 17.
Technologr", an unpublished paper presented at the IndoAustralian Public Poliry Conference, 23-24 October 1996'
New Delhi.

Bhaskar Ghose, 'Cultural Diversity, Media and New

7.

'Popular Interactlons

in South Asia: A

Post-Modernist

Agenda" in Iftkekharuzzrnan, (ed.), People-to-People Contacts rn South Asic, New Delhl: Manohar Publishers, forthcoming. For a detailed account of such dialogues, see, Navnita Chadha Behera, Paul M. hans and Gowher Rizvi, BegondBotndarEs: A Report on te State oJ Non-Offici.al Dialogues on Peace' *atri@ otd Cnperation in SouthAsia, University of TorontoYork University, 1997.

9. Roushan Jahan,

-A Different Voice: Women Writing in this volume, P. 452. Bangladesh', in

Contents

Foretoord

Tlte Contributors

uii

Introduction

n)
PART

I VOICES OF CIVIL SOCIETY

l. 2. 3. 4.

On a New Msion for South Asia Mubashlr Hasott

A Nepali Vision of South DeuendraRg Pandag

Asia Asia

12

Conflict Resolution in South BhabaniSenGupta

36

South Asia: Politicised Ethnicity; Problems of Human Rights; and Environmental Issues K.M. de SilucL G.H. Peins and RadhlkaCoomaraswamu
Need to Save the

68

5.

Process

116

KhaledAtmted

XXDL|I

Contents

6.

Politlcal Process and Institutions in South LA. Rehman

Asia

L23

7, \\e

Shared Imagination and Cooperation in South Asia: Nepalese Perspective DwgaPrasadBhandari.

148

8.

Muslims and I Vljag'lendrnkar PART 2

r62

COUNTRY REPORTS

9.

The Indian Polity in PranChopra

'Crisis"

l8l
2OO

10. Country Report on Pakistan

PakistaniDelegation

ll.

Country Report on.Bangladesh RehmanSobhan

Post- l99O

219

12. The State of Governance in

Deuendra Rqj Pandag

Nepal

233

13. Sri lanka-Country Paper 1992

K.M. de Silua and S.I./IR. de A. Samorosirghe

257

PART 3

DEMOCRACY AND POLITY 14. Fostering Democracy

AsmaJahrngir

15. Problems

of the Electoral Frocess and Election

Funding ln India V.A. Pai Panondiker

Conlents

16.

Power to the People: A Case of Decentralization

in

Nepal

3lO

DeuRcg DaIMI

17. Decentrallzatton and Development: The

Bangladesh Experience Atiur Rahmcut 337

PART 4

HUMAN RIGHTS
18. Human Rights and the Rule of Law in
Bangladesh MegtataGuhatlwklrrta 353

19.

Social Justice and Human Rights: Refleeflons

in

Bangladesh Literature
Anisuzzaman't

2O. Human Rights and the Rule of Law

B.G. Verghese

384

21.

Strcngthening Democracy in South Asia: The Role of Human Rlghts and Rule of Law BeenaSarwor
South Asian Perspective on Human Rights and Environment LA. Rehman

4O7

22.

416

PART 5

WOMEN AND CULTURE 23.

Women in the Contemporary Art World of Bangladesh: Images and Reality

427

kiaRukhSelim

Contents

24.

A Dtfferent Voice: Women Writing in

Bangladesh
Rottsho.nJahott

439

25. Images of Women in Hindi Cinema: PostShobana-Azmi 26. The Image of Women on TV and

l95Os

454

Cinema Art Women

462

Sarahker
27. Images of the Female tn Sri Lankan
Sirima-

468

Kirbamute
479

28. Contemporary South Asian Art and Naznldlslam

INDE)(

485

PART

VOICES OF CTWLSOCIETY

On a New Vision for South Asia

Mubashir Hasan

PART

Our Imperlalist Legacy

South Asia
s

way of looking at itself stands deeply infested,

in structure and content, with the culture of imperialism. The long and arduous encounter between the two
civilisations-Westem and South Asian-was total: political, economic, social and ideological. We were enslaved, looted and disintegrated as well as 'educated' and 'civilised'. In resisting imperialism South Asia itself got 'imperialised'.

TWo exceedingly harmful consequences

imperialisation of South Asia have been:

of the
it had

1. Our adoption of the ideologr of nationalism as

evolved in t}le leading capitalist, expansionist and imperialist

natlons, and

2. Our failure to change tJ:e structure of governance devised by the imperialist rulers with the obj ective of subjugating, exploiting and ruling over conquered peoples.

Perspectiues on Soufh Asra

Natlonallsm
To confront the imperialist power or to avall ourselves of tJle opportunitles its dornination offered, or both, we aped the West as well as reslsted it, A section of tlle elite convinced itself that the way to progress and power was to acquire western weaponry, knowledge, technologr, culture and so forth. The other section among the ette convinced itself that the best course to fend off the imperialist domination was to rej ect its civilisation and the kind of modemisaflon it offered.

Labelled 'fundamentalists' and without much political influence, until recently, they advocated a return to the purity of the original religious faiths.

It was only natural that the leaders of our twentieth century independence movements should get converted to the Western ideologr of "nationalism", to fight colonialism and imperialism, They adopted the ideologr with all its basic tenets and trappings such as 'national destiny', 'national sovereignty','national will','national economy','national flag', anthem, heroes, martyrs, holidays, birth registers and the like'. In the name of the naflon-state, their new political relig[on of nationalism laid claim to the highest loyalties of their citizens on the model of the loyalties claimed by the medieval Christian Church from its laity.
The section that simultaneously cooperated and confionted imperialism built for itself immense political power. At the head of the movements for independence, it inherited the reins of the government upon the departure of the colonial ruler.

Self-determlnation
The doctrine of nationalism also mealt that a new nationstate had the right to covet and to acquire any geographical area which in its opinion was inhabited by people of its own nafionality. Thus our struggle for independence got ftactured into several strugles.

On a N etu V rsionJor

outh As ia

The several nation-states of South Asia that came lnto being, as a result of the departure ofthe British, contained in their polities one section or more of the population which had nationallstic aspirations of its own. Adoption of the doctrine of nationalism by ethnic groups and other aspirants to sovereign status in specific geographical areas was only a matter of time. The results have been truly disastrous. Since 1947, the changes in tlle political map of the subcontlnent, emd demands for further changes have been unceasing. Our geographically intermingled communities which had learnt to live in relative peace w'ith one another have been rent asunder with horrific losses of life and property and disruption of social and psychic equanimity. The exercise of the right to determine their own future political siatus by the people of a terrltorial unit, has become a maj or source of antagonisms.

Impertalist Governance
The leadership of the newly emerged states who became helrs to the British Raj embraced the stmcture of the state built by the imperialists. Thousands upon thousands of laws, rules and regulations along with the state apparatus consisting of imperial civil and military establishments and secret agencies devised by the British to rule over subject peoples were fully adopted. Several 'New Delhis' came into being. We chose to foreclose our options to do away with the distincton between the governors and the governed, as was justly required to liberate the newly independent polities. In many important areas, such as that of the treatment of minorifles, women and other weaker sections of the society, political battles continue to be waged over ttre entire subconfinent, on the old pattern of "British versus Indian" long after the departure of the British. The states of South Asia conflnue to nurture the gulf, with all its multifarious antagonisms, that had separated the British rulers from its
subJects.

Perspectiues on Soufr Asra

'Those who have waged or are waging struggles, some inciptenUy, others flagrantly, in the name of autonomy, national self-determinaUon or even independence have especially been meted out the imperialist treatment by the newly empowered states of South Asia. The metropolises of our newly emerged naUon states know nothing better than to curb. indeed to crush wi r an iron fist, tt1s a gitating aspirants, as did London, paris, Madrid, Amsterdam or Lisbon to the freedom fighters in their colonies. There is little effort, today, to understand the nature of their struggle. To Justi$z ttre violence perpetrated by 'national' power there is always the appeal to 'national interests'.

After Independence, the ruling elites of the new nationstates frequently manifested towards their neighbours the aggressive traits associated with the political culture of imperlalism.
The new nation-states have not hesitated to mount hostile propaganda campaielns agatnst each ot_her spreading fear and hatred. They have imposed cultural boycotts, restrictions on trade, travel and flow of information, and have applied economlc sancdons. They have accused each other of hegemonic designs. They have indulged in acts of subversion and sabotage and of aiding the secessionists and have interfered with the flow of river waters. They have acquired territory by force and have gone to wars for reasons quite unlike those in the previous history of the sub-continent.

'Us'aad'Tlrey'
The structure of governance of the subcontinent was devised by tl e British to rule over a subJect people. It was based, firstly, on the assumption that the .natives', who are 'inferior and uncivilised', have to be subjected, controlled and ruled. Their resources and labour have to be exploited; and secondly the almost 'divine' distinction between 'us' and 'they'-the ruler and the ruled*has to be maintained. After

On aNew VtsionJor

fufihAsirr

the departure of the British, those who inherited the power of the Raj became tJle new 'us' and the ruled continued to remain'theY'. Today, ftfty-two years after Independence, in Pakistan, India and Bangladesh, the employees of the government, especially in the departments of the police, revenue, judiciary, irrigatlon, forests, income-tax, customs and those in the military and mtglstracy' constitute a category which has a long tradition of antagonistic relationship with the overwhelming majority of ttre population. The dawn of Independence in the sub-continent has done little to alter ttre relationship between the occupants of the 'chair' and the people.

Culture of Vlolence
Perhaps the most distressing social and political feature of the societies of South Asia today is violence-which prevails ever5rwhere at individual and state levels. Direct and indirect violence by citizens, individually and collectively, is rampant in the form of spates of murders and dacoities and crimes against women; a horrendous toll of millions of avoidable deaths of infants and children and of women during childbirth; and as manifestation of extreme poverty in the form of unemployment; malnutrition, child labour, etc.-besides violence for political causes.

It is true that the very odstence of the state means an assemblage of armed physical coercive power. What disunguishes the behaviour of civilised states from others is the application of the coercive power without being immoderate, cruel, or brutal, and without infringing upon ttre legal rights it delineates for its citizens' The successors of the Brttish have perpetuated the mode with all the violence that constituted its essential ingredient. At the receiving end are the people-hundreds of millions of them. Insecure, malnourished, ill and saturated with the fear of brute

Perspectiues on South Asra

strength, violence is their only recourse and hatred their only wealth.
The forms ofinstitution: t.ized violence in the states of South Asia are: widespread incarceration and torture in police stafions, Jails, and interrogation centres besides brutal acts by police, para-military and rnilitary formations agatnst

agitating tribes,. rioting mobs, radical leftists, protesting labour, and against militants demanding or deemed to be demanding a share in political power in the form of autonomy or sell_ determination. The burgeoning budgets of tJre police and military, are a proof, if one is needed, that the situation is getung worse, year by year.

Nothing can reinforce the urge to destroy through violent action the 'image of ttreir common degradation', better than the sanction of the religion. Thus, to the list of various grounds for violence-autonomy, self_determination, ethnicit5r, class struggle or plain injustice_gets added those for caste, sect and religion. The leaders ofthe independence movements had propagated that rvith national freedom shall dawn an era free from econornic deprivation and social oppression. Five decades have passed and the promised era ofpeace, prosperlty, equity andjustice has yet io dawn. As a monstrous reaction to tJ e prevailing state of material and spiritual deprivation, large sections of frustrated populations bind ttremselves to scrupulous observation of the rites of thelr ancient faiths. Then as true faithfuls, they are ready to bomb and to kill, in the name of the faith, anvone Urev declare to be an enemy of their fa:ith.
PART 2

Baelcs of New Vislon

Surely, the coercive political, economic, and social dlspensation prevalent in our soqiety, which is accepted by some and resisted by others, the latter, by far in gpeat majority, has fallen far short of what was required for tJle

On

aNeu Vision for South Asin

liberation of our mind, the restoration of our dignity, and for the full realisation of our pre-lndependence dreams.
The prime need of South Asia is that of reorientation of the concept of nationalism as it stands adopted today by the ruling elites ofthe South Asian nations. This concept has to be redefined in such a way that it no longer breeds parochialism, arrogance, violence, bigotry, hatred and strife among its various religious, racial, and ethnic groups and does not lead to wars with neighbouring countries; that there is room in its organisation for cultural diversity, ethnic individuality and political autonomy; that one's love for one's nation-state does not correspond with one's love for its armed might; that the highly centralised state is not necessarily the claimant for the highest loyalty from its citizens; that there should be less of nationalism as a political ideologr and more of patriotism as a vehicle of peace and humanism. The most conspicuous features of the political landscape

of the nations of South Asia today are the following: 1. they are among the most economically deprived in the world; 2. theirpoliUes are endowed with racial, religious and ethnic diversity; and

theirhighly centralised and authoritarian states represent an internal imperial dispensation with a partial external component.
3.

In history'the combination of these three elements has always proved to be greatly inimical to the maintenance of peace and political stability and to economic and social
progress.

Rcmodclling State Structure

The centralised state structure of the South Asian nauons has failed to come up to the standards of civilised societies in protecting life, liberty and property ofits citizens. It is serving

lo
as a powerful tool for tJ'e economic

Perspectiues on South Asi.a

exploitation of the politically and economically weak. It has exacerbated indeed, in most cases given rise to, a sense ofdepr:ivation and ofbeing politically oppressed among ethnic, religious and other groups and minorities. This state structure has come to pose a grave threat to the integrity of the countries in Souilr Asia. It needs to be replaced. The transfer of substantial political, social and economic power from the highly centrali$ed state to smaller political and administrative units has to be accompanied by an extensive revision of the maJor laws which constitute ttre hardware that is incapable of dispensing justice and which is responsible for the maintenance of a yawning gulf between the apparatus of ttre state and the citizens. The important laws requiring revision are those pertaining to land setflement, revenue, police, jails, minerals, irigation, forests, cusroms, and immigration, besides the codes of criminal and civil procedures and so on. NewAg;endas
Whereas the extensive revision of the structure of tl.e state would only create the necessary environment for usheririg in an era ofpeace and tranquility, the actual transition to such an era would require political, social and economic agendas which are founded on peace, justice and love, and on such other cherished values which have led the world communit5r to adopt the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and its Conventions and Protocols. The main thrust of this software ofa truly democratic set-up has to be the creation ofconditions which successfully discourage if not eliminate violencekeeping in mind, always, that the prime initiator and perpetrator of violence in society is the powerful and ttre strong. Ttrere can be no peace, justice or love unless our societies

are in a position to produce wealth in sufficient measure

On aNew VisionJor South Asirr

ll

and are able to effect its distribution with some degree of equlty. Not taking part in the process of production to tfre best of their abilities is their defence to keep the powerfulthe oppressor-in their society weak, to keep him vulnerable to conquest by someone more powerful and hopefully more just. They would not be partners in making the powerful and the unJust stronger. They refuse to produce for him. Their cooperation is dependent upon their being socially and politically empowered.
For over two centuries one of the major economic problems

of South Asia has been unceasing transfer of its wealth overseas. For the powerful nations of the industrialised world it has been feasible to maintain their imperialist hold
throug;h providing support to our weak and paranoiac elites and in lieu thereof 'trade' and -aid' with ttrem on unequal

terms. To reduce the exploitative component

in

our

commercial and financial relationship with the industrialised countries, the nations of South Asia shall have to jointly evolve the correct political and economic strategies and tacucs.
PART 3

Recommendations

l. The question of reorientating nationalism needs to be further studied and researched. A new synthesis of
natlonalism and self-determina on needs to be evolved.
2. The question of remodelling the state structures needs

to be articulated.

Universal Declaration of Human Rights and of the Protocols and Conventions evolved under it can be a great contribution in bringing tJle nations of South Asia nearer to each other, in

3. In-depth studies and articulation of the

preventing wars, and

in settling disputes through

negotiations, mediation and arbitration.

A Nepali Vision of South Asia*

DeuendraRqi Pandag

I. Background
South Asia is a paradox in more than one respect, For a civilisation wolving through many millennia, it was thirteen years ago that the leaders of the seven South Asian states assembled in Dhaka to announce to the world that there is in fact such a thing called South Asia. What is more, a comfortable and constructive consensus on this question is still missing. The leaders themselves have not truly demonstrated from their actions, beyond ttre rituals and the rhetoric, that they have a faith in what they have initiated. The positlon in terms of commitrnent is generally the sarne among the intellectuals who can be expected to know better what a disunited South Asia would mean in the so-called globalising world. The enthusiasm and ttre sense of a mlssion *This essay was urrltten for the ThAd South Asia Regional Dialogue held in Lahore in 1993. Alter some editing and adapflng, an introductory sectlon and a Postscript have been added to caphrre some important developments that bear on the theme of the essay.

A Nepali Vision

o;f

South Asia

l3

and vision on South Asia are limited principally to the

groups of former diplomats, bureaucrats and other public officials together with a section of the media, who probably (or hopefully) are inspired by an urge to atone for their past sins.

The reasons for this relative somnolence is not far to seek, given the history of the South Asian peoples which is a good illustration of an experience that common civilisational experience alone is not enough to create a community. The scourge of regional conflicts today, not limited .to hostilities between India and Pakistan, is too real for any satisfaction from a romantic journey back into their magnilicent history. Even intra-state harmony is increasin$y disturbed in almost
all countries by the revitalised ethno-nationalistic aspirations, regional agenda, and the tendency of these tensions to spill

over state boundaries, with the conflict-resolution

mechanisms not properly in place. One view, therefore, has it that South Asia will always be a home for hundreds of communities, not one communit5r. The challenge, it is said, is to create a "confederation" of the communities. The spirit of such a confederation has to find its relevance, in fact, in the minds of the leadership in every pluralistic societyeven though, in reality, the image does not necessarily have to manifest itself in its structural form. It should not surprise us if tJle South Asian states have a difficulty in forging the spirit of a community among them by aggregating different aspirations at the inter-state level when they cannot do so internally within their respective territorial jurisdictions.
The traumatic history of South Asia is a story of wars and

conquests, integration and secession of territories and regimes and the partition and annexation of states before and after the British that ruled and/ or protected almost all of them till recently. In addition, it is also a story of peoples of different religions and ethnicities trying to live in peace even as this diversity is politicised and, sometimes, transoorted across territories to further compllcate the nature

t4

Perspectiues on South Asra

of the conflict, The diverse geo,strategic structures and relaflons and the conflicting domestic regime interests of the states that followed different rules of governance and
political organisations in the post-colonial period have further fed and fuelled the paradox. Amidst such trends and tendencies, the image of India as the central and dominant power of South Asia has not been a source of reassurance to the smaller states even as they are all beset with their own internal conflicts and contradictions. There may even be some apprehension that the concretisation of South Asia as a regional (which in today's world means increasingly political) community rnigfit look too much like akhrnd.Bhotat or undivided Indian sub-continent, with Delhi as ttre imperial seat of power. The region suffers from an enduring and so far the most intractable conflict between India and Pakistan. This problem has an overbearing effect on not only the bilateral relations between the disputing partes but also on the substance, priorities and direction of discorurses on South Asia. That ttrere are also incessant disputes between India and her other neighbours, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Nepal, concerning anything from trans-national ethnic tension to the sharing of river waters and influx of refugees has not helped the process. On Indo-Nepal relations, both countries are incuring higf,r costs on account of the opportunifies lost-through a period of at least five decades-in harnessing the water resources for the benefit of the people in the two countries and in the region as a whole. Given the complodty of the economics and politics of water-sharing projects, the delay may be understandable. It is not so, however, when we realise, rather inexplicably, that Nepal and India that look like the diplomatic version of David and Goliath have had unsettled border disputes for decades. On Nepal's part there is also the additional grievance that not only the Indian state but also its intelligentsia tend to take the country for granted. Even a sensible and much respected (in

Nepali. Vision oJ South Asia

t5

Nepal as well) academician-journalist like Bhabani Sengupta

occasionally forgets ttrat there is a state called Nepal (and Bhutan) in the political map of South Asia. For example, he can write, without sparing a thought for the sensibilities of these countries that, "India's national security and territorial integrity must also take account of China's power projection in South Asia where Tibet joins it with India and Xinxiang wtth Pakistan." Currently the atmosphere is further mired, of all things, by the dispute between Bhutan and Nepal. The problem arising from the entr5z into Nepal via Indian terdtory of tens of thousands of Bhutanese and their camping in refugee camps in Nepal-because of the "ethnicity" of the unwanted Utotsampas of Bhutan-can be resolved only wittr their return to where they came from. The positive aspect of India's status as a regional power can be accentuated and a South Asian spirit engendered if it permitted itself to be an impartial and constructve mediator in such matters. It would be even better if India could

appropriately inspire aII its neighbours as a "mother of democracy" in South Asia.

"regional disputes in South Asia have a tendency to self-perpetuate because they seem to possess logic and dynamics of their own." The challenge for South Asia, especially for its enlightened citlzenry, is to overcome this history and create a civic, diplomatic and political ethos that is founded on not only a shared civilisational past but also a common destiny. The differing perceptions on whether ttre South Asian states in fact share a common destiny have a bearing on the need and the contours of ttre vision we try to conjure up here. Ttrere are views-especially, again, in India and Pakistan-that run counter to this premise. ltrey have their virulent, and sometimes violent, disputes between them. But both seem to take a view that they are too important and too powerful a country to "mesh around" with the smaller and economically unattractive states in the region. It is not

It has been said that

l6

Perspectiues on Souttt Asin

appropriately appreciated that no South Asian country can truly be a part of the "globalising" world, by ignoring the possibilifies and opportunities for "regionalising" South Asia.

Any temporary gain to a cotrntry that is not a part of a broader progress that must be sought to reverse the selfdestructing dynamics as stated and to unleash the forces necessary to build a proud and prosperous South Asia cannot be lasting. History stands witness to this lesson as we recall the gains and losses to the two problematic countrles, India and Paldstan, as they flirted with their respective extra-regional sources of support in the Cold War era. No relationship can be constructive when its importance rises only when tensions flare up between e$44regional powers or superpowers. Earlier, an unintelligent interpretation of the non-aligned movement by the US establishment opened an opportunity for India to move closer to the then Soviet Union and nearly consummate what the former projected as the political image of a nonaligned country. Later, the strategic importance of India to the United States fluctuated with the progress in Sino-US relations, following the rapprochement between them since the 1970s and the growth of trade and economic relations between them since the 1980s. Pakistan has similarly benefitted from the patronage of the United States only when tlee latter found it in its interest to court that country. We know this from the experience in the 1965 war between India and Pakistan. We know this from the secession of East Pakistan 9fi,'ing birth to Bangladesh in I97I (it would have been so rewarding for South Asian solidarity and pride if Pakistan had conceded this eventuality on its own in the spirit of the "Confederation of South Asian Communities"). More recently, we know this from the ups and down in Pakistan's status as an ally of the US as required by the latter's interest in Afghanistan following the Soviet invasion and the subsequent withdrawal of its troops from there. The point is that bilateral disputes present the most

A Nepali Visbn oJSouth Asta

t7

formidable hurdle to the securit5r and progress of South Asia. The internecine quarrels within and between states are only reinforcing tJle image of South Asia as a land of perpetual poverty, ethnic tensions, civil strife and rising religious fundamentalism. The region is deemed increasingly incapable of loining ttre ranks of ottrer Asian countries as they prepare, despite their recent financial troubles, to step into the Asian century. This is an incredible situation because, after all, the region is also recognised as some of tJle largest reservoirs of technical and scientiftc minds in the world. Ttrese people have to show that ttreir technologically advanced and economically poor countries can do more than build nuclear armaments. This depends on the leaders of South Asia, the sense of their historical legacy and the vision they may carry for tJle future of their people. In the least, they need to begin anew-with a sense of

confidence and commitment rooted

in the

glorious

accomplishments of the past, the grim reality of the present, and the vast opportunities of ttre future.

tr. Need for

Vislon

may as individuals, the status of world citizens of a command,

A substantial section of the South Asian elite

sort by virtue of their professions or

personal

accomplishments, But they do not seem to always appreciate how low is the standing of each of them as a nation or a

social community

in ttre league of peoples interacting

politically and economically in the world arena. South Asia's current moral and material status in the world contrasts sharply with the glory of one of the earliest civilisations it had offered to humanity. With its population exceeding one{tfth of the world's total, the region's distinction now is emphasised only by the indifferent place it commands in the world economy and politics. The region's dubious reputation is further emphasised by its largest contribution to world poverty. Poverty protrudes its ugly face to spoil the

I8

Perspectiues on South Asia

festivities even when tJle two South Asian powers show off their prowess by forcing their way into the nuclear club to the delight of their gullible citipenry.
Yet, the statesmen of the region have not woken up to the need for a new order or a vision beyond the strategic transformation that some of them have engineered by their technological achievements and their use for weaponisation. They have not understood that ttrey must try to make a clean break with their desolate record with the use of the same technolosr for building, severally and collectively, a society that is hospitable to all peoples in the region. There seems to be a lack of appreciation that fundamentalist postures and belligerent rhetoric and actons cannot miflgate the problems crated by moral, social, political and economic erosions. Such misadventures can only reinforce the contradictions internally, and contaminate the region generally, thus threatening the peace and stability of eaCh country, albeit, in varying degrees.

It is unfortunate that, at the moment, there is not even a consensus on whether we in South Asia are a distinct and vlable community with a comrnon destiny, notwithstanding the 15 years of South Asiarr Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). This is strange especially in view of
the benign neglect ttrat each member state suffers separately

and collectively-except when they invite notice through nuclear explosions-when it comes to getting heard in the global decision-making or conflict-resolution processes. The larger countries might occasionally take satisfaction from the opportunity to participate in forums that seemingly handle global issues, but such ad hoc engagements allow little room for them to contribute as a rightful party to global governance. If we accept ourselves as a region and cooperate with one another, for example, one of us will most certainly be a permanent member of the Security Council of the United Nations when that body is expanded. WitI India and Pakistan both clalming a seat, the region may altogether

A N epali Vision oi South Asia

lose what is its rightful share.

l9

There is also a need to be clear about whether and how a South Asian order can be articulated and pursued, with the larger and more developed countries in the region expecting greater prospects for their development through integration with economically more advanced countries of the world. India's interest in association wit}l APEC is one example. This urge was defined some years ago in the call for a New

Asian Order that the then prime minister of India, P.V. Narasimha Rao, made in connecfion with his visit to Japan. Since then, India has also been participating in the ASEAN process as a partner country. I am not implying that any membership to a regional group has to be exclusive of any other regional arrangement. But the priorities should be clear. Something llke a South Asian communlty can emerge only if the first regional home of a South Asian country is a South Asian grouping. It needs to be stressed that, for all the disappointments with the organisation's performance so far, the only alternative to SAARC is a stronger SAARC.

This issue becomes more complicated when not only short-term economic but also primordial instincts similarly drive countries towards closer relationships with states outside the region. A relatively new-found extra-regional af{inity,'even if it is ostensibly based 6n 1sligi6n, can be at variance with the social, cultural, and developmental experiences as a part of what we have called shared civilisation. Pakistan, probably as a reaction to its inability to find its natural moorings where it must, contnues to court its neighbours to the west in lran, Turkey and so on, and more recently, in the newly independent Central Asian countries emerglng out of the erstwhile Soviet Union. That such propositions are themselves not free of geo-strategic instructlons is illustrated by the growing differences between Pallstan and Iran in the aftermath of the rise of the Taliban power in Afghanistan. An important consideraflon here is whether inter-state cooperation in a modern age can indeed

20

Perspectiues on South Asia

good of a country or a group of countries, when such relatlonships are bound to lack the needed political and economic cohesion. This should be a pertinent question, notwithstanding the prospective .clash of civilisations" a la Huntington. For reasons as above including, most importanfly, the tnability of India and Pakistan to resolve their long and, in human terms, severely destructive dispute over Kashmir, ttre required sense of communit5r in South Asia has not crystallised beyond what has been haltin$y structured under SAARC. The latter has kept the spirit of South Asia alive. But by limiting its scope of work to only a bureaucraUc and technical agenda and by desperately avoiding contentious issues, SAARC has become sornething like an alien specie in a world that is becoming extremely competitive wittt every important region trying to berrefit from an economic and, where possible, strategic union.
Speci{rcaltg:

be forged on the basis of religious afffnities for the long_term

The persistence of a Cold Warlike situation in the region and the practice of forging extra-regional alliances for security and sustenance have not served the region well. Happily, this is changing now through both internal policy
designs of specilic countries (including the exercise of nuclear

l.

options) and what the changed world context has forced upon us. But the continued state of belligerence between ttre two major countries of the region and its direct and indirect effects on the rise of terrorism, ethnic conflicts and fissiparous tendencies within both countries and elsewhere have not served the cause of either of them or of the region
as a whole, 2. The security of every nation is further threatened by a host of other factors that are sapping the vitals of each country. The social values and institutions that have held

A Nepali Vision oJSouth Asia

2T

the diverse peoples in each country together have been breaking down. The corrosive influence of poverty and deprivation, on one hand, and the sense of injustice and
exploitadon of the weak by the stronger, on the other' are shaking the very foundations of our social systems that should be readying themselves to tap the potentials' possibilities, and responsibilities of a twenty-first century .civilisation. Mounting corruption is a blot on our democracy even as it is also retarding economic and social development.
3. The rise of ethnic conllicts and the inroads

that religious

fundamentalism is making into the body politic of many

countries should be a matter of special concern. They too owe thelr origin to social injustices perpetrated by history and nurtured by a system of political and economic management that is devoid of moral values and the requisite sense ofjustice and egalitarianism. What is more important is that they delile the spirit of pluralism, secularism and enlightened nationalism that alone can guarantee a South Asia that is well adjusted within and to humanity at large.
4. The new wave of democracy notwithstanding, there is a danger that the people of the region might lose faith in the political process itself. Cormption in politics is the principal source of public apathy as well as misery. Degeneration of politics into a system of trading privileges and pecuniaqr interests at tlre cost of public resources, and the perversion " of the electoral process through the use of ill-gotten wealth or brute force have brouglrt "the South Asian democrary" into disrepute. The syndrome of "functioning anarchy" l'isualised by Galbraith many years ago may soon make the systems unable to function, with governments becoming increasingly incapable of governing and the people being increasingly unwilling to be governed in mutually supportive roles. Or, at best, the unfolding events might vindicate the judgements of another poliilcal commentator who, too, having served in a diplomatic post in India speculated about "the possibility of democracy surviving changing India". This

22

Perspectiues on South Asia

Asian region,

must not be allowed to happen to any country in the interest of peace, security and development of the South

5. The inability so far to develop a system of economic and dwelopment cooperation among counhies does not doJustice to the peoples of the region who suffer from the similar problems of frequent flooding, environmental degradation, and shortages ofenergr in a region with vast water resources. These problems can be overcome if there is no further delay in evolving a framework for harnessing the river systems of the region to the mutual and equitable beneflts of the countries concerned in the region as a whole, and, most importantly, tJle people living there. The unexploited potential for rapid development of the region through cooperation in trade and lnvestment is another lacuna in a world where most of the important countries are deciding trading systems that take advantage of both protectionism and the virtues of common markets.

South Asian countries thus need a new vision of themselves and of the region as a whole as a confident communit5r that responds to the challenges and opportunities of the emerging world order. India and Pakistan, in particular, have a historic responsibility to make the future different from the past. What we need is not a utopian blueprint. The quest should be for the much-needed changes in values and the standards of conduct of the regional leadership. This will help them to project themselves and their countries in a light that is free ofpast prejudices and narrow-mindedness. In a positive frame of mind, the leaders will be able to visualise a future that is full of promises to be harnessed for the promoflon of peace and cooperation that has so faf been only talked about, in warm words or otherwise, and not acted upon.

III. Guldtng Hnciples

l.

There is a need to tap the sources of power that are

A N ePaLt Viston oJ South Asia

23

sense internal to South Asia. This will require' first of all' a potential' There is of self-respect and confidence in our own a need to generate necessary enthusiasm in the politcal societies Ieadership of each country that they can make their if they so wish' This will then and prosperous *or" """.tr. to translate itself into a determination to avoid intrahave state and inter-state conflicts that often surface in the pursuit of short-term gains by transient rulers' be they further autocratic or democratic, military or civilian' This will in terms of military require a re-definition of securif not strength but in terms of the capacity to fulfil the diverse peoples' needs and aspiration. It is one of the illustrious sons of South Asia, the late Mahabub ul Haq, who has been most influential in articulating and promoting the concept of human security ttrat is based on security of people' not just of territory; security of individuals, not just of nations: security through dwelopment, not through arms and security of all people everywhere-'in their homes, in their jobs' in their streets, in their communities, and in their environment'" It is up to t)'.e leadership of South Asia to rise to this

challenge and also add, after the words *in

environmenf', another three words, namely

"in their

the region"'

2. Every nation should ftnd an ideologr for itself that is not based on religion. Religion has occupied an important place in the belief systems. and social engagements of men and women from ancient times to the modern' Religion as a source of moral basis defining human relationships has served human needs well in the past and can do the same in the future. But when religion is raised to a level' beyond the perimeter of personal faith and is allowed to interfere with the relation between citizens and the state, it corrodes all democratic values and conventions including the basic tenets of political and social equality. Pakistan suffers to this day from the contradiction it invited for itself when its founding fattrers wished to forge a democratic polity while using religion as the basis for nationhood' Nepal, by declaring

24

Perspectiues on South Asra

itself a "Hindu state" even unden its democratic constitution has opened the door for unnecessar5r conflicts ir, that has more important things to manage *t " "o"i.iy it, limited economic resources agd already depleting social capital. The powerful forces of Hindufua in ttre targist democracy of the world have now raised doubts aborlt the ideological basis of Indian democracy and its secular values. By claiming ro resurrect a modern RanrqiAa through the denial of an honourable place for the minorities, there is a danger that these forces may defile the central value, namely, iquality andjustice, which to every good Hindu is the most attractive gd:f this concept of state. Every Hindu child in South Asia has been raised to believe that in RamrqgcL everyone is equal and not even Lord Ram is above --the law. The governments and indeed the enlightened sections of the civil societies need to resist the untenable pressures from religious lobbies of all kinds whose only prripo". can be to dMde their peoples at a Ume when energr-shoula instead be channelled to unite ail peoples of South Asia. In addition, the growing linkages among religious movements in the region must be discouraged to rnake grounds for ideologies and state systems that are based on high moral values and secular, democratic principles g..r"d to the seryice of humanity.

3. Narrow nationalism can no longer be the basis for economic and political transactions among states in an inter-dependent world. Similarly, the pursuit olextra_regional linkages in the interest ofthe conventional balance power of between major countries in the region has often meant an additional burden on tJre peoples of the region_in terms of the cost of unceasing arms-build r._,p, .""J.tion of violence and the plight of millions of refugees. By developing a regional framework of cooperaUon, these countries can better harness ttreir resources and tose of the extra_regional powers for regional peace and development. yet, perceived vulnerabilit5r to undesirable outside influences affecting their

A Nepali Vision o/South Asia

25

their respective bureaucracies and other sections of

establishments should generate magnanimous decisions that can build lasting confidence where needed.
4. The apparent cultural unity of the ruling classes of the region with the mainstream world order is one of the factors responsible for a lack of vision in each country of itself and

economic and social cohesion tends to make some states conscious of the need to emphasis their national identities and interests within and beyond the call of reason. This happens especially in the case of smaller states that are also economically disadvantaged and more underdeveloped. Politrcal sagacity of the more powerful partners in the region superseding the entrenched influence and the mindset of

of its place in the region, and collectively in the world at large. The priorities, the life style and the general cultural behaviour of the elite classes are more in tune with those of their external cohorts than with their "native clientele" from whom they are increasingly alienated. There can even be complacency that nothing much can be done directly to ameliorate the condition of the masses because that will detract attention and divert resources away from activities

that are more relevant for the "global village" in the

technological age and a new miilennium. Manifestation of what is called "the colonised mind" might have conditioned even the character arrd the intensity of dissent voiced occasionally for equitable relationships for the South Asian peoples in internal and global settings. This has to change so that the ruling establishments use the ground realities as their frame of reference even while interacting with the outside world to derive benefits from trade, technologr and investment. They have to borrow not only capital and technologz from outside the region but also the other liberal values regarding work, leisure, compassion, cooperation, resources and costs, and the difference between what is private and what is public in the management of interests and resources. Our own proud heritage, too, should give us

26

P er s p ectia e s

on South Asia

the om and the energ' we need to recharge our value system. ottrer things, this should help to put a brake growing alienation of the leadership on the people ln South Asia. from

South Asian countries must strive to make the global resurgenc<i of democratic values and the most importance that is now placed on the need for respecting the fundamental rights of citizens and groups of peoples ttrroughout the world. The theory that every country has a right to choose its own social system or political ideologr including what is fundamental about fundamental rights cannot be carried too far. Care must be taken that such arguments do not become a vehicle for reintroducing and legitimising authoritarianism in the region as has happened in the recent past. The SAARC Charter makes no menflon of democracy or ttre system of government which it wishes to see developed and be instrumental in the fulfilment of the regional aspirations of the South Asian peoples. This is not surprising given the political orientation of most of the founding fathers of tl.e SAARC and the aimost hostile relationship they saw between democracy and development. WitJl one or two exceptions in more recent years, none of the Declarations of the SAARC customarily issued at the end of the Summit every year ever mentions anything about the
c.

importance of democratic values and tJ e role of representative

institutions in nation-building. The closest that the Declaration of the iatest Summit held in Colombo came to
embracing democracy was in this obtuse formulation: 'The l,eaders agreed that tolerance ahd mutual accommodation, combined with the strengthening of participatory governance, constituted the foundation for the sustainable economic and social development." Why our leaders are shy of admitting their commitment to democracy is an enigma, even as we may agree that the Westminster model is not the only form

of democracy suitable to mankind. Armed with their

commitment to democracv. the South Asian states should

A Nepali Vision

oJ South

Asirt

27

be able to withstand all outside pressures on their internal affairs in the name of "good governance" or conditionalities imposed on them lbr one reason or another. At the same time, they crn expose the double standards that the $obal patriarchs or matriarchs of democracy and human rights may deploy in the world to serve their own interests.
6. The contemporary fashion to equate political democracy

with capitalistic ideologr and the cooption of all important political forces in each country of the region into the system of external$tnduced economic ideas and policies should be moderated if not recast altogether in the light of the South Asian needs. The incapacity of the ruling classes manifested in the absence of a vision for their countries and for the
region, as stated, may be the result of this stifli'ng influence. The myth of a global paradigm of development and unisystemic economic management can affect indigenous analyses and thought processes so as to obviate them effectively. It is no consolation that the myth already stands exposed. The position of the peddlers of this philosophy is weakened considerably as they encounter one debacie aftei anottrer-from Sub-Saharan Africa to East and South East Asia even as they go on prescribing their well known medicines. It is opportune for South Asia to take advantage of these developments and present its own model of development or a system of priorities and instrumentalities that address its ground condition. We know that, among other things, liberalisation as pursued now is unlikely to help tackle the most important problem facing the regionunemplo5rment and underemployment and ttreir relation to poverty and social conllicts. This is not to suggest that we shut out all wisdom from the outside world. But if poverty with the associated dynamics of population growth, the poor quality of life of many and the unsustainable.lifestyle of some and the environmental degradation that goes with it is a present concern, South Asian scholars may be ttre best suited to ftnd a solution not only for their region but also for

28

Perspectiue s on South Asia

the "global village". South Asia is not Just a fountain of poverty. It also produces world Class economists and other social scientists. Furthermore, we do not have to learn about Mahatma Gandhi from Schumacher of the .,Small is Beautiful" fame. Nor do we have to benumb our senses and join the chorus with ignorant neo-liberals who denigrate Jawaharlal Nehru for his vision of a .,a socialisilc pattern of society." The more powerful countries need to motivate themselves to take moral leadership in the design of the South Asian destiny. This sho 'ld have an accompanying positive effect of de-emphasisinfg the unproductive debate over the alleged hegemonic design of one country or another in the region.

7. Economic management in South Asia needs to be liberated from the strangulatirlg effects of bureaucratic control and the rigidities of centralised management and
decision-making. The market can indeed be used to a greater degree to improve efllciency in resource allocation and to unleash entrepreneurial zeal in the private sector. But the agenda of povert5r alleviation including the question of entitlement for meeting basic needs and other areas relevant to a just social order cannot be superseded by the cold logic of economic laws. The poor can neither be overlooked nor dispensed with Just because they become inconvenient to

the ruling dogma. The South Asian vision must ihus encompass a South Asian development perspective that

must also address tJre question of trade liberalisation in the region beyond the currently agreed preferential trade arrangements (SegfA) and the now delayed inauguration of SAFTA to a full-fledged South Asian Economic Communit5r. The latter appears a pipe dream when judged against the current reality. But if it were reaXly so, one would imeqine that ttre scholars who have been writing about it and the group of eminent South Asians who have been discussing it for some time would have to be judged irrelevant too. While proceeding along these lines, special arrangements to

A Nepali Visrbn o3f South Asia

29

safeguard the interests ofweaker and less developed partners

must also be built in. For example, priority consideration will have to be given to the special problems of Bangladesh, which is prone to natural disasters of a mammoth scale from one year to the other. We have seen that some humanitarian aid may come from outside, but a permanent solution to the flooding will have to be devised regionally.

8. The countries of the region should also look for a common position and strategies in international economic
negotiations on aid, trade, debt and world environment. The division that surfaced among the developing countries provided the vested interests at the global level to engineer a "new world order", a reformulation of the concept of the "new international economic order" that the former were demanding earlier. The South Asian countries should resist

all temptations to pursue their interests in the world in isolation of their neighbours in the region. It would be immensely rewarding if the countries could work towards evolving a collective stratesr that would contain external pressures with conditionalities on aid and investment. In
this way, they can also promote truly equitable international trading arrangements as is purportedly the objective of the

wTo.
To end, the realities of power are such that, in any order, internal or external, the powerful seek domination and control over ttre weak. The opposite reality is that the latter cannot withstand the pressure unless they congregate and act together to enhance their leverages of power. The bigger and 'powerful" countries of South Asia may sometimes see an independent place for themselves in ttre larger world arena. But the fact remains that the region did not enjoy a position of importance in world politics even in the Cold War era when they were hobnobbing with their respective patronsuperpowers. Nor does it enjoy it now (except for the attention India and Pakistan have attracted after their nuclear tests as discussed in the Postscript below). Any claim for status

Perspectiues on South Asia

or power by any one of these countries in the conduct of world affairs-or even their own affairs at times, as when India or Paldstan wished to import certain t5pes of modern technologr--has gone largely unheeded. India, in particular, has been so busy in proving its prowess and worth in its neighbourhood, as the principal inheritor of the British Raj, that there is a risk of it forfeiting what it can achieve globally in partnership with all countries in the region.
Both India and Pakistan must accept responsibilit5r for their share of the blame for the slow progress in the realisation of the South Asian cohmunity. They must commit themselves to take a.lead in rectiSring the past. Even for the settlement of the Kashmir question, all that may be needed is the appearance on the scene of a statesman who takes the risk ttrat must.be taken and sacrifices his or her political career should suctr need arise given the nature of domestic political equations. No matter w{rat and how the settlement is reached, there is bound to be a backlash in either countr5r, and someone should be prepared to suffer politically in the larger interest of peace, security and development. Ultimately it is such sacrifices, not narrow-minded belligerence that will be recogrrised by history. In the least, there should be some room for taking advantage of tJ.e possibility of "solidarity in production and trade" as a means of avoiding wars and aihieving long-term peace and cooperation between the two countries and in the region as a whole. This will be along the lines initiated by Robert Schuman of France some 5O years ago when he sowed the seed of the European Union amidst a climate of distrust which was perhaps no less intense than in South Asia at present. The move towards a Visian oJ Soufh Asia can take a cue also from what a former Soviet Politburo member was reportedly alluding to in the context of the global communit5t as a whole in a lecture he gave at Columbia University some years ago. I will end this essay witi the very pertinent observations in question. "What does it mean to speak of a neus qualitg oJ societg? A polifical

A Nepali Visian

oJ South

Asia

31

system? Economic Effectiveness? Scientific Achievement? Wealth? No, the new quality of societ5r means elevating man through his morality. "
IV. Postscript
There has been little change in the status or perception of South Asia as a community since the essence of the above 'vision" was shared with the Dialogue colleagues six years ago. Nor has there been any genuine eagerness on the part of the region's ruling elite in drawing the contours of South Asia in the 2lst century. Each country is pursuing its interests, by limiting its contribution to the imperatives of mutual cooperation to rhetoric. In the meantime, some momentous changes have taken place in the position and stakes of some individual countries. This is bound to affect the prospects of regional security, cooperation and development. I should therefore like to briefly interrogate what these developments have done to the possibility of transforming the South Asian dream, as discussed above to a reality.

India and Pakistan tried to make a "clean break with the desolate past" by conducting eleven nuclear tests between them in the heat of May this year. There can be no doubt in anyone's mind that this development will affect whatever little solidarity has still remained among the two powerful states of the region. The tests have affected not only the relation between India and Pakistan. They have affected the

hopes and aspirations of every country in their neighbourhood. The ritualistic completion of the nearfruitless and purposeless Tenth SAARC Summit held in Colombo under t].e shadow of these nuclear tests is an illustration of the case.
Ironically, the two regional adversaries that trained their nuclear guns on each other now find themselves in the same boat as they together suffer the burden of economic

32

Perspectiues on Sotfth Asio"

sancilons imposed by tl-e West. But their togetherness goes only as far as the suffering of their innocent people. One would ordinarily e>rpect tllat their common grievances against the West (chiefly the US) along with their joint contributions to exposing the monopolistic position of ttre five established nuclear powers on the issue of nuclear proliferation would bring the two countries together. It is even possible that both India and Pakistan have earned the understanding of millions of people in the third world (but not necessarily of the naUon states) who can take satisfaction that the double standards of the West on the nuclear issue has not gone unchallenged. A South Asia with a history of less discord would have found a God-given opportunity for forging solidarity and meaningful cooperation between India and Pakistan as both negotiate with the West against the pressure that they are now under to sign the CTBT. But this is not to be. When bottr countries show little sign of decelerating their traditional belligerence, the recent events can only add to the complodty of regional security, not otherwise.
South Asia is now a region with two nuclear powers. It is also a region that inhabits 4O per cent of all poor people and

46 per cent of all illiterate adults in the developing world. This is where the "vision ttring" as the former US President, George Bush might say, becomes important. Vision is not a borrowed wisdom, for that reason, it is also immune to sanctions. The two most important countries of the region have to take interest in fully developing a process that meets the challenge and harnesses the potential as we enter a new era amidst the burden of growing population, increasing debts and rising unemployment. It has been said that the 'next millennium can begin with the South Asian Century" because tJre development frontier may shift from East Asia to South Asia. It is up to the political leadership in each country of the region to seize this possibility. The South Asian Century if it is to be relevant for all South Asians and not merely for the upwardly mobile middle classes tJlat are

A NepatiVision oJSouth Asia

33

hooked to the so-called global economy has to embrace a wtde range of agenda-from social and cultural to poliilcal and economic. Governance is going to be even more of a challenge than now if a chasm is allowed to develop further between the rich and the poor, the privileged and the ordinary and one geographic re$on and another' Even if thls were not so, it will be difficult to take pride or satisfaction from the expanding markets for consumption goods and the growth in economic activites they entail when, for example' 85 million South Asian children or nearly 5O per cent of those in the developing world remain malnourished' There have been some posifive developments. That the constituUonal process has survived in all countries that got ini ated or reintroduced to the practice only recently should give some satlsfactlon. It is another matter that the output of tJrese regimes could have been more relevant and benellcial for the people. Similarly, as a foreign minister (later prime minister), Inder Kumar Gujral made a big contribution' though far from being a lasting one perhaps' when he presented his doctrine, one element of which is nonreciprocity in economic relations with smaller neighbours (that is not asking for a quid pro quo by India) in economic relaUons with "neighbours like Nepal, Ban$adesh, Bhutan, Maldtves and Sri Lanka". A concrete outcome of that doctrine has already been seen in the Trade Treaty between Nepal and India in 1996 that did away wittr all the non-tariff barriers against Nepali exports to India-something tl-at had been a sore point in the relations between the two countries for a long time. It is important to note, however, that even this very posiuve development was burdened by the legacy of the complex relauons and unremitung discord between India and Pakistan. I.K. Gujral who is not an enthusiastic supporter of nuclear tests by India and who has also opposed signing the CTtsT was nonetheless unable to articulate his doctrine in such a mElnner that there was room for improvement in

34

Perspectiues on South Asra

otherwise highly welcome initiative was perceived by some as one whose basic purpose was to isolate pakistan in South Asia like yet another of Gujral's initiatives-the scheme for sub-regional cooperation for development among Bangladesh, Bhutan, Nepal and North-east India.

the relations between India a4d pakistan and collecUve action by ttrem under ttrat frampwork. As it happened, the

That I have to end this essay by reverting to tJle relation between India and Pakistan is s!.rnbolic of the centrality of thls issue in any vision that we may try to define in our minds on South Asia. [t seems to me that the relations between the two countries may not revert to a lasting improvement until the domesgc political order in botJl countrles gains maturity in such a way that it is capable of producing mentally and politically secure leaders. Democracy cannot flourish and regional cooperation cannot improve when insecure rulers, whether democratic or autocratic, have to prop up their regimeg on the foundation of a fundamentalist myth, the threat of a .foreigyt hand" or an external enemy they are forced to invent for their survival. Fortunately, with the gradual growth of the .,South Asian Civil Society", there are now at least some people and groups that appear 'Visionaryt'. Many individuals and programmes on the ground to find ways and means of enhancing understanding and cooperation among peoples and states in the interest of all of the more than I.3 billion people of ttre region. For example, there are groups working for human rights and for the rights of the children and the handicapped in individual countries and collectively in the region. In the economic sphere, there is a proposal for the development of a South Asian Economic Community generated from within the civil society. These are good signs. It is the success of these efforts that may eventually influence the course of events in South Asia.

organisations are struggling intellectually and with

A NepaliVision

oJ

SoutttAsia
REFERENCES

35

Brezinski, Zbigniew, 'Power and Morality", World Moniton Marc}r

1993.

Grant, Bruce, God"s and PolitLcians: Politics as Culture-An Austrcrtian Vieu oJ India, Ringwood, Victoria: Penguin Books'
1982.
Haq, Mahabub ul, and Khadija Haq' Humo:n DeDelopment in South

Asia 1998, Karachi: O>ford University Press for Ttre Human Development Centre, 1998.

Harison, Selig, "South Asia and the United States: A Chance for a Fresh Start", Ctrrent History, March 1992. Khatri, Shrtdhar, "Natonal Security and Conflict Resolution in South Asia", South Asia: Vision & PerspectiDe, Lahore: Independent Planning Commission of Pakistan, 1994'
Nandy, Ashis, Thc Intimote Enemy: Loss anl Reauery oJ Ilnder Colonirtlisnu Delhi: Oxford University Press' 1989'
SeLJ

Nandy, Ashis, "Interview: Hunger

1998.

is more Powerful than

o..f

Nationalism', HimalThe South Asian Magazine, t I :9, September a Uni'on, New

Pinder, John, European Communitg: The BuiJding York : Odord University Press, 1991.
Sen Gupta, Bhabani, "Conflict Resolution

in South Asia", in this

volume.

Conflict Resolution in South Asia

Bhnbani Sen Gupta*

South Asia is the habitat of a billion people, a region that has seen more wars than most others since it carne into being in the first flush of decolonizaflon. What is known as South Asia now-a geopolitical region of seven disparate states: Indla, Paktstan, Nepal, Bhutan, Sn Lanka, Maldives and Bangladesh-used to be the British Indian Empire. It bears the poet's famous epitapLr of the wtrite man who wanted to change its traditional societies: .A fool lies here who tried to hustle the East,"
Not that South Asia has not been hustled in the last fifty years. Its member states have seen ups and downs of rulers and ruling systems. In what Sam'uel Hunting[on has called the 'third wave of democracy- of democratization of all states of the region, with the exception of the tiny monarchy ofBhutan, all are now governed by representatives ofpeople
*This chapter is the original verslo[r of the paper written for the Third South Asia Regional Dialogue held in Lahore, pakistan in
1993.

Cotlllict Resoltttlon in Soutlr Asta

37

Asta has wltnessed four major wars and a minor one.2 Relations among the region's seven na ons are marked more by mutual mistrust and non-cooperafion than by good-netghbourllness. It is a latecomer to regionalism. Even ttrough lts organisation for regional cooperatlon-AARCis now more than fifteen years old this region remalns
strate6gcally divided. It has not even tried seriously to develop

r elected ln freedom and accountable to parliaments. South

a regional approach to security and stability, far less to disarmament and arms control. Peace and conflict management and resolutlon studles do not figure in the
curriculum of South Asian universities, nor on the agenda of most of its research institutions. Since the mid-8Os, South Asia has been one of the most heavily armed third world regions. Here, national power ambitions of Indta and Paldstan mingled with the superpower rivalries, and interstate ethnlc tensions meshed with domestic conlllcts build a high reglon-wide threshold of tensions, confrontations, and conllicts. Indeed three of its member states: India, Paldstan and Sri Lanka carry an overload of conllicts. South Asians do not have to go outside their region to test what Homer wrote ln his eptc the Odysseg: 'We are qulck to flare up, we races of men on the earth,'

AProfle of the Rcglor

South Asla is a reglon marked with serious lmbalances of population and the essentlal attributes of states - territory, natural resources. India towers over a cluster of small and

weak naflons except Pakistan. The two large 'distant neighbours" were born into a well of mutual psychological and ideologfcal hostility from which they are still to get out. The basic conllictual relations in South Asia are between Indta and Pakistan, though India's national security and territorial tntegrity must also take account of China's pourer projecflon in South Asla where Tibet Joins tt wlth India and Xirudang wtth Pakistan. The smaller nations, or several of

38

Perspectiues on South Asia

of trndia's behaviour. The key to security and stability in South Asia, and,to conflict control and resolution, lies in the unfriendly relaflons of India a4d pakistan. Both now have acquired capabitrity to make nuclear weapons, if they have not already made some bombs or devices. Both are emerging as missile powers, and India is seen try. some as a power building a blue-water navy..3

them, will, at any given time, peqceive India as the hegemonic power and their perception will often tre conffrmed by nuances

Conflict Resoluhan in South Asia

southern districts of the small kingdom wher the majority of the population is of Nepali origin while the Drupkas hold powerinThimphu. Some 5O,OOO Bhutanese oJNepali origin irave escaped to Nepal through India aftelbeing pushed out by Bhutanese security personnel' Since 1984 India has been accusing Pakistafl of extending material assistance to secessionist Sikh militants ffghting for "Khalistan" in PunJab' In the Kashmir Valley, Patlstan is lnvolved in helping the anti{ndian struggle of four million Muslims. These domestlc conflicts extending to the neighbouring countries reinforce the snse of insecurit5r of the ruling elltes, erode the stability of the state systems and institutions and generate pressures to expand arrnies and larger inventories of imported arms and equipment. In recent years, the armed forces of Sri Ia.nka and Ban$adesh have been expanded rapidly straining the development resources of the two countries, increasing their foreign debts eind enhancing their dependencies on
foreiggr aid.a

Nature of Conlllct ln South Asia

The nature of conllict in the region has shown a stubborn

persistence. The main conflict. as noted, is between India and Pakistan. It has territorial, religiousideological, ethnic, political and strategic dimensions, making it one of the most

enduring conflicts

in the third world. Minor territorial

disputes do exist between India and Bangladesh, but the source of conflict here is ethnicity and religion, and Bangladesh's tilt towards Pakistan since the installatlon of military rule in August 1975. Ethnicity is almost the only cause of sharp dtfferences between India and Sri Lanka which in 1987 came close to a military conflict; India sent a Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) to Sri Lanka at the explicit request of its then President J'R' Jayewardene. In two years, the IPI(F grew nearly I0O,OO0 strong and it $ot bogged down in an expensive guerilla war wit}. the militarit rebels of the Northern province of Jaffna named "Liberatlon

40

Perspectiues on South Asla.

asked for the lmmediate withdrawal of the force, which was now seen by Sri Lankans as an ..occupation army.. The IpKF left the island in March lggO but the relationslip between Indta and Sri Lanka has since then remained less than warm.s There are no territorial or any other disputes between Indta and Nepal. However, during the two decades of rule bv an auttroritarian monarch, Nepal, in Indian perception, souglrt to strike a closer relationship with China ttran Indians beliwed was good for their country's security. India took particular obJecton to Nepal's purchase of several truckloads of weapons from China, while the King failed to get Indian recognition of Nepal as a peace Z/],ne. Alandlocked countrv. Nepal, is totally dependerit on India for an exit to the oceans; even otherwlse, Nepal's trade and commerce is overwhelmtngfy with India. Disputes over whether there should be a slngle trade-cum-transit agreement between Nepal and Indla or two separate ones have heavily strained the reladonship. In lggo, however, India conceded two sparate treaties to Nepal. This, togettrer with the restoration of democracy in the kingdom in 199O, has returned the Indo-Nepalese relationship to a relaxed, mutually beneficial nornralcy.

Tigers of Tamil Eelam {LT-|E)". president Ranasinghe Premadasa soon after assuming office in January lggg,

of inlluence, makes it clear to the smaller neighbours that they must pa,y due regard to its own security sensitlvities and needs as a large country with borders with pakistan and China and also as an Jndian Ocean power. The neigfrbours complain t]ut India pays scant regard to tJreir security sensttivitles and at times does not mlnd trespassing on their sorrerelgnty.6
Btlateral disputes between India and pal<istan have
a

Territory, ethntcity and religion are, then, the three main causes of conflict ln South Asia. The smaller neighbours are apprehenslve of India's towering slze and resent its hegemonic behaviour. India on tts part, without proclaiming a doctrine

central

ConflictResolrttion in South Asta

4l

place in the South Astan syndrome of conlltcts, The roots of thts conflict go back to the colonial period when the imperial doctrine of divide and rule ftnally led to the partttion of British Indta lnto Indla and Paldstan. The two sovereign nations were born in mutual rejection and hostility. The rivalrywas lgligious and ideological-Pakistan proclaiming itself an Islamic state

while India commltted to build a secular and democratic

society. The total strategic divide into which the two neiglrbours were born was reinforced by the cold warring external powers

since the fifties. Paldstan Joined the US sponsored regional military alhances ostenslbly to contain Sovlet and communist power, actually to get a security cover agalnst India. And, India found its own friend in the USSR. Since the 1980s India and Pakistan have become major importers of weapon systems putfing South Asia on the world map of mtlttartzation. India's arms imports ln the 1978-88 decade escalated nearly 8O0 per cent, from $36O million to $3.2 billion. Pakistan's milltary imports Jumped from $210 million in 1978 to $6OO million in 1984 to come down to $34O million in 1988. However, Pakistan received huge caches of weapons from ttre United States as outright grant, according to an authoritative US account: In India, military spending increased at the rate of 5.8 per cent throughout the decade. Military e4renditure in Paklstan increased at the much more rapid pace of 1O per cent during the decade and at 7 .l per cent of the last half. An essentially large increase occurred in 1983, when Pakistani milltary ercpendlture Jumped nearly 26 per cent.

Sri Lanka, a country that has historically had very low military o<penditure (in 1988 Sri Lanka's military orpenditure was a mere 3 per cent of India's military expenditure), is nwertheless the third largest South Asian country in terms of milttary expenditures. As a result of the intense civil war plaguing the countr5r, Sri Lanka experienced phenomenal growth in military expenditure of 29.2 per cent during the flrst five years of the decade and 17.3 per cent during the
decade as a whole.T

42

Perspectiues on South Asra

In the nuclear arena, however, India and Pakistan have reached the take-off stage, capable of generating a regional nuclear weapons arms yace. Inflia which exploded a nuclear device "for peaceful purposes" ln 1974 declared its decision not to make weapons, though, since the late 198Os, in response to international, mostly American, disclosures of Pakistan's acquired or nearly acquired weapons capability, India has several times publicly brandished its "option." konard Spector, of the Carnegie Foundation, said of the then Prime Minister Fajiv Gandhi's statement in June 1985,. that India "could quickly exercise its nuclearweapons option" to suggest tlat India had already acquired the capability to make nuclear weapons.s Spectbr was certain that Pakistan was in fervdnt pursuit of the bomb. '"Itte real question is what is the point at which Islamabad's efforts will level off. "e

The point evidently was reached as the Bush administraflon took over in Washington DC. For the first time President Bush refused to certify to the Congress in October 1990. that Pakistan dld noi "possess', io. *u" trying to make, nuclear weapons. As a result, US mtlitary and economic aid to Pakistan has remained suspended slnce then under the Pressler Amendment.
Regardless of what kind of capability the two countries may hav acquired, weapons actually produced, and, if so, the slze of thelr arsenals, it is now assumed bv bot]. countries

Conflict Resohrtion in South Asia

,43

that.both of them have the capability. Both countries have strong nuclear lobbies even as both officially keep denying having embarked upon making nuclear weapons. An Indian strategic e>qrert sees South Asia passing through ttrree -nuclear regimes"-first, a "rudimentary nuclear regime" in which both India and Pakistan have unrefined weapons, Pakistan obtains operational status with the gas centrifuge enrichment plant at Kahuta, and moves steadily to increase that throughout. India, however, remains at its 1974 'one bomb capacity'. Second, an 'intermediate nuclear regime', in which Pakistan has stockpiled enriched uranium for ten bombs but has not increased their efficiency by raising the yield to weight ratio. "This posture of ambiguity forces New Delhi to explicitly test its plutonium devices." Third, a
sophisticated nuclear regime, in which India has coordlnated its atomic erierg/, space and electronics with the needs of natiohal defence. "An Indian ballistic missile (MRBM) capability emerges. These could be targeted against Pakistani cities or against China's military targets (such as airfields) in Tibet. Once the deployment of MRBM starts there is a clear possibility that Pakistan too may attempt to gear up its present lnciplent space programme towards the manufacture of IRBMs. The net redult may be the emergence of strategic stability between India and Pakistan."ro

PakHan's dominant nuclear stance is a mirror image of Indta's with tJre exception that Pakistan's belief is that the United States is 'putting one-sided unfair pressure on

and confused for well over a decade" without bringing it any DeneIlt.

"Conventional defence not only has proven inadequate for Pakistan, it also has proved to be a. heavy financial

44

Perspectiues on South Asio

burden , . . with nuclear weapons (a conventional) balance is not required since nuclear weapons are absolute_where no balance is possible since it is not essential to possess more or stronger strategic explosives than tJre rest in order to be accounted as a atomic power in the political and mtlitary sense. . ."

'In fact, given the economic viability of acquiring nuclear

weapons capabllity tn relation to the civilian factor (throug;h the benefits of the civil nuclear fuel cycle) on the one hand, and the crippling impact of development of huge conventional forces weapons expenditure on the other, it would seem as if Pakistan has no option bui to develop lts nuclear weapons capability-given its politico-strategic regional compulsions .'r r

In Paldstan according to an English daily, it is regarded 'unpatriotic" to criticise the country's nuclear prog3amme and to suggest that it should not make nuclear tveapons.l2 In Indta, a small but vocal lobhy against nuclear weapons e>dsts. r3 It will be ineffectual, however, if the decision is taken at the political level to use the nuclear option. In I991, strategic thlnking in India began to absorb the realit5r that bottr countries possess nuclear capability. This reality entered war and peace calculations of both military leaderships and introduced a certain measure of cautlon in engagtng in the decades-old game of confrontaflon and
as

tensions.

ra

Natlon Buildrng and Conflicts ln South Asla

The process of nation-building has been far from peaceful in South Asia. Conllict attended the birth of the hrin states of India and Paldstan. In Sri Ianka. Prime Minister SWRD Bandaranaike was killed by an a.ssassin, a Buddhist monk. Bangladesh was born of a liberation war. Four successive heads of state were assassinated between 1975 and lggl, when ttre countr5r disposed of its third military ruIer and proclaimed a democratic state with the Westminster model

of parltamentar5r democracy.

Conflict Resolufibn ur Soulh Asra

ZTD

Several other outbursts of bloody conflict must also be attributed to the st5rle and model of nation-building. In India, reorganisation of the British Indian provinces and the integraflon offormer princely states into a more orderly system of states in the 1950s and 196Os was attended by collective violence. The Indian government used the coercive power of the state to suppress violent separatist insurgencies in Nagaland and Mizoram. The Pakistan government similarly suppressed an armed uprising in Baluchistan in the lg7os. Bangladesh confronted the Buddhist tribe of the Chakmas irr the Chittagong Hill Region as soon as it attained its independence from Pakistan. In almost every one of these significant cases ofinternal conflict, South Asian states have blamed one or more neighbours of instigating, fuelling and supporting the separatist or anti-state elements.

It must be noted that t]le collective violent movements against the state have occurred in democracies rather than military dictatorships. The Baluchis rose in an armed rebellion
demanding larger autonomy and a greater share of the resource-cake only after military rule ended in Pakistan and a democratic government was set up in 1972. To be sure, the rebellion in Sind began during the late General Ziaul Haq,s mllitary rule; butits current marked aggravation has occurred
in the last four years of democracy in Pakistan. The Chakmas in Ban$adesh rebelled during the first year of Independence when tJle country had a democratic regime. Ttrese examples certainly do not JusUff dictatorial or authoritative rule ttrat denies liberties and freedom to all citizens to a greater or lesser degree. In a democratic regime, people have the right to assert their demands and aspirations. Deprived and humiliated, they sometimes take to arms and come in confrontation with the powerful coercive machinery of the State. Dictatorships paper over internal conflicts with stern repression and denial ofafreedom ofexpression and assembly. When dictatorships collapse, conflicts come olrt intothe open.

46

Perspectiues on South Asid.

Reltglous and Ethntc Coafllcts Unlike other regions of the third world, the South Asian states have been spared violent class-oriented revolutions. The JVP insurgenry iir Sri Lanka in 197 I was an insurrection rather than a grassroots revolution: it was wiped out by the government.
Domestic conflict in South .A,sia has been broadly of two types: religious (commonly called communal in this region) and ethno-political. Religious wars and. conflicts are. not peculiar to South Asia only. TLrey marked the evolution of political sociefies in Europe fro;n the feudal times of ttre first stages of the industrial revolution. Even today, Catholics and Protestants are in a state of war with one another in

Northern Ireland. In South Asia, Hindu-Muslim riots in British India had occurred for hundreds of years. Independence and nation-building have not brought these conflicts to an end; sometimesi the process of development has accentuated communal killings. Political parties fuel them with a view to win votes. Currently, politically and
culturally assertive rellgious fundamentalisms severely strain civil societies in Pakistan, India and Sri Lanka. If communal riots have been few and far between in Bangladesh, it is because Muslims and Hindus fought and died together in the war of liberatlon, creating a spirit of togetherness which the Islamic state and fundamehtalists have not been able to demolish.
Since the l980s, ethno-political conflicts have put South Asian states under persistent strain because they are -qualitatively different from communal clashes. l,arge minority ethnic groups with a territory and language and culture of their own assert their separate identities which did not confront ttrese states earlier. The Sikhs of Punjab ask for independence-Khalistan-frorn India because they believe that their identity and secular and religious rights have been denied by the rulers of the country. Sindhis ask for

Conflict Resohrtion in South Asia

47

Sindhu Desh, a separate land of Sindhis, alleging that their legitimate aspirations had been refused by the rulers of Pakistan. The Tamils of Jaffna demand a separate Tamil

"Homeland" because they find the Sinhala majority determined to deny them the status they believe is legitimately theirs. The Muslims of the valley of Kashmir
have been in a state of rebellion, segments of ttrem demanding

"independence," because they found that India had cynically violated the terms and conditions of Jammu and Kashmir's accession to the Indian Union in 1947.

hessures of Democracy The process of development has generated numerous pressures on the political systems in South Asia and, even more pointedly, on the power structures ttrat have grown in the different states. The pressures are essentially for recognition of the democratic rights of the people-indeed the masses-living on the outskirts of the power structure. The numerous economic, social, cultural and political contradictions of the Souttr Asian political societies,.which are still largely feudal and have just entered the dislocation of industrial revolutions, inevitably generate conflicts. Some of the conflicts provide d5mamics of positive change and are, therefore, to be welcomed. Some of the contradictions
cha-llenge deep rooted atavistic centres of power and generate

destructive conflicts like communal tensions and clashes. Political and social demands of deprived populations are often dubbed as anti-nationai by the rulers and the two inevitably clash.
Analyses of the architecture of building the South Asian states provide insight into the origins and ramifications of some conflicts in each country. In India, partition and the religious killings that attended Independence hardened the leaders' attitude towards federalism and decentralisation and created a strong bias for centralism. Democracy and secularism became the motto of the state and the two-

4A

Perspectiues on South Asia

nation theory haunted the ellte like Banquo's gfiost. Hence the inordinate delay in granting the legitlmate demand of the Sikhs for a state in which they would enjoy a clear and dominant maJority. This is the root of the Khalistan movement. Kashmir's autonomy was gradually diminished because of the fear that the Pakistan-sponsored two-nation doctrine would alienate the Muslims of the Valley against India. It was not realised by the rulers that denial of autonomy would turn the Muslims of the Valley against India with deadlier effect than the two-nation doctrine.

and resources at an imperial centre and systematic

In India, since the mid- l97os, over-centralisation of power

diminishing of the states' powers generated demands for federalism, decentralisation and grassroots democratic selfgovernment. Less dweloped parts of the large states demand separate statehood; exploited deprived tribals-8o milion inhabiting a long stretch of land across the waistline of India-ask for self-ruIe. As these demands and the struggiles that manifest them are denied and dubbed disintegrative and separatist, some of these movements tend to get violent. The social and political conflicts that dot the Indian landscape at present are basically diverse manifestations of the demands and struggle for democratic self-government. They challenge the architecture of state building from below and are seen by the rulers as disintegrative and separatist. In reality these are more integrative as they promise to enlarge the frontiers of democracy and build the democratic state from below. In Paldstan, the running conflict has been between military rule and representative democracy. The great casualty of this conflict was East Pakistan which broke away in 1971-

more homogeneous, medium-size state, it was still multinational, and dominated by Pufrjab. In democratic interludes the nationalities that felt deprived and suppressed asked for redress of their grievences. Thus a bloody conflict broke out

72 after a bloody liberation war. Though Pakistan was now a

ConJlict Resolution tn South Asia

49

MQM in in Baluchistan in the 1970s' The lawless rule of the of law and ttarachi and Hyderabad cities and the breakdown province spawned Ziaul Haq s order in the rest of the Sind current democratic phase' In -tfittty rule as well as theof the Muhajirs-Muslims who 1992, ihe MQM, the party migrated from India-was reportedly workingfor - J.innahnur'" !t"t" comprislng Karachi and Hyderabad leading to " dismemberment of Sind. A relationship of attrition between the secular values of parliamentary democracy and the orthodox Islamic values of the Shariat nibble at the stabilit5r and of tJre political system and work as a magnet of division is used to cover up the alienation. Islamic fundamentalism deeper social, cultural and political contradictions of the Pallistani society, at times with success' Meanwhile' the legacy of military rule has fragmented the power structure' In ttre ruling Troika, the military and the bureaucracy are believed to wield greater power than the elected representatives of the PeoPle. In Sri Lanka, the fundamental cleavage is between the two large ethnic communities, Sinhalese and Tamils' who iniUally fought together for national independence but later drifted apart. The Sinhalese saw the Tamils to be favourites of the Raj. Indeed, the stubborn refusal of the maJority ethnic community to recognise Sri l,anka as a country of plural ettrnicity or nationality has got it into tlle protracted -armed conflict with the Tamils of the north and the northeastern provinces. Also, the failure of the ruling elite to design a scheme of devolution of power in order to build a stronger foundation of its democratic system brought a lot of strain on tJre government in Colombo' In Bangladesh, the power-hungry military robbed the people of ihe fruits of their liberation struggle and distorted the insUtutions of government-the legislature, the judiciary' the bureaucracy and the press. Even the founder of the State, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, betrayed a strong preference for authoritarian personalized rule. After 16 years of military

50

Perspectiues on South

Asc

rule, Bangladesh has a democracy that resembles the Westminster model more closely than pakistan,s where the Constitution reserves a cluster of crucial powers for the P-resident. Bangladesh's mellower brand of Isiam has spared the countr5r the bitter and divisive contradiction between secular values of democracy and atavistic values of religious orthodoxy that we nobce in pakistan. However, the country,s fundamental contradiction between power and mass povert5r remains a perpetual source of conflict especially as thl benellcence of western donors shrinks a.rd th. country,s longstanding dependency on foreign aid comes home to roost.
Nepal has followed a more or less similar track_long years of authoritarian monarchical rule ffnally yielding to a mass struAgle of unprecedented magnitude in lgg0_91 that

a constitutional monarchy with a sovereign parllament. The democratic system, however, is perched on
created

".,d dependency on foreign assistance. Its deveiopment or decay will depend largely on the ability of the elected representatives of the people to improve the lMng condition of th. -"""." and exploit the forest and water resources ofthe country for generation of wealth. It has built-in problems of ethnicity or nationality which can be resolved only with democracy at the local level, glving each ethnlc entity the right to govern itseH to tJle extent possible.
beautiful tiny kingdom of Bhutan, placid and peaceful day, is going tl.rough a potentially tearing conllict between the Drupkas who have the patronage of the palace and the Nepalis who are being thrown out as illegal migrants. Some 60,O0O Bhutanese of Nepali origin have taken shelter in a border district of Nepal, Jnaph, and are betng given some subsistence by the UN Refugee Relief Organisation.
_Jhc till the other

a feudal foundation, on mass poverty

h"lpl"""

ConJlict Resolttlton tn South

Asia

5l

Inter-State Conflicts
conflict which is over Kashmir. It has become each nation's symbol of national ettros-the Islamic fullilment of Pakistan and the secular-democratic state doctrine of India' Its solution by mutual bilateral negotiations will prove to be far from easy. There is a sharp element of irony in the Kashmir situation. After the Shimla Agreement of 1972' the Line of Control dividing the Indian and Pakistani parts of the state gained dejure recognition for 17 years. Itwas de-recognised in 1989 when the people of the valley of Kashmir rose in rebellion against India and received immediate military' logistical, political and moral support from Pakistan' Unlike in 1965. on this occasion, however, the Pal'iistanis did not despatch a large number of troops into the Valley provoldng a full-scale war wtth India' In 199O-9f , India and Pal'dstan engaged in rhetorical brinkmanship while their troops stood eye-to-eye along the Funjab and RaJasthan borders' But the Pakistani military cautioned the political leaders from the beginning against provoking India to war' With their help to the Kashmir militants, Pakistan staked its claim to the entire state, demanded a UN supervised plebiscite (ignoring ttre fact that the UN Security Council's resolution of 1948 was more unacceptable to it than to India). The two countries are thus locked in what is called' in strateg$c language, a low intensity conllict. It has been bleeding both countries, India more than Pakistan. India has posted half a million troops in the state and is spending Rs. 30 million a day to save it from the Jaws of Pakistan. The cost for Pakistan is not precisely known. However, the demand for an independent Kashmir is as unacceptable to Pakistan as it is to India though some Pakistanis now acknowledge that there can be no settlement without the free consent of the people of Kashmir. Pakistan can hardly snatch away from India the Valley with four million Mustms. 'Itre deadlock is, therefore, difftcult to

In South Asia, only India and Pakistan have a generic

52

Perspectiues on South Asra

is politically impossible for any Indian government to let the state go to Pakistan. Kashmir, therefore, threatens to freeze the relationship between the trvo major nations in Sou r Asia in a state of permanent tension and confrontauon. However, the cloudy sl$/ is not entirely without a silver lining. In recent years, several streams of unofficial dialo5gues have been flowing between pakistan and India with a view to influencing the two governmerrts to adopt a more flodble posiflon to relax the near-frozen relationship. An eminent former Pakistani diplomat has suggested a .,basket approach,', dividing the issues between the two countries into tbur 'baskets" and suggesting that these baskets be taken up according to an agreed priority, each basket, bearing positivi fruits of accord and under$tanding making lts own contribution to the overall relationship. lssues like the Siachin Glacier, the Wullar Dam, the Sir Creek naval boundary are easier to resolve. If their resolutiorr opens up trade, cultural and {nformation flows between the two neighbours, some shine will descend on the cloudy overall relationship. The Kashmir problem will eventually have to be settled more or less along the current line of control, perhaps giving Pakistan territorial concessions in certain specifiic areas, and opening up tJle border between the two .parts of Kashmir so that Kashmiris can travel and trade between them freely.

break except on the basis of give_and_take. pakistan is unable to give because of its national position and also because Kashmir is a gainful issue in its electoral politics. It

military intervention by a South Asian countr5r in the internal affalrs of another, either at the request of a beleaguered government or in a clandestine but easily discernible manner have added a sharp edge to regional conflicts. The Indtan despatch of a peace-keeping force to Sri Lanka in lgg7 was

Milttary Intervention In the late l98os and earl5r lggos, direct or indirect

Conflict Resotution in South Asia

53

legitimate because it was done at the specific request of the then Sri t ankan President. But the complex rdmifications of the intervention-the expansion of tJle force from 4,OOO to 1,OO,O0O, its long and costly military engagement with the LTTE, the role it played in Sri Lanka's internal politics like safeguarding the national election, and enabling the Colombo gou".n-"ttfto divert almost its entire military force to the South to reduce the JVP rebellion, the demand of Premadasa for the withdrawal of the IPKF immediately after his election as President and his dubbing the IPKF as an "occupafion army" and flnally and, tragically, the assassination of RaJiv Gandhi at the hands of a LTTE female suicide cadreconsfitute a melancholy episode from which all South Asian states have great lessons to learn.
No South Aslan count4r can afford its internal schisms to debauch to a stage when it has to solicit military intervenflon

from a neighbour or a distant government. Military

interventons, if at all essential as a measure of last resort, must be like a surgical operation, finished quickly and the knife sheathed as soon as the operation is over. Intervention by a regional peace-kegping force is far more constructive than intervention by a single nation, which in South Asia, can only be India. Intervention by an extra-regional force will not be acceptable to India unless India itself is included in the force or unless the UN is the intervening authority.
Indirect clandestine military operation in a neighbouring country leads to "pro:rqr wars- or low intensity conflicts. This is going on between India and Pakistan since the mid- l98os with the outbreak of tJle 'Khalistan' rebellion and, on a large scale, since the 1989 uprising in Kashmir. Indian denials notwithstanding, it would be idle to claim that India is doing nothing to pay Pakistan in its own coin. There are reports ttrat the ULFA rebels in Assam are training in Bangladesh and Chakma rebels in India. The reports are routinely denied by the respective governments, but thy go on

Perspectiue s on Sottth

Asia

appearing in the mass media and they do influence offlcial relaflons with one another.

End of the Cold War It is often mistakenly argued that the end of the Cold War has had no positive impact on Souttr Asia and that the region's own little cold war continues unabated. The facts are otherwise. Both India and Pakistan have lost their patron states whose generous transfer of weapons and spares kept the two armies batfle-fit. The cut-off of American military aid to Pakistan since October 1990 had diminished the army's war-making ability. India has lost the assured supply of 7O per cent of its weapons from the USSR as well as the supply of spares. All countries in South Asia are under pressure to reduce military expenditure. In lgg2-98, India cut its military budget in real terms by six per cent and Pakistan increased its own by an insignificant two per cent. As the end of the Cold War has ruled out a nuclear war between t]le US and Russia, so has it mled out a conventional war between Pakistan and India.
After the Cold War's end, the overall strategic situation in the South has improved. Relations between Nepal and India have never been better; India's relations with Bangladesh have improved in spite of the strain created by the issue of illegal migrations. President Premadasa, on a short visit to Delhi as chairman of SAARC in early Octob er 1992, declared that there were no conflictual trilateral issues between the two countries. Even SAARC has begun to move tentatively and falteringly towards the concept of a South Asian free trade area. Private investment from India has begun to flow into Nepal; trade between India and Bangladesh has been steadily increasing, and even Pakistan and India are buying and selling to one another in stealth. India and Sri Lanka have been discussing the prospects of expanding IndoLanka trade links.

Co4llict Resolution rn South Asia

55

India's position in the world has changed with the end of the Cold War. It is no longer seen as an ally of the USSR which is no more. India is now part of what once used to be called the "free world," or more precisely, the world capitalist economy. Its relations with the United States, Japan, Germany, tJ.e EC, Russia and countries of the Pacilic rim are improving and assuming more of an economic and technological context. Its market of 3OO million buyers of consumer durables, with 50 million Indians enjoying a lifestyle that is higher than that of the average American, will surely attract foreign investment sooner rather than later. Once India becomes rich, and its rate of GDP growth gets close to China's, the geo-human situation in South Asia will begin to change, and many of today's conflicts will yield to mutually beneficial cooperation.
For a while, the melancholy turn of events in the former USSR and Yugoslavia generated a false hope that all or most ethnic groups struggling for independence in South Asia would succeed in their objectives and that the multinational states of South Asia would break apart. Most Pakistanis were certain in 199O that nothing could stop the Kashmiri peoples'bid for separation from India or that Punjab will break away from India like Ukraine or Moldavia did from tl.e USSR. The separatist euphoria has already waned if it has not withered altogether. South Asian multinational state systems are fundamentally different from the way the USSR was created. No multinational state in South Asia is going to break up; the units are bound together by single civilisational ties; the states are strong enough to turn away the tide of separatism; no state is going to openly intervene to separate a limb from a neighbouring state.
However, the end of the Cold War has brought in waves of

democracy and self-determinatlon. These waves not only overthrew dictatorial or otherwise authoritarian regimes, they also built up pressures for the recognition of the right of self-determination of geographically and culturally

56

Perspectiaes on South Asia

identiflable ethnic groups or nationalities. The centre of conflict in South Asia will shift from the external to the internal though, in the peculiar ethnic overflow character of the region, demands and struggles of nationalities for democracy and self-determinafion, for equality and justice, will often strain inter-state relations.
The last but by no means the least constructive impact of the end of the cold war of South Asia is the, metamorphosis

is reconciled to the Chinese policy to simultaneously build friendly ties with Indla and Paftistan. The change in China's erstwhile posiUon on Kashmir and its present emphasis that Kashnrir is an issue to be setfled bilaterally between India and Pakistan (both regarded by China as friendly) through peaceful negotiations, and India's correct stand on the status of Tibet have helped cement Sino-Indian relations. A strong Confldence-Building Regime (CBR) has been erected along the Sino{ndian border ensuring that there no border incidents, while negotiatlons for the settlement of the long-disputed border have begun to show promise of success. The end of the Cold War has brought China to the Non-Aligned Movement as an observer.
interests and
Recommcndatlong
The nature and dimensions of South Asian conflicts have been discussed in detail in the foregoing sections. To sum up, the conflicts are of four tJpes, triggered by three causes. First, the generic conflict between India and Pakistan. Its hottest manlfestaflon is Kashnlir. Second, conllicts involving cross-border nationalities or ethnic groups like Tamils,

among the South Asian nations. India's relations with China have improved sigprificantly and are in the process of further improvement. What is most stgntficant is tllat India does not regard China's relations with Nepal, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka as hostile to its own

in the image of China

Confllct Control, M4nagcmcnt and Resolution: Pollcy

Nepalis and Bengali Muslims and Hindus. Third, inter-

Coqflict Resofutbn tn South Asia

DI

religious clashes. And fourth, demands and struggles for self-determination by nationalities or ethnic groups who have found their own still-to-be-recognised identity within the larger identity of the nation-states.

Then there are threat perceptions. At several defenceoriented seminars in Delhi held in recent times, delegates from the smaller South Asian countries reiterated that the large size of India's military power-army, air force and navy makes them feel threatened and insecure. There is
a hegemony, a perception ttrat has often been sustained by Indian diplomatic rhetoric or national behaviour. However, ttrreat perceptions alone do not make conflicts. They do render the building of mutual trust and confidence difficult. The territorial as5rmmetry of South Asia cannot be

the traditional South Asian perception of India as

wished away. India with its large size, huge population, common borders with China and Pakistan and a coastline that exposes it to (possible though not probable) attacks by naval powers must have a defence force that is considerable to be commensurate for its security. However, certain new policies adopted and pursued by India should reduce and mellow threat percepUons. India as the giant power in South Asia must build other concepts of securit5r-mutual security, collective security, adequate and not maximalist security. It must constantly ensure its neighbours that they have not only nothing to fear from it but everything to gain from its strength. Joint military exercises, a network of confidence-building measures, periodical meetings of defence chiefs and ministers and joint mechanisms for regional security against dmgs, arms peddlers and terrorism will reduce threat perceptions and generate mutual confidence. The concept of zero-sum relations must be totally and permanently banished from
South Asia. Resolution of lesser conflictual problems like Siachin, Sir

58

Perspecthses on South

Asia

Creek and the Wullar Dam will dlefinitely lower the threshold

of Pakistan's enemy perceptions of India. On this morethan-modest threshold of mutual confidence, opening of commercial, econornic, technological, cultural relaflons, even on a moderate scale, will strengthen mutual trust and confidence and build a mutual stake in peace. The mass media will have to abandon their sole concentration on building images of enmity and hostility. While differences and disputes will continue to be reported and commented upon, and the points of view of each projected to the other, the mass media should also report positive developments in

free flow of information between the neighbouring

other countries and give legittunate importance to the lowering of the conflict threshold. Of the utmost importance is the

democracies. Both India and Pakistan must abandon the language of confrontation, rejection, spite and hatred in favour of a language of restraint, of regard for one another's politlcal systems and cultural and social achievements. The current multi-channel unofficial dialogues and joint statements by eminent individuals of both countries urging a lowering of confrontation and even a modest opening to one another must be continued and expanded. Many more exchanges of scholars, Journalibts, artists and musicians, social workers, civil right acth'ist$, parliamentary delegations will help open up the long-closed minds of Indians and Pakistanis with regard to one another.

