LIBERTY UNIVERSITY

PHILOSOPHICAL ARGUMENT FOR THE EXISTENCE OF GOD IN RESPONSE TO H.J. MCCLOSKEYS ON BEING AN ATHEIST

A PAPER SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE OF BACHELOR OF SCIENCE

SCHOOL OF RELIGION

BY JOSHUA LUMPKIN

LYNCHBURG, VIRGINIA JULY 2011

H.J. McCloskey, in his article, On Being an Atheist, presents a series of arguments in an effort to justify his atheism. His strategy includes dissecting specific claims made by those who advocate the existence of a Creator, in general, and the Christian God, in particular. He begins his series of objections by way of summarizing each of the arguments, which he calls proofs, concluding that neither of them, individually, should create enough comfort or security to believe in God. However, if we take the cumulative case approach in explaining the existence of God, what we have is successions of truths that, individually, cannot bring about definite proof, but, together, create concurrence. Additionally, if the objections are examined separately, McCloskey faces the same flaw he protests: that each of his objections is fatal to the existence of God. McCloskeys first objection is to the cosmological argumentthe argument from existence. He claims that the mere existence of the world constitutes no reason for believing in such a being [i.e. a necessarily existing being]. 1 However, because there are contingent beings in the universebeings that, because they do not have an explanation for their own existence, must point to an ultimate beinga first cause of the contingent beings must, therefore, exist. A first cause is necessitated due to the fact that contingency cannot be infinite. 2 Just as a trail of falling dominoes necessitates a first domino falling, the existence of the universe necessitates, and is contingent upon, an uncaused cause. The ultimate question we are really asking ourselves is, Why does anything exist? Is the answer to the question of existence meaningful or meaningless? While the cosmological
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2

H.J. McCloskey, On Being an Atheist, Question 1 (February 1968): 51. C. Stephen Evans and R. Zachary Manis, Philosophy of Religion, 2nd Ed., (Downers Grove, IL: IVP Academic, 2009), 74-75.

argument begins to open ones senses to the idea of an ultimate being, McCloskey is correct in asserting that the causal argument, does not entitle us to postulate an allpowerful, all-perfect, uncaused cause. 3 In the case of the teleological argumentthe argument from designit purports a source of intelligence in the way which the universe came to exist. McCloskey, after elaborating on several reasons for his belief that this argument is unsatisfactory in proving Gods existence, he says, all we should be entitled to conclude was that there was a powerful, malevolent, or imperfect planner or designer. 4 However, what McCloskey does not see is that he is refuting his own position by declaring an awareness of nature being broken. Tim Keller, in The Reason for God, says, We cant know that nature is broken in some way unless there is some supernatural standard of normalcy apart from nature by which we can judge right and wrong. 5 By concluding that there was an imperfect planner or designer, McCloskey is alluding to the fact that nature today is broken, whether or not he believes in it ever being perfect. McCloskey makes another claim, perhaps more preposterous than the previous one. He says that, in reference to the teleological argument, To get the proof going, genuine indisputable examples of design and purpose are needed. 6 The idea that his concept of indisputability is a very conclusive objection, is a false one. 7 First, the standard he sets for the defender of the argument is one he cannot live up to himself. Second, because indisputability is, according to Evans