Mutually agreed reduction of force levels and military budgets together with confidence-building measures along the frontiers of t]le two countries will also reduce threat perceptions.
With regard to Kashmir, the only rational policy for both countries is to begin talks within the framework of the Shimla Agreement but without giving up either's well-known positions on other aspects of the issue. However, as the talks proceed, neither country should expect early progress

Co4llict Resoltttion in South Asia

59

towards a solution according to its own preferred positon. Oflicials and unofficial experts can work separately and,/ or together to explore various ways and means to build a regime in Kashmir that would be acceptable to both. In political life what is desirable is often not possible or attainable; hence the need for mutual compromise and accommodation. India cannot hand over the state of Jammu and Kashmir to Pakistan nor can pakistan abandon its national position on Kashmir. A compromise will have to be achieved, and the two countries must reconcile themselves to the reality that this will take time.
has brought its own part of Kashmir, specifically the Valley,

India cannot start serious talks with pakistan before it

under normal political conditions which means a political settlement with the Kashmiri Muslims and rejuvenating the democratic process. Once this has been attained-and it is not going to happen tomorrow-the Kashmiris on both sides may be taken in as a third party to the talks for a final settlement. Surely Jammu and Ladakh will refuse to accept a settlement that is weighted in favour of the Muslims or Pakistan. Nor can "Azad Kashmir" and the Northern Territories be excluded from the negotiafions process. An independent sovereign state of Kashmir will not be acceptable to either India or Pakistan, nor indeed to China in view of its possible repercussions on Tibet and Xinxiang. But a combined Kashmir of the Muslims on both sides with the ma)dmum autonomy and with equal ties with India and

trrst and conlidence between the two countries has been firmly established. Both Indians and Pakistanis will be sobered by the thought that a war alone muted the Kashmir issue for lZ years. They cannot afford to risk another war to resolve the issue .,once and for ever", as some people in both countries someumes suggest. Territorial disputes have taken many yers ro resolve elsewhere in the world. Once the two countries agree that the issue is disputed and must be settled peacefully

Pakistan looks like an ideal solution once

60

Perspectives on South Asta

through negotiations, time should be hugged as an ally and a helper not an enemy and an obstructor.

On the nuclear issue, both countries find themselves grtdlocked to their national posltions. For India, the nuclear programme and the elusive'option" with capability to make the bomb proven, constitute a sJrmbol of national status. India exploded the device in 1974, in response to China going nuclear a decade before. Did Indira Gandhi anilclpate that tl'.e Indian explosion would immediately trigger a Palrristani resolve to acquire nuclear capability whatever the cost? Now that both countries have acquired capability' their flrst task is to mutually freeze this capability and ensure that no weaponisation takes place in either nation. India will not find it possible to sign tl.e NPT without a compensating status symbol which may be permanent membership of the UN Security Council.
The immediate task is to make South Asia nuclear safe if it cannot be made nuclear-free. A nuclear-safe region would require India and Pakistan to sign a series of bilateral agreements freezlng their capability at the present level, pledging not to use their capability against one another, providing mutual inspecfion of, one or more nuclear plants in etther country, adopting an open skies policy, and initiating cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear energ5/, particularly in the field of medicine. In the case of conflicts emanating from spill-over of ettrnic groups across borders, a three-pronged approach to control, management and resolution needs to be adopted' Firstly' naflonal governments must find all ways and means to give

the maximum posslble political satisfaction to ethnic

minorities demanding self-government or "independence". Empirical studies show that refusal on the part of those in power to grant moderate demands of democratic self-rule pushes ttre concerned groups, or their youth fringes to armed extremism. Armed militancy is relaflvely easy in the

Conflict Resolution in South Asia

6l

present world where regions and nations are awash with arms; there is a huge open arms bazaar, and almost each nationality has a diaspora that can come to its aid with arms and funds.
Once a conflict has broken out, care must be taken to insulate the overflowing ethnic groups in the neighbouring country from getting involved. This is a very difficult task but no South Asian country must allow its territory to be used against the interest and security of a neighbouring countr5r. The governments of involved neigfibouring countries must frequenfly consult with one another and set up a joint body to arrest spill-over effects. South Asians have to realise that language, religion and cultural heritage are human properties divided between and among natons on a permanent basis. The French do not regard the French-speaking Belgians as their kith and kin, nor intewene on their behalf in Belgium's internal turmoils. The Arabs with the same religion and language and cultural heritage are divided into many nation-states. Pakistan's "concern" for the Muslims of India is an indirect intervention in the latter's internal affairs. India has far more Muslims than Pakistan. There is hardly a day or a month when Muslims are not killing Muslims in Islamic countries or an Islamic state is not flghting another Islamic state.

Empirical research shows that communal riots do not break out but are provoked and created by interested and motivated political or bigoted religious people. These riots are easy to prevent and easier to bring under control provided the government and communities act with will and determination. Creation of inter -communal bodies in sensitive areas to act as watchdogs of communal peace, building volunteer groups who will be mobilised for immediate intervention as soon as there is a sign of a bushfire, settlement of disputes by arbitration, mediation and compromise outside courts of law, permanent lines of

62

Perspectiues on South Asia

communication and dialogue between unfriendly

communifies, and civilized, humane behaviour on the part of the police are some of the measures that should be but are not taken because politicians often believe that communal riots are politically gainful: they divert people's minds from major social and economic issues, and they are electorally profitable.
Dialogue at offfcial and unofflcial levels is of gpeat value to

reduce tensions and promote mutual and multilateral understanding. In South Asia there are several streams of
dialogues between India and Pakistan, each seMng a useful and desirable end. These dialogues contribute towards confidence-building measures being adopted by the two governments. We must realise that there will be a lot of public posturing together with negotiations at summits, between officials and in tl.e corridors of power for a long tlme before India-Paldstan relations can be brought to a
However, the South Asian Dialogue has its own distinctive contribudon to make to improve the overall climate of human minds in this region of massive humanities. llee South Asian Dialogue does not speak from country positlons, its search is for the region's true and abiding interests. It brings regional ouflooks to bear upon individual issues, but, more importantly, seeks to set directions in which the rulers as well as the elites must project their minds in the post-Cold War period if they really wish to improve the lot of over a billion people. It will be a long hard slog, but that must not daunt the pathbreakers to peace, regional understanding and cooperation.

Along with the South Asian Dialogue, the time has come to set up bilateral dialogues between India and its smaller neig;hbours. We must now take up seriously the task of setdng up regular perlodical dialogues between India and Sri Lanka, India and Bangladesh and India and Nepal.

Conflict Resolution rn South Asra

63

Our persistent efforts must induce the governments of South Asia to commit themselves to a set of inviolable principles governing bilateral and regional relations. The seven essential principles to be adopted are:
There shall be no military conflict or war between countries of South Asia. The region should proceed towards tJle conclusion of a regional no-war pact.
2. No South Asian countr5r must allow its territory to be used against the internal and external interests of another.
3. No South Asian country must intervene in the internal affairs of another.

l.

good-neigfrbourly negotiations. Each South Asian count4r must display maximum understandinA of the other,s difficulties and problems

will be solved bilaterally or multilaterally through peaceful

4. Issues affecting overflowing groups or illegal migrations

5. The South Asian countries must set up in the near future a Regional Security Consultative Council which wlll discuss and resolve all conflictual issues, determine agreed level of arms and military expenditures and mechanisms to settle territorial and other disputes as and when they arise. The prime ministers and executive presidents will attend the meetings of the Council which should meet twice a vear. with their foreign and defence ministers. 6. The South Asian countries must abhor and reject all kinds of weapons of mass destruction including nuclear. chemical, bacteriological weapons, and meticuloislv avoid running arms races.
7. There should be set up as soon as possible a South Asian Environmental Council to take care of environmental needs of the region.

64

Perspecttues on South Asta

END NOTES
I

The polifical history of the Sotrth Asian countries mirrors the

changed from a parliamentary democratic model to a presidential one in 1977. Eangiadesh, started in 7972 as a parliamentary democracy, came under a single-party presidential regime, and then under military rule in 1975' iollowed by a presidential form of military rule, and recently' after the fall of General Ershad, decided to revert to parliamentary democracy. Nepal changed to constitutional monarchY after an uprising. 2. The 1948 war between India and Pakistan in Kashmir; the 1962 border war between India and China; the 1965 IndiaPakistan war over Kashmir; and the 1971 war between Pakistan, the Bangladesh Mukti Vahini (liberation force) and India in East Pakistan' The small war was fought between India and Pakistan in early 1965 in the Rann of Kutch, on the west coast of the subcontinent'

region's diversitles. India has remained a parliamentary democracy except for a short period of 18 months from lg75-77 when civil liberties were suspended and an Emergency regime was proclaimed. Pakistan has been under direct military or bureaucratic-military rule for the better part of its history. It has had three constituflons and three democratic parliamentary governments, the first, after the 1972 elections, for three years, and the second, after the 1988 elections and the third from l99l to July 1993' The first democratic government followed the defeat of the Pakistani army in Bangladesh and the resignation of General Yahya Khan as President; the second followed the death of General Ziaul Haq in a plane crash in 1987' Srt Lanka

3.

IndiaDeJence Reuieu) makes the interesting claim that "there is a neat arrangement worked out between China' Pakistan and India in the matter of guided weapons (GW) development and thereafter deployment as and when a given system fructifies... -The arrangement works thus: China develops a comprehensive range of GW system of the first generauon wittr- some help from outside. To partially make up for the large amount of funds spent and also to earn prestge and influence, it sells some missiles to Pakistan together with

Coqflict Resoltttion in South Asia

65

and for developing methods of evaluation that could potentially substitute for subsequent operational flights. New t5pes of US ICBMs typically undergo some two dozen or more deployment.' Susan M. Burns, .,Arms Limitations," in Stephen P. Cohen, (ed.l, Nuclear prolikration in South Asra: The Prospects Jor Arms Control, lnndon: Westview press, f991, p. L42. lndian arrd pakistani nuclear capability has imparted a new dimension to the two countries' fledging missiles arsenal. At the same time, the persian Gulf war has made ultramodern features of weapon system the goal of most countries." S. Adhikari, "Missiles proliferation in Third World," Indian Journol oJ Strategic Studies, vol. xvi, special issue on Gulf Crisis, 1991, pp. ISS-144.

designs, know-how and components. India does not make more than cosmetic noises of protest. It develops its own GW systems. There are no protests from China, See, ,.More Missiles," Indian DeJence Reuieu. 1989. pp. 2O7 -2Og.lndia has test-ffred three ballistic missiles of which one, Agni, is of an intermediate range (IRBM). An American specialist wrote in 1991, 'A single test, or even a few, of India,s Agni IRJiM provides an insufficient database for both assessing reliability

4. For a

detailed analysis of cross-border ethnic flows, and each South Asian country's ability to create domestic

1988, Chapter l. For more comprehensive studies, see, Partha Ghosh, Cooperation and Conflict in South Asia, New Delhi: Manohar, 1989; Urmila Phadnis, EthnicitA and. Ncrtion Building tn South Asta, New Delhi: Sage publications, lggo; Bhabani Sen Gupta, (ed.), Regionol Cooperation rr South Asra, Vol. I & II, New Delhi: South Asia publishers, 198g.

problems for at least one other regional country, see Bhabani Sen Cupta, SottlhAsiant Perspectiues: SeuenNattons in Conlict and Cooperation, New Delhi: B.R, publishing Corporation,

5. For a comprehensive critique of the

IpKF operations, see,

S.C. Sardeshpande, Assignment Jaffna. New Delhi: 1992. The author says that the force was poorly conceived and it had to operate entirely without experience offighting guerilla forces. See also, Bhabani Sen Gupta, op. cit., Chapter 6, K. Subramanyam, "The IPKF Expedition Not All in Vain," The Times oJ India, l3 June 1989.

66

Perspectiues on South Asin

6. The Indian hegemonic posture is the subject of continuing

criticism and attack in Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Nepal. It is conceded and criticised by some Indian analysts, but denied or defended by others. As samples of Pakistani perceptions, See Mushahid Flussain, "India's Bully-on-theblock Mentality," The Natton, 23 April l99O and Akhtar MaJeed, "India's Security Perspectives in the l99Os," Astan Surueg, November 1990. For a sample of Nepali perspectives, Dhurba Kumar, Souit Arms to Indkr and lmplications on Regional Seatritg, Kathmandu: Centre for Nepal and Asian Studies, March 1985. A Sri Lankan analyst wrote in 1989 *Time and again the smaller nations of South Asia have had it drilled into them that they must not cease to remember the geopolitical realities of having to peacefully co-exist with their giant Indian neighbour...Sri l,anka is at present in the thores of the agony of being gradually swallowed up ... Considering what is happeniqg today and India's hegemonic ambitions, if a dismembered India is brought into being, then only could her smaller neighbours live without fear." Swtdag Times,23 April 1989. For the Indian side, see Saeed Naqvi, 'superpowers have endorsed Indiana in South Asia," The Telegraph. l9 August 1987; Sunanda K. Datta Ray,
"South Asia Under an Indian Version of the Monroe Doctrine,"

lnternational Herald Tribune reproduced

ln

Nrrlua-i-WoLqt,

l,ahore (in English), 2l April 1989; Bhabani Sen Gupta, "An Indian Security Doctrine," IndiaTodog. l5 September 1984'

7. World Military Expenditures qnd Arms Transfers

1989,

Washington D.C. pp. 3-4. "Sputh Asian armed forces grew at arr overall rate of 1.7 per cent during the decade. However, after the peak in 1985, growth declined to 0.5 per cent. Armed forces in India, the trargest in South Asia, began decreasing during the second half of the decade and in f 988, fell 9,3 per cent. Simllariy, Pakistani armed forces, which have been in a state of decline since 1984, experienced a sharp decrease of I5.4 pet cent in 1988. Despite such cutbacks in the two largest armed forces of South Asia, it is uncertain if these changes reflect a lessenlng oftensions and conflicts within the region." Ibid., p. 4, At the end of the decade, India became the largest single arms importer in the thirld world after Iraq, p. 1O.

Conflict Resolution in South Asra

67

8.

Ieonard Spector, Going Nuclear, Cambridge: Mass, Ballinger Publlshing Company, f987, pp. 73-rOO. There is now a considerable quanuty of literature on Indian and Pakistani nuclear progFtrmmes written in India and the United States (with fewer than half a dozen publications in Pakistan). See Stephen P. Cohen, (ed.), Nuclear ProliJeration in South Asrc: The Prospects Jor Arms Control, London: WesMew Press, l99l; Rodney Jones, Smcll Nuclear Potuers, Washington Papers No. lO3, Washington D.C. 1984; K Subramanyam, (ed.l, Nuclear MAtts and Realities, New Delhi: 1984; Roberta Wohlstetter, The Buddha Smiles: Absent-Minded Peacejtl Aid. and the Indinn Bon7b, Monograph I, Energr Research and Development Administration, Contract No. (49-l)-1747, f O April f977; RaJa Ramanna, Years oJ Pilgrimage, Penguin India, l99l; Ravi Rikhye, Militarization oJ Mother India, New Delhi: 1990, S. Rashid Naim, Asra's Day Ajter: Ntrclear War BetLoeen India and Pakistan, Office of Arms Control, Disarmament and International Securitv, Universitv of Illinois, 1985.

9.

pp. 1Ol-119. For Indian perceptions of the Paklstani bomb, see Maj.Gen. D.K. Palit and P.K.S Namboodiri, Pakistan's Islamic Bomb, New Delhi: Vikas
Spector, Ibid.,

Publications 1979.

tO. R.R. Subramanian, Indio, Paktstdn, Chino: DeJence and

Nuclear Tnangle in South Asia, New Delhi: ABC Publishing House, 1989, pp. 49-5O. I

1. Shireen Mazari, "Nuclear Issues: Options for Pakistan," Strdtegic Perspectiues, Islamabad: Institute of Strategic
Studies, Vol. I, Summer 1991, pp. 4f -49.

12. The Netus,l,ahore edition, 9 November 1991.

13. A policy case against India going nuclear is made in Bhabani Sen Gupta, Nuclear Weapons? Policg Options Jor India, New Delhi: Sage Publications for Centre for Policy Research, r985.

14. See interview with General K. Sundarii. Indirt Todau. January 1992.

15

South Asia: Politicised Ethnicity; Problems of Human Rights ; and Environmental

Issues
K.M. de Silua, G.H. Peiris and Radhika Coomnrasusamg

Sectron

POLITICISED ETI"INICITY

K.M. de Silua

Introduction
This paper deals with three related and vitally important issues in South Asia. This region has some of the most intractable political conflicts of any part of the world, and at three levels: international, national and subnational. The issues we deal with are politicised ethnicity and conflict resolution; problems of human rights; and environmenta,l issues. The sources of conflict are as much social and

Etfuiicitg: Human Rights: and Enuironment

69

government forces and separatist and other opposition forces as well. G.H. Peiris's review of environmental issues in section III shows how massive increases in population in most parts of South Asia, among other problems, have resulted in a persistent pressure on resources. This in turn raises the political temperature both within the countries of the region and often, in their relations with each other.

is as Radhika Coomaraswamy shows in section II of this chapter, a widespread violation of human rights by

economic as they are political. They are as much internal as tJrey are cross-national. The inevitable result of these conflicts

Confllct Resolution
The reality of internal struggle, the potential for external conflict and the prospect of bloodshed on an enormous scale are greater in South Asia than in most other parts of Asia with the possible exception of the Middle East. We need to remind ourselves that no ethnic or religious conflict in

recent times has resulted in greater carnage and destruction than the Hindu-Muslim rivalry that led to the partition of India in 1947, It caused between 5OO,OOO .rrd t *illio., deaths and resulted in nearly lb million refugees, enormous numbers given the population of the rq of about 42O million at that time.
Some of tJle problems we confront are unique. No region in any part of the developing world is dominated by a sin$e state, in population, in armed might and in the size of the economy, as India dominates South Asia. Thus the very vastness of India is a central feature of any study of conflict

situations and conllict resolution in South Asia. To complicate matters even further, each of India,s neighbours has minoriff groups with linguisuc, religious or cultural ties with gro.rp" in India, or aspire to establish such ties with them. India has been, and is, in a positon to exploit ttrese links to its advantage or the disadvantage of its neighbours wherever it wants to. r In one instance, however, India's neiAhbour

70

Perspecttues on South

Asia

Pakistan has been able to exploit such ethnic or religious ties with Kashmiris to her (India's) discomfiture. South Asia ls a geographical oddity not only due to the overwhelming dominance of India, but also because it is virtually impossible to demarcate a distinct boundary on two of the four sides of this large sub-continental landmass. To the north lies the Himalayan frontier and beyond it China and, up to very recently, the Soviet Union but now ttre various 'istans', including the Islamic states of Central Asia. To the north and north-west lies the Islamic worid. To the north-east and east is Myanmar (Burma)-in part a buffer and in part a link between South and South-East Asia. Myanmar was part of the British rq, and many of its current problems are rooted in its colonial past, just as some of India's problems in the north-east stem from the conquest and absorption of Burma. OnIy in the south where the sub-continental landmass tapers down into a triangular form do we find a distinct and undisputed boundary-the sea around South Asia. The Himalayas are geographically an unmistakable boundary, but politically they are in dispute' The Legacy of Colonialism

national and subnational-either go back to the region's colonial past or are rooted in the manner independence was attained such as the problems between India and Pakistan flowing from the partition of the rcg. India, Pakistan, Ban$adesh and Burma (now Myanmar) were all part of the rq. Of the ottrer lbur SAARC countries two were peripherally linked to the rq: Nepal and Bhutan. Sri Lanka, Iike the Maldives, was independent of the rqi and was controlled by the Colonial Office. The Maldives had a tutelary relatlonship with Whttehall through the Governor of Ceylon (Sri Lanka). All the successor 6tates of the rq have inherited border problems from ttre rq, which bring them into conflict with neighbourtng states (India and China' for instance and, to a

The origins of many conflicts in South Asia-international,

ELhnlci!: Human Rrghts: and Enuironment

7l

lesser extent in terms of the violence it has generated, Pakistan and Afghanistan) or with each other (lndia and
Pakistan, and Ban$adesh and Myanmar). Post-Independence definition or re-definition of boundaries also brings these states into disputes with neighbours (India and China) or over resources such as irrigation works (India and Pakistan) and river waters (india and Bangladesh not to mention India and Paldstan).

The fact tllat the hosfllity between India and Pakistan

looms so large in the South Asian political landscape should not divert attention from the domestic tensions which are. in fact, more sigpilicant as threats to ttre political stability of

many countries in the region. All too often these domesflc tensions spill over borders into neighbouring states and trigg;er inter-state conflicts: the conflict between India and Pakistan which led to the creation of Bangladesh; the Kashmir imbroglio which has resulted in three wars between Pahistan and India; and the problems of Sri Lanka's north and east which attracted Indian intervention. In the mid and late 194Os these internal tensions had resulted in the partition of the rq and the establishment of Pakistan-the triumph of naflonalism linked with religion; less than twenty four years later, there was the creation of Bangladesh, the triumph of linguistic nationalism. With the current salience of Hindu fundamentalism in India, with its insistence that being a Hindu is the dellning principle of being an Indian, the interplay of religion and nationalism has come full circle. Hindu 'fundamentalism' is now a mass movement in India, and given the size of Hindu India-Hind.ufua-its demands and claims have provoked in turn, similar reactions from Muslims. Sikhs. and to a lesser extent from Buddhists and Christians.2 As the recent events in Ayodhya demonstrate, the communal violence they set in motion in so many parts of the country poses a grave threat to the stability of the Indian polity, both through further rounds of violence between Hindu and Muslim. and in ttre alienation

Perspectiues on Soufh Asia

of Indian Muslims.

The recrudescence of politicised religion in the

contemporary public life of India is an appropriate point of departure for a brief reference to an aspect of religion which deserves more attenUon from South Asian scholars and politicians than it has received so far-the threat to the survival of Buddhism in the Himalayan region. The parlous state of Buddhism in Tibet is, of course, the core of the problem. Many Buddhist monasteries, and other sites of religious significance to Buddhlsts, have been destroyed by the Chinese, and even those that survive do so under severe restrictions. The Chinese see Tibetan Buddhist monasteries as centres of resistance to their control over Tibet. Tibet's problems are beyond the scope of South Asian conflict resoluton, but many aspects of the survival of Himalayan Buddhism are very much within its scope, beginning with the threats to the survival of Buddhism in Ladakh, and the decline of Buddhism in Sikkim under Indian rule. Bhutan, of course, remains a Buddhist kingdom, but one aspect of the present conJlict between the Bhutanese and Nepali minority is the perceived threat to Bhutan's Buddhist society from an inflr-rx of Hindus. Beyond the Himalayas and on to the Chittagong Hill Tracts of Bangladesh we confront the threatened position of that country's Buddhist minority.3

Polltlcs and Ethnicity The political establishments in all of South Asia are embroiled in protracted conflicts with ethnic and religious minori es who seek to resist the expanding powers and demands of the state, Often tl-e pluralist reality of ethnic and cultural conffgurations is overshadowed by assertions of a homogenetic identity within the boundaries of these post-colonial states. The post-Independence states of the region bear the marks of their colonial origins through the processes of pre-colonial consolidation and expansion, and of state building which they have inherited. The new rulers

EthnicitA: Human Rights; and Enuironrnent

73

as legal heirs of their colonialist predecessors often disregard indigenous forces such as language, culture, religion and ethnicity with the same insouciance. As a result conflicts over identity are a major, if not the principal, source of internal tensions in India, Sri Lanka, and pakistan, in that

order.

religion and ethnicity stemming from pre-colonial times, and acting separately or in combination, have assumed the proportions of explosive forces threatening the stability of the post-Independence political settlement. The successor states which are intent on preserving their inheritance unchanged confront separatist forces immanent in these powerful but contradictory processes of state building on the foundation of colonial and pre-colonial structures. The minority ethnic resistance takes the form, more often than not, of separatist movements seeking the creation of new states in which the minorit5z could convert itself into a majority. Thus separatism is as much the result of the processes of imposing colonial rule in these regions, as it is a result of the re-emergence of powerful pre-colonial forces seeking a political identity coincident with language, and culture, and/or with religion. While separatism appears to be endemic in South Asia and could be and is a powerful destabilizing force, it has generally been held at bay by an even more powerful force: Asian natonalism embodied in the post-colonial state system of Asia. It would be true to say that, up to very recently, the great obstacle that separatist movements in re third world faced was a general hostility to disturbing the srarus quo. Because practically everyone is vulnerable to the pull of indigenous and often external forces it was seen to be in everyone's interest to help edsting post-colonial nationstates to resist tlrreats to their integiity from indigenous and external separatist forces.

The current reality in South Asia is that language, culture,

Persoectiues on South Asra

A general reluctance to disturb the stahrs quo embodied in the boundaries of the post-colonial state system however, did not prwent or even inhibit involvements in ethnic conflicts tn neighbouring states. India's intervention in Sri Lanka's ethnic conflict, Pakistan:s covert involvement in the affairs of tJle Punjab, or India's in Sind are examples. And of course there was the classic case of a regional power's successful exploitation of ethnic conflict [n a neighbouring state to its own strategic advantage, the events that led to the

dismemberment

of Pakistan-in its original political

1.4

manifestation in I97

In the current international environment of the end of the Cold War, this tolerance of the sanctity of boundaries, even when they are seen to be manifestly disputed boundaries is likely to fade away and so too the general reluctance to countenance separatlsm, or to treat it as a legitimate force. A world which accepts the dismemberment of the former Yugoslavia-a balkanization of the Balkans-is hardly likely to give as much thought as in the past to the political consequences of changes in international boundaries in the post-colonial world. The rulers of most post-colonial states will have to learn to live with that.

Mlgratlons: Colonial and Po$t-Colonial

Migration of population from the rq1 and within it, some of it voluntary and some of it involuntary, has contributed to tensions among and within the states of South Asia, and among their neigfrbours. Ttre voluntary demographic shifts could be divided into two chronologically distinct categories; some go back to colonial times and others are postIndependence. The r4F was treated as a vast reservoir of labour which ttre British tapped for despatch to colonies as far away as Guyana in the Caribbean, Piji in the Paciflc, Natal in South Africa, and to Mauritius in the Indian Ocean region, and closer home, to Sri Lanka, Myanmar and Malaya wherever there was a shortage of labour, an early form of

Ethnicifu; Human Rights: and Environment

75

transnational transfer of population.6 Indian communities that emerged from these voluntary migraUons have remained behind in the receiving colonies. Questions relating to ttreir political status have led to prolonged and acrimonious disputes between the successor governments to the rq and the host territories, with Sri Lanka and Myanmar being the most prominent examples in South Asia.
Presently, voluntary population shifts within India are far more siginificant, for ttre tensions they generate, than issues relating to the political status of the Indian community in neighbouring states.T In India's north-east for instance, Hindu and Muslim, Bengali-speaking groups, have moved from densely populated parts of Eastern India and from Bangladesh (former East Pakistan) into the relatively underpopulated Assam and the neighbouring region. These movements have continued after Independence in the form of illicit or illegal migration and have contributed to an upsurge of separatist agitations provoked by opposition to outsiders from Pakistan before 1971, and thereafter from Bang;ladesh in Assam. In one of the most densely populated parts of the world, it is natural for people to move out of their own regions or countries in search of living space if not a better life. Thus some of the comparatively underpopulated parts of South Asia have acted as a magnet for illegal miggants. Bhutan which is host to a large migrant population from Nepal is one example, and the other was the illicit immigration to Sri Lanka from the coasts of Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh. The latter has recently stopped only because the conditions of virtual civil war in the north of the island make migrailon there a singularly dangerous proposition.

The involuntary movements of population-refugees or displaced persons are associated with cataclysmic political events such as the partition of the rqi in 1947; the Chinese government clamping down on Tibet's autonomy and Buddhist culture in the late 194Os and early l95os; and the crea on of Bangladesh in 1971, or ethnic conflict as in the

76

Perspectiues on South Asra

in Afghanistan. The consequences that flow from these

movements of refugees are familar to students of the subject,

case of Tamils from Sri Lanka after l9B3; and the civil war

but tlie point is that in the South Asian context, they are historically-conditioned.s In most instances the response of
the host society is ambivalent at best and in some instances such as with the Biharis in Bangladesh they are treated as a burden on the host society while they themselves yearn for a home in Pakistan. The governtrnents of pakistan have been

Bangladesh back into the country. In contrast pakistan has provided a haven for nearly 5 million Afghan refugees, about a third of the population of Afghanistan, one of the largest refugee flows into a single country in recent times. These refugees unlike those displaced by the partition of the rq in 1947 and accommodated in both India and pakistan, regard themselves as temporary sojourners who have every intention of going back to Afghanistan whenever the situation there permits them to do so.s

reluctant, up to now, to bring the Biharis stranded in

The current political reality with several major trouble spots in South Asia associated with separatist agitation, makes the situation even more dangerous for regional and global political stability. The principal separatist trouble spots in India-Kashmir, Punjab, Assam-are all border states which adds to the volatility of the situailon. The north and east of Sri l,anka, Sind, Baluchistan and the North West Frontier province of pakistan are also border regions, if not states. Many among these have the potential for cross_ border tensions.
How does one resolve these conflicts, distil and develop proposals that can help to ameliorate them, and promote political, economic and social conditions that enhance the prospects of regional and global stability? If we are to develop appropriate conflict resolution policies, we need to understand the complex nature of most of these conflicts and to analyse them in their multiple contexts. The flrst

EtlnicitA: Human Rights; and Enuironment

77

necessit5r is to understand the underlying factors that produce ethnic conflict and, above all, armed separatist movements in general, which is hard enough. But the situafion is rendered all ttre more difficult because South Asian separatism now draws inspiration and, on occasion, support from similar movements elsewhere in the world. The crumbling of the former yugoslavia and the break_up of the former Soviet Union, gave fresh hope to South Asian separatist groups operating in other parts of the world, especially some diaspora associations of dissident South Asian ethnic minorities living in western countries.
END NOTES

* This part of the present paper is a revised and shortened version of a paper on Conflict Resolution in South Asia
presented at the Second South Asia Dialogue held in Kandy, Sri Lanka, in November 19g2. The article was subsequenflv published in Journal oJ Group Rrghts, Vol.l, tSS+. pp. Z+i_ 267 and in Luc Van de Goor et al., (ed,l, Bettoeen Deuelopment and Destruction: An Enquiry into ttre Causes of Conflict in Post Colonial Sfales, London: Macmillarl, f 996, pp. 2gb-32}.

l.

See, Partha, S. Ghosh, Cooperotion

Asrla, New Delhi: Manohar, 1989. Urmila

and Conjict in South

Sage

Publications, 1989.

and Natton Building rn South Asta, New Delhi:

phadnis, EthnicitA

2,

For discussion of this important theme, see prasenjit Duara, "The New Politics of Hinduism,', ?he Wilson euarterly, lb:3,

1991, pp. 42.52; Ainslee T. Embree, Iltopios

of Modern Hinduism as a Concepl and as Institution,.f n D. Gunther Sonttreimer and Kulke Herman, (eds.), Hrnduism Reconsidered, New Delhi; Manohar publishers, l9gg, pp. 29-49; Bruce D. Graham, Hindu Ncrtionatism and" Indian Polit[cs: The Origin and- Deuelopment af tLe Bharatiga Jana Sangh, Cambridge: Cambridge University press, Ig90, Romila Thapar, "lmagined Religious Communities? Ancient India and the Modern Search for Hindu Identitie s" , Modern Asian

Religinn and Nationali.smin Modern India, Berkeley: University of California Press, 199O, R.E, Frykenberg, .The Emergence

in

Conltict:

7a

Perspectiues on South Asi,a

studiras, 23:2' $a9' pp' 209-31 and "S1'ndicated Moksha'" Seminal September 1985, pp. 14-22.

3. See

B. Chaudhuri, "Ethnic Conflict in the Chittagong Hill Tracts of Bangladesh", in S'W.R' de A. Samarasinghe' and R. Coughlan, Economic Dinensions oJfEthnic Coryflict, london: Frances Pinter, 1991, PP. 135-f55.

4. See, Richard Sisson and Leo E. Rose, War and Secessiron:

India, Pakistan and the Credtion oJ Bangladesh. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990. 5. For a recent discussion of this theme see, Christopher Z' Guilmoto, 'The Tamil Migration Cycle, 1830-1950"' Economic and"PoliticolWeeklg, 16-23 January 1993, pp. I r l-l l9 This article has a very comprehensive bibliography.

6. The other

source of supply was, of course, Chinese labour from southern China.

7. In both

countries this problem is now a minor issue. The Burmese took a much tougher stand against their Indian minority than Sri Lanka where a settlement was reached after long drawn out negotiations. analysis of some of these problems see Myron Weiner, "Rejected People and Unwanted Migrants in South Asia", Economic and Polttical Weeklg' 2l August -1993, pp. 1737-1746.

8. For a perceptive

9. On the effects of the Afghan conflict on Pakistan' see M. Isaphani, "Pakistan: Dimensions of Insecurity," Adelphi
Papers 246, london: Brasse/s for the International Instltute

Rogers, "Harbouring Instability: Pakistan and the Displacement of Afghans" in K.M. de Silva & R.J. May, (eds.), The Intenatinndlizotion oJ Etttnic ConJlict, London; Frances Pinter, 1991, pp.58-75'

for Strategic Studies, 1990; Tom

Ethnici!: Human Righls: and Enuironment

79

Section

II

HUMAN RIGHTS Radhika CoomarasutamA

The 198Os and the 1990s were exciting decades with regard to human rights development in the South Asian region. On the one hand these decades saw the rise of electoral politics and the election of parliamentary heads of governments in Pakistan, Bangladesh and Nepal. In India innovations with regard to the Judiciary saw the rise of social ac on litigation where economic and social issues were brought to the portals of the Supreme Court by activists on behalf of victims who had been denied their fundamental rights. The demonstration effect of the Indian judiciary appeared to influence Sri l,anka where in the famous Boosa case the court recognised the practice of social action litigation.

The decades were full of promise but certain other developments showed a darker side. The growth of secessionist movements which fundamentally challenged the state with the use of violence led to a great deal of human rights abuses by state and non-state actors. The violence began to dominate life in Sri Lanka which remains in the throes of a civil war. The same movements in Kashmir, Assam, Mizoram and PunJab threatened the security of the Indian state. These violent confrontations between state and non-state actors led to a complete breakdown of civil administration when human rights violations became common place. A citizenry caught in the middle were denied all access to courts, subject to arbitrary arrest and detention
as well as disappearances. Loyalty to a cause was valued as being more important than the process of civil and political

Persoectiue s on South Asia

vindication of human rights. While there was much to celebrate in Paldstan, Bangladesh and Nepal, the traditional
democracies of South Asia, India and Sri Lanka were facing insurrecfions in parts of their countries threatenirrg the social fabric and leading to cycles of violence and counterviolence. In addition, in Sri Lanka traditional democratic rights were also under threat by elected governments determined to keep their parliamentary majority.

At the World Congress on Human Rights held in June

1993 at Vienna, some of the Asian governments put forward

the argument that in Asia(a) economic and social rights are as important as civil and political rights; (b) collective rights are more important than individual rights.

This information was challenged by human rights groups who stressed the indivisibility of the human rigfits documents of international law. This formulation supported in part by the governments of South Asia displayed a distrust of essential human rights values in the contet of Asian developments. There is a concerted attempt to downplay civil and political rights which the government feels are the concern of western states and which have in recent times dominated discourse about the granting of aid to Asian regimes. However, regardless of the theory, in practice human rights have become an important part of political tensions in Souti Asia.

The countries of South Asia have increasingly become market oriented and aid dependent. This poses a fundamental dilemma. On the one hand they wish to assert national
sovereignty. On the other hand, they do not have the complete independence to dictate terms to the West. With the Aid donors becoming increasingly sensitive to the human rights

EtfnicitV:

Hwutl

Righfs: and. Entsironment

8r

Iobby and humanitarian groups, especially after the fall of Eastern Europe, the Asian countries are concerned that economic development in their societies will be adversely affected by human rights reporting. This has led to a confrontation position when it comes to civil and political human rights.
The link between Aid and human rights will be one of the main issues that will be debated at the international level. For human rights groups working in South Asia, this poses a major challenge. Many of the groups are opposed to the linkage between Aid and human rights, while others feel that the Aid linkage is an important weapon in the imposition of international human rights standards on Asian governments. The Aid linkage would be less suspect if there is an obJective judicial body which evaluates the performance of governments. At the moment the evaluation is ad. hoc and based on donor selectivity leading to certain arbitrary actions by the donor community. The need for an objective process such as a tribunal may be one way to resolve the debate between those human rights groups which oppose the Aid linkage and those that do not. Regardless of the debate at the international level, there are those who believe that the next decade will witness a different type of human rights debate within South Asian nation-states. Holding the state accountable for human r'ights problems will only be one aspect of a far greater problem. The real threat to human rights in the l99Os comes from movements in civil society which are nationalist, or fundamentalist in their approach to political issues. Ttrese movements which value loyalty to an ethnic group or religious formation as the most important political value will increasingly clash with movements which base their conviction on human rights. This contestation between the forces of democracy, human rights and secularism on the one hand, and the forces of ethnic bonding and religious fundamentalism on the other will be the primary debate of

82

Persoectiues on South Asla

the year 2OOO. The incident at Ayodhya captures the essence of this new South Asian phenomenon and is a harbinger of the type of issues which will be debated in the next decade.

In battling the state while engaging in the contest in civil society, human rights groups appear to be losing ground to other ideologies. Ttre traditional model for human rights is ttre individual pitted against the state before the judiciary. On the other hand, groups which advocate nation and religion are capable of mass mobilisation along the lines of traditional political parties based on an emotive call. Unless human rights groups think of innovative ways to mobilise civil society in favour of their cause, the battle in civil society for the hearts and minds of the citizenry will be lost.

NGOs working in the field have become the main custodians of the different types of human rights whether political or civil or economic and social. However, these are small units usually centring around a few individuals. The need to build institutions in civil society which will promote human rights is another aspect which will emerge in the year 20OO. The human rigfrts community is usually issue oriented. In the next phase of consolidation it is important to go beyond raising issues to ensure systematic campaigns on many fronts. This ability to consolidate gains in the NGO sector will determine the future effectiveness of the human rights community, especially in the present political climate.
In addition to strengthening the NGO sector in civil society, especially those NGOs working for peace, secularism and democracy, the institutions of the State, such as parliament and the judiciary must also be strengthened in terms of conventions and processes which will make them more sensitive to human rights impulses. In India and Sri Lanka, the t99os witnessed the growth of a vigilant Supreme Court determined to protect fundamental rights. In ttre end, the success of these two institutions will determine the quality of democracy enjoyed by a glven society. Human rights

Ethnic@: Human Rights; and Enuironment

83

groups should actvely work with democratic politicians and judges to ensure protection of their rights in the countries of South Asia.

At present, there is a certain cynicism which prevails at

all levels of society about politicians and judges. This qmicism

has its costs. Unless active steps are taken to remedy the situation by making the system more effective, the institutions of democracy will be further undermined. The need for institutional reform and institutional conventions which will protect human rights is another aspect which merits full consideration.

Another problem that has emerged in recent years has been "government lawlessness". The use of thuggery and extralegal force by governments in all the South Asian countries has led to cynical comments that this is a South Asian variet5r of parliamentary democracy. The practices become especially acute during times of elections. India has responded by strengthening the powers of the Elections Commissioner. In Sri Lanka, the problem still remains with increasing accusations about the veracity of the electoral process. Human rights groups are often powerless to deal with this type of violence. However, media exposure and poliUcal mobilisation around these human rights issues may help contain them in the near future.

As mentioned earlier, ethnic and religious conflicts of South Asia will, to a great extent, determine the future of human rights in our region. Ironically, the human rights communit5r with its basis in individual rights and state
focus does not have any formula for the resolution of human rights issues in ethnic conflicts. Since human rights requires the vindication of rights before ajudicial process, the overtly

political nature of ethnic conflict has kept most human rights activists sceptical of the process required to resolve ethnic conflict. The process of conflict resolution to allow efeater devolution and federalism to areas fighting for

84

Perspectiues on South Asia

autonomy is not seen as part of the human rights legacy. However, recent developments ih Europe and at the United Nations seem to be moving in that direction. Recent documents on human rights point to a human rights paradigm on resolving ethnic conJlict. The paradigm requires:
(a) a recognition of the cultural identity of minority groups living within naUon-states; (b) a recognition of the right to political autonomy or power-sharing with regard to mlnorities that are territorially placed within a natlon state; (c) a process of conflict resolution of negotiation and compromlse to ensure that disputes are resolved without violence and if possible on a consensus.

In the years to come, this paradigm wiII probably develop and refine itself witl- regard to normatve human rights standards. None of the states of South Asia have accepted the ethnic issues in their couniries as an aspect of human rlglrts. Recent thinking on human rights, specially with regard to groups rtghts and ethnic minorities appear to be merging the two concerns so that a human rights paradigm can assist activists to think about these intractable problems.
The violence of non-state actors has been an increasing

dtlemma for human rights activists. Increasingly the international paradigm has recognised violence by nonstate actors as accountable with regard to international humanitarlan standards. Ttre need to refine these concepts at the regional and national level is also necessary. The violence of tl.e LTTE and the Kashmir militants for example,
has led international human rights groups such as Amnest5r

International to expand their mandates so as to bring the actors of these groups under a human rights paradigm.
One aspect which has become an increasing problem in Srf Lanka, as well as India has been the problem of internally displaced people. Whenever there is civil strife, the resulting

EtfuricitA; Human Rights: and Enoironment

85

need for human rights groups to be fully aware of international humanitarian law-a different area in the study of international law-is an aspect which has been highlighted in recent years.
The issue of human rights in the South Asian region is
diverse and complicated. Since NGOs have been spearheading this approach, it is important to assess their capacity for action in the next few years. There appear to be two types of NGOs working in the field. The first are those who focus on

refugee crisis is an aspect which is of increasing concern, where over a million people are displaced (such as in Sri l,anka), these raise humanitarian issues which to some extent go beyond human rights as classically detailed. The

the law. They wish to ensure that legislation is passed and standards set along with trying to secure implementation of these laws in courts of law. Where parliament and the judiciary are effective there is some recourse.

The second type of NGO is concerned with grassroots mobilisation on specific issues. Their primdry aim is to lobby, take civic action, engage in consciousness raising and are sometimes linked to political parties. They engage in fact-finding missibns and publish reports on htrman rights violations by state and non-state actors. They were extremely active in Pakistan, Bangladesh and Nepal in the democracy movement and in Sri Lanka and India with regard to mobilisation in the face of violence and disappearances. These are the movements which are in the forefront of the struggle for human rights with regard to values in civil society.

In many ways, years of martial law in Pakistan, and in India and Sri Lanka years of having been governed by
Emergency, have created an awareness of civil and political rights and make them relevant and meaningful in the South Asian context. Though Asian governments may downplay this aspect of human rights, the election turnouts indicate

86

Perspecthtes on South

Asia

that the rtght to vote and the rlght to a fair trial are rights that have speclal value for the citizenry because of the history of the last few decades. It is the experience of violence and emergency that have made these rights important in every day political discourse. The next decade must therefore be an era of consolidaton. Human rights values exist today in civil society by political c5micism, ethnic loyalty, and inefficient implementation prevent
effectlve enforcement. These are the issues that must concern

human rights activists in the near future.

EtfuticW: Human Rights; and EnDironnrent

a7

Sectian

III

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND DEVELOPMENI THE SOUTH ASIAN CFIALLENGE{'

G.H. Peiris

Introduction
From macro-regional perspectives environmentalists often

identiff South Asia, as an area of "crisis" where certain ongoing ecoiogical changes are approaching "entrophication"the passing of the threshold beyond which the disruptive positive feedbacks ofthe ecosystem become irreversible. The magnitude of the crisis tends to be explained not only with
reference to such karmic causes as the intensive use of the natural environment by man over several millennia, colonial exploitation, the massive size of the South Asian population and the rapidrty of its growth, and the priority that must necessarily be placed on the immediate minimum survival needs of the people regardless of long-term environmental consequences; but also in terms of mismanagement of the

environment through myopia, ignorance, apathy,

parochialism and cormption. Moreover averting the crisis through measures such as controlling population growth, regulating migration, preventing deforestation, and inculcating conservationist attitudes among the people, is believed to be less feasible in the South Asian socio-political milieu than it appears to be under more authoritarian
*This is a revised version of a paper submitted to the South Regtonal Dialogue held in Lahore in November 1993. The revision has entailed the incorporation of material extracted from more recent research. Yet, the paper remains what it was originally intended to be-an impressionistic overview.

88

Perspectiues on South Asra

systems of government and with populations that are more amenable to mass mobilisafion.

In contemporary discussions on disequilibria of the planetary ecosystem, there is some consensus that South Asia's contribution to the general degradation of the environment is relatively slight. Recent (1989) estimates show, for instance, that the release of carbon dioxide to the atmosphere-one of the main forms of atmospheric pollution and, possibly, the main cause of global warming-from North America and Europe is l7 times more, and from East Asia almost 6 times more, than from South Asia (Table l). It has also been pointed out that the primary pattern of air mass circulation in the atmosphere is such that what goes up in South Asia invariably comes down in South Asia. Thus, as it stands at present, $outh Asia's environmental crisis is, by and large, its own crisis, with only meagre extraregional ramifications in a purely physical sense.
TABLE I
Release oJ Carbon Diaxide to
Region

tte Atmosphere
Amount
oJ

(1989 estimates)
Population
19A9 (mtllions]

Carbon

Dtoxide Releosed
(tons / gear)

USA, Canada & Europe East Asia

Sout-h Asia

I,O50

r3,580
+,._i

I,350
I, 130

JJ

7ao

Source.' UN Population Reports, May 1992.

In the relative significance of the different processes of man-nature interaction from ecological perspectives, there is much diversity within South Asia. There are, of course, the obvious commonalities such as those concerning repercussions of rapid population grortrth, urban expansion,

Mhnicitg; Humut Rights; and Erwironment

89

Sri Lanka. Similarly, the loss of arable land through

salinization under hi-tech agriculture is a matter of serious concern mainiy in the irrigated semi-arid areas of the subcontinent.

and persistence of poverty. Yet, specially from the viewpoint of priorities for intervention, there are diversities both among and within the countries of South Asia. For example, it is understandable if the possible rise of sea{evel through global n'arming causes less alarm in'Bhutan than in the Maldives. Reforestation and forest conservation is likely to rank lower in the ecologist's agenda in Nepal than it does in

Populatlon Change Since increasing population pressure on the physical environment is the most pronounced process of overall ecological change in South Asia, our discussion on environmental issues should commence with a brief recapitulaUon of the main elements of recent demographic change in the region. South Asia in 1951 had a population of 44O million which, by 1990, had increased to l,lOO million. It is expected that by 2OO0 the population of the region will reach 1,320 million, an almost exact three,fold increase over the second half of the twentieth century, compared to an increase of 54 per cent (from 285 to 44O million) during the first half.
Although in general, the rural populations in South Asian counbles have increased at a slower rate than their respective urban populations, within rural areas, there has been much spatial diversity in the rates of change recorded during the past few decades. In India, for example, between 196l and 1981, rural population growth rates have ranged from over 2.5 per cent per annum in most of the north-eastern srares such as Meghalaya, Mizoram, Tripura, Nagaland and Arunachal Pradesh, to about 1.5 per cent in the southern states of Tamil Nadu, Kerala and Andhra Pradesh. The main

90

Perspectiues on South Asia

TABLE 2 Population Chutge in tlrc Countrtes o;fSouth Asia

Popul'.tion
ir7 1990 ProJected %tAnnuo,l

Dottbling

(million)

Population (mjllion) 2000 2A25 176

Grouth
('92 Arsl

Ttne

1965-80 1980-90

Bangladesh

106.7 rza

2.6
l.o
2.3

2.3
2.r
2.1

29

Bhutan

1.423
1,348

849.5 I,006 India O.2 Maldives 18.9 24 Nepal Pakistan 112.4 147 l9 17 .O Sri Lanka

34

4,7

240
24

2.4 3.1 r.8

2.6 3.1 t.4

28 23 46

Sources: World Development Report, 1992; and Population Council, Report No.l0, 1992.

agricultural areas of Pakistan have had rates ttlat are comparable to those of tl.e upper end of the Indian range. Likewise, while rural Bangladesh ftnds parallels in West Bengal and the Hindi states ol lndia (close to 2olo), the rates in Sri Lanka have been similar to those of South India' As one could expect, the highest rates have been recorded in those parts of South Asia where the frontiers of agriculture have been extended towards sub-humid areas through irrigation or into the mountain terrain of the Himalayan
belt.

Ethnici!; Human Rights: and Enuironmerrt

IABLE 3
RwaJ Population and- Area Under AgricuLtwe
Rural Populatinn

91

in South Asirl Iand

Extent oJ Agricultural

(million)

(million)
%

1965

1990
90

Chtnge
63.6
57.2 70.o 76.2

1964-66 1989-90 %CLnnge

Bangladesh 55

India Nepal Pakistan Sri l.anka

S'outh

395 lO 43

621

t7
IO

I
5 12

Asia*

l3 at7

44.4
b9. t)

9.O t62.4 1.8 t9.2 1.8 194.2

9.2 169.5

2.2

4.4
44.4 8.3
1

2.6
20.4
2.O

1.1

204.1

c.r

*excluding Bhutan and the Maldives

Note: The figures for Bangladesh, India, Nepal and Pakistan are based on data from the World Deuelopment Reports (!V'orld Bank), which are likely to contain errors. For example, the UN reported the extent under agriculture in Sri Lanka in 1989 and 1990 was 1,885,OOO ha, while the local data sources indicate a higher figure (used here) of 1,998,0OO ha.

As an on-going change that has environmental

repercussions, rapid urban growth or, more specifically, the formation of excessively high population densities in and around the large urban areas, and the resulting accumulation of poverty and squalor, are considered as important in South Asia as overall population growth. Despite the well known lack of clarity in the urban-rural dichotomy, the related data show clearly enough that in most parts of South Asia urban population has grown more rapidly than rural population.

Within the urban sectors of the South Asian countries, the growth trends of cities and towns have been so varied, spatially and temporally, that it is difficult to make

92

Perspectiues on South Asia

generalisations on covariance between size of urban places and their rates of growth. Frorn a view point that does not take into account changes in urban boundaries and distinctions between cities and their satellite towns, it appears that the long-term trend has been one of cities growing

more rapidly than the smaller towns. Closer scrutiny, however, makes it evident that this has not been a persistent pattern throughout the region. During the 1970s (unlike in the preceding intercensul period when the smaller towns were stagpant) India's fastest growing urban places were those wtth populations of less than 50O,OOO in l97l , many of which were state capitals, mining towns and centres of tfie ilanufacturing industry. Over the same period, in the
larger cities such as Calcutta, Bombay, Madras, Hyderabad, Lucknow and Kanpur there were signs of out-migrations

and deconcentration of population. To this latter

phenomenon, there have been the conspicuous exceptions of Delhi and Bangalore in India, Pakistan's Karachi, and Bangladesh's Dhaka. In Sri Lanka, the urban clusters that constitute the suburbs of Colombo have grown far more rapidly than the city. Regardless of these diversities, however, it is expected that the swing of the population pendulum toward the larger population agglomerations will continue into ttre early decades of the 2lst century, at which time some among them will rank among the largest cities in the world (Table 4).

Environmetrtal Issues ln Rural Areas The effects of agrarian pressures on the ecosystem, as highlighted in many wrifings, revolve around the twin themes of rapid depletion ofthe resource base at rates that exceed their natural rejuvenation and replenishment, and pollution of the en'ironment. In the various elaboraticns of the former theme, the focus has mainly been on forests, soil and water. The rapid increase in the extent of land harnessed for agriculture and settlement inf,rastructure along with the

EthnicitA; Human Rights; and" Enuironment TABLE 4

93

Rates oJ Urban Grouth rn South Asia; Past and projected

Percentage per annum Soufh Asia

Si
2.53

Lo'nka

r950-59 r960-69
1970-79 1980-89 1990-99

2.95 3.56 3.95 4.06

4.O2

4.72
z+,.tc

3.23
a
"71

1.56
1.41

3.71

3.80
J.D /

2.45 3.40
3.23

2000-09

3.76

20ro-19
2020-25

3.r2
2.64

2.91

2.57

2.74

Note: The definition

of 'urban' varies from one country to

another. From the present perspectives, the Indian definition-all areas under urban local authorities, and all places having 5,O0O or more inhabitants, a density of more than I,O00 per sq. mile, and at least 3/4 of the adult male population employed in pursuits

other than agriculture-is the most meaningful. The Sri Lanka definition, in contrast, is highly arbitrary.
excessive extraction of timber and fuelwood from the natural vegetation, and tlle attendant chain of ecological reactions in the form of accelerated soil erosion, duricrust formation and lowering of groundwater infiItration, loss of subtemanean aquifers, and reduction of bio-diversity, are tJre specific processes associated wittr the exponential human onslaught on forests. Similarly, in water, there are the a qgravating problems of mismanagement and of inadequate availability and access in relation to demand. The latter theme-that of

94

Perspectiues on Soutlt Asi.a

pollution-in rura! areas tends to be associated mainly with changes in the chemical composition of soil and water through salinisation as well as accumulation of the toxic

residue of agro-chernicals on lll-drained irrigated land. In recent studies of rural environments attention has also been devoted to excessive air poliution within dwellings-a consequence mainly of the use of biomass as domestic fuel under ill-ventilated conditions which is being considered a serious health hazard, especially for women'
are exemplified in South Asia is, of course, not known with any degree of certainty and precision. Systemailcally recorded measurements, even on the most basic among the related processes are scarce; and when available, cDnfusing in the messages t-lley convey. What is perhaps one of the foremost considerations in this context is that, as Table 3 suggests, in South Asia as a whole, the extent of land under agriculture has expanded at a very slow rate. It is, indeed, remarkable that during the twenty-five year period from the mid-l96os to the early I99Os, over which the rural population of the region increased by almost 60 per cent, the overall expansion of farm land has been a mere 5 per cent, with a large part of this latter expansion probably being accounted for by the conversion of land under shifting cultivation to sedentary forms of use. On India, as certain critics believe, there is Iittie evidence of extensive deforestation attributable to t]e expansion of area :under permanent agriculture [Chapman & Baker, 1992).
The extent to which the effects of these disrt.pfive processes

Thus, by way of preliminary clarification, it is necessary to note tJlat on some of the main issues concerning on-going ewironmental change in rural South Asia, their prominence in discussion and debate notwithstanding, even the basic information available lacks quantitative precision. Consider, for instance. the various sets of data available on recent changes in the forest cover. According to an official estimate cited by Biswas (1992: 255), in South Asia as a whole, an

EthnicitA; Humar, Rights; and Enuironment

95

average of about 4OO,0OO hectares of forest have been removed annually over the decade lg8l-9o. However, an estimate based on the well known Citizens' Reports of the Delhi-based Centre for Science and Environment (CSE, f982, 1985 and l99l), has placed the "recent" (period not specified) rate of forest removal in India at an alarming one million hectares each year (Vyas & Reddy, lg98). The latter estimate does not correspond either with the Indian government estimates or with those on Sout_h Asia furnished by international agencies (World Resources Institute, lg86). Similarly, in Sri Lanka (where the rate of forest removal probably ranks the highest among the countries of the region) the percentage extent ofland under 'high forest' was officially reported to have declined from 44 per cent h 1956 to about 24 per cent in 1984. Certain ecologists reject this latter figure, and claim that the actual forest cover in the mid- 1980s was no more than lO per cent of the island (Fernando & Samarasinghe, 1988; Gunatilleke, f 988). The same absence of exactitude is seen in the available data on afforestation. The related official estimates on India, for instance, point to a net gain in the forest cover attributed to the establishment of new forests at a rate exceeding that of deforestation. This, once again, stands refuted by estimates found in certain reports compiled by non-government institutions according to which the annual net loss offorests in India during the past two decades could have been weII in excess of SOO,OOO hectares.

A measure of uncertaint5r exists even in respect of the ecological impact of deforestation. It is, of course, well known that the exposure of bare soils to torrential rains consequent upon tlre removal ofvegetation causes excessive erosion and, eventually, as witnessed in several parts of South Asia's sub-humid zone, the loss of arable land. But whether this has been an inevitable outcome of the extension of ag5iculture into forested mountain slopes has not, by aly means, been proved beyond reasonable doubt. Certain

96

Persoecttrses on Sotfi]t

Asia

detailed studies conducted in the Himalayan foot-hllls' for example, suggest that terraced hill slopes under ca'refully tended crops are more water retentive and less suseepUble to loss of soil through erosiol'l than similar slopes under natural vegetation (Chapman & Baker, 1992:29l.It has also been demonstrated that, especially in the humid tropics where vegetative gSowth is rapid, ensembles of flora developed by man could simulate natur"rl forest ecologr while generating substantial economic returns. Ttrese findings, still tentative, if substantiated with further research, could well mean that there is considerable scope for expanding the extent of farm land in South Asia without necessarily entailing ecological degradation of Sahelian magniitude. arecognition of the fact that uncertainties exist in The regard to the nature of environmental processes is not meant to constitute a denial of the ecological disruptions caused by both clearing of forests for agriculture and other forms of land use as well as the extraction of timber and fuelwood from forests. In most parts of South Asia, the disruptive processes have been in operation for many centuries. As Pouchepadass (1995) has argued "it would be erroneous to present the pre-colonial relationship between societies and their environment as a golden age of equilibrium which colonial conquest disturbed and destroyed." He has also pointed out that "the first oflicial measures for protecting nature, whatever their motive and effectiveness, arose in these countries on the initiative of colonial government. " Nevertheless, the weight of evidence points to the generalisaflon that changes under colonial dominance had the effect of accelerating the processes of ecological degradation.
For instance, ttrere was the impact of plantation agpiculture in certain highland areas of Sonth Asia-those of tl-e eastern

Himalayas, the Western Ghats and Sri Lanka-in the form of extensive deforestation ovetr terrain more vulnerable to denudation than the lowlands; AccordinA to an esfimate on

EthntcitA: Humart Ri.ghts; and Enuironment

97

Sri Lanka (NARESA, l99l:fo8), since the beginning of plantation tea in the l88Os, some 3O0 mm of top soil has been washed away from 'upland' tea areas, an amount equivalent to an average rate of 4O tons of soil per hectare per annum. This estimate needs to be placed against the backdrop of the fact that the average rate of soil formation from consolidated metamorphic rocks in the tropics under undisturbed forests is estimated to be a mere 46 mm per one-thousand years (NARESA, l99f : lO8). in traditional agriculture under the impact of colonial rule also had profound ecological ramification. There was the large-scale conversion of land under subsistence agriculture to commercial crops which, in turn meant, re increasing dependence of the peasantry
Changes that occurred

impact of 'shifting cultivation' is, of course, a controversial issue. For instant, the conventional view that 'slash-andburn' (an integral aspect of this form of land use) is the principal cause for deforestation in the tropics, has been reJected by certain recent researchers who prefer instead the view that this type of farming, since the cycle of fallow permits the regeneration offorest flora, represents a delicate s)rmbiosis between consumption and conservation needs. As a generalisation on shifting cultivation in South Asia, this contention also appears somewhat shaky. The possibility that it is an environmentally sustainable form of agriculture where the farming communities ar-e small enough and the forests are large enough to permit long cycles of fallow cannot be discounted. But, it appears that, more generally, shifting cultivation with prolonged fallow is usually the first step in the process of forest removal-one which is followed by the gradual shortening of the cycle of fallow, eventually leading to sedentary and perennial forms of land use as farm populations increase. There is fragmentary evidence from studies conducted in Sri Lanka (cited in peiris. lg96:gg-

on 'marginal' (forested) land for the production of food, often in the form of 'shifting cultivation'. The exact environmental

98

Perspectiues on SoLtth Asirr

90) which suggests that, from an environmental perspective,

the period of transition from the long fallow phase to

sedentary farming, which also tends to be featured by an increase in the pace of fuelwood and timber extraction (a consequence, once again, of increasing population), is more destructive in its effects than most forms of long established sedenta4r farming. It is this transition which took place in many parts of Sri Lanka during the colonial regime' More generally, the impression conveyed by the recent writings on 'shifting cultivation' in South Asia is that, at present' in almost all areas, the cycles of fallow are of short duration and, in many situations, rain-fed agriculture carried out in forest clearings, which continues to be referred to by terms such asjhum anrd chena. does not involve the rotational use of the land.
Despite the absence of related statistical data as evidence, there is reason to generalise that, in areas where forest removal is not accompanied by 5afeguards against erosion such as terracing and the establishment of a substitute cover of flora, the ecological damage is invariably profound, and often extends well beyond the actual venues of deforestation. One of the most significant forms of such damage is excessive siltafion tvhich, while contributing to floods in the lower parts of river catchments, also has disruptive effects on irrigation. The area which is more adversely affected than any other by the former process is

the Ganga-Brahmaputra-Meghna delta where the discharge of river water into the sea is irnpeded not only by the flat terrain but also by tides and cyclone-induced tidal waves. This results in massive loads of debris being regularly deposited along the river channels, bringing about a reduction of channel capacity, and thus increasing the incidence and intensity of floods. To illustrate its effects on irrigation: Mang;la and Tarabela reservoins-the two most important

water storage structures in Fakistan-were losing their storage capacity at annual rates of 48'27 and 167.75

Ethdcitg; Human Rtghts: and Enuironment

99

million cubic metres, respectively, owing to the accumulation of sediments. Similarly, recent studies of eight Indian reservoirs constructed in the early years of IndependenceBhakra, Gandhinagar, Hirakud, Maithon, Mayurakshi, Nlzamsagar, Panchet and Thngabhadra-Indicated that their average sedimentation rate is "slightly more than twice the estimated value that was used for designing purposes" (both sets of information have been extracted from Biswas, 1992: 253). The Polgolla reservoir-one of the hydraulic structures of the Mahaveli Programme of Sri Lanka-was silted up to 45 per cent of its capacity within l2 years of its construction
(MEPA,

l99r).

From a resource perspective, the environmental issue which has assumed greater prominence than all else relates to water-its availability in relation to increaslng demand, and problems concerning its management in the face of various obstacles that stem from mutually conflicting demands. These problems are, of course, not confined to rural areas. Calculations of 'replenishment' (worked out with rougft estimates available on the different components of the hydrological cycle) and of 'current use' [also based on equally imprecise estimates on the different forms of consumption) convey the impression that water is not a scarce resource in most parts of South Asia. The related data suggest, for instance, that in the region as a whole, the rate of use is no more than about 1O per cent of the rate of replenishment. Yet, despite the intensifoing demand for water, the scope for increasing this ratio remains restricted both by the on-going ecological disruptions of the type referred to above and by various economic and political constraints.
There is an emerging body of opinion according to which one of the principal methods of harnessing surface water for irrigadon employed in the subcontinent for well over one hundred years-construcfion of large reservoirs and channel

roo

Perspecttves on South Asra

systems-has failed to fulfil expectations, and will continue to fail with greater disruptive fallouts than in earlier times. The failure has been explained mainly with reference to defective planning, overambitious designing, and the neglect of catchment conservaton (see, for example, Bottrall, l9g2; ttre series of 'special reports' published in Indin Todag of September 15, 1995; Ruitenbeek & Cartier, 1995; and Swain, 1998). Although the related claims are not uniformly persuasive, and have not remained unchallenged, particular$ from the viewpoint of comparative advantages of scale in gravity irrigation fVerghese, 1992:197: Peiris, 1996: 2OO203), it is becoming evident that, in the prevailing technoeconomic milieu, and given the pattern of geographical distribution of the surface water resource base among the national units of the region, there is little scope in most parts of the sub-continent for expanding this form of irrigation to meet the rapidly increasing irrigation demands. Moreover, recent experiences also indicate that irrigation systems planned to extend over large areas, and cause ecological and socio-economic changes in such areas are likely to meet increasing conservationist resistance, while intensit/ing conflicting interests. The latter, in certain

situations, has been associated with aggravating

international and sub-national disputes fVerghese, 1990:358360; Islam, 1992; Swain, 1998).

The shortfall of supply in relation to demand is also with the current trends of availability and utilisation of sub-surface water in many parts of South Asia. Traditionally, groundwater irrigation-widespread throughout the region-involved the extraction of water from shallow dug wells using labour-intensive techniques. The water yield of these wells varied widely, depending on
associated rainfall as well as sub-surface structure. It was substantially hlgher in the alluvial flood-plains than in the inter-catchment hardrock areas. Even the largest among these wells seldom had a daily yield of more than a thousand gallons. The

Etlnlcity; Human Rights; and Enuironment

lor

mechanised extraction. Among tJle causes for this were the higher levels of agricultural productivity (and higher net profits) facflitated by lift irrigation, and the incentives provided by tJ-e government in the form of loans and low cost (or free) electricity. Thus, by the mid-lg8Os, deep borewells penetrating to depths of over 2OO feet, yielding several thousands of gallons per day, were quite common in the larger riverine plains of the sub-continent, in parts of the "black-soil" area of north-west Deccan, and in a few other localities where geological formations permit higfi rates of sub-surface percolation and storage of water. In many such areas, the effects of over-extraction were beginning to be felt at this time (Nagaraj & Chandrakanth, 1997). On ttre one hand, the extraction of water through deep bore-wells often resulted in the drying up of the shallow wells in the vicinity. On the other, the increasing density of bore,wells also meant, in some areas, the extraustion of the subterranean aquifers, the replenishment of which is a slow process.

advent of 'green revolution' technology in the mid_ 1960s brought about a gradual shift towards deeper wells and

Ttre increase of soil salinity is yet another ecological problem in those parts of South Asia that depend on large scale irrigation systems. The damage mechanisms as understood from world-wide experiences is that irrigation of flat, Iow-lying terrain, especially in areas that are exposed to drought over a greater part of the year, unless accompanied by adequate facilities for drainage, causes the accumulation of residual salts in the soil which, beyond a particular threshold, makes the soil uncultivable. In coastal areas such as those of Gujarat and Sind, excessive groundwater extraction which permits subterranean sea water infiltration has also contributed to thts process. Additionally, in most parts of the region, irrigated agriculture also involves the regular administration of heavy doses of agro-chemicals to the soil, which not only enhances the rate of salinisation but also brings about other adverse changes in the chemical

r02

Persoecttues on South Asia

composition of ttre soil. According to Agrawal ( I 989) ' although the use of pesflcides in agriculture has increased rapidly in the past four decades, its environmental and morbidity effects are yet to be studied in detail. He refers, however' to studies which indicate that "the levels of contamination may be higher than those in many other parts of the world".
The extent of land affected (or in danger of being affected) by salinisation, however, is not known. Corrective measures

are costly, and could also be ineffective. The scale of the required intervention is illustrated by Pakistan's trft-bank Outfall Drain ProJect which, when completed, is expected to be a river almost the size of the lower Indus' carrying saline water from PunJab and Sind to the Arabian Sea.

The various issues to which reference has been made above figure prominently in discussions on the theme of sustainability of 'green revolution' agricultural technologr in South Asia. Studies done on this subject since about the early 197Os have indicated that, in contrast to traditional farming techniques, the new techniques often cause critical imbalances in the ecosystem which, under certain condi ons set in motion processes of 'desertification'. Several recent studies (Paroda, Woodhead and Singh 1993; Chand & Haquet, 1997; Nellithanam, 1997) have also highlighted the possibility tJlat the productiorr increase ushered in by the package of new technologr is unlikely to be sustained and that in certain areas, it is likely to be reserved. Environmentnl Problems in Urban and Industrlal Settings Certain controversies felating to processes and consequences ofrapid city growth in South Asia have a direct
bearing on the analysis of environmental issues . Briefly stated,

until about the mid-l960s, ttre phenomenon of rapid city

growth in the region was explained mainly with reference to the large-scale migration of destitute people from rural areas to the cities (see, for example, Spate, 1957). It was perceived

Etful;.cffqy:

funnalt R@hts: and Enuironment

103

that has alarming environmental, economic and social consequences. The specific formulations of these notions, however, have been challenged, initially, by Asish Bose (1967, 1973) and Sovani (f966) who questioned the validity of the statistical interpretations on which the perception of an on-going urban "population explosion" in South Asia was based. More recently, others Iike Lipton (1977) have argued that'disaster treks" from rural areas have contributed substantially less to urban population growth in South Asia than is often believed. From an economic point of view, it has also been asserted that attempts need not be made to stall rapid city growth ". . . because urban areas are seen to be more efficient at providing rising incomes, with better external economies and hence better local income multipliers for each unit of capital invested" (Chapman & Baker, 1992:14). From environmental perspectives, the relevance of this dispute lies more on the issue of whether a large proportion of migrants into urban areas have been , and will continue to be, 'economic refugees" from the rural sector' rather than on the past and projected rates of overall intersectoral migratlon.
as a process

The environmental problems ttrat are currently associated with over-crowding in many urban areas of South Asia have been fairly well documented. Features such as excessively

high residential densities alongside substandard housing' presence of sprawling squatter settlements and large vagrant populations, problems associated with the provision of even the barest minimum requirements in public health and sanitation, excessive chemical and excretal poilution, and the high incidence of pollution-related diseases, have all been sensationalised in such vivid detail that they hardly bear repetition. Unfortunately, the details are seldom available in the form of systematic measurements of the comparative erlvironmental impact of these phenomena. Indeed, it sometimes seems that to describe the congestion of a shanty

r04

PerspectiDes on South Asia

population of Dhaka inhabit slums and squatter setflements, or that the holy river is polluted with the sins of 7g urban areas each with populations over 5OO,OOO is merely a cry of despair. It is, therefore, of some interest to see what the few measurements that are available on a few random locations in South Asia actually portray. The measurements presented in Tatrle 5 relate to water quality, and have been extracted from published tabulation of the Canada-based Global Environment Monitoring System (GEMS). The two criteria that have been measured--dissolved oxygen and fecal coliform contnt in a sample of river water-are regarded as basic indicators of water quality. The former is a critical factor in the health of aquatic organisms; and, in general, for the survival of aquatic life, values must exceed 5.5 mg/lt in warm water habitats, and 6.5m9/lt in cold water habitats, The fecal coliform content is a sentinel indicator for the presence (or potential presence, of many otJrer pathogenic organisms. Drinking water should not contain fecal coliforms, and water for bathing should have less than I,OOO per IOO ml sample.
TABLE 5
Spot Measurements oJ Water
Riuer

ignorance and apathy regarding mass poverty and deprivation. Similarly, to say that some 5O per cent of the

town or the stench of a contaminated river is no more than to express dismay and pass censure at what is believed to be

eualifu in Some South Asran

Riuers

& Place Dissolued Oxggen Colifurm (per l)Omg sampte)

oJ

monitoring 1ga7
_90 (7)

1979 1983 1987 1979 1983 -82 -86 -90 -82 -86
tt)
Cauveri, down
stream KRS res. 7.2
(2) (3)
(4) (5) (6)

/.o

7.3

JI

68r

445

ELhnicity: Human Rights: and Enuironment

r05

(1)

(2)
7

(31 (4) (5)

7

(6)
684

(7) g2O

Cauveri

(Satyagalam)
Godavari Godavari Godavari

.O

.3

.S

l0

(Dhalegaon) (Mancherial) {Polawarm)

Sabarmati

6.5 6.6 8.O 8.O 7.2 7.2 9.4 9.I

6.7
Z

.S

S 4

S 2 224
4,5

I
4
22O
2,8OO 3, rOO

6.9

(Dharoi)
Subharnareka Subharnareka

8.9 248
T

(Jamshedpur) 8.O 7.9 6.7 4.O 7.5 6.9 7.2 7.O

.S 659

rB

(Ranchi)

5.3 1,239 7,988

Tapti Tapti

(Burhanpur)

6.1 7.O
7

IfO r9 456 463 rzt 746 Sg2

fgo
163

(Nepanagar)

Chenab

(Gujarat Indus
Ravt

Branch) 6.2 6.8

7

.t

446
78 S55

(Kotri)
(d

.6 7.2

2.6 ro5 6.9 STa Z.O 2ZS

from from

Lahore) Lahore)

ownstream)

6.8 5.7 7.2 6.7

Ravi (upstream Meghna

24g

physical accuracy of measurements vary among stations. Averages of4-year periods are used in order to minimize seasonal and vearto-year variability, and to emphasize general trends..

@angladesh) 6.5 7.O 3,193 ZOO Note: According to the data source, .,. .the frequency

and

106

Perspectftses on South Asta

To begin with some comparisons of South Asian rivers with those in other parts of the world in respect of the two criteria, the most noteworthy feature is that the South Asian measurements da rl,r,t fall into the extremes of the global range. For example, in the 'dissolved oxygen' measurements, on which the data source contains a total of 111 recordings from tropical and sub-tropical rivers, 85 fall within a range of 5 to 8 mg/lt. More or less the same dispersal is seen in the recordings from South Asia. On 'fecal coliform content', the readings from the majority of the reglon's rlvers are similar in absolute and comparative levels to those recorded elsewhere, and fall into a distinctly lower range than those of certain European, Mexican and Japanese rivers (in some of which coliform levels of over IO,OOO per 1OO ml have been recorded' with the all time high among the GEMS recordings standing at 916'667). Thus. in so far as these sets of data could be considered reliable enougfi, it is possible to suggest that the real problems (of the South Asian rivers that have been monitored) is not so much the prevalence of high levels of pollution and

contamination, but rather the widespread human

consumption of river water in untreated form. Regarding the variations arnong the rivers listed in Table 5, two features are worth taking note of. The first is the exceptionally high readings of coliform in Subharnareka at Jamshedpur and Ranchi, and, the somewhat less distinct, but expected, relationship between variations in population densities of the areas in which the recording stations are located, and the levels of pollution. The temporal trends, on the ottrer hand, are far from clear, except in the sets of data on fecal contaminatlon in the Subharnareka and Cauveri rivers. It is of course risky to draw firm conclusions from the thinly scattered recordings of data made available by worldwide monitoring systems, except to say that they fall short of conlirming the "cess-pit" image of South Asian rivers.

Ethnic@: Human Rights; artd Erusironment

t07

(Note, however, that the tabulation does not contain any recordings from Ganga-Yamuna rivers, which are believed to be among the most polluted rivers of the region). Detailed studies seem to indicate that, in proximity to sources of domestic and industrial effluence, the levels of river water contamination are very high. Synthesizing conclusions drawn fi'om several studies on water pollution in India, Paliwal (f989:54) states: (a) that there appears to be a general deterioration of water quallty in the country as a whole; (b) that in most rivers, there is an upsurge of pollution levels with the onset of the summer monsoon, and a decline during winter; and (c) that there are sudden temporal oscillations and micro-spatial variations in the levels of

contamination.
The available GEMS recordings of air pollution in South Asia are even more restricted in coverage than those on river water, being confined to the cities of Calcutta, Bombay, Delhi and Lahore. The measurements relate to concentrafion of sulphur dioxide and suspended particulate matter' The data on the former indicate a faint trace of an increasing trend, but the directions of change reflected in the latter are indistinct. Since air pollution is a phenomenon in which one can expect a great deal of localized diversity, no generalization can be drawn from these sets of data. Despite the paucity of measurements on pollution of the atmosphere, the phenomenon itself is widely regarded as an environmental hazard which is assuming crisis proportions in urban South Asia and in semi-urbanised industrial belts of tJle region. Indeed, it has recently been claimed that in respect of air pollution the main metropolitan centres of the region rank among ttre worst cities of the world. This condition is caused mainly by excessive gaseous emissions from vehicles and factories. On the one hand' there has been a spectacular upsurge of motor traffic-in Deihi' according to a recent report (Rajalakshmi' 1998)' the number of vehicles increased by 51 times between 196I and f 99l-

r08

Perspectiues on South Asia

with no corresponding road improvements, and no effective controls on the quality of the vehicles used. On the other, there has been (until about the mid- lg8os when certain partially successful measures were initiated in some of tJle Indian cities to impose legal controls) an almost unchecked agglomeration of relatively small scale but high polluting manufacturing ventures in the cities. In addition to these, there has been an increase in the frequency of accidental leakages of poisonous gases which, as pointed out by Vyas & Reddy (1998:51), have gone almost unnoticed, except when their death toll was large, a6 it was at Bhopal. Ecologists also assert that South Asia's nuclear reactors are featured by substandard safeguards concerning workers' health, and are also among the least protected in the world against
accidental leakages of radioactive substances. Some among them present the spectre of another Chernobyl.

Apart from what the measurements relating to water and air pollution convey, there are several sets of information which could be used for the purpose of furnishing other insights on problems associated with South Asia's urban environment. There is, for example, a link between the formation of "dust domes" and the high temperatures (,.heat islands") recorded in the cities. The ramified effects of this are believed to extend even into political unrest and crime. Yet another form of environmental degradation is illustrated by Hyderabad (Ramachandraiah, l997:229g)_'reputed in the past for its scenic splendour-the explosive growth of which since the early lgTos has been accompanied by the disappearance of most of its green belts and over fort5r of its lakes. Of greater immediate concern is the fact that even polluted water is scarce in many urban areas-Delhi figuring prominently among those that suffer most from this scarcitlr.

Possibilltles of Interventlon

'Ensuring that the environment of South Asia is fully protected in the process of achieving economic growth" is

EthnicitA: Human Rights: artd Enuironment

109

environmental degradation is inevitable, and that ,.protecting the environment fully" could only be an unattainable ideal.

the available options, while recognising the fact that, in many ways, given the persistence of the on-going trends of development-related change in the region, further

one of the thematic concerns of this paper. In this, it would be meaningful to identi$ tJ.e possibilities and limitations of

government.

generating systematic and mutually compatible sets of information on the components of the ecosystem. It is of interest that the only element of the natural environment on which there is a fairly detailed and comprehensive body of information extending over a long period of time in South Asia is climate-especially rainfall, which, in Sri Lanka alone, has been monitored at more than B0O stations for well over one hundred years. Regarding information on certain other environmental parameters, the situation could be expected to improve with increasing availability of data from remote sensing and satellite imagery. yet, in respect of many vital aspects of change, there is no substitute for monitoring thror-rgh regular field measurement. And, for such measurement to be practically useful in policy formulation, some degree of coordination (especially by way of standardised methodologies and facilities for exchange of information) is essential. Researchers working over short spells, individually or in groups, sporadically, on issues of restricted scope idenflfied and financed by external funding agencies, cannot be expected to fill the prevailing lacunae of information. This should be a well coordinated function of
One of the principal justifications for a vastly enhanced

There are certain measures that could be adopted in a concerted effort towards environmental protection that are relntilselg easy to implement and are likely to be free of controversy. The most obvious among them is that of

effort towards quantifted monitoring and evaluation of envlronmental processes stems from the fact that. in the

llo

Perspecttues on South

Asia

absence of hard data, related cliiscussion and debate would remain largely at a polemical plane, making only a meagre contribuUon to educating the public, leave alone planning and policy formulation. Quite often, even on vitally important but controversial issues, the weight of one or another of the conflicting views tends to depend on elegance of presentation rather than on the substance upon which it is based' One

recalls here the recent Medha Patkar -Tavleen Singh confrontation on the subject of priorities in harnessing

combat, but the confrontation itself, useful only for its entertalnment value. It is seldom realised that this feature is not conlined to information flows in mass communication, but that it pervades much of what purports to be scientific discourse althouglr it is invariably embellished with technical jargon. Indeed, much of the technical planning on environmental concerns has tended to be based on statistical manipulations of empirical data of restricted coverage and precision' This can be observed in many South Asian planning documents on subjects such as afforestation, catchment conservation, protection of endangered fauna, or improvement' of urban environments. The TAMS report (1980) which focused on environmental aspects of Mahaveli Programme, or the Forestrg Master Plan produced by Jaakko Pory International (1986), both for Sri Lanka, could be referred to as monumental illustrations of this feature. But most of all, it is evident in the planning for hydraulic works in which, in the absence of an adequate body of recorded observational data, the planners usually rely on simulated or proJected guesstimates. This, of course, did not cause much trarm in the past when the values so derived were used merely as rough indicators of the extreme limits of a range within which the key ingredients of the plan were designed' But where planning calls for precision-as it has in the recent

India's water resources (lndiaTodaA, July 27 and August 3' f998) both duellists displaying remarkable skills of verbal

Ethnicita: Human Rights: and Enuironment

lll

past in matters such as the determination of dam heights, areas of inundaUon, command areas of channel networks, or allocation of water between competing riparians-ttre absence of reliable and precise measurements invariably has serious repercussions. The periodic upward revisions of estimates on the total volume of water in some of the Indian river systems that has been a feature of worldng out interstate water quotas {Swain, 1998), for no apparent reason other than that of maldng a pacificatory response to agitation by some among the riparians for larger quotas, provide a glimpse of the empirical haziness of many of the planning
processes.

The fact that there is a growing mass consciousness on environmental issues also calls for greater attention than in the past to the precise monitoring of ecological processes. Over the past few decades, public concern on environmental degradation has sometimes found expression in spontaneous and endogenic movements ofgrassroots protest, as witnessed in the early stages of the Chipko Movement of the upper Gangetic valley (Mishra & Tripathi, 1978). There is no doubt ttrat this type of activism could resonate beneficially at the level of policy-making. However, some of these movements are known to be driven by parochial considerations or instigated by vested interests, which makes it essential that policy responses be solidly based on objective and precise information. Almost twenty-five years ago, Vohra (1973) urged the central government to "obtain a commanding position for itself in the field of land and soil management" in India. From the various experiences gained from conflicts of parochial interests in environmental issues since that time, there appears to be a strong case for a high degree of centralized direction and control of matters relating to the environment within each country of South Asia, along with mechanisms for supra-national collaboration among the agencies involved.
The monitoring of ecological processes, though an essential

tt2

Perspectives on Souih Asra

requirement for a conservation strategy, is obviously not an end in itself. In tJ e first place, it should be accompanied by exchanges of the technical data so generated among those who share ecosystems, and, more generally, modalities for ttre effective public dissemination of the related informa on. Secondly, the interpretation and use of such data in matters concerning planning and policy formulation should take place in conformity with clearly postulated economic and politcal paradigms concerning economic growth, equity, state intervention, citizens' rights, national securitSr, and resource use. This would, apart from aII else, enable the avoidance of ambiguity that has always been a feature of decision-making on environmental issues.
In approaching tJle problem of environmental degradation

in South Asia, it is also useful to make, at least implicitly, a distinction between those processes that cannot be reversed or stalled without bringing about fundamental changes in living standards and of stances in international relations, and those that are more amenable to environment-focused corrective or preventive action. This distinction is, ofcourse, not always easy to make because many forms of environmental degradation are mutually connected. Nevertheless, from a practical viewpoint, it would be reasonable to place certain forms of feasible intervention on a different plane from the more intractable and contentious micro-regional problems that are linked inextricably either to mass poverty or to diversities of perception on national interests. In many situations it would be possible to place in the former category the adoption of safeguards against processes such as the disappearance of nature reserves; haphazard urban expansion and industrial agglomeration; excessive air pollution through gaseous emissions; contamination of water by industrial effluence or release of municipa-l sewage into natural waterways; and the increasing toxlcity of food, incidence of water-borne and vector-borne diseases and health hazards at work places. Similarlv. several

EtfuricitA: Human Rights: and Erusironmerrt

rr3

recent experiences (Shah, 1998) point to the feasibility of community-based interventions in afforestation and watershed development.
REFERENCES
Aggrawal, H.C., "Pesticide Pollution and Water", in C.K. Varshney, (ed.l, Water Polllltion qnd Monagement, New Delhi: Wiley, 1989, pp. 61-73. Basavaiah, M. Channa, "People's Action to Protect Water Sources", Economic and Politlcal Weeklg, )oodi, 1996, pp. 1572-1574.

Biswas, Asit K, "Forest Management, Environment and Development in South Asia", Contemporary Sorl/,h Asia, l:2,
1992, pp. 249-259.
Bose, Asish, (ed.), Patterns Chonge in India, 1951-1961, Bombay: Allied Publishers, 1967.

Bose, Asish, (ed.), Studtes in lndia's Urbanisation, 1901-1971, Bombay: Allied Publishers, 1973.

Chand, Ramesh, and Haquet, "Sustainability of Rice-Wheat Crop System in Indo-Gangetic Region", Economic and PolitbalweeklA,

32:l3r 1997, pp.26-30.

Chapman, Graham P.,

& Baker, Kathlene M., the

Ctnngtng

Geogrophg oJ Asin, London: Routledge, 1992. CSE (Centre for Science and Environment) 1982, f985, f991, The State oJ India's Enuironment, First, Second and Third Citizens' Reports, New Delhi,

Fernando, R.

Samarasinghe, S.W.R. de A. (eds.), Forest Conseruation and tte Forestry Master PlanJor Sri Lanka, Kandy: Wildlife and Nature Protection Society, 1988.

&

Gunatilleke, C.V.S., "Forestry Master Plan and the Conservation of Plant Genetic Resources", in Fernando & Samarasinghe, S.WR. de A. (eds.), Forest C onseruation ond tle Forestry Master
PlanJor Srilanka, Kandy: Wildlife and Nature Protection Society, 1988.

tt4
InternatianaL 8: l. 1984.

Perspectiues on South Asia

Harris, N., "Some Trends in the Evolution of Big Cities", Habifat Islam, Nahid, "Indo,Bangladesh Common Rivers; the Impact on Bangladesh"', Contenporary South Asicr, l:2, lgg2, pp. 2OS226.

Jalko, Pory, International,

r985-2OOO. Helsinki. 1986.

Forestry Master plan Jor Srt Lankc;

Lipton, Michael, Whg Poor People Stag poor-A Stttdg oJ llrbon Bias in WorA DeuelopfiEnt, Bath: pitman press, 1977.
MEPA (Ministry of Environment and parliamentary Affairs), NoLtiDnat Envirorunentrrl Actian Plan, 1992-1996, Colombo: 1991.

Mishra, and Tfipathy, S., Chipko Mouement, New Delhi: Gandhi Peace Foundation, 1978.
NARESA (Natural Resources, Energ/ and Science Authority in Sri Lanka), Nofiral Resources oJ Sri lnnko: Cortditions andTrend.s, United States Agency for International Development, 1991.

Nagaraj, N., & Chandrakanth, M.G., 'Inter-Generational Equity Effects of Irrigation \Vell Failure$: Farmers of Hard Rock Areas of India', Ecot@mir and Political Weeklg, 32:13, 1997, pp. 4l44.

Nellithanam, Jacob, 'Green Revolution and Subsistence

Agriculture', E)conomic qnd polifical Weelcly, 32: 1g, 1997, pp. 930-932.

Paliwal, K.V., 'Pollution of Surface arrd Ground Water., in Varshney, C.K., (ed.), Water Polhttion and Manogement, New Delhi; Wiley, 1989. Paroda, R.S., Woodhead T. & Singh, R.E}., (eds.), Sustoinabilitg oJ Rice-Wtrcat Production Sustem nAsra, New Delhi: Oxford & IBH

Publishers, 1993.

Peiris, G.H., Deuelopment and Cttange in Sri Lanka-4eographical

' Perspectives, New Delhi: Macmillan, 1996.

Pouchepadass, Jacques, 'Colonialism and Endronment in India: Comparauve Perspective", Economic and political Weetctg, SO:35. 1995, pp.2059-2067.

EthnicitA: Human Rights: and Ertuironment

rr5

Rajalakshmi, T'K', "Capital Misery", Ftontline,22 May f 998' pp' 120-121.

Ramachandriah, C ' ' "Weather and Water in Urban Areas" ' Econorm'c and Political Weekty, 32. 43, 1997, pp' 2797 -2AOO'

Ruitenbeek,

H' Jack., & Cartier, Cynthia, M', "Evaluation of Narmada Projects: An Ecological Economics Perspective"'
Economic and PoliticatWeektg,3O:

34, 1995, pp' 2138-2145'

Shah, Amita, "Watershed Development Programmes in India"' Economlc and Po\iticat Weektg' 33:26, 1998, pp' 6l-79 Sovani, N. V', "The Analysis of "Over-Urbanisation"' (ed')' Liberatisation ln Nertlu DeueLoping Countri'es", New Jersey:
Prentice-Hall in Gerald Breese, 1966' Swain, Ashok, 'Fight for the Last Drop: Inter-State Fjver Disputes in India", Contemporary SouthAsia, 7:2' 7998, pp' 167-f8O'

TAMS, Tippets-Abbet-McOarthy-Stratter' EnDironmental

Assessnrcnt oJ
1980.

tle

Acceterated Mottoueli Prograrry New York:

Verghese, B. G.' Waters oJ Hope' New Delhi: Centre for Policy Research, 199O. Verghese, B.G., "Wealth, Welfare, Water-Developing the Eastern Himalayan Rivers", Contemporory South Aslo, I:2' 1992' pp'

193-202.

Vohra. B. 8., "A Charter for the Land", Economic and Political Weeklg, viii, 1973, PP. I l-16.
Vyas, V. S., & Reddy, V. Ratna, "Assessment of Environmental Policies and Poliry Implementation in India", Economic ond 'Potitical Weeklg,33: l-2, 1998' pp. 48-54. World Bank, World Deuelopment Report, 1992: Deuelopment a,nd Enuironn:r:nt, Oxford, I 992,

World Resources Institute, World Resources, New York: Basic Books, 1986.

Need to Save the Process

KhaledAhmed

SAARC has no substance but it embodies a process which must be saved. This actually constitutes a thought process militating against the postures adopted by the nation-states that have emerged in South Asia. This process is at risk because its exponents remaln marginal to the opinionforming environment of the region. SAARC threatens over 5O years of nation-building and subverts natlonalism simply because it posits a regional construct that is increasingly supranaflonal.

Normally nation-states abeindon their tradiuonal nationbuflding ideaswhen propelled by common economic interests. In Europe, the supranational process began with economic

interests related to the production of coat and steel. It

survived tense bilateral contradictions and subsumed other areas till the very existence of the nation-state began to be threatened. In South Asia, economic cornmonall es have not yet been perceived. Most of the trade here is extrarqgional and there ls little complementadty to even encourage too much intra-regional trade. Eecause this nexus has not yet emerged, the process of SAARC needs to be kept alive as

Need to Sa:se

tle

Process

TL7

to states that are undoubtedly

collective crisis.

an intellectual exercise benignly offering alternatve strategies

progressing towards a

SAARC increasingly attracts individuals of a certain intellectual identity. They probably enter as nationals of a state intent upon defending the interests of their government but are increasingly challenged to think of the region. As years have progressed, the number of indil'iduals involved in the process of SAARC has increased. So has the number of those who initially brought to its forums minds formed under a particular kind of nation-building, but then gradually allowed the national indoctrination to loosen its grip. This is the SAARC process and it is seeping quietly into the minds of more and more thinking people as time passes.

Thinking of the region doesn't only mean what others may do wrong to damage South Asia as a whole but, significantly, what 'my' country may do wrong to damage
South Asia. The interacUon at SAARC forums has a pattern. You go in feeling defensive about some obviously wrong things you know your country is doing, but you are shocked to see some of the discussants frankly dismissive of the policies pursued by their governments. After the first trip, you return enveloped in a bogus triumphalism; but by the time you have seen two or three forums, you realise that it is quite all right to break out of the national mould and think of the region.
The process of SAARC has to be saved because it subverts the various nation-building processes invented to keep the

if not locked in hostile relationships. Pakistan and India form the centre of this poisonous grid. Their ideologies are mutually exclusive and posit these that are mutually destructive: if India lives as a secular state then the ideological state of Pakistan loses its ro"ison d'etre: if Pakistan lives, then India's secularism is fake. To survive, one has to conspire the end of the other.

states of South Asia apart

118

Perspectiues on South Asia

Nation-building in India and Pakistan is also mutually destructive. India interprets the British colonial period in such a manner that the creation of Pakistan looks like a British conspiracy against Indian nationalism. The doctrine of divide-and-rule is central to history-writing in India. On the other hand, history in Pakistan means the story of Hindu betrayal and treachery against the Muslims, and textbooks are free to describe other religions pejoratively because Pakistan is overwhelmingly Muslim.

It is often sald that the condition of alienation in South Asia attracts foreign intervention. Because Pakistan and
India keep on quarrelling and conspiring against each other,

big powers outside South Asia are able to push through

their political agendas without any difficulty. SAARC scholars believe that South Asian states should have their own problem-solving systems so that foreign intervenfion on one side or the other is avoided, The truth of the matter is that the world outside South Asia doesn't look at it with any imperialist greed. In fact, South Asia has gradually dropped out of the radar-screen of international politics. It is South Asta that looks at the outside world with a conspiratorial eye. For a Paldstani, the world is divided into two camps: those who favour India for whatever reasons and those who favour Paldstan's position. The same is true about the world-view of the Indians, specially after the demise of the USSR in whose camp once India naturally felt a partisan. The next step is that both India and Pakistan 'use' the outside world against each other. Such is the relentlessness of their mutual animus that the world today seems to be an innocent being in the manip'r-rlating hands of the South Asian man. If there was no SAARC and no incipient trend inside it to
expected sooner or later to succumb to war and famine in the same way as Africa has. Already sorne populations have started moving in the north and southeast, and food is now short in

think in regional terms, Sortth Asia would be

Need to Saue the Process

r19

almost all the states. Pakistan and India have been ready to go to war for a long time, but specially after 1990, after the trouble in Kashmir. There are other signs why South Asia will not move onwards but backwards to the condition of Africa. Solutions are no longer available inside the region. More and more states outside South Asia are inclined to believe that South Asians have lost the capacity to think straight about their problems and tieir polittcal will has to be stiffened with incentives from outside. Many Pakistanis take offence at the idea that India and Pakistan would have to be given the 'Oslo therapy' that brought PLO and Israel to agreement over tie issue of the Palestinians. But the truth of the matter is that South Asia is no longer able to think about its problems objectively. The region seems to aspire to the condition of Afghanistan where all solutions, even ceasefires, have to be concocted outside Afghanistan anh then transported to Kabul as the Peshawar Accord and Islamabad Accord etc. South Asia is also confronted with

the strange example of unchanging hatreds in former

Yugoslavia; one may dismiss the possibility, but the truth is that and the India-Pakistan conflict may give rise to the sort of savagery that is in evidence today in Bosnia. The SAARC process is attractive for many other reasons. It is an intellectual construct that supersedes the lndefensible mythologl of the nation-state. Bad governance in India and Pakistan, persistent over decades, has squeezed all conviction from their nationalisms. Indian leaders singing praises of secularism and condemning Pakistan's fundamentalism look just as ridiculous as Pakistani leaders praising Islamlsatlon

and condemning Indian secularism. It is no longer intellectually challenging to cleave to the self-image of the two states. The SAARC-minded Indian will find the Indian doctrine of national security, as based on external threat, totally ridiculous because he can see easily that India's security is threatened from within and irot without' The SAARC-minded Pakistani will find it frightening that the

t20

Perspectfises on South

Asia

state doctrines are increasin$y predicated on extra-regional factors and that Pakistan can become a cockpit of intrigue harmful to other countries in other continents.
SAARC has not taken off for many reasons. No state is rich in South Asia. No one has surplus capital that could spread around in benign big power deals. The region is not threatened from any power outside the region forcing it to come together from a sense of insecurity. South Asian states don't trade

witl

one another, their exchanges recorded

at over 95 per cent with regions outside South Asia. The South Asian states have fought with one another. pakistan
and India have fought wars; Pakistan has once been broken as a result of these wars. India and Sri Lanka have gone through periods of intense hostility; so have Nepal and India. Disputes between India and Bangladesh have simmered on without solution and there is an anti-Hindu wave in Bangladesh that might damage tlle bilateral equation further. India can respond to the hostile nations surrounding her with hegemonic assertion of power, but most of the economic aspects of this assertion are missing. SAARC therefore lacks substance; in fact, there is danger that it might collapse altogether in the face of anti,region forces within South Asia.

What SAARC provides is an alternafive view of South

Asia, a view that today finds no takers. But it is important to keep this alternative view alive for the Ume when nationalist visions are no longer viable without war. When the mythologies of nation-building in South Asia suddenly wither away, and we have nothing to take their place, then it would be time for South Asia to convert itself into an African wasteland with populations walking across it looking for food and avoiding religious and ethnic massacres. The SAARC mind thinks of human rights because tomorrow's massacres and migration will emerge from South Asia's nationalistic interpretation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The SAARC mind thinks of a regional sovereignty rather

Need to Saue the Process

t2r

than a cluster of conflicting sovereignties invented to

safeguard the various nation-building processes adopted by the South Asian states. The SAARC mind miniaturises the global need to downplay national sovereignty so that a more universal sense of sovereignty can take hold of the international system.

If the SAARC mind has to be safeguarded against further marginalisation and probable final annihilation, it has also to be safeguarded against the viruses that have started infecting the regional mind as a whole. Democracy and human rights will hurt the South Asian states if they do not pay heed to two warnings: save the masses from the grind of unrelieved poverty, and rescue the state from the clutches of bad governance. This means that economies have to be run efficiently without being lumbered with big military expenditures. This means that tJle plight of the common man must impinge on our ambitious but unrealistic dreams of power. If the SAARC mind starts looking at the outside world with suspicion it will not build a good alternative vision of South Asia. It will have to acknowledge its allies outside the region and it will have to accommodate external views of how South Asian states observed human rights. In Pakistan, it is the law that violates human rights. The victim has no recourse inside the country. All his friends are outside, not in the Islamic world where human rights have not yet attained any importance, but in the Christian West which is supposed to be an enemy of Islam. Similarly, the message in favour of democracy comes, not from our third world friends, but from the 'unfriendly' G7 states who try to arm-twist us into giving democracy a chance. In India, the law is not the culprit; therefore, anyone fighting for human rights has the law on his right side. Why should the SAARC mind be distracted by the fact that Washington is now speaking his language? The SAARC mind must learn to interpret 'intervention' in a benign manner; otherwise, the fear is that it would succumb to the malignancies of the very nationalisms it is fighting against.

122

Perspectives on South Asia

The SAARC mind talks in terms of the South Asian civilisation, This construct is essentially secular but can be made to work for both secular India and Islamic Paklstan within certain sociological and linguistic frameworks. Once the malignancy of opposed nationalisms has either been defeated through a great regional misfortune or sheer economic extraustion, the emphasis on civilisation will have to be carefully calibrated. Scholars fear that the coming international order will be characterised by a clash of civilisations. The way civilisation is being emphasised in India and Pakistan these days, it is possible that one clash under the new world order will be between the Islamic and the Hindu civilisafions. SAARC must predicate, as it already does, a civilisation of regional familiarity rather than regional differentiation. And as quickly as possible, SAARC must move towards an economic reason for the stbtes of Souttr Asia to cleave to one another. TilI then, thg process of SAARC must be saved from the realiW of tl'.e nationalisms that threaten the region.

Political Process and Institutions in South Asia

l.A. Rehman

Introduction
In all South Asian countries the system of representative
government was introduced bythe British. The ConstituUons

drafted by the colonial power have largely shaped their political institutions, The essential premises of the system were: directly elected legislatures based on a progressively enlarged franchise, leading to adult suffrage, parliamentary form of government, and safeguards for minorities. The colonial power decided that awestminster q4)e of constitution best suited these countries and their respective dominant political parties, at the tirne of Independence, agreed. During the four decades of independence most of the South Asian states have had trouble while working this system and their search for partial remedies as well as alternative models continue to this day. The process has been less marked in India than in Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Nepal.
However, even India has not been able to avoid some serious

problems. As a consequence political institutions in these

t24

Per spectiues on South

Asta

countrles, except to a great extent in India, have acquired neither stability nor maturity. The political structures continue to be vulnerable to pulls and pressures of various kinds. In most countries, constitutions had to replaced or
amended.

Bangladesh shared constitutional problems with Pakistan between 1947 and 1971. It$ first constitution (1952) envisaged a parliamentar5r system. It was soon amended and later on, twice suspended by military rulers. Although Bangladesh was ruled by the rnilitary from 1975 to 199O, elections were held in 1979, f98f , 1986 and 1991. Adult suffrage had come to Bangladesh in 1954, the siggrificant changes made in the constitution have been: switch-over to the presidential system in 1972, introduction of singleparty system in 1975, revival of multi-party systern in 1977, and restoraUon of the parliamentary system in 1991.

legislature has been active, though legislation is still determined by the cabinet. The system ofjudicial review has been enlarged. The press has mosfly been free and the fundamental rights largely respected. The deviation from the democratic norms and the spirit of the constitutionduring the Emergency in the seventies-was temporary. The Indian political structure has come under pressure from states (demands for greater autonomy), linguisfic and

India has been able, by and large, to function within the system established by the 1950 Constitution, and also to consolidate the conventions of a parliamenta4r democracy under a constitutional chief executive. No President has served for, nor sought, more than two terms. There have been divergences of views between tl-e President and the Frime Minister but invariably matters have ended the way the latter willed. Elections have been held regularly and there has been no attempt to subvert the verdict of the electorate. The system of separation of powers between the principa-l organs of the state has worked fairly well. The

Polittcal Process and.Instihttions tn South Asia

safeguards, autonomy), but of that later.

communal/ethnic entities (demands for recognltion,

directly for long periods-I958-1962, 1969-t}ZI. tgZZ_ 1985, and indirectly from tg62-1969, tgZI-tgT2, r98S_ 1988. Signiftcant changes in the constitution include: adopfion of presidential form ofgovernment in 1962, revival of parliamentary system in l9Z3; separate electorates l95l _ 1955; joint electorates 1962-13TZ; reintroduction of separate electorates 1978; multi-party elections I95l_f9b5; f962, 1964, 1970, 1977, 1988, 1990; party-less elections lg6o,
1985.

In Nepal, democratic experiments began with the interim constitution of l95l but political institutions remained weak. A new constitution was promulgated in lgbg but it collapsed soon. There was a long period of .guided democrary, (1962_ f 99f). Finally the latest constitution was enforced in 1991. Pakistan was governed under the Government of India Act of 1935 as amended by the Indian Independence Act of 1947 for the first nine years of its existence. The first indigenous constitution adopted in 1956 was abrogated two years later. The second constitution lasted seven vears (1962-69). ln 1972 the country acquired an inierim consfltuton, and a regular one in 1g73. This constitution was held in abeyance from lgTT to l9g5 and revived on tire last day of 1985 with drastic changes. Adult suffrage was introduced in lg5l. The country was ruled by the military

presidential system, and provided for proportional

representation.

In Sri l-anka t]le British,drafted constitution survived tiII it provided for a parliamentary system and bicameral legislature. The constitution adopted in l9Z2 retained the parliamentary system but abolished the senate. A new consutuuon was adopted in I97g which introduced the
1972.

The multi-party system has surr"ived throughout and elections were held regularly during tg4B-TO (19b2, 1956,

t26

Perspecfwes on Soufh Asta

1960. 1960, 1965, 1970) and less regularly during 1970-90 (1977, 1989).

kessures on Politlcal Systems l. Controlled DenacracA: Pre-lndependence elecuons in but the region were held on the basis of restricted franchise had betwein 1948 and 1959 the principle ofadult suffrage been accepted in all the five states' However' there was fully considerable debate in two of them on the suitability of and Nepal democratic systems to their people and Pal'iistan experimented with what was described as 'controlled' or 'guiaea democracy'. At the beginning of the sidies the

iitit

in Nepal introduced ry di"tutot in Palidstan and the King Paliistan the system electoral colleges to elect legislatures' In ("Basic Democracy') collapsed in 1969 while in Nepal countries {Panchayats) contlnued Ull f991. In both these followed widespread mass the resioration of democracy upheaval. the SAARC 2 . CenIre us Linguistic / Ethnir Units: In three of had to face serious countties political structures have challenges from linguistic,/ethnic/provincial/state units' and tensions Persist. Union on a linguistic basis emerged soon after Independence' The leadership responded to the public pressure quite early and a division of the pre-lndependence provinces on a linguistic basis was carried out. Special prol'isions were also made for several territorial and ethnic units in the Constitution. However, a number of communities had to agitate for years before their demands for recognition as separate administrative units or for greater autonomy were conceded-for example, Mizoram, Nagaland, and Assam' The troubles in Punjab and Kashmir also stem from lack of success in resolving centre-state issues'
In Pakistan also linguistic and regional challenges emerged

In India the demand for redemarcation of units of the

Political Process and. htstitutions in South Asra

r27

soon after Independence, and the response was both slow and undemocratic. Resistance to the principle of majority rule delayed the llnalisation of the constitltion lbr nine years, tiil a strange formula of parity between the two wings of the country had been hammered out. But the questions of provincial autonomy were never resolved and even alter the principle of majority rule had been conceded (lg7o) ihe search for a durable polifical framework did not bear fruit. Ultimately, East Bengal was driven to break away and became the independent Republic of Bangladesh. The 1973 Constitution was based on a consensus among the federating units but the provisions in regard to provincial rights weri not fully respected. This caused conflicts between the centre and units. Some of the differences persist. The demand for a new linguistic province (Seraikee) continues though it is still quite weak. During the eighties the migrants 1etfled in Sindh started agitating for their rights, leading to serious conflicts in the province.

In Sri Lanka, the adoption of the lg72 Constitution widened the differences between the Sinhalese and the Tamils which were further aggravated by the introduction of an oath in favour of united nationhood and citizenship. The Tamil demand for a separate state led to armed conflict which has continued for I I years. Although an autonomy formula has been introduced, the conflict has not vet been
resolved.

3. Religious Pressures: All countries of the region have been under pressure from religious lobbies that have soupht
special privileges wittrin the democratic set_up or trieJto supplant it. Pakistan's record on this score is discussed in the section on ideological challenges to democracy. Bangladesh started with a secular ideal. Although the military rulers did not concede the religious lobby's demand for a drastic change in

the Constitution, Gen. Ershad,s policies of ritualistic

r28

Perspect )es on South Asia

concessions to the religious factions and closer alignment with Muslim states strengthened the religious pressures' In India the government's surrender in the Shah Bano case' the Sikh demand for'Khalistan', the uprising in Kashmir' and the rise of the BJP and its call for India to be declared a Hindu state have seriously strained the secular polity' In Sri t anka the dropping of the cl,ause in the Constitution of 1947 guaranteeing non-discrimination against minorities and the introduction of a clause granilng Buddhism the foremost place added a religious dimension to the issue of

ethnicity.
4. Efrect oJ Potitical Culhte: The functioning of democratic institutions in the region has been greatly affected by a political culture rooted in pre-democracy values' Feudals' e[te castes and the socially privileged have shaped elected bodies in accordance with their own interests' values and preJudices. As a result the representative character of parliamentary insfltutions ha$ been eroded and, where the

privileged groups can form alliances, the standards of accountability and the state's interest in the welfare of the masses has declined. The area where anti-democratic elements have caused the heaviest damage is the electoral process. Several factors have undermined the sanctity of the election process, such as resort to rigging of poll by unrepresentative regimes, use of administrative agencies
and the police to garner votes, coercion and violence by local musclemen employed by candidates. Besides, the rising costs of electlon campaigns and purchasing of votes reduces the possibility of free and falr elections. Candidates from

less affluent groups find it increasingly difficult to win election to the legislatures. Public opinion in Pakistan is worried about the hold that drug barons or others possessing ill-gotten wealth are acquiring over the election process and in india the swelling of the ranks of criminals among the candidates is a matter of concern. The predomlnant political culture of politicians' distinction

Political Process and- htstitutians in South Asia

t29

being based on inheritance, on their ability to mobilise effective 'contractors' of the electorate, on the role money can play in buying power and privileges-has subverted all democratic institutions to an extent that no model of representative rule-method of election, presidential and parliamentary forms-today commands the confidence of
the have-nots.

5. Alienation Jrom Politics: Almost all countries of the region have experienced governments of more than one polifical party. Several ofthem have suffered long periods of authoritarian rule. But apart from some cosmetic changes, the nature of the rule and the priorities of governments do not change with shift in power from one group or party to another to the extent the ordinary citizens can feel the difference. Besides, election manifestos are generally forgotten once the electoral battle has been won. This has weakened the people's faith in the political process itself as manifested in two trends. One, interest in national affairs or ln seeking redress of local or regional grievances within a national framework, is receding. Politics is getting fragmented. Second, the people tend to give less importance to party programmes than to connections with politicians. A clnical attitude is growing according to which the voter does not care how he gets some benefit out of the political process so long as he can get it. Naturally he is becoming more interested in securing his limited interests than in the nature of the system of governance. It could be said that democratic institutions have been'feudalised'.
Ideological Challenges to Democracy
Democracy is an evolving concept. Its central idea, ttrat sovereign power in a state is exercised by the representatives of the people, elected through a system based on equality of vote, has remained unaltered over centuries. However. the authority of democratically elected regimes has been made subject to constraints derived from concepts of rights, people

r30

Perspectives on South Asia

do not or cannot surrender to the collective. To the extent that these constraints are derived from sources other than widely acknowledged norms of democratic governance, or definitions of the state's responsibility and citizens' rights freely evolved by the people thernselves, or universal rights of human beings, they constitute deviations from democracy. When these deviations are justified with reference to a set of beliefs in a particular theory of suzerainty, equity and justice they can be considered ideologically motivated.

Ideologr has been defined differently by a number of authorities. For the purposes of this paper, ideologr may be defined as a set of beliefs, codified or vague, derived from dogma or a moral theory of human needs and behaviour, which is used to project a political structure, or some aspects of it, as immutable and above democratic discourse, if propositions based on this ideology have the potential to supersede democratic conventions they assume the form of challenges to democracy. In South Asia ideological challenges to democracy have stemmed from both religious faith and political doctrine. The Chsllcnge to Democracy i]n Pakistan
The most serious ideological challenge to democracy in South Asia is posed by Pakistan's Islamic revivalists. Pakistan's founding fatherS visuaiised the state as a democracy on the western pattern. However, they had to make concessions to the theory of nationhood based on religion that they had employed to demand a separate state. The compromise they made was a democratic polity inspired by Islamic principles of social Justice, assuming generally that there was no conflict between democracy and Islam. However, Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah's attempt on the eve of Independence to replace the theory of nationhood based on religion with one based on political equality of all citizens failed to find firm support among his successors. The leadership gradually yielded ground to the religio-political

Political Process and Inshfuhons in South Asia

13r

lobby. Encouraged by the demographic changes in the new state produced by exchange of population, especially in what was then the western wing of the country (and which now constitutes Pakistan), this lobby not only resuscitated the theory of religion forming the sole basis of nationhood, it also invented a political ideology which it claimed had inspired the struggle for Pakistan and which dictated organisations of the state-polity in accordance with the injunctions of Islam. Over the past four decades this ideologr has been invoked to effect deviations from democracy. Now a state has been reached where this ideological challenge threatens the very essentials of a democratic order. There are several signilicant developments in the growth of this challenge.

l. One was the adoption by the Constituent Assembly in 1949 of an Objectives Resolution, which laid the basis of a
theocratic state clearly distinguishable from a democracy. It affirmed that "sovereignty over the entire universe belongs to God Almighty alone, and the authority which He has delegated to the State of Pakistan through its people for being exercised within the limits prescribed by Him is a sacred trust". The Resolution was made a preamble to the Iirst Constitution (1956) and has been retained as such, with minor changes, in the succeeding constitutions. Although the Resolution incorporated the salient concepts of democratic rule, the opening clause gradually acquired an overriding effect.

2. In 1956, Pakistan assumed the title of an Islamic Republic and adopted as a directive principle of state policy the taking of steps "to enable the Muslims of Pakistan individually and collectively to order their lives in accordance with the Holy Quran and Sunnah". The Constitution laid the basis of Islamisation of law by deciaring: "No law shall be enacted which is repugnant to the Injunctions of Islam as laid down in the Holy Quran and Sunnah, hereinafter

132

Perspecttues on South Asra

referred to as InJunctions of Islarn and existing laws shall be brought into conformity with such lnjunctlons." Idenfffication of laws that needed to be harmmrised with Islam was to be done by a commission.
3. The 1962 Constitution provlded for a Council of Islamic

Ideologr to advise the chief executive on bringing edsting laws into conformity with the inlunctions of Islam.
4. The 1973 Constitution incorporated a provision, Article

2, whtch declared that'Islam shall be the state lsllgion of Pakistan".

5. The system of separate electorates, that is, Muslims voting only for Muslim candidates on an exclusive electoral list, introduced ln the sub-continent by the British, was defended by the early rulers as an integral part of the Islamic ideology of Paldstan. However, the framers of the 1956 Constltution failed to agree on this question. They left the matter to be decided by the National Assembly after ascertaining the views of the provlncial assemblies (of eastern and western wings). Eventually, the eastern wing (now Bangladesh) rejected separate electorates while the western wing (present Pakistan) opted fbr their Continuation. The 1962 Constitution did away with the separate electorates and the 1973 Constitution followed suit. In lg85 General Ziaul Haq amended the Constitution to revive the system of separate electorates. 6. In 1974, the Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto government declared the Ahmediya community to be outside the pale of Islam, thus changing its status to a religious minority. The same government in 1977 changed the weekly holiday from Sunday

to Friday, and prohibited drinking and gambling-all

measures offered as proof of the State accepting its Islarnic obligations.

7. General Ziaul Haq took a series of steps to Islamise the polity. He added Article 2-A to the Constitution whereby the

Politicol Process and b.stthtttans in South Asia

ObJectives Resolution was made a substantive

r33

reintroduced. In 1979, he introduced a law empowering the state to collect religious levies on wealth (zakat) and iand (ushr), and promulaeted Islamic laws (Hudood Ordinances) for the offences of theft (providing for amputation of limbs), illicit sex (providing for stoning to death), use of intoxicants, and false allegation of adultery. I_ater the law of evidence was changed to incorporate a provision, claimed to be Islamic, whereby a woman's testimony in some cases is equal to half that of a man's. In lg80 he amended the Constitution to provide for a Federal Shariat Court with power to examine laws with a view to bringing them into conformit5r with Islamic injunctions, and to strike down laws, except tJ.e Constitution and Muslim Family laws, and fiscal, banking laws for a specified period, on the ground of repugnancy to Islam. Through a series of changes in the penal Code he made the use of Islamic expressions or offering of prayers in Islamic st5rle, or description of places of worship as mosques etc. by the Ahmediyas Penal offences, and strengthened the blasphemy law to provide for capital punishment. He also proposed an amendment to the Constitution (the gth Amendment) which did not materialise as the National Assembly was dissolved by him in l9gg. It was only after the creation of ttle Federal Shariat Court that the process of changing laws with a view to bringing them into conformit5r with Islam began. 8. Since the exit of General Zia in lggg, tJre government
has offered more concessions to the religious lobby.

basic law. The system of separate electorares was

part of the

power to commute the death sentences. In 19g l the Shariat , Act was enforced to provide for Islamisation of the judiciary, the economy and the education system. The government announced plans to amend the Constitution to make Islamic

the Penal Code was changed to provide for Islamic punishments for offences involving physical hurt, made murder compoundable and extinguished the president,s

In lggg

134

Perspectisses on South

Asia

Shariah ttre supreme law of the land.

already subverted the democratic principles or threatens to do so on the following counts:
The prolonged Islamisation process in Pakistan has either

l.
to

the people's right to exercise sovereigR authority has

been compromised;
2. Parliamenfs authority to legislate has been made subJect

endorsement by courts which have become supralegislative organs of the state;

3. the system of separate eledtorates creates an apartheid-

like situation, no member of a minority community can

become head of state;

4. tJle constitution may soon become vulnerable to court edicts, thus losing its character as a basic law embodying the people's choices; 5. the state's ability to maintain fundamental rights' especially the rtgfrts of women, minorities and economically disadvantaged sections of the society' or to respect international human rights standards has been seriously
eroded:

6. the principles of justice in a democracy have been eroded by the creation of a parallel judiciary and collapse of
safeguards for right to equality before law:

7. the system of election on the basis of adult franchlse' by secret ballot, the institutlons of assemblies, political parties (especially those in opposition) are threatened;
8. since Shariah is defined as the Quran and precedents set by ttre Proptret, both as interpreted by schools of thought that finaltsed their opinions 5OO years ago, the people's right to evolve laws, economic policies and egalitarian measures. in response to changin$ socio-econordc situaflons, could be practicallY denied.

Political Process and Insfrfutions in South Asra

135

This somewhat detailed view of the theocraflc challenge to democrary in Pakistan has been attempted to underline not only the inherent incompatibility of any ideolog/ with democracy but also the form such a challenge assumes in its various phases. It can disguise its ultimate objective by affirming allegiance to the democratic means to capture
power.

Bangladesh

Although Bangladesh, while part of Pakistan (1947-71) resisted the theocratic tendencies that developed in the other half of the country and consciously adopted a secular democratic model of state on gaining independence, it has not been able to escape entirely the consequences of the theory underlying its accession to Pakistan in L947. Political forces exist in the country which pursue the ideal of an Islamic state. Under dictatorial regimes, the state took several steps to demonstrate its commitment to religious ideals, such as declaration of Friday as the weekly holiday, prohibition of drinking and gambling on religious grounds and a general display of state interest in rituals. However, the essential features of a democratic dispensation have survived. The Islamic ideological challenge to democracy is still weak but its existence cannot be denied. Unstable political leaderships could fall back on religious slogans when threatened by popular rejec on.

India
India, too, faces a challenge to democracy from the ideolory of Hindutva adopted by communal parties, though they are

less explicit than their Pakistani counterparts and their tactics are different. Since the early fifties, several political
parties (Hindu Mahasabha, Rashtriya Swayam Sevak Sangh,

Jan Sangh, Shiv Sena and Bharatiya Janata Party) have in

various ways demanded that India should abandon its secular ideal and become a Hindu state. What is generally meant by

r36

Perspectfues on South

Asia

these demands is the establishment of a polity based on Ramrqjga, adopted by the state of Hindu culture and language. Instead of seeking special political rights for Hindus, the measures offering safeguards to the minorities are attacked. This theory of state does not envisage separate constitutional and legal provisions for minorities, it demands that they make their religious, ethnic, social values subservient to the Hindu Code. Although there have been occasions when some militant communalists have asked the government to change the polity by executive action, there has been no serious attenrpt to repudiate the essential democratic process and concepts, such as elections based on adult franchise, political institutions of assemblies, political parties and opposition. A breach in this tradition is being made by the assertion, in cases of places of worship, that where law or constitution conflicts with a tenet of Ratrvqjga or Hindutva the latter shall prevail. To the extent the Indian government yields to the communal demands of the majority, or goes out if its way to placate a minorit5r, the threat to democracy will grow.

External Factors Contrtbuting to Religious Challenges

The religious challenges to democracy in South Asia are rooted in indigenous factors, such as the history of religiopolitical conflicts in the region, religion's extraordinary hold over the people and their tendency to extend its jurisdiction beyond matters of personal falth. However, a number of external factors have contributed to the phenomena. The messy partition of India carried out by the British and the internationalisation of India-Pakistan disputes during the Cold War perpetuated the communal politics of the preIndependence period. The Indian people's fear of the lg47 Partition becoming a model for similar developments on the basis of religion or ethnicit5r, and the Pakistani people's tendency to attribute any problem faced by their state to hostility to their faith prompted people in both the countries

Political Process ond lttstitutians rn South Asia

L37

to fall back on religion as the last barrier to disintegration. In its long war against communalism western powers took extraordinary interest in emphasising the role of religion and traditional culture as the anchor of stable polity and found numerous ways of strengthening religio-political formations in the region. Finally, the rise of oil rich Muslim states as aid givers and markets for labour gave them possibihties of tying their generosity with their being accepted as role models for Muslim countries. In countries benefiting from. {heir bounty, sympathetic religious forces grew and where such beneffts were not visibly available or were seen to be available to particular sections on the basis of religious aflinity, those left out sometimes articulated their grievances in religious terms.

among the national religious movements of the South Asian region is evident. The concessions Pakistan offers to its religious lobby encourages its couterpart in India to press for a similar advance, and vice versa. The impact of the fundamentalist upsurge in Paldstan on Bangladesh is even more marked. The interest governments in the region take in the affairs of ttre minorities in neighbouring countries, with some of whom their
majorities share a religious faith, produces strong backlashes. There are sharp differences of opinion on the strengttr of the religious movements' challenge to democracy in South Asia. At one extreme are the scholars who maintain that religious revivalism is a bogey created by weak political leaderships and that they impose their perceptions on the masses who are not necessarily interested in a religious polity. At the other extreme are theorists who argue that the desire for a religious state is deep-rooted in the South Asian people's psyche and therefore it cannot be resisted. The realitlr lies somewhere between these two viewpoints. All countries of the region have witnessed, in varying degrees, effective exploitauon of religious sentiment for political ends. The fact that the masses can be mobilised for political

A pattern of linkages

138

Persaectiues on South Asta

action by religious slogans cannot be denied. But equally manifest is the incapacity of religious ideologies to answer the demands of a modern state and to meet the aspirations of the people, sharpened as they have been by whatever exposure to democratic management they may have had. In particular, religious ideclogies have no answer to ethnic and regional pulls on South Asian states. If anything they exacerbate such crisis. It is also likely that the need of the global polarisation will relieve the Big Powers of the need to pander to the religious proclivities of their camp followers, bolsters this very fundamentalism. Thus, hopes that the ideological challenge to democracy presented by religious revivalists should peter out in the long run do not seem unrealistic. However, in the irnmediate future the strains on democratic structures will be hear,y and dangerous and the damage they will cause to the people's interest, that democracy alone can serve, cannot easily be assessed.

unless the United States obsession with Islamic fundamentalism produces a new polarisation and thus

A decade ago, democracy in South Asia faced a considerable challenge from the contemporary model of the socialist state. Without going into a discussion on the merits or otherwise of this model, it$ rejection of the multi-party system and lack of safeguards against the will of the proletariat being supplanted by the whims of an entrenched party bureaucracy conflicted with the commonly understood essentials of democratic organisation. The collapse of tl.e Soviet Union has considerably weakened the socialist challenge to liberal democracy in South Asia but it survives in several states. Its accession to strength in proportion to the perceived failures of the present democratic regimes to address the people's pressing material needs cannot be ruled out. For the present, however, mainstream socialist forces have setfled for democratic means of change, and this should give democracy considerable breathing space.
Any suggestons regarding the ways and means of meeting

Political Process and Inshfuhons in Soufh Asia

139

ideological challenges to democracy, particular$ in the South

Asian context, are outside the scope of this paper. But perhaps one point can legitimately be made here. Some of the most severe strains on the democratic experiments in the region have been generated by national leaderships' tendency to be selective in their acceptance of democratic norms. Unless their conduct is characterised by a willingness to accept democracy as a dynamic movement towards higher forms of people's participation in self-governance, they will render their people increasingly susceptible to alternative
models of rule.

Instltutlond Structures of Democracy Most political theorists accept both presidential and
parliamentary forms of government as democratic so long as they are accompanied by adequate and fair systems of checks and balances. All the South Asian states unreservedly accepted the colonial legacy of the parliamentary system' but all of them except India have been shalry in their commitment to it. Pakistan has had the longest periods of deviation from the parliamentary system it inherited at Independence. Indeed, it started with less than the respect due to the parliamentary system as the first Governor -General functioned as the head of both the State and the Government without being answerable to parliament' a task assigned to the Prime Minister. The aberration was justified in view of the extraordinary privileges accruing to the Governor-General by virtue of his pre-Independence stature. His death after barely 13 months in offlce made it possible to correct the deviaflon and the precedent came handy to the third and ttre fourth Governor-Generals who made serious inroads into the parliamentary system. The facade was totally demolished by the army commander-in-chief when he established dtrect military rule in 1958. When the country returned to constitutional rule in 1962 it was under the

140

Perspecttues on South

Asia

presidential form of governmertt which continued till August 1973. Horvever, the 1973 Cou:rstitution as drafted under Zulflqar Ali Bhutto's guidance, did not clearly opt for the parliamentary system. It is known that he was personally in favour of the presidential system and had to give up his preference in the face of strong opposition. Only four years earlier ttre advocates of the parliamentar5r form of government had forced Ayub Khan, the architect of the presidential system in Pal<istan, to give up his cherished creation. The compromise Bhutto made was to make the Prime Minister stronger than normal in a parliamentary system by making the constitutional head of state even more of a figurehead than usual and making him answerable to t)le prime Minister. During the four years that this Constitution remained in force the Prime Minister also wielded the authority the parliamentary system assigns to a constitutional head of state. Under General Ziaul Haq (lgZ7.8B) pakistan was ruled by an all powerful chief executive. More important, he revived the 1973 Constitution only after drastically changing its character. The Constitution as it stands today gives such extraordinary powers to the President that in the opinion of most scholars it makes the functioning of the parliamentary system impossible.

Bangladesh, too, has had a long experience of the presidential form of government. The first step in this direction was taken by Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman himself who switched over from the parliamentar5r to tJre presidential system, which was retained by the military rulers till 1991. Sri Lanka persisted with the parliamentary form of government till lg78 when Mr. Jayewardene introduced a new constitution providing for the presidential system. In Nepal, the central issue till the upheavals of l99O was not the choice of the form of government but t}le degree of power the monarch was prepared to concede to the elected representatives. Althougft the latest constitution enforced in November l99O envisages a parliamentary form

Political Process ottd.Instittttiorns

South Asra

l4l

of government the constitutional monarch retalns substantial powers, including the right to nominate ten members of tJle sixt5r member Upper House.

The South Asian states' vacillation between the presidential and parliamentary systems of government has given rise to considerable literature in support of both. The debate is inconclusive because, among other things, the proponenm of each system J ustl$r themselves with reference to successful external models while their opponents base their rejection of a particular system on its practical malfunctioning in their particular context.

The principal arguments given by the advocates of the parliamentary system in South Asia are: that it is the system with which the people became familiar during the colonial period; that in pluralist societies, which most of the states in the region are, an executive accountable to parliament offers the best possible safeguards to different interests; that parliamentar5r rule consolidates people's sense of sovereign power to a better degree than an executive subJect to a written code. The denigrators of this system point out to its inability to guarantee stability over periods considered necessary for national development plans to complete. The presidential system, they contend, relieves the state of uncertainty caused by parliamentary factions' fluctuating loyalties. However, in almost all South Asian states the switchover to the presidential system has been based less on clearV argued national imperatives than on a strong personality's personal ambition or a ruling group's parusan interests.

In the case of Pakistan, Ayub Khan's preference for the presidential system was determined by thlss factors-his personal ambition to be the sole arbiter of his country's destiny, backed by a military man's peculiar 'concept of a team captain's absolutist prerogatives; his belief that an underdeveloped societ5r was incapable of properly working

r42

Perspectiues on South Asia

self government apparatuses; and his preJudice against

politicians who seemed to be fighting all tJle time for loaves and fishes. He failed to realise that the political squabbles in his country during f948-58 were not an essential comcomitant of parliamentary rule but resulted from the studied attempts by the custodians of power to circumvent the principle of majority rule. He also failed to appreciate that just as the parliamentary system needed for its efficient functioning an institutional under-carriage, the presidential system also needed accountability devices and safeguards against its degenerating into absolutist rule. These flaws in his thinking resulted in his presidential system causing Pakistan more grievous harm than was done by the brittle parliamentary system he had $uperseded.

The Bangladesh military rulers' fondness for the presidential system hardly needs discussion. For one thing, it is in tie nature of military rule to follow the authoritarian model and, for another, these rulers barely concealed their debt to Ayub Khan. What is intriguing in Bangladesh's political history is Sheikh Mujiibur Rahman's decision to go in for the presidential system. It is possible that he found the parliamentary system, with its emphasis on collective decision-making by the Cabinet, slow or inadequate in responding to the enormous task of nation-building after a traumatic war of liberation which had also thrown up radical challenges of different hues. But one suspects that he fell a prey to a common disease afflicting political leaders tlrroughout the region that they tend to prefer the counsel of bureaucratic expert to the views of elected colleagues.
The Sri Lankan transition from the parliamentary system

to the presidential differs from the Pakistani or Bangladesh experiments in two material respects. First, the military did not figure among the forces pressing for the changeover. Second, the change was not sudden; it followed a fairly prolonged campaign during which the issue was debated at length not only by party ideologues but also by the public at

Political Process and Instifufrons in South Asra

143

large. Nevertheless, in practical working, the presidential system in Sri lanka has not come up to the model presented in these debates. It has operated as a partisan instrument of the ruling party and the tendency to its degeneration into personal rule is clearly visible.
The unavoidable conclusion from South Asian history is that what have been adopted here in most cases are spurious verslons of both parliamentary and presidential forms of government. Practically, all countries of the region have found it impossible to breakaway from the tradition of viceregal rule embedded in the political structures inherired from the colonial masters. No political system developed in one country can be transplanted in another. Adjustment and adaptation are necessary in accordance with the history and level of the population's socio-economic development. Thus, there was nothing wrong in attempts to adapt the parliamentary and presidential systems to local conditions and requirements but, more often than not, such adaptations took the form of compromises on essentials and excessive fidelity to the incidentals of the chosen formula. If India has had to face fewer setbacks to the democratic functioning of

the state, the reason lies in its minimum attempt at

adaptation. When it made a major attempt to indigenise the parliamentary system, the departure from the normal practice was too glaring to be tolerated by the electorate.
A common tendency to accommodate regional and ethnic-

cultural entities within the national framework is another factor that has adversely affected the institutions of democratic rule in South Asia. All countries have serious problems related to ethnic minorities. Every country, with the possible exception of Bangladesh, is a multi-ethnic state. Yet the strong tendency among ruling groups to establish unitary forms of government, even when the constitution envisages a federal structure, has undermined
democrary. Pakistan has always professed to be a federation, but has consistently acted in breach of the federal principles.

t44

Perspechves on South Astc

Ttre framers of the Indian constitution betrayed an inclination

towards centralism when they preferred a union to a federation. And in Sri Lanka, ttre attempts to hold unitary
government qmonlrmous with unity have landed the country in costly strife. Had the South A.sian states adopted rational political methods to grant the federal units, regional entites, and ethnic groups the means of participatlon in governance, regardless of the system of government being parliamentary or presidential, the shtp of democracy might have had a smoother sailing.

Failures mentioned in the preceding paragraphs have exposed the unworkability of the classical theory of nationstate in South Asia, and of the futility of forcibly fusing conscious national entities into A bigger nation , with emphasis on unilication rattrer than respect for well-formed diversities. TWo essential pillars of a democratic natlon state have crumbled in the process. First, all state political parties have
beenyieldingground to regionaly'ethnic formations. Examples can be found from Pakistan, India and Sri Lanka. Second, the Judiciary's power to protectthe democratic system from being subverted has been gravely eroded. The trend to put execu ve actions and legislative enactments outside the scope ofjudicial review, as evident in Pakistan and Sri Lanka in particular, betrays a deliberate attempt to place partisan interests above the dictates of democratic dispensation.

It is a moot point whether South Asian democracies can

save ttreir essential

institutions from further revision. Perhaps

it will be more rewarding to adopt more genuine models of pluralist democracy, redesign the apparatuses of state with
a bias in favour of decentralised authority, and restructure the institutions of representative government (including the administra on, justice, economic and welfare services).

Decllne of Leglslatures

In most Souttr Asian countries, legislative organs

have

Political Process and Inshfufions in South Asta

145

not played their due role in consolidating democratic norms. Large legislative majori es have often gone beyond ttre democratic principles to protect party interests. The

Assemblies

in

Pakistan have persistently violated the

demands of a fair dispensation for the pluralist society and ignored the lnterests of the minorities. In India the legislature could prevent neither the imposition of the Emergency nor the abuses perpetrated under it. The battle against the Emergency was fought.outside the legislature-in the Press and atJudicial forums, In Sri Lanka some of the amendments to the Constitution, whereby the government can control dissent in all parties, do not stand an objective test. Thus, legislatures have generally failed to keep the governments within the spirit of their constitutions. Another criticism of

legislatures

is that they have not assumed control of

legtslation. Not only are they subject to government initiative, in some cases, such as Pakistan, most of the legislation is done by the executive authority and legislatures only rubber stamp it.

The Ctvtl Soclety

The civil societ5r has been receiving a raw deal in all states of South Asia.

The foremost cause of the civil society's predicament is the security syndrome visible in all these countries. The tendency to seek national security exclusively through acquisiflon of military power is common. Pakistan spends over 30 per cent of its total government expenditure on defence and India around 17 per cent, while the figures for education and health are I.2 per cent and 2.4 per cent in the case of Pakistan and,2.7 per cent and l.Tpercentinthe case of India. Sri Lanka has the highest allocation for education and health but over the past many years the allocations as percentages of the total government expenditure have been falling. For decades the civil society has been deprived of its basic rights to life, work, food,

146

Perspectiues on South Asra

shelter, health, educa on and the enjoyment of culture because disproportionately high porUons of the resources are being diverted to military machines under the misleading label ofdefence. This trend has not strengthened security; it. has bred a greater sense of insecurity, leading to suicidal arms races and a dangerous imbalance between the civil society and the military.

Apart from being fleeced to pay for the military

establishments, the civil society in South Asia is required to payfor, and suffer the consequences of, military's involvement in purely civil matters. The military operation in Sind in Pakistan, the mtlitary's involvement in Kashmir, PunJab and the north-east in India, the grirn civil war in Sri Lanka and the military campaign against the tribal populations in Ban$adesh are all instances of grave encroachments on ttre civil society.

The state's fondness for military power and its use to resolve political lssues or meet ethnic pressures have led to militarisation of societies, increased civil violence, and a weakened tradition of peaceful coexistence among diverse groups that is the hallmark of a civil societ5r.
The civil society has been deprived of the possibilities of collective and individual self-realisation by the failure of states to eliminate discrimination on the grounds of belief, gender and economic status, and to realise one of the primary obJectives of democracy-guarantees of equality of opportunity to all their citizens.

Grinding poverty, slow and uneven industrialisation, reluctance to adopt informal approaches to development and a general blas in favour of the e;dsfing social relations prevent the disadvantaged secUons of the civil society in all South Asian states from breaking tJle bondage of tribalism, casteism and debilitating prejudices and inhibitions of different varieUes.
The task before conscious and enlightened sections of the

Polttical Process and Instrtutricns in South Asia

t47

population in South Asian countries is not merely to secure a larger share of resources for the benefit of the civil society but the creation of orders which guarantee the fullest possible regeneration of the creative faculties of the civil population. This will necessitate liquidation of praetorian tendencies, drastic cuts in military expenditures, wholesale revision of economic priorities and the raising of the common ciflzens from the status of state subjects to that of participants in self-governance.

The Shared Imagination and Cooperation in South Asia: Nepalese Perspective

DurgaPrasad Bhnndori

Exploring the shared values captured in the creative imagination of South Asia is a challenging task. There ts such a commonality of vision and voice in the South Asian creative imagination, that it is very hard to tell the Bangladeshi imaginatlon from the lndian imagination, Indian from the Nepali and vlce versa. Yet it is worthwhile to find out the nauve uniqueness and peculiadty if there is any. What overwhelms one at the very thought of such an endeavour is to embark on ttre adventure of going through the famillar and unfamiliar creative genres. Human rights and social justice, posiflon of women and secularism, communalism and sectarianism are in their character very much common to all the SAARC countries. Nevertheless it is stimulating to take a look at the difference of perceptions.
Nepal is a country with a political identity and historical consclousness like all the SAARC countries and with

The Shared. Imoghntion and, Cooperation: Nepal

t49

comparatively greater and longer isolation like a few of its members. The imaginative and tfie intellectual, the intuifive and the logical faculty of any countr5r or society is determined by the course of its cultural history right up to ttre present moment. The 'challenge and response" theory of Arnold Toynbee, a great thinker and historian of this century is worth recalllng while contemplating the texture and quality ofa culture. If the response matches the challenge a great culture can be born, if the matching is unequal then it tends to slide towards a masculine or feminine way, exkovert or introvert. We can classiSr the societies as introvert and extrovert as we classiff individuals. SAARC is a conglomerate of introvert societies barring the few episodes of racial invasion and assertiveness in the past. But they are all unitedly and individually trying to be more outward looking, more assertive than they were half a century ago. They seem to be determined to face up to the situation that their own history has presented to them. They share many things such as common heritage, common aspirations for the future and common ambitions to work for a fellowship of the free nations of the world. The creative ime qination of India, Pakistan, Bangladesh

and Nepal is essentially lyrical. A lyrical imagination is pulled more powerfully by the past than by the future. Even in our most prosaic moments we tend to be lyrical. By lyrical
I mean the South Asian mindset is sentimental and nostalgic;

it talks more often than not of the golden past that has left us and of t}re golden future that is yet to come. When we talk of the present reality, it is not interesdng. Yet we are
condemned to talk because we have to live in the present.
Nepal has enough reason to be proud of having produced some creative arHsts in the twentieth century who can be

ranked with the important artists of other South Asian

countries and beyond. They have seen the position of women,

the human rights and social justice, communalism,

secularism and sectarianism with the vision of a creative

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mind, not with the loud perspective of a politician, a social

reformer and a policy maker. What is true about one genuine artist is usually true about the other artist. I cannot think that any literary artist, any painter or sculptor can be ostensible and declarative in his objective. He is for the most part subfle and impressive in his creations. Any creation with a manifesto to redress the social ills has the inherent danger of falling into vulgar sloganeering and pamphleteering which is unfortunately called by a certain set of people as the real aim of art. The artistes I have in mind are the artistes who are free from the preJudice of any reformist and didactic zeal. At the moment I am inspired to recall-rightly or wiongly-Rabindranath Tagore, La:<rni Prasad Devkota, Saadat Hasan Manto, Kazi Nazrul Islam. Manto and Islam, in spite of their obsession with social ralism, did transcend it in some of thelr writings. In fact a great artist is one whose creation combines both time and timelessness. I have in mind great painters and sculptors, great producers and directors of tfieatrical art, great classical and folk artists, with my limited understanding of the classical art in its different expressions. My attempt to deal with art forms ottrer than literature might sound gratuitous, irrelevant and superficial. I will try to discover how all the three issues are reflected in the best known dramatic poem of Mahakavi La:rrni Prasad Devkota and will also take a passing look at some of the representative Nepali literary artists. Devkota's magnum opus, Mwwrmdan, serves as my master narrative.

Mutanndrnls thoroughly rooted in Nepali soil; the theme, the rhythm, the metre, the. conception and execution,
everything about tJ:e poem is unaffectedly Nepali, the first and last of Devkota's great poerns without the impress of any external influence. Most of his works bear out the direct or subtle influence of classical Qanskrit poetry and English romantic poetry. Munamadan in its idiom, energy, naturalness and flowing cadence stands out unique in Nepali literature, perhaps in Souttr Asian literature.

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151

maturity in the speech of the most common man. Munanndan is a folk tale refined into a beautiful lyrical poem of love, separation and death. It is presented in
different forms-ballet, dance drama, painting and special poetic recitation since it appeared in print in 1935. And the poem which is very small in size-forty pages-has made an immense impact upon Nepali Iiterature and the Nepali psyche. In those days, issues of human rights, women, communalism and secularism did not trouble the Asian mind wittr a few exceptions. It was inconceivable to imagine ttrat Nepali artists under the family autocracy could overtly or covertly plead for human rights, women's rights and secularism. In fact the formal recognition of human rights came much later even in the west. Devkota was a rebel as all great artistes are in some sense, but he was a rebel not at tle cost of art. He was not happy with the state of affairs in

The sublime emotion is expressed with meticulous artistic

his country but could not openly demonstrate his unhappiness through his writings lest it was detected by
the autocratic rulers and their minions. He very subtly conveyed his message in all those poems, for his own time
and for future generaflons.

Muna is the wife, Madan the husband who have retained the fervour and heat oflovers who can sacrifice and surrender whatever they have on earth and heaven for each other. Madan, a high caste Kshetri decides to go to Bhot' Tibet, to make a living. Muna stays back at home to attend to his old ailing mother, but her mind is occupied with the thought of Madan and gets nearly wild in her imaginings. Madan is suddenly taken ill and is looked after by the alien Bhote, the lowborn tribal of high Tibet. The human quality of the poor Bhote touched Madan's heart. In return Madan touches his feet trying to convince him with these words: A son of high Kshetri touches these
feet with love unbounded

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Perspectiues on South Asia

Any man is great not becauge of his caste

but because of his heart.

The strong caste barrier and communal division widely prevalent in those days is ridiculed by Devkota tn Mnrnrwdan and other works.

Madan makes a significant comment on the state or position of women not in any particular society but in the whole scheme of creation. Madan tells Muna: "Woman is holding the whole responsibility of creating the present and future and she has been giving delight and fragrance to human existence since time immemorial." Devkota could not be so crude to say that ]ret women are being discriminated against by every society'. Detrkota in Munatrwdan Shaklutalcand other poems and dramas is always upholding the case of women and the downtrodden with his characteristic artistic delicacy. Devkota is clearly a humanist who (if he were alive today) would have vigorously defended human rights, including the rights of women, and would have sincerely and powerfully conveyed his message that religious, communal, and ethnic harmony is essential for the healthy growth of any societ5r. He questioned the rationale of orthodoxy and obscurantism it'r his poems without fearing the ruler's whip. Mahakavi Devkota is a poet of the highest stature in Nepali literature. Under the dictatorial regime panegryic writing was more or less customary for creative as well as non-creative writers. Ddvkota deliberately refrained from dedicating his poems to the rulers and praising their repressive rule. He was completely given to his muse to the end of his life. His casual eccentricity and indifference to the practical aspects of life is a mark of a man who is creatively and spritually above the common men. This is to say that he not only created great poetry, he also lived it in a very uncongenial age. Some of his shorter poems along with Munamadan and Shakuntala will live for all times. lf anv one

The Shared Imagination and. Cooperation: Nepal

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happened to be born about a hundred years before his time. Devkota is the guiding spirit for most of the poets of modern Nepali literature. Clearly, Munamadan has made a seminal impact upon the Nepalese psyche.

ever tries to discover a message in his poetry he will lind that Devkota is above evelything else a humanist who

Next to Devkota, because of my limited knowledge of Nepali literature, I feel compelled to recall B.p. Koirala for his obvious relevance for tJle given issues of the dialogue. He has earned a considerable reputation as a short story writer and a novelist who has mostly written on human societ5r and the human mind. Curiously enough politics which has been his lifelong vocation has never for a moment restrained his literary output. His creative writings are neafly detached from his political ideolog5r. Sumnima is the title of his most important novel he wrote in prison (1970), (almost all his novels were written in prison). He gives a very balanced and penetraung insight into the questions of ethnicity and communalism in Nepal.
Som Dutta, a Brahmin who takes a vow to lead a life of celibacy and austerit5r as is prescribed by the Shastras and his immediate ancestors, falls in love with Sumnima, a girl from the putative lowborn Kirati community who is relatively free in matters of sexual and social behaviour. Som Dutta does everythlng externally impressive towards the fulfilment of ascetic destiny. But he cannot adhere to the ascetic discipline for very long. He falls into the embrace of Sumnima and finds his fulfilment. He is traditionally married to pulmos, a woman of his caste who is also internally drawn to another man. Sumnima is much more drawn to Som Dutta. The pairs are not comfortable with the conventional roles they are supposed to play. The women break the age old social respectability and look for greater freedom. The mutual gravitation of Sumnima and Som Dutta is an embodiment of communal harmony and of longing for psychological and

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social freedom. B.P. Koirala by making the high caste Puloma

attach himself to the low caste man is sending an obvious message to his audience that the concept of high and low caste and community is irrational. The theme of ethnicity is deftly dramatized in this novel. The kind of social scenario and ethnic problem reflected in the novel is a chbracteristic Souttr Asian reality. The portrayal of women in B.P. Koirala's wridngs is more unorthodox than other Nepali writers' There are, of course, a few tradition-bound women who stand in contrast to those quesfioning tradition. Koirala's men do not look so important as his women. His stories and novels together fascinate readers for ttrree reasons: his deep psychological insight. his insinuation of social, psychological and moral message, artistic balance, and the mild thrust upon the liberation of humans from the irrelevant dogmas' rituals, and superstition. Above all' Koirala is a writer for harmony-communal, social, psychological, biological and religious. Yet this great politician never ta-lks of politics in his creative writings. Women are at the centre of his works'

Gopal Prasad Rimal, a playwright and a poet makes poverty, social injustice and the liberation of women ttre leitmotif of his writings. Both in thought and technique, he breaks the convention of moving around the old religious and social stereotypes. In his play Masan he frees the principal woman from the tyranny of her husband and the repressive domestic atmosphete in the same wa). as Ibsen frees Nora in Doll's House. Masattwas written about fifty years ago. Govinda Bahadur Gothale wrote Pallo Ghnrko JhAaL (the window of the other house). The window is a s5,'rnbol looking out for a woman who has been confined in the room for centuries. She leaves home to start a new life with the man she sees outside the window. A s1'rnbolic representation of woman's desire to be free and discover herself is the burden of tlre novel. Similarly the play Bhoosko Ago (fire in the husk) dramatizes tl.e feelings and problems of women.

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Parijat, a powerful woman novelist in her most popular

novel Shirlsko Phool (1965) wrote about woman's predicament and her position in a male dominated societ5r. In her novel. men were frightened by free spirited women, no matter how physically frail and delicate they were. Parijat's women were

independent or on the road to independence; they were becoming more and more resolute not to be men's shadows.

Bhoopi Sherchana, a popular modern poet is satirical and epigrammatic in these lines which are among the most quoted from the anthology of his poems:
When I constantly see young Sitas

in the streets, the alleys, the markets, in my country and in foreign lands,
stripped bare like eucal54)tus trees, when I see countless Bhimsen Thapas, standing still and silent,
..

...

I really feel like mocklng my blood.

Bhoopi here laments tJre degeneration of the ideal for which we have.been living and dying for ages. The old values are juxtaposed with modern reality.
More recent poets in Nepali literature have also discovered issues relating to society, politics and the eternal thirst for Iove in their poetry. They were particularly articulate in the I99O movement for democracy. It provided them an opportunity and an excuse to express themselves uninhibited. During the Panchayat rule, several literary artists were excited at times to articulate their feelings at a considerable risk. The ardstc mind generally revolts against repression and injustice. Most of them talk and assert for human rights denied under a ruthless dispensation. I believe circumstances, both political and social and the desire to

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Perspectiues on South Asia

improve or tolerate them in the artistes are very common to the SAARC countries.

Drama and theatre have undergone changes in the last Iifteen years. The street theatre is a new phenomenon in the subcontinent. The emergence of Saruanacm, a street theatre group in 1981 is an important event. A perceptive critic in Nepali literature, Abhi Subedi says, "The Sarvanaam Street Theatre started at a tlme when it was not posslble to dramatize even within the four walls, the desire of free expression. What could not be said within the four walls was, however said openly by the Sarvanaam in the Street." And the Sarvanaam mosfly spoke in favour of human rights, social justice, improving the condition of women and in

favour of ethnic integration, harmony, and ethnic

participation in the affairs of the country. They said it with a great deal of seriousness and intensity. About five years ago, well known groups from rnost countries of South Asia staged their performances in Kathmandu. It was an extraordinary experience. The dramas showed that the problems and aspirations of the region are similar. Issues like human rights, women's position, poverty, exploitation, democracy were the principal themes. Ashesh Malla, the dramatist, was ttre main organizer. Banal Searcher, generally called the father of street theatre in India also participated and shared his experiences. If Safdar Hasmi were alive he would also have taken part in the Kathmandu drama festival. All important participants talked nostalgically of him. Television serials and non commercial and commercial cinemas to some extent, reflect the suffering of women, and the new awakening in therr to revolt against unJust domination by men and society. Some movies like Ujeli and Chelibeti demonstrate the suffering of women who cannot complain and articulate their feelings and accept suffering as an inevitable part of their destiny. But tJ.e response in the sensitive audience is the sense of disgust and protest.

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Nepal T.V. is, I hear, planning to make more films on communal harmony, on the evils of poverty, illiteracy; on socialJustice and on women and their right to be equal with men. At present the serials and Iilrns made on these issues are few and far between. Nepal radio is doing a fairly good job on this score.

Contemporary Nepali paintings

compassionate moments, also reflect the issues of human rights, women's condition, communal discord and harmony with considerable poignance and sharpness. Like modern poetry, paintings too embody the themes of freedom. Many modern paintings done under tJ.e tifle of .Democrary" present a new scenario. The brush strokes, the prominent use of primar5r colors and ttre mobility of images in the paintings of Lainsingh Bangdel, Kiran Ma-nandhar and other young artists, the vision ofthe apocalypse in the Kalkiauatar series of Shashi Shah dramatise in the visual form tfie ttrirst for freedom and change.

in the artistes'

environment, and the predicament of women, There is profusion of blue and green in her art.

traditional society. She shows them by the use of familiar themes, archetSpes and the use of familiar colours, ,,Ragini's political paintings do not project the grim and violent post modernist images of the political myth of the recent times', says Abhi Subedi. Shashikala Tiwari links women and

Ragini Upadhyaya's recent paintings present very successfully the themes of women, their posi on in the

Women artistes are also coming up with amaaing brilliance.

extribiUon of Nepali paintings is organized in Ohaia. Earlier Nepali and Bangladeshi artists had Joinfly exhibited their works in Kattrmandu.

the creative minds of South Asia. Almost every year an

There has been occasional o<change and interaction among

Writers of the region, officially or privately, visit each other's countries. Whenever there is political change in the

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Perspectrues on Sottth Asia

subcontinent the writers want to come closer and share each others' hearts and minds. This sharing may promPt them to work in unison. Further sharing might be stimulated by the South Asian Dialogue. I believe it holds a great piomise. Ttre awareness of making a dialogue about the creative imagination of live cortntries is in itself a remarkable step towards moving closer to the real understanding of each others' problems. In reality the outer manifestation in any form-war, peace, human rights, social justice' woman's agony, communal harmony or conflict' religious or political dogmausm, fundamentalism-is an indicator of what we have been inwardly feeling and thinking and how we have been expressing ourselves through the medium of art for many generations. South Asia or for that matter any part of the world is what it is on the strengile of its inner irowth or inward journey in the creative imagination. lord Buddha is creative in the ultimate Supreme sense' Shakespeare is creative in the sense we usually understand creativit5r and creative imaglnation. There is, I repeat, an overwhelming commonality of creative imaginatlon in South Asia, because ttrere is some commonality of sources and roots that has been shaping the South Asian mind for many centuries' The tangible is drawing upon the intangible, upon the subterranean. Besides, the geography and history of the reg;ion has been passing through more or less similar vicissitudes. We have been holding dialogue with each other for centuries, but the dialogue of this time is going to be of a unique character. Certainly this will "break a new ground"' A major factor determinin$ social peace and prosperity in the reg;ion is culture-a sense of common identity' traditions and values. This South Asian Dialogue is presumably a search in that direction. Culture is created by artists, seers and thinkers. Folk culture also has its roots and branches in the artistic thinking and behaviour of every society' Each of these five countries has its own cultural identity' If all countries merge together they create a greater whole and

The Stnred Imagination

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greater responsibility to keep individual identity on the one hand and to develop a resilience and openness for the regional, subconunental, continental and intercontinental communlon and oneness on the other which should be the mark of a great cultural undertaking. This is essentia_l to liberate ourselves from the religious bigotry and pettiness, from nationalist egotism and from much of the hypocrisy of the present day world whose staple of dialogue and conversation is politics and economics more than an5rthing else. The fffth South Asian Dialogue will hopefully provJ that talking of culture which encompasses among other things literature, painUng, theatre, cinema, folklore can be more fascinating and equally profitable. To give a picture of tJle regional creative imagination on these much talked about issues is nearly imposJble within the limited space of time and the paper; to give a cogent picture of what the creative artists of my counfir have imagined, referred to, alluded or directly dealt with is very difftcult. And despite my dissatisfaction with myself I am

obliged to take it as a pious task to put before this distinguished gathering whatever I have discovered with my desultory effort. Most of the artists in South Asia have displayed their sense of revolt against tyranny, injusfice, fundamentalism, dogmatism, excessive nationalism, repression of men and women and any kind of superstition. La:ani Prasad Devkota, completely uncormpted by any obvious political opinion or ideology, or any obvious enthusiasm for the improvement of his society has verv artistically-if we want to find-expressed about the position of woman and what it ought to be, about the dignity of man and woman in an undignilied world, about ttre oneness and harmony of all communities and castes, about the god who dwells in everybody's hearts irrespective of colour, caste, birth and gender. In his short poem ..Temple" and To a Beautiful Prostitute', he is an uncompromising humanist, unparalleled in Nepal literature. I know very litfle about the

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Perspectiues on South Asta

most renowned poet of Ban$adesh, Kazi Nazrul Islam' However, on the basis of what I read long ago of Islam I venture to say that he was an iconoclast and a hurianist of
great understanding. His ,Rebel ls a work which comprehends ill ttr" i"".r"" of our Dialogue and at the same time transcends tleem. He was a great artist and very egalitarian' I know very little of Pakistani literature. And I do not know where to put

Ghalib and Meer and othr-r pre-Independence writers: in India or in Paliistan' Iqbal was Pakistani by choice and by temperament. I love Ghalib, Meer, Fa? and Ahmad Faraz' Iqbal was a great poet but not equally lovable for the secular-mtnded readers. His lines such as Allehoke steronlco aati nahtt rubahi (The lions of God know no cowardice) smacks of something less than the humanistic abandon and poetic amplitude of Ghalib, Meer, Faiz Ahmad Faiz and Ahmad Faraz, Saadat Hassan Manto, a remarkable story writer wrltes about the poor, the down-trodden and the iowliest in the society with an extraordinary boldness of treatment. Manto the story teller in the recent past and Faraz the poet in contemporary Pakistan have carried tJ:e flre of revolt against injustice and brutality in the society' Marrto, for example, writes in his story '"Thanda Gost" '.A prostitute is a helpless and friendless woman' Every day hundreds of men come to her carrSring a single desire' But even in the midst those who desire her she is alone"' Devkota s prosfltute is also apparently a vic m of social injustice, but spiritually she is higher than the so-called high caste women. Manto presents his helplessness as it is' Devkota ideallses it. Both are compassionate and wish her to come out of the mire. Devkota is oblique in castigating the society, Manto is straight. Whatever the similarity and difference in the artistic expression of the subcontinent, the creative imaginauon on the whole is multi-dimensional. It seems moving from the

"foul rag and bone shop of the heart" to the splendid heights of metaphysics and spiritualism. The most known and the

Tle

Shared" Imaginatinn and. Cooperation: Nepal

l6r

best example of multidimensional creative imagination is Rabindra Nath Tagore who is simultaneously moved by the smell of the earth and the fragrance of heaven. Here he sings of the mystic ecstasy, there he shudders at the colossal poverty, widespread social injustice and expanding religious and communal insularity in the Indian society. His heart is filled with "awe and wonder" at the celestial glory above and "the uncontrollable mystery of the bestial floor" below. Tagore prays to the Almighty to free his countrymen from all kinds of pettiness, injustice, inhumanity, repression and narrow mindedness, and prays that India be a land "where the heart is without fear and the head is held high, chittajetha bhag a shung a ucctn j e tha math-"

Muslims and I
Vljag Tendulkar

I was born in 1928 in Mumbai class family.

in a Maharashtrian middle

Mumbai was known and spoken of, except in Marathi speakingfamilies of Maharashtra, as Bombay.
Even those Marathi spealdng gentlemen who had higher education-which had its accent on English-and wished to show their proficiency in the language of ttre rulers, would fondly call the city Bombay. Bombay was fashionable w.ith us; Mumbai was natural. And of course the original. Itwas turned into Bombay by the white sahibs first and then by the brown sahibs as was the practlce. Mumbai of that time was not as sprawling and overcrowded it is today. The city was limited to its core areawhich was sparsely populated. You could walk on the road at any time of the day without being bumped off by a speeding vehicle or
as

colliding wlth another pedestrian rushing to reach

Muslims and.I

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somewhere. Life wen with clocks and watches was long enough to be enJoyed with its simple comforts and to be lived without the persistent feeling of anxiety.
We still had to learn by heart and recite a poem eulogising George the Fifth, the then emperor of the British Empire, on

which tlle sun never set. This poem was a part ofour school curriculum. At the same time the air outside was charged with Mahatma Gandhi's movements of non-violence and the memories of Lokamanya Tilak and Shahid Bhagat Singh which were sflll very fresh in the minds of the elders. My mother, who was a housewife and was bard educated as most women of that time used to be, talked fondly of the meeilngs she had attended of Tilak and his powerful oratory and the terrible nig$t on.which Bhagat Singfr was hanged. *Bhagat Singhl Hail Hail" She would tell us how ttrese muffled slogans of ttre mourners echoed on the roads of Mumbai throug;h that night. My college going elder brother was already in the freedom movement and had pledged himself to sroadeshi and the charkha, the spinning wheel that Gandhi had turned into a household item. Once in a while the atmosphere would suddenly get tense. Everyone looked concerned, I was urgently brought home from the nearby school and my elder brother who had grown a beard was pressurised to shave it off for the time being. This meant that a communal riot had begun in the city. Hindus shed any resemblance to a Muslim and took extra care to look thorougf,r Hindus and made it a point to avoid Muslim localiUes till things got normalised again. They in their routine existence had very little to do in these localities except passing through them in a tram or a bus towards another destination. It was an alien part of the city for them; segregated in their psyche like the prostitutes' area. One avoided even passing through this Muslim area for safety's sake till the end of the tensions between the two communities

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Perspectiues on South Asra

(names were meticulously avoided in the media) were officially

over. Withdrawal of the curfew was situauon returning to normal.

a sure sign of

the

Ttrere was no way to know what happened to the Muslims

even I, a child, would hear about incidents in which a Muslim hawker or a beggar who strayed into the F{indu locality was promptly stabbed in the back or in ttre belly. A similar incident of a lone Hindu straying into the Muslim locality and getting stabbed was as a rule mentioned after such an incident in the Hindu locality was narrated. Maybe to convince the listeners-and the narrator hirnself--that it was only in the fitness of things; a case of squaring of the account or a case of tit for tat which was perfectly Justified.

in the city during the riot situation; but

But I clearly remember; there would be a short or long hush in the conversation before this topic was resumed or
changed.

The hush was not out of a feeling of doubt about the wisdom of such a Justilication but probably tl:e whitecollared clerics and their families felt uncomfortable with
even the verbal feel of bloody violence. They had got so used

to the smooth working of the [,aw and Order machinery of the BriUsh Raj and the peaceful existence of the politically uninvolved middle class under it.

Ttuly life then was paradise for my family and for families like mine as compared to the routine gang wars and the murders and the dacoities committed in the white-collared middle class localities of Mumbai now. And the much publicised complicity of the police in such terrible happenings. One would not even dream of such complicity then. Not only the police but the government machinery as a whole was taken to be above board in its functioning. Whether it was, is anybody's guess.
Going back to the topic of my paper,

I did not get an

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opportunity to meet my first Muslim or even to see one-a real one-from near till I was well over twelve years old. Not many of my class, the white-collared middle class-even in their adult age-got this opportunitSr of meeting a real Muslim in person in their normal life in a so-called cosmopolitan city of Mumbai. One was only aware of a Muslim existence in another part of the city and inherited some stray ideas about them while he or she grew into an adult. What were the ideas like?
Let me recount from mv exDerience. A Muslim meant someone with a beard. It also meant an unclean appearance; even an uncouth behaviour lacking education and culture. Someone you better stay away from. Contact in any form was supposed to be dangerous. I still remember a common expression very frequently heard in casual conversations of the white-collared adults. (T|-ful{T 3lfeq 6'I gqFrlfl?T ?; Are you a human being or a Muslim? It was never said seriously; the tone would be light; half-joking; even frivolous. Casual. Once it was said in my
class by my teacher to one of the troublesome students. The

student did not mind it. He grinned sheepishly as it was said. No one seemed to mind in fact. It was a way of saying your behaviour is most unseemly.
My first education on the Muslims began with tristorical plays of the time. Those plays invariably dealt with the ascendance of Shivaji the Maratha king who freed the Hindus of Maharashtra from Mughal rule and established his own rule which came to be known as tbe Hindu-padapad"shahi, the empire of ttre Hindus. The ffrst such play I saw had Shivaji's son Sambhaji as the hero, who according to the history of that time was a passionate womaniser and an alcoholic and a generally irresponsible young man wtro preferred a martJrr's death in Mughal Emperor Aurangzeb's prison to getting converted to Islam. It was staged in our

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school as part of the annual day function. All the actors were school children (older than me) and they were directed by one of our teachers. The play had been originally written for adults and had earned acclaim on the commercial stage. Like any Marathi historical play of those days this too had the Mughal emperor Aurangzeb, Shivaji's arch-rival in his flght against t]le tjrrannies of the Muslim religious fanatics against the Hindus, as ttre bad man of the play. He was painted in loud colours; a religious fanatic, a ruthless tyrant, a despicable figure with a long white beard on a crooked face wearing garish costumes and shouting swearwords supposedly from Urdu and Farsi (I did not understand them but felt very piqued by them:) directed at Shivaji's son and the ruling Maratha Emperor Sambhaji and his men. In short he was like the villain in any commercial Hindi masala film of to-day. Alternately comic and repulsive. The rest of the Mughal characters in the play were drunkards, lechers, capable of any dastardly act and big-mouthed cowards who always lost in a ffght with Sambhaji's brave litfle men. (maulas, the Maratha soldiers were small in stature).
Ttre Maratha Mavlas stood in contrast to these Mughal ruflians and buffoons. All the applause-winning dialogue was given to Sambhaji and his men by t]le play'r!'right and the 'enemy camp' spouted only hatred toward the kq;ftr Marathas, toward their'holy' cows and contempt toward the Hindu religion on the whole.

As children we were made to participate in and watch many such baffling (baffling for us children) specimens of adult theatre; this was only one of them. The very first I watched and brooded over for days.
You can imagine my reactio:r at that age to this mindblowing ttreatre experience. Being a school production the audience, in addition to
me, was mainly of children of the age-group between six and

sixteen.

Muslims and

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Apart from this our school textbooks carried excerpts from Marathi historical plays which shaped our ideas of our past and also the present to a large extent. Access to authentlc history at that age was out of the question. Even if one found access at a later age the ideas-some of them wierd and tvdsted-were already formed at an early age and though they can change over Ume I doubt whether they disappeared entirely from one's psyche. Our attitudes have a lot to do with what we internalise in our early formatlve
years.

The first real Muslim in my life was a boy in my class. This was after we left Mumbai for Kolhapur, a small town at that time. My new school had boys from lower castes who were the sons of lorry-drivers, tailors, carpenters and we had a girl in our class who was the daughter of a 'kept woman'or a concubine of a rich man-a novelt5r even for ttre more knowledgeable among us. I met Sheikh here in the school. On the first day of the school we were made to stand up one by one and say 'present sir' as our class teacher read out the roll-call. When a tall, gaunt boy with high cheek bones and small peering eyes answered to the name of Hussein Ali lzaz AIi Sheikh (the first and the second name is my imagination; since I do not remember the original ones) I looked tqdce, with utter disbelief at that boy wearing horne-washed pajamas, a neat cotton coat fully buttoned on a clean white home-washed shirt and a black shapeless cap properly placed on his head through which his unruly halr sprouted from all sides. I simply could not believe my eyes. He did not fit into the concept of a Muslim in my mind at all. He was like any boy. He was so gentle and shy and soft-spoken in spite of looking bigger than usl And he did not utter any swear-words. As ttre days passed I also found that Sheikh was a studious boy, he spoke my language, i.e., Marathi-though later I found that it had a natural mix of Urdu (not of the Aurangzeb ldnd) when he was away from the school especially at his

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Perspectiues on South Asra

home and with his family-and this mix of Urdu and Marathi sounded even sweeter than my chaste Marathi. And Sheikh was very sociable. Warm in his general behaviour. Eager to make friends. Very co-operative. When I was unwell and had

to stay away from the class, Sheikh would help me in catching up with the back{og by offering me his notebooks. We became friends despite my deep-rooted
reservatlons about his being a Muslim. He lived in a locality which was in the same direction as mine. He had to walk farther on. So we left school together every evening. Chatted on the way. For days I could not make up my mind on whether I should invite him horne or not. He was a Muslim after all. Besides my own reser'r'ations about Muslims I had apprehensions about horv Sheikh would be received by others at home. I had even avoided mentioning our friendship to my parents. One day during the lunch break he offered me somethlng from his lunch box. I had not thought of doing so. I ate from my box and he from his though we ate sitting on the same school bench. That day when he took out something from his lunch box and held it in front of me I dithered. I did not know whether I should eat from a Muslims's lunch box. I did since I could not say no to Sheikh but my conscience troubled me that night for doing what I had done. I even imagined in my sleep that I had turned into a Muslim and my family was blaming me for eafing from a Muslim's lunch box. 'Good for you!' They were saying in a chorus. Want to eat from a Muslim, eh?' And my mother was crying her heart out for my becoming a Muslim.

But soon this feeling of guilt disappeared and I

even

invited Sheikh to my house one day to see my collection of kites. I did not inform my family about the religion of my school frtend but they discovered it while Sheikh was at our house. Probably by Sheikh's way of speaking or his appearance. I do not know how. To my surprise they did not object. My mother took care to tell me that night not to go to his house and not to be 'very friendly'with him. 'He seems to

Muslims and

169

be a good boy' she said, 'but these people (she meant the Muslims) are not our kind. It is better to stay awav from thern'.

If I remember correctly, he was uncomfortable and tense for a while in his ffrst visit to my house but liked the house and my family and then frequently came to my house to play with me.
His father was a butcher by profession. I did not know this for months. Nor did my family with their vegetarian habits; otherwise I would have been forbidden from mixing with Sheikh. I myself came to know it when I was compelled to go to his house for the first time when I learned that Sheikh was not well and would not be able to come to the school for some Ume, After knowing this I wanted to help him in his back-log of studies. Sc I decided after some inner resistance that I would. go to his house. I remember tle shock I felt after meefing his father. He was a typical village Muslim in appearance as in his manners; warm, natural, robust yet gentle and in a coloured lurEi and white kurta He was curious about me and my upper-caste Hindu family. He had seen and even met Hindus but only as clients who came to his shop to buy mutton. He had no qualms about his profession. He talked about it as casually as my fattrer did about his clerical profession. My father talked of files and paper; Sheikh's father talked of the quality of the mutton he sold and the intestines and brain and the liver of the sheep he killed. His gentle nature never matched with his Violent' profession in my mind. How can he kill the poor animals and be so genfle? I used to ask myself in those days. Years after ttrat I became a flesh eater and never cared to ask myself how I relished eating animals \illed by someone, with the gentle, non-violent nature I have.
Sheikh's mother and sister kept themselves to the kitchen when men-even l-were around. They wore burkhas and Iooked mysterious and even sinister to my eyes because of

t70

Perspectiues on South Asra

that. I had not seen anyone in a burkhattll then. Not even in a Marathi historical play. I could not imagine my mother or my sister moving in our house in a burkha.
Sheikh's mother called me beta and gave me some sweet dish to eat. I had not eaten anything as tasty as that in my life or I so thought while I ate the 'special' dish.

Sheikh was not keen to show me his father's shop. I inslsted out of curiosity that he should take me there only once. I went with him and could not take in the gory sight of raw headless cadavers hanging upside down. It upset my stomach and I even felt that I would throw up but managed not to. That first sight of raw flesh and blood was so irresistible to me in spite of the revulsion I experienced that I wanted to visit that shop again and see a sheep being killed by Sheikh's father. For some reason Sheikh avoided it. Perhaps he himself did not like his father's profession. Or he dtd not relish killing.
My frlendship with Sheikh was my first genuine education on tJle subject of Muslims. Sheikh remained behind when we left Kolhapur for Pune, a predominantly Brahmin city at that time. It was nearly impossible to get an accommodation in a Brahmin locality of Pune fyou were-no, not a Muslima non-Brahmin. You would be asked to state your caste before anything else was di$cussed and we were nonBrahmins. Which meant that we were 'flesh-eaters'. In fact my family was strictly vegetarian but it took a lot of effort for my father to get a place for us in a decent 'no-flesh' localit5r. The next crucial influence in my life uis-a-uis the Muslims was tfre experience of the partition of the country. We were

glven

to understand-and we readily believed-that

Mohammad Ali Jinnah was the villain of the piece in tllis gory drama that unfolded before us mosfly through the media and all kinds of hearsay. Even the most authentic accounts of the massacres that took place in this period on both sldes of the dividing line read like cheap pulp liction

Musltms ond

t7l

consisting of unlimited violence and the most pervert kind of sex. For us Jinnah was the cause of it all. And his Muslim League of course. The word Muslim had a familiar

connotation for us. lt meant uncultured, illiterate, undeveloped minds full of perversities and a violent drive always ready to go berserk. And Hindus though cultured and civilised had no option but to retaliate with the same
pervert violence. I was in my late teens then.

When we heard on the radio that Gandhi had been assassinated everyone around me knew for certain-and made no bones of it-that the assassin had to be a Muslim. When we were told that he was not a Muslim but a Hindu our minds in spite of their benumbed state refused to believe it. But then we knew why a Hindu had to kill the
Mahatma. Because of the pro-Muslim politics of tl-e otherwise great man. Politics which pampered the wicked Muslims at the cos'i of the interests of the well-behaved; gentle Hindus.
Those were the days of a rabid anti-Muslim feeling around me.

This is when I heard a new Marathi word for the first time. It was not new in that sense. I had heard and even used it before. The word was ftiWr;. Its literal meaning was 'an animal whose tail has been cut'. Generally a dog. When I heard it for the first tlme in a new context-to suggest a Muslim-I could not catch its new meaning. Then I was enlightened on this subject by friends. And soon I tried to use it in my speech and felt very self-conscious; even embarrassed. But that word became a household word during those days even among boys of my age. The bias which had been intentionally and unintentionally sown in our minds when we were children now grew into a confirmed opinion. Muslims were an aggressive rowdy savage rabid minority: dogs with a cut tail; their leaders used them for their gains; and the secular Hindu leaders like fools were

t72

Perspecttues on Souih

Asia

playing into their hands at the cost of the interests of us Hindus who were a majority but suffered at the hands of a mere rninority.

I too held this view thougfi not with the fanatic anger of ttre typical white-collared Hindu of that time.

In this very period another Muslim entered my life. He was leading the cultural squad of the undivided Communist Party in my state. He was Amar Sheikh. Shnleer (the bard) Amar Sheikh as he was widely known. He came from a poor rural Muslim family and sang songs with a political message.
His volce was a musical but strong booming voice which thrilled an audience of thousands by its thunder. It was not necessarJr to be a communist to feel charged by its magic. The 'revolutionary' message did not mar the lilt and the roar of the sing;ing. I came under the irresistible charm of this voice so much so that the fact that the singer was a Muslim did not bother me even in that climate full of anti-Muslim feelings. The songs moved me as if they came straight from the heart. Once in a while I did wonder how a Sheikh. a Muslim, could put so much pa.ssion in some of the patriotic songs he sang. But his style of singing them was irresistible. I began singing those songs imitating his style. I would stand like him. Upright and with my chest thrown out; then sing imagining myself to be him. (My fair complexion could not match his tan black and he was too manly in looks as compared to my vegetarian adolescent looks-which gave me a terrible complex.) I was in my late teens now and sflll with the bias against Muslims in general and an ardent fan of a Muslim: Shaheer Amar Sheikh.

till he died in an accldent.

Incidentally

We became friends after many years and remained

friends

came to know about his mother after he

died. Munerbi Amar Sheikh's mother, was an illiterate Muslim woman married to a small farmer and a poetess of unusual

Muslims and"

t73

strength. The poems she had composed had a natural mixa captivaUng intermingling-of both, the Muslim and the Hindu cult. The imagery came straight from the Bhakti poets and tJre poems flowed from Urdu into Marathi and
back to Urdu like a child frolicking between two secUons of a house divided by a recently erected wall. At times the metre was traditional Marattri, used by the Bhakti saints and tJ'.e

Ianguage Urdu as spoken by the rural Muslims in Maharashtra. In one of her poems she sees Krishna, the Hindu God, in her Muslim son.

In 1967 her Muslim son, the bard Amar Sheikh, posus a quesflon to his readers in an article: How am I a traitor? He nurates a happening: 'l cannot forget that day. I had returned from an election meeting in which I had performed as usual and was taking a nap when I was awakened by some commotion. Then a kick on tJle door of my apartment in the chawl. Then anotleer kick. The door gave way with it. It opened wide. Someone rushed in. Lunged at me. I sprang to my feet and grabbed him. A battle royal ensued. My attacker was in his early thirties. I had completed fifty. I did not spare him. Nor did he while letting himself go at me. It is not the beating I had to take that hurts; but ttre words which shouted at me. The mind behind those words. 'Amar Sheikh is a Muslim' he yelled. He deserves to be \mched. He has married a Hindu woman. Haul me before a court and put me in a jail but I shall come out and lynch this man. I shall become a martyr for killing a Muslim.'
Amar Sheikh writes further in this article: 'l have been living in this locality for the last seven years. My attacker grew up watching me. My daughter grew up with him. And to-day he barges into my house after beating up three Muslims on his way. Why'7 Because I am a Muslim. And a Muslim is a traitor; an arch-enemy of this country. I with my record of service to this country and to my people am called a traitor and he who has never shown any concern for this country is a patriot because he is born a Hindu! We

174

Perspectiues on South Asia

were born as Muslims and that puts a stamp on our forehead

in this country: TRAITORI

Whf/

This excerpt says everything,

I came across Munerbi's poetry and this article of her son

in a book which was given to me during the post BabriMasjid days, namely, when the communal passions were running high once more in the country and a spate of communal riots was already on. The climate around me was once agaln ripe with Muslim*hating and the word I had heard again for years after I had heard it first during the par[ition of the country:Fiwn The human dog with a cut tail.
The answer to Amar Sheikh's question immediately came to my mind. Because we were brought up that way. the Hindu -We, children; with casual remarks like Fff${ effdq sT gseqfd)? Are you a human being or a Muslim? Because of our grooming which prohibited and taught us to shun any contact wittr Muslims. Because of the biases knowingly and unknowingly sown in our minds by displaying and teaching our history {in my case the Muglal and Maratha period of it) in a wrong light. Because of the experience of the partition of the country as felt through thre media and of the preceding years of Hindu-Muslim relations as they percolated to us through the attitudes of the elders. But most of all because of the total lack oJ contacl there was a wide chasm between us and the Muslims among us, as people.

Yes, I am aware of the games the politicians played among both the communities from time to time and the communal passlons whipped up by them to suit their politics of self-interest based on hatred, But those games would not have succeeded to tJle extent they did if we Hindus and Muslims had known each other better; if we had grown together from our childhood as one community tian two

Mustims ctttd. I

t75

separate worlds within one nation.

After Amar Shiekh

had the good fortune of having

Hameed Dalvai the Muslim reformer of the sixties in my life. We became friends much before he plunged into the Muslim reform movement. He was a creative writer. He wrote short stories. I was the editor of the monthly magazine and one of the lirst readers of his writlng. He wrote about his community.

His childhood. He wrote with anguish about his mother who was the third wife of his father. About communal riots. He wrote with a searing insight about his communit5r, the Muslims.
Those were my real lessons in understanding the Muslims

in my society. My days wlth Hameed. The worklng of the minds of the Muslims, their upbringing, what they were
taught about us, the Hindus, in their early formative years and the biases they were injected with at an early age. All this realization came through Hameed. Through our long evenings and nights of inflmate conversations.

or less in the same way as I came to learn about his: through whatever little contact we could make witl. the
'other' world, the other side of the communal divide, by going out of our way in our adolescent years to know things by ourselves. His father was a Muslim I-eaguer. A local leader of the League and a Hindu-hater. Hameed had grown up as a boy in this political climate. He grew out of it in later years. In his young age.
When he worked for a better understanding between the two communities and progressive social reforms in his own community particularly concerning the state of Muslim women, he was branded a traitor and a heretic by the majority of his people-especially the diehard conservative men of his communif; and was simultaneously looked at as an exception and a freak within his Muslim community by the Hindu intelligentsia.

Hameed had come to learn about my Hindu world more

176

Persoecttues on South Asia

One of our writers who proudly proclaimed himself as a Hindu revivalist once advised Hameed-and with genuine concern-You will always be an outsider among the Muslims. Why don't you become a Hindu? After all your forefathers were Hindu. You have Hindu blood in your veins. Come, I shall arrange for your conversion to Hindudom.'

did say to me once in his introspective mood: .We Indian Muslims are a peculiar lot. Our forefathers did not come from across the borders of the country. They were not the
invaders but the invaded like the Hindus. They were Hindus. They were converted to Islam mostly under pressure; even by force. If this is true, then we belong here. We have Hindu genes in our system and a Muslim upbringing, a Muslim bias. We are a product of a mixed or hybrid culture which makes us an isolated lot; rernoved from the general reality, the general ethos. We belong nowhere. Not to the Muslim world outside nor to the predominantly Hindu world of this countr5r. We have no roots to claim. And our loyalties will always remain questionable in this country. Not necessarily because ofwhat we do but because of what we are expected to do-as an alien race whose interests lie outside of this country. It will be presumed that we do it, that we have done it though we may have not. And we must not. Whatever happens to this country happens to us. Our fate is tied up to the fate of this society which may never accept us as its natural integral part.'
Hameed died prematurely of kidney failure.

Hameed laughed heartily every Ume he heard this. But he

After him I have had many Muslim friends. Some of them mean much more than friends to me. But when I look back at our friendship I find a sutrtle difference between them and my other-I mean Hindu*friends.

I meet a Hindu friend and am never conscious of his religlon. He is just a friend. But when I meet a Muslim friend I never forget, never can forget, that he is a Muslim. If I

Muslims and.I

177

forget this for a brief Ume my upbringing reminds me that he is Muslim. I am proud of his friendship. I love him more for that.
Ideally it should be no less, no more. A friendship is beyond all considerations. Is it not?

PART 2

COUNTRY REPORTS

The Indian Polity in "Crisis"

Pran Chapra

The dictionary defines "crisis" as "arry marked or sudden change of symptoms", and pathologr adds that it is a point at which 'change takes place which is decisive of recovery or death." In that sense of the word, India's democratic polity stands at a crossroads as the current millennium turns into the next. Either the polity will move toward a future that may be even better than the past, which has been good; or toward disaster.

But as important as the crossroads is the indisputable fact that it is entirely in India's own hands to decide which way it will turn. In that sense this crisis is diflerent from the others which surround India, because the resolution of some of the latter might depend upon factors over which India has little control. The remedies the polity needs are wltl.in tl.e political system we have. We can use them whenever we decide we must.
Not only is this a crisis of our own maftlng. It is alSo a part of the customary dynamics of socio-political systems, that every phase of advance produces new challenges, and they

r82

Perspecttues on South Asia

call for new methods of meeting them. This is not just a proposition out of political science. It stands out in our own experience of our polity. Each generation of achievement
leaves a legacy of problems which have to be resolved by the

next generauon. But their resolution moves the system to the next phase of its evolution. At no time in the past has tJ.is process been of more crucial importance to India's democratic polity than it is at the end of this century. On the one hand the late 1990s have thrown up more urgent problems. On the other hand the polity is closer now than ever before to some urgently needed reforms. The lessons are clear, and so are signs that India is learning them, because experience is proving to be a stern headmaster.

The life of our polity began with a "sudden change of s5rmptoms." India not only became independent after a very long time, lt also became a full democracy for the first time ever, and the world's largest at that, and one which adopted universal adult franchise at one go, unlike most of the more famous democracies, which came to that level of enfranchisement only sfage by stage. There were voices against such speed even within the Constituent Assembly. This is not suprising, because the Assembly itself had been elected by a Iimited franchise, which by some estimates had covered only eleven per cent of the population which would have had the vote under universal adult suffrage.

But to jump to universal franchise is only one of the challenges which the polity accepted at that time. There was little doubt that the Assembly would opt for democracy, even though a more authoritarian form of government might have been expected to be more effective and manageable in a country which had three hundred million people even in those far off days, was so new to self-governance, so steeped in poverty and illiteracy. But India's huge and intensely participatory movement for independence had involved so many millions of people in its active politics, and had broug;ht the leaders of the day into such intimate contact

The Indian Polity in "Crisis"

183

with such vast numbers of people, that an authoritarian

government was unimaginable either for the leaders, that is the future government, or the people, that is the future electorate.

More interestingly the Constituent Assembly opted for the parliamentary system. Again, there had been advocates of the presidential form, who thought a president would be a better manager than a cabinet responsible to a parliament. But those in favour of more democracy prevailed. they argued that only a parliament consisting of a few hundred members would fully reflect at the apex of political authority a country which was such a vast, complex and varied mosaic, while an apex consisting of only one person, who would necessarily belong to one or another piece of the mosaic, would be excessively identified with that piece, either in its own eyes or in the eyes of the other pieces. A still greater act of faith was that the Assembly opted for a federal rather than a unitary form of government. India was still struggling with the trauma of Partition, and secessionist voices were also being heard from some corners of the country. The bulk of the rest of the country was also susceptible to linguistic sub-nationalism. A large part of India consists of very sizeable and well defined territories, each inhabited by tens of millions of people spealdng the same rich, well developed, distinctive and centuries old language. Therefore each would be capable of thinking of itself as an "imagined nation". Once given some autonomy within a federation, it would seek independence.

But India responded to this challenge with

an

accommodative philosophy, summed up in Nehru's famous phrase, "unity in diversit5r", andwitha matching federal polity which, although weighed in favor.rr of the federal centre, also gave to the federating units considerable and well defined space and powers, guaranteed by the Ccnstitution against any unacceptable major encroachments by the federal government (except with the approval of the apex court, which

184

Perspectiues on South Asra

is the keeper of all maJor provisions of the Constitution.) This balance between unity and diversity met what could have been history's largest challenge of linguistic nationalism in any democratic polity,

It was in this orderly and peaceful first phase that India became the world's largest democratic polity, defined and certified by one of the most detailed and enlightened consfltuflons, which was backed by a nearly universal and nation-wide consensus. India also began to be accepted

increasingly as

a signiflcant player in

international

diplomacy, with a unique philosophy of foreign relations: as an economic player with an equally unique and promising philosophy of development; and endowed with such stability that the same party and prime minister remained in office for more than a decade and a half.

But before thls phase ended, it threw up some disturbing challenges to the future growth of the polity as a democracy. First, India began to look like a one-party state, stable but frozen, devoid of active interaction between the polity and the society, and lacking significant competition between parties wit-Lr significantly differing points of view or programmes. Second, the reason for this stability. Despite three adult franchise general elections with a good turn out ofvoters, in 1952, 1957 and 1962, the electorate remained, by and large, an undifferentiated mass, as yet incapable of throwlng up competing parties and agendas. As a consequence or as a cause, the Congress also remained content with amorphous and ill-defined programmes, which the party could interpret whichever way it wanted while addressing its electoral audience for tJle day. Again as a cause or as a consequence, most other parties also remained ill,defined and vague. Therefore, thirdly, while the voter had many parties to choose from, he had very little choice of programmes and visions, let alone competing ideologies. The result was that elections became contests between personalities and group allegiance s, not between alternative national agendas.

>i

The Indian PoLitg

in "Crisis"

185

This situation suited the Congress very well, and that, not its popularity, is the main reason why it was able to remain in power for so long that India began to look Iike a one part5r state. In fact the Congress rarely polled more than about 4O per cent of the total votes cast in elections to Lok
Sabha, the lower House of Parliament, which has the power to vote the government in or out of office. Since the leaders of the Congress had been the leaders of the freedom

movement, they were also the country's best known personalities, and between them they gave the party a foothold in all classes, castes, religions, Ianguage groups. Its electoral appeal was also vague and wide enough to have pockets of support among most parts of the electorate. Even if it was outnumbered in some segment by a party more identified with that segment, the aggregate of the pockets outnumbered all parties in the ultimate aggregate which mattered most: the number of seats won in Parliament. The Congress was also helped by the shortcomings of India's flrst past the post electoral system. The party could win a seat by polling only a minority of the votes if no other party had won even those many, and so many of its seats were won that vray that even with only a fort5r per cent share of the votes it could win around sixty per cent of the seats, while another party, if more thinly spread out, might get
only ten per cent of the seats despite a twenty per cent share of the vote.

First, it made Parliament much less representative of the electorate since so many of its members were elected by a minority share of the vote. Second, it made the government
even less representative, and therefore less able to command the conftdence and allegiance of the majority of the people, because not only had it been rejected by sixty per cent of those who voted, but fort5l per cent of those who were elected were also against it. Third, it made the Congress look more invincible, and India more of a one-party state,

This had several unfortunate consequences for the polity.

186

Perspectiues on South Asia

it also made the Indian polity look more like a monarchy than it was, as one after another member of the Nehru family became the prime minister {or aspired to become one, as in the latest episode of the Nehru saga.)
tfian in fact either was. Fourth,
But this began to change from about the mid-l96os, as democracy began to do what democracy characteristically does: it gives voice to different groups and segments of the electorate, assisting them thus to define themselves, and gives them the opportunity and incentive to mobilise their respective constituencies. In the course of time, competing
parties and agendas develop, the choice before the electorate becomes more wide and real, and politics and society begin to reshape each other through dynamic interaction. As the largest party, the Congress was naturally the first to feel the change. As different segments of the electorate began to define themselves more sharply, they also began to use tieir votes more purposefully for their own segments, and the very amorphousness which had been so useful for the Congress for so long in identifliing itself with conflicting segments turned into a disadvantage. The more sharply a segment demarcated itself the keener it became to move out of a generalized party like the Congress and into a party which more clearly reflected the interests of that segment. Thus the higher castes drifted into the BJP, the lowest into the Bahujan Samaj Party, the Muslims into parties or forums of their own, and so on. But the two biggest changes were new phenomena in the polity, and each was to prove to be a far reaching one.
The first change was that as the Congress shrank in size, also becarrre less tolerant of diversity, which had been its biggest asset in its best years, that is under the leadership

it

of Nehru. His daughter, Mrs. Indira Gandhi, centralised, personalised, and tightened her control over the party to such an extent that top leaders of the regions and states,

Tte IndintPoliu in "Crlsis"

t87

who had been a source of strength to Nehru as they stood beside him in the collegial leadership which he practised, began to feel ignored, denied, suffocated. Therefore instead of seeking to advance their political careers within and through the Congress, they moved back to their regions and states to organise new parties, which were therefore more regional in their outlook and horizons. This had three major consequences: the Congress lost more and more ground as it was defeahd by the regional parties in one state after anotfrer; regionalism became a stronger ldiom even in national level politics when national level parties became increasin$y dependent upon the support of state level parties for making up and sustaining majorities in Parliament; and a vertical integraton occurred between state and regional level politics on the one and national level politics on the other, making each level much more aware of the realities at the other level than ever before.
The second major change began in the late l96os, at the hands of Mr Ram Manohar Lohia, one of the cleverest strategists among Indian politicians, whettrer of those or later days. He had taken over the leadership of one of the main branches of the much splintered Socialist Party in the northern Indian state of Bihar, which is the second most populous in the country. But he had not been able to make much headway because of the grip of social and economic conservatism on Bihari society. He was blocked out of the higher caste vote by the Congress and the BJP, and out of the lowest caste vote by the Congress and by what was later

to become the Bahujan Samaj Party, better known as BSP.

But he discovered the greenest of all political pastures in the large group of "intermediate" castes, so-called because on the caste ladder they were spread out between the high castes above them, who were large landowners in much of Bihar, and the lowest castes below them, who were mostly landless labourers. On the other hand the "intermediates" were hardy and enterprising cultivating and dairying castes,

188

Perspectiues on South Asra

who either owned some land or were comparatively more secure in their tenancies. They had been the main beneficiaries of the Congress programme of putting ceilings on landholdings and selling the surplus to those who had been traditionally cultivating it. While elsewhere the programme had been pursued well, ip Bihar it had not been because of the strong influence of the high caste big landowners on the Congress, and the resentments of ttte Biharl intermediates had made them a ready audience for the wit and skills of Mr Lohia's rhetoric.

His success in the state elections in Bihar in the late

1960s was not only phenomenal. It also became a persuasive

precedent. Within a decade he consolidated the bulk of Bihar's intermediate Castes, who form the majority of the electorate, into a powerful constituency, cutfing across the sub-caste barriers which had hitherto divided ttrem despite ttre interests they shared as an economic sub-class. He so Ioosened the grip of the (mostly Congress-minded) high castes on the politics of the state that his successors were able to take away much of the electoral support of that party. Gradually this new constituency began to use its increasing poliflcal power for making inroads into the citadels still held by the high castes in the land ownership structure of ttre state.
Not a great deal of this structure has changed in Bihar as yet, but the precedent proved to be very attractive to the corresponding farming castes in other states as weII in the Gangedc'plains of northern India, greatly to the discomfort and resentment of the bigger landowners on the one hand and urban middle classes on the other. The small and medium "farmer" became the presiding deity of all politics in this "Hindi belt", which constitutes the bulk of northern India and accounts for close upon a third of India's population. Parallel processes wer6 also taking place, and at about the same time, in such maior states of South India as Karnataka and Andhra.

The IndianPolitA in "Crisis"

189

Of course ttrese were not the first examples of the invasion

of politics by caste. Ever since the start of India's adult franchise polity, matching the caste of the candidate with the caste profile of the constituency has been a major
preoccupaUon ofthe election managers of all parties. Outside

the electoral arena, and several decades earlier, social movements had overthrown the dominance of the high
castes in other large areas of South India. The leadershtp of the Congress, even when held by the higher castes, was always concerned about preserving its base among the lowliest, the HariJans. But the case of the intermediate castes has some interesting differences, which ln turn have produced some far reaching consequences, and also good illustrations of the theme of this paper, the cycle of challenge and response in the polity.

The HariJans had been co-opted into politics under the political patronage of higher castes, and being unassertive at that time they did not hurry into forming parties of their own, preferring to fit themselves into the folds of bigger parties, like (and mostly) the Congress. Their intrusion did not cause much uneasiness among the higher castes, only some raillery at their expense, and the general thinking about them was that they could be managed, as indeed they were until the coming of the BSP. On the other hand the cultivating castes burst into politics under their own steam, which was partly fueled by their numbers, much bigger than those of ttre HariJans, and partly by the sturdiness of the peasantry and the rumbustuousness of the more assertive among them. This itself led to some psychological changes ln the polity. A reflection of this change lies in some terms popularised in the urban owned and inlluenced media.

The term *intermediate castes", or more briefly 'intermediates", is purely descriptive. But this gradually
changed to'backward castes", and more popularly "the backwards", which carries a stigma, while the term in rural Hindi discourse continued to be 'pichhare htrc uara". that is

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Perspectiues on South Asia

people who have been defeated and thus left behind. In further disparagement, whether intentional or not, they also came to be called the 'other backward castes", in brief as "OBCs", that is those who could be classed t'ith but somewhat distinguished from the very lowest segments, like the Hariians.

Despite the disparagement, however, the new intruders were seen as a threat, evoked more viclous reactions, particularly among the urban upper middle classes which, being the 'haves" of the day, felt apprehensive about this huge crowd of vociferous "have-nots" hammering at the gate. A case in point is afflrmative action. The reaction withtn the gate was mild when government jobs and seats in education began to be 'reserved" for Harijans. But the reaction was furious when the intermediates also began to
demand reservations, and gradually to get them, and for the same reasons as the Harijans did, that they too had suffered social oppression for centuries at the hands of the high castes,

intermediates, and the urban response to it, created a bigger urban-rural divide in politics than had existed before, and as the power of rural numbers began to be felt in politics the urban middle classes began to lose some of their affection for politics in the lirst place, then for parliamentary democracy, and gradually for democracy itself. On their part the intermediates, much more familiar and concerned with the local realities, a stranger to higher level (read national) concerns, became a natural ally and recruiting ground of regional parties, mostly consisting of and led by their oivn kind. This added further to pessimism about democrary among the urban rniddle and upper middle classes, whose perspectives are more nation-wide if not
necessarily more " national", while the emereing "backwards" discovered a new enthusiasm for democracy because it gave more power to their larger numbers.

This loud and exclusively rural presence of the

The Indian Polttv rn "Crisis"

191

The assertlveness of the peasant castes also intensified and inflamed a divide within the rural society. The relations between the high caste oumers of large land holdings and their lower caste labour had gradually become more relaxed, pardy because the owners were more or less like absentee landlords and were content to leave their landless workers. who had rlo claims on ownership, to eke out what existence they could. But the new self-cultivating peasant was more demanding, drove himself and his labour hard, and was always close at hand to do so. Therefore the competitive poliUcal empowerment of both, that is the peasant and the landless, and the economic empowerment of only one, the peasant, led to furious friction and often to cruel clashes between them. While the intensity of these clashes has subsided in most places, with both sides tqdng to come to terms with realties, it persists in Bihar, where the recently radicalised landless and others. combined under the name "Dalits" (meaning ground down to pieces), now engage the private arrrdes of the landlords and other higher caste owners gun for gun and are giving as good as they get. Unfortunately for both, the Dalits as well as the backwards have also become the victims of the same socio-political process of which each is a product as polidcal force. Both had been segmented away from the higher and more prosperous castes by the deftning processes of democracy. But the same segmentatton began to deflne their own respective worlds as well. In distinction from the relatively better off "bacla*rard" castes, a further term also came into vogue, 'the most backward castes", who continue to be counted, however , as still a cut above the 'Dalits". At the same Ume the Dalits have got segmented into those who have been jround down relatively less, but sufficiently less for an august body like the Supreme Court of India to describe them as ttre 'creamy layer" among t-hose for whom jobs have been reserved under the government's afftrmative action programme.

tsz

PerspectiDes on South

Asia

Unfortunately for the future of the democratic polity, this peeltng of the onion of Indian society has not remained a sociological process. It has heavily intruded upon the party system, which is one of the important wheels of democracy. Whereas at one time the electorate was too amorphous to throw up alternatives for tJle voter to choose from, now it has become so minutely fragmented that even the largest party is too small to form a viable government, either on its own or in coalition with other partles. Sometimes no party has much more ttran a third of the seats. So many of the other parties are so busy fighting for the marginal interests of such small constituencies that they behave like colleges of theologians fighting over fragments of dogma, not as practical parties trying to build a broad enough consensus for ruling a country as large and varied as India is. The mosaics of parties which have constituted ruling coalitions during most of the last decade of the new millennium-and there were four during the second half of that decade, each rvith about a dozen partiest- might be more representative of the mosaic of Indian society as a whole. That is as it should be in a parliamentary system. But governments have become so unstable as to be almost transitory; the life span of offfcial policies has come to be measured in months, not years; and far more frequently than ever before, lnk Sabhas and state legislatures die unnatural deaths in the midst of their terms, inflicting rnid-term elections on voters far too often.
A side-effect of the fragmentation of parties in legislatures

has been that the process of forming the next government has changed, to the detriment of the role of the legislature concerned and advantage of the role of the President at the federal centre in New Delhi or the governor in tJle concerned state capital, The Constitutiorr intended them to be only constitutional heads, and their only duty to be to invite that person to form the government who in their judgement would be best able to form a reasonablv stable one. So long

The Indian Polifu in "Crisis"

as an election threw up a party

r93

with a clear majority and the leader, tie job of the constitutional head party had a clear was only to iwite that leader to form the government and to leave it to the legislature to accept or reject the government' But with no majority party, and coalitions between minority parties proving to be unstable, the President or the governor got much more discretion to decide who he should invite to iorm the government and in what manner the invitee should prove that he has the confidence of the legislature'
playing a bit of party politics in using their widened discretion' But even the few who have done so have fouled the air in the

Not all Presidents and governors have refrained from

minds of those who are left out in a given situation' There might be good reasons for not invifing them' But they tend to see a partisan motivation' This can create a very awkward political equation, and sometimes it has. If a party that has been left out in the first round manages to gain a majority later on and is then invited to form the government, the relations between the government and ttre constitutional head can get soured, and sometimes they have been' This can seriously come in the way of the constitutional head exercising what is his most valuable function, that is to be an objective and trusted counsellor to the government when the latter faces a sensitive situation. There is much to support the expectation that in the course of time Indian societ5r will so rearrange itself around a few themes that stable coalitions, built around the competing themes, will alternate with each ottrer in and out of power, and over longer swings of time than they do at present. But in the meantime the country might descend irretrievably into non-governance. But while this is a deeply distressing side of the current crisis, another is equally encouraging. Responding to the serious warning signals, the polity has moved closer to major and far reaching remedies, and should they come to

194

Perspectiaes on South Asta

be implemented, as now seems increasingly likely, the polity could become far healthier than it has ever been. It would

it outwards from Delhi to the state capitals and from there to the districts, and downwards into the socio-economic
pyramid. At the same time it would be freed of the five main weaknesses which it has developed over the past decade or so, as has been explained on earlier pages : that governments have become unstable, forcing dissolutions and mid-term polls; their electoral support base has shrunk, making them much less representative than they should be in a democracy; the role of the legislature in the formation of the government has diminished; elections have had a very divisive effect upon India's pluralistic society; and the party system has been fragmented. Political scientists, analysts, academics and practitioners have pondered over these problems for long and from time to time have come up with very convincing remedies, all within the powers and procedures available to the polity, and all of them likely to make it more rather than less democratic. For example, tJley have argued that a government formed by someone who clear\r has the prior approval of the legislature would be less likely to be voted out soon than one formed by someone who has been hand picked by the constitutional head acting in his own discretion. Mid_term elections would also become less frequent then. On this ground they have been suggesting that as soon as a new house is elected, its first duty after electiirg the Speaker should be to elect a leader of the house by a clear majorit5r of half the votes plus one. This could be ensured by having two rounds of elections. While the first round should be open to anyone who v,'ishes to contest, the second should be open only to two candidates: the ones who have polled the highest and the second highest number of votes in the first round. If

retain the vigorous interac on it has developed between society and politics, at and between all levels. It would coR nue and strengthen decentralisation of power, moving

The Indian PolitA in "Crlsis"

r95

votng were made compulsory in the second round, the winner would have a proven majority in tJle house, and
would merit the first invitation from the constitutional head.

The same advantage would be ensured by tJre same method whenever a new government has to be formed on tlee defeat of the incumbent on the floor of the house. But in this case an additional or an alternative reform has also been recommended. A motion expressing lack of confidence in the incumbent government should be admitted for discussion only if it is accompanied by a parallel motion expressing confidence in an alternative. That way the defeat of a government would not become a cause for dissoluflon because it would simultaneously install an alternative. In

the interregnum the incumbent would continue as a caretaker, and that would be a strong incentive for the opponents of the incumbent to agree quickly on the alternative instead of bickering about it endlessly, as tJeey
do at present. There is nothing in the Consttution which bars these changes, and probably not much in the laws either. Mos y they would call for changes in certain procedures and practices. They have also suggested changes in electoral laws for prescribing a two-round procedure for electing the members of legislatures, to give each member, and thus each legislature as a whole, a wider and more stable base of approval by the electorate. Polling held in any constituency should be recognised only if voter turnout is above, say, 2O per cent. The first round should be open to all, and if it does not give 5O per cent plus one vote to anyone, there should be a second round, open only to the leader and runner up of the first round. The complexity of both ttrese reforms is self-limiting. If candidates and parties know that an election will not be held to be valid if the voter turnout is below the prescribed level, they will campaign harder to reach that figure, to the

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Persoectiues on South Asia

benefit of the electoral process as a whole. Besides, even the normal turn out is so high-the nation-wide average is above 6O per cent and the state-wide average is higher in many states- that a 20 per cent level can be easily counted upon. Regarding the second reform, even as it is many candidates win wittr an absolute majority, and if that becomes a requirement ln the second round the proportion of those who reach this level in the first round is bound to go up gradually.

But apart from making legislatures and their members

more representative of their electorates, the absolute majority requirement would have the merit of making elections less divisive. When a candidate knows he will need 5O per cent of the votes in the second round if he does not get them in the first, he will not run a campaign in the first round either in

any way which might alienate those whose votes he will need in the second round in any case. This will reduce the use of caste based and religion based appeals, lift the salience ofclass in general and eoonomic issues in particular.

Party systems would beneflt in the same way as the representativeness of legislatures and of their members. A
legislatures. But if seats can be won only by polling an absolute majority of the votes, then like its members, the party too must broaden its appeal and agenda, cutting across the confines ofthe narrow allegiances which presenfly enable it to win a few seats with an intensified appeal to a particular segment of the constituency. Instead of trying to make or join a coalition among the elected members after the election, which can involve doubtful and secretive enticements for individuals, with slippery results, the party would have the incentive to broaden its constituency in the electorate before the election and by more open means, thus acquiring a more stable base for the future.

party flourishes as its members win more seats in

The IndianPolitg in "Crisis"

t97

After doing the rounds for some years in academic circles, these suggestions have started attracting some notice at the highest lwels of active politics, where the power to implement them also lies. At the end of April, 1999, Mr Atal Bihari Vajpayee became the lirst Prime Minister to advocate the idea that a motion of no confidence must be accompanied by a motion of confidence in an alternative. On the same day another major proposal, that a candidate must poll arr absolute majority of the votes cast, also received the powerful advocacy of Mr M.S. Gill, who has filled the very relevant post of the Chief Electlon Commissioner with greater distinction than many an earlier incumbent. He also supported the need for a positive vote of confidence in addition to a negative vote of no-conlidence for a legislature to change the government. Earlier, one of the more dynamic and reform minded chief minister, Mr Chandrababu Naidu of Andhra Pradesh, had also endorsed it. B.JP annouhced an if fully implemented by it, could go a long intenilon which, way in reforming coalitional politics. It announced that the ruling coalition at tJle federal centre, which is headed by it' would go into the impending parliamentary election as a coalition, with an agreed agenda, and that the BJP itself at any rate, if not other members as well, would not issue any
separate manifesto of its own. Its leadership also announced

In the days which followed, the

that, to help in the formation of this coalition before the election rather than after, it had suspended three of its most
controversial electoral planks. These had been the distinction of its political agenda for several years but were unpopular with many, particularly with non-Hindu voters. What this might do to tJre support for BJP from the more conseryative minded Hindus is a different matter, but forming a coalition before rather than after the electlon is a good example for other parties to follow. The constitutional head can prod

198

Perspectiue s on South

Asia

them to follow it by making it.known that, until the time comes when the legislature itself may designate its leader, he will recognise only ttrat coalition as a single group which had gone before the people as a declared coalition.
As interesting as this spreading support for these reforms

are some of the reasons for it, which also go to the heart of ttre 'crisis". In the midst of the worst phase of governmental instability during the past half a decade, the economy has been doing quite reasonably well in spite of many adverse factors which are wholly out of India's own power to control. An optimisflc quesfion has arisen from that: how much better it would be if the polity were also put on its feet simultaneously? This feeling has reactivated the interest of the urban middle classes in the fate of the democratic polity, because its interest ln the economy is much closer than of .those who have hardly any place in the economic arena. Confronting this feeling on the other side is the fear of a collapse of the polity if nothing is done very soon about it. They also have to cope with the near certainty that the next push behind the polity will come from those who have won political but not economic empowerment yet, and will now use the former to reach the latter as well. An equally interesting reason why support for these critical reforms has increased is that aII of them are clearly so much more "do-able" than sorne other ideas which have been talked about for longer but are more difficult to carry out or are otherwise of doubtful value. Among the latter is tJ'.e proposition that we should switch to the presidential system. But apart from the disadvantages of ttris alternative, which have been discussed earlier, the change would require such drasflc changes in the Con$titution that the Supreme Court ls not likely to allow-it might use its power to block changes in the "basic structuren of the Constitution-nor can a sufficient political consensu$ be built behind it, because most of the lesser parties will count for much less in the

The

IndinnPoliQ rn "Crisis"

199

presidential system than in the parliamentary system. Therefore it seems very likely now that fateful changes will take place in the polity, whether for better or worse. The chances of changes for ttre better are good.

Country Report on Pakistan*

Pakistani Detegatian

Introductlon
The winds of change are blowing strong all over the world. The arrangemerrts made by the Big-Powers to protect their material interests, and the ideological theses evolved to Justify them, are being abandoned. Consequently, ttre tactics employed hitherto by the smaller nations to suryive have become irrelwant. These states are under pressure not only to review their policies and tactical priorities but also their basic ideals. Happily, release from the mix of strategic opportunities and the constfaints they entailed has offered the developing countries opportunifies to find new strategies of progress better suited to their circumstances and needs. A number of states are, therefore, taking a critical look at

their recent past and exploring possibilities of fruitful

cooperation with their neighbours.

Nowhere ls the need for such a reappraisal felt more acutely than in South Asia where one-fourth of the world's
rThis chapter ls the original verslon of the regional conhlbution

wdtten for the Flrst South Asira Regional Dialogue held in New Delhn. India in 1991.

Countrg Report on Pakisto:n

20r

population lives and which has sadly lagged behind in the movement for regional understanding. While a widely shared desire for opening a new chapter in the history of South Asia is to be welcomed, it is obviously necessary to examine the factors that inhibit the stat-es of the region from realising tJ.e obJective of progress through mutual cooperation. These constraints are found in the different experiences the countries of the region have had in their search for democratic policies in their management of the economies, and in the peculiar dynamics of social change.

The purpose of this paper is to present before the parflcipants of the South Asian Regional Dialogue, the Pakistani delegates' perception of the current scene in Pakistan witleout a correct appreciation of which it may be impossible to assess Pakistan's ability to Join a regional
effort towards individual and collective advancement of the South Asian states. It is not a consensus paper; it is rather a compilaUon of views of some of the delegates in ttreir individual capacides.

Political Developments

Pakistan's political system is characterized by discontinuity, intermittent breakdown of constitutional

machinery, prolonged absence of a permanent constitution, and a rapid expansion of the role of the military-bureaucratic elite. The military ruled the country under the cover of martial law for 15 years (October l958June 1962, March 1969-December 1971, andJuly l977-December 1985), when its top brass exercised supreme political power without any constltutional restraint. TWo interim cons tutions remained in operation for approdmately ten years (August L947March 1956, April 1972-August lg73). The {irst'permanent' constitution enforced in March 1956, was abolished in October 1958 by the military. The second constitution lasted for six and three-fourth years (June 1962-March 1969); it was also abolished by the military. The third constitution,

202

Perspectiues on South Asia

adopted by a direcfly elected assernbly in 1973, was firnctional from August 1973 to July 1977, when the military suspended

it. This consfltufion was revived in 1985, after the military

rulers had changed it to t]le extent that its original character

was diluted. These developments adversely affected the growth of viable political institl'tions and processes capable of coping with ever-increasing parucipatory and distributive
pressures.
TWo conflicting politcal strands are quite conspicuous. The common man, enterprising and hardworking in economic

endeavours, deslres participation in the decision-making process. The well-established participatory norms, i.e., the electoral process, accountability of the rulers, the rule of law, and economlc justice, enjoy widespread acceptability among the people as the foundations of a national, democratic political order.
T?re other strand pertains to the operational norms of governance. The ruling elite has often violated ttre democratic

and participatory norms and with a few exceptions, their support base has generally been narrow. Their authoritarian and dictatorial rule is coupled with an elitist and eqtloitative socio-economic system. However, despite the sharp contrast between the two strands, neittrer is able to overwhelm the other except for briefperiods. If a viable participatory system finds it difftcult to take root, authoritarian and personalized rule also suffers from the crisis of legidmacy. The conflict between the two has been the norm of the Pakistan political
scene.

Pakistan inherited an institutional imba-lance at the time the bureaucracy, the military and the secret services, was more organized and developed than the political and democratic institutions. The administrative $ystem inherited from the colonial period was marked by centralisation of power with emphasis on the regulative, punitive and ortractive functions.

of Independence. The state apparatus, especially

Cotuthy Report on Pakistan The problems of setting up the new state in a mixed feudal and tribal society with little experience of trade a.nd industry and the security problems it confronted in the early years of independence reinforced the position of the statc apparatus. The over-developed bureaucracy and the military began to play an important political role by ttre mid-fifties. In October 1958, the military swept aside ths flagile political institutions and established its direct rule. This was the beginning of the era of direct and indirect rule by the military elite who enjoyed the support of the bureaucracy. The judiciary invariably concurred. With the exception of 1972-77 , the military has maintained its pre-eminent position in the body-politic.

The political arrangements tailored by the military elite reflected their professional experience which emphasized discipline, obedience, secrecy and surprise, and assigned a high premium to authoritarian rather than participatory values. Again and again, they favoured a non or partially representative system and advocated the idea of a guided democracy witJ restricted franchise. These arrangements were designed to preserve the political status-quo.established during the period of military rule rather than encourage political accommodation and participation.
The military rulers of Pakistan co-opted a section of the civilian elite who were prepared to play the game of politics within the limits set out by them. The dissenting voices were excluded. TWo such experiments were made in 1962 and 1985 by Field Marshal Ayub Khan and General Zia-uI-Haq

respectvely. The former civilianised his military rule by introductng the 1962 presidential constitution which reflected his notion of "guided democracy," and concentrated power in ttre office of the President which he occupied. A section of the civilian elite was coopted to create a semblance of a participatory system. However, the political stability provided under the Ayub system proved personalised rather than institutionalised. It collapsed in the wake of the massive

204
street agitations in 1969,

Perspectiues on South Asra

Zia-ul-Haq's civilianisa orl of military rule involved five inter'-related nleasures. First, he sought a vote of confidence through a referendum (December 1984) in which he was the only candidate. Second, the 1973 Constitution was amended (8th Amendment) to strengthBn the position of the President (Zia-ul-Haq) vis-a-vis the Prime Minister and Parliament' Third, martial law orders and policy decisions were incorporated in the legal-cons tutional structure which placed a check on the powers of the civilian courts and

reinforced the position of the President. Fourth, the Constitution was amended to enable Zia-ul-Haqto combine

the offices of the President and the Chief of Army Staff after the withdrawal of martial law. Fifth, a section of the civilian elite was coopted through a closely regulated non-party election tn 1985. The coopted leaders faced a paradox. On the one hand, they strove to establish their credentials as a political entity independent of the military. On the other, they could not afford to alienate the rnilitary commanders.because the loss of their support made it difflcult for the former to withstand the pressures mounted by their political adversaries.

In t]le tradition of the British rulers, the authoritarian rulers cultivated the feudals who were willing to support
any government that did not attack their privileged position in the rural setting. But unlike the British, ttrey also pampered a section of the onthod ox ulema who invoked a conservafive interpretation of Islam to legitimise authoritarian rule and restrictlons on popular participauon in decisionmaking. The ulama supporting the rulers were projected in the state-owned media, and ttre government extended liberal flnancial assistance to them. A large number of new schools for the propagation of orthodoxy sprang up and several eldsting ones adopted a high profile after Zia-ul-Haq's government began to dole out to them billions of rupees

Countrg Report on Pakistan

205

from the zakatfund deducted compulsorily from the savings of Muslim citzens. They did help to deflect the participatory pressures, at least for the time being. But they could not bring forward a leadership that could replace the dissident political forces. The maJor reason being the denominational differences and mutual jealousies which made it difficult for them to put up a coherent leadership, not to speak of the moderate ulema who did not share their conservative interpretation of Islarri.
The leaders of Pakistan endeavoured to impose a political system-presidential or parliamentary-on a socio-economic structure which was ex-colonial and semi-feudal with strong

bureaucratic traditions. Such an archaic system could not be supportive of any participatory process. As no serious attempt was made to reformulate the socio-economic system' the principles of participation., equality, rule of law and accountability could not be articulated in a manner that the political system could accommodate the diverse pressures generated by the polity.
The low level of tolerance of dissent and a poor tradition of open debate on important national issues that pervade the polity hindered the growth of a widely shared consensus

on the framework of political action. Several basic

constitutional issues, namely the Islamic state, centreprovince relations, decentralisation, representation and the electorate, and the national language, are not yet settled. At times, the ruling elite endeavoured to actrieve consensus without cohesion by relying on the coercive machinery of the state or by excluding those who did not share their perspective.

framework of political action that commands widespread acceptability together with political discontinuity has led to the decay of the already weak political institutions and processes. Language, ethnicity, religious-sects, and regional considerations substituted the

The absence of

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Perspectisses on South Asta

nadon-wide issues and organisations as the symbols of political identity and mobillsation. These particularistic considerations have given rise to strong movements in parts of the countr5r. The political leaders are so divided and lack a sense of direcfion that they cannot assert their primacy in the political system. This fragmented the political process, thereby making it difficult for any institution other than the military and the bureaucracy to function effectively on a nation-wide scale.
Several political processes are functioning simultaneously. Though they have their points of pos.itive and negative contact with one another, each maintains a distinct political identity and style. These movements neither cut across the regional or group boundaries nor adopt a joint stratesr for the realisation of their demarrds for political particlpation and economic justice. The state apparatus continues to be successful in isolating them and dealing with them individually, thereby further tilting the balance in favour of the military and the bureaucracy.

However, circumstances are becoming increasingly nonconducive to smooth functioning of authoritarian rule. If particularisdc orientations have fragmented the political process, these also serve as constraints on the ability ofthe state apparatus to ride high all the time. The linguistic, ethnic and sectarian forces have created entrenched enclaves of their support and they resist the adversaries and the state authority if they perceive threats to their interests. The easy availability of deadly weapons in the underground arms market has given them a new sense of power and they do not hesitate to resort to agitation and rioting, and use automatic weapons to achieve their goals. Rampant cormption and the flow of drug and smuggling money into the political arena has also adversely affected the performance of the state institutions. At times, their disposition is tainted with ethnic, linguistic, and religioussectarian considerations. These particularistic forces resist

Cowttry Report on Pakistan

207

the development of an all-powerful establishment but their resistance is neither organised nor designed to promote participatory and democratic values. It is more anarchic and rebellious in st5rle, creating lawlessness, disorder and chaos that causes serious problems of political management for any government, not to speak of an authoritarian regime. A sense of frustraUon prevails among tJre political forces, especially those who perceive themselves to be at the periphery of the political system. Despite such an experience, their commitment to the participatory norms has not wavered. They refuse to acknowledge an authoritarian and non-responsive style of rule as legi mate, and continue to build demands on the political system to make it more responsive to their needs and aspirations. Some of them resort to violence to express their resentment or to make their voices heard. The political system thus operates under conflicting pressures-the demands for participation and an authoritarian st5rle of rule-and does not move steadily in tJle direction of a responsible and participatory political
order.

Pressures for Change

The struggle for the realisation of participatory democracy in Pakistan cannot be viewed in isolation from the dynamics of social change.

The growing demands for an end to the politics of confrontation and its replacement with rule by consensus,
for a legitimate federal arrangement, and for decentralisation of authorit5r all indicate a search for a more equitable polity. There is an increasing realisation that respect for human rights alone can rid the country of the various societal conflicts. All human rights groups are, therefore, receiving increasingly encouraging responses from the population. There is every reason to hope that not only the attitudes of the people but of the government also will be determined bv

204

Perspectiues on South Asia

better practical standards of human rights. As could be expected, the process of Islamisation has sharpened awareness among minorities and women of their rights. Both these sections, along with the economically disadvantaged elements, are moving towards greater organised assertion of their rights to social, gender, and economic equalitY. The tensions generated by socio-political conflicts have brought the judicial system under severe strain and the need for considerable reform of the judicial order and procedures is being felt.
and total respect for freedom of expression neither the extent of dissatisfaction with the traditional models of organisation can be gauged nor wiII an open discussion on alternatives be possible. The conflicts between authoritarian tendencies and

It is obvious that without an environment of free

debate

democratic forces, between theocrats and secularists, and between conservatives and modernists have obviously brought new challenges before writers, journalists and artists' New attempts are being made to control not only the Press but also the entire thought process' The attacks on newspaper offices and individualjournalists provide a measure ofthe seriousness of the battle of ideas going on in Pakistan.
democracy, secularism, women's emancipation and rational exchange of ideas may at the moment appear, it can be said

However weak

or disorganised the forces favouring

with confidence that the defenders of the traditional

establishments are on the retreat. The oresent state of flttx is being viewed by many as a good opportunity to divert the people towards a fresh interpretation of their regional identlty and a new view of the world. The EconomY

During the decade of the eighties, Pakistan's economy

CotnW

Report on Pakistan

209

merrily moved along the way of consumerism. The

expenditure on private consumption in Pakistan increased by 59 per cent and the level of current consumption try the goverhment went up by 136 per cent. The gross domestic fixed capital formation increased by 6l per cent. The value of export of goods and non-factor services increased by 1f3 per cent whereas import of goods and non-factor services increased by 18 per cent. The net factor income from the rest of the world decline d by 44 per cent. There was 83 per cent increase in the GDP and 73 per cent in GNP. On per captta basis, the latter increased by 24 per cent against the population increase of 3.5 per cent. The per capita GNP stood at Rs.2966 for the financial year f 989-90 and Rs.4O33 for the year 1990-91 (Economic Surueg, p. 35). During the financial year 199O-91, the share of agriculture was 26 per cent, of industry 3l per cent and of services 43 per cent
(Economic Surueg, P. 33). The ofllcial figures do not take into account the flourishing

informal sector of the economy. Large sums earned by

Pakistan through export of drugs and the level of the earnings by Pakistanis abroad remitted through unofficial channels can only be conjectured. Nor does the official data reflect the distortions in the figures of exports and imports due to the practice of under and over-invoicing or rampant smuggling across the international borders with India, Afghanistan, Iran and along the Arabian coast. The National Taxation Reforms Commission estimated for the year 1984-85, "the total black wealth in Pakistan at Rs. I8O,OOO million . . . in the form of unaccounted-for bank deposits, currency notes, gold and other valuables, black capital in business, undisclosed real estate, foreign deposits and assets and household effects and luxury cars." (p. 104).

Directlon of the Economy

The main thrusts of the government of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif were towards privatisation and deregulation.

2to

Pe r s p e ctiu e s

on South Asia

In the sphere of privatisation, one scheduled bank has been sold to the private sector. The number of corporations owned or sponsored by the federal government as of 3O June 1987
were:

1. Scheduled Commercial
3. Insurance Companies

Baiks Banks

5
14

2. Finance Institutions and Specialised

Commercial Corporations
J.

4
99
3
16

Manufacturing Corporations

o. Construction Companies 7 Oil and Gas Corporations 8. Mining

C

orporations

9. Transport Corporations

I
4

lo. Printing and Publication Corporations I t. Power generation (not including the giant
Water and Power Development Authority) 12. Mass Media Corporations
13. Consultancy Corporations

I
3
3 tl

r4.

174

In the early 1990s, the Government was in the process of

selling them.

In the sphere ofderegulation, progress has been rela vely substantial. Government's sanction for private investment is no longer required and no questions are to be asked about the source of investment funds until the end of the financial year 1991-92. The maximum possible debt-equity ratio for industrial ventures was from 60-40 to 70,30. Liberal tax holidays for new industqr were granted. Plant and machinery for less developed areas has been exempted from custom

Countrg Report on Palcistan

2tl

duties. For other areas, it has been reduced by half.

Foreign currency accounts for Pakistanis as well as

foreigners are now permitted. It is now possible to bring in and take out foreign exchange without any questions being asked. Restrictions on investments by foreigners and on taking out profits on the investments have been lifted. Ways have been opened to convert black money into white as well as for its use for certain investments without any need to declare ownership. The International Monetary Fund and the World Bank are happy with the measures taken by the Government in this direction.

Internatlonal Ttade
Pakistan has finally complied with the demands of the IMF and the World Bank to throw open its doors for foreign imports. For the four-year period ending 3O June 1990, the average negauve trade balance of Pakistan was U.S.$I,9999 million, whereas, the average negative balance for the previous five-year period, 1980-81 to Ig85-86, has been U.S.$2,943 million (Econnmic Surueg, p. f 62). For the year 1989-90, the exports comprised: primary commodities 20 per cent, semi-manufacturers 24 per cent and manufactured goods 56 per cent. For the same year, imports comprised: capital goods 33 per cent, industrial raw materials for capital goods 7 per cent, consumer goods 19 per cent (Economic Surteg, pp. 164-65). For the year lgBT-88 to 1989-90, Pakistan has had a favourable balance of trade with the SAARC countries by nearll' Rs.1,50O million (Ecorpmic Surueg, p. 185). Balance of Payments
Despite a reduction in the value of imports during the last few years, the pressure on the balance of payments had continued to mount. Table I summarises the oosition.

212

Perspectiues on Soulh Asra

TABLE I
BaJa nce oJ

Pagment in Million US Dollars

Year

Current Account Long-term capital Basic Balance InJloto (net) Balance

r986-87 r987-88
1988,89

-7r9
-1,642 -1,934
-

793 I too

-383

t,952
7,671

l8
-20

r989-90

1,891

Econonuc Surueg,

p.

l6l.

In ttre past the deficit was met through inflow of loans and by short-term borrowings. Today, Pakistan's external debt poses difficult choices for servicing. As of October l,

off. Table 2 summarises the position of the external

disbursements and debt.
TABLD 2 Anrulnl Commitments, Disburs ements, Seruice Pagment, and- Outsturdlng Debt oJ Pakistan

199O, the flow of loans from the'United States has been

cut

(inmillionUS $)
Year Debt Outstanding end oJ period

Commtt- Disburse- Seruice rnents nEnts paAnents

Disbursed Undisbwsed

1988-89 r989-90

14,190 r5,O94
15.961

7,372
Q

,J.OIO

n70

3,424
3,221

1990,9r

10.480
2OO.

2,619 2,342 2,105

I, r25 1,232

r342

konomic Surueg, p.

Country Report on Pakistan

213

Public Finance Table

finances.

summarises tJre position of Pakistan's public

It is a serious situation. The IMF and the World Bank are reported to be unhappy with the recurring huge deficits in the budget. In order to continue their support, they would like to see the complete elimination of the subsidies, reduction in the current expenditure and containing the deficit within the limits recommended by them. In recent years, no position to reduce the . government in Pakistan has been in a current expenditure. Also, determined to take the unbridled capitalist road, the past two governments, following in the footsteps of Reagan and Thatcher, have been eager to cut tax rates. Income tax rates have been reduced. Super Tax has been partially retained as surcharge. Wealth Tax, Gift Tax, some forms of Capital Gains Tax and Estate Duty stand abolished.
TABLE 3
Cor tsolidated

Federal and. Prouincial Gooernments Budget

(in millbn Rs.J

Year

1988-89

1989-90

1990-91 1991-92
(Budgeted)

20l.\76 21a.733 Expenditure Total Revenues 144.297 159.816 56.879 58.9 17 Overall Deficit 24.529 Finajlcing (External) 18. f 95 Financing (lnternal) 38.684 34.253
Economic Surueg,

234.64a

258.309 r53.389
104.920 44.037

r50.479 84.169

37.706 46.353

56.883

p. 134 and Budget in Brief, l99l-92.

2t4

Perspectiues on South Asia

Nobody knows better tJlan gome of the big businessmen who ran the previous government how easy it was in Pakistan to avoid and evade payment to the tax collector. In an attempt to bolster revenues, stubbornly unresponsive to normal laws, the government resorted to collecting tax on income as proportion of the volume of business conducted. Under the laws effective from I Julylggl, all commercial imports are subject to 2 per cent income tax. All suppliers have to pay 25 per cent income tax on the value of supplies made by them. All contractors must pay S per cent income tax on their gross receipts. Businessmen have to pay O.5 per cent income tax on the proceeds of their sales etc. According to tax consultants, these measures might double the amount of tax collected from the business community.

Polltlcs and Profit

Cooperative societies had become unable to pay back an amount between 17 billion and 24 billion rupees collected from an estimated 4.5 million depositors, during the PML (N) rule. Five giants held 9O per cent of the deposits. Of these ffve, four were owned by thnee members of ttre provincial assembly belonging to the PML (N) and one by a member of the national assembly belonging to the opposition, who was also in-charge of the portfolio o[ finance in Ms.Bhutto's last cabinet.

It was revealed that among tFre beneficiaries of the loans from the cooperatives were undertakings owned by the then Prime Minister and his family {the Ittefaq Group) and by his interior minister and his family (Chaudhri Brothers). Major development financial institutions, including Bankers Equity Limited (BEL), the National Investment Trust (NIT), and the Investment Corporation of Pakistan [ICp), trad agreed to provide credit of approximately one and a half billion rupees to companies belonging to t1.e Ittefaq Group and the Chaudhri Brothers. The loans from the cooperatives were thus quickly returned. Defending their loans from the cooperatives, the

Colutry

Report on Pakistan

2t5

then Punjab Chief Minister accused Ms. Bhutto's government which would not allow the leaders of opposing parties loans from the scheduled banks.
Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto has named four familles of Pakistan who have used political influence to secure an

extraordinarily disproportionate amount of loans for themselves. Specific allegations might be true or false. It is undeniable, however, that business profits and political
influence got mixed up in Pakistan today to a degree explosive for business as well as politics.

External Pollcy Faetors

Kashmir has been the central issue around which Pakistan's foreign policy has always revolved. The belief that
Pakistan was cheated out of its right to Kashmir is respected by the people and the governments alike, though there have often been differences of opinion on the methods employed to pursue Patrristan's case. No government has been able to exclude this question from tJle national agenda. The degree of interest successive governments have shown in it has depended partly on the postures of the Big-Powers and partly on the situation in Kashmir. During the periods that India was able to find effective allies in Kashmir, Pakistan was constrained to put the issue on the back burner but every time there has been trouble in Kashmir the government in Islamabad has found it impossible not to react' The Shimla Accord, coming as it did after three fruitless wars, laid down that the issue had to be decided by India and Pakistan through peaceful means. Unfortunately, no such effort was made mainly because India considered itself satisfied with the status quo.
T?re present trouble in Kashmir has rudely reminded both countries of the opportunities of an amicable settlement missed over the years. Both countries face an extremely difficutt situafion. Pakistan cannot give up what it has

216

Perspectiues on South Asia

viewed as a stand based on principles and India cannot give up the argument it has applied for three decades. There are elements in both countries that are recklessly pleading for a milltary solution, which could destroy or at least critically wound both India and Pakistan. It is now for the saner opinion makers in both countries to silence the war-mongers and prepare public opinion in their respective countries for a settlement that could avoid loss of face on either side and secure the objective of satis$ring the aspirations of t]le Kashmiri people. Pakistan's involvement with the Afghanistan conflict also has affected its relations with the South Asian neighbours. Not only ttre region but the wider world has had reason to view with concern the prospect of Afghanisthan passing into the hands of Islamic fundamentalists. pakistan's efforts to convince India that its policies along the northern border need not affect its goodwill wlth the neighbour along the southern border cannot obviously be wholly convincing. A count4r cannot have different policies along its different borders. Likewise, India's problems with Bangladesh, Nepal and Sri Lanka cannot but affect Islamabad's thinking not only in relation to India but also about the whole region. From Pakistan's point of view, therefore, it is necessary to discover a common interest in the intra-regional issues. So long as this does not happen, it will not be possible to remove the contradictions in the foreign policies of the South Asian states.

All countries of ttre region have serious security problems as a result of which they have been diverting huge resources to defence. A barren debate is going on, principally between India and Pakistan on their nuclear options. Although there are many in Pakistan-from hard-headed economists to unquestioning pacifists-who consider pakistan,s insistence on its freedom to pursue the nuclear option as a folly, the majority of the people and the military establishment stoutly defend the countr5r's nuclear programme as an essential

Country Report on Pakistart

2t7

security shield. Unfortunately, India's refusal to sign the nuclear non-proliferation treaty prevents Pakistan from publicly admitting to a change of heart.
There is an urgent need for the countries of the region to reduce their expenditure on conventional arms and standlng armies. So far as Pakistan is concerned, public opinion is now realising more and more that the country cannot develop with the present levels of defence expenditure. The concept of a regional security arrangement which enables all South

Asian States to divert their scarce resources away from defence must, therefore, be high on the agenda of all trrose who wish to secure the peoples' common future.
Pakistan has always considered itself more as an extension

of the Muslim Middle-East than a South Asian entity. Its links with the Muslim states, especially its role in the Organisation of Islamic Countries, have often led to rnisunderstandings, even estrangement, with the South Asian neighbours. The process has been aggravated by the drift towards what is called Islamisation. The role Pakistan's
establishment sees for itself in the Middle-East,/Gulf defence arrangements and the revival of Pan-lslamic dreams caused by development in Central Asia could affect this country's foreign policy perceptions to the extent of persuading it to turn its back on South Asia. The dangers inherent in such a development are obvious. Concrete steps will need to be taken by the South Asian states, collectively and severally, to evolve a commonality of strategic and economic interests to deal with these issues so as to ensure that South Asia and a potential Muslim bloc do not run on a collision course.

Conclusion
What emerges from the foregoing appreciation of Pakistan's situation in ttre nineties is that t]le climate has become conducive to new initiatives over a wide range and these

2ta

Perspecttues on South Asia

include regional and international openings The domestic pressure for democratisation coupled with trend against authoritarian state strrr-ctures should help Pakistan, 'sooner or later, to revamp the state on the principles of democratic pluralism and respect for human rights. This should give strength to the logic of regional understanding and cooperation.
a global

The imperatives of economic survival must persuade Pakistan, like other South Asian states, to increase its faith in regional cooperation, especially in view ofthe shifts in the priorities of the traditional aid-givers.
The old concepts of foreign policy priorities have rusted beyond repair. As the world moves from military demarcated power blocs and spheres of influence and states derive their strength from their econornic viability and popular contentment, the concept of achieving security through peace and understanding with neighbours will acquire greater strength.
However, it is plain that Paldstan, or any other country of
tJle region for that matter, will not be able to take a meaningful

step towards the shared goal of progress regional concord, unless all countries of the region coordinate their outlook and display equally strong commitment, in practice as well as ln theory, to their common good.

Country Report on Bangladesh*

Rehman Sobltan

This paper spells out tJ:e dlmamics of the Bangladesh polity. This is important in providing some understanding of the compulsions which underline its external and regional relations. The presentation is somewhat stylised since it is designed to provoke discussion rather than serve as a dissertation on our history. This perspective is obviously selective and omits marry areas of importance and complexity which others may have addressed. The paper's provlslonal nature must thus be underlined.

Political Inheritance
The history of Bangladesh has been determined by the struggle of its peoples to realise their democraflc right to self-rule. It was this vision which took them into the Paldstan movement where an economically deprived community ln Bengal sought to improve its condition through a process of democratic assertion. It was the denial of this inheritance
* This chapter is the original version of the regional contribution written for the Fast South Asia Regional Dialogue held in New Delhi, India in 1991.

220

PerspectiDes on South

Asia

by the Pakistani ruling elite which sustained the struggle for self-rule in the period of our association with Pakistan. It was the military aggression tO undo the democratic will of the people of Bangladesh which precipitated the liberation
war and led to the emergence of an independent Bangladesh.

Tragically the struggle for democratic assertion did not end with the emergence of an independent Bangladesh. The building and consolidation of a democratic culture has been exposed to repeated setbacks. The initial phase ofour history was filled with hope for building a state founded on representative insfitu ons and democratic opportunity. The phase of nation-building was constrained by the traumatic birth of the new nation, the unrelenting assaults of nature, the vicissitudes of a global economic crisis and the malevolence of global politics.

Our own effort to build a democratic infrastructure

designed to cope with the hostiile environment was flawed by the virtual absence of a parliamentary opposition which seriously compromised the efficacy of the legislature as a vehicle to register the concerns of its citizens. This perpetuated the tradition of the all-powerful bureaucracy-bound executive, institutionalised during the period of military autocracy under President Ayub Khan in the Pakistan ofthe l96os.
The weakening of democratlc institutions in post-liberation

Bangladesh was preJudicial to the task of building an egalitarian and secular polity. The privileged classes and the communal political forces who were marginalised by the outcome of the liberation war could reassert themselves behind disaffected elements in the armed forces. Ttre assassination of tlle founding-father of the Bangladesh state, his family and political lieutenants laid the basis for a long phase of ascendance of the cantonment in the Bangladesh polity, which exercised its influence initially through the instrument of Martial Law and then through civilianisation

Country Report on Bangladesh

of the

221

military leadership. This phase of militar5r-cum-civilian rule was characterised by the ascendancy of the executive President and the progressive erosion in the authority of Parliament. A strong executive lent itself to building an autocratic political culture closely tied to the power and influence of a strong leader rather than the strength and vitatity of the nation's institutions for sustaining democracy.

Poltttcal Culture

of degeneration in our political institutions and the

The Ershad regime was a logical outcome of tJris process

ascendancy of an autocratic executive. Centralised power lends itself to unconstltutional and violent interventions to challenge this power and the prospect of those with the necessary backing of arms to slrstain them to capture the all-powerful executive and build it in their personal image. Ershad learnt his lessons from an earlier generation of military rulers going back to the regime of Ayub Khan in Pakistan. His own point of difference was his largely personal motvation. Whilst he preserved the socio-political coalition which had been put together by his predecessor regime, his dominant motives remained personal and centred around his private political and material aggrandisement. This led Bangladesh into a phase of political anarchy and institutional degeneration where the state appeared to privatise itself into a series of discrete enterprises each driven by the personal or parochial goals of the executive.

The concept of

societal vision became eroded. All

decisions became executive decisions motivated by personal interest or sirnple whims with little scope for building an institutional memory which could guide the decisions of the state by law and precedent. Transparency and accountability in statecraft became virtually extinct and most decisions from the local to the cabinet level derived from personal access to the relevant repository of power and resources.

222

Perspectiues on Soulh Asra

The instituflonal consequences of this degeneration of thelpolity was the ascendancy of the executive and the devaluation of the legislature: In this process, successive parliaments whose representative credentials were
progressively more flawed owing to the deterioration in the fairness of the electoral process, found that within the prwailing systems of governance, they had little role to play but rubber stamp the decisions of the executive.

Again the apotheosis of this process was the last parliament under Ershad which was elected in a voter-less election boycotted by the rnain democratic parties. A parliamentary opposition had to be manufactured by the government, its campaign paid for by the government, its leadership patronised by the state to ensure that it plays its role in ttre parliamentary charade. The fact that the opposition party has its offices in the building of the ruling party was gratuitous excess which compounded public contempt for them at the absurdity of ttreir situation.
Clvll Society
The irony of Bangladesh's contemporary history lies in the fact that a country born out of a half,century of political struggle where so much of blood was invested in its creation could have, for most of its tortured history, lived with the attenuated erosion of its democratic rights. There have been six regime changes between l97l and 1g90. Not one has taken place through the constitutional process.

The present change of government is the first to take

place through a free election. The tragic political inheritance of a whole decade demands deeper analysis. It is easier to explain the s5rmptoms rather than the source of ttre political

malaise.

What we see is the withdrawal of citizens from societ5r and their preoccupation with t1le pursuit of a private agenda. Sectional actions where they emerged either as a grouping

Country Report on Bungladesh

223

at the work place or as local or social coalitions are motivated entirely by expectation of sectional gains. Civil society had effectively disenfranchised itself and left politics to those with money and muscle to assert themselves. In this way, the Ershad regime could survive for nearly a decade, trading on the self-interest and opportunism of its opponents as much as the awareness that the leaders of civil societ5r could be kept preoccupied with their private agendas whilst government and politics was usurped by those with the appetite and capacity to capture and retain state power.

The Democratlc Renewal

The weakening of civil society to resist arbitrary governance did not mean that opposition was non-existent. Throughout the period of autocratic rule by Ershad in the 1980s, political mobilisation in the streets challenged his usurpation of power.

political diplomas in the j ails of Bangladesh. A not

Many leaders of the opposition and workers earned their

inbignificant number of people paid with ttreir lives for the realisation of our democratic rights. In the second half of 1987, the regime was almost toppled but the movement lost its momentum. T?rus the upsurge again in the autumn of l99O was part of a continuing of resistance to autocratic rule. This time, they could sustain the momentum of the movement which brought down the regime in December 199O. However, the end of Ershad Rq owed in no small measure to its inner weaknesses. Poor economic performance, eroding credibility with its aid-patrons and, flnally, the unwillingness of the military to underwrite the survival of the regime at any cost weakened its capacity to suppress the popular mobilization.
The fall of the Ershad regime and its replacement by an interim-government under the Presidency of the Chief Justice of Bangladesh was seen as a second birth for democracy in

224

Perspectiues on South Asia

Bangladesh and generated emotions which were reminiscent of the heady days of liberation. The interim-government managed, notwithstanding many moments of self-doubt, to hold a free and fair election of quite exceptional legitimacy. The interim-government could do so because its members saw ttreir role as non-partisan and could thus communicate to the administration their conmitment towards an election whose credentials were unchallenged.

In spite of a legary of vioience and corruption in the electoral process and the proliferation of arms in private hands, the election was violence-free and the outcome invested a representative status and legitimary on those elected, which remains beyond debate.
The results were a surprise. The front running Awami League{ed alliance won the most votes, around 38 per cent, but only a third of the seats. The BNP won 3 I per cent of ttre votes but emerged as the largest party in Parliament, and now with tlle 3O nominated seats for women. holds a slim majority in the House. A measure of the even-handedness of the election lay in the fact that President Ershad won 5 seats in his home district of Raingpur and his party 35 seats. The elecUons proved that the people retained their faith in the democratic process and if given the right to exercrse their franchise will do so with zeal and commonsense.
The signillcance of this Parliament is its legitimacy derived from a free election and the strength of the opposition. This is the first Parliament in Bangladesh's history which has a strong and vocal opposition. The repeal of provisions of the 4tJl amendment which had vested supreme powers in the ExecuUve and the restorabon of the authority of Parliament at least. integrate the letter of the original 1972 Constitution with the political reality on the ground and holds hope for a vlable political order.

Countrg Reqort on Batagladesh

225

Prospects for DemocracY

over our renewed democratic order' The acts of continuing violence, the arming of students for partisan purpose' the degeneration ofthe administration and its culture of arbitrary lack of transparency and cormption have undermined "o""", the euphoria of the democratic renewal. With many of our universities and colleges closed due to violence, the perception
However, the legacy of our misbegotten past hangs heavy

that law and order is breaking down, the debilitating

recession in the economy and a growing awareness that our economic agendas are made by our principal aid-donors has compelled everyone to realise that a democratic awakening is only a means to an end.

This end is to consolidate a democratic culture whictr can ensure that in five years, another free and fair election can bring to power a parliament with equally impeccable reprisentative credentials. To do so will demand the institutionalisation of a strong parliamentary system' the capacit5r to make the executive responsible to both parliament and public opinion and the capacity of the government to build a vision for the future which guarantees a better life for the people. The prevailing stagnation of the economy, the prevalence of massive poverty, the growing external dependence on aid and the resultant loss of sovereignty to our donors in the direction of the economy demand a poliilcal consensus to build a viable democratic and sovereign polity.

Crlsis of Economic DeveloPment build a stable democratic order demands that the long deprived masses of Bangladesh must be given a stake in the new order. This demands both a more efficient and a more self-reliant economy which puts the concerns of the democratic majority of the poor at its centre. To redirect our energies to these goals poses lbrmidable problems because
To

226

Perspectiue s on South Asra

savings to below one per cent by the beginning of the l99os. The failure to register sustained economic growth contributed to tJle structural atrophy ofthe economy where the share of manufactures in GDp remained virtually unchanged over two decades.

of stagnant economic growth, declining investments both public and private and the collapse of the rate of domestic

of the degeneration in the economy. The lggos was a period

Whilst the public sector stagnated both ow.inA to acts of policy and the crisis of governance, the attempt Io privatise the economy did little more than breed a class of rentiers masquerading as capitalists. Arr attempt to build the private sector by a masslve infusion of public loans culminated in a situation where today nearly 9O per cent ofthe loanees from public financial insiltuflons are in default and the rate of recovery from these loanees is around lO per cent of the total recoverable amount of their debt.
Bangladesh has privaflsed over 600 public enterprises in the last 15 years-more than Chile under pinochet_perhaps a record in the world. A recent study in lggl, commissioned by the interim-government, the first-ever attempt by the government in 15 years to physically look at the outcome of its privatisation pollcies, found that around 6O per cent of these enterprises were closed. privatisation has thus become a vehicle for extracting resources from the State and from the people without contributing either to growth, investment or productive efficiency. Meanwhile, in Bangladesh around 5O per cent of its households live in conditilns of poverty, deprived of their basic needs.

This stagnating economy could only survive as long as it did because of the largesse of its external benefactors. Aid today accounts for nearly l0O per cent of our development budget and perhaps some of our revenue expenditure as well slnce items of current expenditure are deliberately smuggled into the development budget to draw upon aid

Countrg Report on Barglnd.esh

227

resources. The available evidence suggests that this aid has,

if anything, discouraged domestic savings and reduced the pressure for generating domestic revenues. It has become tJle soft option for our development and is doing little to
create a capacity for sustained and self-reliant development.

structural adjustment has brought little more than stagnation, with mass poverty remaining
A decade ofsponsored

pervasive.

The failure of donor-sponsored adjustment policies has

done litfle to persuade donors to rethink their policy. Rather it has driven them to paroxysms of frustration at the failures of the government to deliver the expected gains from donor-

sponsored adjustment policies. The donor's irritation with the government is reflected in the growing influence in setting policy directions and in the proliferation of

conditionalities attached to most aid agreements which are designed to realise macro and micro economic reforms. Successive governments have accepted this growing paramountcy of the donors in our affairs which first invited donor approbation but finally led to their disillusionment with the government. The newly elected government has accepted the donor's policy prescriptions negouated with the erstwhile regime in toto. However, as an elected government, it now faces serious problems in reconciling these donor-driven policy conditions not Just with the frustrations of their domesfic business supporters whose faith in a market economy remains less than categorical but also from their mass electorate who have to pay the price of the donor-sponsored de-subsidisation policies. A Consensus for Development
What Bangladesh needs is to soberly rethink its economic agenda, free of old and more contemporary dogmas. During the tenure of the interim-government, 2O Task Forces were

Perspectiues on South Asirt

set up which mobilised over 25O of our best talents who volunteered their servlces te define the problems and possibilities facing a new democratic order. The work was completed in eight weeks for presentation to the elected government and members of Parliament. This exercise was designed to strengthen the capacity of the new democratic order and to promote public debate around which a political consensus could be built to design a development agenda for the 1990s which derives from our own compulsions rather than the dictates of donors. But to take on the orthododes of the donors will require both democratic support at home and a capacity to deliver good governance which delivers the goods rather than evades problems. This will be no easy task in a societ5r where everyone perceives the state as a milch-cow but few are willing to work to raise productivity and mobilise domestic resources for promoting a strategJr of more self-reliant and sustained growth. A failure both of credibility and in drawing upon our owrr capacity to design our own agenda could continue to compromise the sovereignty of the Bangladesh state.

In redefining our relations with our donors, we will have to look to our external relations vrithin the South Asian region and beyond it with the world. Oul aid obsessed perspec ve renders all our el.ternal relations aid-driven. Our attempts to build links with the West and then with the Islamic bloc are all derived from the belief that their aid would sustain our polity and economy. In practice, however, in recent years the US contribution to cur development deri'"'es much more from the fact that they are the largest buyers of our garments which constitutes our largest commodity export. Bangladesh's relations with Middle-East oil exporters is driven much less by their declining aid commitments and much more so by their acceptance of large numbers of our migrant workers whose remittances last year accounted for the largest single source of our
exchange earnings. Whilst such specific bilateral compulsions

Countrg Report on Banglarlesh

229

influence our external policies, no attempt has yet been made to deftne a meaningful external policy derived from our domestic problems and a vision for the future.
Redefi nlng Reglonal Relations Since South Asia today counts for little in the way of aid or markets for Bangladesh, our relations within the region remaln at a low ebb. However, a large volume of informal cross-border trade with India raises the volume of our economic transactions whilst a massive migration of migrant workers from Bangladesh to both Pakistan and India has provided an important but undefined source of external

earnings. No attempt has been made

to take official

cognisance of this informal trade or to find ways to legitimise

it. Within the South Asian region, Bangladesh's dominant

concern remains its relationship with India. The tragedy for Bangladesh and indeed all the South Asian countries has been that they have treated this vital relationship with the major regional power as a part of their domestic political debate rather than as an issue of external policy built around a domestic political consensus. Relations with India have constltuted one of the major fault lines in the domestic politics ofnot only Bangladesh but Pakistan and Nepal too, and presence of this large neighbour on their borders has not only prevented these countries from making a serious objective assessment of the nature of this relationship but has inhibited the building of a domestic political consensus to assess and define this sensitive relationship. Obviously, India has contributed to feeding this obsession of its neighbours which defines its relationships with its immediate nelghbours. In the Bangladesh context, the feeds these domestic compulsions. It is incredible that l7 years after President Sheikh Mujibur Rahman took the bold step of entering into the border demarcation agreements with Indira Gandhi, a great regional power such as India could not
perslstence of unresolved disputes, some of real insignificance,

230

Perspectiues on South Asra

fullil its own part of the agreement and hand over a small parcel of land of Teen Bigha connecting the enclave of Dahagram with Ban$adesh. There may, no doubt, be local problems which have constrained this hand-over. But the political as well as the technological resources of the Indian
state could have been deployed to solve this trivial problem so as not to compromise the international credibility of tl.e Indian state for these l7 years.

waters are hardly beyond the realm of both human ingenuity and the spirit of compromise needed to build a durable relationship. In such negotiations, it is obviously sensible to discuss these problems within a broad holistic framework defining the relationship rather than to bilateralise each issue so that there is always a w.inner and a loser. It is even more sensible to multilateralise some negotiations within the region so as to widen the scope for trade-offs. In most such negotiations, ab rnitb, it is India which has the more criilcal and giving role to play. India must decide the price it is willing to pay to have harmony on its borders which can provide the basis for building a regional consensus.

Other problems such as the Chakma refugees, the maritme boundaries and even the issue of the Ganges

In the Bangladesh context, this would suggesr accommodation by India particularly on the issue of the rivers. The Ganges waters in the context of the Indian state are a marginal problem. For Bangladesh it is a touchstone of its relations with India and a matter of maior concern to half the country. A standstill agreement with a generous share of the waters pledged to Ban$adesh should be followed by a Jotnt rwiew not just by clvil servants but by an Indo_ Bang;ladesh-Nepal Commission discussing afresh a strates/ for sharing our water resources.
Structural AdJustment

In the area of economic relations, the core of this

Cortnhy Report on

B arElade

sh

23r

relatlonship lies in the attraction of the large Indian market. Access to this market is inhibited both by the protective policies of India and the structural limitations of the neighbouring South Asian economies to exploit this market. This suggests the need for restructuring ofour economies to expand and diversi8r the manufacturing and export base of the smaller economies to service this large market and adJustments within India to accommodate these regional imports.

This restructuring provides the most credible basis for building economic cooperation within South Asia.
To this end, India should as a token of its goodwill, begin

by offering a two-year non-reciprocal access to its market to all the countries of South Asia. where neither tariffs nor

non-restrictions would apply to inhibit imports from its neighbours. Within these two years, a longer term plan for building industries which strengfhen the export capacity of the smaller countries and policies which create the basis for liberalising the movement of goods, capital and people within the region must be worked out. This will again have to take into account the apprehensions of the smaller countries of being swamped by hidian goods, capital and technologr.

The planned structural adjustment of the regional economies must thus create conditions for balanced trade both in volume and structure and for a truly participatory process of planning and decision making. Such framework for cooperation will demand the parHcipafion of the regiorr's quite considerable professional talents working with their governments to design an agenda for durable cooperaflon. But above all, it will demand political courage and statesmanshlp to emanclpate ourselves from the confines of domestic political opportunism so as to reach out to build a vision for the future of our region. This vision must recognise that our destinies are shared and that to fulfil thts destiny and build a better life for a region

Perspectiues on South Asia

where the majority of the world's poor live, we have to dream and work together.

If we can do so more effectively, two decades from now, even earlier, South Asia can become another centre for democratic opportunity and economic dynamism in the dynamic Asia of the 2 I st century.

The State of Governance in

Post- 1990 NepalDeuendraRqj Pandag

The world is changing rapidly. And it

will keep on changing as no given international order is permanent. Hopefully, South Asia s "regional order", too, would brace itself up to enable the countries of the region to cope with the new challenges and harness the opportunities for peace, cooperation and development in the next century and beyond. Meanwhile, the countries of the region as those elsewhere need to develop and consolidate a domestic order that is responsive to the changing world as well as to their own internal conditions and compulsions. Nepal took a big stride in thls respect eight years ago through the reintroduction of parliamentary democrary after a gap of 30 years. How Nepal has progressed in the past eight years in this direction is the subject ofthis paper.
*This chapter is an updated version of the regional r:ontribution

written for the Second South Asia llegional Dialogre hekl in Kandy, Sri l,anka in 1992. The stn:cturr: alcl the stlrle of the
original paper remain unr:halgecl,

234

Perspect )es on South Asla

pursuit.

Nepal's e.xperience should be of interest to the Dialogue because all countries of the region face similar problems and prospects even though sorne of them are democracies much older than Nepal. More than a billion people of flve countries represented in the Dialogue are strugiling with the values, principles and practices of democracy as they try to find a coherent and functional basis for organising themselves towards their nation-building goals. They are similarly challenging the notion that the parliamentar5r process, as the Marxists would say in theory, or as the law and order school of development would allege, in practice, is inherently inimical to economic development including the objective of poverty eradication and remedying injusilces and inequities in the society. t'he con{lict and competition that is a part of competifive politics called democracy is likewlse considered suspect by the votades of economic liberalisatlon who wish to see a uniform commltment of all parties and interests to the paradigm and its sustained

can hopefully benefit from tltls propitious international

environment.

Democracy itself appears like a new-found element of the new world order. In the days of the Cold War, it did not really matter to Western powers whether any of our countries was a democracy. The only qualification necessary to be a free member of ttre 'free world" was arrti-communism in domestic and international political postures and, if possible, a capitalistic mode in the organisation of the economy, Now that these powers do not need the support of authoritarian states to serve this agenda and interest, democratic states

As a system of governance and a medium of articulating interests, resolving conflicts and deploying material and non-material resources for sustainable development of peoples and groups deseMng equal rights and opportunities, democracy has enJoyed wide reoognition for a long time. Of the five countries of the region t'epresented in the Dialogue,

The State oJ Gouentance inPost-1990 Nepal

235

Sri Lanka has been engaged tJ.e longest, together with India, in this journey towards the establishment of a democratic society. In India, the "key", in the words of Junius Richard Jayewardene, to the realisation of South
Asian aspirations, tJre people are successfully demonstrating

that despite many frustrafions arising from confinuing

inadequacies in the mechanisms of resolving complex, social and economic conflicts they have the resilience and perseverance required to sustain the process. As for tJle other ttrree countries, they too share many problems and promises with the two oldest and relatively uninterrupted democracles of South Asia. But they are very much behind. In the aftermath of the.most recent wave of democracy, the peoples of Bangladesh, Nepal and Pakistan face the formidable task of establishing confidence in the political process and consolidating democratic institutions even while they cope with the burden of traditions and demands that may mn counter to the norms and values of democracy. Even as each of these countries has to struggle with tJle challenges themselves, what happens in the region as a whole may matter more. In particular, what happens to the older democracies of South Asia including their ability to

cope

with the forces of fundamentalism and their

commitment to regional and ethnic harmony will have an effect in other countries also. It is therefore pertinent that we discuss the issue of governance as a part of the regional
dialogue.

on the course of the evolving political process, there is already a sense of despair with the inadequacies and

In Nepal, where the country's future may depend largely

perversions of the system that the people brought into force in l99O after a struggle lasting three decades. The experience looks like an illustration of a case where the political leaders who appeared vislonary when they led the struggle for democracy suddenly metamorphose into ordinaqr mortals with all the frailties and none of the vision needed to lead

236

'Persoectiues on South Asia

the country along the democratic path towards prosperity. Nepal's in case, democracy appears very much on track, and there is some satisfaction to that account. But then, when it comes to the values that guide it and the outcomes it has produced, the process falls far short of the people's expectations and its own potential. A common perception is that the political process is de.void of political culture that should match the structures envisaged by the Constitution. When a set of modern structures comes under the spell of a political culture suited more to the ancien regime th.an a democracy, the pathologies manifest in a more sinister form. Ttre international community that Nepal is extremely
dependent upon has sensed this and thus insists on improved governance so that the agreed policies and programmes, the economic reform measures in particular, are implemented with greater certainty and effectiveness. But then, one also senses ttrat in this insistence, the stress is more on efficiency in economic management than political accountability. Where accountability ls emphasised, its scope is limited to the issue of linancial accountability. Hence tJle new-found allergz against corruption, among other things. In Nepal where corruption is corroding the very fabric of democracy, not to mention the society, this emphasis cannot be disputed. But financial accountability cannot be divorced conceptually and in practice from political accountability. Governance is not only about who manages and how, but also about who decides what is to be managed and how.

In this paper I look at governance in the context of democracy which to my mind is the foundation of any discourse on the subject. I will therefore concentrate here on Nepal's experience with democracy and see how the political process is evolving tD serve the cause of good governance in that context. The implications for economic management as experienced so far will also be presented in the same context. A brief account of the state of foreign

The State oJ Gouernance in Post- 199O Nepal

237

relations as they affect governance and problems and challenges ahead will be outlined at the end.
Status of Political Evolution
Nepal in a structural sense is now a full-fledged democracy.

in lg9l, in Delhi, Nepal has gone through significant experiences, pleasant as well as
Since the First Dialogue

unpleasant in governance under a parliamentary system. In a country about which scepticism on the viability of
democracy abounds, one can take note of many developments

that point to the positve aspects of the ongoing political evolution. As I do so in the following paragraphs, the contradictions that inhere in the process will also be pointed out together with their implications for democratic
governance as relevant.

First, as I edit these lines. the l4th session of the parliament is in progress. This is the second parliament since the Constittttion oJ the Kingdom oJ Nepal, I99O was promulgated. TWo parliamentary elections have been held and power has been transferred between competing political parties peacefully and democratically. In seven years, two parliaments, following two general elections, have produced seven governments with five prime ministers. The adverse implications for political stability and the ability of a government to design policies and to steer development is apparent enough. Political stability is a serious issue in a country which is one of the poorest in the world and where the ordinary people look for not only political freedom but also committed leadership of the government in ameliorating their social and economic hardships. Development programmes and policies do suffer when the government is unstable and the bureaucracy is not strong enough to provide the initiative and continuity as needed. On the other hand, seven governments mean that all major parties have had a share in power in coalitions with one another which may eventually contribute to the development of a culture of

234

Perspectisse s on South

Asia

consensual politics which the country needs as much as competitlve politics inherent in a democracy. Furthermore, the political parties that have been leading the communist movement and the leaders of the erstwhile reglme who for thirty years opposed democracy, have joined the democratic mainstream and participated in the parliamentary process with some exceptions at the orthodox fringes to the right and the left. Nepal has the largest proportion of communist members of parliament anJrwhere in the world, wittr the possible exception of Gennady Zyuganov's communists in the Russian Duma. In addition, the principal communist party has headed a minority government and also participated in coalition governments.
Second, two local elections have been held for local bodies at the district and village levels. The first was held within a short period since the promulgation of the new constitution and the next, too, without any delay, which must be a record in the South Asian region. About two hundred thousand elected representatives belonging to different political parties are now functioning at village and municipality levels performing functions as delegated under the law. A principal feature of a recent legislation in this respect is the mandatory requirement of women's representation by creating separate electorates for women at the ward level, the lowest political unit. As a result, out of tfre above number of elected officials, at least 350O0 would be women. Between the Village and the Centre, there is another tier of elected local bodies, the District Development

Committees,

that represent more prominent loci of

decentralised power. Though the standard of fairness in both local elections was far below the level observed in the general elections, the existence of elected local bodies in all parts of the country may mean that vested interests in favour of democracy may now develop at the grassroots. This may depend upon the extent to which the powers at the Centre are willing to surrender some of their privileges to

The State oJGouernance inpost-1990 Nepal

239

tJle leaders and people at the local levels, namely tlre erstwhile periphery. The evident reluctance of all major parties in enacting the Local Autonomy Bill, pending with parliament for some time, which promises greater degree of devolution of power to the local bodies that is historically the case is not a good augury. On the other hand, with democracy, tJle politically aware and active citizens at the local level will not forever be passive receivers of what is offered from the Centre. They have begun to assert themselves in such a way that they will most likely succeed in not only obtaining the statutory authority they need to function as a unit of autonomous local-self government, but may also serve as a source ofan effective rearguard action for democracv, should such a need arise.

Third, the political parties despite being full of problems and shortcomings have shown a measure of understanding and tolerance necessary in a democracy. The unholy alliances they enter into and the threshold of plausible compromise they cross as they enter into coalitions with one another has become a matter of considerable disappointment more recently. In addition, the political leaders do not have the image they once had on account of their unethical and irresponsible conduct in and out of parliament. yet, no political party represented in parliament seems ready to do anything that jeopardises the parliamentary process and negates the achievements since April 199O. Specially noteworthy is the attitude and stance of the two mainstream communist parties, the Communist party of Nepal: the United Mandst-Leninist (UML) and the Communist party of Nepal: Marxist-l,eninist (ML), the latter being a breakaway group liom the UML. As communists, their commitment to the parliamentary process or multi-party democracy guaranteeing civil and political liberties and related values
democratic party, the Nepali Congress (NC), does question it often for its own political purposes. But so far, despite their

and institutions can be questioned, and the principal

240

Perspectiues on South Asia

obvious internal contradictions, there is no manifest desire in tJle leadership of these parties to deviate from the democratic process beyond the unbecoming compromises and cadre-focused theatrics they indulge in from trme to time. In the latter sphere' too, they are no dilTerent from the NC. The UML fi:om the beginrring' and more so since the split with the ML, has had difficulty in coming to terms with the changing reality in the world and the contradictions that will continue until it discards the symbols and nomenclature of its communist heritage' Now with the breakaway party, the ML, trying to project a more radical or orthodox image than its rival, UML, this proposition will be even more difficult for both of them to execute' The enigma in Nepal politics reached its climax in August 1998 when the more orthodox communist par[r undcr the banner of

ML joined the government under the leadership of its

erstwhile principal political adversary, the NC led by erstwhile avid anti-Communist leader G'P. Koirala. The ML' came into being only a few months ago when its leaders broke away from the UML because of, among other things, the alleged subservience of UML leadership to the "anti-national" policies of the NC. The bone of contention was the disagreement on

the interpretation of the provision for the sharing of

downstream benefits of the proposed Mahakali Project and related issues concerning Nepal-India relations to be discussed shorllY. Fourth, the Rashtriya Praj atantra Party (RPP) of the erstwhile rulers, the panchas' is engaged in projecting its image as a democratic group' Wtrile this can be interpreted as a simple political ploy, it is also possible that the politicised wing, as opposed to the bureaucratic-technocratic and feudalistic wing of the Panchayat camp does not see anything advantageous for itself in carrying the image of t}re ancient regine arrd. being associated with any rumours about the

possible reversal of the ongoing evolution' As the parliamentary process matures, they must' see the

Tfe

State of Gouerncarce in Post- 199O Nepal

241

advantages for them of a system which gives them power to go with the responsibility as opposed to the conditions in the defunct Panchayat system where to some extent they were exposed to public scrutiny while the real power resided with the Royal Palace and its appendages. This anomaly only fuelled personal greed. Yet, the internal contradictions that this party too faces led to a split in the RPP also. As in the case of the UML split, the ideological or political factors that might have made the split inevitable are not clear. What is clear is that the leaders of both factions (now heading the two parties after the split) have led coalition governments in a political dispensation they tried to suppress for decades. What is more, both of them were supported in the coalition by parties suppressed by them in the old order (the UML and the NC in turn), and larger than them by virtue of elections held in the new regime. This illustrates the nature of politics in Nepal and the need for indepth research on the subject that is necessary to adequately understand the underlying forces that govern such a state of affairs.

Fifth, the Nepali people are showing awareness that however limited its functional merit to the poor people in a poor country with gross inequities and growing economic
difficulties, lieedom has its virtue and can be addictive' The people who seem to be groping in the dark to find the difference between the present system of governance and the old from the standpoint of material benefits and a sense of general well-being do acknowledge that the freedom they enjoy as citizens is unprecedented. A general impression is that they would not want to lose this too easily. Clearly, if the grievances of the people against the government have increased significantly in the post-199o dispensation, it is not all result of an actual adverse change in the objective conCitions. Much of it may be because the people can now express themselves with greater fieedom and greater intensity than before. An alert and active civil society is emerging

242

Perspectiues on South Asia

which takes up issues that would not even surface earlier. For the first tlme, Nepal truly has a free press. Obviously, one wishes that the press would match the freedom it enjoys with requisite fairness. But ttrat is not happening because of the fterce compefiUon among maJor political parties to proJect their points of view through the print media they love to own. The truth gets compromised to nobody's surprise and everybody's chagrin. Nevertheless, the interest and concern of alert civic groups in asserting the truth and establistring justce is demonstrated by the growing numbers of public litigaUon suits handled by the Supreme Court. The subject of litigation has ranged from the constitutional auttrority of the King to the need for ratiftcation of a water resources agreement with India by Parliament under Article 126 of the Constitution, the authority of the anti-corruption agency to prosecute
government rnlnisters, riglrt to information, women's propert5r

rights and many ottrer important matters. On balance, ttre state of political evolution is now at a stage where democratic forces can take some satisfaction that democracy has survived for more than eight years. They cannot however, gloss over the fact, thht whatever has been accomplished is too fragile, and far from being productive to the benefit of the people. Underneath the scenario that does not look too discouraging for an emerging democracy in South Asia, the political culture, the style of governnnce, the tendency to abuse authority, and the very objecflve of ttre state do not seem to have changed much

from the Panchayat period. On the other hand, the

aspiraflons of tJre people have risen and those, in particular, of the ethnic minorities and other groups inhabiting the more depressed parts of the country are being revitalised. The interest group that should be most concerned with the challenges that lie on the path of democratic consolidation do not seem to be adequately aware of them. A fundamental problem lies with ttre leadership of the principal politcal

The State oJ Couernnnce in Post- 799O Nepa|

243

parHes. At the moment tJle state of affairs in the ruling party is especially in disarray. Earlier, after the first general election in 1991, tJre prime minister, despite holding a comfortable majority in Parliament, was constrained to suggest a mid-term poll partly because of the challenges and non-cooperation he faced within the party which, in turn, was partly the result of his own undemocratc conduct. This opened the door for the minority government of the UML and many other patch-up coalitions after tl.e second elecflons in 1994. The seed of instability that was sown with, as many people in Nepal believe, the managed defeat of K.P. Bhattarai, the popular prime minister in the interim government, in l99l germinated fully in 1994. Since that time, in particular, Nepal's politics has started going downhill with accompanying instability in government and erosion in what had barely begun to crystallise in the name of political culture and democratic values.

The problems facing the political system are of three categories. One, the changes in the political structure have made little impact on the feudalistic character of tJle society and the politico-bureaucratic culture inherited from the Panchayat era. As a result while established parties and leaders lose their aura and credibility, ttre forces of regression get their morale boosted from the growing feeling that the new regirne is only the old wine in the new botfle. Second, the principle democratic force, the Nepali Congress, has so far been unable to establish and follow a set of principles and norms governing tlee relationship between the party and the government. This has adversely affected the performance of the government when in power, and the credibility of the party when out of it. Third, the economic condition of the count4r and general deprivation of the people is a problem for the nascent political democracy which is unable to resolve, among other things, the conflict between the expectations of the people from the government and the latter's imperaUve to accept and pursue structural

244

Perspectiues on Soulh Asia

adjustment and economic liberalisation, especially because of the country's over-dependence upon foreign aid. That the government, regardless of the character and substance of its policy framework, has yet to prove its competence or show commitment to a set of principles or priorities is an additional burden. If the social implications of the liberal economic regime were the only problem, the complaints from ttre concerned quarters should have been compensated for by the satisfaction in the private sector and the allimportant donor community. But that is not the case. For the first time, responsible sections of the private sector have taken to the street, much like the students do in Nepal, protesting the introduction of the Value Added Tax [VAI), thus challenging the very legitimacy of the government. Similarly, for the first time, important donors have taken off their diplomatic gloves and started airing complaints against the non-performing government without pulling their punches. Seen in this perspective, Nepal may be at the precipice of a crisis of governance.
Ncw Challengcs Governance is not simply an issue about the structure and functions of the government or even of the polity. It is a larger concept that has yet to fi-llly crystallise and incorporate in it the elements of the state, the contribution of the policies and the role of market and the civil society as composite parts of the process, At the mornent the different elements or relationships embedded in a possible theory of governrnce are emphasised differently by different interests, not only in Nepal but also in other parts of the world. Accordingly, there are views, for example, that in East Asia, the "miracle" was produced by good governance; and that now the'miracle" has disappeared because of deficiency in governance. The Russian Federation is about to collapse because of the economic crisis, this, too, is attributed to the problems of governance. This may ail be true, but such

The State oJ Gouernance in Post- 199O Nepal

245

casual approaches do not help us to understand the concept or to devise policies that aridress the country's reality. The only message that corRes through liom this type of argument is the dubious verdict that for good governance tl-e countries concerned should economically liberalise, and liberalise fast.

In Nepal, too, wit}- its all-important donors taking keen interest in governance, emphasis may have shifted to the economic managerial dimension of the governance problematic from the political, as initially was the case when countries all over the world were riding the "third wave" of democracy and when democracy, human rights and people's participation were emphasised. For sure, the latter is stressed by the donors, too, but their conception of participation may have more to do with participation for delivering local development as envisaged in their aid strategies than the exercise of citizenship rights at the political plane. The former is an important consideration but it cannot be propagated in lieu of the measures for
strengthening the constitutional system, building democratic institutions, enforcing accountability, serving social justice and protecting human rights. Nepal is thus caught in a situation where it has to address the issue of governance for impro!'ing its delivery as the donors wish (which may or may not coincide with what the people wish or need) while at the same time exercising requisite autonomy to steer democracy along the path where the multifarious needs-economic, social and cultural-of the diverse interests in the society are met. The difficulty is rendered more complex by the fact that despite the seeming convergence of priorities with regard to poverty alleviation, for example, the policies that the donors wish to pursue may not be consistent with what the 1O million and more people that fall in the "absolute poor" category need urgently. The proclivities of the donors to follow tieir own agenda and strategies which they cannot harmonise even among themselves have not sewed their

246

Perspect ses on South Asra

wlsh to contribute to poverty alleviation in any case. In addition, it is certain that as the "external constituency" of
the government also demands a better performance in macroeconomic management, policy reforms to reduce disincentives

to producers and exporters, and generally the privatisation of the economy, the expectations of the domestic constituency would require the government to follow a more welfarestatist line in economic policies and development priorities. The issue here is indeed about governance, not the need or otherwiSe of a "welfare state" which stands discredited as a concept and as a social policy in the eyes of the powerful sectlons of the global communit5r. The deprived and the disadvantaged are bound to create a law and order problem sooner or later, throwing all the calculations of the economic reformers haywire and making them unmanageable. Unemployment and underemployment are increasing with the problem being more severe among the youth, not sparing the educated ones among them" The Maoist insurgency that is growing is a political problern only in parh the other part is the manifestation of people's frustrations with unjust policies and attitudes of the government, irrespective of the party heading or parficipating in it, and the unharnessed enery of the youth tJlat seeks an avenue for its release.
A fundamental dilemma facing the governance project in Nepal is the fact that from the Lreginning of the second dawn of democracy the count4r is constrained to pursue the policy of economic liberalisation in the name of economic reform. In the process, the political parties have not been able to address the reality of the country in their wisdom and in the light of their historical understanding of the country's economic structure and social formations. The Nepali Congress has surrendered its 'democratic socialist,' ideologr, history and image bringing it closer to and making it often indistinguishable from the parties to the right and to the left who are also required to toe the same line. In Nepal's democracy, governments change too fast, and the policies

The State oJ Gouen'ance in Post- 199O Nepal

247

do not change at all. On the other hand, this is not a comfort even for those who wish to see a contiunity in policies-because the continuity basically means the maintenarice of a directionless state and accompanying confusion. Even as we may assign some blame for the current predlcament to the economic liberalisation frame tJle country is supposed to be pursuing, the reality is that the government has done precious little on that front also. If
it was, at least, the private sector and the potential investors abroad would be happier with the situation which is not the case. The bottom line, I am trying to stress, is tJlat in Nepal's condition, when there is no challenge for any party to come up with a new vision or a set of policies, the continuity the people get is the contlnuity of a vacuum in the policy environment that no political forces are willing or able to fill, and pathologies in political and bureaucratic behaviour against which they seem to be just as helpless.

The economy is not growing with any speed even wittr liberalisation. The growth rate of GDP since the mid- l98os is higher than the historically low rate of around 3 per cent. But one can hardly claim tJlat the higher rate of 5 per cent a
year ls adequate, especially to generate the necessary spread effects that can serve the all important objective of poverty

alleviation across regions, castes, gender and ethnicity' In addition, there is no guarantee that even this rate is sustainable with the political instability on one hand, and uncertaint5r in policy outlook, on ttre other. The ominous scenario can be observed in the declining growth rates since f995-96, with the lowest rate recorded last year at 1.9 per cent. In the meantime, there is no evidence that povert5r at 45 per cent of population is declining or that the distribution of beneflts of whatever development that has occurred is spreading more widely. Only 12 per cent of population in Nepal resides in urban and semi-urban areas' It is widely known that most of the development and its benefits are concentrated here. What may not be known as widely is

248

Perspectiues on South Asra

that even within the urban population, the top l0 per cent of the households enjoy 7l per cent of income while the
bottom 4O per cent has only 2 per cent.

In the meantime the resource position is becoming precarious with stagnating government revenue and the donors threatening to reduce their aid unless performance improves markedly. It is a sad commentary on Nepal,s development efforts that in nearly 5O years of endeavour, the country's dependence on foreign assistance has not slackened. In the 1998-99 budget government revenue is to finance only 57 per cent of public expenditure. Of the
development expenditure, 68 per cent is to be met by foreign loans and grants. In addition, there is a big inflow of not fully accounted money for disbursement via domestic and foreign non-governmental organisations. The latter activities, whether well-meaning or not, have added to the confusion in policies, ownership of programme and their direction which should also be an issue for the governance agenda.

The above conflict in itself is not as serious as the government's inability to perform in general. The anxiety of the donor communit5r-which I am stressing here, because of the very vocal and overt manner many important'donors are airing out their complaints-is limited not to the tardy and slow implementation of the liberalisation agenda. They are also concerned about the general inefficiency, corruption and delays in the implementation of prograrnmes and projects in the public sector. Though the positive as well as negative outcomes in development and governance in Nepal are the product of the consummation of interests and intentions of the government and the donor communit5r, it is the latter that will decide eventually whether and for how long the business as usual can continue.
One principal reason for the deterioration in government's

performance is that the political parties have not observed the need to maintain the sanctity of the civil service. The

The State oJ Gouernanrce in Post-1990 Nepal

249

politicians in power sometimes give an impression that they really do not know what a "state" is. They cannot differentiate between their role and responsibility as a government minister and as a party leader or worker. But it is more than a case of individual aberration. The political parties, as a matter of policy, have taken a position that when in power, they need their own "civil servants" who will do their bidding. The transfers of officials in important positions at the centre and the districts and in projects and public undertakings have become a major threat to governance and ultimately to development of the country. The civil service has become so demoralised that civil servants from the top level to lov'er ranks are available to play the servile roles as expected by the political bosses of the day. In the process the civil servants claim their own "pounds of flesh" at public cost.

Against this background, the frustrations and pent-up feelings and grievances of the people accumulated over many decades have been surfacing. The ruled as well as the rulers are in no mood to wait until the utopia of a globalised economy is harvested to provide opportunities for them to transform their reality. The ruling elites are constrained to express their faith and commitment to policy reforms and sound management. But they are not willing or prepared to imbibe the requisite values and norms of behaviour. It is largely their behaviour which has contributed to the general perception ofa breakdown in the law and order and a sense of social responsibility all around. The obscurantist Panchayat regime was thrown out, and righfly so. But the feudal values with associated authoritarian culture persist. In addition, there is a breakdown in social discipline accompanied by the politicisation of various civic groups that, however, have not been required to go through a political socialisation process conducive to a democratic culture. Whether and how, this condition will be remedied will depend upon, among others, the responsible institutions ofthe civil society. The steady growth ofthe civil society is in

250

Perspectives on Soufh Asra

fact a silver lining ln the cloud in a count4r with litfle or no tradition of truly independent social organisations and civic activities until recently. If it can establish its credibility by winning the trust of ordinary people who, at the moment, see litfle difference in the rapacity of the political society and the influencial agents of the civil society for example, the professionals, NGOs and other consultant-intellectuals, there should be some hope that Nepal \Mill be able to engineer a reversal in the dismal trends sooner than later.

The rise of ethnic-national sentiments among regions and groups that have long suffered callous ne$igence or, worse, outright discrimination from Kathmandu's ruling elite is another issue engendering a possible crisis in
governance. Many political parties and groups have emerged

federation, in place of the current unitary state, with autonomous provinces based on ethnic and geographic considerations. A less radical initiative can probably yield ttre desired results if the Centre were to be more receptive to the inevitable change. The problem is that the major parties that are also nominally the most secular have not shown the sensitivity and consideration in this respect as needed at this juncture.

demanding institutional remedies for deprivation based on ethnicity, regionalism and various forms of ascriptive considerations. Some of them want the creation of a

By and large, however, the present problems are not

has in fact been long recorded in relevant literature on
political development of "traditional societies". They are also a part of the experiences that simtlar or better-placed countries have undergone in the past as well as ttre present. There is a reasonable degree of hope and expectations now that the present problems only reflect the growing pains of a process where the new rules of the game take time to assume and project a more concrete vision. As the process of institutionalisation of democracy proceeds through trial
altogether unique or unexpected. The possibility of setbacks

The State oJ Gouerrut'rce

in

Post- 199O Nepal

25r

and error, Nepal can be expected to sustain a stable

democracy eventually.

Developments in Forelgn Poltcy For a countr5r that is geographically handicapped, landIocked and highly dependent upon foreign assistance, Nepal's

governance

successful. management of its international relations. It is something of an irony that the country's foreign policy environment has remained static in a rapidly changing world order. The hopeful signs of some improvement in the country's allimportant relations with India have not materialised in the eight years of Nepal's "second democracy''. Nevertheless, there are two critical elements in recent developments that need need to pointed out.

is intimately related with the

Firstly, as a part of the global interest in democracy and human rights, whatever may be the motive behind it, a large number of countries including such "strategically neutral" ones such as Denmark, the Netherlands, Finland or Sweden and Switzerland are taking grea,ter interest in Nepal's political, social and economic development. Nepal has done well to harness such goodwill, but it may have begun to lose some of that interest already for reasons just pointed out. Secondly, sooner or later, there has to be a fundamental breakthrough in Nepal's relations witlt India. The conduct of Nepal's India Policy will be nothing short of a test of democracy in Nepal and India's willingness to support it. Every time India is seen to be acting large-hearted towards Nepal, it will be supporting Nepal's democracy, because it is the democratic regime that would have elicited that magnanimity. On the other hand, a reasonable assumption would be that, in India, even if its people were to perceive that Nepal is the beneficiary partner in a relationship, there would be little resentment among the people and no political price to be paid for this crime by the government of the day. At the moment. however. it is not even clear whether the Indian

252

PerspectiDes on South Asi.L

establishment views the re-advent of democracy in Nepal.

It is not surprising if India prefers in its own wisdom a regime in Nepal that produces stable, predictable policies and a parliament that does not "politicise" the relations
between the two countries and the treaties and agreements that flow from it. The vagaries ofelections and the intricacies of the parliamentary process cannot always ensure that this will be the case. This concern is illustrated in a recent article by Parmanand, a hardliner in India in respect of that country's relations with Nepal. He says, "Many in India had thought that the policy of Nepal was more unfriendly towards India during the Panchayat days (1962-90) and the re-establishment of multi-party democracy in the kingdom would bring them much closer. But multi-party democracy has shown that it has its own compulsions vis-a-vis India, and rarely does a political party wish to lose in the game of one-upmanship vis-a-vis India" {The Statesman, Delhl: October 8: 98). In this view, the test of the success of democracy in Nepal is the speed and smoothness with which India's Nepal policy can be executed. In Nepal, on the other hand, there is a perception that democracy has a better chance to be successlul and to be productive in the interest of its economic development, if India were to be more sensitive to the problems and the agenda of the democratically elected governments.

the enlightened leadership in these matters is often

In both countries, however, the potential contribution of

overwhelmed by the ill-advised prejudices and bureaucratic interference stemming from a mindset carried over from the past. The agreement on the Tanakpur project reached between India and Nepal's first elected government after 199O, which could have heralded the beginning of a new age, became an embarrassment to both sides because of the usual bureaucratic myopia in India and the ignorance, incompetence and lack of homework in Nepal. This was

Ttre State of Gouernance in Post-199o Neoal

253

salvaged with a package agreement to build a larger hydroelectricity project on the same river flowing between the two countries along the western border. But, again, the expected Detailed Project Report (DPR) has not been finalised because

of the usual lack of agreement on the interpretation of downstream benefits. In addition, the disagreement on
sharing of water from the Mahakali river has now graduated to a full blown border dispute (related to the source of the river) upstream in the Kalapani area where the Indian army has been stationed in Nepali territory for at least three decades. Similarly, the question of revising the 195O Treaty of Peace and Friendship-a demand made by Nepal under the present political reality-is hanging in a balance between India's covert reluctance to do so arrd Nepal's overt inability to spell out what it really wants as an alternative. The reluctance of India to mediate in Nepal's dispute with Bhutan regarding the repatriation of 100,0O0 or so refugees at the refugee camps in Nepal for the iast seven years or so has also been a subject of disagreement between the two countries. The is:,ue has cast doubts, in particular, on the interest of India, which is the largest democracy in the world and the oldest one in the region, in playing its role of a l'regional power" in a constructive frame of mind. These are genuine problems that should not defir a solution with both sides being honest with each other and to themselves. India's generally dismissive attitude on such matters wiII not be helpful. Similarly, how blatantly a sensitive issue like a border dispute with a very important neighbour can be used for domestic political purpose is illustrated in Nepal by the ttreatrics and deception of the Marxist Leninist party (ML) which is now a partner in the government of the Nepal Congress. It broke away liom its parent party on this ground, among others, engineered a "march" to Kalapani as if to hoist the Nepali flag over the Indian military camp, and blamed the Nepali Congress, the traditional bait for any anti-lndian, anti-democratic campaign in Nepal, for selling out Nepal's interests. Now it is, politically, in bed with the

254
same, forces

PerspectiDes on South

Asia

it did not mind maligning parent party, the UML. against its

in a proxy war

Meanwhile, on the positive side, Nepal-India relations have made unprecedented gains in the area of trade and transit thanks, perhaps, to the tenure, albeit short, of the "GuJraI Doctrine". Nepal now has full access to the Indian

market without the burden of the traditional non-tariff barrier expressed in the form of ttre minimum labour and raw material content required in the Nepali manufactured
items to be eligible for export to India on a preferential basis. As a result, in 1997-98, Nepal's export to India increased by 72 per cent, which is a sutlstantial development given Nepal's traditional grievances against the growing trade deffcit vrith that countr5r. The increased Indian investment in Nepal in the manufacturing of products, such as soap geared for the Indian market has also contributed to the growth in exports. There is still a danger that, unless political wisdom and sagacity prevails, tJle old attitude in Indla may raise its head again to block the export of any item that shows some potentital for growth. For example, because Nepal was able to er.port \tgetable ghee in big quantties in 1997-98, Nepal was obliged this year to levy an

export tax on that item under the threat that it might otherwise be put in the "negative list" together with ltquor and cosmetics. In transit, the existing treaty will expire in December this year. A new treaty is being negotiated at present. A positive outcome is indicated by the fact that, changing its past policies recently, India made a big gesture in allowing Nepal to use the Bangladesh route for accessing a convenient port in Bangladesh for its trade with the "thlrd countries". This development has been received well in Nepal though it might take some time for the traders to take full advantage of the alternative route where it is more eflicient for them to use it.
The relations with China remain important though at a
low key for some time. China has always been meticulous

in

The State oJ Gouerrlarrce in Post- 199O Nepal

255

recent decades to make sure that it does not raise expectations in Nepal to an unrealistic level, Whether aid or trade, there are no peaks and valleys in the relationship and no steep curves either. The historically good and valuable relationship, which is demonstrated by the fact that even now every new Prime Minister feels obliged to visit China soon after the visit to India is completed, is made somewhat uneasy at present by the Tibet issue and the activities of Free Tibet groups and individuals in Nepal. A democratic government, wedded to the protection of human rights, faces greater difficulty than an authoritarian regime. in controlling such activities which, understandably, can be a source of an:dety and concern to the Chinese government. On its part, every government has pledged that, honouring Nepal's long recognition of Tibet as an autonomous region of China, no and-China activities would be allowed on Nepali soil. Nepal's foreign policy regime can take a decisive and more constructive turn once relations between India and China improve further, making way for intensive economic collaboration between the two, or even among the three countries, China, India and Nepal. Nepal's desire to nurture good relations and expand economic cooperation with China and all other countries in the region including, most importantly, the SAARC region should also be a non-issue
when the process of liberalisation and globalisation of
respective economies makes more substantive progress.

Concludtng

Re

marks

The threat to democratic governance is inherent in the political tradition of a country that has its source in the feudal culture, economic backwardness, increasingly rapacious middle classes, and extant court intrigues. The constitutional government can get strengthened as commitments get manifested from all parties concerned to help match the change in the political structures with changes in the larger cuitural system to ensure the

256

PersoectiDes on South Asta

sustainabihty of political democracy. A little help from friends in the neighbourhood and in th,e region can also be critical. Governance has become an important issue today that seems to bridge the domestic and international concerns for

good government. Movement towards "globalisation of democracy" may be one factor contributing to the 'rider interest in governance, if indeed such movement is discernible. It is likely that the gl,obal concern with democrary or good governance may be related to the interest of external powers that may be out of step with what is directly reievant for the welfare of the people of Nepal. It is also possible that it is not the globalisation of democracy, but of the economy that moves the forces behind the governance agenda. Governance comes under further stress if the two are not enUrely complementary in Nepal's short to medium-term scenario. It is to be hoped that instead of surrendering the initlative to extra regional interests, the South Asian community (states as well as the civil societies) will take greater interest in the subject, Given the similarity of the problems and the common destiny that they might share, the countries in South Asia can make good governance a part of their collective agenda and contribute to democratic development in,the region.

Sri Lanka-Country Paper 1992K.M. de Srluaand S.W:R. de A. SamarasirEhe

INTRODUCTION

The year under review saw President R Premadasa

consolidate his position in the Sri l,ankan political system. On I September 1992 the Supreme Court, after a lengthy hearing lastng over two and a half years, rejected the election pettion instituted against him by Mrs Bandaranaike (Leader of the Opposition and Leader of the SLFP), thus confirming the validity of his election as President in December 1988. One year earlier his position seemed somewhat shaky when-in August-September 1991opposition groups supported by a section ofthe UNP began proceedings for his impeachment, an initiative which appeared to herald a signiffcant challenge to his authority. Although the impeachment motion was rejected by the Speaker ofthe Parhament, M.H. Mohammed, in early October
*This paper was presented at the First Dtalogue in 199 I . It was revised before the assassinations of President R Premadasa on lst May 1993 and Mr Lalit Athulathmudali a week earlier,

25a

Perspectfircs on South Asia

1991, and ttre dissident group was expelled from the party, these events provide evidence of a major split in the UNP. The dissident group is now organized as the Democratic United National Front (DUNF). The SLFP, in the meantime, continues to suffer the effects of a leadership conflict. It remains in a state of unresolved crisis over the succession to ttre ageing Mrs. Bandaranaike who has been the head of the party since 1960. The war of attrition between the armed services and the LTTE continues in the north and east of the island. The securiQr forces were gaining the upper hand, steadily making inroads into the LTTE held areas in the east and north of the island including the densely populated Jaffna peninsula, when they suffered a serious setback in early August 1992. Ten senior officials, including the general offtcer Commanding in the northern region and his deputy, were killed when the vehicle in which tJrey were travelling set off a ptressure mine in an area near Jaffna in early August 1992. The campaign against the LTTE continues under a new leadership.

The LTTE retains its hold on the Jaffna peninsula and remalns strong enough to launch surprise attacks against the securit5r forces in the north and east of the island. They are also engaged in a brutal campaign of ethnic cleansing directed against the Muslims living in the north, and to a lesser extent in the east, ofthe island. On 15 October lgg2 a glroup of LTTE raiders killed over 16O persons, mainly Muslims including a large number of women and children, in three villages on the border between the north-central and northern provinces. The continuation of this ethnic conflict has resulted in some uncertainty in the economic sphere, but as regards the adverse effects on ttre economy this was overshadowed, in the early part of 1992, by an unprecedented drought. On the whole, however, the country's economy has recovered from the bleak position lt was in, in 1988-89.

Sri

Lanka--Qoutttg Poper 1 992

THE ECONOMY

259

Policy
lanka was one of the first developing countrles cum structural adjustment, abandoning a two decade old d@iste economic poliry. The tnternational donor communit5r, led by the World Bank and the IMF, supported the new poliry with substantial aid. The reform package adopted therr included the liberalization of imports, reductions in exchange controls, elimination of price controls and rationing of food (in effect, a weekly rice ration) the virtual abolition of the state's monopoly in the import of certain key goods, the establishment of a unifled (and floatin$ exchange rate, the transfer to private-sector ownership of selected state enterprises, and lowering of corporate and personal taxes. What is remarkable is that despite political difliculfies such

ln

to adopt a programme of economic liberalization

1977 , Sri

in the last two years vrith an accelerated programme of privatization, reform of the public service and further liberalization of current and capital account transac ons in
ttre balance of pa5rment.

as the ongoing ethnic war, these reforms have been sustalned over fifteen years. Indeed they have been further strengthened

Recent Performance

Following three years (1987-89) of virtual economic stagna on, in l99O the Sri Lankan economy recorded a real growttr rate of 6.2 per cent (Table l). In 1991, however, the GDP growth rate slipped back to a modest 4.8 per cent. This was caused mainly by a sharp decrease in the rate of growth of agricultural output from 8.8 per cent to 2.2 per cenr primarily owing to contractions in the output of paddy and coconut. Howwer, tea yielded a record hawest in lg9l. The growth rate ln tJ:e manrfacturing sector was a reasonable 6.9 per cent but it was one-quarter less than the previous year's rate. Both the trade balance and the current account

2qo

Perspecttues on South Asra

balance in the international balance of payment (BOP) deteriorated sharply in 1991. Ttre adverse trade balance was primarily caused by a 1.9 per cent deterioration in Sri La.nka's international commodity terms of trade, largely attributable to a drop in tea prices. In 1991, the debt service ratio increased marginally to l8.l per cent. On the fiscal front, the budget deficit as a percentage of the GDP increased to 11.6 per cent from 9.9 per cent in 1990. In 1991, the share of Sri Lanka's investment financed with foreign funds also rose. The only real bright spot in this otherwise discouraging economic performance was a substantial reduction in the annual rate of inflation from 21.5 per cent in l99O to 12,2 per cent in 1991. Improvement in domestic food supplies was partly responsible for this. The other irnportant contributory factor was a tight monetary policy that caused a slow down in the expansion of bank credit given to the private sector.
The proJected economic growth rate in 1992 was about 3.5 per cent to 4.0 per cent which is less than the rate achieved in 1991. The drought in the first half of 1992 that affected agpicultural output ls the primary reason for slow grourth. Sri lanka's tea output is expected to be down by about 2O per cent. Rice and coconut crops will also be substantially lower. The disruption to hydro power supplies caused by the drought also adversely affected industrial output in the second quarter of the year. However, garment ptroduction, Sri Lanka's principal manufactured export, is expected to increase substantially. Tourism, with arrivals expected to exceed 3OO,OOO for the year, has enjoyed its best ever year since 1982.

Macroeconomic Management
The above account would make it evident that Sri Lanka's macroeconomic management in 1992-93 would be a difficult exercise for several reasons. Firstly, the trade deficit and the current account deficit in the BOP have moved in the wronA

Srt l-onka-Cotnt41 Paper 1 992

261

TABLE I
Srt I-anka: Basic Ecorwmic

Indicators, 1990-1991
1990
1991 17.2 1.5

Population

(million)

17 .O

(o/o) GDP real gFowth rate (o/o) Per capita GDP growth rate (%) Per capita income (US$) Agriculture:gtowth rate (o/ol Manufactufrng:growth rate (0z6) Investment/GDP raflo (o/o) Domestic savings/GDP ratlo (o/o) Foreign savings/GDP ratio (0z6) Rate of consumer price inflation (o/o) Exchange rate Rs/US$ Trade balance Gdeflcit) SDR Current account balance
Population growth rate Current account balance/GDP ratio
Debt service ratio
(o/ol

6.2
5.1

4.8
3.3

417

465
2.2 6.9

8'8

9'4
22.2
14.3
7

23.4
12.a

.9

to.2 t2.2 4t.37

-724 -372

21.5 40.6

-5fB
-192

9.7 l2.I
17 .A

(%o) ratio

l8.l
I 1.6
1991,

Government budget deficit/GDP

9.9

Sourcer Central Bank

Colombo, 1992.

of Sri Lanka, Anntnl Report

direction. The current account de{icit to GDP ratio of 12.1 per cent is greatly in excess of what is normally considered to be tolerable (say 8 per cent or less) in a healthy growing economy that is in need of foreign capital. Second, the same

262

Perspectiues on South Asia,

observation ts true for tlee budget deficit to GDP ratio that also deteriorated from 9.9 per cent in I99O to ll.6percent ln 1991. Third, it is true that the rate of inflation declined. Howwer, it was still in the double digits and needs to be reduced much further to achieve reasonable domestic price stabflfty. Fourth, by mid- 1991 Sri Lanka's rupee was seriously overvalued in the international currency exchange markets. It ts true that the nominal exchange rate has been depreciated from the beginning of Ig88 (US$l = Rs.3O.76) to end l99t (US$l = Rs.42.58). This nominal depreciation noturithstandfng, the real effective exchange rate (REER) ttrat influences the competitiveness of Sri Lanka's tradeables appreciated by about 25 per cent between the first quarter of 1988 and the second quarter of 199 l. From June 199 I the REER has been depreciating. However, the rate of depreciation has not been adequate to fully offset the appreciafion that took place over the preceding three years. Problems and Prospects
In broad terms, the po st-1977 export-oriented and liberal economic stratesr has led to a revival of economic activity. Between the late l97os and the mid- 1980s total expenditure on lnvestment more than doubled in real terms. Rough estlmates Juggest that, during the same period, about 1.7 millton newjobs were created, making a substantial impact on the level of unemplo5rment, which fell from around 25 per cent of the labour force in 1976-ZZ to around lS per cent today. The agricultural sector registered an annual overall real growth of 3 per cent durir,rg the period 1978-86, and output of paddy rice alone increased by 55 per cent between 1977 and 1986. Manufacturing output increased, in real terrns, by about 6 per cent per year over 1978-gl, and the value of annual exports of manufacturers (excluding petroleum products and cut-diamonds, both of which have a low value-added) increased by more than 2b flmes, from SDR 3l m to SDR 788 m between lgZZ and 1991. More

Srt

Innka-Cowrtrg Paper

99 2

263

importantly, the country's export structure has undergone a substantial transformation. In 1960 the three primary exports, tea, rubber and coconut products, accounted for about 6O per cent of exports and industrial products for about 33 per cent. In l99I the shares were 27 per cent and
60 per cent respectively.

The programme of economic liberalization has generally benefitted the manufacturing sector. Factory industries, as well as small and cottage industries, recorded satisfactory growth rates after 1977. Import liberalization has helped to ease the shortage of raw materials and spare parts, while the reduction of bureaucratic controls has encouraged investors, both foreign and local. It has also helped to rationalize industry by removing inefficient units. However, import liberalization has adversely affected certajn industries, such as fabricated metal products, machinery and transport equipment producflon and handloom textiles. There is a widely shared belief that some of these industries with good future potential should be protected from cheap imports for a further period of Ume. The pronounced bias in the Industrial Promotion Zones (IPZs) towards the textile and garments industry has also

invited criticism, chiefly because of a concern that textile manufacturers from the Far East are using the IPZ to 'corner' a part ofttre export quotas which have been allocated to Sri Lanka by the EC and the USA. At present, moreover, the textile and garments industry in the IPZ has a relatively low rate (about 25 per cent) of domestic value-added and normally does not bring new technology into the countr5r. In 1991, 66 per cent of the gross export earnings of the IPZ were from textile, garment and leather products, compared with 75 per cent in 1989. The decline in the relative importance of this sector is the result of the Greater Colombo
Economic Commisslon's (GCEC) policy of discouraging new investment in this ffeld. The current emphasis is on industries such as electronics, electrical goods, plastic, rubber and

264

Perspectitns on Soufh Asia

wood products, in which domestic value-added is generally higher and linkages to tle domesfic economy stronger. Furthermore, 28 factories in Sri lanka's second IPZ complex, constructed to accommodate 'heavy' industry, were in production at ttre end of 199I. A third IPZ, close to the southern port city of Galle, also came into operation during 199r.

There have been considerable lmprovements in the economic infrastructure, notably in the expansion of
hydnoelectric power and in the development of the Colombo harbour and alrport. The internal telephone system has been lmproved, but its capacity has not been sufficiently augmented to meet the demand for new telephones. The adnrinistration of tlle system, which was hitherto under a government department, was vested in a state-sponsored

corporatlon in 1991. International telecommunlcation facllities are also inadequate to meet growing buslness requirements. The rail and road network leaves much to be deslred, although, in the case of the latter, a major rehabilitaflon progrErmme is under way.

Ttre long-term problems of economic growth assume a certain lmmediate urgency because policies of dwelopment pursued since Independence or even earlier have now reached crucial stages of ossification. To take one important example, the distributton of state-owned land-and the state was the biggest landholder in colonial Sri Lanka in the sense that it had at its disposal very large extents of undeveloped landwhtch has been pursued since the early l93Os as a matter of priority in economic and social poliry alike, has now reached lt natural limits. There is very little state land left for dtstribution. In ttre pursuit of equity the size of the units of land thus distributed have become smaller. These have been reduced to the point-0.5 hectares or less where
subsistence agpiculture become$ the only real option available

to the cultivators and with it a perpetdation of the poverty from whlch this programme was originally desigyred in the

Sri

Inrka-Cotntrg Paper 1 992

265

l92os and 193Os to save them.

Yet one of the results of this policy has been very beneficial.

Sri lanka's dependence on imported rice, a feature of the period of colonial ruIe under the British, has been eliminated, and ttre country has reached a very high level of foodsecurity. This achievement is one of the success stories of the post-independence period, and the principal agent of progress has been ttre peasant culflvator. Ironically' but perhaps understandably, one of the results of ttre search for food security has been a neglect of the plantations. Declining yields in the plantations are due to a combination of several factors : the plantation stock-the tree crops as well as the machinery used in productlon-is old and needs urgent renewal; second, it is the inevitable result of nationalization of the plantations and bureaucratization of mEtnagement. Yields are lower than in most other plantation economies' and living standards of workers on the plantations remain lower than that of ttreir counterparts in many other countries. And this despite all the efforts made since 1977 to bring the wage structure and welfare facilities up to the level of the rest of the country. In the long-term, the coconut industry is threatened by the loss of land to alternative uses, especially urban construction. Government policy measures designed to increase yields in coconut plantations have not produced the expected results. Coconut product exports are a steadily declining residual after meeting domestic requirements, which increased by 13 per cent between 198O and 199O' In the tea sector, the fall in production in the early 198Os has been arrested with the help of a $212 m five-year rehabilf tation programme, World tea prices dropped in l99l' Owing to sharp increases in production costs (on account of wage increases introduced in 1988 and the unchecked expansion of management cadres), producer margins have narrowed' In tJle rubber industry, however, the performance has been even more discouraging. Notwithstanding the fact that the
'

266

Perspect

ses

on South Asra

total area under rubber cultivation is reported to have been replanted under a state-subsidiZed programme, output has shown a declining trend since 1984. In response to this situaton, in mid 1992, the government decided to privatize the rnanagement of state-owned plantations in ttre hope that productivity and profitability could be improved.

Sri Lanka's rural areas are free of the worst features of landlordism prevalent in many parts of South Asia, and tJle caste oppression seen in many parts of India. Land reform has been a greater success in Sri Lanka than elsewhere in South Asia. In addition there has been an equitable distrlbution of state-owned land to the peasantry. yet Sri Lanka's rural areas have spawned some of the most ferocious radical movements in any part of the world-ttre JVpled insurrections of 1971 and 1987-89. It is easier to focus attention on thts paradodcal situation than to provide a credlble explanation for it. No doubt the high literacy and unemplo5rment rates in combination with modest economlc growth that have retarded the upward social mobility which the young people from the rural areas have come to expect as something society owes thern, are important factors of any satisfactory explanation. But while these thwarted expectafions have given a {illip to radical and violent political movements, the reductionist assumption that these are due mainly if not entirely to unemployment or underemploSrment is as naive as it is misleading. It fails to take into account tlle importance of ideological fervour, the commitment to class warfare, and the political initiatives and ambitjons of the leadership of ttre JVP, in organizing and sustaining this insurrection,
The rate of unemployment reached 25 per cent of the work force by 1976-77. Although this dropped to around 15 per cent in the early and mid 1980s the siuation deteriorated in 1988-89 largely as a result ofa steep decline in econornic activlty and in industrial output in tJle wake of the JVp insurrectlon. In mid Ig89 when the JVp seemed on the

Sri.

Lattka-Cotrttrg Paper 1 I 92

267

verge of toppling the government, more ttran I million persons (2O per cent of the total labour force) were unemployed, Despite an immediate improvement in the situaflon with the crushing of the JVP insurrection, the situation deteriorated once again with the return of thousands of Sri Lankan workers from the Middle East (where about 25O,OOO Sri Lankans were estimated to be workin$ during the Gulf crisis. By 199f -92, the situation had improved once more and the level of unemployment had dropped to around 15 per cent of the work force. However, to find a lasting solution to the unemployment problem, Sri Lanka must have a sustained GDP growth of at least 7 per cent per year for the remainder of the decade.

The environmental sustainability of Sri Lankan's

development effort is becoming an increasingly important theme in public discourse. The protecton of the already depleted forest cover-an estimated 2O per cent of total land area-is one issue. The potential damage caused to the

environment by development schemes ranging from

agriculture and irrigauon to industry and tourism is another. Macroeconomlc AdJustment
The Sri Lankan case clearly illustrates the need to make a

sharp conceptual and operational distinction between economic liberalization and adjustment. Sri Lanka has liberalized its economy to a considerable extent. However, its persistent balance of pa5rments (BOP) deficit coupled wittr the appreciation of the exchange rate from 1979 and 1984 and again from mid- 1988 to 1991 is evidence of macroeconomic maladJustment. The country's import bill rose nineteen-fold over 1977-9I. Nevertheless, export
earnings increased only thirteen-fold over the same period. This persistent and growing trade delicit is partly attributable to tlle adverse movements in the international commodity terms of trade. The terms of trade showed a substantial lmprovement in 1982-84 but have deteriorated ever since.

268

Perspectiues on South Asra

FYorn a short term point of view, the unfavourable movement is attributable to external factors, primartly a decline in the prices of Sri Lanka's commodity export. However, from the long term viewpoint, adverse terrns of trade and the chronic and growing trade deficit are indicative of the inadequacy of adJustment. The appreciation of the real exchange rate skewed the incentive structure against exports and domestic production and in favour of imports. The high level of domestic eJ<penditure, especially budget deflcits, sustained high levels of imports. Moreover, investments, especially some of tJle large public sector projeits, failed to provide an adequate yteld. In such a situation the generous foreign assistance provided since 1977*in 1991, Rs.7,87O m was received as grant and Rs.2l,O88 m as loans (net of repayments) that together financed 33.0 per cent of total domesfic investment-had the unintended effect of helping to maintain an unrealistically high exchange rate-1sri Lanka's version of the "Dutch Disease". This situation still persists. Given the probable short term adverse political repefcussion of adjustment, Sri Lanka can try to postpone adjusfing its macroeconomy if the donors are willlng to provlde tJle funds. However, in recent years the government has come under considerable pressure from the Washington twins-the World Bank and IMF-to introduce measures to correct the balance of payments deficit, through a depreciation of the rupee and further restraints on public spending. Since June 199I, the rupee has been allowed to depreciate, and stood at Rs.44 against the dollar in mid September 1992. Government expenditure has been curbed by reducing major new projects to a minimum; tirough efforts to rationalize the activities of state enterprises; and by means of the selective transfers of state-owned industries to the private sector. However, even with such measures Sri l,anka failed to fulftIl tl.e macro-economic objectives for I98E-9O imposed by the IMF and World Bank. Consequently, in l99O-91 the government was forced to take additional measures including a reduction in the size of ttre state

Sn

l-anka-lotuttrg Paper 1 992

269

bureaucracy and further liberalization of external pa5rments, in order to make the IMF agree to a fresh structural adJustment loan worth $5OO m. A SOUTH ASIAN WELFARE STATE

Almost alone among the states of South Asia, Sri Lanka developed a comparaflvely advanced welfare system. The roots of ttre system go back to the 1930s and l94os. All post-independence governments have contributed in their own way to its growth. The results have been remarkable.
Using GNP per head as the criterion, the World Bank classifies

Sri L,anka among the poorest 36 countries in the world with a per capita GNP of around $4OO. However, when Sri I-anka s national output is measured in US prices to calculate GNP in terms of internationally comparable (real) purchasing power, GNP per capita is about $2,40O. Even more signiftcantly, the Human Development Index (HDI) for 1990' computed by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), using life expectancy, educational attainment and real GDP per capita as indices, ranks Sri Lanka 76th from tl,e top on a list of 160 countries (which is much higher than the position that it occupies in the GNP per capita only

ranldn$.
There is a lively debate on the effects of recent economic policies on ttre welfare net that had evolved since the late 193Os. Critics of ttre dirigiste policies of tJ:e past have argued that without rapid economic growth to sustain it, Sri Lanka's welfare system would impose additional strains on Sri Lanka's deeply divided societ5r, and its volatile political system. On the other hand critics of the new policies charge that these-and especially the abolition of food subsidies and the rationing system, and the substitution of a system of food stamps in their place, undermined tJle effectiveness of Sri Lanka's welfare system, and reduced the monetary value of the benefits that the poor enjoyed in the past.

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Perspectiaes on Soufh Asra

President Premadasa, who has continued the liberal

economic policies of his predecessor with even greater vigour responded to the criilcism by introducing a poverty Alleviation Programme (PAP or'Janasaviya") for the tbod stamp holders. These numbered 7.5 m (I.4 m families) or about one-half of the total population in 1989. Under the pAp each qualifring family receives a monthly consumption grant of Rs 145g

($32) for two years and, if the recipient qualifies, a loan to establish a self-employment enterprise at the end of tJ.e second year. In return, during the two year period, each grantee family must provide 26 man-days of labour per month to a public works proJect. The World Bank is providing a grant of US $lOOm to create a trust fund to linance pAp work programmes. The consurnption grant is provided by the Sri Lankan budget. In response to criticism from several quarters, including aid donors, the government has scaled down the PAP to make it flscally more manageable. Under the revised progfamme, the PAP will be implemented in l l annual rounds. In the first round, which commenced in October 1989, 156,245 families were selected for benefits. and in 1990 a further 77,260 were selected. However, there are several remaining problems that pAp must overcome. The PAP consumption grant is distorting the incentive structure in the economy. It has exerted at least in its initial state, a strong upward pressure on wages, with serious inflaUonary implicaUons. The administrative and logistical problems that the implementation of the pAp involves are also immense. Many critics of the system are skeptical of the ability of the government and beneficiaries to generate productive employment for the grantees at the end of the two year grant period. Never-theless, there is general agreement that the PAP in some form, perhaps one that essentially provides 'food for work'is necessary to help the underprivileged 2O per cent of the populaflon, who are victitns of serious malnutrition, unemplo5rment and poverty. Thts explains the support extended by the World Bank.

Sri

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271

From 1978 the UNP government embarked on the most ambitious housing programme in Sri Lanka's modern history through a comprehensive island-wide scheme of house construction for the poor. This is now in its third phase (f 990-95) with a target of 1.5 million houses, The ultimate objective is to provide every Sri Lankan family with adequate shelter by the year 2OOO. Unlike in the earlier phases, direct construction by the state is now minimal, and the emphasis is on private effort, with some government assistance. Although the programme has tended to fall behind schedule, overall, it has made a substantial improvement in Sri Lanka's housing stock. One other theme needs discussion at this point, the population problem. Its present rate of growttr of l.B per cent is less than half the rate at independence and is one of the lowest in Asia. Yet with its present population of 17 million Sri Lanka has one of the highest population densities in the world. Demographers project a population of 24 million In 2O25, with the island's population levelling off by the mid 2lst century at 28 million. Given the fact tJlat Sri Lanka's population was a mere 4 million at the beginning of the 2oth century and only 6 million at independence, its demographic history provides a classic case study on how
population growth has outstripped resources and the capacity of its governments and its economy to respond adequately to the aspirations of its people. The projected addition of another I I million to its population over the next 5O years would suggest even greater stress on the economy and social structure than today's population places on the count4r's resources.

There is hope for optimism, however, in the remarkable long-term and consistent improvement in Sri Lanka's physical quality of life, despite the persistence of povert5r and the high rate of unemplognent. At around gO percent the literacy rate is by far the highest in South Asia, and ranks with the best in South and South-East Asia. Since

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Perspectitses on South Aslrr

education is provided free of charge at every level, and there is vtrtually no difference in the education of males and females there is reason for optimism in further reductions of the rate of population growth. Life expectancy has reached 7l years, wittr females having a life span that is generally 6 percent higher than that of males. The contemporary femalemale ratio is around l.O5 very close to the values obtatning in most of Western Europe or North Arnerica (l.Oa) and totally different from that of the rest of South Asia (with the exception of the state of Kerala in India) and most other parts of Asia. The irrfant mortality rate has dropped to around 25 per cent of lO0O live births. No other low income country has achieved this level of social dwelopment. All governments since independence have built upon and consolidated past achievements, a record that is all the more remarkable given ttre turmoil of the last decade and the diversion of resources to build up the countr5r's very meagre defence system. In the areas directly affected by the ethnic civil war, especially the north, social welfare has probably deteriorated in the past ten years.
ETHNICITY AND ETHNIC CONFLICT

How to keep the country together and manage its ethnic corrllict is one of the major tasks for Sri Lankan politicians. Given the tensions and passions of the recent past and conllicting percepfions of vulnerability this will not be very easy, but the reassertion of Sri Lanka's pluralist nature, and the embodiment of that fundamental assump on in its constitutional framework ha$ been achieved through the 13th. amendment to the Constitution in 1987, and that is a maJor change for the better. Nevertheless, much more needs to be done to strengthen democratic institutions, and to make these the natural fora where disputes are articulated and setfled.
The Sri l,ankan experience provides a classic case study of the stresses and strains a democratlc svstem faces from

Sri Lanka--Cotuttrg Paper 7 992

273

prolonged periods ofacute ethnic strife. First of all, economic growth is retarded as resources are diverted from social welfare and investment in infrastructure to the building of ttre security services and the purchase of arms. Investment in productive enterprises declines, and with it the rate of growth of the economy. The damage caused by six years of violence (1983-1988) to the economic infrastructure and output lost has been estimated at Rs. 145,000 m, This was equivalent to about 13 per cent of total GDP over the same period, which, if saved, would have doubled Sri l,anka's national savings rate. Considering the violent events since 1988, the total cost must be much higher today. Defence expenditure totalled an estimated Rs I5,663m (4.6 per cent of GDP) in 1991, compared with Rs 325m (O.8 per cent of
GDP)

in

1978.

Secondly, civil liberties and political riglrts are at a discount

when the state musters its strength to resist challenges to its authority from minority groups-the Tamils in this instance-and deploys state power in a variety of ways, including the use of the armed services, to meet such challenges. Tamil activists for their part, began with peaceful protests in support of their claims, and then these campaigns moved imperceptibly into riots, temorism and rebellions and eventually a separatist movement and a civil war. Thirdly, ethnic conflicts can no longer be confined to the country of their origin. Driven by factors such as cross-border links between ethnic groups, quick global disseminafion of news,

international concern for human rights, international

terrodsm, and easy access to the international arms market, ethnic conflicts are, increasingly, getUng internationalized. Once a conflict breaks out, sooner or later, indeed sooner rather ttran later in this era of instant communictions, it will be internationalized. The Sri Lankan experience of an Indian intervention illustrates the ramifications and consequences of the internationalization of an ethnic conflict.

Fourthly, the Sri Lankan experience also illustrates

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Perspectiaes on Soufit Asia

another crucially important point, namely that minorities seeking redress of grievances, and guarantees of the protecton of their indentities are by no means always agemts of democratic change or adherents of the very liberblism they advocate for thernselves. Minorities could be Just as harsh as anybody else within the.territorial limits over which they have dominance, as the current conllict between the LTTE and ttre Musltms in the north and east of Sri Lanka illustrates so vividly. The LTTE has indulged in bbuts of 'ethnic cleansing" Iong before the Serbs earned a well deserved notoriety for similar practices tn Bosnia.
As the world ts learning so painfully today ethnic conflict

will be one of the major points of tension over the next

decade or more. There are no easy solutions to such conlllcts. One. can only hope for careful management of these, and urge a constant awareness of the price to be paid if vigilance

in management is relaxed.
FOREIGN POLICY

The government of President Fremadasa was under too

mucb pressure from extra parliamentary domestic challenges to its authodt5r in its first two years (from the JVP, and later on from ttre renewed struggle with the LTTE) to have much time for reflection on ttre revolutions of f gSg in Central and Eastern Europe-the simultaneous collapse of communist reglmes there and the dramatic shift in tJle world's power balances they heralded. The external environment of South Asia had changed dramatically with the collapse of the Soviet Union : it meant the collapse also ofthe pivot of India s defence and foreign policies of the recent past, its alliance with the Soviet Union. India was making agonizing adJustments in foreign policy. Sri lanka, in contrastwas still inward-looking, and her foreign pollcy was determined to an even greater extent than in tJle past by domestic compulsions. Of these latter, ttrree facts are clearlv identifiable.

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275

First of these was the question of relations vrith India. Under President Premadasa these had been remarkably frost5r even after the departure of the India Peace-Keeping Force, the presence of which on Sri t ankan soil had been regarded and treated by President Premadasa as an
intolerable affront to Sri Lanka's independence. In the early stages of Premadasa's tenure of office as President, he had made a concerted attempt to reach an understanding with the LTTE, at the expense of India. Eventually, even when the LTTE had turned its guns on the government's secudty forces again after June 1991 , there was no effort to improve relations with India.
In January l99l, the LTTE suffered an apparent setback when hime Minister Chandrasekhar's minority government in India, respondlng to pressure from Congress(I) dismissed the state government of Tamil Nadu on account of the latter's alleged support for the Tamil separatists of Sri Lanka. This is believed to be one of the principal reasons behind the LTTE s assassination of the former Indian Frime

Minister, Rajiv Gandhi, on 2l May near Madras, thus providing evidence of the LTTE s contlnued freedom of movement in Tamil Nadu. As a result of the assassination there has been a strong reaction against the LTTE in Tamil Nadu no less than in the rest of India which now seriously impedes the LTTE s campaign in Sri Lanka. The Indian
authorities are prosecuting many prominent LTTE members on charges of complicity in the assassination, while Prabhakaran himself is accused of planning it from Jaffna. In early 1992 the Indian government decided to proscribe tJle LTTE in India, and to place a ban on its activities on Indian soil. The LTTE's access to Tamil Nadu bases and other resources has been sharply curtailed while rigorous patrolling of the seas by the Indian navy has cut off the LTTE's traditional sources of supply of arms.
Even at tJeis stage there was no anxiety on the part of Sri Ianka government to pursue a co-ordinated anfl-LTTE poliry

276

Perspecttues on South Asrla

along with India, despite the fact that India's change of attitude to the LTTE made it easier for the Sri l,ankan government to meet the challenge posed by tJle LTTE's battle-hardened guerilla forces. But a change in Sri Lanka's attitude to India did come eventually. President Premadasa's visit to India in September 1992-his first to that country

alter he came to power-as the Chairman of SAARC dramatised the improvement of relations, by his official
statements there and in the course of his discussions with the Indian hme Minister and other Indian politicians.

The changed world situation has seen India make a significant shift in its relationships in the Middle East. It began with India's vote at the UN in favour of revoking the UN resolution equating Zionism with racism. Sri Lanka voted against on this occasion thus demonstratjng afresh the powerful influence Sri l,anka's Muslim minority has on the governmenfs policies on the Middle East. Then came India's decislon to re-establish formal relations with Israel, and indeed to establish a defence relationship with that country. Sri Lanka continues to hold out against a renewal of links with lsrael, one of the few non-Islamic nations in Souttr and South East Asia to do so. Sri Lanka's traditional fi:lendship with Pakistan, of course, goes well beyond the compulsions of the domestic base of Muslim voters, into the maintenance of links with a countervailing power against India.
The third of tJ:e domestic compulsions on Sri Lanka's foreign policy is the need to maintain close ties with the donor agencies whose support is essential to sustain her economy. In effect this means good relations with two countries; the US and Japan. The latter in fact has emerged as the main source of aid for Sri Lanka, a continuation of the special relationship established ln 1977 when President Jayewardene became head of government. Despite the fact that Sri Lanka has not yielded to US pressure to soften its attitude to Israel, the relations between Sri Lanka and the

Sri

Innka-Cotntrg Paper 1 992

277

US have remained cordial. The US backs Sri Lanka's

economic programmes through its influence at the IMF and

World Bank. The quantum of direct economic assitance granted by the US is substantially less than the Japanese contribution.

In sum, as with the Jayewardene regime, Sri Lanka's foreign policy plays a rather peripheral role in President
Premadasa's poliUcal agenda.
PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE

Polltlcs
The ethnic conflict apart, there were two principal issues in Sri Lankan politics that had to be addressed at that time, One relates to the further evolution of Sri Lanka's democratic system of government. The opposition is almost unanimous in rejecting the present Presidential system as belng too authoritarian. However, it is far from clear that the public is particularly anxious to return to tl.e Westminster model that Sri Lanka had prior to 1978. There is considerable public concern, especially among the intelligentsia, that Sri Lanka's democratic political process does not function as well as it once did-in the first decade after independence, for example limitations on press freedom, total goverhment control of the electronic media, a certain lack of public accountability on the part of those in authority may be cited as examples in support of this assertion.

The second principal political question that needs resolution concerns Sri Lanka's political parties. At the present time, Sri Lanka's two party system appears to be on the brink of a long period of change and realignment. In the two main parties factionalism has reached the point where the parties themselves need to embark on systematic reconstruction to accommodate this or, as is more likely, to watch factions break awav from them and seek an

278

Perspectiues on

Sc

uth Asia

independent role either on ttreir own or as Part of a new coallfion. With the continuing decline and marginalizadon of the Mardst left, and with the JVP unlikely to recover anytlme soon from the crushing defeat it suffered at the hands of the army and the police, there is space on the left of ttre polttical spectrum for a faction of the SLFP to flll. But glven the decline ln the appeal of Marxism with the collapse of the communist state system in Central and Eastern Europe, a left of centre party will need to develop a more pragmadc approach to social and economic issues in order to wtden its appeal to an electorate that is now more skeptical of tdeological fervour, if it is to make any serious bid for poliflcal power. One of the central issues in Sri Lankan politics of the l99os will be ttre fate of the UNP. By the end of 1994 the
UNP would have governed the country on its own (mosfly) or

ln a coalitton of convenience with others, for 32 of the 48

years of its edstence. Between 1977 ard 1991 it had achiwed a lorel of public support-measured by its electoral success-

comparable to that of the Indian National Congress under Nehru, rvith ttre difference that unlike the Indian National Congress, it has secured a clear majority of the popular vote at wery election since July 1977. ^f"be UNP controls the presldency, the parliament, the provincial councils, and the vast majority of the local government bodies. After a long spell in power the party suffered a major split in AugustSe1*ember 199 l. One has to go back to I 95 I to the defection of S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike-which led to the formation of the SLFP-for a parallel to the defection which occurred in August and September 1991. Like all parties which remain in power for a long period of tlme the UNP itself began to generate factional and personal tensions which undermined the cohesiveness that was one of its great strengths during the fifteen years (1973- 1988) of Presldent J.R. Jayewardene's leadership. One of the crucial weaknesses of the Sri l,ankan party system-and this is as

Srl

Lanka-Cowttrg Paper I 992

it is of its opponents-has been the reluctance if not refusal of the leadership to accept dissent as a necessary factor in tlle life of a political party. Sri Lanka's leader-orlented political parties have generally responded to dissenting opinion by seeldng to drive tie principal dissenters to the political wilderness. In most tnstances they have succeeded in doing so, but the level of dissidence withln the UNP seen last year presents a far greater challenge to the party leadership than anything that occurred ire the pedod 1977 to 1989. Like its principal rival the SLFP, tJle UNP itself has had no inner-party democracy that long established parties of the major democracies of the world enJoy, the factionalism that erupted so unexpectedly to the surface in the latter half of l99l will wentually tear the UNP apart. It could lead to a realignment of political forces and the emergence of new parties such as occurred in India in the 1980s in the wake of the decline of the Indira
true of the UNP as
Congress.

The SLFP is thus presented with an opportunity for poliflcal lnitiailves that it has not had since the l960s. The SLFP has always been dominated by the family of its founder S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike who established the party in 1951. From the time of hls assassination in 1959 to the present day a perlod of 40 years, the leadership has been with his widow. The transitlon from Mrs Bandaranaike who is over 75 years of age to a successor keeps the party divided and the tension this leadership struggle causes places the SLFP as much ln danger of self-destruction as the UNP. Moreover, unlike the UNP, it is caught in the coils of a conflict over ideology. While a section of the party realizes that the old development models are not working, and would like to adopt new ideas, they confront strong opposition of a smaller but influential group who seem unable to abandon the attltudes, prejudices and habits of the past. While these issues remain unresolved, and the party does not come to terms witl- the essential pluralism of Sri Lankan societ5r, it

Perspectiue s on Soulh Asra

carries a set of self-imposed handicaps which made it difllcult to exploit the cipportunities that have come its way through the faetional conllicts within its powerful rival.

Whhtever the outcome of these tensions within the country's main political padies, they will be worked out in a changpd political situation in which the pressures for greater democratization will be all but irresistible. AII the seemingly lost causes of the heyday of populist nationalism-freedom of the press, a strong and independent judiciary, the autonomy of educational instit'utions, and an eflicient bureaucracy-have a renewed appeal to the intelligentsia and the electorate ln a world that is renewing its commitment to liberal democracy and the institutions associated with it. Economy
To some extent Sri Lanka's neaf term economic prospects

depend on events in the global economy. A recovery in the global economy and a more liberal trade regime in the west follov/ihg a successful completion of the Uruguay Round will help the country's export-oriented development strategr. However, key constraints will be domestic. The absorption of resources by the war effort as well as the political uncertaint5r created by the conflict will continue to hinder econorhic progress. The conflict between the need for external payments stability and domestic price stabilit5r on the one hand, and the need for rapid growth, job creation and maintenance of a social welfare safety net on the other poses A major economic policy dilemma for the government.
RecEnt government policies-e.g. slow depreciation of the rupee, privatization of the state industrial enterprises, postponment of privatization of state banks, program to establish 2OO garment factories island-wide, two free sets of school uniforms for over 4 million school children-suggest that tlne government is trying to satisSr both, the donor agencies demand for stringent economic management as

well as the voting public's demand for more iobs and welfare.

PART 3

DEMOCRACYAND
POLITY

Fostering Democracy
AsmaJahangir

Introductlon
The term 'democracy" is used for several different types political set-ups. Nevertheless, over the years a minimurn standard is generally expected before any society can claim to be a democracy. Regular elections, where cltizens can freely participate and elect their rulers; rule of the maj ority and (at least theoretically) the acceptance of universal freedom are the basic criteria of a democratic state. An ideal democrary would guarantee basic human rights to all individuals and groups. Democratic governments would respond to the needs ofthe people and endeavour to come up to the expectations and aspirations of the society they represent. As the concept of human rights develops within the society, the dimensions of democracy also expand to include new a.reas of rights.
of

Version of Democracy Ttrere are different versions of democratic societiesalthough there is no perfect form of democratic society so far. On the one extreme are the mature democracies of

244

Perspectiaes on South Asia

Western Europe, where civil liberties and human rights are well promoted and norms of cir,'ilised behaviour invariably follonted-at least within their own boundaries. On the other extreme are dictatorships disguised as democracies. Thesd societles maintain a thin facade of democratic norms and lnstitutions, However, beneath the thin veneer of democracy lies the naked force of dictatorship. While institutions such as parliament, cot'-rts, press and elections are maintained, they are brazenly manipulated to suit the requifements of the dictatorial force.

In between these two extremes lie many models. Those like lrrdia, who despite all odds, (poverty, lack of leadership and ethnic and sectarian conflicts), continue to cling to a democratic political order as the only means to keep the nation state together. Others, like South Korea, who are reluctantly forced by economic forces to relax dictatorial rules and adopt more tolerant pluralistic policies. Yet others where the snowball effect has wisely made them realise that ttre old order must change. King Birendra of Nepal announced in April 1990, that he was lifting the ban on political parties as a lesult of "the international situation", and "the rising expectations of the people".t
The continuing wave of democratisation will surely reach far more countries in the future. "Between lg74 and lggo, at least 3O countries made transitions to democracy, just about doubling the number of democratic governments in the world.2lt is observed that "never in history has awareness of popular struggles for democracy spread so rapidly and widely across national borders."3

At the same time, political thirrkers and historians have cautioned supporters of democracy. They feel that a reversal of the system is very much possible. Larry Diamond, coeditor of the Journal of Democracy writes, "founding a democracy and preserving it are two different things',. He feels "committed democrats would do well to restrain their

Fosterirg Demacracg

285

impulse to celebrate. Democracy is the most widely admired type of political system but also perhaps the most difftcult to maintain."

Threats to Democracy
This is particularly true of democracies of tl.e developing world. .Broadly speaking, democracies of the developing world are either a recent transition, or 'old" democracies. Both barely manage to survive rather than thrive. This is particularly true of "new-bornr" or "interrupted" democracies. The first few years of democratisation have ttreir setbacks. Expectatons are high. People expect drastic reforms. They hope to see some fruit at the end of a bitter and long stmggle.

The rulers of a "new born" democracy find themselves helpless, while introducing any radical or fresh ideas. They are confronted by a strong vested interest groups, both within and outside the government. These interest groups have the means and power to exert pressure on the rulers to malntain a status quo. "In the context of Pakistan the coalition of the bureaucracy has been so strong with the military and their economic interests have been so common, that even an elected civilian government is not able to deny
economic political privileges of these classes. The bureaucracy has constanfly helped the military in methodically destroying the political parties. The privileged segment has depended

completely on the bureaucracy interests."4

for the protection of its

In countries of recent transition to democracy, the added problem is a lack of political culture and activists. Genuine leaders or believers in democrary find themselves lonely. They command respect but have hardly any following. This often happens where during an autocratic rule, political parties and human rights groups are systematically destroyed by the rulers. Prolonged struggles and a lack of faith in

246

Per spectiue s on South

Asia

popular actlon to remove long-standing dictatorships, wears out llhe political acflvists. At thi$ stage there is no attraction for those struggling for freedom, in the cliches used by the leaders for democracy or similar ideologies. They are more moved by populist slogans and agitational politics. Thus the leadership passes into the hands of those who are ready to exploit populist sentiments, as a short-term policy. Such leaders are not necessarily committed to a democratic system, these leaders themselves undermine the very system which brought them to power. TWo such recent examples of South Asia are Sheikh MuJib-ur-Rahman of Bangladesh and Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto of Pakistan. Both were elected as the representatives of East and West Pakistan respectively. Once in power, they adopted autocratic methods to silence their opponents.

There are some who genuinely employ the strategr of confrontailonist politics to promote the cause of democracy. The5l, however, fall prey to this style of politics, even when in power.s They are soon isolated and out-manoeuwed by the forces of the old order.
Isolating such leaders is not difficult. During the years of dictatorship, political parties learn to barely survive. They are not well organised. Most parties, though committed to democracy, do not even pracfice democratic rules within their own parties. There is no accountability of leaders. The zeal of the ordinary party worker diminishes once his party is in power. Thus the leaders lose touch with their supporters and there is little resistance when power is taken out of their grip. The paradox of democracy is, that once transition (from dictatorship) takes place, democracy in its wake brings forth a number of freedoms, including a free press. The new rulers are held accountable and subjected to criticism in the press. A free press, if it is to perform its duty honestly, must comment on its own government. However, this sudden

Fosterhg Demrcracg

287

rulers are far worse than the former autocrat. Their shortcomings are Judged, not taking into account the
di{Ilculfles they inhertt, but in comparison to the etpectafions of the masses. The point that such criticism in the past or public comment on the follies of an authoritarian regime was not possible, is often forgotten. Pro-democratic pressure groups are virtually absent in a 'new-born" democratic order. The organised groups are either establishment-minded or brazenly anti-democratic. Where they feel helpless in reversing the political system they struggle to keep democracy confined to a limited section of societ5r-malnly the elite. The new rulers lind themselves virtually prisoners of a strong and powerful vested group. Soon their attention diverts to tJle pressing demands of this group. The ordinar5r voter feels neglected and cheated. Either they lose faith in democracy or struggle to change their rulers. The new change often results in a hung parliament. Hence no real change, can as such, be expected or made. If tl.is does not happen, the vicious circle of being surrounded by vested interest groups follows. Eventually, people begin to accept weak and crippled forms of democracy. The flaw in the system is accepted in the same resigned manner as their fate in a poverty ridden society. Thus, one often linds repeated and continuous abuses of human rights even in 'old democracies".

exposure of the regime, gives the impression that the new

A report of Asia Watch on the prison conditions of India, wondered how a democratic government could lose sight of such widespread abuses of human rights.

'India is the world's largest democracy in more than name. It has free elections, a multi-party parliamentary system, a diverse and outspoken free press, an independent Judiciary and the country abounds with non-governmental organizations that take pride in their independence and that help to make up a lively civil society.

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Perspectiues on South Asta

"Yet if the checks and balances of democrary are supposed to curb government lawlessness, something has gone wrong in India. At least, so it seems from examination that we recerltly conducted of imprisonment and police detention in India. In some major cities of the country that we vislted, and probably elsewhere as well, anyone unluclry enough to be arrested faces a far greater likelihood of torture, or worse, at the hands of the police than in many countries entirely lacking in the protection of civil liberties available in India."6
Polarisatlon on account of ethnic, religious and political loyalties undermines even older democracies. Sri l,anka and India remain "troubled spots" because of such tensions. While new-born democracies have yet to grow and find it tough to avoid a reversal, old democracies of the developing world are on the decline. "Sri l,anka has had universal franchise since

lg3l. It

has had experience of holding a number ofgeneral elections

after independence that were generally considered free and fair... There was thus popular acceptability of election results and there was a trend ofeven the routine violence and malpractice progressively diminishing from one election to another, . . The envlronment for free and fair elecUon had apparently changed in recent years in the perception of important civic and political groups in the
country."T

Elections are hotly contested. Their impartiality is no Ionger taken for granted. The election mechanics have been fine-tuned to allow only the privileged few to contest elections. Vlolence threatens the voters. The political atmosphere is highly charged. Indians, as well as being proud of tJreir democracy, believe in taking part in elections that charge the population with an enthusiasm whose recklessness all too often brings violence and death. Despite this passionate

Fosterirg Democracy involvement, the people expect little real changes."s

289

Once the election ends, the general public becomes invisible. They return to the same life and experience the same oppression. Their "representatives" do not "represent" anything; they are elected. Once elected they answer to numerous pressures and constraints, including subsequent re-election, but for them actually to "represent" the wills of their constituents is impossible."e
The fear of early re-election coupled with the expenses involved during election campaigns, compels representatives to relax their values. Many get corrupt. "Corruption is the terrible and endemic sickness of the developing world. Embezzlement, fraud, bribery, payoffs, nepotism and extorfion are so common in some countries that they constitute a separate system of administration."ro Temptations to power and money are offered as rewards for the obedient. Floor-crossing and changing party loyalties weakens both the treasury, and the opposition benches. On

the other hand, to avoid floor-crossing, many countries, including Pakistan, have passed strict legislation. This in turn, makes the legislators prisoners to the dictates of the party boss. The back-benchers lose initiative and become
mere rubber stamp parliamentarians. Because of this apathy often parliaments cannot proceed for lack of quorum.rr

The enthusiastic parliamentarians are hampered by the conduct of business in the parliament. "Every rule of procedure, every technicality is now insisted upon and worked for all it is worth. This stiffening or hardening of the

modes

of doing business has made parliamentary

deliberatlons seem more and more of a game, and less and less a consultation by the leaders of the nation on matters of public welfare. "r2
The worst threat to any dernocratic progress is the rise of

religious fundamentalism.

13

Since religion is an explosive

294

Perspectiues on South Asia

and sensitive matter, in most of the developing world, even dictators hesitate to brutally dismember religious groups. Dufing dictatorships, these religious groups organise thefnselves. They sometimes take over the role of political parties. At the very least, they are one of the most powerful org4nised pressure groups. Democracy cannot prosper where fundamentalism looms at the fringe of all political powers. One of the most important dspects of a democratic society is not only to tolerate, but to protect and promote all forms of minorities and disadvantaged sections of societ5r. Religious fundamentalism is bound to resr.rlt in persecution of religious mirxorities and is detrimental to the rights of women. Another worrying aspect of politicising religion is that such a tactic is very contagious . Pakistan turned totally theocratic and Islarnisation was revived in early 1980. As a result, the Hindus of India turned to obscurantism. They felt threatened at ttre revival of Islamic fundamentalism at its borders, particularly, as the largest religious minority of India is that of Muslims. Politicians, both in India and Pakistan. have explloited the situation at the expense of eroding democratic values. Both India and Pakistan suffer on account of revived

religious intolerance. Muslims and Sikhs of India feel threatened.la Non-Muslims in Pakistan are given a separate status. r5
"In the recent Indian election the third most powerful party was a Hindu party d'edicated to advancing the
cause of the Hindu majority at the expense of both the rights of Muslims and the concept of the secular state. In
some parts of India many Sikhs and Muslims and members

of other groups are equally intolerant of others whose beliefs olbackgrounds are different from their own.
Pakistan's emergence as a dernocracy has been repeatedly delayed by the claims of Muslim movements against the rights of others, and these claims may again cause the collapse of democracy in Paklstan."r6

Fostertq Democrorg Solutions

291

Admittedly, there are no simple solutions and answers to the problems faced by democracies of developing countries. One of the maJor hurdles is lack of resources. Dwelopment policies are lopsided and not distributive in nature. Those who are heard louder are the first to be satisfied. The poor and the underprivileged are the last to benefit. Men, rather than women get priority. There is just not enough to go around. This, by itself, is the root cause of many ethnic, sectarian and class conflicts.

The threat to democratic values thus lies within the weaknesses of the institutions and political leaders
themselves, who have been unable to accept tJle challenges democrary brings with it. Some problems (like poverty) are too complex to overcome in a short period, but certain issues can at least be addressed openly by national leaders and policy makers. In the developing world, the trend has been to avoid solving or discussing the real issues whictr affect the ordinary person. Instead new issues are manufactured to keep public attention distracted from the actual problems.

To a certain extent, one can argue that strengthening of political institutions, spreading awareness, increase ir-t education and training of national and community leaders could promote a democratic atmosphere. All this can help to a point.

institutions within the developing world have taken in trying to democra ze society. The judiciary in India opened its doors throug;h Public Interest Liugation to the ordinary citzens and deprived classes of society. Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka are following the Indian example. Judicial activism has made a positive change, This kind of an action at least builds sorne confidence and hope amongst the general public. The perception that the judiciary is solely a service provided by the state to the powerful is now
Some
a lead

292

Perspectiues on South Asta

on the decline (at least in India, Pakistan and Bangladesh). Other institutions have not made any efforts at reaching out to the ordinary cifizens.

Parliament

is a key institution in the framework

of

dernocrary. If it is seen as unapproachable and irraccessible, then the very purpose of democracy is defeated. Parliaments must respond to public demands. They must have keen ears and not simply be all-ears. Their time, while legislating, should proportionally be spent on the classes of citizens they represent. The developing world is outnumbered by the disadvantaged population. Parliaments in the developing world spend far less of their business time in addressing the issures of this section of society. In almost every countr5r Iegislation affecting children, women, minorities and labour remains outdated and inadequrate.

revitalising democracy. It could encourage greater participation from the people to manage their affairs.
Democracy must move forward from "a say" of the people as to 'who manages their affairs", to the first universal desire of people to manage their own affairs. Parliaments must reach out to their electorate, rather than expect a chosen handful to converge towards the capital. Leaders of the developing world can only raise economic standards by cutting down on their non-developmental expenditure. Huge standing armies are a drain on such expenditure. No one dares to cut the army to size or reduce its share in the national expenditure. Often the military engages itself in some manner of conflict-either external or internal-to justit/ its existence. It is in their interest to keep tensions (both external arrd internal) alive. In order to control the military, leaders must work towards getting strong popular support. This support will naturally come from the disadvanfaged sections of society, who will be the eventual beneficiaries of an equitable economic order. More

Parliamentary activism may open the doors to fresh ideas,

Fosterirtg Democr(rcA

293

time and effort must hence be spent on gaining the support, respect and credibility of this section of societ5z. Parliaments can only be powerful in a true democratic society. Collectively parliamentarians should work towards democratisation of the society at the grassroots level.

Any action towards parliamentary activism presupposes

that elected representatives stand convinced to promote

democrary. Without such a commitment by the privileged of the developing world, democracy cannot foster.

International pressure can only bring _the horse to the water, but cannot make it drink. Spirited individuals and organisations, or human rights groups, can only make ripples but the waves can only be whipped up by a larger consensus of the ruling elite to democratize society. Precisely for this reason it has correctly been concluded that "democracy will spread to the extent that tfiose who exercise power in the world and in individual countries want it to
soread."lT END NOTES

].

The Times, (London) 27 May 1990

2. Samuel P. Hunfington, Democracy's Third Waue.

3. Larry, Diamond, Three Paradoxes oJ Democracg.

Parmanand, PolitTcal Deuelopment in SouthAsia, New Delhi: Sterling, 1988. Many of the political commentators in Pakistan quote Ms.

Benazt Bhutto as an example.

b. Prison Conditions

in Indra: An Asin Watch Report,

April

1991.
7. Report

on Presidential Election bA Non-Gouernrment SAARC

Obseruer Group, 7989,

8.

The Economist

Surueg oJ India, 4- I O May, 199

294

Perspecttues on South Asta

9. Paul, Q. Hirst, Iaru, Socrahlsm and DernocracA, London: Allen & Unwin, 1986.

lo.
I

Edgar Owans, The Futwe oJheedom in the Deueloping World. agreed not

I. In Pakistan, the opposition and the government

to point out the lack of quorum.

t2. Philip, Norton, led.), Legislatures.

13. Fundamentalism is used in a broader sense, to mean extreme

religious lntolerance, where, religious beliefs are forced on people, where religion is politicised and a conservative and narrow interpretation is given to its dictates,
14. ElecUons

in l99O could not be held in East Punjab and the Kashmir valley on account of tensions,

15. Pakistan's

consttution does not allow non-Muslims to vote in the general elections (where only Muslim candidates can contest). Non-Muslims have a separate electorate system. Under certain laws the evidence of non-Muslims are not
accepted while awarding the highest sentence.

16. Raymond, P. Gasttl, "What Kind of Democracy", MonthIA.

Tle Atlantic

t7. Huntington, op. cit..

Problems of the Electoral Process and Election Funding

in India
V.A.

PaiParnndiker

The legiUmacy of the entire democratic system ofgovernance depends essentially on the efficacy and effective working of the electoral mechanisms. If the verdict of tJre people which forms the basis ofthe propriety and legitimacy of the political

system is vitiated by unethical methods, the faith of the people in the people itself gets eroried and ultimately destroys the very foundations of democracy.

In many countries of the world, democracy has lost its legitimacy for their failure to evolve an electoral process which maintains this vital credibility. In recent years many European nations including France, Germany, Italy, and even the U.K. have witnessed grave concerns about the working of the electoral system. In almost all the countries of South Asia, the problems associated with the electoral process have caused grave

Perspectiues on South Asia

concerns about the future of democracy. As it is, some of the South Asian countries have been plagued by military rule reflecting a failure of the democratic electoral process. In others, a variety of other problems have eroded the credibility of the system.

In India, for instance, violence and corruption linked to the electoral process have been two major concerns. The situation in many other South Asian countries is not enilrely
disslmilar.

The Indian Election Commission's report on the first

general electon (f 951-52) mentioned that 88.6 million voters

cast their vote in a perfecfly peaceful atmosphere. There were only minor breaches of law and order in a few polling stations in some of the states. But by the time the fourth general elections were held in 1957i the Election Commission had begun to sound alarm bells. It said in its report: "Regrettably the record ofpeaceful polling was broken at the last general elections. . . Owing to serious disturbances or apprehended breach of peace, poll was adjourned at 12 polling stations in 5 different Assembly constituencies of

Bihar.

One or two sporadic instances of violent

disturbances were reported from Assam, Andhra Pradesh, Haryana, Madhya Pradesh and West Bengal."r The subsequent reports on the fifth general elections of lg7172, the sidh in 1977, and seventh in 1979-80 etc. kept reporting on the alarming increase in violence, "booth capturing", and other electoral malpractices in many parts of India, but more speciflcally in Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, and Jammu & Kashmir. The parliamentar5r elections in l98g and 199I only confirmed the trend..
A central issue relating to the electoral process which has emerged in South Asia is the funding of elections. In India this problem has also been one of the core issues. Ramakrishna Hegde, then the Chief Minister of Karnataka, in his book on electoral reforms released in 1984 quotes the

Electoral Process and. Election Furtdina in India

297

well known Indian political leader late Jayaprakash Narayan as follows:

"Collection of party funds, especially for elections, is perhaps the largest source of political and the other fields of cormption. One hears of fantastic amounts running into tons of crores collected by certain man-eaters of the Union Cabinet and placed at the disposal of the Prime Minister. These amounts are not entered into the Congress Party's open account books nor are they ever audited; no one knows except for a very few how much is collected, what part of it is pocketed by the Ministers concerned, nor how the moneys are spent. These funds are used mainly for Parliamentary and State elections at which the dependable supporters of the leadership particularly of those among it, whether at the Centre or in the States, who happen to have command over the vast funds, are

specially favoured. These funds are also used for "managing" party members, buying up defactors, and toppling not only opposition Ministers but also Congress Ministers in the course of party infighfing."'z
Election funds are clearly the biggest source of cormption

in India. And since it begins at the top, the other forms of corruption then become rampant at various levels of the
bureaucracy, especially at the cutting edge where the citizen comes into direct contact with the official.

The experience in India of the last fifty years effectively demonstrates the distortions in the democratic processes generated by the inflow of big money into elections. The role of big money can, to some extent, be circumscribed by putting a ceiling on electoral expenses. However, Indian experience again shows that laws controlling election expenses have not worked well. As the case of Amar Nath Chawla convincingly shows, returns of electoral expenses by candidates invariably understate the expenses. Also

Perspectiues on South Asia expenses incurred by the party of a candidate on campalgn

activities are not usually covered by such returns. This simply means that a party with greater resources can with impunity contravene the spirit of the laws controlUng election
expenses.
A. law on ceilings on election expenditure can take care of only excessive exlrenditure. It cannot remove unequal access to resources. The persistence of this inequality will, again, Iead to the distortlon of the democratic process. The per$istence of this phenomenon is in itself a very strong indicator of the fact that some parties find it very difftcult to mobilize enougfr resources to fight elections. This problem cannot be handled by leaving its resolution to the natural proCess of support mobiliTation. This is a structural problem that aggravates tJee tendency towards cumulaUve inequality in which weaker parties get weaker because of the lack of financial sustenance and strong parties get stronger because they can attract or get hold of ever larger resources. As long as structural imbalances in our society continue, the state has to intervene to provide correctives.

il Given these considerations, it is desirable to separate the

subJect to the restrictions indicated later. One of the prerequisites for such reform is the need for public audit of par$r funds by agencies appointed or approved by the Election Commission.
question of party funding from election ftinding. Party funding may be allowed through private and corporate contributions

On the question of election funding, the questions that need to be answered are: (o,) Should the state be the sole financer of elections? (b) What should be the mechanism of financing elections or controlli4g election finances? and (c) What other measures should the state take to make electioneering corruption-free and less expensive?

Electoral Process and. Election F\tndina in Indio.

299

Insofar as the question of state financing of elections is concerned, there is no doubt that in the existing conditions, the state has to intervene not only to impose a ceiling on election expenses but also to ensure equal opportunity in respect of access to resources. The nexus between big money and elections has to be broken. This can be done only by determined state action.
Given the desirability of state intervention, the question

then arises: should the state be the exclusive source of

election finance? There is one very weighty argument against

the state being the sole source of election finances. The argument pertains to protest movements that may arise
because of the ossification of the party system which, even while there is alternation, does not respond to the interests

guarantor of democratic processes. However, tl s argument takes into consideration the experience of only a very few Western democracies-namely, England and USA-that have worked with an alternatlng two party system. OtherWestern democracies have successfully operated with a multi-party system. Even the experience of England and USA shows that to break the rigidity induced by a duopoly of political power, third party movements become inevitable.

and aspirations of certain sections of the society. It is frequently argued that a two party system is the best

It can, however, be recognized in the Indian context that the edstence of a plethora of political parties, most of which enjoy only regional support, does vitiate the electoral mechanism in the sense that a party gets a large number of seats even while it polls only a small fraction of total votes. As such, the reduction in the number of parties becomes essential. A law regulating election finance can certainly lnitiate a process that may, over the years, check the tendency towards party proliferation and induce coalescence; but it cannot by itself make a two-party system possible. If despite this, the tendency towards more than a two party system persists, or the emergence of a third or a fourth party

300

Perspectiues on South Asia

becomes necessary, the state should not outlaw

it or make imposslble for genuine protest movements to it virtually rise,

In the light of these considerations, it is worth considering whether, while state funding of election expenses is envisaged, indMdual contributions to especially new parHes entering the electoral contest for the first time be legally stopped. TWo points need to be noted in this regard. First, a new party begins with an initial disadvantage in the sense that it may not have yet established a stable support base for resource mobilization. It may, therefore, have to depend on indMdual contributions for financing election campaigns. Second, forbidding individual contributions may be treated as an infringement of tle fundamental right of the individual since such contributions are usually treated as a form of political expression and a device contributing to the dissemination of political views. In all, barring individual contributions may prove discriminatory to minor or new parties.

As against this, it should be recognized that private contribufions especially to election activities may open up avenues for the infusion of wealth and monied interests into the electoral process. One way to prevent it frorn happening is to make a distinction between individual contributions to parties and that to candidates for electoral campaigns. While the latter can be prevented, the former should not be.

In order to check the influence of big money on the electoral process public funding of elections seems desirable. But governmental funding must be so designed ttrat it helps serious candidates and discourages frivolous ones. The goal of government financing of elections should be to assist serious candidates, yet retain enough flexibility to permit opportunity to challenge those in power without, at the same Ume, supporting with signiffcant tax money candidates who are merely seeking free publicity, and wit_hout attracfing

Electoral Process and. Etection F\rtdina in lrtdia,

so many candidates

301

that the electoral process is degraded.

In order to achieve this goal, it is necessary to recognise three sets of contestants: nominees of established political parHes, that of new parties entering the electoral contest for the flrst time, and non-party candidates. While in the case of well established parties, pre-election funding is possible, this is not so in the case of either a new party or non-part5r
candidates. But before any of these categories of contestants can be given financial assistance the criterion of eligibility will have to be defined.

It is not necessary to have one fixed criterion of eligibility applicable to all these categories. One fixed criterion. may prove discriminatory against minor and new parties as well as non-party candidates. If, for example, the eligibility criterion was defined in terms of, say, the obtaining of a national average of 4 per cent of popular votes polled, it will be easier for national or major parties to pass this test but very difficult for minor or new parties. It is, therefore, advisable to prescribe a stiffer criterion for national or major parties, say 15 or 2O per cent of votes polled in the parliamentary elections and a not so stiff one in the case of minor or new parties, say five per cent. In the case of nonparty candidates, the fixing of the eligibility criterion might be simply the polling of one-eighth or one-tenth of all valid votes polled in a constituency.
Once the eligibility criterion has been defined, the question of who should be given money out of the public fund for the

election campaign must be answered. Should the election fund be allocated to parties or to candidates directly? Election subsidies in countries with parliamentary systems, with the exception of Canada, are made to political parties, not to candidates. The reasons for this are not far to seek. In the first place, payment out of the public fund to candidates may directly accelerate the trend towards candidate independence and could diminish the role of major parties.

302

Perspectirns on South Asra

In tJee second place parties will tend, in case candidates are directly given public funds, to put up candidates even in those constituencies where traditionally they never did. And, lastly, it will encourage the proliferation of frivolous candidature. In the conted of rampant defections and the need to strengthen parties, direct pa1'rnents to candidates will be harmful in the long run.
As against this, there is the weightier argument of a party discriminating against its own nominees. If the fund is given directly to a party which will then distribute the fund among its nominees, there is a greater likelihood that it may conrcentrate larger resources in some constituencies as against others. This will again vitiate equal access to resources. It is desirable therefore to (a) prescribe the eligtbility criterion for parties for state financial assistance; and (b) determine the basis on which a party is allocated its shane of the state fund for election purposes. The party nominee should then receive the state fund directly.

It is beyond doubt that the purpose of election finance legislation should be to ensure equal opportunity. The discontinuance of individual contributions for election purposes will protect equal opportunity to only a limited extent. TWo situations may work against the operation of equal opportunity. First, parties with large resources may supplement state subsidies to their candidates. Second, voluntary organizations, such as political committees, citiaens' groups, etc., may on their own or at the behest ofa particular party mobilize resources for helping the election of particular candidates. These two situations are likely to lead to inequality in access to resources. While it is easier to deal with the former, it is not so with the latter. One can make a distinction between normal part5r functions and functions that bear on election campaigns. But there will be twiligfit zones where this distinction will break. For instance, it can be argued that the propagation of ideology, programmes, etc. is a part of normal party functions but the

Electoral Process and, Election F\tndt-n in India

303

discharge of such functions during the election campaign will undoubtedly add to campaign efforts.

Political committees are a different matter. It is the democratic right of everyone to form associations and propagate his viewpoints, even campaign for particular candidates. To prevent such committees from participating in the electoral process may tantamount to curtailing democratic rights; while such rights cannot be snatched away, they can certainly be regulated. The objective of such regulation should be to balance the integrity of the electoral process and the preservation of democratic rights.
One way to do so would be to impose a ceiling on election expenses incurred by a candidate. There is already a law on the statue books which limits election expenses. This ceiling

varies from States to Union Territories. These ceilings are too low and are maintained only in their breach.

It is therefore desirable to raise the ceiling from time to time keeping in view the current costs. It should be about Rs. 25,OO,0OO in the case of Lok Sabha elections at 1999 prices. Given this ceiling, party acti\dties in support of ttre
election campaign of its candidates and campaign activities mounted by political committees should come under this ceiling.

The regulation of such activities can be effective only when parties and political committees are required by law to keep strict accounts of their income and expenditure, and report to appropriate authorities. Their accounts should be audited by an approved authority desigriated by the Election Commission.
In the case of political committees, it can also be required of them, following the American practice, to register themselves with the Election Commission. Moreover, parties and political committees can also be required to deposit all their receipts in specified banks and meet their expenses of,

304

Persoectiues on Souih Asra

say, more than Rs. IO,OOO ttrrough cheques. This may be made applicable also to candidates. In the case of political committees, it might even be advisable to legally prevent them from mountlng a campaign in favour of a party norninee or a non-partisan candidate.

One of the gravest dangers to the democratic process arises from contributions by corporations to political parties. However, it is not desirable to ban corporate contributions to election expenses. In the case of corporate contributions to political parties, it will be necessary to impose ceilings on such contributions. Such ceilings should be based both on capital and reserves of tlle corporation and on absolute amounts of say Rs. 25,O0,O0O per annum. In addition, the prior consent of shareholders should be made mandatory before a corporation makes a contribution to any political party. Similarly, individual contributions to political parties should also be placed under a ceiling not exceeding, say Rs. IO,OO0 per annum.
R.ecognizing the necessity of public funding of elections,

it

is necessary to estimate the total allocation in this regard and to determine the method of election financing. There are two ways in which thls estimate can be made. One, assuming ibur candidates per parliamentary constituency and given the ceiling of Rs. 25,0O,O00 per candidate, the total expenditure will come to about Rs. 550 crores. TWo, one can es mate the total co$t on the basis of twenty five rupees per vote. This will mean a total outlay of about Rs. l5OO crores. However, assuming a 60 per cent turnout of 6OO million voters the effectine cost will not be more than Rs. 9O0 crores. In any case, the total cost of the financing of
parliamentary elections is not expected to be more than Rs. l50O crores at 1999 prices.

This fund should be placed either with the Electlon Commission or a specially created state funding agency for meeting election expenses.

Electoral Process and Electinn F\tndtu in tndin As has been pointed out earlier,

305

various political parties on the basis of the percentage of votes secured by each of them. The quantum of the grant to each party can be calculated either on the basis of its performance in the last election, that is, its nafional percentage ofvotes polled or its performance in the current one or bottr. If the money is to be apportioned to a party before the elections, then the amount of the grant must be determined on ttre basis of the part5r,s performance in the preceding election with a ceiling of, say, Rs. 2S,OO,OOO per candidate. For instance, a party obtaining 42 per cent of votes in the Lok Sabha Election will get 42 per cent of the public fund but with a ceiling of Rs. lSS.bO crores, i.e. 542 candidates x Rs. 25,OO,OOO and the party getting only 5 per cent will receive only 5 per cent. The same principle should apply to the disbursement of funds if the performance in the current election forms the basis of this disbursement.
The criterion of the performance in the preceding elections assures tl.e availability of funds to the candidates when it is most needed. However, there is no reason to believe that a party will be able to repeat its performance in the current one.. If it obtains fewer or more votes compared to the preceding elections, allocation of funds on the basis of part performance may not be equitable. If, on the other hand, the performance in the current elections forms the basis of fund disbursement, the funds might be available to the

the eligibility criterion, block grants can be allocated to

pa5rments to candidates than to parties. Once a party

it is desirable to make
fulfils

parties only after the elections. Unless alternative

arrangements for lunds are made, the candidates, debarred from access to other sources of funding, may find it difficult to run their campaigns.
One of the greatest disadvantages of taking the previous election as the base for determining the share of a parry rn the state subsidy lies in the fact that a party trying to break out of its regional shell and contest elections in areas where

306

Perspecttues on South Asirr

traditionally it has been weak or non-existent will find it difficult to do so. The criterion of past performance will limit its share of state fund and will not allow it to contest more seats tfian possible on the trasis of the criterion of past performance. Since other funding sources will be legally barred, this will virtually amount to freezing the relative
electoral strength of different parties. This situation is bound to affect adversely the possibilflty of alternation in the party system which is the kernel of a democratic system. Keeping tJlis in view, it is advisable to arrange for longterm loans and subsidies for parties which propose to put up more candidates than possitrle under the proposed scheme of disbursement of election funds.

Another dysfunctional consequence of this pertains to the possibility of party candidates contesting elecUons as independents and later returning to the party fold after they wirt at the polls. This is bound to encourage concealed deflection. In order to prevent this phenomenon from recurring, it is essential to tie up the question of election financing with the anti-defection law.
In otder to avoid the demerits of these methods, it may be advisable to combine both the pre- and post-election criteria. In this case, 5O per eent of the funds will be released on the basis of tJ'.e performance in the preceding election and the rest on the basis ofthe performance of the part5r in the current one. This method will take care of the fund requirements of new parties as well as of non-part5r candidates.
Once the quantum of the block grant to a party has been

determined, grants should be directly given to various candidates on the basis of party nominations. The accounts of expenditure should be maintained strictly by the indMduals and they should be audited and be made available for public scru ny. The authority to administer the allocations to candidates should preferably vest in the Election Commission which should also be responsible for

Electoral Process and" Electian Fltnding in India scrutinizing the candidates' election expenses.

In order to make electioneering less costly, various other steps need to be taken. First, equal time sharing on radio and television by different parties and/or candidates should be encouraged. And, instead of separate public meetings by parties and / or candidates, joint meetings could be
encouraged.
IN

Alarmed at t]le ever increasing problems associated w.ith the electoral process, in lggO the V.p. Singh Government appointed a higfi powered all party Committee headed by the Law Minister of India Dinesh Goswami. Its report was
not entirely satisfactory. In the main, ttre Goswami Committee did not accept the principal recommendations made by V.A. Pai Panandiker and Ramashroy Roy in their paper prepared lbr the Morarji Desai Government in ISZZ in favour of state funding of elections and audit of party funds.
Even so, the Goswami Committee Report contained many valuable suggestions which were accepted by all political parties. Amongst the main recommendations the Committee suggested were the following:

I. Reforms in the electoral machinery and independence of the Election Commission;

2. Steps for improving enrollment of all eligible voters; 3. Issuance of identit5r cards; 4. Restricting non-serious candidates; 5. Regulation of functioning of political parties; 6. A model code of conduct for the political parties; 7. Proper conduct of polls; 8. Steps to eradicate booth capturing, rigging, and

intimidation:

308

Perspectiues on South Asra

9. Fixing a reasonable ceiling on election expenses; and lO. Stringent penal provisions against electoral offences.
The then Chief Election Commissioner T.N- Seshan, a former Defence Secretary and lat-er Cabinet Secretary had stirred up a veritable hornet's nest by taking drastic steps against all erring political parties and political executives including Chief Ministers and Gcvernors in the recent
elections. T.N. Seshan became a folk hero by single-handedly disciplining the electoral process so much so ttrat the State

elecdons of December 1993 had one of t"he lowest levels of electoral violence and electoral irregularities in recent years. Seshan's popularity with the political parties was in inverse

proportion to his popularity with the intelligentsia. An attempt was made in 1994 to bring a special bill to amend
the Indian Constitution and the People's Representation Act to curb the powers of the Chief Election Commissioner. Strong public opinion and opposition in the Parliament by some political parties forced the Government to withdraw the bill.
rV

Electoral reform has become a major political issue in India. Unfortunately, most political parties have not shown the de$ired degree of commitment to the central issue of maintaining t-he integrity and sanctity of the electoral process. Thelr concerns are more with immediate gain and since the ruling party at the Centre or the States has a certain vested interest in 'no reforms", the fight has in effect been between the concerned citizenry and the political parties. The reality is that those contesting the election are no ordinar5r offenders and include those who win and become lawmakers. The unusual zeal for reform and campaign of former Chief Election Commissioner T.N. Seshan against what he called the nexus between corruption, criminals, and politicians therefore evoked a strong popular support which the political

Electoral Process and Electlon fr_nrding in India

309

parties could ill afford to ignore. The batfle for reform of the electoral process is by no means going to be easy or certain. But it is quite clear that public opinion is stacked strongly against the abuses of the electoral process and against the use of money or muscle power. It is a process which will determine to a great extent whether India's democratic system will work for the better or for worse.

The principal issues are two. One relates to the entire electoral process, from enrollment of eligible voters to holding free and fair elections, in which there are no cormpt prac ces or booth capturing, no rigging and use ofviolence to prevent voters from exercising their electoral choice or misuse of oflicial machinery by the ruling party to inlluence the electoral outcome. The second relates to the corruption and criminalization perpetuated by political parties by way of collection of funds and use of criminal elements in elections, some of whom have also entered the electoral fray. Both threaten the sanctity and credibility of the Indian electoral process and a great deal of public concern today is how to prevent the ills of the present electoral system.
END NOTES
1

in L.P. Singh, ELectoral ReJorm: Problems and Suggested Solufirons, New Delhi: Uppal Publishing House, 1986, Cha.pter IL
Quoted
Bangalore: Karnataka State Janata Party, 1984, p. 7.

2. Rarnakrishna H egde , Electoral Rejomt-l,ack oJ Politiccr| W\II,

Power to the People: A Case of D ecentr alization in Nep al

Deu Rqj Datnl

Introductlon
Decentralization of power from the capital city to different districts, towns and villages intends to empower the people at the local level by increasing their control over the local affairs and removal of their powerlessness. Decentralizaflon is the best way of orgailzing local life as it links freedom with social responsibility. Without local self-rule sanctioned by the constitution, democratic life cannot be imaglned and the notion of civic liberty loses all meaning and purpose. In Nepal, the notion of decentralization is associated with a critique of hukumi sashan, peremptory rule, statist development strategies and a necessity for engaging people in local governance and development. Though the policies of decentralization always fluctuated in tandem with the nature of polity in the country, it legitnnized a consensus that decentralization is a sincere response to the remoteness of Kathmandu and impersonality of the state bureaucracy at Singh Durbar, where major political and development

Pouser to

tle

People: Decerttralization in Nepal

3ll

decisions are made q'ithout the lceowledge of local conditions.

Genuine decentralization fosters democracy-internal party democracy as well as democratization of state, deconcentratres information, wealth and social power through mass mobilization and mass participation in tlee institutions of representative bodies to achieve social Justice. A rigid, centralized government, by its very nature, attempts to undermine ttre domain of self-management of the local people. If people are given adequate opportunity they are capable of maintaining social standards by themselves, formulating a vision, acquiring experience, enforcing accountability of leaders' actions and strengthening the habit of self-reliance. A genuine decentralization, in this sense, helps to build the access of the majority of the people to the means of sustainable livelihoods, individual dignity and meaningful participation in governance.

Hlstorlcal Background
The hereditary rule of the Rana family (1846-195O) can be best characterized by an excessively rigid, bureaucratic and patrimonial style of governance which only established some administrative units in the country to sustain their rule, extract revenue, maintain law and order and protect the count4r from external invasion. The Multtlci Ain (civil code) of 1854, amended in l9lo, governed the social and cultural life of the Nepalese people. In the latter part of their rule, the Ranas tried to legislate some social reforms, such as abolition of slavery, widow burning, soti pratln and establishment of schools, colleges and factories, building roads, bridges and electricity and so on. The framing of the Constitution of Nepal 1948 for the first time visualized the horlzontal divlsion of power. But this Constitution never came into effect. After the success of the political movement of 1950, the Interim Constitution of the Kingdon of Nepal l95l was

3t2

Perspectiues on South Asra.

promulgated which espoused th,e notion of popular legitimacy of democratic governance. In the I gSOs efforts were made to expand local Panchayats through Village Development and Cooperatives. Advisory Boards, District Development Boards and Block Advisory Councils were created. yet, the state could not retain tl.e relaUve autonomy of the dominant castes, classes and ethnic groups of society and link its resources to public interest. The Constitution of the Kingdom of Nepal 1959 made the government collectively responsible to the elected legislature. Despite these efforts, the decade of the fifties marked an upswirrg of political uncertaint5r in the country caused by the tenacity and ferocity of power struggle among the political parties, interest groups and tradtitional centres of power. King Mahendra, who had adequate power and the will to use it astutely, found this power struggle an opportune moment and promp y ventured to dlssolve the parliamentary system in 1960 and introduce a monocratic panchayat polity under the Constitution of Nepal, 1962. The panchayat regime (1960-1990) had all the trappings of authoritarianism which by all means was incompatible with the horizontal and vertical devolution of power, inndvations of several legislative and institutional measures notwithstanding. The "active involvement of the king in administrative affairs means concentration of power in the hands of Royal Palace officials creating a classic mismatch betweeri authorit5r and responsibility and distorting the most elementary principle of the line of command in favor of informal channel of communications and personalized decision rules." (Panday, 1989:3f 9) decentralized planning and local governance through several innovative iniUatives, such as the Local Administrative Act 1965, District Administrative plan 1g75, Decentra_lization Act 1982 and Decentralization Working procedures Rules 1984. The country was dir,'ided into 14 zones, 7b districts

The panchayat had formulated a framework for

Pouer ta ttrc People: Decentrqlization in Nepal

313

villages. Still, decentralization was a herculean task because of the top-down systems of power and authority and in the absence of freedom of speech and association, the state institutions had monopolized control over the forces of civil society. As a result, electoral

and about

4OOO

participation remained largely powerless, accountabilit5r was enforced upward to higher authorities (mathiko aadesh) rather than downward to ttre people who elected the leaders.

As a centralized regime engaged in the promotion of planned economy and market diversification, the Panchayat discouraged the growth of "third sector" institutions and civic groups, such as trusts, workers cooperatives, nonprofit organizations and civil society with a principle of inclusion-education, participation, employment and development. Public bureaucracy boasted most of the universal attributes-hierarchy, enterprise, specialization and coordination yet it suffered from a lack of motivation to serve public good and stand above patrimonial interests.
Despite these weaknesses, the basic structures of the political

economy, social reforms, growth of a professional middle

class of intellectuals through modern education,

communication, transportation and land reforms and the sectoral differences of the planning tradition created by the panchayat instituted the social-economic base of democratic change in Nepal.
Ttre successful upsurge of political rrrovement restored a multi-party polity in Nepal in April l99O which dislodged the institutional framework of the ancien regime-National

District, Town and Village Panchayats. The interim

P. Bhattarai carefully concluded government's twin-tasks of framing the new constitution his and holding timely elections for the national legislature. In its policy statement, the first popularly elected government of the Nepali Congress party (NC) led by premier G. P. Koirala in l99l promised to strengthen local government

government led by premier K.

institutions (LGIs) by introducing

decentralized

3I4

Perspectiues on South Asra

adrfiinistration, thus entrusting the local people to carryr out development tasks and solve their problems. Moreover, the government also pledged to include citizens in the national development and deliver the fruits of development to the poor; relieve the hardship of people; enlarge private sector

participation in the economy and expedite the

decentralization process by delegating more authority to the local bodies thereby maklng them capable of formulatlng and executing rural development projects. The Emergent Issues of Decentrali zatlon
Does the discourse on decentralization of power consider the question of sustainability of development? Will it be able to redistribute the fruits of development across gender, caste, class and regional divisions or continue to perpetuate polarizafion? Does it hold the potential to enthuse a sense of national identitStr Does it help spawn a sense of social justice to all the local units or create an economy of scarcit5r in one area and abundance in another? What does local self-government in Nepal mean-decentralization of power, shal"ing of power or relative autonomy of local units from the centre in many matters of popular concern? What are its primary units-elected institutions, party units, local offices of HMG, NGOs, community, ethnicity, market or popular institutions traditionally created by the people themselves? The basic objectives of tJlis article are to probe the constitutional framework arrd policies of the state about decentralization; examine the relationship between central

and local governments; and explore several practical

measures for decentralized local self-government in Nepal.

Constitutional Framework and Policies

The Constitution of the Kingdom of Nepal lggo recognizes that the source oJ souereign authority oJ the ind.ependent andsouereQn Nepal is inherent in the people. How is this sovereignty shared and popular wiII reflected in the

Pouser to the People: Decentralizatton

in Nepal

3r5

governance? Devolution of power to the people is integral to

enable them to share the sovereignty of the nation

in

democratic and legitimate manner. Accordingly,

decentralization has been incorporated in Article 25 (4) of the Directive Princlples and Policies of the State under which the chief responsibility of the state is 'to maintain condiUons suitable to the enjoyrnent of the fruits of democracy through uider parttcipatian oJttw people in tle gouernatrce oJ the countrg and by wag of decentralization and to promote general welfare by making provisions for the protection and promotion of human rights by maintaining tranquility and order in the society." Though Directive Principles are not enforced under tJle law, they provide guiding principles for good governance. Similarly, Article 46:1(c) of the Constitution speciftes that fifteen members of the Upper House of Parliament, three from each of Development Regions, would be elected based on the system of single transferable vote by an electoral college comprising Village Development Committee MDC) chairman, vice-chairman (mayor and deputy mayor in the case of municipality) and the elected members of village' municipality and District Development Committees (DDCs). The Third Amendment of the I-ocal Administration Act 1990 removed the post of zonal commissioner. District, Town and village Panchayats were renarned as DDC, Municipality and

VDC and their rights and responsibilities, territorial jurisdiction, nature of elections and the number of representatives were redefined. The 75 DDCs' 58

municipalities and 3,912 VDCs constitute the wellsprings of decentralized local self-government in Nepal. Each VDC is subdir4ded into nine wards. Each ward elects five members including one women. The municipality wards can elect more based on their population, size, resources and complexities of developmental requirements.

in several plans. These goals were first identified by the

The government s decentralization commitment is reflected

3r6

Perspectiues on South Asra

Natlonal Planning Commission (NPC) in its Third Five year Plan (1964-69) in order to create a ffnancial basis for popular participation. A concrete emphasis was put in the Seventh Plan for formulating, implementing and maintaining projects and mobilization of local resources and talents. The Eighth Five Year Plan (1992-1997) similarly laid stress on poverry alleviation, sustainable development, reducUon of regional imbalance and the promotion of rural development through Ihe decentralizatian oJ'pouer and actiue participation o;f people at the grassroots leuel, The plan document envisaged the role of government in assisting, rather than intervening and controlling the process of development. Faith in state ownership to deliver socialjustice or efficienry of governance has seriously eroded.
The provisions for decentralization seem more pronounced in the Ninth Five Year Plan (1992-2OO2). It aims to empower the local units to take the responsibility of formulating and executing local development plans by institutionalizing local self-government, increasing people,s participation in the distribution and mobilization of local resources, social and

imprnvement, expansion and development of suitable local technologies, socio-economic progress of the women, indigenous and backward cornmunities of rural areas, enhancing the participation of local people for sustainable development and establishing technological and human development infrastructure in rural areas.

economic development of geographically disadvaniaged areas,

In 1992 t)le government promulgated four Acts pertaining to \rDC, Municipalit5r, DDC and Local Bodies Election and. passed Working Procedure Rules in lgg3 and 19g4. These Acts are vital instruments for democratic institution_building at the micro level for the dispersal of power and authority and inifiafing planning from below. An Administrative Reform Commission headed by the prime Minister in 19gl too suggested reforms in the administrative sectors so as to make bureaucracy people-centred and attuned to the needs

Potoer to ttte People: Decentralization in Nepol

317

of democratic development. It, accordingly, suggested to

make the municipality an autonomous unit. The Civil Seryice (TWenty-ninth) Amendment Regulations that came into force

on 6 November 1992 introduced the notion of 'reinventing governance" by downsZing the state bureaucracy. A neo-

liberal state, minimalist economic thinking took its

momentum by means of privatization, denationalization, deregulation and globalization. The ruling Congress party even dropped its ideological commitment to socialism in the second general election of 1994 and ventured to salvage the Nepalese people through foreign investment and global economic integrauon.
On 13 February 1995 the Nepalese government under the Communist Party of Nepal-Unified Marxist-Leninist (UML) introduced Build Ow Village Ourselues with the idea to accelerate local development through the utilization oflocally available labour. resources and institutions wittrout outside intervention; make local bodies independent of the central government; promote self-reliance and rural development planning; provide oflicial support in management, technical input and legal reforms; capacity building of the VDCs by providing authority to utilize 40 per cent of the land revenue by the VDCs ttremselves and the central level grants of NRs.SOO,0OO per VDC for the current year and increasing the amount to NRs.S,OO,OOO the next year. Despite these steps, the creation of All Party Advisory Committee at the DDC, VDC and municipality levels by the government was rebuked on the grounds that it weakens the autonomy of Iocal self-government, the representation process and even tries to politicize the developmental processes. The devolution of economic power to local units was not
opposed by the coalition government of the NC, Rashtriya

Prajatantra Party (RPP) and Nepal Sadbhavana Party (NSP) led by premier Sher Bahadur Deuba because of ttre inherent populism in the programme. Rather, it continued the same populist rhetoric with a different name ViLLage Deuelopment

318

Perspectiues on South Asia

artd SelJ-Reliance Programme wilth slogans like pouer to the Viilage and Deuelopment Pregramme through people, s Participation. The difference between the two is that the latter applied the formula of cost sharing in the development project. Yet, it gave monitoring and evaluation power to the DDC, even the authority to stop project implementation in case it detects the abuse of funds by the VDC. Likewise, decentralization of economic and political power became sub.fect to spoils and patronage with the introduction of the Constitutency Development Programme (under which an MP gets NRs 4,OO,O0O to spend in his or her constituency at will) and the provision for VDC advisory committees to reconcile part5r Interests.
The High Level Decentralization Commission formed under the hlme Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba in 1996 prepared a report on Decentralization and Local Governance. It identiffed several weaknesses in past practices, such as undefined scope and jurisdiction of local self-government, overlapping laws, detlciency of institutional culture, lack of political will, resource scarcity, absence of mechanisms to enforce civic accountability among the elected bodies and government officlals, problems in the sustainability of development projects, dearth of a planned development process, flawed electoral and organizatonal techniques and so on. Similar problems were identiffed in the realms of coordination, rnonltoring and evaluation of development activities. (HMG. r996:29-34)

Accordingly, a Bill was prepared by the then Congress_ RPP-NSP coalition government to present in the parliament. Yet, its replacement in 1997 by the coalition government of UML, RPP and NSP led by Lokendra Bahadur Chand left ttre Bill in the lurcir. Instead it promulgated an ordinance to amend some laws relating to local bodies and local elections thereby initiating changes in the power, composition, representation and organizational set up of the LGIs. All these are included in a separate Local Governance Bill

Pouser to

tle

People: Decentralization in Nepal

319

(Parliamentary Secretariat, 1997). Thus two separate bills are pending in parliament. Lack of consensus among the parliamentary parties defied legislative approval.

Political support for decentralization is definitely

widespread. Political manifestoes of tJle major political parties

commonly divided into the conservative, the moderate and tlle radical spectrum are pro-decentralization. The only question is how to implement it and to what extent power is devolved to the people. The LGI federations (of DDC,VDC and municipality) are exerting their full strengf,h to achieve self-governance. Ethnic groups, minorities, women, marginalized and popular institutions of societ5r are opposed to the existlng laws and are articulating their position for local self-governance. MaJor donor countries, especially DANIDA, GTZ and UNDP and some INGOs are strongly lobbying for it.

Central-Local Government Relatlonshlp

The Local Government Acts (LGIs) underline the role of His Majesty's Government (HMG) or central government as follows:

local government institutions, their functional jurisdiction, laws, rules and procedures. The LGI

HMG is the policy-maker with the power to classifr

federations, however, seek to insert a separate provision for local self-government in the Constitution.

Under special emergency conditions, it can suspend, dissolve, even increase one additional year of tenure of the local government, if elections are deferred. But these measures have to be ratified by Parliament.
HMG appoints the secretaries at the district, municipal and village level to look after the administrative work of

their respective areas. LGIs federations demand ttre power to appoint office secretary, their career

320

Perspecttues on South Asto

development and.evaluatlon in order to make them accountable to local units while HMG is willing to give them the power to appoint additional staff and hire necessary technical persons on contract.

o HMG's courts settle all the major disputes of local

government.

HMG can inspect and monitor the functions of local government and issue directives to them in the formulation and execution of development projects especially taking into accrount the priorit5r regarding
backward communities, women, children and ecological balance. It also determines the municipal plans and projects of intra-DDC natuire and the functions of local level development agencies. HMG can also execure special programmes for the capacity-building of LGIs.

collection and auditing.

I{MG determines the areas for financial resource mobilization, the range of fee rates to be coilected including the policies on grants, areas of revenue

irregularities by LGIs.

HMG can probe into corruption and financial

HMG can form

a high level .Decentralization

working committee can be constituted.

by the prime minister, with a number of ex_officio members mustering a political will to implement decentralization and under this committee, another

Implementation Follow-Up Committee" to be chaired

It can constitute a "Finance Commission" to conduct investigation and study about the taxation of LGIs and sharing of taxes between t-GIs and HMG, to update taxation and the accountancy system as well as other policy matters.
LGIs have to maintain contact with IIMG through the

Power to tte People: Decentrqlization in Nepal Local Development Ministry.

321

DDC can create a Coordination Committee involving all the related coordind.tors of service centres, mayor and chiefs ofvarious subJect units related to its secretariat.

Under these condidons how is economic, political and administrative power devolved? Self-government can mean very little if the bulk of ttre resources is privately owned or state-controlled and public service is done through
government-directed bureaucracies. If democrary is conllned

to

shareholders what

is the

significance of electing

representatives? What is the legislative framework to make the local people stakeholders, who have a share in the costs and benefits of local governance and development? Widening people's participation in decision-making can make government more directly transparent and accountable.

Attributes of Local Self-Government

The viability of local self-government in Nepal is dependent on a number of factors:

Autonomy
The Acts on local government institutions speciSr their autonomy as "perpetually succeeding self-governing organized entifies with separate seal, enjoying the right to
acquire and sell off property and sue and be sued in its own name in the court." LGI federations, however, argue for subsidiarity in local bodies' decision-making and favour an autonomous self-governance involving devolution. This argument is becoming popular right across the political spectrum: RPP and NC for downsizing the state: UML for an alternative to centralized planning and Mandst-Leninist (ML), radical left and ethno-regional parties for consolidating their position in society by gradual federalization of the state. In practice, however, there are three sets of limitations. First, the LGIs are legally disembodied from a genuine

322

Perspectiues on South Asia

notion of autonomy which entails three basic rights:identity, contract and property. They have certain powers to make by-laws, raise revenue, spending, staff recruitment and adJudication of local disputes on a limited scale. The LGIs, for example, as Junior partners have to work under the legal, administrative, financial and operational framework defined by HMG, thus tahing national priorities and policies into account. Second, the social, economic and political environment of LGIs is s'rll hierarchical. And third, their rellance on grzrnts from the government, INGOs and NGOs in $olving their problems has fostered a culture of paternalism and dependency.
The dominance of centralized planning continues to force local leaders to conform to the plans and programmes made by central institutions, while LGIs federations are struggling for more autonomy in policy initiatives. These federations increasingly cri cize the central government and National Planning Commission {NPC) for ignoring their plans and programmes prepared on the basis of local needs and

aspirations; stripping their power of managing primary

schools, communit5r forestry, health centres, water resources, etc. by respective national acts and the authority of district

offiices thereby increasing a trend towards centralization. The Municipality Association of Nepal has suggested the HMG to revise a number of acts relating to transport and construction, health, education, sports, housing and physical planning, irrigation, soil erosion and river control, hydroelectricity, local development, forest and environment, labour, culture, land management and reform, industry and taxation which are not favourable to local self-government. LGIs have become victms of the fluctuation of central policies with every alternation of government and have become unable to expand the rights to local communities.
Local institutions have been dominated by political elites, intermediaries and middle men from various political parties. They form a framework of patron,client and, therefore,

Power to the People: Decentralization in Nepal

323

LGIs'energies have been absorbed in incessant manoeuwes of patrons. A patron-client order centres on power personality, the patron, who controls resources vital to the welfare of clients, dependents and the weaker sections of society. l,GIs do have adequate knowledge and experience to run local affairs but they have to rely on their respective political parHes which only fosters ideological rigidity, act aggressively and are associated with the dominant interest groups of society. This has undermined the autonomy of local self-government in Nepal. There have been efforts to insert anti-defection act stipulating that membership of any member of LGI will be ceased if he or she defects from the party being elected or violates the party whip. But, because of strong opposifion in the parliament, it was not implemented.

Peoplc's Particlpation The Acts espouse the case of strengthening local selfgovernment by maximtzing people's participation arrd tlstihltionaliz@ multi-patlg democracg ot tle grassrmts leueL
The promulgation of a new act in 1997, expanded the base of people's participadon in local governance, mandating tJle election of one woman in the ward committee (which consists of five members) and nomination of six from among the persons of backward communities, social workers and ethnic groups including women in the Village Council by the VDC chairman. This applies to municipality, DDC and District Council as well, This act has not only widened the social base of representation but also offered prospects for the dialectical impetus for social change of hitherto subordinate castes and classes of societ5r.
The Ninth Plan upholds the "empowerment of local bodies" of HMG attuned to decentralization and make administrative

units efficient, "people-oriented" and productive by means

of involving the government, NGOs, private sector and local

bodies

in

social mobilization

to enlist

tJ:e marginalized,

324

Perspect ses on South Asia

deprived and disadvantaged groups

in the

development

process. Active participation ofpeople in local governance is

a means by which citlzens enter into the political system, etttrer througfr ffio manchlw (own person), or through interest groups, political parties, legislature, administrative bodles and even the civil society. The key consideratlons of people's participation are: shaping policy decisions, enhancing sense of political elficacy, developlng capacities to enforce their claims, getting benefits and developing stakes and interests in governrnental affairs.
LGIs have an intrinsic stimulus for people's participation owing to their continued activities and easy access compared to relatively far off central principal secretanat, SinghDwbar

which is generally unresponsive to the local needs and concerns of people. Political participation has certainly increased but it is not a crucial indicator of empowerment because social and economic order are still not compatible with it. Right to peoples' parHcipation should accompany
opportunities for equality, ecofromic security and property rights. In a hierarchic society like Nepal , however, barriers to people's participadon spri4g from the webs of power wolren by caste system, feudalism, patron-client network of parties, paternalistic planning process and monopolization of wealth in ttre hands of a few.
People's participation has been severely constrained by growing poverty, r,nequality, isolation, social contradictions and gender biases. Other barriers-existence of a number of archalc laws and low level of political consclousness among the citizens offer minimal support for the devolution of power. Given the agrarian nature of the elite support base, participaton over local development resources is, therefore, largely controlled by better off sections of the society, technocrats, party leaders and government bureaucrats.

They tend to professionalize development without

acknowledging indigenous vision, knowledge, resources, instituflons, art and a pluralistic space of the nation and

Power to tte People: DecentraLizatian in Nepal

325

consuming up all of people's spiritual and creaflve energies. Development, especially partlcipatory development, has become a fundamental problem for many VDCs of the far western region, such as Humla, Jumla and Mugu which are

condemned

to remain marginalized, dependent

and

impoverished. Political choices can become meaningless economic frameworks remain fragile and vulnerable.

if

Accountablllty LGIs do not directly derive legal authority from the Constitution. They derive delegated authority under the statutory law. This means LGIS have dual accountabilityupward to the line agencies, concerned departments and ministries of the central government and downward to the people who elect them. Accountability caufions the leaders of the consequences of their decisions and actions which they have to satisfactorily explain to the people. How to make MPs and DDC authorities accountable to VDCs and municipalities in terms of their performances, goals and the use of public resources? DDC authorities do not have a popular base because tJrey are indirectly elected by the people's representatives and, therefore, are not morally sensitive to the consequences of their actions as the VDC and municipal authorities.
In the case of MPs, neither political parties which have a history of fusion and fission nor local institutions which are too weak to establish a link between authority and accountability, control their actions other than the potential tlrreat to their next elections . Even the nomination of advisory

bodies at VDCs and municipalities consisting of representatives from NGOs, intellectuals, government
oflicials, social workers and women; and the ward committees further conline the local self-government to the principle of delegation of authority and undermines the devoluUon process. Conceived as a legislative part of local selfgovernance, the Advisory Council is not representafive nor

326

Perspectives on South Asra

really functional with clear power, authority and

responsibility. The policy initiatives of the District Council spring from the DDC where ttre HMG exercises inordinate power and control through the Local Development Officer (LDO) and Chiief District Oflicer (CDO). The DDC Act speciftes that the
local dwelopment ministry "shall execute, supervise, monitor,

district and the coordinator of the plan formulation cornmittee, service centre, integrated plan formulation cornmittee as members. The Act speciffes the involvement of the Member of Parliament (MP), the CDO and regional representafives of the NPC. This committee, after deciding the nature and type of proJects, sends them to tJle DDC for approval. The final recommendation is made by the concerned ministry. Control of the process of decisionmaking enforces an upward accountability. The organizational process of coordination and control among HMG, constituencies, DDCs, Ilakas, municipalities and VDCs, are also not well deffned. Therefore, staff posted in the districts are not accountable to elected officials. When LGIs became executois of the central government's will, how can they work for the transformation of societ5r for the benefit of people?
participatory planning. The scope of LGIs, especially the DDCs has been strenglhened irt local development activities by the use of rational planning-taking into account the potqnttal of the plan, environmental considerations, uplifting of women, the backward and children througlr an increase in productivity, income and employment, prioritization in the selection of proJects and their transparency. While in

and coordinate" the development programmes of the district forinulated by the District Development Project Coordination Committee. The panel has the DDC president and vicepreEident as chairperson and vice-chairman respectively, the LDO as member secretary, the office heads of the

Irr some cases, HMG seems pro-active in promoting

Potuer to the People: Decentralization in NepoJ

327

others, it is reactive. For example, it leaves the role of CDO vague whether he or she is a development agent, promoter of law and order, controller of people's representatives or coordinator of all district offices Plans, programmes and projects that fall clearly under the domain of the VDC and municipality are controlled by central ministries and departments. In the area of plan execution, the LGIs can recruit or hire required persons specified in the projects. They can also constitute a Monitoring and Supervision Committee under the chairperson or local MP, with DDC president, one member ofDDC to be nominated by the chairperson and concerned officials of the disitrict as members. The Committee can hold regular meetings with the participation of donors,
NGOs and private sectors, undertake studies on tl.e operation
of completed projects as well as type of beneficiaries, outcome,

productivity, emploSrment opportunities and environment impact assessment. These assessment reports have to be submitted to the District Council and the parliament for
review.

Finaneial Resource Base

The Acts state that LGIs can mobilize resources from three sources: HMG grant, from its own internal resources and from loans, grants, etc taken from various funding agencies and organizations including banks, INGOs and NGOs. The Acts make the DDC, VDC and municipality mandatory to get HMG approval for receiving any foreign aid. Each VDC gets half a million annual HMG grant. As a rule, sevent5r per cent of LGIs funds should come from their own resources. In practice, however, a majority of VDCs, especially of hills and mountains, can mobilize less than ten per cent only. The eds ng polarities in wealth, affluence and privilege among LGIs make development process inherently unfair and without the mobilization of adequate revenue and income-generating activiues, decentralization

Perspectiues on Soulh Asra bebomes self-defeating at best and destabilizing at worst.

Land tax based on the productivity of land, property tax, tal< on public utilities, local contracts, etc. can generate cohsiderable amount of revenue in the plains area, Tarai anld valleys and can redress the balance between rich and pcior. Likewise, projects of intra-VDC or DDC nature, such as hydro-electricity, irrigaflon, community forestry, health faCilities, education, etc can also generate revenue as well as confllcts on sharing resources. Similarly, control of comrption, bribery, kickbacks, mismanagement of funds and administrative inefffciency can save tJ.e scarce resources. Pr0perty disclosure of municipal and DDC representatives dufing their period in office, arrangement for detecting abfrse of authority and a system of removing DDC authorifies by two-thirds of members are important provisions to enforce finrrncial transparency, integrity and accountability. There is a provision for constitutirxg a Finance Commission to re$ularly review the revenue structure of LGIs and provide suggestions to HMG for essential reforms. HMG tried to abolish octroi, the main source of municipal revenue, but all its efforts were in vain. LGIs seek to receive grants directly frofn the finance ministry for their development plans rather th4n in a complex and tortuous way which also remains unrealized.

Municipalities are parallel to \rDCs

in

structure and

acd-rrities except, of course, the former must have a population

of ht least twenty-thousand, one million rupees in annual income and be able to offer minimal urban facilities such as edUcation, roads, drinking water, electricity and communica$on. There are three kinds of municipalities; metropolitanmdnicipality, sub - metropolitan municipalities and

municipalities. A metropolitan municipality such as

Kathmandu, and sub-metropolitan municipalities such as Laftpur, Biratnagar and Pokhara are economically well off an{ enjoy relafive autonomy wl.rile the newly created twenty, two municipalities are no better than VDCs. For example.

Power ta the People: Decefttralization in Nepal

329

the municipality of Ktrandbari Chainpur has no basic urban characteristics, even roads and drainage. Each ward of these twent5r-two municipalities gets O2. million annual gFants for their development activities. There are contrasts,

too between VDC and municipality. Most of the

municipalifies, owing to their industrial and commercial activities and local taxaton rights, are financially viable while the VDCs of the hills face scarcit5r of resources and are, therefore, dependent on DDC grants, plans and budget approvals. In a situation of highly unequal resource endowment, how the development process can become harmonious and sustainable remains a moot question.
Schemes launched by HMG to mobilize savings from the poor people in rural areas and invest in productive activities. Others where ministers and MPs are articulate have INGOs' NGOs, Participatory District Development programme' Deprived Sector Credit (DSC), Production Credit for Rural Women, Grameen Bikas Banks, Banking With the Poor' Small Farmers' Development Programme, etc. Still others have sectoral programmes, such as population education, manpower development, indigenous people's development' rural infrastructure building, poverty alleviation and integrated development. A majority of these programmes are constituency-oriented not evenly balanced among the regions and people and, additionally, suffer from patronage politics, loss of loans, lack of management, poor motivation among animators and over-politicization with all the potential to polarize the development process. HMG has identified 25 districts as backward and remote ones to initlate the Remote Area Development Program under which it is moderately providing human development training, drinking water' irrigafion, suspension bridges, non-metalled roads and electrilication, In order to make the development process just and balanced, central government's grants should be adequately allocated to support the development of remote
Some fortunate VDCs and DDCs have Rural Self-Reliance

and backward regions where a majority. of the people are strqggling for mere survival. Codsrrmers'Gmup
How can the long-term benefits be combined with much widpr participaflon of people in the consumer group? How can principles of social Justice be reconciled with those of the allocative efficiency of the market? The DDC Act states that it can help create up to 17 sen'ice centres to facilitate the people with goods and sendces. DDC can also coordinate tJ.e activities of consumer groups and NGOs in the VDCs and municipalities among the beneficiaries of the plans and programmes undertaken by them. But in the formation and exedutlon of the plan, the group or NGOs must act in concert wittr DDC. The latter too can formulate and execute plarls through them by involving NGOs or launching at least one programme once a year pertaining to women's devdlopment.

Irl this context, the effectiveness of consumer groups is

deriVed from the association of common ownership with the production and distribution of wealth and power. The landless and poor can also contribute their labour and other seryices to gdt a share in the enterprise. If the consumer societ5r does not $atis$/ the needs ofthe poor, poor people's participation becdmes a means for satis$ring the needs of the rich only. It

entalls an ability to enforce discipline among its members, forrdulate and execute plans locally, mobilize resources, maifJain a high morale and strong sense of collective identity glandng all the members a stake in corporare weal[h and reforming the o\rnership, control, regulation and maintenance cost. In seeking to pursue collective rights, first, a proper separation of efficiency and control in tJre $roup must be established, and second, institutional poli$r measures which would encourage collective action must be maintained. Investment behaviour is determined by tfansac tion costs, information and risk management.

Pouser to

tte

People: Decentralization in Nepal

33r

How the institutional behal'iour of members is managed, training interventions made, Ieadership chosen and penalty is applied for non-compliance are crucial for the mechanism of improvtng accountability and transparency of consumer group or society.

The criteria of accountability, control, rights and responsibilities would be determined by the members
themselves. The scope, status, composition and functional jurisdiction defined for this group, if successfully carried out, can really make local government accountable to the people, manage productive business akin to cooperafives, develop local capacity for resource mobilization-capital, labour and material and eventually can contribute for the
socio-economic and political transformation of village Nepal.

Changing ownership to the benefit of people is the key to realising not only social justice but also enabling them to overcome market fallures which may result from huge concentration of productive assets and accountable private power. Profit is the buitding block of cooperation . Beneficiaries are the real agents of social change.
NGOs,

Civtl Society and Self-help Organisatlons

What are the roles of non-state and non-market institutions in strengthening local self-governance? In a democracy, continuous participation of people is achieved not through the state ins tutions from above but through vibrant "third sector" institutions from below which can develop new forms of collective actions, both to inspire democratic disposition of fundamental rights and then to
sustain this posiuon against attrition. The non-profit sectors seek to mediate between people and dominant institutions of societ5r by strengthening political space, emancipating grassroots ini a ves and expressing various needs of local people. LGI Acts encourage the formaUon of NGOs and civil society with the approval of VDCs and municipalities and involve in local development projects those who can also

332

Perspectiues on Soufh Asia

"identiff, formulate, execute, maintain and evaluate", those prOjects. Final approval is made by the VDC itself. DDC can provide technical support for the projects and VDC has to ablde by the instruction of NPC and DDC while formulating and execuflng programmes. The policies and pririciples of local self-government stipulate to orient devolution of power toward transparent, accountable, democratic people-oriented and participatory civil society. The Ministry of Social Welfare reveals that there are 83 INGOS and 370OO NGOs in Nepal

which spend about 500 million rupees annually for

development efforts in Nepal.

Some

of the NGOs are effective in mobilising,

conscientising and catalysing the rural peoples involvement in the development process and carryring out communitybased relief work. INGOs and NGOs emphasise the role of intermediary insutuuons, voluntary associations and various forms of collective action in shaping and institutionalislng people's power. Their procedural flodbility and integrated approach in functioning have enhanced efficacy and legltimacy by:

. . t . .

enlarlrn the consciousness of rural people, especially women, the poor and disadvantaged secfions ofsociety,

social mobilisaton for the identification and execution

of small-scale projects,
organlzing consumers' cornmittees to facilitate service demands and delivery,

accomplishing the programmes in a cost-effective manner both in terms of time, personnel and finance, and building local capacity for local self-governance

Critics, however, point out that the majority of NGOs and INGOs in Nepal are concentrated mainly in urban areas and

Potuer to the People: Decentralizatian in Nepa|

333

Kathmandu and they are being controlled by ex-bureaucrats, politicians and the elites. As a result, their plans are not well adapted to national priorities nor are resources involved in productive use. In fact, resources are being captured by development brokers and favoured clients, thus pushing the people into dependency, debt trap and denuding the policy-making prerogatves of people's representatives. They, therefore, s rggest that t]lre Social Welfare Council coordinate, monitor and evaluate INGOs and NGOs activities in Nepal through a One Window Policy. There are, however' two practical limitations on the functioning of NGOs in Nepal: the CDO retalns inordinate power over their registration' renewal and abrogation; and the Social Welfare Act 1992 makes it mandatory for every NGO to register with it' which also controls the flow of INGO funds to NGO. Do these conditions help the long-term viability of NGOs in Nepal? Alternatively, are the policies, Ieaderships and operaUon of NGOs in Nepalese hands? Can both set of organizations share a development vision embedded in the needs, resources, experiences and aspirations of local people? These questions require a separate study.
Besides NGOs, there are more than 1743 registered Sajha Societies (cooperatives) which provide a basis for socialistic

production, service to the rural people and for increasing the prospects for people's empowerment. Ttrere are a number of civil society and people's organizations in the form of media, human rig;hts groups, clubs, Guthi, public libraries' literary societies and socio-cultural groupings who voluntarily mobilise capital, labour and material in grassroots development, build networks, nurture communication and protect the citizens from arbitrary decisions of high political authorities, bureaucrats, the police and rich and powerful persons, and test the transparency in decision-making. Civil society is a condition of participatory democracy. Ttre greater its operaton among development actors ' the less the cost of development processes. Yet, the capacity of the

334

Perspectiues on South Asr,a

state to shape vibrant civil society and to curtail the capacity of government to undermine local checks and balances of power have not been fully established in Nepal so as to nudge decentralization in the right direction.

Concluslon

and political networks has facilitated the scope of decentralization in Nepal. The inequalities of caste, class,
gender and ethnic groups have substantially hindered the

The diversity of terrain, ethnic groups, social organization

extent of people's participation in governance and

leverage for empowerment. The statutory provisions, structural and political cultural factors have underlined the pos$ibiliues of traditional practices of decentrali zation, deconcentration of decision-tnaking and delegation of authority, not the genuine devolution of power. What is more important, however, is granting the local government the autonomous power to legislate, execute and evaluate the process of development and governance with the HMG and donor agencies plapng only a supportive role. Development projects should also go beyond the power base of politicians and serve as a psychological lever for the processes of social and political transformation. This is the way in which economic deficiency, bureaucratic inertia and political resistance to democratic decentralization can be steadily overcome. Empowerment of local self-government can be attained if people are involved in political decisions, have information to select the plans and projects and possess adequate resources to translate policy in to practice. Unless

development. In a backward economy where two-thirds of Nepalese are consigned to poverty, the strategr of devolution involved the creation of a nurqber of competing sources of autltority such as civil societf, consumer groups and NGOs,. which can represent tJle interests of diverse sections of people. People in Nepal are not only disorganised but also suffer from a lack of knowledge, resources, institutions and

Pouer to tle Peopte: Decentralization in Nepal

335

the beneficiaries are linked to the development process, decentralization can only mean that people are just a passive recipient of goods and services. A true devolution of power entails local autonomy in production and distribution of resources and enhanced opportunities for the people for
ttreir empowerment and social justice.
REFERENCES

Dahal, Dev Raj, State, SoctetA and Deuelopment in Nepoi,

Kathmandu: IIDS, f 998. HMGN, Basic Document of Ninth Plan, 1997-2002, (in Nepali) Kathmandu: National Planning Commission, 1998.
HMGN, Report of Decentralization and Local Self-Government, (in

Nepali), Lalitpur: High L,evel Decentralization Coordination Committee, 1996.

HMGN, The Consitution of the Kingdom of Nepal, Kathmandu: Ministry of Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs, 1990.
Nepal South Asia Center, Humant Deuelopment Report,Kathmandu: NESAC. T988.

Panday, Devendra Raj, 'Administrative Development in a SemiDependency: The Experience of Nepal," htblic Administration ond Deuelopment, 9:3, June-August I 989. Parliamentary Secretariat, Bill Pertaining to Local Self-Gover nment, (in Nepali), Kathmandu: Parliament, 1997. Shrestha, Tulsi Narayan, "Present and Proposed local Governance and Decentralizauon Programs in Nepal: A Comparative Analysis in Legal Perspective", paper presented at a seminar on

Strengthening Local Self-Governance in Nepal: Inputs for Decentralization Bill, organized by Political Science Association of Nepal (POLSAN) and Friedrich-Ebert Stiftung (FES), in Kathmandu, 3O June 1997. Participatory Local Governance System in Nepal, a paper prepared for Local Governance Programme and Participatory District Development Programme (PDDP) /UNDP, Lalitpur: November 1998.

Perspectfues on South

Asia

Shrestha, Tulsi Narayan, and Tirtha Bahadur, Manandhar, MacroEhonomic Management and Dacentralized Planning, A Study Report Submitted to DDSMS, New York: United Nations, 1997.

Uprdty, Hari, "Power to the People", The Rising Nepal, 22 March

1996.

Decentralization and Development: The Bangladesh Experience

Atiur Rahman

The state shall encourage local Government institutions

composed of representatives of the areas concerned and in such institutions special representation shall be given, as far as possible, to peasants, workers and women.

-Article 9, The ConstttutianoJtle People's Reptibtic oJ Barqladesh (GOB, I 988:9).

The government is beyond the purview of Sam4j (community). So we never expected much from the state. If we wanted something, we had to compromise
with ourfreedoms, Ifthe community becomes dependent on the state, it wlll lose its own bite. This was never true for us. We survived the rules of many kings. The Sam4inever ceased to function. It never allowed outside intervention for anything, big or small. As a result,

338

Perspectives on SouJh Asia

when the outside rulers left, the Samq continued to provide its essential services. (Rabindranath Tagore, 'Inner Strengf,h' (Bangla).
Selected Works, Vol. II, p. 628, 1993 BS).

1. Introductlon Bangladesh ln the recent past experienced a multitude of o(perimentadons on decentralization and rural development, often witnessing cosmetic changes in the format (i.e. number of tiers, tenure of office, manner of election and composition of local bodies) of the local government without touching its content, Most of these changes have originated from polttical expediencies rather than to ensure participatory local governance. Decentralization has always been couched as a means for achieving 'development' and not as an end in itself or as a basic human right. As a result, the local government system, the maJor proxy for decentrallzation, has been characterized by:

highly inadequate mobilization of local resources.

totat exclusion of and lack of participation in local

government bodies by the rural poor.

to devolution/decentralization -marginal commitment1994: 3r4). in pracfice. (Siddiqui,

It was hoped that $/ith the return of parliamentary democracy in 1991, the scope for elected local governments would be increased. But in reality whatever little gains were made earlier h thfs fteld were wiped out for a myopic polltical interest of exclusion of the rural rich loyal to the prevlous regknes. This happened at a time when there was a renewed surge in enthusiasm about decentralization and pafrlclpadon worldwide, mainly for ttre following reasons:

D ec entr alizatian and- D eu elap me nt : B anglade

sh

339

With the collapse of the Soviet socialist system which epitomized centralized political and economic management, the focus shifted to local organizational structure.

With the mounting local environmental crisis, the emphasis on decentralized management of natural
resources was gradually increasing.

With a global economic crisis, the preference for mass production was declining and the success of relatively Iess centralized economies in Europe and East Asia based on'flexible specialization model' (Schmitz, 1988; Banuri, l99l) was providing added support to
decentralization.
However, after the change of the government in lgg6 the emphasis on local governance increased, although ttrere has been a problem in implemenflng this desire.

2. Benelits of Decentrallzatlon
2. 7. Tlrcoretical

Arguments

Traditlonally under-development was thought to be not due to lack of resources or technologr, but rather the end result of inability to make add implement collective decisions. The 'soft states' (as propounded by Myrdal) of South Asia could not prove effective for development as they could not make such collective decisions. Instead the successful economic performance of East Asian countries was derived from their superior ability to implement collective policies and decisions (Banuri, 1991). But today such a state centric view is now being increasin$y questioned. One argument which is still attractive is that large groups are not conducive to reaching collective decisions, rather they lead to surrender of authority to a small number of decision

340

Perspectiaes on South Asirl

makers (Olson, 1965). fuain, the groups should not be so small that they cannot derive any benefit from the economies of scale. Hence, 'The trick then is to lind the right organizational form for a society in which the declsion making unit is small or decentralized enougfi to enable the formaflon of legitimate collecflve decisions, and large enough to permit the exploitation of scale of economies and interdependences." (Banuri, 1991, p. 3). 2.2. Empirical Arguments

Several empirical arguments can as well be made to support decentrali?ation. These include:

1.

The centralized state apparatus is ovrburdened

with detailed issues. Fundamental government policies cannot be effectively implemented by such an apparatus. Hence, there is a need to divest the centralized state's functlons.
drive for rapid globalization, the
earlier tendency of modernization and homogenization of the societ5r under centralized system of the state has, in fact, further divided most post,colonial societies into Anglophile and Vernacular' classes. A vast majority of the people have been marginallzed and disenfranchised in the process. Decentralizaflon can help re-enfranchise local communifies so that thev can control immediate decisions.

2. With the existing

3.

like Bangladesh. The on-going poverty alleviation programmes implemented by the centralized state structure with an inherited bias towards regr.ilatory

Desplte sigFs of growth in some sectors, the extent of absolute rural povert5r has been increasing in countries

functions has invariably been experiencing

implementation failureg. Local self-government giving priority to social mobilization of the rural poor can go

Decentralization and. Deuelopment: Bangladesh

34r

a long way tow'ards countervailing such centralized

state structures.

The human resource development, pursued so far mainly to achieve some quantitative indicators (e.g. literacy rates, infant mortality rates, life expectancy, emplo5rment, status of women, hospital beds, primary health care facilities, nutrition), has not yet been able to make a significant impact on the quality of life, This calls for empowerment, a qualitaUve indicator, which can not be ensured by the existing centralized
arrangements.
5.

Concentration of power, prestige and sources of income

generation

in the urban

sector has been further

encouraging people to migrate to the cities. Unplanned

urbanization has been causing congestion and other kinds of environmental degradation. Decentralization can not only reduce the flow of the people from rural areas to the cities, but also can create an opportunity for better management of urban problems.
6. The 'flodble specialization model' of new organizational

forms along with small enterprises, new information and computer technologr has proved quite successful in improving both growth and equity in some countries. This model presupposes existence of vibrant local communities with strong personalized commitment to each other. A centralized state structure is contrary to tl-e spirit of this model.
7.

Domestic resource mobilization remains

major

constraint to development in the Third World countries. Taxation is always a difficult proposition. A fine balance between revenue generation and delivery of public services can be an acceptable solution to this problem. This requires decentrahzaton.

8.

Decentralization can help tailor the development

342

Perspectiue s on South Asra

project/programmes in line with people's needs.

9.

The national government can acquire better legltimary

if people get better public services. through local governments.

However, despite so many arguments in favour of decentralizatlon there are strong criticisms against it as well. These include: the fean of anarchy; the necessit5r of coordinating the actions ofvarious local agencies; ofenforcing complizrnce with rules and lhws; of ensuring responsibility and accountability; of protection of the rights of individuals and smaller groups; and the need to establish mechanisms for dealing with official negligence, waste, cormption and misuse of powers. (Banuri, ap. cit.)

Without undermining these criticisms, democratization of governance still requlres decentralization. It, of course, takes a Iong time to derive tlenefits of decentralization. All successful models of decentralization were based on continuity with the past. But in Bangladesh, ttris continuity has been missing. Decentrallzation has undergone so many ups and downs, it is nearly impossible to construct a clear picture of its evolution. Colonial rule surely disrupted the communit5r based local self-rrrrle. But the post-colonial rulers have not given the desired priority to this either.
3. Decentralization in Bangladesh: Hlstorical Erperience
The British Raj pursued a policy of night-watchmen and was primarily interested in the status quo and law and ofder adminlstration. Newly introduced European laws ttlough incorporating customary usages regulating the conduct and rights of the members in order to maintain the s{atus quo, did not always prove dynamic enough to suit to the changing needs of the people. While the earlier Sam4l pfeferred consensus oriented.trudgement, the modern colonial state tried to commoditise the legal system in re western impersonal way. The rural poor particularly got alienated

DecentralEatian and Deuelopment: Bangladesh

343

from the centralized legal and administrative system. This dichotomy had serious implications in the subsequent evolution of the local government system in Bangladesh.
Even though a variety of local bodies were established or

reformed (e.g., municipal corporations, municipal

committees. notified area committees, cantonment boards, district boards, union boards) this dichotomy persisted. The

local government system could never meaningfully

incorporate the local autonomy.

Although the post-colonial government in Pakistan gave lip seruice to the issue of local autonomy but successfully managed to bypass local authorities while 'doing development'. Often, bureaucratic controls over these authorities were strengthened.
The introduction of Basic Democracies (BD) system with a hierarchy of councils with direct elections to the lowest tier (Union Councils and Committees), and indirect elections from each tier to the next higher council was a signiflcant initiative. The national parliament and President were also to be elected by the local councilors. Only the lowest tier had an elected chairman. Higher lwel councils were to be chaired by bureaucrats.

The BD system was integrated into development administration at the local level in the early sixties. However, this system was tainted by Ayub Ktran's desire to manipulate the Iocal power base for his regime stabilization. This perception of the system made it all the more unpopular and tfre subsequent struggles for democracy in 1969 and the liberation war in l97l made BD system an easy target of attack.
Another tmportant initiative during the sixties was the establishment of the Academy of Rural Development in Comilla under the Ieadership of Akhtar Hamid Khan. The experiment, though misused by the centralized state, is still

344

Perspectiues on South Asra

considered to have spawned a number of NGO initiatives in Bapgladesh and Pakistan.

After the birth of Bangladesh, the local governments were superseded. An attempt was made to recognize the field administration through district governor's scheme in 197b, wittr wide power to the district governors to control the oflicials within t]le districts. However, the scheme could not

be implemented as the then government was brutally

overthrown by a coup d'tat.

Ttrough provisions of elected local governments were revlved after the abolition of one-party system following the coup the elections of the lowest tier of local governments were not held till 1977. During the period of lg75-g2 an attempt was made to organize "Swanirvar Gram Sarkar,' or profnulgation of Martial l,aw in 1981, the experiment for building an alternative to government ended in a fiasco. In
I 982 , a Committee for Administrative Reorganization/ Reform was consfituted, The committee recommended strengthening loc4l governments. The Upazila system based on the Comilla

Self-sufficient Village Governments. But with the

model of rural development was introduced in the light of the trecommendations of the Committee. Under this system the Thana (renamed Upazila) was made the focal point of all adr4inistrative activities. Some elements of devolution were alsd introduced in the system. A clear demarcation was made between functions of the national government and the Upaaila Parishad headed by an elected chairman. It also had limited powers of raising taxes coupled with sharing central revenues. Though officially devolution was proclaimed as the goal of decentralization, there was no legal guarantee to such a devolution and Upazila parishads remained to be a sulbservient agency of the government. Nor was the system incorporated in the ConsUtution.

There was
expenditures

a significant increase in government in the rural areas, especially in the ffeld of

Decentralizatton and Deuelopment:

anglade sh

345

infrastructure development since the introduction of this system. Also a administrative set up with elected chairman of the parishads supported by services of national officers was established. There was considerable delegation of authority to officers at local level, especially the placement
of a Judicial office at the Thana level was a significant step. However, there were strong criticisms against the system as well. The officials themselves did not like the idea of devolution and the activities of 'brokers' and touts intensified (Rahman, 1989). Notwithstanding these criticisms, the system could have been improved and further democratized.

But as is normally the case with any experiment at decentralization, this one too was abolished abruptly as

soon as the government which introduced the system, fell. The system became a victim of partisan politics and

disgruntled field administration further fueled the

controversy which was already plaguing the system. So yet another experiment with decentralization experienced an early demise well before a fair trial was given to the system. Lately, the government of Sheikh Hasina has again opted

for an elected Upazila government by incorporating

constitutional provision for the same.

Following abolition of the U pazila system, a new commission was set up which tried to bring back the older two tier structure of district and union councils. Urban areas, especially the big cities were to be administered by a municipal corporation. While elections have been held in the four metropolit-an areas and the elected mayors are now
struggling hard (without much support from national administrative departments) to function as autonomous bodies, the other Iocal bodies, particularly the rural ones are still not quite active except for the last tier. The present system of local government has been summarized in Charts
I and II.

34q
Struchtre
oJ

perspectiues on SouthAsia

ChsrtI
Local Gouernment
MINISTRY OF LGRD & CO-OPERATIVE

DISTRICT 'RNMEI{'I' JHAD.3

ZII,A, PARISHAD

nuner-

I URBAN

6I

CITY CORPORATION 4

UPAZILA PARISHAD 460

POURASFIAVA 1006

CLASS-A=3I

ct Ass-B=2g
CI"ASS-C=46 UNION PARISTIAD 4449

oJ

Chrtrt II Local Gouernment Bodies and Composition

Decentratization and Deuelopment: Bangladesh

347

The fact remains that because of lack of continuity' stepmotherly attitude of the national bureaucracy and shortterm political expediencies, the local institutions, despite some being elected, are still far from being autonomous or effective.

The experiences in decentralization in Bangladesh point out clearly that this cannot be imposed from above and the benefits of decentralization have to be earned and defended by grassroots organizations' Decentralization invariably requires innovatlon, creativity and flexibility. These elements are conspicuously lacking in bureaucratic organizafions' which always played the role of midwives in raising the decentralized structures.
decentralization by government agencies, Bangladesh in the past two decades or so witnessed the unfolding of numerous non-government organizations with significant elements of

Parallel to the unsuccessful experiments in

decentralization integrated into their management

structures. Some of them have formed successful coalitions (e.g., BRAC, Proshika and CARITAS.) with the government agencies and are now playing useful functions in providing essential services to the rural poor. 4. The Critlcal Issues

Given the experiences of decentralization both in the government and non-government sectors, it can be safely argued that despite their numerous benefits, there are some serious issues which need to be taken up by policy makers and academics. The issues, to mention a few, are:
1. The ideological issues of whether decentralization is a means to mere economic development or an end as a political

aspiration-a basic human need, has to be sorted out.. If

this issue can be sorted out, the roles of all other agencies (government organizations, non-government organizations,
communlt5r based organization) can be placed accordingly.

Perspecttue s on South
2.

Asia

NI successful models of decentralization had conthuity. changed too frequently and local institutions were manipulated for creating iocal 6ases of prfwer by authoritarian regimes at the top. Such politicization in turn provoked legi macy crisis in local govet'nment systems and their very survival became vulnqrable with every change of government. So there is a need for constitutional guarantee for the continuity of deceritralized structures.

Butih Bangladesh policies were

This Dresupposes raising of consciousness of the poor and constitutional support for such activities from the state. The facilitpting role of an animator or catalysts in this respect should as well be recognized.

3. Decentralization is necessary but not sufficient for rural poverty alleviation. It cannot be effective unless ttrere is social mobilization of the rural poor under the banner of the ofganizations which can safeguard their own interests.

resoufces. So there should be a constitutional guarantee of reven and also the local institutions can be given the a ority to raise funds through discriminatory user (for publlc sen'ices now given free) which would c

fenerlfs not only on political and administrative support but allso on the continuous and timely availability of

4. The successful implementation of decentralization

the richer sections of the community to bear

higher costs.
'er

of power to local government officials must simultaneously with the transfer of powers to the judici{ry at the local level. All successful socieues with strong local governments have strong and independent judici4ries. In Bangladesh this is not the case. Here the separaltion of the executive branch of administration from the ju{iciary has not yet been possible and hence officials are protected ag?inst judicial proceedings except under criminhl charges. So a reformed judiciary with adequate
5.

take

Decentrolization crnd Deuelopment : Banglade sh

349

power, prestige, independence and financial incenuves is a

prerequisite for successful decentralization.

6. The local government should have an elected subcommittee with specilic police powers to supervise internal
law and order.
7 . Lacal self-government bodies should have the authority to exercise a comprehensive responsibility for the provision of services and the promotion of social and economic dwelopment areas. They should, therefore, have the authority to make the NGO and GO activities of their areas accountable (in agreed forms) to them.

8. tocal government officials and national oflicials put under the disposal of local governments should undergo special training programmes which try to shape the attitude of the officials so that they can better serve ttre needs of the
local people.
9. The length of the tenure of the local government bodies should be determined on the basis of tfie size of the electoral

community. The smaller the community the shorter should

be the tenure.

g. eoasludtng Remarks
The issues raised in the above discussion are quite critical and the recommendations made will not be easy to implement. Even in the best of circumstances decentralizaUon is a diflicult become accustomed to prepared to
g;ive up

proposition. Those who traditionally hold power and have it, for example, the vast majority of

elites-politicians, administrators, technocrats are not

that power voluntarily. So decentralization cannot simply be written in a project proposal by a wellmeaning consultant and be implemented by an equally well meaning national government. This requires a change in mindset and sincere political commitment of those in power at the top . Howwer complex and difficult this may appear, the

for a poverty free society cannot perhaps be reelized

t meaningful decentralization.
REFERENCES
Democrotic Decentralization, (mimeo), I9g I .
of Ban$adesb , Thp Constitution oJ

tte people' s Repttblb

r988.

Khan

A.A., "Decentralization for Rural Development in

", Bangladesh

Journal

oJ

htblic Admlnistrahon, S:I,

1989.

Tagore; Rabindranath, Collected Works, Vol.

II, IggO BS.

PART 4

HUMAN RIGHTS

Human Rights and the Rule of

Law in Bangladesh
Megfun Guhnthaktata

The situation of human rights and the rule of law in Bangladesh ivill be reviewed in thi" pup.r.rnder the following heads: l. Women's rights as human rights, 2. Ethnic and minority rights, 3. State coercion and parastatal violence,
and 4. Freedom of speech.

Ulomen's Rights as Human Rigbts

Women in Bangladesh are subject to various kinds of discriminaU on through tie existing laws ofthe country. Alttrougfr the Constitution gives them equalitywith men in public life, in familymatters like marriage, divorce and inheritance tJrey are ruledbypersonal law sanctified by religious codeswhich discriminate against them. The demand for a Uniform Family Code has been raised to redress this situation.

Vlolence Against Women

Violence agalnst women may be defined to include acts of

Perspectiues on South Asia

, mental or sexual harm or suffering, threats of acts, coercion and deprivation of liberty (Committee on ofWomen, 1994). The main causes of violence against in Bangladesh are economic marginalisation, lack of to resources, and the dependent status of women.
Vidlence against women

is also related structurally to pafriarchy and patriarchal norms, structures which

pefpetuate women's subordination in a male-dominant soQiety. Gender-based violence is perpetrated at many different levels and in many different forms. While the phfsical and psychological needs and the recent trend of issluingjfaftoas (religious decrees) by village power structures

against women who were seen as transgressing the borders of morality are also important dimensions of gender abuse. There are ambiguities surrounding the questions of violence in Bangladesh. On the one hand, violence against women is held in repugnance and may provoke outrage. On the other hand, such violence is accepted, tolerated and in certain coiltexts, legitimated especially in the case of family violence. Aceording to an official estimate at present there are about 50 deaths per thousand women due to pregnancy-related causes and 67 per thousand women due to unnatural ca{rses. On 22 November 1993, the Home Minister disclosed in Parliament that of 2I,622 reported suicides since January 1992, women accounted for 12,47O. These suicides are la4gely consequences of dowry and other domestic violence (TIye Dailg Starsub-editorial report, January 1994). Another report states that in 1984 otnt of the total 1993 recorded mrlrder incidents, 273 were caused to women which was 14 pgr cent of the total incidents' In most cases, the incidents are not reported to the proper authorities for one reason or another.

Crimes against women have been increasing at an al4rming rate. According to data collected by the Ain O Sa"[ish Kendra, (ASK) (f995,r997), the total number of inQidents reported has more ttran doubled from 628 to 1995

Humrut Rights and the Ruie

oJ

Lrtw in Barqladesh

355

to 1,533 in 1997. Among the different forms of crimes, rape was the most frequently reported. In the last three years, incidents of rape had increased from 8.2 per cent of total
reports of violence in 1995 to 49 percent in 1997. Domestic violence persists as the largest threat to women's incecurity. Up to 5O per cent of all murders in Bangladesh have been attributed to marital violence. Causes of marital violence are attributed to demands for dowry, polygamy, non-paJrment of dower, custody of children and suspicion of adultery. Yet domestic violence is not recognised as a crime.
The existing laws which address violence against women are the Dowry Frohibition Act of 198O, cruelty to women (Deterrent Punishment Act of I 983) , Child Marriage Restraint Act (Amendment Ordinance, 1984), the Muslim Family Ordinance 196l (amended n 1985), the Penal Code (2nd Amendment Ordinance ), Family Court Ordinance 1985 and Anti-Terrorism Ordinance 1992. But these laws address the question of violence against women in a piecemeal way and have proved by and large ineffective. This is due to the tendency to avoid rethinking the inherently discriminatory legal basis of each individual's personal status and the overhauling of the procedural technicalities which obstruct women's access to justice. Among some of the changes suggested by women's groups are: (a) legal reforms should be effected only after consultation ahd dialogue with women's organisations; and (b) the state must enunciate a clear commitment to securing equal rights for men and women in all spheres of life, tirough full ratification of UN CEDAW constitutional guarantees, and the enactment of a Uniform Personal Code (Planning Commission, 1OO1, Vol. 1). There is a strong need to provide legal aid and support to encourage women's access to justice. In recent years, human rights organisations have started providing legal assistance, health care and training for female victims of violence.

356

Persqectiues on South Asia

Experience indicates that whatever legal rights are granted to women, when it comes to enforcing the law, most of them

ed$t only in theory. Very often the victims or the members of the vicilm's family cannot seek justice because their moves may be disapproved of by the Samg (community) and they can be ostracised socially. Often they remain silent as thelr demands for Justice may lead to a violent backlash. The roles of legal and administrative agencies frequently favour men and these in turrt discourage the demand for Justice. Their partisan treatrnent poses a threat to justice. However, societal conditions should be created so that crimes of violence against women can be settled properly. Along with this, the implementation capacity of all agencies concerned has to be increased to deal with gender violence. Rellgtous Fundamentalism Affectlng Women
TWo successive Martial Law regimes

in

Bangladesh

necessitated a legitimization of pover. This was accomplished by the state using Islam as a populist ideologr. Women were

among the ffrst groups to be affected by this trend, as for example, in the increasing trends to segregate women. The growing fundamentalist fervour is supported and strengthened by an establishment which is bent on malntaining the status quo, both in relation to politics in general and to gender relations in particular. We think this is leading to newer, more specific forms of violence agalnst wornen: a violence which among other things takes the forms of religious leaders being in a position to order (fatrua jar{ burning or whipping or stoning of a woman regardless of the e.xisting legal institutions. While -;ratrra instigated violence showed an increase tiom 23 incidents in 1995 to 28 in 1997, the latter amounted to only 1.83 per cent of total incldents of violence

Trafflcktng of Women and Cllildren

Trafficldng of women and children is one of the obvious

HumrutRighfs andthe Rule oJLaw

inBanglndesh

357

indicators of growing poverty. It takes place in two ways: (a) selling a woman for prostitution both within and outside the country; and (b) trafficking of men, women and children for work outside the country. Here women and children form the vulnerable group. In most cases where women and children get stranded jn foreign lands, often ending up in prison, they are deprived of the minimal services allotted to a refugee by international conventions as neither the home nor the host country acknowledges their edstence. Recent cases show that there is an ever increasing number of Bangladesh women languishing in prisons or engaged in illegal activities in ottrer South Asian countries, especially India and Pakistan.

According to different sources and information it is estimated that 3OO0 to 5OOO women aged between 9 and 25 to 30 years are taken out of this country each year. It appears from the news published in newspapers, that about
15

to

5O

women are illegally taken out of Ban$adesh everyday

through four or five border areas of the country. Some of them manage to pass through legally but often with false iclentification. The Bangladesh Government has responded to this situation by making it even more diflicult for women migrants to seek work outside Bangladesh. This had made the situation even worse, because owing to economic necessity, women are driven to work just as male members of the family and the official restriction which they face often drives them to seek illegal means. According to a joint study by several human rights organisations entttled Human Rights in Banglndesh 1997, it was stated that in that year alone about 820 victims along with 195 traffickers were arrested by the police. Of this number 284 were women. 4O6 were male children and in I3O cases sex was not mentioned. Ninety-five girls were between 6- 16 years of age. Only 57 cases were filed and the outcome of these cases were not known, though it is often found that the accused is granted bail and released for lack

358

Perspectiues on South Asia

trafficking women and children were forced prostitution, drug carrying, domestic work, construction, informal sector manufacturing, camel racing, organ transplants. The Ministry of Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs has recommended capital punishment for the crime of trafficking.

in

of evidence. Among the most common reasons for

Ethnic Violence and Women

An ethnic woman in Bangladesh is subject to three t5pes of discrimination: {a) as a member of her family, (b) as a mernber of a patriarchal society, and (c) as a member of an ethnic group. One of the most significant indicators of their oppression is their low literacy rate compared to the rest of Ban$adesh. Also, when inducted into the mainstream of educadon, no effort is made to include the traditions, language and culture of these ethnic groups in the curricula. Ettlnic women have special links with the environment and resources, since they tradiUonally inhabit forested tracts of land. The role they play in the conservation of nature is thus substantial, but this role is being eroded through the interdiction of the modern technology and commercial farffdng of forestry. Family planning is also one of ttre priority areas of the Bangladesh Government, but the rate of permanent sterilization in the Hill Tracts is higher than in the plainlands (60 per cent to 20 per cent). This is alleged to be an indication of how the government is using ethnic wofiren as vulnerable targets for ethnic cleansing. Furthermore the blatant violation of human rigfrts in the Chitttagong Hill Tracts has resulted in many incidents of rape, molestation, harassment and abduction of women by security personnel. In l99O information from one refugee carnp in India indicated that one in every ten of the total female population had been a victim of rape in the CHT. According to one report, over 94 per cent of ttre alleged cases of t'ape of Jumma women between f99l-f 993 in the CHT were by security forces. Of these rape allegations, over 4O

Human Rights and the

RuLe oJ

Lant in

Bangladesh

359

per cent of the victims were women under 18. (HWF leaflet' 1995). One case of abduction which drew much media

attention was the abduction of Kalpana Chakma, the Organising Secretary of Hill Women's Federation who was reportedly abducted by army personnel on the fateful night of ll June 1996. Ethnic and MlnoritY Rtghts One of the most blatant and well publicised violations of human rights in Ban$adesh is of course in the CHT of southeast Bangladesh, a hilly area peopled with ethnic groups like the chakmas, Tripuras, Marmas etc' The systematic suppression of rights and cultural values of these ethnic minorities by the Bangladesh state has been forcing them to flee the country in large numbers' Military oppression has also resulted in armed resistance in the guise of the Shanti Bahini or as formally called the Jana
Samhiti Samiti (JSS).
The maln roots of the crisis on the CHT centres around the land issue, transfer of population from the plainlands

and the control of administration by non-inhabitants of CHT. Besides discrimination, deprivaflon and exploitation in social, cultural, economic and political fields and the programme of assimilation of the indigenous hill people into
the maj ority Bengalee population are the bones of contendon' Peace talks were held between the government and the

JSS from 1985

to

1997. These talks culminated

in tl:e

signing of the CHT Peace Agreement between the Government

of Bangladesh and tlee Parbottyo Chattagram Jana Samhiti Samiti (PCJSS) on 2 December 1997. This accord with the

subsequent surrender of arms on lO February 1998 was hailed by the Bangladesh Government and by many foreign governments as a positive step towards maintaining peace in tlle region. However, nationally the Agreement has created much controversy and has polarised the political as well as

360

Perspecttues on Soufh Asia

civll society. Ihe government and its supporters regard the treaty as the best possible settlement of the CHT issue, whlle the mainstream opposition party, the BNp in alliance witth Jamaat-e-Islam, a right Wing Islamist partjr term it as unconstituflonal, a sell out to the .terrorists'and above all a violation of state sovereignty (more because of India's involvemerrt in the conflict as providing both refuge to fleeing civilians and arms to insurgents). In this highly polarised debate, a faction of the Hill peoples Organisation, those who used to operate within the political boundaries of the Bangladesh state as the civilian w.ings of the armed PCISS, (The Phari Gono parishad, The pahario Chattro Parishad, the HiIl Womens Federation) expressed their dissatisfaction over the terms of agreement claiming that thefr demands weye compromlsed by their leaders. It was expected that with the arms surrender, armed confrontation with the PCJS.S will come to end. But no word was mentioned within the treaty or even in the peace process on the question of demilitarisation. Three cantonments edst in the areA and three Brlgade headquarters in each district capital. The mainstream opposition has resisted the withdrawal of arrded forces from the area and the ruling party has been defensive about it. The reality of the l{ill Tracts is that in ovet two decades of virtual milltary rule in these areas, the civil administration and civil society has been hit hard. There is no sign of this changing overnight. A ministry of CHT has been set up with a cabinet rankinq minister heading it. But as reports say their tasks are those of coofdinaflon. Stnce the Regional Council nor the recons_ tituted Chittagong Hill Tracts Development Board exists only on paper, tJle Ministry is yet to figure out what and who it must be coordinating with. More important, the power of the Regional Council upon which a lot of emphasis was plaaed prior to the Ag;reement, is curtailed and supersederl by the existing local governrnent structures of District
Councils.

Humart Rights and t]le Rule oJ lano in Bangladesh

361

Past atrocities on the hill people, too have been left unaddressed. Human rights issues have been swept under the carpet by official discourse. Crucial questions of land issue and the Bengali settlers is still disputed. Also preliminary steps to peace such as confldence building measures have not been taken by tJle administraton. Mental attitudes of the dominant Bengalis towards the Hill people need to change. One has to break out of the 'insurgency' mode of thinking or else the democratisation process will remain weak. Communallsm
In the backdrop of the B.JP's assault on the Babri mosque in India, a reprisal took place against Hindu religious communities in Bangladesh resulting in at least two deaths and numerous rapes (Amnesty International Report' l99l). 'flee government imposed a curfew, but there were complaints that the police failed to intervene to protect victims from attacks which continued in some areas during curfew hours.

Although currently the government claims that

Bangfadesh serves as the epitome of communal harmony, there are alleged accusations of negative discrimination against minorities in government jobs and educational institutions, coercion in the case of disputed properties and sometimes outright assault, all of which is contribufing to a high rate of invisible and illegal migration to India.

against religious minorities, particularly Hindus. It superseded the Enemy Property Ordinance 1969, under
which the government could take over charge of properties left behlnd by Hindus, during the war bet-ween India and Pakistan in 1965. A recent sulwey estimates that the total arnount of land lost by Hindu households owing to this law would be 1.64 niillion acres which is equivalent to 53 per

1972 continues to be the prime instrument to be used

The Bangladesh Vesting of Property and Assets Ordinance

362

Perspectiues on South Asra

cent of the total land owned by the Hindu community. However the State Minister for Land, Rasheed Mosharraf disclosed in ttre Parliament on 14 March 1997 that the total land under VPA was O.72 million acres. Only 15 cases were {Iled for recovery of property in that year.
FortJr-one incidents of violence against minorities (religrous

and ethnic) were reported in the press (f997). Of these 18 incidents related to grabbing, appropriating or occupying land belonging to individuals and temples, 12 incidents to desecrations of temples or theft of idols. These acts were committed at different times by powerful individuals or grorups, terrorists, poliUcal leaders and some government offlcials, in their private capacity. In some cases, a welcome result was the taking of prompt action against the alleged
perlpetrators.

Stdte Cocrclon and Parastatal Violence

The failure of the democratic process to run smoothly in Bangladesh has been marked by the following characteristics: failure to convert the parliament into a truly sovereign body, failure to make the executive truly accountable to the people and ensure people's participation in state-run institutions;

and fatlure to implement the rule of law; Consequently many unresolved issues have to be settled by'street politcs' i.e., agitation througlr anti-government strikes (in local parlance, this is called horta\, demonstrations and mass meetings. This has led to mass arrests of opposition party workers. Cases of police repression and violence are also rampant. The two legal instrurnents that help to legitlmize
of Terrorist

state coercion are the Special Powers Act (SPA) and CurbinA Actlvities 1992 (CTAA).

The Special Powers Act (SPA) empowers the government to take special measures for the prevention of certain grave offences, and for matters connected therew.ith and serves as the basis for detention without charge and trial. Mere

HumrnRighls andthe Rule oJlnw

inBangladesh

363

suspicion of having committed such offences is sufficient to meet its requirement. There is no provision for representation by legal counsel; the detained must represent himself or herself before an Advisory Board which can renew the order for detention indefinitely. The SPA has been criticised by successive opposition parties in Bangladesh as the enabling provislons for administrative detention without due process of law. The Home Ministry confirmed that over 3,OOO people are being currently detained under the LSA. The Curbing of the Terrorist Activities Act promulgated on I November 1992 intends to cope with offences such as extortion, obstructing or diverting traffic, harassing or abducting women and l,iidnapping children. But Amnesty Internatlonal finds the procedures of the special courts established under the Act not fully meeting international standards for fair trial. More than 2OO cases have been filed under this Act against the ethnic people of the Hill Tracts, tl-e charge being either that they belong to the Shanti Bahini or ttrat they sympathise with them. Parastatal Vlolence

The most incompetent performance of successive Bangladesh governments has been their failure to establish a rule of law. The situation has hardly differed from the preceding autocratic rule of Ershad. Terrorism and exLortion practised by armed gangs of mastaans (thugs) had been one obnodous feature of the old order which has continued into the present possibly because not a single political party has been averse to using these forces for fulfllling their own interests. The most obvious casualty of this state of affairs has been campus life. Since students form a highly politicised pressure group, the student branches of political parties are empowered through the offering of financial incentives and provision of arms in order to protect their interest or tleir prospecdve party 'constituencies' as the case may be.

364

Perspectiues on South Asia

Frcedom of SpeGch

Although in terms of the freedom of press, the print

media have shown sifis of liberalisation, radio and television

renrain under governmental control. Also, indirect pressure

is often exerted on the print rnedia through governmental

corltrol of advertisements. The refusal of the government to acknowledge many of the demands arising from the society as llegitirnate (for example, the demand to hold trials for the war criminals of 1971, some of whom are Members of Parliament and political Ieaders of the lundamentalist party ttre Jamaat-e-Islam has e ggravated tensions in the system, often leading to a virtual breakdown of{aw and order.
From the early nineties, a series of attacks on the freetlom of e6pression can be noted. A group of fundamentalists have those working against the recent trend of.;firtu.ras (religious sertrnons). The government, in support of this group, had ftled cases against naflonal and liberal-nrinded writers and journalists and issued warrants for their arrest. They have been accused of hurting the religious senUurents of the people under a criminal code with a maximum punishment up to two years. .d warrant for the arrest of the feminist writer Taslima June. It was alleged that in an intenview with an Indian daily, The Statesmatt, she had asked for the revision of Quranic verses thus hurting the religious sentiments of the people. In this context, it may be merltoned that Taslima had already given a rejoinder denying the statement. After some initial problem bail had been grafited to all parties, though for Taslirna Nasreen, international pressure had to be called for in order to give her safe custody. Currently Taslima Nasreen has returned to Btrngladesh to visit her mother on her death-bed. But she is still not free to move about lbeely as the threat from the fundamentalists persists. It may also be mentioned that the
Nastreen was issued on 4 been harassing progressive-minded writers, Journalists, and

Human Rights and ttle Rule oJ Law in

Bangladesh

365

current government has also not withdrawn the charges

against her.

'ltre systematic hunt, oh the part of the govermnent to target writers and intellectuals to hold them responsible for
making blasphemous statements could be construed as an

effort to respond to the pressure created by the

fundamentalists demanding the institution of a Blasphemy Law in the country. Human rights activists have vehemently resisted pressures for such a Law (modelled as it is on that enacted in Pakistan), as it would seriously hamper freedom of speech and moreover, give the fundamentalists a legal instrument to silence any progressive voice and thereby annihilate their enemies.
REFERENCES
ASK, BLA,ST, MLAA and Odhikar, Humnn Rights tn Bonglodesh, 1997, Dhaka: UPL, 1998. Baby, Moudud , Pokistaneg Bangladesher Nari Paclwr' (Trafftcking Bangladeshi Women in Pakistan), Dhaka: Bangladesh Mohila

Parishad, 1991. Meghna Cuhathakurta

reDort"

Women

in Conflict Situations in

South

Asia: Tlte Cttittagong HillTracts, Bangladesh, unpublished

draft

Social Justice and Human Rights: Reflections in Bangladesh Literature

Anisuzzamart

It is difficult to concetve of a period in Bengali literature

when the themes of social justice and human rights were not reflected in one way or the other. These concepts have undergone a lot of changes with time ald so have their reflection in our literature. Some of our earliest poets, living probably around the tenth century, regretfully pronounced that 'the thief and its captor are the same person' or 'the j ackal constantly fights the lion'. The novelist Bankimchandra Chatte{ee (1838-94) had, under the influence ofAuguste Comte and John Stuart Mill, published a pamphlet on equality in 1873 where he tatked of inequality and injustice in tf,re relationship between the rich and the poor, the landholder and the peasant, the man and the woman. Although he later retracted the work, he did not withdraw such other pieces of his writings where he argued that since the right of conquest had been conceded by all, the right of
theft should similarly be aclaeowledged. Rabindranath Tagore

Social Jrtstice attd Human Rights : Bangladesh

367

(1861-1941) had a great deal to say, among others, about imperialism, aggressive nationalism, autonomy and selfrule, and the position of women in society. In one of his most well known Poems, he asks God.

Have I not seen secret malignance strike down the helpless under the cover of hypocritical ni$ht?
Have I not heard the silenced voice ofjustice weeping in solitude at might's defiant outrages?...

Choked is my voice, mute are my songs to-day, and darkly my world lies imprisoned in a dismal dream and I ask thee, O Lord, in tears: 'Hast Thou Thyself forgiven, hast even Thou loved those who are poisoning Thy air' and blotting out ThY light?'
Qazi Nazrul Islam (1899-1976), acclaimed as the national poet of Bangladesh, had produced a whole bunch ofpoems under ttre titles of Samgabadi (1925) and Sarbalnra(L926)

where he scrutinized the discriminations all around. quote from some of these Poems:

kt

me

I sing of equality,
There's nottring greater than a human being,

nothing nobler
Cast-e, creed,

religion-there's no difference

Throughout all ages, all Places,

we're all a manifestation of our common humanity. (Translated bg Sqied Kamo,l

I sing of equality
where through our common suffering

368 we're united as one familv.

Perspectiues on South Asia

It's a simple questlon:

We're all children of the same Earth

yet why is it that some of us are kings

while some otfrers, subJects? A strange philosophy indeed

if I speak this simple truth, my friend, I'll be charged with sedition.

(T

ranslate d bg Kabir Chaw dtang)

My lord, raise your mace ofjustice and punish

Those wealthy and the rich who thrived

Robbing the humble poor and the deprived. Today the greater the robber, the bigger the thief

and the cleverer the cheat

T?re more

honourable, the more distinguished

and the more digniffed his seat

In the assembly of nations.

(T ranslated

bg Kabir Ctawdturry)

While travelling in the traiin the other day

I saw a Baboo-Sahab, a member of the so-called gentry.

Throwing down on the ground a person

For the simple reason that he was a coolie. Tears mshed into my eyes.

Will the poor get beaten like this

Throughout the world and for ever?

SocialJustice and.HumanRights:

Banglodesh

369

Will they never conquer their tears and sighs?

The steam engines ttrey run today in terrific speed

Were bought into being by the bones

Dadhichies',

of

these

And now the rich and the aristocrats ride on them While tJle coolies get crushed beneath.
You answer that the coolies are paid.

Shut up your lips, you liars and cheats.

Tell me, How many millions have you made
For yourselves?

And how many pennies have you paid

To the coolies? . .
.

But the great day is ahead

When the accumulating debts of ages

Shall have to be repaid

(Tronslated bA Kobir CtawdhurU) 'Dadhichi sacrificed his llfe to help the gods in distress and the thunder made out of his bones helped the gods to win over the
demons,

You coveted no precious jewels Your wants could be met

Out of a small earthen bowl.

You only desired quiet and peaceful sleep

3,70

Perspectiues on South Asra

And a litfle cottage, neat and clean, Lit by a tiny lamp, shedding tender lig;ht. And, instead.
You found approaching death and disease

And a cunning surreptitious i}ief.

(Translated by Kabir Chowdhtug) Nazrul Islam had somethlng to say about gender equality:

I sing ofequality. I don't see any difference

between a man and a woman.
(T r anslnte

d by S e ed Katna!

The poet, who had sufferedl imprisonment at the hands of the foreign ruler, had cautioned ngainst any division among the ruled: You must Iead them to \rictory, O Captain, my Captain,

The helpless nation is going under water

It does not know how to swlm.

I shall watch tonight
Your determinauon, grirn yet bright, To free the country from slavery.
'Are

thry Hindus or Muslims?,

Who asks ttris question? I say,

Tell hlm, my Captatn,

Social Justice and" Human Rights : Bangladesh

371

The children of the motherland are drowning todav.

{Translated.ba Kabir Clnu:dtury| These are, indeed, loud and boisterous acclamations, lacking the finesse of some of his ottrer poems and l5rrics. Nonetheless, they made a deep impression on contemporary readers and witers and they are still very popular.

The writers of the l93Os and 1940s had carried the

themes further. They wrote about the life of the downtrodden

and the lowly, showing that society has compelled them to live a sub-human life although they have the same desires and aspirations as any other human being. For instance, SailaJananda Mukherji (1900-76), produced short stories depicting, for tJle ftrst time, the life of the labourers in the coal-ffelds; Premendra Mitra (1904-88), who claimed to be a poet of the blacksmith and the potter and the labourer, wrote on the hitherto neglected life in the slums; Achintyakumar Sengupta (1903-76) offered a picture of rural Bengali life -marked by want and exploitation; and Manik BenerJi (1908-56) gave an incisive treatment of the Iife of the fishermen on the banks of the Padma, the beggars on the streets of Calcutta and ttre members of the family of the thief. Many of the writers of the day were, to an extent, influenced by contemporarlr European writers and by Marx and Freud as well. During the Bengal famine of 1943, poets and writers of ftction laid bare the disaster that was brought upon manby man, and registered their agony and protest at a social system that let it happen.
The question ofsocialj ustice has also evolved around certain

issues like those of gender and communal conflict, but the discrimination between the rich and the poor, the urban and rural people, between the high and mighty and the downtrodden and helpless has been a recurring theme in our literature. Sufia Kamal (b. f 91l), the seniormost of the
Ban$adesh literary flgures , nearly follows Tagore in her prayer:

372 Listen, O God

Perspectiues on Soulh Asra

Listen to my entreaty for once.

Can you tell me

'ilhy in this beautiful world

There is so much misery,

of yours

Why the piteous groans of tortured humanity

Fill the slqy and tfie fotests and the hills?

The paln and the sufferings Make the world quake,

And salty tears surge in her two eyes But you are calm, quiet, silent, and undisturbed. ...
How man showers cruel es upon man

And indulges ln tortures and injustices galorel

How passionately he tries to imprison truth

In t]le meshes of vicious falsehood.

'

Sordid ugliness and horror

Bare their teeth in a horrible grin,

While your beautifi.rl mother-earth shrieks in fear, And a dull pallor creeps all over her adgrable body.
(Translated bg Kabir Chotudhurg)

Abul Hossain befall hts hero:

h.

1922) compiles a list of misfortunes

that

The storm destroys my crops now and again,

SocintJustice andHumanRights:

Bangtadesh

373

Hut after hut is submerged in floodwater'

And in cities the leaders clash,
The paddy is washed away by the river,

The pulse disappears, cloth is not available,

The winter comes with the bite of a tiger'

And the bitch of a wife gives me a child every year.

Life nevertheless goes on. I baffle my enerdes

And go on increasing the tribe. Whether I will be mentioned in your poem

Or not is beside the point. l,et me enter the harvestfieId

And appropriate whatever is within my grasp. (T ransVtted bg Abu Rrtstlred

The desire to appropriate rvhat he thinks his share denied

cannot, howe-ver, be fulfilled due to the interplay of social forces. This gives rise to social tensions and rebellions, as Hasan Hafizur Rahman (b. 1932) notices:
A procession there was, Of gory resistance throug;hout.

I see today just one face

In the procession, as

if

All faces of mart5rrs havc Transformed into the quintessential form in this one
face.

Just one face is consPicuous,

With courage and sacrifice written large on

it

374
This face in the procession

Perspectiues on South Asia

Is like a flag fluttertng in the air

Holding up rights sovereign,

Sovereign like the sun.

lTranslated bg Moharvnod. Alil

and martyrdom rather than victory and fulfillment. That is why Hasan, in another poem, complains of his country: What you relish is death Nothing else flatters your palate. In your careful chronicles
There is room Not for men of courage,

What is of importance here is to notice that the face appears to represent courage, but not achievement, sacrifice

But for mart5rrs alone.

(Transktted bg Mohf,rrulnd. Alfl I do not think that the poet is being pessimistic here. His wide experience has taught him to be apprehensive, his pefception has led him to look Lreneath the surface, perhaps, deeper into the locus of power.

Zillur Rahman Siddiqui (b. 1928) notices that the men he

used to meet in his childhood were hugely built, who appeared to have belonged to the clan of the dinosaurs, who moved like the demons of fairy tales, whose thick, wrinkled, bared

skin looked like that of a buffalo, whose wooden sandals, used only on special occasions, knew the weight of their hefty trunks, and whose single weight allowed the frail palmyra rafts to barely alloat, have disappeared.

SoctalJustlce and Human Rights : Bangladesh

375

If now-a-days, I chance to visit

My native vi[age,'I look around,

I do not see them, the dinosaur clan

Rather their progeny, poor petty souls

All cased in little shrivelled bodies,

Bent backs, walking fieldward

In small steps, eating cold rice

of yesternight. And on market days

Crossing the shalry bamboo-bridge

In steps light as a hopping bird's

And on Erd and Bakreed daYs,
As huggings and embracings start
These our men, their brittle frames

Kept hidden under gowny shirts, Yield fearfully to the friendly hug.
These men, the progeny

ofour elders.

Abu Zafar Obaidullah (b. 1934) also speaks about the elders and attempts to connect the past with the future:

I speak of a legend,
I speak of an ancestor
Who had a scar on his back

Flaming like a red hibiscus,

Because he was a slave,

'The two gpeat festivals of the Muslims, when men embrace each other

376

Perspectiues on South Asra

Shall I be able to speak of poetry like him? Shall I, like him, be able to speak of freedom?
He would speak of driving the plough deep into the earth, Of soqring clean seed in the well-drenched land Of tending the ripening corn like the milch cow,
He would speak of poetry.

Each bead of sweat of one who tills the land is a poem. Every grain of corn of that tilted land is a poem. ...
He who has the

thrill of a budding sprout

truths

Is a poet
He who speaks dreamlike

Is a poet And when men would love each other

Everybody would turn to a poet.

I speak of a legend

I speak of my ancestor
I speak of the restless present And of the fine struggle in the future.
(Translated bg M. Harun:Lr Rashrzl)

I{afiq Azad (b. 1943) reacts to the famine condition that appeared in Bangladesh in 1974 in a simple and direct diction and stSrle: I am content if I get two square meals a day. I have absolutely no other demand.

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377

Many persons ask for many things,

Everyone wants a house, a car, money; some hunger for farne

But my wants are few.

What I ask for is little. I want food. I feel a burning fire in the pit of my stomach. What I want is plain and sirnPle:
I want rice. I don't care if

it is cold or hot,

Or if the grains are fine or red and coarse

like the rice doled out by ration shops. I don't care as long as I get
my plateful of rice

If I get two square meals a daY,

I tell you,

I'll give up all other demands of mine. . .

But if you can't satisff this demand of mine,
things wiU go very wrong in your kingdom.
The hungry one does not know

what is right or wrong, what is good or bad,

he does not know laws, rules or statutes.

I'll unhesitatingly devour

all ttrat I'll find in front of me.
I tell you, nothing will be sPared. Everything will rush into my jaws.

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And perchance if I find you before me you will surely be transformed into a tasty morsell
(Transktted" Aa XaAtr Cfau:afurA) Mdhadev Saha (b. 1944) believes that a way out of this situation is to communalize the wealth of a nation:

I shall nation alize all the roses for children,

otherwise they won't get a single flower

I shall, likewise, nationalize land for the peasants

or ttrey too like the children won't be assured of food. . .

I shall nationalize moonlight and happiness,

because, like sorrow, happiness too eannot be claimed solely by an individual.
believe in the certain victory of equality,

shall nationalize light against darkness

otherwise light vdll never get into the dreary slums. (Translated bg M. Harunur Rashrd)

The theme of inJustice and inequality in societ5r and exploltation of the common man is more elaborately treated in fiction. One of the best expositions of the matter is found in SyQd Waliullah's (1922-7t) Lal SaIu (1949). Like most of our early novels it has the countr5rside as its background. The central character, Majid, warrders into a village where there are more caps than crops. Fle transforrns a crumbling grave into a shrine, draped with red fabric, a sign of its holiness. He fully exploits the religious sentiment of the peopld to his own benefit and cleverly destroys all attempts to ch4llenge his authority. Khaleq, the landed farmer and

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379

virtual head of the village, whose influence is affected by Majid's entry into the scene, Iinds it convenient to work hand in hand with MaJid, even when the latter forces Khaleq to divorce his wife. Together they concentrate all powers in their hands and are able to play with the lives of the others. Only Jamila, Majid's young second wife, refuses to be humbled by her husband who chastises her nonetheless. In his second novel, Chander Amabasga (1964), Waliullah
portrays Quader, son of a well-to-do family, who has become a dervish. Arif, a tutor in their home, follows him on a moonlit night, Ioses his track, and, after a while, discovers the murdered body of a young woman. Later, Quader makes Arif help him dispose of the body. The knowledge of the crime weighs heavily on Arifs mind and his attempts to tell the truth, after being arrested for a crime he did not commit, do not help him. Quader had asked him once what he would gain if he is hanged. The police now warn him not to try to harm Quader. And a bewildered Arif keeps on asking himself: what difference does it make to the murdered woman as to who gets punished?

Undoubtedly, Waliullah does not limit himself to the

social issues in this novel. He focuses, in his typical fashion, on the individual and here the introspection of the individual

takes him far away from gruesome realit5r. Some other novelists tend to emphasize the social background in which the individuals play their role. Abu Ishaq's (b. 1926) Suryadighat Bdn (1955), Showkat Osman's (b. 1917) Janani (f 958) and Shahidulla Kaiser's (1926-71) Sareng Bau(I962) portray the struggle of the downtrodden for existence. The protagonists in all the three novels are women-widowed, divorced, or deserted, even if temporarily, and are thus doubly disadvantaged in a male-dominated world. Dariya Bibi in the first mentioned novel becomes a vicfim of lust of the newly rich Yakub and ultimately is driven to commit suicide. Jaigun, in tJ.e second one, is prevented from earning, even by selling eggs, because it contravenes the law of

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purdala and is finally forced to leave the village for an

unknown destination. Only Nabitun ln fureng Bau" succeeds in driting away ttre unwanted suitor and increasing her charrn though she is undernourished.
Novels such as Kashltaner Kanga(1954) by Shamsuddin AbuI Kalam (1926-gn, Adigonta(L914) by Sardar Jainuddin (1918-86) or Seyana {1969) by Satyen Sen (19O7-81), brings out the strugg,{e of the deprived section of society-be they ffshermen, peasants or thleves. Some others, like Sangsqptak ( f 964) by Shahidulla Kaiser, Padma-Meghna-Jamrna. (197 4) (19I1-89), and Ksudha O Astn by Abu Jafar Shamsuddin (1965) by Alauddin Al Azad (b. 1932) deal rvith the events that had swept our society in the immediate past and, in a way, reflect its evolution as well as the aspirations of tJle common man. Often historical elements arrd legendary charaoters have been used to reflect the present. Vidrohi Kdibarta- (1969) by Satyen Sen is a story of revolt in ancient Bengal; Chand Bene (1984) by Selina Hossain (b. 1947) is the story of a legendary character of the bygone days known for his courage to face odds; lVrl Rang Ralcta (1969) is based on thd Blue mutiny in Bengal in the nineteenth century; Alberuni (1969) is the life story of the famous scholar. All these bring out the struggle for justice that man has waged in diffdrent periods of time-a struggle which is most relevant ln the contemporary situation. Anrother instance is provided by Kritadaser Hasi (1962) by Showkat Osman. It appeared at a titne when we were reeling under the lirst martial law adminfistration in Pakistan. The message of the novel is loud and clear: you can buy a slave, bui you can't buy his laughter; and his struggle to free himself from chains goes on, hoWever mighty you may be.

Many of the characters in our novels conslder education

as a mleans of improving one's lot. There is, however, a great

deal o[ debate over the merits and demerits of madrasa education and general education, on the one hand, and that of female education, on the other. In Inl SaIu, Majid prevents

Soctal Justice and. Human Rights: Bangladesh

381

Akkas from founding a school and makes others contribute to establish a mosque instead. It is clearly perceived that ed"ucatlon cannot be easily and equally available to all in vierv of the discrimination between the urban and rural areas, between men.and women and between people with means and those without.

A combination of factors, of which educafion is

one,

Thus the countryside is gradually replaced in our later novels by the city which shapes out as the real centre of
power. Several novels by Syed Shamsul Huq (b. 1935) deal with this change and, more particularly, with the life in the city which liberates people tn mzrny ways, binds them in rnany other ways, but which continues to be unequal. Ttre liberation of Bangladesh makes the city even more powerful and different.

makes people leave their village for the city with phrase from Hasan Azizul Huq (b. 1939) , one of our foremost writers of fiction), 'tears in one eye and avidity in the other'.

(to borrow a

Yet Bangladesh is predominanfly a rural land. Hasant Abul Hai b. f939) notes in his novels, ?imi (1981) and Malrapurus (19S2), that the power-structure in the countryside has not undergone any siinificant change'
despite the country's liberation. Landholders secure elective offices-the chairmanship of the Union Council, for instance, and also the blessings of government officials. Shahed, a teacher in a rural college, who is the central character ln Tuni, realizes that the villages are not as idyllic as ttrey are portrayed in literature, and life becomes quite difflcult wittr bad roads and dilapidated culverts, mosquitoes and snakes,

wild plants and bushes, and frequent natural calamities. And then he discovers that much of human misery comes from fellow human beings, if one can call them that. His attempts to change the system end in his violent death'
During one of his visits to the city, Shahed is taken by a frtend, Asif, to Rebecca's posh house. On the way he had to

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Perspectiues on South Asra

pass by a couple of boys-a shoeblack and anoiher who picks edibles from a dustbin (this was 1974). Rebecca's husband, Afzal, is engaged in the export-import business, and Asif suspects, in smuggling as well, which he does not mlnd because Afzal makes contributions to his party fund. Afzal is currenfly on a visit to penang, Hongkong and Singapore, where he was rathel unwilling to take along his wife, who understands that her presence will interfere with his pleasure. She is, however, not unhappy, because she has got other means of enjo5rment. She shudders to think of the countryside where she was compelled to take refuge duriqg the liberation war. Recollecting the condition of the toilets there, she exclaims that, it was better to have been raped by the invading army. Rebecca and Afzal represenr a new aet of people in Bangladesh who are closer to the corridors of power. Shahed's death-and other acts of violence in the two novel$-reflect the state of human rights, but these are
nelther lsolated nor novel incidents. Communal disturbances. figfrts over occupafion of property, clashes among political workers and such other happenings have been noted by the authors. The worst comes when the state or its agencies indutge in acts of violence. The rnost notable one was the shootlng of people demanding the status of a state language for Bengali on 2l February f 952. It has left an indelible mark on our literature-the first ergample being tle antholosr, Ek:.ls,he Februnrg (1953), edited by Hasan Hafizur Rahman (1932-83), Arek Falgutt (1969), a novel on the subJect by Zahir Raihan (1935-71), ends with t}le promise: .we shall return next February, twice in number'. And they have. Many times in the following years. One of the best novels of the klnd is Chilekotltar Sepai (l9BZ) by Akhtaruzzaman Elias (1943-97), a chronicle of the mass upsurge of 1969 when the police and the army cut down many lives. The hero, Osman, an alienated young man, is confronted with so many deaths around him that he feels the compulsion of

Social Justice and Humatt Rights: Bangladesh

383

coming out of his shell, in violation of the curfew order. And the huge llterature produced in Bangladesh on the war of llberation portrays the deplorable violation of human rights all over the country.
The coercion of the state machinery, resultng in violation of human rights, has not, however, ended with the liberatlon of the country. To this has been added the phenomenon of

Jatwa-Jtdgement handed down by the self-proclaimed custodians of public morality and religious principleswhich has been directed mostly at women. We shall learn more about that later. Our literature has reflected the situation obtaining at home over times. The writers have joined the people who can claim, in the words of Shamsur Rahman h. 1927), the Ieading poet of Bangladesh:
This cataclysm has not put me to flight,
On my own plot of land, defiant
I've stood my ground, and this is

My kind of pride. (Translated bg ZiUur Rahman Siddrqufl

Human Rights and the

Rule of Law
B.G;Verghese

Human rights, though inherent in life itself, have galned ascendanry and a declaratory unlversality only as a byproduct of modern democracy. hor to that the state or rulerwas all, wlth the divine right of kings marking one end of the spectrum and slavery the .other. There were state rights; but individual rlghts quite often scarcely mattered. The French and American revolutions each proclalmed a Bill of Rights. Jefferson was to say, "The God that gave us life, gave us Liberty at the same time" while Paris resounded to the cry of"Liberty, Equality, Fraternity"
T?re

notion of collecflve rights progressed from the clan

and tribe to the nascent nation-state. Nationalism remained the cement of nation-building w.ith human rights seen as a gift by a benign state to its citizens. The United States is

somewhat unique, but elsewhere in the West, liberal dernocrary as it ls known today did not spdng full-blown. It emerged incrementally by slow, painful stages, through struggle and a long proces$ of economic, soclal and

Human Rights and" the Rule

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385

educatonal change. This in turn w-as set in motion by the Industrial Revolution and the Renaissance and Reformation that preceded it.
The influence of the church and the occult were not easily overthrown. Feudal privilege and resignation to fate shaped custom and tradidon which remain strong in South Asia's sflll modernising societies. However, change is discernible and n'ill not be denied.

Democratisation

in South Asia has ushered in

representative government with a guarantee of fundamental rights. The Indian Constitution has a fundamental rights chapter which elaborates on the promise made in the Preamble to secure to all citizens Justice. social. economic and political; Liberty of thought, expression, belief, faith and worship; Equality of status and opportunitf (and) Fraternity, assuring the dignity of the lndividual and the unity and integrity of the Nation. These rights and freedoms are, however, subject to "reasonable restrictions" in the interest of "the sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign states, public order, decency or moralit5r, or in rela on to contempt of court, defamation or incitement to an offence". The test of reasonableness precludes arbitrary restraints which have been successfully challenged in court. Judicial actiyism, as some Would have it, or creative rulings by the Supreme Court over the years have widened the ambit of civil liberties. Prime arnong these is a judgement that renders the basic (democratic) structure of the Constitution unamendable. The right to life has been interpreted to mean not mere animal existence but a guarantee to life with dignity. The fact of life is therefore not to be divorced from the quality of life.

This seminal ruling has had the effect of making the hitherto unenforceable social and economic charter spelt out in the Directive Principles of State Policv somewhat akin

386

Perspectiues on Soulh Asia

to fundamental rights. More than just the constitutional provisions relating to education, health, nutrition,
emplo]rynent and an adequate livelihood, the "life v/ith dignity" test encompasses all these and more in an emerging right to the fullness of life. In extension of this principle, the Courts

in favour of caring and compassionate rehabilitation of persons displaced by development

have ruled

programmes that entail land acquisition or submergence, protection of the environment, consumer rights and a multitude of other concerns.

This is in keeping with international trends and the

steady stream of new covenant$ and instruments that have laid down standards for or codified best practice in relation to the right to development, education and health; housing; gender rights; the rights of the child; safeguards against the dumping of toxic wastes and so forth. India was a siFatory to the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights at their very inception and of ttre subsequent international Covenants on Civil and Political Rights and Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. What has gone unnoticed, however, is that some of these covenants and instruments have for long not been incorporated into dornestic law, thereby precluding their enforcement. In otler instances they prescribe higher standards than stipulated under national law.
The Jurisprudential enlargement of rights has disturbed con$ervatives but has otherwise been welcomed as a significant step towards empowering the disadvantaged and underprivileged. The social gap is certainly narrowing. Nevdrtheless, India has not subscribed to the Optional Protocol to the Convention on Civil and Political Rights which would enable any citizen to approach the appropriate UN forum for relief. Doing this may seem a somewhat radical departure in a yet nascent democracy. There is, however, less reason for not ratiliring the Convention on Torture to which India is clearlv committed but which

HumanRights ottdthe

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387

certain chief ministers are reluctant to accept. Awarenessbuilding and public opinion must be summoned to overcome these barriers. A major innovaUon that has translated the enlargement of rights from an aspiration to a realif is public interest litigation. The poor lack both awareness and the means to seek Justice through esoteric; dilatory and expensive legal processes. Each complainant was on his own and none other could intervene on his behalf without proving Locus standi or being disregarded as a busybody. This changed with Courts deciding to take cognisance of third party pefitions, a scrawled complaint on a post card, or even a newspaper report. The citizen's duty to uphold the Constitution was accepted as locus standi in the public interest. Having assumed jdrisdiction, the Court issues notice to the respondents or appoints independent commlssioners to discover and present the facts of the matter in order to avoid frivolous acfions. Each adjudication is thereafter deemed to be a class action applicable to all those falling within the same broad category.
This revolutionar5r change is buttressed by a strengthened constitutional provision providing for free legal aid to indigent parfies to ensure that opportunities for securing justice are not denied to any citizen try reason of economic or other disabilities. Poverty and illiteracy are polluters of human rights as much as of the environment. Hence, even as entitlements are enlarged and poverty alleviation programmes given greater reach, these rnust be known to be enjoyed. Transparency has therefore increasingly come to be seen as the enemy of corruption, privilege and exploitation and a prime means of disseminating relevant knowledge whether through the state, the media or otherwise. The prevelant information regime, a legacy of the colonial period, is oostulated on the need to know. which inspires the Official

388

Perspectiues on South Asia

Secrets Act. The trend is to rnove away from opacity to an assertion of the right to know, backed by legislation that ordains access to information. A Right to Information Act, with safeguards for privacy, ls now on the national agenda. Freedom of ecpression and the right to information was long seen as a concern of the well-heeled and of little
relevance to the poor. Nothing could be more mistaken. The

Constitution speaks of freedom of speech and expression (Artlcle 19(1)a), subJect to the .reasonable restrictions enumerated in Article l9(2). Freedom of speech and expression, which includes fieedom of the press and of broadcasting, was for long thought, even by media persons who should have known better, to be a somewhat limited newspaper right and something akin to a proprietorial or property right. This old-fashioned concept probably derived from t}le early days of the printing press when security deposits were demanded against scurillous publication.

It was during India's Emergency, when censorship was used as the prime instrument of suppressing all rights and freedoms, that the citizen truly discovered that the media is no more than a professional custodian of the people's right to know. It also came home to him that without freedom of expression, all other freedoms are virtually drained of substance as information and communication constitute ttre basis of all knowledge, actrion and responses. The poor, in particular, found that, more than anything else, the loss of the right to protest (speech, association, movement, justice and access to their chosen representatives) robbed them of leverage to improve their condition. It is they therefore who, valuing freedom, voted massively in 1977 to disapprove of tJre Emergency and oust Indira Gandhi. Thereafter, the citiuen more than the media has been most zealous in defending freedom of expresslon-the right to know and the right to dissent.
.Another instance is the developing movement in favour of

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legislation mandating access to public information. A group of villagers in Rajasthan found that large sums supposedly voted or earmarked in plans and pronouncements for povert5r alleviation did not appear to be reaching them. They accordingly demanded access to the records of public expenditure and to muster rolls at the village and block level. This was stonewalled until one of the claimants to this information was elected a village functionary and inspected the books only to discover t!;rat embez.zlement, fraud and falsification had been the order of the day, witl. monies being pocketed by vested interests for work not done.

The aggregate of what is lost through "leakage" at the bottom adds up to millions, far more than the largest of "scandals" exposed by the press by several orders of
magnitude.

The ambit of press freedom as a facet of freedom of

expression has been steadily enlarged over the years by tJre Courts which have seen this as a seminal right. The Supreme Court has ruled against prior restraint or pre-censorship. It has also followed the American precedent in stating that libel shall not be upheld merely on the ground that an assertion made against an official is untrue. The petitioner must also prove malice and wilful failure to make a reasonable effort to veriff the facts. This shield is intended to prevent what the American Courts have called a 'chilling effect" on the press on the premise that disclosure of malfeasance is in the larger public interest despite the risk ofthe allegation being shown to be unfounded on occasion.

It is noteworthy that, in the discourse on human rights, among the newly decolonised aSrd developing nations after ttre second World War, Indi!, uniquely and deliberately adopted democracy as it saw this as an instrument for making an industrial and social revolution rather than as an end product of such a process. It is important to recall this at a time when affluent nations would impose social

390

Perspectiues on Sotrth Asio.

and political condiflonalities on Third World nations as a means of securing conformity to given standards, ignoring much of their own history.
Though the Human Rights Charter was adopted in 1948
as a marker for the post-World War order, the Cold War soon

intruded. MaCarthyism was matched by extreme tolerance of some rampant dictatorships around the world depending on which side of the line they stood. This continued right into the l98os and lingers on despite the end of the Cold War.
AJI human rights are equal and interdependent and there is no hierarchy among them. Yet, in some sense, social and economic rights are the foundations for the enjoyment and defence of other rights. Hunger, illiteracy, homelessness and disease are so basic to "life udth dignity" that they stmply crnnot be ignored while insisting on what, for those without, must be second order riglrts. It is instructive that tlre marrlfesto on which the Janata Party won the lgZZ post-Emergency election was tiiled "Both Bread and Liberty". The two go hand in hand.

One does not need to take cover behind any exaggerated plea of 'Asian values" that has intruded into certain NorthSouth debates; but nor can this be dismissed as wholly irrelevant. Tradition, custom and family values conflnue to underpin certain human right$ by providing economic and soclal safety nets in a globalising, Iiberalising world. Transitions need to be smoothened; abrupt changing of gears can be destabilising. Democracy as we know it today, and the fundamental rights that go with it, are products of Western political
theOry that accompanied the rise of the nation-state. Territory

mattered as much as people whose collective rights werl repfesented by tlie state. Hence human rights have never been entirely divorced from considerations of national secudty. thls situation actually hardened during the Cold War when the quesfion was not so much where one stood on

Human Rights and t]ue Ruie

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39r

human rights as on whose side you were on' The end of the Cold War and the decline of communism saw a change. The Western agenda moved from states' rigfrts to individual rights. But the emphasis here has been largely on civil and political rights, important though these undoubtedly are, to the relative neglect of social, economic and cultural rig;hts. Human rights, good governance and a variety of social condiflonalities have come to the fore. Yet concepts of nationalism and sovereignty are not obsolete despite globalisauon, the market and the satellite. The process of nation-building remains incomplete over much of the developing world and even elsewhere, especially among plural societies. Ttre demand for self-determination was justified in the colonial era but was clearly limited by the United Nations to colonial territories and was never extended or intended to cover parts of sovereign states' Nevertheless' the substance of the demand for sovereign self-determination can be fully met by genuine power-sharing at all levels' India has certainly been rather innovative in regard to this aspect of political management.
The idea of national integrity'remains strongly rooted and "national rights' tend to be asserted in situauons of terrorism

and armed insurgency. Nonetheless, humanitarian law cannot be disregarded and' where contravened, must be

punished. Insurgency cannot be countered solely by bullets but more importantly by winning the hearts and minds of alienated sections of the population. Human rights violations unless curbed can only aggravate rather than ameliorate the situation. Developing societies face yet another problem' The established order and the vested interests do not necessarily yreld very easily as the power of entrenched feudalism and social conservatism is not to be underestimated. It is therefore necessary to empower the underprivileged' including women'

Perspectiues on South Asia

them to Join together to claim their rights. NGOs can play a catabrtiC role in this task. Here again, the assertion of group rights is often the pathway to realisation of individual rights.

tribal communities, scheduled castes and other victims ol. social and historical neglect and to organise and mobilise

Similarly, collective rights cannot be ignored in stratified and plural societies. Multi-layered groups and minorities struggling for identity and a place in the sun are prone to protect and promote ethnic, linguistic and other group identities along the fault lines. One may not theorise this, but tn many cases it would seem that individual rights are realisable and actually realised largely within a framework of national and group rights. These need not be in conflict with one another. All these rights can co-exist.
India is about the most diverse countr5r in the world and has a tradition of tolerance and accommodation which has enabled it to endure through the millenia as an unbroken civili$ation. Even today, unlike the United States which once professed to be a melting pot, India remains a garden disthguished by the rich variety of its blooms. Its unity is maintained by respect for its diversity. The Constitution safeguards this diversity and has been flexibly used and interpreted to meet changing cireumstances.
These safeguards extend to religious, linguistic and ethnic minodUes, scheduled castes and tribes, other backward classes and, of course, women. Affirmative action in public services and in respect of elective seats in legislatures through reservations has placed these disadvantaged groups on a fast track. While this coruld be justilied and has undoubtedly served a useful purpose, the question now asked is how long this should be continued and how far it is prudent to enlarge preferential lists without their becoming a crutch and doing injury to the principle of merit. The Courts have ruled that reservations forJobs and admissions to edrlcational establishments should not exceed bO per

Hqtman Rights and

tte

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Iaw

393

cent, which ceiling has been more or less reached by extending reservation to the "other backward class" category. Pressures to extend reservations to newer categories are being increasingly resisted and there is a corresponding demand for introducing an exit policy with a cut-off date
after which reseryations should cease.
The spread of education especially the universalisation of

primary education, with further opportunities for skill

building and the growth of employment opportunities, point to the solution. Reservations are a means and not an end. Education enables citizens to grow and compete while an expanding job market must invariably place a premium on merit. This is the direction in which India must move.

The education of the girl-child is crucial for the true emancipation and empowerment of women, happier and healthier homes and the making of a demographic transition. The reservation in 1992 of a third of the seats and elective offtces at all levels of panchayati raj and urban government for women was a revolutionary step in empowering tl.em and promoting gender equity at the base of society and governance. This was fully justified. The current move to extend gender reservation upwards to the state legislatures and Parliament has got embroiled in controversy over reservations (for OBCs and minorities) within that framework. It would be better if girls were put to school instead. If this were done, they would find their own way to Parliament.
Indian and Souttr Asian women undoubtedly face a good deal of discriminadon in law and life. An unfavourable sex ratio and son-preference are obvious examples. Legislation is now being enacted to give women equal title to property and loans with their husbands so that they cannot be turned out of home at will in penury. The public outcry against usurious dowry, bride burning, female foeticide and rape has compelled ttre state to intervene. The heated debate that erupts from time to time on legislating a uniform civil

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Perspectirses on South Asra

granting women equal succession and inheritance rights.

code has unfortunately taken a communal turn whereas in truth it would strike a powerful blow for gender equity by

An opflonal national civil code would constitute a good beginning. Goa, incidentally, has a uniform civil code which was given to it by the Portuquese. This has been stoutly defended by minority groups after merger against attempts to revert to denominational personal codes.
Meanwhile, the National Commission for Women plays a useful watchdog role. Apart ftom its consultative status it has been able to place women's concerns before the nation.

The rights of the child are increasing;ly betng asserted. Prime among these is the right to childhood itself-to a caring home, to health and nutrition, to education, protecdon against strenuous, exploitative and noxious work while of
tender age, and freedom from abuse. Street children, begging and child prosfitution are common. Poverf is a major causative flactor and where the family by itself cannot provide, the state must. Community action is equally necessarj/, as morally and materially abandoned children grow up alienated and criminalised. There has been a raging debate about the constitutionally mandated promise of free and compulsory education for chlldren up to the age of 14 and the evils of child labour. Itis not axiomafio that child labour that keeps children from goirng to school and that were it barred all children would be at school. Children do help at home and in the fields, tending catfle or fetching fuel and water. Others assist their pafents in craft production, acquiring hereditary skills that in turn equip them for life. Craft education is also education of a kind and Gandhiji's concept of basic education sought to use crafts as an instrument of learning and a means of inculcating in the minds of children a sense of the dignity of labour. Both universal schooling and an end to exploitation of child labour are surely necessary and attainable.

Hunrart R@hts and the Rule

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Education, craft learning and literacy are not all the it should be possible to combine these in formal and informal structures. Adult literacy is important as it can be nobody's case that a child who could not go to school
same and should be condemned to lifelong illiteracy. Moreover, a literate parent is more likely to value education and ensure schooling for his or her child.

India has the largest tribal population in ttre world' some 75 million. They have been singled out for constitutional protection and efforts have been made to secure their lands, forest rights, customary law, language and cultural identity. These safeguards have, however, been breached, especially in those areas where there has been an intermingling of tribal and non-tribal populations. The Scheduled Castes and Tribes Commission is charged with the responsibility of oversight and making an annual report to the President' This has so far been a somewhat weak instrument and needs to be rendered more effective.

areas of concentration, been accorded self-determina on through grant of statehood as in Nagaland, Mizoram and Meghalaya or of autonomous councils as in Tripura, tl-e Darjeeling Hills, Jharkhand and elsewhere. Scattered tribes in noncontiguous areas, as in parts of Assam, have also been vested with a degree of access and participation in decisionmaking through tJ'e creation of borderless apex councils. This is in fact no more than an innovative variant of panchayati raj that is intended to give them a due share of power in local dweloPment. Linguistic minoriues have the right to be taught in their mother tongue at the primary level where the numbers so warrant. Numerous backward tribal groups have in their absence been encouraged to evolve, adopt or adapt a script, grammar and lexicon which has enabled them to develop their own literature. Ttris has given them a sense of pride

Tribal and other ethnic minorities have,

in

396

PerspectiDe s

on South Asia.

and identity. The Imphal station ofAll-India Radio broadcasts in some 27 languages, many of them minor languages of the region, as a cultural obligation.

India is strongly committed to the principle of secularism with freedom ofreligion and provides constitufional protec on for its minorities. Secularism implies separafion of church from state and equal respect for all faiths, tJrere being no established state religion. Religious and linguistic minorifies are, however, given the right to establish and administer educational instituflons of their choice. While there has been an unfortunate legacy of communal and caste conflict, which still erupts from time to time, secularism remains the basls of India's vibrant pluralism. Fundamentalist forces have sought to sway opinion one way or the other and extremist elements among them have sought to preach narrow sectarianism. There have been deviaflons from the middle ground but these have been strongly challenged every time.

provided a focal point for looking at matters of concern to the minorities through its deliberations and annual report. Some would argue that the recognition of minorities has resulted in minorityism and appeasement at the cost of the majority. They have urged that the Minorities Commission be abolished and its functions be taken over by the National Human Rights Commission. The purpose of having a separate Minorities Commission is to avoid overloading the Human Rights Commission which, by the same token, could otherwise be vested with the functions of the Commission for Scheduled Castes and Tritres, the Commissioner for Linguisitc Minorities, the National Commission for Women, the Press Councll and perhaps even the Consumer Council. Coordination has been effected tly making the Chairpersons of tJre Minorities, SC & ST, and Women's Commissions ex

A Minorities Commission was established some years ago. This is not exactly a grievance mechanism but has

Human Rights and tte Rule

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oflicio members of the National Human Rights Commission'

Minority communalism is not unknown and can pose problems. Secularists, however, argue that while minority communalism can be countered should it arise, majority communalism is a more potent danger as it could lead to fascism. Who is a minorifl The Hindus are a majority in India but are a recognised minority in Jammu and Kashmir, Punjab, Nagaland and Mizoram where Muslims' Sikhs and Christians respectively constitute the majority. But no majority is a monolithic entity once broken down by gender or age, rural/urban, language, income and professional categories. Thus every majority is made up of constituent minorities and vice versa. A minority, separating out' becomes a new majority only to find other new minorities within it asserting their identity. It requires education to create awareness about this so that the "majority" and "minority" are not seen, antagonistically, as "the other" but merely as "another", like oneself.
While the constitutional ethos is entirely secular, the word secularism did not originally figure in the Constitution except in one Article where it was used in the sense of "worldly". It was only in 1976 that the Constitution was amended to introduce the term "secular" in the Preamble alongside "Fraternity", the word originally used by the Founding Fathers. Fraternity denotes a wider concept of brotherhood and togetherness and avoids any divide' howsoever unintended, between maj ority and minority. Political education and a conscious restoration of the term fraternity would be desirable, coupled with steps to promote the teaching of comparative religion and cultural appreciation
in schools and at the university. Ignorance breeds separatism and conjures up 'threats" which are inimical to rights.

Hindutva, defined as cultural nationalism, may be all right if "Hindu" is understood in its original sense as anyone belonging to Hindustan or the land of the Indus, Sindhudesh.

39E

Perspecttues on South

Asia

But it becomes narrowly exclusive if defined as a religion, religious categories as earlier expounded. But cultural natlonalism too should not lead to cultural chauvinism that excludes little traditions and projects the dominance of a socalled "mainstream" culture, a term often innocen y employed but not without a pejorative connotation when
and an "indigenous" religion at that, as opposed to "foreign"

a new salience with Mandalisation or the extension of reservations to listed Other Backward Classes during the 199Os. Caste preferences or reser-vations were first introduced in tie South early this century. The rise of the Dravida movement in what is norn' Tamil Nadu dates from that period. The practice spread to western India in the 1960s and l97os. In both cases the process was gradual and helped uplift certain classes through affirmative action. However, the sudden extension of reservations to whole classes of OBCs in 198g caused an upheaval, especially in certain northern states where the issue got communalised. Mandalisation, seen as a ploy to divide the Hindus for political gain, was pitted against what was later labelled Hindutva.
Caste has by and large lost its ritual significance and has increasingly become a socio-political category. In an economy

used by zealots. Caste is a broader category tJ.at has acquired

opportunties of those who fear being displaced. Nowhere is this more evident than on the land where feudal privilege is being contested and defended by force and violence, as in Bihar. The underlying trend, however, is an inexorable and accelerating transition from caFte to class, a process that may take another 2O years to complete.
Despite the constitudonal commitment to human rights, some instances, depressing. Reference has been made to women

of strortages rivalries sharpen at the competifive interface where upwardly mobile groups threaten the jobs and

in practice the record is not uniformly good and, in

Human Rights and the RuLe oJ I'aw

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and children. The poor are obviously most disadvantaged as they lack the social and economic base to assert their civil and political rights. The wider concern, however, comes from problems of governance. The failure of development to keep pace with population growth a;rd urbanisation has led to civic breakdown. There is shortage and unemployment. Corruption has caused vast leakages in the delivery of entitlements and services. The crimina-l justice system has been under severe strain, with huge arrears to boot, resulting in the criminalisation of society and politics, the politicisation of crime and electoral malpractice. The policing system leaves much to be desired. A gulf separates the police from the people and law and order is under pressure. Prison reform is long overdue, with undertrials overcrowding jails and often serving sentences far in excess of the maximum penalty to which they would be subject were they found guilty.

These and many other ills of governance need to be monitored and corrected and it is for this purpose that the National Human Rights Commission was set up under the Protection of Human Rights Act 1993. The Commission has a wide remit to draw attention to whatever "inhibits the enjol'rnent of human rights". It is headed by a former Chief Justice of India and ottrer men and women of eminence and experience who are by their charter able to act totally independently. While the Commission generally draws on the resources of the State Governments it also has a DirectorGeneral of Investigation who can act independently.
There has been criticism of the fact that the Commission lacks jurisdiction over the armed forces and para-military forces. It can only seek reports relating to these agencies from the Union Government and make recommendations thereon. This is a legitimate limitation as it would be inadvisable to by-pass the disciplinary processes of the uniformed fighting forces as opposed to the civil police.

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Perspectiues on South Asia

However, the power to call for information vested in the Cqmmission is not a hollow pnocedure but can be salutary. It fs doubtful if any other democratic nation permits even thls degree of external intru$ion in its armed forces. The fact of the matter is that the security forces and the NHRC have established a good working rapport. This has heightened awareness of human rights among the armed forces and their external monitoring as an ongoing process.

that it has had a positive influence in making all limbs of government and public policy organs conscious of tieir constitufional, legal and moral responsibility tc uphold human rights. The Commission has set up a review cornmittee and in the light of its own experience has also proposed several amendment$ to its statute to enhance its effectiveness. These merit eatnest consideration and such legislation as may be required. Five State Human Rights Commissions have been set up and four more are on the anvil. The process of setting up designated human rights courts to provide accelerated attention to and disposal of human rights cases is also under way.

A reading of successive reponts of the NHRC would suggest

to speed and improve the processes of development and

These measures are laudable. But the more basic task is

governance so that a rash of htrman rights violations do not occur in the first instance.

human rights abuses that take place in situations of

terrorism, militancy, insurgency and ethnic cleansing such as in Jammu and Kashmir. The state made special arrangements to ensure newsprint supplies to the srinagar press and continued giving it official advertisements that kept it going despite the fact that most editors functioned with an array of militant guns pointing at them and were or had to be virulently anti-establishment. Many newspapers had tlreir presses bombed and vans and equipment damaged

One issue that has agitated sensitive minds is the kind of

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or burnt and papers "banned". They suffered intimidation and threats in a variet5r of ways unless ttrey conformed to the dictates of coercive power. They had little option but to obey. The same happened in Punjab where newsmen faced dire threats to themselves and their families if they failed to reproduce a stream of press notes, announcements, calls for hartal and so forth by rival terrorist groups. A free press was manipulated by the gun to undermine the democratic state. Tolerance levels had to be stretched to the utmost to

uphold freedom of the press even in these hostile

circumstances.

If the state cannot abdicate its responsibility, neither can law and order be maintained or hearts and minds be won by repressive excesses. These can only further alienate and seemin$y justiff the actions of those who take the law into their own hands.
Ttrere has again been criticism of "black laws" such as the Disturbed Areas Act under which the Armed Forces Special Powers Act can be invoked for search, seizure, arrest and even {Iring to overpower militant elements. Under the latter enactment, members of the armed forces do not have to be

accompanied by magistrates and are empowered to open {ire at the command of designated officers even to the extent of causing death. The charge that this vests the armed forces with the right to kill with impunity is quite unfounded. An environment of terrorism and insurgency is not one in

which normal processes can or do easily operate.

Nevertheless, no uniformed force is authorised to commit any kind of wanton brutality. Even under the Armed Forces Special Powers Act, offenders face disciplinary action for any excesses.
The Commission is e\amining whether certain provisions of these two Acts cannot be modified and made less sweeping.

Nonetheless, as of 3l March, 1997, 259 cases had been registered against members of the Border Security Force,

402

Perspectil:.es on South

Asia

including 12 offtcers. In the case of the Army, proven human rights violations have led to 8l personnel being punished, including 29 officefs. There is no question of
wro[rgdoers acung with impunity.

Ia.rger issues arise. How does the State deal with those who would use the instruments and processes of democracy to destroy democracy. Leading international human rights organisaflons were for a time misled into decontextualising the situation in Punjab and Jammu and Kashmir and unillaterally cri cising the armed forces on the false premise that terrorists and armed militant groups are beyond the pale and therefore need not be held accountable for human rigtrts violations. Such exculpation in a perverted sense amounts to gloriSring criminals. Likewise, sections of the media cultivating militant souroes are sometimes, howsoever

inadvertenfly, responsible for giving currency to highly coloured versions of events. Such "news", photo opportunities and sound-bytes do litfle service to human rig;hts and ulflmrately prolong the tragedy of innocent suffering. The free press and human rights organisations need to ensure that they are not used by armed thugs who, in Margaret Thatcher's words, seek the "oxygen of publicity". For the armed marauder who subverts tJle ballot by the bullet, gross allegations of human rights violations are a means ofbuttressing his cause and vdnning popular support by painting the state as an abomination. So while the state loses hearts and minds through human rights excesses, the terrorist seeks to portray all that the State does to maintain peace and order as violative of human rights through exalgieration and even fabrication. This must be guarded
agatnst. Ttre problem is not limited to acts or threats of violence alone but extends to preaching and promoting extremism, hatred or fundamentaltsm. Cehsorship ,is not the answer and the Indian authorities have not been well advised to

HumatrRights andthe RuIe oJlnw

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prevent the distribution of books, sometimes by banning their import, or ban theatrical performances. The answer to a bad idea is to persuade people throu$h discussion and education that there are better options.

with the envfonment. Survival economics is most often the hallmark of poverty which is of necessity an enemy of the environment. The pressure of population and development itself burdens the environment. Yet much activity that is polluting or far from sustalnable stems from ignorance, lack of awareness or from greed and arrogance. This needs correction. Environmental impacts are most often long telm' even inter-generational, and can be global like the
consequences of greenhouse gases.
bew-qLre of doomsday prophecies. Nostalgia for the past should not erode confidence in t)le future. Small may be beautiful but big is not necessarily

Another real problem and dilemma that confronts developing sociedes such as those in South Asia is dealing

At the same time, one must

bad. Some would want to preserve tribal communi es as they are. Surely they must be allowed to choose and helped to escape the extreme privation that many face even while preserving and promoting that which is valuable and worthwhile in their way of life. Ninety per cent of India s minerals and the headwaters of many of its rivers are in what are tribal homelands. This does not mean that industrialisation or water resource development can or should stop. But lt does suggest the need for new and equitable partnerships and trade-offs that prevent injury to the affected peoples whose rights are not expendable' But others have rights toG*to drinking water, food security through irrigauon' emplo5rment through development and a better quality of life. Fresenttng some of these issues as absolutes has generated avoidable controversy and led to ecofundamentallsm that has not served the environmentalist cause. Development with equity is needed to generate sustainable employment and incomes.

404

Perspecttues on South Asra

subject to a fast evolving envirronmental jurisprudence. The envlronmental issue is going to sharpen with populaUon growth and increasing pollution in the earlier stages of development. Waste disposal is becoming a global problem and the richer naflons can no l,onger get away rv.ith dumping toxic wastes in or around developing nations. One of the most sensitive development issues has been displacement of populations whose lands are aquired or submerged or somehow transformed by development. It is now established that their resettlement and rehabilitation must leave them as well even if not better off at the end of the day. Differentials in rehabilitation over time and space have bred discontent as people compare their lot with others. A national rehabilitation policy for India has now been prepared after a great deal of discussion and consultation and should provtde a minimum threshold in terms of standards and best practice.
The picture of human rights in other parts of South Asia is not very different from that in India though this country has been spared the misfortune of military ruli. The countries of the region share much in common including a not too dissimilar administrafive and legal structure. India has had a iong democratic tradition that has stood it in good stead in prorrofing human rigfrts. The entire nineteenth cenrury soci,al reform movement and the independence struggle under Mahatma Gandhi were closely linked to the advancement of human rights. This institutional base gatiered strength after 1942.

of rights that are being asserted and codifled and being

Envlronmental rights are illustrative of a whole new class

The human rights movement in India has grown and a large number of organisations are active in a variety of fields througfiout the country. They have begun to network and have been successful in focussing attention on a whole range of issues and have won some notable victories.

HumanRights andtte

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The democratisation of governance in the rest of South Asia has given a fillip to the growth of a human rights movement in the region. The Pakistan Human Fights Commission, a non-government organisation, is a shining example of dedication and courage in the face of many odds. It has illuminated many dark areas, created awareness, mobilised public opinion, used the courts and compelled the authorities to initiate ameliorative action.
Similar groups and movements are evident in Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Nepal and all of these have now begun to forge wider links. The Asian Human Rights Commission, based in Hongkong, has on the occasion of the Soth anniversary of the Human Rights Charter, drafted an Asian Human Rights Chader, a peoples' charter aimed at creating a popular culture of human rights in Asia and countering the notion that human rights are alien to Asian values' A number of leading personalities and human rights groups from South Asia participated in drafting it.
A mere listing of the contents of the Asian Human Rights Charter indicates its sweep. The universality of rights and

the duty to protect them is emphasised in sections on the right to life, peace, democracy, cultural identity, freedom of conscience, development and social justice, conditioned only by sustainable development and protection of the environment, and the rights of vulnerable groups such as women, children, differently abled persons, workers, students, and prisoners and political detainees" There are further sections on the enforcement ofrights, strengthening
the framework for rights and a machinery for the entbrcement

of rights.

The struggle for human rights is never-ending. South Asia is well on its way towards securing a better life for all its people. With a steady redefinition of the role of the state in a globalising world and the rise of civil society, emphasis is shifting from government to governance. The people are

Perspectiaes on South Asia

asserting their sovereignty. In so doing they must remember that rights are not absolute and are bound by the rights of others. Hence rights go with dufles or civil responsibility.

GandhiJi well said that rights flow from duties well performed. That too must be remembered.

Strengthening D emocracY in South Asia: The Role of Human Rights and Rule of Law
BeenaSarwar

A rickshawalla in Lahore once told me, 'It doesn't matter who we vote for. If we vote for Benazir, she is removed from office, and if we vote for Nawaz, he is removed from office' And in any case, our lot doesn't change." He was referring to the recent removal in Paldstan of two elected governments within three years after over a decade of martial 1aw, witl: elections for the third about to take place. But his comment holds tme for all South Asiart countries, whether or not elected governments are allowed to take power and fulfill their tenures. The lot of the poor

remains the same, not only in terms of being disadvantaged in material aspects like food and shelter which are basic human rights, but also ln being denied other basic rights like education and emplol'rnent opportunities' It means not having the protec on of law' being treated as lesser human beings by government officials' law enforcement agencies'

408

Perspectiues on South Asrla

and generally by anyone who is materially and socially

better off. Despite the elected governrnents currenfly installed in Souttr Asian countries, the democratic system itas not struck roots. The benefits of democracy, most important of which are equality of treatment and equality of opportunity, are not availatle to tJle majority. Even the electoral system has lost credibilit5r. In pahlstan, the separate electorate system denies religious minorities their share in governance; and in marry areas, women are not allowed to exercise their riSht to vote. Voting patterns sUll reflect biradari or comm-unity allegiances rather than political issues.
The theory of democratic governance is derived from the concept of equality of human beings, and democracy cannot be strengthened without guaranteeing basic human rights that are protected through rule of law which means the availability and protection of law to all citizens, where laws conform to contemporary sensibility and are equitable and applied equally to all, regardless of race, religion, class, or gender. But in South Asia, the rule of law is selectively applied, and works in favour of the rich and the powerful, the politically influential and well_connected. Indeed, most South Asians live in poverty and are denied other rights like education, food, shelter, and equal opportunities. Health serv.ices are poor, inadequate, and not available to everyone. The status of women is undefmined by deep_rooted gender biases. Child labour and child marriages are common as are domestic violence and preferen". io. Women are "o.r". murd,ered by in-laws for bringing inadequate dowries. Wtrile female infanticide may not be as common as it was before, foetu$es are regularly aborted if they are found to be female. The right to choose spouse is also denied to most peoDle__in extreme cases, those wanung lo marry agajnst their family.s wishes are killed or forcibly married off elsewhere.

Add to these, uncontrolled urbanization with its

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accompanying problems and massive unemployment, and

we have a situation where concepts like democracy, human rights, and rule of law seem like not a very funny joke. For

those more concerned with where their next meal is coming from, and whether they'll have a roof over their heads the next day, it's not even a joke, it simply doesn't exist as a concept.
In South Asia, constitutional guarantees are often deffcient

with many "saving graces" that make laws inefficient, or easily exploitable to the advantage of those in power. They
are, for example, qualified by phrases like "in the interest of morality", or "in the interest of public order", which can be interpreted in any one of several ways. In cases tiat are "injurious to the sentiments of Muslims"-what injures one Muslim's sentiments may have absolutely no interpretation, and sometimes it is just luck that pulls you out of a potentially deadly situation.

In addition, South Asian countries have special laws like

tl-e Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act (TADA) and the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act in India, or the

Suppression of Terrorist Activities Act in Pakistan, or the Maintenance of Public Order (MPO) which provide special powers to the administration or law enforcement agencies on mere suspicion. Other defects in our legal systems include the inordinate delays with which cases are settled and the immense expenses involved in litigation which ordinarlr citizens cannot afford. Human rights violations often go unredressed because High Couts are located in large cities, often far away from the areas where violations occur. Legislation is also sometimes circumvented by the executive. This has happened, for example, in Pakistan with the Special Tribunals which themselves are contrary to the rule of law, or with politically motivated judicial appointments. Such steps erode the rule of law, and undermine confidence in the iudiciarv.

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Perspectiues on South Asia

This is a factor in ttre growing lawlessness in our countries where increasing numbers of people are taking the law into argument that the law is ineffecflve or unjust.
The tegal system in South Asian countries owes much to

our common colonial heritage. Many of the laws in our

statute books are the same as when they were originally enacted by the British to perpetuate their colonial rule. Since their purpose was mainrtenance of public order and containing protest against the government ratJrer ttranJusflce or good governance, many of them deal with freedom of expression.
One such example is the Dramatic Performance Act of 1857, enacted after a play staged in Calcutta which led to people coming out lnto the streets in protest against the colonial. masters. The Act, a sort of censor code for theatre, is generally disregarded. But its very existence means it can

be implemented by authoritarian and repressive

governments, for example, during military rule in Paliistan, and under the Emergency irnposed by Indira Gandhi in India. The Act includes vague clauses relating to the incitement of hatred, creation of law and order situations, and allows the district administration to v/ithhold permission for staging a producton, even shutting down the performance at any time. The Act is an exatnple of how laws can be used to suppress protest. In contrdst, despite strict censorship laws in Pakistan, our {ilms are full of mindless violence and vulgarity. What is censored is meaningful theatre that questions the status quo. According to the Police Act of 186l , the sight of policemen is supposed to instil a sense of fear rather than security in the populace. The purpose was to preserve the status quo rather than provide justice. And since prosecu on rests with the police, there is no independent prosecution. Similarly, the civil service was instituted less to serve and more to oppress. The collapse of the system after Partition

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made things worse.

Laws used as an excuse to suppress people cannot be considered equitable, and their enforcement cannot be condoned, simply because they are the law. There are many unequal and inequitable laws in South Asia, some stemming from our colonial past, enacted to perpetuate colonial rule. They may have been seen as unjust even then, but today' changing times and norms have rendered them completely archaic. A hundred years ago, the world placed no moral obligation on tJle British or other colonial rulers to look after the interests of those that they governed. The values and standards of contemporary times are different-or, at least, they should be.

As Devendra Raj Panday pointed out in South Asia Dialogue 1991, "Human rights and democracy or simply 'good governance' have become a part of the 'new ideologr' toward which the West wishes to push the South, including South Asia. For countries that suffered authoritarian regimes for a long time, this attitudinal turn of the West would have been more welcome if it had manifested earlier. Even now, there is no reason to quarrel with this development." (p.378).
Since the late 1980s, with the end of the Cold War, this development has gathered momentum. Unfortunately, most of the governments installed in our countries have fallen into the trap of authoritarianism and centralism, so that the Independence almost 5O years ago still remains elusive. The denial of human rights in many cases has led to the perpetuation of communal and ethnic conflicts in our countries, particularly in cases where people feel that their identity, religion or language is endangered. The rise of communal forces in India and the demolition of the Babri mosque, with the devastating riots that followed, are also a part of this pattern. So are the increasingly militant religious movements in Pakistan and BanAladesh.

promise of freedom and liberty that was made at

4t2

P er s p ectto e s

on S outh Asia

In some cases, the denial of human rights has led to violent separationist movements or other conflict situationsKashmir, Assam, Sindh, Sri Lanka. As Bhabani Sen Gupta noted in his paper on Conflict Resolution in South Asia (in this volume), collective violence movements against the state
have occurred

in

dictatorships. (p. 282).

democracies rather than militarv

Such conflicts divert from the real issues of the people, in economic deprivation and unequal development. The recent uprising in Malakand in northern Paldstan, for example, took place in an area long deprived of basics like healttt, education, and emploS,'rnent opportunities. The Afghan War across the border led to a proliferation of arms and drugs. The region came under the grip of drug barons and warlords, who also obtained special privileges under the exploitative Provincially Administered Tribal Areas (PATA). The Suprerne Court quashed the pAIA regulation as unconstitutional in February this year, leaving an administrative vacuum, and ammunition in the area along with the presence of many tribesmen who had fought in tl.e Afghan war, allowed them to recruit a large armed force under the banner of Sharia (Islamic law).

rooted usually

Armed unrest surfacing in border areas also exacerbates regional tensions, as in the case of Kashmir, Bangladesh, and Sindh. Hostilities increase and militant statements in the press and electronic media blaming other governments for the conflict divert from the fact that the unrest originally stemmed from political neglect. The other hostilities are used to justi$r unMeidy defenoe budgets. Other problems crop up when people are displaced from their homes and forced to live in appalling conditions in refugee camps. Among the casualties in these situations are rule of law, human rights, and democracy. This a_lso happens when people are displaced from their homes because of famine, drought, unemploSrment, or crop failures-all of which can be combated if there is political vision and will.

Human Rights and. Rule oJ Ianu

413

the international community. The methods of

discouragement include accusations of treason, playing into enemy hands, or falling into the trap of the Western lobby. And when human rights activists in other countries want to join hands with activists in the country where violations are taking place, they are warned not to interfere in the internal matters of the country.

Human rights groups are discouraged or prevented from investtgating or commenung on these situauons by their home governments who want to avoid being embarrassed in

But there are signs of change, particularly with the growth of education and in areas where NGOs have been working on community development issues and awareness is increasing. Such work has ensured that there are at least pockets in our countries where people are working to improve ttreir lives, and in the process becoming aware of their rights; for example in Karachi, where the Orangi Pilot Project (OPP) has helped people, through small loans and technical training, to improve their living conditions. Skills training helped to improve the economic conditions, and the level of educaUon increased in the area. Religious or other kinds of extremism, bigotry, and intolerance died down. When a case of blasphemy was instigated against OPP's director Dr. Akhtar Hameed Khan-he was accused of being disrespectful to the Prophet Mohammad, a crime punishable by death in Paldstan-the religious leaders of the area supported him although the clergz all over the country was baying for his
blood.

Commurrity development work improves the human rights situation of the people in terms of better living, housing, eafing, and education. It also raises the self-esteem and awareness levels of basic human rights, making the people involved into more tolerant human beings; and tolerance is a basic component of democracy. Higher awareness levels about human rights leads to greater political participation which can strengthen democracy.

414

Perspectives on South Asra

However, such awareness needs to be supported by the law itself. For this, the flaws irl our legal system need to be addressed, along with laws discriminating against religious minorities, women, children, and other disadvantaged groups, including political opponents. The inadequate implementation of Just laws also has long ranging and adverse repercussions on dernocracy, human rights, and rule of law. It is therefore only too obvious that unless the basic human rights of the people and rule of law are ensured, any talk of democracy will continue to be futile.

Recommendations

Since human rights and the rule of law are basic components of democrary, South Asian countries need to cooperate with each other in developing and fostering these bas[c doctrines, A lot of work is needed at the national and reglonal levels. This includes:

. . .

Bringing constitutions and laws in harmony with the international human rights standards:
Developing an alternative, equitable South Asian system
of Justice

that conforms to international human rigfrts

standards;

Forming locally empowered bodies for the redress of human rights violations at the local level since the edsflng legal system is too costly and distant from the
masses: Lobbying for reductions in defence budgets and reducing tensions between our countries, wittr a view to diverting funds toward development for the benefit of the people;

. .

The formation of a South Asian human rights tribunal or court ofjustice which would envisage human rights

violations as supranational issues wittrout political

considerations:

HumanRights andRde oJIa u:

415

Developing a South Asian model for economic and social development, taking into consideration our common problems, assets (for example, manpower), and indigeneous, traditional methods of living; Demolition of barriers to free travel by ordinary people, free flow of literature and cultural exchanges including theatre, art, and lilm; Awareness raising and sharing solufions about the cornmon nature of our problems, like poverty, illiteracy, the status ofwomen and children, religious intolerance;

Joint strategies and action plans to fight communalism and religious fanaticism;

Economic collaboration including sharing of

technological skills.

South Asian Perspective on Human Rights and Environment

l.A. Rehman

HunanRtghts
The debate on human rights has often been disrupted with the help of shibboleths. Sometimes the modern human rtghts movement is assailed as an attempt by newly civilised socleues to steal the glory of a great religion or an ancient culture and sometjmes as the weapon being used by thinly veiled neo-colonialists to maintaln their hegemony over developing countries. If nothing else the Western advocates of human rights are denounced for their hypocrisy, both in the past and in the present, or human rights priorities are disputed by preferring development and stability to equity and advancing rhetoric about poverty alleviation as a nobler cause than rule of law.

It is humbly submitted that these arguments at the national level betray South Asian intellectuals'and opinionmakers' disinclination to break out of the pseudo-ideological shells within which the states of the reglon have encased themselves. Ttrosd in Pakistan who dismiss human ri{hts

Human Rights and Enuironment

4t7

as inferior concepts in a society guided by Islam, and hence unnecessary or irrelevant, are not faithful to Islam. They are only concerned with the survival of a state structure based

on politicised religion, which not only condemns religious minorities to a disadvantaged status but also keeps the door to power open for a privileged priestly class. In India fears of harm to an ideologised nature of the state and of the consequences of the empowerment of the disadvantaged breed conternpt for human rights. In Sri l,anka insistence on a mythical national unity in the face of manifest diversity Ieads to rejection of human rights. And everywhere tJee movement for human rights is pilloried as a TroJan horse planted by the West.

Attempts to evolve a regional view of human rights are also sought to be stalled by raising the bogey of sovereignty. Although the principle of human rights being indivisible is generally conceded, ex[ra-territorial support to the victims of unlawful acts, oppression and discrimination in any of the regfon's states is considered violation of its sovereign status. That tl.is plea is taken by regimes that accept foreign patrons' diktat in matters ranging from long-term economic plans to power tariff and subsidies denotes a scandalous instance of warped thinking.

It is time that we revised our approach to human rights, took the matter out of controversies born in the period of East-West confrontation, and viewed it in national and
regional perspectives. Human riglrts is not a matter separate from the supposedly more serious issues that we have been trying to tackle, such as problems of democratlsation, interstate conflicts, dangers of militarisation, denial of minority rights, miscarriage of justice, rise of fundamentalist forces, and impoverishment of the under-privileged. It is a matter central to aII these issues. It should not be impossible to realise that acceptance of the basic human rights of all individuals, groups, minorifies (of all definitions) and socially and economically disadvantaged people offers the only firm

4LA

foundations for raising orders based on democracy, justice and equity. Is it necessary to remind ourselves that like many other nations across the seven con nents, we owe our independence neither to religious belief nor culture, it was inspired essentially by the acknowledgement of the inali,enable right of all people to live in freedom and to be gwerned by persons of their choice?
There is thus urgent need for this Dialogue to throw up a consensus that national and regional struggles for human rights constitute a bedrock of all efforts at ameliorating the people's condition in all respects-political, social, economic

and cultural. Instead of taking a rather narrow view of human rights activity, as a means of redressing the wrongs being done to large masses of people, we must adopt it as a positive force capable of realislng our ideals of just and dynamic social orders.

This consensus should be supported by a clear identiftcation of objectives and tasks the group gathered in this Dialogue may itself pursLle or motivate likeminded bodies to do so at both national and regional levels.
At the top of the agenda is the need to redefine the human rlghts commitments of the state, The claim of all our states to having incorporated the provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights irl their constitutions is not wholly valid. The fundamental rights in these documents fall short in many cases of the more recent exposition of human rights. In some areas where concepts and values need to be refurbished, such as the right to life, the right to freedom of expression, and the right to equality before law, some improvemepts have been made by the judiciary, but quite a few rights are still shrouded in mist. National studies on the possibilities of widening the human rights base of the polity, Ieading to comparative analyses and the evolution of a model enforceable in all the South Asian countries. should be quite rewarding.

Human Rights and Eftuirorvrunt

419

Off and on we have been talking about a charter of human rights which could be made binding on all the members of ttle South Asian family. The discussion usually
gets lost in controversies over the desirability or effectiveness

and protocols. We cannot go on protecting our prejudices under endless semantics. If our religions or cultural or political arrogance prevents adherence to international standards, whose authorship and custody we thoughtlessly attribute to alien forces with a dubious past, then let us adopt a charter which not only accommodates our indigenous pride but also guarantees our people's human rights at a higher scale than the international one.

of ratifying/respecting international conventions

Then there is need to use our national experiences of gross violations of human rights for comparative studies and for developing a collective response. As a Pakistani I am ashamed of extra-judicial killings in my country, of the functioning of special courts with built-in contradictions with the minimum requirements of justice, of the blatant denial of basic human rights to the minorities, and of the circumstances that have dehumanised the disadvantaged and pushed them into the abyss of despair. It is no consolation to me that similar things are happening in other countries ofthe region or farther away. And I am sure all the

distinguished members of this Dialogue have better

,credentials and capacity to articulate their own tribulations. Is our commitment to the ideals of the dignity of human beings not strong enough to enable us to do some plain

speaking amongst ourselves, regardless of what our governments say, and devise a plan to jointly study all laws,
regulations, procedures, and customs that permit or condone extra-judicial killings, persecution of minorities, denial of due processes of law, and perpetuation of social and economic bondage?

based on human rights, democracy, and equity is full of

Of course, the task of implementing a South Asian vision

Perspecttues on South Asia.

hazards. The proposal for a South Asian Court of Human Rights is very much on ouf minds. But one should not underestimate the hurdles orrr the way. For one thing, such a forum can only follow the adoption of an agreed set of human rights standards. For another, human rig;hts issues in several countries of the region have been polluted by inter-state disputes/disagreements. Nevertheless, ttre attempt to move towards a sirrrultaneous accord on delinking human riglts issues from infer-state disputes, and setting up a regional court under a South Asian human rights charter is worth making. However, greater reliance should be put on disseminating a belief in the inviolability of human rights of all peoples of South Asia and the interdependence of their destinies.

That these tasks demand approaches to governments, collectively as well as severally, encouragement of nongwernmental organisafions, and initiatives by the present group are obviously a matter of detail. Discussion on these points should follow an agreernent on a broad framework for and the direction of our effort. Envlronment
A perceptive Indian journalist once described the people livlng in our subcontinent as the children of Himalayan

add the winds that bring to all our lands the tidings of rebirth. We have not yet been able to fight over winds and clouds but we have certainly made a hash of our Himalayan inheritance, though unlike human rights, disagreements over resources, which constitute most of what the debate on environment ls about, have often been communalised. Disagreements can still be treated at a sub-ideolopical level. This should facilitate quicker appreciaUon of environmental imperatives at both national and regional pianes.
At present responses in the tegion to environmental issues

rahges from which we receive the life-giving waters. We may

Human Rights and Enuironment

42L

present an uneven scene. In most countries (India, Bangladesh, Nepal, and Sri Lanka) the state is lagging
behind NGO activit5r whereas Pakistan can boast of a Natlonal Conservation Stratesr without adequate backing from either the state apparatus or broad-based NGOs. In aII countries a healthy debate on environment has been dissipated by a barren controversy over West's supposed designs to keep the Third World under-developed or over the choice between development and environment.

This Dialogue should be seriously concerned at the fact that our region is la qging behind in benefiting not only from ttre international advances on environment but also such regional iniuatives as envisaged in the Bamako Convention and Arusha Declaration in Africa, the Arab Declaration on Environment and Development, and the Latin American and Caribbean Declaration. Pakistan may have ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child but it is doubtful if the authorities have even taken note of its provision that education of children should endeavour to inculcate respect for natural environment.
I am sure the participants of the present Dialogue do not need to be informed of the link between environment and human rights, human progress and happiness. This area presents fewer contentious points than human rights, for instance. One may therefore proceed to identi$r some areas where Dialogue initiatives can bear fruit.

All of us have to strive to get the right to a healthy, natural environment, in its broadest sense, recognised in national constitutions. In a July 1992 UN study of national provisions on environment, India is mentioned as the only country in South Asia whose constitufion, thanks to a 1985 amendment, obliges the state to "endeavour to protect and improve the environment and to safeguard the forests and
wildlife of the country" and enjoins every citizen of India "to protect and improve the natural endronment, comprised of

422

Perspect :es on Sou1h Asia

the forests, lakes, rivers, and wildlife, and to have compassion

for living creatures". One could add Sri Lanka to the list. But in Pakistan the call by the non-official Human Rights Commission to include the right to environment in the list
fundamental rights has rem4ined unheeded. The Islamists here do not even care to look at the Iranian Constituflon which forbids "economic activities, and other activities which may pollute tJle environment or destroy it irrevocably".
of

It ls necessar5r not only to secure recogni on of the right environment as a constitutional right but also to comprehend it adequately. The Indian definition, too, is quite narrow as it does not cdver all the natural resources and excludes human habitat and cultural heritage. One may not be as elaborate in the Constitution as Brazil or Algeria but perhaps something can be learnt from Burkina

to

Faso whose Consfltution declares:

':Ihe right to a healthy environment shall be recogFised; the'protection, defence and promotion of the environment shall be a duty for all. Every citizen shall have the right to initiate an action or to join a collective action under the form of a petltion against th6se acts:-harming the public heritage; harming the intetests of social communitles; harming the environment or the cultural or artistic
heritage. "

committees, which are concerned with some

degradaUon.

of the environmental issues under such heads as agriculture, into a keener appreciafion of the consequences of environmental

The evolution of model constitutional provisions suited and acceptable to all countries of the region and attalnmgnt of possible levels of uniformity in national legislations on envlronment should be a fruitful exercise for the Dialogue participants, collectively as well as severally. One should also explore the possibilities of goading the SAARC

Humart Rights and Enuironment

423

Our states have for long been entangled in disputes over sharing of river waters. Perhaps joint regional committees of non-official experts would find hammering out of agpeements less frustrating.
Some other points for consideration are:

1.

Countries of the region could collaborate on evolving common strategies and regulations to regulate the impact of industrialisation on the environment. "Ilte impact of major civil works, such as irrigation/ power dams, on ecologr and people's heritage could be jointly studied.
Management and control ofdisasters caused by natural factors could be examined. The inter-state warning system in flood seasons could be improved.

2. 3. 4.

5. Environmental damage 6.

caused by cross-border jointly tackled. rdgrations could be Countries ofthe region could exchange data on urban pollution, waste-disposal, river-drainage, and deforestation and learn from one another's
achievement and setbacks.

PART 5

WOMBNAND CULTURE

Women in the Contemporary Art World of Bangladesh: Images and Reality

Lala Rukh Selim

The art of this region has a long and wonderful past, As part of the sub-confinent, Bengal shared various trends in art that developed and flourished in the rest oflndia. Regional distinctlon also found expression in the arts of Bengal at different times with the changing socio-political context. As in the rest of the world, the changing socio-economic status of women has found expression in the arts of this land. Women as bearers of life, qrmbols of fertillty, mysterious
and powerfirl beings, have from the very begfnning fascinated, perplexed and overawed men. Worship of the fertility of nature, onwhich humanity depended, dweloped and fertility ltself has been embodled in the form of the pregnanr wofiran, the mother goddess. With the advent of civilisation and changing cultures and values, women have always featured in art as society, and in most cases, patriarchal society has chosen to depict ttrem, The role of women in the'high'arts

428

Perspecthses on South Asra

has always been determined try men while the folk or

popular arts have been relativelj less restricted as they have sometimes been practised by womenfolk themselves and have shown the women's perspective in different cultures. This same pattern weaves the fabric of our ovrn art world. The appearance of Islam in Bengal caused a break with the past traditions. Islam frowned upon tJre ligure in art. Culture became compartmentalised into Muslim and nonMuslim culture. Things became further complicated ivith the arrival of the British, who, flaced very little value in the wealth of art teeming in ttris part of the world. They set up their own art institutes to train people not to be artists but to create a new group of craftsmen who would facilitate their work . Thus, the line arts developed, as in all cultures, from ritualistic, religious or political needs. Witl. the British academic schools that were set up in different parts of the sub-continent, the artist community encountered their higlrly formalised, rigid schooling. These academies were rarely attended by Muslims as Islam is intolerant of art and women dabbling in tiis field was out of question. Thus women have only recently stepped into the arena of fine art. We see no women among the first generation of artists who Iaid the foundation of the modern art movement of Bangladesh. We hear of no women students studying in the Government School of Arts, Calcutta, parallel to Zainul Abedin, Quamrul Hassan, Shaliqddin Ahmed or S.M. Sultan, who were the pioneers of modern Bangladeshi art. With the Partition of Bengal and the birth of Pakistan the issues of national identity and integrit5r became further disjointed. Were we Muslims first or Bengalis first? Which
roots should we recognise and follov/? Religious values were stric y imposed to bind East arrd West Pakistan together where almost no other common boundaries odsted.

The Government Institute of Arts was established in

Dhaka

in

1948 after the Partition of Bengal. Zainul Abedin

Women in

tte Conlemporaty Art

World:

Bangladesh

429

was instrumental behind the founding of the institute. The first batch of female students joined it in 1954. They were Tahera Khanam, Rawshan Ara, Zubaida Akter Khatun, Syeda Moyeena Ahsan and Hasina Ali.r They were not ordinaqr girls fiom ordinary families. They had the courage to stand up to being regarded from under raised eyebrows which must have followed ttrem around in those conservative times. However, they could not go on to become successful artists. We have examples of women getung admitted to leave the course unffnished and some who actually completed the course never to put their training to any creative use. Somehow the bondage of marriage, family, children and art has not proven a good combination, at least for women. Social pressure and the duties and obligations of the family can never be conducive to the concentration. dedication and, above all else, the constant practice that is a must for the creative process to work. The creative process requires tJre harmony of vision, intuition and execution without which true art cannot be created. For men are allowed to earn the bread and remain in the position of a remote outsider from other family duties. Not so for women. Even today the economically independent woman is more harassed than in the past with the effort to synttresize her different worlds of the home, the workplace and at the same tlme tapping her creativit5r for the flow of art.

It is interesting to note that the first woman to leave her mark in the modern art movement of Bangladesh was a
social outsider, Novera Ahmed. Novera Ahmed's appearance scene of Bangladesh was not the culmination of social events which made the appearance of a woman artist inevitable or acceptable. She had no antecedents and left no immediate predecessors. She created a turmoil in her times so that whoever who was in any way connected with cultural matters knew of her presence. Her presence was no common presencet ". . . I Noveral appeared as an apparition, a spectre. On closer view, it was a small, intense woman,

in the art

430

Perspecttues on South Asio-

dressed severely in black, with a bead necklace around her neck and no other ornament, penetrating eyes and a mysterious mien, that reminded one of the priestess of a long forgotten cult, a votaress in a temple."2 These are the words of Abdus Salam, editor of Pokistan Obseruer written in the catalogue printed for the first exhibition of sculptures in this country by Novera in 1960.
Novera was born

in l93O in a culturally inclined family.

She learnt to sing and dance and grew up watching her mottrer

make clay models. This probably dictated the decidedly 'unfeminine' calling she chose in life. As a young woman she was married off to an eligible suitor but she rebelled against
the marriage to go away to her elder sisterwho lived in London ostensibly to study Sociologr. She enrolled in t]le Camberwell School ofArts and Crafts in London to study sculpture under Sir Jacob Epstein and chose to come back to former East

Pakistan after she finished her course. In Dhaka she lived alone, kept no contact with her relatives to protect her independence and commenced her solitary battle to create sculpture in a land where it was totally new territory, and where itwas feared that itwould be considered irreligious and unacceptable. It was she who created the first outdoor sculpture and the first frieze orr the wall of a public edifice which alone should have given her a place as a forerunner in the field of art. In the words of Zainul Abedin in the catalogue of Novera's first exhibition, " In East Pakistan's art world, it was a minor revolution, when Novera Ahmed gave the city the first frieze on the wall of the Central Public Library in 1957 and then the first open air sculpture in 1958. We, the citizens of Dacca. have been living with this lSic.l two magnilicent work [sic.] for lthel past few year's. But I still think, we shall take generations to assess the impact of these two work [Sic.l in our artlife."3Alas, ZainulAbedin's words have been proven prophetic because even after almost for[r years have elapsed, we are still unable to correctly evaluate and acknowledge the historical and aesthetic significzince of these two works and

Women in the

9ontemporary Art World:

Bangladesh

431

the body ofworks that Novera lelt behind in this cilr of Dhaka when she left it forever, disillusioned, rejected and perhaps dishearterred. She had her dreams, the dreams of buildin! a city enlivened with sculptures and other works ofart to create citizens enlightened by them, "We must ignite among our people the spark ofcuriosity, about the innervisions, meanings and truths of life, which can come only by bringing art within the horizon of our city life."4

same time spring from the roots of her own culture, the whole process of coming to terms with her medium must have been considerable for Novera. She was used to working in an institute with all modern facilities of models, materials and technicalities and came to Dhaka to find it barren indeed in these areas. She remoulded her methods of execution and her forms to suit the conclitions and materials that she had at hand and within a very short space of time successfully created her own language.

Apart from tle challenge of establishing sculpture as an art form, creating her own language which would at the

In Dhaka in those days of political f-ervour ancl activism she must also have been part of the surging nationalistic zeal which was born after the Language Movement of \g52. Novera chose to look eastward to her orvn tradition when she struggled to create her Ibrms and images. Thus we find fbrms captured from the tblk dolls of our iegion simplified, exaggerated and activated by her skilful analysis and her presence. Village dwellers were often her source of inspiration. Her work testifies to the struggle to combine her western schooling with the spirit of national identity. Even though she was a very individualistic artist and a very private person with her sculpture created for herself alone. she was not unconscious of her social obligations as a responsible and conscious person. She was deeply involved in the planning of the Shaheed Minar.s

432

Persoectiue s on South Asra

The fascinating part about Novera's work is the image of woman. We see her generation of male artists struggling to combine the voluptuous sensrLrality of European females with a romanucising of women so ptrevalent in our country. Stilted , suggestive scenes of rural women bathing in clinging drapery, at their toilet with comb or mirror, sniffing a bloom, etc. Women were resolutely kept out of the world of activity. Other than this the image of Mcu motherhood, an eastern concept which is the saving grace that gives woman an elevated status in this part of the world, is the prevailing one. In Zainul Abedin's famous famine sketdhes we do see women as a part of the vast sea of suffering humanity devoid of sentimentality

and all other western or eastern feminine attributes.

Occasionally we even gaze into the face of a pensive woman in his paintings because he was a compassionate and feeling person with a concern for people irrespective of sex. Yet the characteristic womarl is definitely not one 'in action'.

himself as the focus, all his women are his. Either his mother, wife or daughter. Derroid of individuality, they are created with the sole idea of pleasing others. These two major artists are mentioned here as examples of the female image in the eyes of male artists to compare with Novera's
female images.
Novera Ahmed's work shows the female in a totally different

Quamrul Hassan is

a completely

different matter, choosing

light from the eyes of men. Her female forms are not seen
through the idealising focus we notice in men' In her groups men and women are seen as units coming together to form a whole, to create a compositional design. What is a distinctive feature in Novera's work is her effort to go beyond the creation of superficial and pleasing forms. She wanted to peel her forms of all excesses to present her vision and her statement in meanlngf,ul, simple and original terms. This is no easy task because one has to rely on the truth of the concept much more than on the skill of the craftsmanship. She was definitely interested in presenting certain ideals

Women in the Contemporary Aft World:

Bangladesh

433

and on occasion, reality. She had the driving force of her convictions and her total concentration on her art alone in her position as the eccentric outsider that gave her the power to relenflessly keep at her work and explore new territory witJl her inner gaze. Wtlen Novera created women in sculpture she stripped the images of all sentimentality to create forms of real women, stubborn, determined, with a frank eroticism such as we see in "The l,ong Wait". Her mothers are not pretty but are strong, bold and struggling' Often they go beyond the realm of mere individual feeling to become symbols of mankind. As Merv)'n Marshall of En$and said of this piece, "The l,ong Wait" is a typical example of Novera's work. In this basic, primitive oufline, one feels the longing and the despair the resignation and resolution of a whole people waiting for deliverance!'G
Unfortunately enough tJle efforts of Novera have till now found very little appreciation in our art world and Zainul Abedin's words echo down througlr the years as the bitter truth. One questions oneself: why was Novera forgotten? Would she havb been allowed to sink from sight as she did if she had been a male? What happened to the'1OO pieces'7 of sculpture that find mention in the 1960 catalogue of her exhibition? Why was she compelled to leave the country while many other artists (and many of lesser merit) found fame and social acclaim?
Novera's crimes were many. For a beginning she was a woman and a beautiful one at that and again she was born in the 1930s. She chose sculpture as her calling and not the better accepted painting. She was delightfully bohemian' unable to conform to any social norms and could not be judged by them. Her eccentricities were not pretensions to attract attention, they were actual demonstrations of her concept of life, how she wanted to be and was. She was not a successful public relations person, she could not market her work wittrout which quality it is almost impossible to be a successful artist. She was honest and she was what she

434

Perspectiues on South Asia

was. What happened was that men were fascinated by her because she was beautiful and extraordinarily uninhibited. As a result when one talks of Novera with her contemporary males they speak at length on Novera as a personality but have very little to say of her work which seimed minor to them in comparison to her persona. Many wish to dismiss her work as the useless exerci$es of a flighty female. I may add that this has gone to ilre advantage ofthose who wished to be recognised as pioneers of areas which were already covered by Novera years agol Thus the Novera phenomenon is resolutely a skeleton in the cupboard, an example of how facts are ffltered through the \r'ision of those in power. Her name is not to be mentioned in the academies that teach art in our country. Some of her ,lOO pieces, stand maimed and broken and have only very recently been collected by the National Museum which orgahised an exhibition of her works in April 1998. This exhibition has to a certain extent underlined the importance of Novera. If she had been a man would we not have eyed her eccentricitie$ with tolerance and indeed glorified them as we do those of all our great men? We can only say that theie is still time for us to look, analyse and record our history with reference to realit5r. With the vanishing act that No,/era performed in the lg6os we unfortunately lost the only woman in the field of art for years to come. Novera's generation of male artists returned home from abroad in the sixties armed with western aesthetic values and relentlessly set to battle often to set their roots in the air rather than the earth and the modern art movement in Bangladesh was underway. Women artists struggled under-water never to quite reach the surface while the image of woma.n found a place in the arts as the object of romance, sentiment or fantasy of men. Only in the 1970s again do we see women as artists emerging as a tangible part of the aft world, holding their own to some degree. This seems to be the actual fruit of social change and a change in the srtatus of women. Such artists as Laila Monsur Nazlee, Masuma Khan, Farida Zarnan\, Naima Haque, Shamim

Women in the Contemporary Art World-:

Bantgladesh 435

Shikder and Sadhana Islam are women who completed their studies in the institutes in the early 1970s and are active as artists to this day. The first group show of women artists was by the "Group of Four" in 1974 which included works of Farida Zaman, Naima Haque, Shamim Shikder and Sadhana Islam. This is a landmark in our art world. These women struggled on and mostly went abroad to further their studies. Farida Zaman was the first ever woman artist to receive recognition from the government by being awarded ttre "Young Artists Award". This change in the position of our women artists was the fruit of our anrvareness as a people which had sharpened from the Language Movement of 1952

to climax in the War of Liberation in 1971. It was t] e

liberation of our beings as a total nation. Men and women struggled equally for freedom and nationalistic fervour overcame the confines of religious or social restrictions. It was a time when tJle nation had dreams and hopes and anything was deemed possible. To believe in the equality of men and women came to be considered as a basic requirement for any progressive being.
From the 1970s onwards women have become increasingly active in the art scenario of Bangladesh. The number of female students in the art institutes is increasing as are the number of teachers. Farida Zaman, Naima Haque, Shamim Shikder, Rowshan Haq Dipa, Nasreen Begum, Rokeya Sultana, Dilara Begum Jolly, Niloofar Chaman and others are well known in the art field as serious practising artists. Our women are receiving acclaim both at home arld abroad. There is a strong participauon of women in any national or international exhibition held in the country and they are active in all the different media. Group shows by women are also a common fare. As in the rest of the world, women artists in Bangladesh are in the limelight now. Women artists do not have to achieve the level of intensity and solitude that Novera Ahmed needed in her time to declare her individuality and freedom of spirit. She does not

436

Perspecttues on Souttt

Asia

have to dress and make-up to look bizarre or shocking to announce and retain her existence and her faith in it as Novera did. Things are easietr, on the whole. With this loosening of boundaries we see certain changes transforming our art world, the emergence of new trends and a diversilication of subject and style. In the wake of the footsteps of our women ttre ferninine perspective and feminine value is added to art. It is no easy task to liberate the female image created by men, all our training, all the books on art and the visual materials that confront us drum it into us. Yet the female image has come out of the stereot54re into more fluid and 'real' forms As they are created by women tltemselves who are inside the spirit of the forms. This is not to say that all the women are engaged in creating art that is socially committed and feministic. There are many women who are pracfising non-representational art. Those who are doing representational art rnay be not dealing specifically with women's issues but since they are women, their experience and attitudes are definitely mirrored in their work and this is totally different from that of men Women here are real beings, not figments of the imaqinafion. There are some women who have consciously used their art to make social statements about the plight of women, statements aqainst religious fundamentalism and repression. On the whole when one is confronted by the work of a group of women artists, one is made quite conscious that women are thinking about themselves and for themselves.

work the image of women predominating mos y a social

To discuss a few examples we see in Laila Mansur Nazlee's

panorama where the claustrophobia of a woman's existence is the focus. Her women are active, flesh and blood persons depicted in different gestures. Rowshan Haq Dipa has at times painted women who are obviously in difficulties and are unhappy. Women hounded or overshadowed by men who look threatening, almost menacing. Dilara Begum Jolly is a frank feminist in her themes. Her paintings and prints show

Women in ttle CorrtefiWora.rA Art World:

BangLadesh

437

herin the role of a social critic. She has satirised and presented violence in society and very often violence against women in her work. Religious fundamentalism was her focus for a long time. For instance her 'Noorjahan' is the expression of her personal agony and her feeling of solidarity with Nooriahan who was a village maiden buried to her waist and stoned by villagers at the instigation of fundamentalists who had accused her of adultery. Noorjahan later committed suicide. Jolly is no romantic and life is no dream in her impassioned creations. Niloofar Chaman's paintings are a world offantasy, a gloomy, acid coloured world peopled by women, men and animals who are immensely cerebral and intensely bored or unhappy. Her men and women are almost indistinguishable and emerge as similar forms. Her fantasies are symbolic depictions of what is often her outrage at what is happening around her. The phallic forms that she uses and her erotic imagery is perhaps an expression of the female point of view. The frank eroticism in her images of humans, animals and plant life shows her individuality and a feminine perspective of sexuality. Rokeya Sultana who has been working on her Madonna series for quite some time shows her Madonna in an urban setting, a woman with her child struggling against several adversities that afflict a working mother. Fareha Zeba's recent exhibition entitled "Homage to Frida Kahlo" presents, through her own painungs, the life and works of this Mexican artistwho, although lesser known in our country, has reached almost legendary status in the west by virtue of her extraordinary life and yet more extraordinary presentation of the feminine perspective and experiences in her paintings. Zeba attempts to incorporate Frida's imagery into her work to portray the bleaker aspects of life as she observes them.

This basking in the glow of another woman artist's

achievements and the $orification of these achievements is an example ofthe changes transfiguring our artistic horizons. Women want to discover their own past, to find predecessors with whom they can relate their lives to.

All in all, one is quite con$cious of the fact that women are victims of social injustice and this comes across qutte strongly in the work of a lot of our women. It is undeniable that the work of our women is as much overshadowed by the identity crisis as is our total art world which is looking for ways to synthesising its cultural and national identity while at the same time being international and individual with the overpowering influence of western art movements gripping the very foundations of its modern art.
Considering the last 3O to 4O years, I can only say tJlat the women have definitely changed the climate of our art world with their presence. The female images that they create are charged with lived experience, strength and depth of feeling and the truth of their very existence enlivens them and gives them verity. yet women are still only on the threshold of all that can be achieved. Just as art is not a discrete and unique phenomenon, separated from society, neither are artists. True genius may transcend all barriers but much strength and goodness may be lost in the process.
ENDNOTES

l.
2.

Syed Azizul Haque, Charubhikhhaye Chhatrider I,ratham Batch", Prqtham AIo (Daily Newspaper), 27 November 199g. Abdus Salam, n Spirit Devoted to Art of Novera Ahmed, Dacca: 1960.
",

Inner Gaze, Sculptures

3, Ibid., Zainul Abedin, ?ostscript". 4. S.M. Ali, 'Inner Gaze", op.cit.. 5. Shamsuzzaman Ktran, Nouera Ahmed Sculp/;.re 6.

by Novera Ahmed, Dhaka: Bangladesh National Museum, l4 April- 13 May, 1998.

Exhibition

Nooera Ahmed, Dacca: lg6o,

Merryn Marshall, 'The Inng Wait',, Inner Gaze Sculptures oJ

S. M, Ali, 'lnner caze", op.ctt..

7,

A Different Voice: Women Writing in Bangladesh

Ronshan

Jalun

Introduction

A quarter-century has passed since the emergence of

Bangladesh as a sovereign country. The war of liberation was a watershed in all the maj or areas of national life' 'Materializing the dreams and promises of 1971" and "upholding the spirit of the war of liberation", still remain the most resonant emotive appeal in the socio-politlcal arena. The promise of the establishment of a secular democratic society based on the principles of economic and social justice, freedom from material want and cultural repression is still to be fulfilled. The last two decades have seen the launching of many orgarized efforts, initiated by concerned citizens for realisation of the vision of preferred future. Some of the efforts focussed on speciflc issues and arenas of social life, some others tried to address the problems in a holistic and integrated manner. A notable feature of such efforts is the active parlicipation ofv/omen in increasing numbers over time.

440

Perspecttue s on Sor,rth Asta

have been demonstrated very clearly in recent years particularly in the riots following the demolition of ttre Babri mosque in Ayodhya and the protracted unrest in the

traglc potentials of the religious-communal and ethnic divides

The growing number and visibility of women are often seen as recent phenomena but women's activism is not new in Bangladesh. That gender along with class and location, determines to a large extent, a person's access to and control over developmental opportunities, social resources and services was a well-known, though seldom acted-upon, fact. Despite constitutional guarantee of equal rights to all citizens, and prwision for special measures for women and other disadvantag;ed sectors, nafional statistics show glaring disparities between the positiorl of male-female, rich-poor and rural-urban population. In addition, the disrupUve and

primarily identified by their gender and, consequently,

Chittagong HiIl tracts. Though as a group,women have been

gender-oppression has been thelr immediate deep concern, they were also aware that men, as well as women are victims of many types of oppression. In recent years, this realization has deepened as femfnist research has brought to attention the linkage between the over-arching structures of oppression operating at various levels and the mechanisms which support them. The efforts, launched by women activists and researchers, to mobilize popular opinion and raise social awareness for social transformation through undermining the oppressive structures have been considerably strengthened by the incisive insights and passionate protests against injustice provided by creative women authors.

and perspectives which characterise recent writings by women: the themes they prefer; the difference in their
world-view, their attitude to the prevalent gender-ideology, literary convenfions and stereotypes; their awareness of the wider context in which they are located; and the quest for

Here I propose to discuss briefly the different dimensions

A Different Voice: Women Writing in Batglndesh

441

idenfity which may or may not inform their work. Of the various literary forms, I would focus on poetry and fiction
only.

As this is intended to be an opening statement on the subject in a regional dialogue, no comprehensive description or analysis is attempted here. As the participants belong to various disciplines, I have tried to limit the use of largon'

l['omen in Bangla Literature: Major Trends in Representation and Participation Legacy of the Past: Conventions and StereotJpes Representation of women in literature and the extent of their participation as writers (active agents) and readers (consumers) are closely related to their situation and position in a given society and culture. Before the colonial rule, social and cultural values sanctioned segregation of the sexes, imposed strict gender division of labour and fostered a systematic bias of male supremacy. Women's biological role, defined in terms of reproduction and social functions associated with reproduction and nurturance was emphasized. As the bearer ofthe seed' and the carrier ofthe line women were held to be sexually vulnerable, needing to be jealously guarded from the lust of strangers. Chastity and modesty in women were valued at a premium and early marriage was perceived as the best strateg/ for providing "symbolic shelter" to young girls.
Several mechanisms and institutions maintained male dominance. The major one was the propagation of the ideologr through sanctions by religious texts. Both Islamic and Hindu traditions maintained clearly that men and women were not only biologically different but that men were superior to women. The other mechanisms and institutions for maintaining male supremacy through domestication of women and strict control over their mobility, sexualitv. and labour were: sex role stereotyping during

Perspecttues on South Asr,a

differential allocation of resources and opportunities. Formal education was perceived to be not relevant for women's role in life which was to provide unpaid labour for the family and to ensure the supply (by bearipg and rearing children) of future unpaid labour. As a cofrsequence of this denial of education access to formal, very few women writers emerped at this time in Bengal.
Poetr5r was tJre

childhood, socialization, gendered division of work, segregation of the sexes in space (private and public) and

auttrors of this period. poetical works, written by (mosily) men, for a largely male audience, described the emotions and deeds of men in love and war. The poets, both Hindu and Muslim, were deeply influenced by the aesthetic theory (Rasa Shasfra) expounded in $anskrit literature. Themes were borrowed directly from tJle Hindu epics, the Ramayana and the Mahabharata, which were translated in Bengali during this period. Even when the themes were not directlv borrowed, the character of the hero and the heroine (rnaal, and nagika) were cast in the mould prescribed by Sanskrit literary conventions.
The two types ofheroines, presented in Sanskrit literature reflected the deep rooted male ambivalence towards women in a patriarchal society. The ancient Hindu ml,th of Slvee (Lakshmi),the great mother goddess and Urvashithe celestial dancer, rising out of tle churning primordial ocean clearly

major literar5r form preferred by the Bengali

sets the antithesis, Lakshmi, tJ e ideal wife, symbol of fulfillment and plenty (female sexuality under male control and within the bounds of marriage) and Urvashi the ideal courtesan, sSrmbol of beaut5r and unrestrained gaiety (female sexuelity beyond male control and outside marriage)_ continued to be projected by Bengali poets even in this century as archet5pes of women.
Their litet'ary incarnations were: (a) Sita, the heroine of the Rlamayana, the ideal Hindu Kulastn (woman of good

A Different Voice: Womenwri@ in Bangladesh

443

family) whose devotion to husband, chastity, modesty and fortitude were extolled through the centuries for girls to emulate: and (b)Vasantasena' the ideal Ganika (courtesan) the heroine of the play Mriccha Katika (the clay cart), the prototype of the 'fallen' girl with the golden heart, also portrayed endlessly by the future authors for young girls to take heed from examPle.

At first glance ttre two types seem to typiff the two poles of a woman's existence when facing a pre set pattern (a) conformity to the norms set by the prevalent genderideology; and (b) rebellion against them. However, it is important to remember that patriarchal society itself recognized the need for the existence and maintenance of both types of women to serve specific male needs. Even the courtesan, for all the apparent freedom of sexual mobility and choice, was subject to a set of rigidly defined social customs. In fact, society seldom allowed women any space outside the confines of these moulds. Literature, the mouthpiece of the patriarchy, like the rest of ttre cultural apparatus, propagated that acceptance was tlle natural dharma of awoman, not rebellion. The heroines, presented by male authors of this period, thus, exhibit very litile conflict within themselves. Even Radha, the celebrated heroine of the Vaishnau a Padabali (lyric poems written by the poets of Vaishnava sect such as Chandi dasa etc.), who dared to love Krishna outside the bonds of marriage, is no social rebel While bitterly complaining about the cruelty of the social norms which separate her from Krishna and the condemnation by her in- laws, she is never seen to raise any serious questions about the validity of such norms nor does she reject them. Similarly, the heroines of the popular M5rmensingh Gitikas (ballads on secular love written by poets belonging to the Mymensingh region), such as Mahua or Molua face crises quite bravely, but submit to the will of their lover/husband unquestioningly. The advent of the colonial British, bearers of an alien

444

Ferspectiues on South Asrc

culture and the sweeping rekrrms in tJ.e political, economic and cultural arena introduced by them caused a crisis of identitj/ in both Hindu and Muslirn Bengalis. Rapid changes in the wider context resulting from macro_processes of modernlzation, urbaniza on, industrialization, lntroduction of technologr, exposure to the literature, culture and ideas of t]re West and other countries, introduction of universal primary education-all these generated considerable social analysis and examination/assessment of the odsting social structures and institutions as well as cultural traditions and customs, regarding both privaie and public life. public discourse, including creative writing, in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, abounded in serious quesuoning of and protest against the unequal power reiation and systematic oppressions stemming from hierarchies based on class, caste, gender, ethnicity, religion, and other socio political divides. Women's unequal situation and position in the farnily and in societ5r appeared as a grave social issue. Alleviation of their situation becarne a priority agenda of social reform especia_lly among the educated Hindus and Brahmos. Relaxation of purdah and access to formal education not only increased wofnen's visibilitv but also gave them the exposure and trainfng to analyze their own unequal and inferior posifion and the mechanisms which conditioned this inequality. They also had ttre opportunity
complementing the representation made by men so long. TWo aspects of the response to the Bengali identity crisis and question of women are noteworthy. Firstly, thoug;h the Hindus responded earlier and the Muslim response came much later, there was a remarkable Eimilarity in the patterns of response and attitude. In borth the communities a prolonged debate ensued between the traditionalist, who urged the communities to cling to traditional values an<1 customs and the modernists, who urged adaptation and reforms to suit the needs of modern times. Ovir ume. the

to articulate their own thoughts and views, thus

A Different Voice : Women Writ@ in

B anglade

stt

445

modernists gained ground. Secondly, though the modernists were in favour of women's participation in formal education' the major motivafion for this education was to keep the traditional notion of 'womanhood' intact and to enable women to perform better as 'appropriate' wives and mothers in a modern household.

Rabindranath Tagore and Kazi Nazrul Islam were imbued with a strong liberal humanism and protested against the oppression unleashed by systems of inequalities based on imperialism, class, caste and gender. Patriotism, made strong by the political repression of the colonial rulers, along with romantic love for the beloved also appeared as dominant themes of many of the songs written by them which inspired the political acilvists. Despite such sensitivi es' it should be noted that both these poets and those who followed them in the later decades, still clung to the time honoured image of the beloved cast in the patriarchal mould. The few women poets, all minor literary figures, were strongly influenced by the dominant dicflon. Fiction in the form of novels and short stories written in prose also appeared in the nineteenth century Bengal. It gained popularity very rapidly' Over time, the major writers have shown an increasing awareness of the conflicts and tensions hherent in gender relations both within and outside marriage. Tagore and Sharatchandra had drawn very sensitive portraits of women in transition' torn between the pressures to conform with the norms imposed by society and rebellion against them. However, they and other contemporary male authors seemed to have accepted the centrality of marriage in a woman's life and motherhood as the major avenue of fulfillment for women. Women authors of the time such as Swarna Kumari Devi, Shailobala, Ghoshjaya and Anurupa Devi were more critical about the double standards of sexuality and social restrictions on women's mobility and choice, though they tended to reflect

The

maj

or poets of the early twentieth century'

446

Perspectiues on

fuuth Asir'

had the heroine of her novel pad maragadeclarethat marriage is not the ultimate goal of a woman,s life. * In !9a7 , British Bengal was divided into two provinces_ East Pakistan and West Bengal belonging to two ditferent states, In the next two decades writers in east pakistan were greatly influenced by their immedtiate socio_political context and responded to that, The repressio.r" of dictatorial " regime, the crisis of democracy, the cultural impositions in the name of national integration, the tensions between the religious and cultural-ethnic idex-rtity_all these informed their writings. But gender stereotjrpes still continued to haunt them. The face of the beloved in poetry and the heroines portrayed by tlre writers of fiction on the whole presented the traditional stereotypes.

the same attitude toward marriage, love and motherhood as crucial to women's self fulfillmerlt. Only Rokeya Sakhawat Hossain, the first and foremost feminisi of Vfuslm Bengal,

Contetnporary poetry and Womsn in Bangladesh Poetry is still the most popular literary form of self_ expression. The major themes are: love, patriofic struggle, protest against social and political repression and economic exploitation, dehumanization of social environment and the alienation of indi'"'iduals. The predominant voice is urban, educated middle class male.
The piiority attached to protest originates from the ,left, orientation of our major poets, most ofwhom are the products of the 'radical' sixties and early seventies, a time of political activism against repressive and non_democratic regimes. Some scholars have pointed that many effective slogans used in the anti-autocracy movement during the lggos came from poems written by such poets as Sikandar Abu Zafar, $hamsur Rahman, Nirmalef,rdu Gun.

Indeed, Iotse for persons (a woman) and the coumry as themes made intensely personal poems accessible to a great

A DifferentVoice: WomenWritig in Bangladesh

447

number of people. The existing socio-political repressive context also elicited instant response. Fusion between the two muses-the beloved and the motherland-further strengthened the appeal to' the
predominantly male readers. The archetypal image shaped by the enduring mlth of the 'good woman', a self-sacrificing, patient, devoted nurturer, is thus presented in new but familiar, idealized and sentimental forms.
Women poets, on the other hand, of necessity rejected the idealized arid sentimental image of the beloved. The poems of Taslima Nasreen, Ruby Rahman and others refute the passive stereotype of women in love. Frank expression of women's sexuality, longing for shared intimacy, absence of guilt and false modesty mark their confessions of love and add a new tone.

to women and gender-stereotype obviously is the most

Taslima Nasreen's satirical attack on patriarchal attitudes

'

notable point of departure in 'protest' poetry. Earlier Bengali poets such as Tagore, Nazrul have written poems protesting against gender -oppression and advocating women's entitlement to human dignity and personhood. But none had demonstrated like Taslima a passionate fury born of a deeply-felt wound. Her rejection of patriarchy and genderdiscriminatory religion is direct and unhesitant. In one of her poems, with ease and well chosen images, she reduces the mighty male of the species to an insect, capable of causing only minor irritation and annoyance but no permanent damage to a woman's self-worth. At the same time her poems resonate with the loneliness of one who has chosen the road less travelled. It is easy to brand Taslima as a man-hater but that would be too simplistic. She detests the stereotypical male chauvinist who has no saving grace and articulates this in a telling manner in her poems.

448

PerspecLiues on South Asra

Contemporary Flctlon and Women in Bangaladesh Themes which recur in current ficuon a_re: changlng way of life and social institutions, namely, the family, the work place, neighbourhood and the wider societ5r; crises in the wider context impinging on the life of individuals and ttreir struggle to cope with such crises. Especially emphasized are: dehumanization of social environments, break-up of family and erosion of loint-famlly values, unemplo5rment, widespread corruption and violence which adversely affect the quality of life in urban areas. Confusion, pessimism and nostalgia for things past (lost Eden) are the dominant mood characterizing present-day fiction. Those written by men, are 'male-centred', focussing on a man,s sense of alienation, lack of communicafion within marriage and family life. Rural people and rural life are often depicted in stereoqpes: ruthless, exploitative rnoney-lenders and rich landholders Ots-a-uis simple, uncomplicgted people with limited aspirations struggling against them. There are exceptions. For instance Hasan Azizul Haq and Akhtar Uzzaman Ilias depict the stark reali\r and multiple complexit5r of rural and urban life.
While some argue that the urban alienation is contrived because many authors still have rural roots one feels that for firany, a distance has set irr and the present reality of urban life supersedes the rernembered rural past which partly contributes to the flat and non-realistic representation ofrural life. Even less reahstic perhaps is the reiresentation of women. The gender stereot5pe lingers on. The two faces of Eve, the benevolent and malevolent aspects of the great Goddess stll persist. A popular motif is the disruption of the conjugal routlne by the presence of another woman or man (the eternal triangle) externalizing the Fggression and hostility,

the growing apart and frequent coming together, still reminiscent of the novels of fffty years ago. The mother is

A DifferentVoice: Womenwriting

i" B:'gl"dtth

449

still idealized and recalled with nostalgia' The bad woman' . .ro.t-"t ing, greedy, selfish and often empty-headed' ^" remains. In many novels, she is a shadow' not worthy wife of a fully develoPed Portrait. by The obverse side of the coin is seen in novels written

many women. The protagonists are women, Iaying bare the layers of their selves. Even the apparent contradictions characterizlng women depicted by male authors as shown manifestations of women's "natural" irrationality' are Uy ttt. women authors to be logical outcomes of the protest circumstances in which women are placed' The values against male oppression and rejection of patriarchal manifest in varlous .id .to.-. within marriage and family women ways in the novels and short stories written by the authors, who had started writing in the fifties and sixties and are still continuing to write' Rabeya Khatun' Razia Khan, Dilara Hashem, Rizia Rahman' Makbula Manzoor projecung and other women have contributed significantly in the image of life and society through women's perspecflve' Youngei authors such as Taslima Nasreen and Nasreen Jahai have been notably bold in their treatment of issues related to gender-roles and relations and women's sexuality' Thus in Taslima's Shodh (Revenge) the hostility and woman extreme desire for revenge drives an oppressed young to seduce a young man and have his child-only to foist the baby on hei husband and his family' The husband who at oar"ii*" compelled the woman to have an abortion because right ofbaseless doubts about paternity and denied her the from ttre real to have a child is ttrus completely tricked control over the wife's fertility and sexualit5r' Perverse perverse overdrive for male control is countered by an equally who has neither a viable female hostility. The housewife option to end her marriage nor any normal and recognized channel for self-assertion, nevertheless, thwarts the male control over her sexuality and fertility, albeit in a pewerse fashion. A grim warning, surely, to male chauvinists'

450

Perspectives on Souijh Asrb

oppression.

are, drawn with great insight. Her strengths and weaknesses-jealousy of her $ood_looking sister who got male attenhon and mother's preference; her ambivalent feeling about motherhood, guilt and longing for the child she had lost; her courage in chroosing noi to-terminate the pregpancy which resulted from her former husband,s taking advantage of her are drawn with fine details. At the end oi the novel we find her divested of illusions, reaching within herself to draw upon the inner reserves of self, getting ready to continue on tlle difhcultJourney of self_fulfillment, through motherhood and a career she has chosen freely. Economic self reliance and a survival network outside the claustrophobic conjugal and natal family are shown as signlficant conditions for a woman,s liberation from

work place, her yearning to resume painting and her refusal to llve in to the entreaties of her husband for remarrlage__

of support by her own blood kin; the haiassment at the

strugg;les of a lower-middle class young woman who divorces her husband when his lack of sensitivity and rouune sexual assaults become unbearable to her. The rejection and lack

Nasreen Jahan's Urukku (Flying, 1993) depicts the

Razakar).

Protest agalnst Potitlcal Repreeslon and Social r4justlce _Yd. authors writing about the language movement of 1952, the popular uprising against the repressive army reginte in 1969, above all the war for liberation in lg7i, generally focus on middle-class .student volunteer freedom fighters and army oflicials. Though the people were the real heroes, their stories are still untold. With a few excepuons, the story line resembles classic Hollywood .Westerns... Drawn in black and white, it is rendered as a fight between the hero (freedom-fighter) and the villain (pakistani army official/

Wornen and rural people are shadowy, stereotSpe, flat. Women are shovrn mostly wringing their hands, waittng to

A Difierent Voice: Women Wrtting in Botqladesh

45L

(rape) ' be rescued by the hero from a fate worse than death In some cases, they are victims of atrocities' waiting to be

rehabilitated and in otfrers, they are the long-suffering Iiances of the freedom Iighters waiUng patiently for ttre return of ttre hero. The mothers and sisters' ministering angels, are also present ln many novels, as inspirational
flgures.

Women writers have Just started to reject this malecentred history by writing 'her story" Selina Hossain's Apn'a Mase Horins Bairi written in 198O (the Plumed Peacock' poor poet 1983) for instance tells the story of Kanupada' a who yearns to establish the dignity of the vernacular at the royj court of medieval Bengal, where Sanskrit' the official language is used' Hls unconventional stand draws tJle anger of the Brahmin minister who imprisons him' TWo women' Shaboree, the beautiful, dependent and devoted wife' whose aim in life is to obey and please Kanu and Dombee' the dancing-girl, who is free, lively and self-reliant' inspire Kanu to sing and closely resemble the classical stereotj4)es of Lakshmi and Urvashi. However the author deviates from the stereotype in startling ways. Dombee kills the minister's nephew who pesters her with unwelcome attentions and bravely faces death. Shaboree, who patiently sheds tears and waits for Kanu's return from prison very untypically the story' like some Joins the mass-uprising at the end of Mitra of the Tebhaga Movement fame' It is medieval IIa interesting to note how the woman author neatly reassigns roles and flouts tJ:e conventions about gender-stereoq4)es in this (thinly veiled) retelling of the story of the 1952 movement for establishment of Bengali as state language by situating it in the medieval setting. No matter which theme is chosen, the novels and short stories written by women authors underscore the basic humanness and personhood of women' They demonstrate the contrived and male- imposed nature of the exaggerated gender-division and reJect the patriarchal notions about the

4s2

Perspectiues on South Asra

and conditions of marrlage, the untenabiliW of social expectafions from women to conform to gender_norms at all costs and the need for new ground rules for gender relations and the basic social insUtutions and structures.
Concluslon In 1905, Rokeya Sakhawat Hossain, the first and foremost femlnist of Muslim Bengal, dreamed of empowering women in her feminist utopian story (Sultana's Dream) by a simple reversal of gender roles, putting men in seclusion and letting women take charge of the public sphere. For the inheritors of Rokeya's dream of wom..r'" .-po*".ment, the task is complex and difficult. While the ,"tirri"t. have to thinl< of strategies for an alternate paradigm of development based on participatory politics, egalitarian distribution of social resources, free expression of pluralistic culture and non*hierarchical gender relations in the family, communltv and state, they would depend heavily on the women writers to cqntinue a counter,discourse for raising social awareness. Reluctance of the dominant male to give up privileges which they have enjoyed unfairly on the g.orr.ra" of gender; increasing hostility from the fundamentalists and reactionary forcos towards the advocates of secularism, pluralism and freedom of expression; continued intrusion of the state to limit the basic rights of individuals are serious cha_llenges. Fortqnately, the recent works of Bangladeshi women wnters indicate their willingness to face such challenges. They have already rejected the restraining images and rnoulcts created by the dominant male and are fashioning their own idiom for self expression, informed by their own innermost feelings,
desires, knowledge and world-view.

'masculine and the feminine'nature. Above all, they advocate very convincingly the obsoleteness of the traditional terms

on Bangaladeshi social consciousness and women's own identitv

of the activists to realize it, has made an impact

The articulation of theirvision, combined with the struggles

A Dilferent Voice : Women

WriW i" By'gld"

and self-image. Intensely personal though the act of creative writing is, it is also an act with a deep social meaning'

Hopefully, women writers would continue to remain with and committed to the ideals of a holistic

"o.r.r""t.i development

of the self and the society to which they belong'

Images of Women in Hindi Cinema: Post- l95os

Shabana Azmi

I begin with a quote from noted film critic Aruna Vasudev. 'It is no coincidence that the first Indian film was a mythological. The moral education of all but the thinnest layer of affluent, Westernised looking Indians is derived from the epics. These stories, despite liberal doses of miracles and fantasy, a_re no fairy tales easily told and forgotten. They still have a living reality and a dominant sav in the conduct of daily life today." Unfortunately for the women of India, the example of Sita in her husband's rejection of her has been held up as the ideal for women to follow. Taken in conjunction with Manu, the lawgiver, the average woman in India has had no opportunities to become anything more than the role to whickr she has been restricted as daughtef, wife and mother. In chapter 9 verse 3 of the Manu Smnh-Manu is quoted as sayirrg'In childhood a female must be subject to her father, in youth to her husband, when her lord is dead to her sons.

as the perfect wife acquiescing unquestioningly

lmages oJ Women tn Hi"g

Ct*

Pt* 1:5O:

455

She must not seek to A woman does not deserve freedom' She must tt"t"elf from her father' husband' sons' her household of ""p.t"i" JiuV" u. "ft.erful, clear in the management economical in her utensils' ;f#., careful in cleaning may give her' or her l*""it,*". Him, to whom her fathershe' shall obey as long tritt er wittt the father's permission' must not insult hls ."-tt. it"" and when he is dead she were condemned for with these few lines women ;;;'. required to a life of eternal subjection' Tradition ;;d;*" it' In fllm after n, Lal"V,ft" cinema enthusiastically upholds reinforced' these values reiterated' underlined' fri* *"

"." middle class To the weight of this tradition is added a between woman morality which makes a sharp distinction mistress and lover' as wife and mother, and woman as views of the Subscribing to the predominantly orthodox the f"rg" ma;otit! of audiences rather than acknowledge to ..uiity of women's growing intluence and contributionthe of society, film makers generally prefer perceptions domination in women which perpetuate male "t"t"J "f such, these portrayals reflect the society not so As "o"t.ty. it is evolving as the way they wish it to remain' muctr as for uncritical Popular cinema creates instant mythologies tttd not histories of credible people ' The heroine "o.r"ri-ptio.t moulds' is cast in two
(o) The all forgiving, self-sacrificing n'ife;

(b) the virtuous upholder of morality' the nurturing mother; or (c) the 'other'woman-vamp, titillating 'siren'; or

{dl courtesan with

a heart of gold'

really Hindi cinema in the l98os and 1990s has not stereot5pes' Like noted p.oJr."".a beyond these cardboard

{ilm-criucMaithiliRaosays,.Thetruearchetypesofpopular

456

Perspectiues on Sotth Asia-

romanticised apostrophe to women as the patiretic impossible innocent 'o rer' to be rescued from the penumbra of social oppfobrium. Every Tawad and her cousin is descended frorf Pakeezah and is a man's reflection of pale, derived poetic_pathos and every mother sternly castinj out her son, Is trvlother Indih's daughter, R&dha, as portrayed by Nargis in Motter Indid. ls a truly iconic archetS4pe in ttre sense that she is simple, strong and stern without re complexity that assails most modern individuals. Mother Indirr,s appeal is not only emouonal and dramatic as tJre nurturing mother who stoically faces wery advensity heaped on her. From tender bride io respected mafuflarch, her whole identity and purpose in life is nurturing her Ohildren. She is conceived as the enforcer of dhannas. The two sons are obviously derlved from the two mythical heroes-Rama and Krishna. The younger Birju is the dark prankster with a penchant for dispensing rough and ready Jusfice. And it is the passionate Birju that the mother loves most. But this conflict between duty and love is not allowed to cloud her Judgement or impede the inevitability of her Mother India's path is sternly and immutably fixed. lction-. Over the years it was easy to make this potent image with all its uncomplicated simplicity and apply it to an urban. contemporary setting as in Di u(a AgrLeepallrand Khahwgqk The mother figure has a prorninent place in the cast of characters of most Hindi films, none of which ever speak of a relationship between mother and daughter. Even with the sons, it is not so much a relationship that is explored or portrAyed as the deification of the mother. Self_sacrificing, maliglred and victimised by fatB or the husband, she is showh as indestructible when it. comes to protec ng her sons. Since the heroine is strait_.f acketed into a chaste wife whose suffering can only make her more virtuous, she can

cinema are only two_First is the Mother India,s matriarch whd is the upholder of dharma and the lru. .moUon"l centre of the hero's life. The second is pakeezah, the

Imoges oJ Women in HirLdi Cinemcc Post- l 95Os

457

never assert her sexuality. No real relationship can develop with a wife who is a potential mother/goddess and must be a pure and sexless creature. With whom then can a man have a satislring relationship, physical and emotional? The courtesan has been a signiftcant flgure in classical Indian literature and until the 197Os, a staple diet of the Hindi

films. Since she is forever excluded from the pale of

domesticity, she can answer his physical needs, later to his fantasies (unlike the wife whose purpose is to procreate). Of course he may not fall in love with her, but inevitably her heart is lost to him. She provides solace, a haven when he recovers from his sorrows-he goes away or she conveniently swallows a diamond and dies. The cultlvated ?au:aif is not merely a pathetic victim of male lust. Around her is a cluster of myths and romantic yearning, of neatly labelling women as the exciting 'other' and the wife as boring in her virtue. She is the melancholic music of romantic poetry, the graceful arbiter of courtly manners, the siren who lures with song and dance-she was different from the vamp of Indian Cinema.
The vamp from Hindi Cinema, a popular figure from the
195Os onwards becomes a staple diet in the film of the 1960s and early 197Os. The vamp was seen as an outsider, a

home breaker who could display wanton sexuality on the screen. This display of sexuality was restricted to certain spaces of the Hindi Screen, for example the ntght clubs, the bars, the casino etc. These were moral spaces associated with the West, which through our own history of colonialism, were seen as evil. The association of sexuality wittr the West had the effect of denying Indian women their own semality. The vamp was thus contrasted with the heroine of Hindi Cinema, a woman who was virtuous, chaste, pure and splritual. Helen played an extremely important role in the Iilms of the 196Os as she was able to carry the Western image very easily,

458

Perspectiues on South Asra

In the cinema of the lgg0s, we see that vamp, who was crucdal to the narrative of earlier cinema, has almost disappeared from tl-e screen. This exit has been significant and is being seen with both fear and concern since the hero[ne of the l99os also carried within her t}le image of the vamp. New levels of permissiveness have obliterated ttre strictly enforced divide between the heroine and the vamp. The rigid dress code has disappeared. Today's heroine
dances with the seductive abandon of a houri as the camera

routlnely zooms in on one body part or the other. Her titillating purpose done, she usually dons a demure sari
towards the end as she attain$ the "highly desirable" life status of a life.
The conllation of the heroine And the vamp of yesteryears into a single image of the heroine is disturbing many because the questlon of sexuality which was essentially seen as wantonness associated with the West and thus outside of Indian culture, is no longer being seen as something to be reJected. The heroine of today seems to be questioning the image of flxing the heroine into a slot where any display of desire was seen as negative and unlike the values of Indian women (with excepfions like Sahrb, Bibi aw Ghulam-Meena Kumari asserts her sexuality and demands that her husband stay back with her and takes to alcohol. . . ultimately dies tragically).

While the new image questions the moral codes ttrat operated on the heroine of yesteryears, it would be wrong to celebrate this change uncritically. The business of films is to create its mythical seemingly indestructible life. The ftlm lmagle ostenstbly celebrates the heroine's eroticism, while reducing her to a passive sex object. Much as one might wish to argue that Karishma Kapoor seems to be an active participant rather than a pas$ive recipient of Govinda's lust-the fact cannot be denied that she is being subjected to the male gaze. The Choli ke Peeclt'rcq, while ostensibly

hqes

oJ Women

in Httdi Ctemcu

Post- I 95Os

459

celebrating a woman's early sexuality is picturised in a way-where her body is fragmented into heaving bosom, swinging hip, bare midriff-commodifies her into an obJect for the overwhelming male gaze and robs her of all autonomy over her body.
Cinema is a confused one-whereas the earlier films like Main Cfury Rai:lutlgi (I Will Remain Silent) being considered a virtue in itself, are giving way to a different female protagonist-the avenging angel hkhmee Aurat, Sherni' hsaJtctDeuietc., inevitably show a female vigilante sworn to vengeance after the trauma of rape. Do these films offer any insig;hts into the complodties of what it means to be a woman?
The change that is taking place in the women of the Hindi

It is only a cosmetic change. First we had Rambos, now we have Rambolinas-men in drag wearing figure hugging leather jeans, with a gun in one hand, purely imitatlng the
cardboard one dimensional herol

Itwas left to the parallel cinema to give women their due. The attempt of the neru t aue cinema was to situate women in real life conditions as social beings and not as either obJects of display or seMle, static creatures . The agenda of the neru uJaue was directed against the mainstream and thus a spate of films emerged with strong women characters. Films like Arkur, Btaomrkou Nishant, Mantha n etc' became well known for their strong women characters' While the women of these Anms were no doubt strong, they were Iimited in their agenda by the politics of realism ttrat was a major influence on the neu) u)aDe cinema. In attempting reality on tJle screen, the films makers were always restricted by the oppressive conditions that prevented women from attaining any kind of freedom in society. T}:e new usanse, was tfius, marked by a series of compromises that the women always made and was justified in the name of

460

Perspectiues on South Asra

"reallty" (e.g., Maniltnl Bhoomika). The women thus never ceased to be victims of society in the ne[r, ruaue barring exceptions like Much Masalq sections of Mandi etc. In urban situations, the dominant narrative become an explqration of the woman's self rather than situating women in tl.eir social context-thus turning the quest for women's freedom into a struggle withh the private sphere alone. The woman, having an affair with a man other than her husband, being seen as an ultimate act of feminist revolt eg., Ek pat,
Parorna

hsf.

etc.

It ls, however, becoming ampily evident that society and cinema can no longer close their eyes to the changing Indian woman. Self assured, confident women are starting to back out of ttre economlc dependence that had for so long held thena in thrall. In a society in transition, the rigidity of part norrls cannot be maintained.
BUt who is this new woman? How much liberty can she be "granted" without threatening the very basis of a patriarchal order? What aspect qf her personalitJr should be highllghted? Even if a daring premise is taken, isn't it safer to stay with a resolution that is conformist?

A hero is the personiffcation of contemporary morality and 4spirations till such time as societ5r can work out what this new woman is all about. The transformation of sterebtypes lnto icons will continue to be confused.
In a situatlon where stereot54tes play such an important role iln defining the way we make sense of the world, it is clear that a pure space outside the stereotl4pe is difficult to imagfne. Thus the quest for wornen's representation on the screegr should move beyond just a critique of stereot54ring to a mofe complex dialogue and debate about the plurality of women's imagery-a plurality that needs to recognise that women's representation cannot tre seen as only a positive or negative image but as an arena of contesting voices and

Images oJ Women in Hindi Cinema: Post- I 95Os

461

faces. It is finally up to us to recover the resistant voice/ moments within this area. Acknowledgementsi Aruna Vasudeva-The W omen Vamp or Victim- Malthili Rae-To be a Woman. Shikha Thingan vs RanJam Mazumdar.

The Image of V/omen on TV and Cinema

SaraZnker

Nayeeka is the Bengali word for a female central lead played by the woman actor in play or a feature film. Ttre role played by the Nageelca is essentially created by the man and the sexist connotation is deeply entrenched in the implications of the Nageeka There are hardly any plays on television or feature films of the film industry of Bangladesh that do not feature the Nageeka in the image that it connotes. This Nageeka that the audience is continually exposed to is undoubtedly avery attractive figure and indeed to be emulated, as made obvious fiom tire endorsement by playwrights thrcugh their continuous presence on the screen. The image that she conjures up among the target audience however is apfly summed up in the undulating lines, the rosy cheeks and charcoal eyed drawings of the women from showbiz on the rickshaw backs plying the roads and alleys of the country. That women are an unequal lot is accepted by all classes, colours and creeds of the world in various degrees of ire or consent.

Tte Image oJWomen onTV

artd" Cinema

463

That the media shapes human minds is also an universal truth. In today's world the power of mass media to communicate and educate the huge cross section of people stands beyond argument. What had once been the domain of commercial marketers has now been usurped by the politicians. As more people are getting access to the mass media of television and cinema, the "tube" and the "celluloid" areas becoming more and more dear to people who care to have a good share of voice and visual presence on them. Also, in this vasfly illiterate world of ours the audio visual medium has a far greater impact than any other medium.

That the women's unequal status uis-d-r.ris the man is a sociopolitical question, is a commonly shared notion by all right thinking people of the world. Thus, if the lot of women has to improve, a colossal job remains to be done in the rebuilding of her image through the mass media of television and cinema.
The Film Development Corporation was formed in 195O. Ever since its inception, the film industry has functioned as a very good industrial enterprise. As it became more and more important to make the film commercially viable, women in the ftlms came to be used increasingly as a commodit5r. In the event where 'women' are hooks for commercial success, litfle can be expected from the role played by them to change the status in societ5r. Thus, the participation of women in a commercial venture defeats the cause of women and we can presume that it necessitates no further deliberatlon. Also, as an instrument of social change, the cinema has lost its credibility ever since its reach has been overtaken by television. Cinema provides unadulterated entertainment to the masses, the vast majority of whom are male. What is seen in the celluloid world is a fantasy world and emulation is not the driving force. T?rus cinema, as it stands today, is not so much an impediment in the reconstruction of women's image in the way television is.

464

Perspectiues on South Asra

Television's unique role in bringing social change is now universally recognized. When speaking of building an image, in tJle way the stage is excluded as any mode reconstruct, cinema too may be excluded from the task of exacting the job.
Television had been a home media and on its fringe when it started operailng in the early sixties in Dhaka. In the beginning it was only in the capital, but soon it reached out to all corners of the country and even across the boundaries to India by the mid seventies. This position changed further as more and more TV sets came into middle class households. A phenomenal change was witnessed in the nineties with the mushroom growth of satellite dishes on rooftops and the webs of satellite cables that crisscrossed the sk5r soon after. Now when TV has overtaken the cinema in its reach and splendour the TV stars too now adorn the tin backs of the rickshaws on the Dhaka streets which hitherto had been exclusively dominated by the heroines of the tinsel world. The subject of the discourse is the image of women. The important role of the mass media is its power to create role models. Roles that are recreated by the respective target groups which empathise with them. It is widely believed that images built through the rnass media create a mirror image in society. Shakespeare had said that the job of the playwright was to hold a mirror onto nature. Obviously Shakespeare's concern was to improve the form of art. In the meantime, more than one or half a century from his age, we have come to a situatlon in which whether or not we reflect "Life in Art" people wiII follow art or the likeness of it as represented in the electronic art form of television.

In the light of the argument of this paper, that

continual presence of the

the

IVay eekaas the female lead defeats the cause of status change for women, we may look closely

into her characters.

Nageekafrorrr the days of yore till date on Television or in

The Image oJWomen onTV and. Cinema

465

Cinema, is tJle woman lead who may be defined by the following attributes:

l. 2. 3. 4.

Young (preferably spanning the years eighteen

tirough

twenW five);

Beautiful and the criteria of being fair and attractive

qualifo beauty; Belonging to the middle class; and Manoeuweable.

As in literature and poetry, so also in drama, women cast in this mould re-inforces the perception about women in a way that it becomes 'ideal' role to follow. This is a tall order

for the maJoritjr of women to achieve. At an individual level it creates stress for women to flt into the category and at the social level the Nageeka s position at the centre excludes all other women of society from the focus of attention. Thus any woman who cannot meet tJle standards of the Nageeka

is one less in her

accomplishments, whatever her

achievements may be otherwise. This creates a setback for the woman, as in addition to her other efforts, more than necessary time is spent by her to make herself as close as possible to the Nageeka

In comparison, her counterpart man is better placed, fc(-

his attention is more concentrated on accomplishment as he himself deftnes it, and even if society defines it, it is not
merely a superficial accomplishment that is modelled by the Nageeka This contribution of art and poetry towards the image of women and mass marketed by the media is so stron$y embedded in our psyche that we are actually talking of a homogeneous job, if are to think about changing the practice altogether.
We cannot hope to remove the Nageeka from the central focus of attention of "Business". However, we can well use this central position of the "woman" in the media to the

466

P er sp ectiu e s on S

outh Asla

advantage of image reconstruction for the new woman.

Recommendations Maturity accompanied by confidence in facing the world is a far more attractive and comfortable position to be in for the woman than blushing in her discomfort with tl.e world. Thus maturity could be opted in place of innocence for the reformed Nageeka On Bangladesh television, maturity in the central lead women had not been uncommon in the past. In recent times though, it ls becoming rare. Like the fashion world of t'lle West women's roles in.privately produced TV dramas have only the very young in the central lead and the story is of courtship prior to mardage. This has also been the norm of clnema. The very narrow span of life and situation covered of the woman excludes and obliterates all other experiences in her life. In the process it reinforces the stereotyped Nayeeka sltuatlon once agaln.
The activity of the woman "lead" also negaflvely contributes to the construction of her image. Apart from tJre dialogues it is lrnportant to evaluate "business" given to the woman ln the role she plays. More often she is before the mirror combing her hair or doing the bed. One of our most famous playwrighfs female leads is critlcized for persistently making and serving tea to the family, Thus, in the middle class household, it is the most common activity of the woman to keep the rest of the family in constant supply of tea, however It ls also a common phenomenon that she studies, reads the newspaper or works on the computer. However these buslnesses are but very rarely depicted in the women's roles on TV. To be informed makes the posiUon of a person strong. Our new woman of the 'media' could be shown as lnformed and actlvities could well be of readtng a book than surdng the tea.

The plays of Bangladesh television are also stuck in the

Tte Image oJWomen onTV and Cttemn

467

very marketable for the masses, or so it is assumed. The rrrttdle posiuon of this class is easier to treat and gives sc6pe for romanticism using the middle class sentiment. The lower income group is fleetingly touched upon when the support class of servants has to be depicted. To depict villainy, or soclal wrongs, upper income people are depicted in stereotyped roles as "bad people". Middle class values put a limit to the "woman lead" which may be overcome by her if she can take a bold step beyond this boundary adding yet another dimension to the new Nageeka For example the virtual absence of say, a garment worker in a central positlon is an under representation of this huge workforce, and lt is only indicative of the narrowness of the media's range of vision. Thus the heroine is usually a student who belongs to a middle income household whose future, other than being the ideal match to her partner, is never a concern for the playwright. That women are coming into the workforce and the ups and downs of her career, and threats thereof can be of equal interest as her affairs to the audience, seems beyond the conception of most pla)^nrrights.
Given that tlle world of "showbiz" supported by "commerce"

groove of the middle class since middle class sentiments are

will continue to place women in the centre and under the male gaze, it is well that the new Nageeka is shaped in the place of the stereotyped Nageeka men think as ideal and
continue to construct in their blissful ignorance.

Images of the Female in

Sri Lankan Art

Smma Kiribamtrte

In the words of the Convenors of the South Asia Dialogue what is attempted at this meeting is exploring "the shared perceptions of our artists in the way they reflect certain values and attitudes of fundamental concern to our socleues". My presentation is related to only a small part of this vast exploratory field and has to do with looking at how pre-modern Sri Lankan creative artists have addressed the issue of the positlon of women in socity. The values and attitudes reflected in these creations need to be placed in the wider context of South Asia so that the presenr discussions can lead to a combined exploratlon of the roles and status of women in our socieues. A point that I need to draw attention to at the very outset of this exercise is tlrat the "shared perceptions of our artists. in the present study are almost exclusively male perceptions. So what we are basically looking at a_re perceptions of male sculptors and painters regarding the social roles and position of women. The missing element in this is women's own

Images oJ tte Female in Srtlr:r.kan Art

469

perception of their roles and status i;l society. The almost total absence of known sculptors and painters among women is not a particularly Sri Lankan phenomenon and neither is it an Asian occurrence. The question as to why this is so would go beyond the parameters of a South Asian Dialogue. Suffice it to say that one has to constantly keep in mind that the female in art is mosfly a male preoccupaflon. Let me' however, hasten to add that artists, male or female, are not immune to their environment. The attitudes and pressures around them inform their art and its relevance to societal analysis is not insignilicant. Therefore the artistic expressions regarding women need not be looked upon as mere pictorial objects. They have the potential of showing up women's role as historical agents, and can reveal the range of constraints and opportunities women have had over Ume.

That the different countries of South Asia belong to a single cultur al zone is a strong percepUon among both anthropologists and historians. While the inter-cultural diversities among and within the countries of South Asia should form part of the present discourse, the overarching
similadties across national boundaries can provide a common platform of understanding for "a shared vision". The language

of art transcends state boundaries and has facilitated

communication across diverse groups' Common myths and symbols are expressed through sculpture and painting despite stylistical variations encountered in different cultures'

These motifs

in art provide a

common language of

communication across South Asia. the proximity to the subcontinent, relations between island's them have been necessarily close. While one is aware of instances of political tension between Sri Lanka and her South lndian neighbours, the harmonious pattern of cultural intercourse forms the most positive aspect of the Indian relationship. Looking back on these historical links, it is important to recognise ttrat political conflict did not deter

In the case of the Sri Lankan experience, given

470

Perspecttues on South

Asia

was the result of voluntary association and was not the result of politlcal, social or economic pressures exerted bv
the bigger neighbour.

exchange resulfing in the spread ofideas, values and beliefs

cultural coopera on and dialogue. This model of cultural

This is something one needs to emphasise. Much of the available evidence suggests that the cultural diffusion referred to was mostly a one w&y street. But Sri l,anka did pay her debts, for a reverse flow did take place in certain areas of art and religion. It is important to recognise that pre-colonial Aslan cultures which received extraneous impulses selected certain cultural elements of their own choice and in the conted of Sri Lanka too there was thls same selectivity. These elements were often restated in new terms and at times endowed with different meaning. One is not unaware ofinstances ofcultural resistance when specific views did not conform to the host country,s own ethos. In the evolution of any culture there is an inner dynamic at work which gives it a certain colour and texture. Therefore it is in the context of these basic interconnections and divergences that one has to claritr one,s own perceptions regarding the social position of women as represented in pre-modern Sri l,ankan art.
Theoreflcal formations regarcling women's status have to be tested against historical material and variables such as time, class and ethnicity have to be accounted for. In other words there is historical variability rather than uniformity in women's experience. Defining women is a shifting area in women's studies research and there is no single stance from which femlnist scholars have viewed the e4perience of women. The patriarchal gender ldeologr which has become a bedrock of feminist scholarship has its critics and how the artist views power relations between the sexes can lead to a more nuanced approach which views the position of women in terms of the constraints and opportunities they face.

Imoges oJthe Female in Sri l-ankan Art

471

present With this introduction an attempt u/ill be made to some of tJle basic concepts outlined above'

Inter-cultural Links Writing on women in Indian art' Heinz Mode has said ". ..to*h"r" in the world than in India can women be whether entitled to claim higher rank than men in art' the quality of their tft-tgtt ttt. quanUty of representations' o"".riion or the importance of their symbolic content'"r This concentration on the female figure in India is not ethos matched by Sri Lanka and this is where the Buddhist its sculpture' is comes to itay. Sri l,ankan art' especially dominatei Uy ttre Buddha image, and the female flgure Buddhist takes a back seat. This reticence is only true of the the Indian genre' This is art in Sri l,anka, Hindu art follows art' also true of a few representations we have of secular A point which needs to be made and which is perhaps impoitant in terms of diffusing current ethnic tensions' is the eclecticism of ttre Sri Lankan artists when it came to Indian art' deriving inspiration from the different schools of cited to demonstrate the fact Numerous ixamples can be that there was no regional bias in this regard' A relief

"u-irtg Bod*ituahas close affiliations with the Amaravati School

on marble, depicting Queen Maya' the mother of the

and of art, dated to the early centuries of the Christian era' paintings which have often later we nrove on to the Sigiriya a been compared to the paintngs at AJanta' The torso of the woman from Anuradhapura can be compared with Ganga/Yamuna sculptures at Mathura' dated to the Gupta p..io'a. Next we have the relief sculptures depicting heavenly musicians at Isurumuniya of the sixth to seventtr century period where the Pallava inspiration is unmistakable' Sri I-ankan Parva images are not unlike similar images in the at Chola or Pandyan art tradition and the relief carvings at the Konark Yapahuva ,"rni.td one of the sculptures of temple in Orissa. This is avery quick overview of the l'rind

472

Perspectiues on South Asra,

artistic exchange between Sri Lanka and the Indian subcontinent, demonstrating a wide diffr.i;; of ideas, the cultural carriers being artists, religious men and women, pilgrims and traders.
The Social posltion of lVomen as Deplcted ln Art
Sgmbolic Worship oJMottrer Earth . The issue of patriarchy and tlte subordination of women looms large in feminist discourse. St"."otype" of women as uniformly oppressed and unempower"o io provide us wit]. a complete picture. on t].e positive side, "oi mottrerhood is perhaps one of the most powerful concepts *ii"t p._.a." SoutJr Asian culture. The worship of ttre fUottrer Goddess has found visual expression from the earliest times in both India and Sri Lanka. The reproductive rols of women associated with notions of fertility and good luck have elevated women to divine status. A commoir manif,estation ofthe goddess dating back to as early as ttre secona century B.C. at Sanchi is the GqTalakshrni image. ln Si f,anka the .image of Lakshmi as the goddess of gooJluck is represented in botJl Buddhist and Hindu art. The composition of Lakshmi bathed by elephants is even emproyed in secular structures as an auspicious s1.rnbol. This sl,rnbolic representagon is very widespread in India too. The basic idea seems to be the pouring down of water over mother earth, making her fertile, the elephants representing rain clouds. U"ffiis.tl. Hindus and Jains, all of them to t irrt.."ufisJifi. venerafion of Lakshmi within "".in own mythologies. """ their It is that this symbol of fertility is a manifestation y."ry :l.T of the Mother Goddess concept and forms a common substratum in the South Asian belief system.
The Concept oJ the Goddess and" Her Cutt Worship

The feminist view is that all religions are patriarchal. Religion either takes for granted male dominance or gives

Images oJ the Female in Srt lo,nkan Art

473

direct expression to it. As a general rule women occupy subordinate status in most established religions. In TterauadaBuddhism which is the dominant tradition in Sri Lanka, the Buddha is always male and there is no way in which a woman can become a Buddha. "fhe Mahagctna
tradition, which has had a profound influence on Sri Lankan Buddhism, is somewhat more inclusive. The Bodhis atua or the aspiring Buddha can be either male or female, although according to some texts the female Bodhisatua becomes male at the point of Buddhahood. Sri l,ankan Hinduism looks upon Shiua as the supreme god while Vtshnu is accommodated more or less as a Buddhist god. Outside these formal structures dominated by the male, ttrere is a strong undercurrent of goddess worship and often her mediation in human affairs has been much more powerful than that of the male gods.
TWo of the most powerful goddesses worshipped

in Sri

a Buddhist goddess and is, in the popular imagination, the

Lanka today are Pattini and Kali. Paffini is
Compassionate Mother, warding off ill-health and other evils. She is also a Bodhisatua or a future Buddha, a notion which seems to have persisted in the popular mind from earlier times. The eighth and ninth centuries A.D. seem to have been the heyday of Mahayana Buddhism in Sri Lanka and the worship of Tara or the female Bodhisatua seems to have been very strong. Sometimes called Paftini, she is also the BodhisatuaTara- One such image is now housed in the British Museum. A unique image of Tara in transcendal meditation is a clear expression of the Buddhist view that women are capable of the highest spiritual attainment. Her cult worship was independent of the veneration of the male Bodhisatua.
The worship of goddess Kali has been mostly associated

with Hinduism, but the cult has straddled the Hindu/

Buddhist divide. Durga or Y'ali in the popular perception is

474

Perspectiues on South

Asla

the Great Goddess and there is rlo place for a supreme male god in some local belief systems, for instance in some parts of India. In the Hindu tradition, Durgais the warrior goddess, the Sakfr or the counterpart of Shiva, not to be confused with his consort, ParuatL Her most powerful role is the destruction of evil and in this she takes on a very aggressive stance, There are many manifestations of the goddess, one where she stands on the head of a buffalo and another where she tramples evil, personified as a demon. More "benevolenf' forms or "less war-like" forms of the goddess are widely seen in village temples in both India and Sri l,anka. The great reliance on the Mother Goddess through her many manifestations in both Hindu and Buddhist traditions represents a comrnon value system which envelopes the whole South Asiart region. The Unlon of the Male/Female Prlnciple in Art

The most logical evolution of the theory of Saktr is the depiction of the Supreme God as both male and female-the Ardhanari form, half male and half female. A striking illustration of this concept as expressed in art is the image found at an excavation site at the Abhayagiri temple. Once again both the Buddhists and Hindus seem to have been comfortable with this idea, for numerous Indian examples can be cited in this regard. What is exemplilled in these images is that the ultimate reality is both female and male. The Representatlon of Women's Llves: Constraints and Opportunities
We have so far seen the image of woman as the source of good fortune, the 'Great Mother' and the Supreme Goddess.

While the artist has depicted all this, he also records for us the negative side, that women are controlled or subordinated. This is the contradiction that one faces regarding the social position of women as represented in art. Within the same tradition or the same belief system the two I'iewpoints seem

Images oJ tte Fennle tn Sri Lanlsn Art

475

to coerdst quite amicablY. Sita exemplilles the Hindu wife, a perception which has wide ramifications throug[out South Asian society' She is the divine consort whose sexuality is controlled' In both Buddhist and Hindu art, the goddess is most popularly represented as the consort of either the Bodhisatua or the main Hindu God. She is sometimes placed on a slightly lower plane as seen at the Vegiriya temple in Kandy and at the rock temple at Buduruvagala' Numerous examples can be cited in Hindu art, Poiruo:ti in the Chola tradition being one of the better examPles'
The same phenomenon is seen among the lesser deities, the most extreme example ttrat one can present are the

guardian gods at the Abhayagiri temple, whose consorts are relegated to a small niche on the sculpted slabs. However gender stereotyping can be quite problematic. The larger number of guardian deities found in all parts of Sri Lanka and during all historical periods is an eye-opener to the great variability in social attitudes towards women. As in the case of the principal deities, guardian deities are both male and female, the large number is of course male. Independent guardian goddesses are not uncommon' as ln the case of the guardian goddess at Pidurangala and one is also aware of joint male/female guardians of equal stature on the Lankatilaka temple balustrade in Polonnaruwa. Therefore the relative importance of the consort in Joint compositions varies considerably. One needs to look at the possibility of changing attitudes over time and the perceptions of artists, patrons and donors for the interpretation of these artefacts. Radhika Coomaraswamy's statement that "woman must be seen in context before she is seen in liberation"z is perhaps very pertinent. Women's Soclal and Polltlcal Roles
The pre-modern Sri Lankan artist has presented to us a

476

Perspectiues on South Asla

regard.

wide repertolre of images .reflecting women's social roles such as those of the dancer, the musician and tJle religious devotee. There is space in Asian culture for the talents of both men and women in dance and rnusic without too much gender differentiation. Flowever, one can see a noticeable emphasis on the female dancer and very often the men provide the music, although the women do not always dance to their tune as seen among ttre yapahuva dancers. Some literary texts suggest tJrat dancing and music were accomplishments which cut across class divisions but with time they appear to have been limited to the lower rungs of society. Here, it is the class bias rather than the gender bias that we seem to be confronted with. parallels can be drawn from most South Asian cultures in this

The religious devotee is a regular image among women represented in art. This is a position of power which has been assigned to women from very early times. However the mediatory role of women invoh,ing the divine is a private activity. The more presugious role of mediation in the public sphere is assigned to men and ttre political influence of women is limited to the domestic arena. The perception that informal networking among women ls a source of power has been grapkrically demonstrated in a

the Kandyan painter. An instance where the woman asserts hersell pushed by the village women is once again part of the same record where the young wif'e is encouraged to slap her aged husband.

Kandyan temple painting of the seventeenth eentury. Exchanging news and views around the village well is a familiar pre-occupation among wornen a scene captured by

Traditionally the political culture of South Asia did not provide adequate space for \f,'omen to participate in the formal political arena. In Sri Lanka a few queens did reign but as a rule it was the men who wielded institutional

lnrages oJ the Female in Sri In*an Art

477

power. Women were also completely shut out from official government positions. Although wives of kings were not part of the formal decision making structures, they did find opportunities to assume the role of power-brokers. AJataka scene ln a temple painting where the king confers with his ministers while the queen sits by his side suckling her infant child is to my mind a telling scene. This is not a ceremonial sitting of tlle king and queen with state officials. Although her domestic role is accentuated, the queen is not disinterested in the official decision-making process. That women have found indirect methods to gain power and influence demonstrate the lack of direct access to formal politics-a concern in most of South Asia.

It is not necessary to labour the point that painting and sculpture do not provide us with a complete picture of the position of women in pre-modern times. However they do
furnish us with certain insights which can supplement and complement data derived from other sources, resulting in a much more holistic understanding of ttre status and roles of women in South Asian societies. The strengths and weaknesses regarding the condition of women seem to resonate across South Asia, bringing us back to the main focus of this seminar, "a shared vision".
END NOTES
1

Heinz Mode. Wonen in Indir;,n Art, New York: 1964.

2. Radhika Coomaraswamy, "The Impact of Tradition, Culture and Religion on Women in South Asia", Ethnic Studies Report, 6:2. Julv 1998.

REFERENCES
Archer, W.G., and Paranavithana, Senarat, Ceglon Pointings Jrom Temple, Shrine and Rock, New York: New York Graphic Society,

r958.
Bandaranayake, Senaka Dias, The Rock and WaII Paintings oJ Srt

474

Perspectiues on Sotrfh Asrcr

Lanka, Colombo: Lake House, 19g6. Devendra, Don Titus: Classical Srnhalase Sculpturei SOO B.C. A.D. IOOO, London: lg58; Hetuaratchi, S.B.,.Bronze and Other Metal Artefacts at Abhayagiri Vihara., Ancient Ceyton No. 10,
1990.
_

Kiribamune, Sirima, and Seneviratna, Harsha, The Femnle in Art, Mimeograph, Colombo: International Centre for Ethnic Studies.
1987.

Paranavitana, Senarat, Glirnpses House, 1972.

oJ

Ceglon's past, Colombo: Lake

Schroeder, Ulrtch Von, Tfe Golden Age oJ Scrtlpture in Sri Lantco, Hong Kong.'Visual Dharma Publications Ltd., 1992.

Contemporary South Asian Art and Women

Nazrul lslam

Artists at all times and in all places have been concerned with the nature of women (as much as, or even more than' the nature of men). The artists of the South-Asian subcontinental region have similarly found women and their
lives an absorbing subject for the expression of their creative activities. Artists have depicted women' as women, at work, at play, in love, in nature, as women and their ideas, women

in their conllicts and

also women as goddesses. In the

contemporary situation, the last theme (women as goddesses)

is nearly irrelevant, while the other themes persist. Contempora4r modern arflsts in South Asia have also

pursued the above themes while depicting women. In very recent times, one of the most famous of the South Astan ar0sts, M.F. Hussain, landed in serious trouble for having drawn sketches of a Hindu goddess in the nude. Had he been an artist ofthe tenth century and sculpted a figure of the delty hewould probably have had no problem. However, the artist's own religious identity would perhaps still cause

480

Perspectiues on South Asia

a problem. Art and artists, even today, seem to have caste and creed. In any case, our topiC of discussion in this paper ls women in contemporary South Asian art, particularly with reference to such lssues as (rJ women in societ5r, (ii) social justice and human rights, and (iuJ fundamentalism and communalism.

to the last five

1947. We will also confine ourselves to contemporary "modern" art rather than discuss "traditional,, or ,.folk arts". Our discussion is also limited io the arts of Bangfadesh, Nepal, India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka, five of the seven South Asian countries participating in the South Asian Dialogue. (In the latest Asian Art Biennial Bangladesh f 99S, artists of Bhutan also assumed a westernised modernistic posture and depicted women and the girl child in their work. But Bhutanese contemporary artisti in general like to adhere to traditional styles. The artists of ttre Maldives have not been participating in the Asi,an Biennial for some time and we have no clear idea about their recent artistic activities. Until the late eig[ties, they were, however, portraying women in a realistic manner. These were women at leisurely work or women ln love). It is not very easy to find expre$sion of all three themes of the Dialogue in re contemporary arts of the region. For

post-colonial period. However, some references may go beyond

81 the term contemporary art, we will conffne ourselves decades, meaning post_Independence or

portrayal in the artistic works of major arUsts of South Asia. One may also have to search hard to find el,idence of works on social justice and human rights. However, examples of works under the theme of ,.women in societ5r,, may not be very dlfficult to get, as the theme addresses a much broader subject.

example, fundamentalism and communalism have lound little

Fundamentallsm and Communallsm

Some of the Ieading South Asian contemporary modern

Contemporary South Asran Art and. Women

481

artists have held politically quite radical views and stood

against fundamentalism and communalism. In Bangladesh, Quamrul Hasan's name is remembered with reverence in this

context. He participated

in many agitations

against

fundamentalism, but we do not {ind serious works of art by him onthe theme. Although many brutal incidents have taken place in Bangladesh in which women became victims of fundamentalists' verdicts. Like the case of Noorjahan, who ultimatelyhad to commit suicide because of fundamentalists' persecution, ttre topic has moved few artists. Dilara Begum Jolly, a young female artist, is an exception. Her painting 'Noor Jahan" is a statement against fundamentalism. Jolly has also been depicting violence against women in general in a rather surrealistic manner. She was chosen for an honourable mention in the twelfth national exhibition of art last December (f 996) for her painting "Molence-3". In this work the central focus of violence is a woman.

In India, as has been mentioned earlier, an eminent

victim of fundamentalist and communal attacks, not for standing against fundamentalism or communalism, but for depicting goddess Saraswati in a artist. M.F. Hussain became
a

rather unorthodox manner. Although he made these sketches many years ago, the reaction from fundamentalists came only recenfly. Hussain has depicted more worldly women, both celebrities and ordinary. His attitude is not so much political as it is social or simply adistic.

Although fundamentalism is an increasingly strong force evidence in art, showing protest against these forces. None of the 26 illustrations in the comprehensive volume on Contemporary Art in Pakistan by Marcella Nelson Sirhandi (Ferozsons, Lahore, 1992) show any such evidence, nor had the seven Asian Art shows in Dhaka since 1981 provided any example of artists rising against fundamentalism. Although the "Women Series" of Nahid Raza and works by other artists have focussed on women,

in Pakistan, there is little

calm.

Despite the fact that Sri Lanha is tormented by ethnic or racial strifes, it has not disturbed its world of art. The artists seem to be able to maintain a distance and remain

Soclal Justice and Human Rights The political questions of social justice and human rights, have also attracted attention of some contemporary arusts of the sub-continent. Zainul Abedin, the pioneer of, the modern art movement in Bangladesh, made his mark ulith the famous sketches on the 1943 Famine in Bengal. These sketches are polgnant statements on the cruelty of colonial exploitation and social injustice. Many other artists of Calcutta at that time

(Ramkinkar, Somnath Hore, Chittaprasad, Sudhir Kfrastagir, Gohardhan Aash, Paritosh Sen, Gopen Roy, Bhobesh Sanyal, Sunimadhau Sen, etc.) have also depicted the famine scenes in their works and focused on the r,rrlnerability of women in particular. But the sketches of Abedin have attained almost a symbolic status on social injurstice through famine. It is interesfing to note that after over fifty years since the famine sketches, how perceptively Abedin had recorded the plight of the woman, the mother. She had not only to fend for herself, but also for the childnen, because the father, or the man, had abandoned the family, looking after himself alone. Quamrul Hasan, the other most powerful and influenUal modern artist of Barrgladesh, wis also deeply concerned at the lack of social Justice and human rights, particularly of women. Some of his post{iberation works, specially the large wood cut compositions of 1974, depicting the famine on the one hand and the I,ulgarity of the urban rich on the other, are a strong statement on social inequality. Much younger artists of Dhaka, like Shishir Bhattacharva. Rokeya Sultana, Nilufar Chaman or Dilara eegum Joly, have also satirized the predicarneht of women in an unequal societ5r. Hundreds of thousands of women during ihe

Contemporary South Asinn Art and Women

483

Ban$adesh War of Liberation suffered violation of their human dignity and rigbts, and some artists have chosen such experiences as their subject matter. Amrita Sher-Gil in India, Subaida fu;ha in Pakistan or Novera Ahmed in Bangladesh were some of the pioneer women artists of the sub-continent who paid special attention to women. All three artists were thorouglrly modern, Novera in sculpture and Sher-Gil and Agha in painting. Sher-Gil and Novera are particularly noteworthy as they chose ordinary women as the subject of their work (Lala Rukh Selim has made a thorough analysis of Novera's portrayal of women, in her paper in this volume).
Women ln Society
Of the three themes, 'Women in Society' is more practically

illustratable on the basis of their greater representation in works of modern art in South Asia.
Fioneer artists like Zainul Abedin, Quamrul Hasan or S.M. Sultan in Bangladesh, Abdur Rahman Chugtai, Shakir Ali or Zubaida Agha in Pakistan, Amrita Sher-Gil, kela Mukherjee, M.F. Hussain, G. Subramanium, Meera Mukherjee, Ganesh $me, Sarbari Roy Chowdhury and many others in India, George Keyt, JDA Perara or Stanley Abesinghe, Madapatha Dhamasera Thera and ALD Sirisena in Sri Lanka, and artists in Nepal have seen women in various ,strata of their respective societies. Chugtai only placed women in high society, as a contrast, Zainmul, Quamrul and Sultan were more engaged in depicting the life of ordinary women or working women. Hussain chose both famous personalities like Mother Teresa, Indira Gandhi and rnore recently even film actress Madhuri Dixit to symbolize womanhood. Amrita Sher-Gil had changed the attitude towards women in Indian art by addressing ordinary village women.

In the contemporary modern art of Bangladesh it was

484

Perspectiues on Soufh Asla

Shahabuddin who took a lead in depicting political and social leaders, both dead and lMng. ShahabiAiin was bold enough to portray Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman during the eighties when it was indeed taboo to do so. Other artists came forward only after Sheikh Hasina became the Prime Minister. Shahabuddin is also the pioneer in portraying great women of Bangladesh on his canvases. He depicteJ Sufia Kamal, Jahanara Imam and Sheikh Hasina in his recent works. There are not many other artists who chose to do the same.
Most of the young artists of Bangladesh, includtng women artlsts, are more down to earth in the selection of their subject matter, but quite surreal, post_modern and highly satirical in style of depiction. On the other hand, some very senior painters (like Mortuza Basheer) of Bangladesh, have found greater interest in the portrayal of middl,e class urban women in cosmetic attire in a more romantic semi_realistic style. Sensuality and even eroticism also pervade the works of young artists, mostly males, but also females, while depicting women. Women in love, Or men and women making love, are also not rare scenes. At the same time the dignity of women, women as contributors to economic productivity, as s1rmbols of fertility, of motherhood, continue to be depicted in art.

We might conclude by noting that the artists of the South-Asian subcontinent have been fairly conscious ofthe socio-political status of women in the society but have normally not taken a very radical stand in deiicting their situation in works of art. Howeven, at least in Bangladesh, modern painting has remained very secular in content all
along.

Index
environment and, 416-23 in Bangladesh, 353-83, 4O5 in India, 385-404 paradigm on solving ethnic

489

International Monetary Fund

Investment Corporation of
Pakistan tlCP), 214 Iqbal, 160 Islam, Kazi Nazrul, l5O, 367-70. 445,479 Islam, Nahid, lO0 Islam, Sadhana, 435 Islamabad Accord, 119
JVP, 266-67,274
16O,

0MF), 2 1 1, 259, 268-69, 277

conflicts,84-86 rule of law and, 384-415 social justice and, 366-83

South Asian perspectives on,

476-23
women's rights as, 353 Htllnlrrn Rights in Banglodesh

1997,357 Hunfington, Samuel, 36 Huq, Hasan Anz.ul, 381 Huq, Syed Shamsul, 381 Hussain, M.F., 479, 481, 483
Ibsen, 154 Illias Akhtar Uzzaman, 448 Imam, Jahanara, 484 Imperialism, in South Asia, 3 India, election funding in, 294-307

Jaakko Pory International, I lO Jahan, Nasreen, 449-5O Jahan, Roushan, 439 Jahangir, Asma, 283

Jainuddin, Sardar, 380 Jan Sangh, 135

Bangladesh, 359 Janoni, 379

Jana Samhiti Samiti

(JSS).

Janasaviya Programme, Sri

Lanka,27O
Jayewardene, J. 39, l4O

. ceiling on election
penses, SO3

ex-

Jayewardene, Junius Richard'

corporate contributions, 304 eligibility criteria, 30l -07 performance in earlier election criteria, 305o6

235,276-74
Jefferson,384 Jinnah. Mohammad
170-71

Ali,

13O,
,

Jolly, Dilara Begum, 435-37

487-82 Journat oJ Democrocg, 284

public funding of election, 304 electoral process, 295-98, 307-09 electoral reform, 308-09
lndirt Todog, lOO

Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF), in Sri Lanka, 39-40,

53

Kaiser, Shahidulla, 379-8O Kalam, Shamsuddin Abul, 38O Kamal, Sajed, 367, 37O Kamal, Sufia,37l,4a4 Kapoor, Karishma, 458 Koshbaner Kanga, 38O Keyt, George, 483

Indo-Bangladesh-Nepal Commission, 23O Indo-Nepal Trade Treaty, 33 InsoJ Ki DeDi, 459

Khalnayak,456
Khan, Akhtar Hameed, 413 Khan, Akhtar Hamid, 343 Khan, Ayub, L4O-42, 2O3, 22O'

2t.343

490
Khan, Masuma, 434 Khan, Razia, 449 Khan, Tahera, 429 Khastagir, Sudhir, 482 Khatun, Rabeya, 449 Khatun, Zubaida Akter, 429 Kiribamune, Sirima, 468 Koirala, E}.P., 153-54 Koirala, c.P., 24O, 319 Kritddaser Hasi, g8O KsudFo O Asha, B8O LaI Salu, 378, 380 Igislatures, decline of, 144-4b
Ealam (LTTE), 39, 258, 22476

Perspecttues on South Asia

Meer, 16O

Mishra, I I t Mitra, Premendra, BZ I Mode, Heinz, 471 Mohammed, M.H.,2ST Mosharraf, Rashed, 362 Mother India, 456
Mukherjee, Leela, 48S Mukherjee, Meera, 483

Mill, John Stuart, 366 Minorities Commission, 396

Mukherji, Sailajananda, 3Z I Muluki Ain(Civil Code) of 1854,

Liberation Tigers of Tamil

Lipton, Michael, lOB Local Administrative Act 196b, 315 Lohia, Ram Manohar, l87-gg Mahabub ul Haq, 23 Mahakali Project, Nepal, 240
Nepal, 312 Local Administrative Act tggo,

Nepal,3lI

Munamadan, l5O-b3
Muslim Family Ordnance 1961, Bangladesh, BSs Myrdal, c., 339
l\lGOs, human rights and, g2 Nlagraj, N.. lol I\,laidu, Chandrababu, 197

Mahapurus,38l Mahaveli Programme, Sri l,anka, 99, I lO

Mahendra, King, 312 Main Chup Rahungi, 489 Malla, Ashesh, 156 Manandher, Kiran, 157 MandL 460

449 Nasreen Begum, 435

Narasimha Rao, lg Narayan, Jayaprakash, 297 Nasreen, Taslima, 564, 442,

Manthqn,459-60 ManuSmriti,4S4 Manzool Makbula, 449 Marshall, Merqm, 483 Marx, 371 Masan, 154 Mazari, Shireen, 43
Manto, Saadat Hasan, lSO, 160

Commission, 396, 999_4OO National Investment Trust (NIT),

National Commission for Women, India, S94, 396 National Human Rights
Pakistan,2l4
tional Planning Commission, Nepal, 316, 322, 3.26

Nation truilding, and conflicts in South Asia, 44-45

Na

Mazumdar, Ranjam, 461 Meena Kumari, 458

Nehru, Jawaharlal, 2g, l g3, ra6-a7, 27a Nellithanam, Jacob, lO2

Commission, pakistan, 2O9 Nationalism, 4 Nazlee, Laila Monsur, 454, 436

National Taxation Reforms

Index
Nepal,

491 tries,217
Oslo therapy, I 19 Osman, Showkat, 379-8O
P adma-Me

Central-local government
relations, 319-21 civil society, 331-34 decentralization of power in,

ghnallamuna, 38O

3ro-35 constitutional framework for,314-19 historical background, 311-14 issues in, 314 politics and,314-19 ecollomy,247 foreign policy, 251-55 governance in, 233-56 NGOs in, 331-34 new challenges , 244-51 political evolution, 237 - 44 self-government attributes, 32t-34 accountabtlity, 325-27 autonomy, 32 l -23
consumers' group, 33O-3r

Padmaraga,446
Pahario Padshad Chattro, 36O Pai Panandiker, V.A., 295, 3O7 Pokeezah. 456 Pakistan,

balance of payments, 21 1challenge

to democracy in, i30-35 country report in, 2OO- fg direction of economy, 2O910

t2

economy, 2O8-

l4

external policy, 215- 18

ideological challenges to political system in, l3Ointernational trade, 2l I political development in, 201-o7 polltics and profit, 214- 15 pressures for change, 2O7o8 35

financial resource base, people's participation,

323-25
self-help organisations, 33I 34 Nepal Sadbhavan Party {NSP),

327-30

public finance, 213- 14

Pakistan Obseruer, 43O Paliwai, K.V., lO7 Pallo Gtnrko Jhgol, 154 Panday, Devendra Raj, 12,233,

317-18 Nepali Congress (NC), 239-41, 243, 246, 253, 313, 317, 321 New Asian Order, l9 Nil Rang Rakta, 38O
Nish@nt, 459

Parbottyo Chattagram Jane

Samhiti Salniti (PCJSS), 359tfU

372,4tl

Obaidullah, Abu Z,afar. 375

Odgsseg, 37

Parijat, 155
Paroda, R.S., I02

Official Secrets Act, 387-88 Olson, Mancur, 34O

Paroma,4@
Patkar, Medha,
,

Orangi Pilot

Proj

ect

llo

[OPP)

Peiris,_G.H., 68-69, 87, 97, lOO

Pakistan,413
Organisation of Islamic coun-

People's Representation Act,

308

492
Perara, J.D.A,, 483 Peshawar Accord, ll9 Phari Gono Parishad, 86O
Police Act of f86

Perspectiues on South Asra

Rahman, Ruby, 447 R.ahman, Shamsur, 388, 446

t, 4l O

Rahman, Sheikh Mujibur, 49,

Political system, in South Asia, alienation from polltics, 129 centre us. linguistic and ethnic units, 126-22 civil society and, 145-42 controlled democracy, 126

t40, r42,229,286,4a4

Raihan, Zahir, 382

Rajalakshmi,'f.K., IOZ
Ramachandraiah, C., lO8 Ram Kinkar, 482 Ramrajga concept, 24 Rao, Maithili, 455, 461 Rashid, M. Harunur, 576, SZg

ideological challenges to,

r29-39 Bangladesh, l35

external factors contributing to, 186-39 India, 135-36 Pakistan, t30-35 institutional structures of
democracy, 139-44

Rashtriya Swayam
Sangh, 135 Raza, Nahid, 481

Rashtriya Prajatantra party (RPP), 240-4r, 317-r8. szr

Sevak

legislatures, 144-4b parliamentary system, 14I 44

Rebel, 16O Reddy, V. Ratna, 95, tO8 Rehman, 1.A., 723, 416 Fleligious and ethnic conflicts,

45-47

Presidential system, 142-44 pressures on, 126-29

process, 123-45
127 -29, 136 Pouchepadass, Jacques, 96 Poverlr Alleviation programme [PAP), Sri Lanka, 2ZO

religious pressures.

Rivers of South Asia, water quality in, 104-O8

Roy, Gopen, 482 Roy, Ramashroy, S07

zught of Information Act, S8g Rimal, Gopal Prasad, 154

Ruitenbeek, H. Jack, IOO

Prabhakaran, 275 Premadasa, Ranasinghe, 39, 53-54, 257.270,274-77 Pressler Amendment, 42

Pdson conditions, in India, 287-

Ruler areas, environmental

issues in, 92-lOO Ruler Self Reliance Schemes, 329 SAFTA,28 SAPTA,28
SELF, Sri Lanka, 252, 27 A-75
Sa"hib, Bibi aur Ghulam, 4Sg Salam, Abdus, 430 Samarasinghe. S.WR.de A., 95, 257 Sambhaji, 165-66

Ruler-ruled relationship, 6-7

88 Protection of Human Rights Act

r993, 399

$zne, Ganesh, 483 Rahman, Attur, 345 Rahman, Hasan Hafizur, S7S, 342 Rahman, Rizia, 449

Samyabadi,367
Sangsaptak, 38O

Index
Sanyal,

493

Sarbatara, 367 Sareng Bau, 379

Bhobesh,482 156

156 4-5 Selim, Lala Rukh, 483 Sen, Paritosh, 482 Sen, Satyen, 38O Sen, Sunimadhau, 482
Searcher, Banal,
Self determination,

Scheduled Castes and Tribes Socio-political systems, India Commission, India, 395 crisis in. I8l-99 Schmitz, Hubert, 339 South Asia. Schumacher,28 agenda lbr new vision for, Schuman. Robert.30 I0-1I
challenges to democracy in, 129-39 civil society, 145-47 cold war like situation, 20 colonialism legacy, TO-72 communal tension and riots in, 762-77

Saruonaam Street Theatre, Sarwar, Beena,4O7

Singh, Tavleen, II0 Singh, V.P., 307 Sirhandi, Marcella Nelson, 481 Sirisena. A.L.D.,483 Sobhan, Rehman. 219

Segana,S8O Shah, Amita, 113 Shah. Shashi. 157 Shah Bano case, 128 Shahabuddin, 484 Shailobala, Ghoshjaya Anurupa Devi, 445 Shakespeare, 158,464 Si''lakuntala, 152 Shamsuddin, Abu Jafar, 38O Sharatchandra, 445 Sher-Gil, Amrita, 483 Sherchana, Bhoopi, I55 Strcrnt,459 Shikder, Shamin, 434-35 Shimla Agreement, 58, 215 Shirlsko Ptaol, 155 Shiv Sena, 135 Shivaji, 165-66 Shodh, 449 Siddiqui, K.,338 Siddiqui, Zillur Rahman, 374, 383 Singh, Bhagat, 163 Singh, R.E}., lO2

Sengupta, Achintya Kumar, 371 Sengupta, Bhabani, f5,36,412 Seshan. T.N.. 3O8

conflict resolution, 36-63,

69-70 cooperation

in, 148-61 creative imagination in, 148-

6l

cultural unity, 25-26 culture and women in, 425a4 democracy in, 45-5O

economic cooperation, 22,

27-28 end of cold war, 54-56 environmental issues in rural areas. 92-102

environmental problems in

urban and industrial

setting, 102-08

environmental protection
and development, 87-113 ethnic conflict, 21, 46 ethno-political conflict, 46 Hindu-Muslim, 46, 162-77 history of, 12-17 human rights to, 79-86, 351423 imperialist governance, 5-6 imperialist legacy, 3

494
induced arms race in, 41-44 inter-state conflicts, 50-52 intervention possibilities for
protecting environmenl in, r08- l3 legislatures, 144-45 rJllgratiorrs, 74-77 military interventions, 52-53 Muslims ir,, 46, 162-77 nation building and conflicts

Perspecttues on South Asia under agriculture in, 9t security ill, 20-21 self-determination in, 4-5 shared values in imagination in, I48-61 state structure remodelling. 9-10

strategies

in

international

economic negotiation. 29

in. 44-45

water quality

urban growth, 92-93

nationalism, 4, 24 nature of conflict, 39-4I

need for new vision, l7-22 Nepali vision ot, 12-34 new vision, 8- 1 I nuclear regimes, 43

in rivers

of,

104-06 women and culture in, 42584 South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC),

parliamentary system preference, 14l -44

policy recommendations for

18-20, 27, 3I, 37, 54,70, r16-22, 126, 148-49, 156, 255,276, 422

conflict control manage-

ment and resolution, 5663

South Asian Human Rights,

420 Spate, 1O2 (SpA), Bangladesh, 362-63 Spector, Leonard, 42 Sri Lanka, economy, 259-69, 2aO basic indicator, 261 IPZ-s,263-64

South Asian Civil Society, 34

political degeneration, 2l political process in, 123-45 politicised ethnicity, 68-77 politics and elfutici\r, 72-74 polity and democracy in, 281-350 population change in, 89-90 presidential system preference

Special Powers Act

in, I4l -44

principles goveming bilateral and regional relations, 6263 prolile of, 37-39 religion's role in, 23-24 religious and ethnic conflicts

macro economic adjustment, 267-69

macro economic manade-

ment, 261- 62
performance, 259,61

in. 45-47 resurgence of democratic

values, 26-27 ruler and ruled relaUons, 6-

policy, 259 problems and prospects, 262-67 e{hnicity and ethnic conflict,

254,272-74

politics luture prospects,

277-80
welfare state, 269-72

foreign policy, 274-77

ruler population and

area

Irdex

495
Toynbee, Arnold, 149 Tripathi, S., lll

Sri Lankan art, images of

women in, 468-7f
concept ofgoddesses and her

cult worship, 472-74 inter-cultural lilrks, 47 l -72 life's constraints and opportunities. 474-75 male/female union principle in, 474 social and political role. 47577

UNCEDAW 355

uNP,257 -5a,27a-79
UN Refugee Relief Organisation,

United Liberation Front of

Assam (ULFA), 38

50 Ujeli, 156

social position of women in,

United Nations Development

Universal franchise, in India, ta2 Upadhyaya, Ragini, I57 Upzila system, Bangladesh, 344-46 Urban and industrial areas, environmental problems in, r02-08 Untkku,45O
VHP, I28 Voishn ou a P adab ali, 4 43
Vajpayee, Atal Behari, 197 Vasudev, Aruna, 454 Verghese, Et.G., fOO, 384

Programme (UNDP), 269

472-74 symbolic worship of mother

eafih,472
St4tesman, 252, 364 Subedi. Abhi. 156-57 Subramaniam, G., 483 Sultan, S.M., 424, 4as Sultana, Rokeya, 435, 437, 482 Sumnima, 153 Suppression of Terrorist Activities Act. Pakistan. 4O9 Suryadighal Bari, 379 Swain, Ashok, 1OO, 1ll Swarno Kumari Devi, 445

Tagore, Rabindranath, l5O,

16r, 338, 366, 37 1, 445, 447 Tanakpur Project, Nepal, 252
Television, image of women on, 462-67

Vidrohi Koibarta, 38O Village Development Committee (VDC), Nepal, 315-19, 323,

325,327-24
Violence, cuiture of, 7-8 Vyas, V.S., 95, f 08

Tendulkar, Vij ay, 162

Teresa, Mother, 483

Terrorist and Disruptive

(TADA) India, 409

Activities (Prevention) Act

wTo,29
Waliullah, Syed, 378-79 Welfare slate. concept of, 246
Women,

Thatcher, Margaret, 402

Thera, Madapatha Dhamasera, 483

communalism and, 480-82

LUr l tcll
r

Thingan, Shikha, 461 Tilak, Lokamanya, 163

P Lr-r ar

Tirni 38 f Tiwari. Shashikala. I 57

llction and, 448-50 poetry and, 446-47 South Asian arL, 479-84 ethnic violence and, 358-59

496 fundamentalism ald, 356, 4ao-82 human rights and, 353, 48283 images of

P er sp e ctiue

s on South A sir:-

in Hindi cinema, 454-61 in Sri Lankan aft, 468-77

social and political roles, +tc-t I social justice and, 482-83 social position as depicted in art, 472-7 4
South Asian art and, 479-83 traflicking ol 356-58 violence against, 353-56 writing in Bangladesh, 439tre

47t-72 on'IY,462-67 in art in Bangladesh, 42738 in Bangla literature, 441-53

inter-cultural links

of,

in Sri l.ankan ari, 468-77 in society, 483-84 protest against political repression and social injustice, 450-52 religious fundamentalism
and, 356, 480-82 rights in Bangladesh, 353

T., 102 World Bank, 217, 259, 26A, 270,277

Vr'oodhead,

Zafar, Sikandar Abu, 446 Zaker, Sara, 462 fukhmee AuraL 459 Zaman, Farida, 434-35
Z,eba, Fareha, 437 Za-ul Haq, 45, 48, 132-33, t4O,

203-O4

fruganov, Gennady, 238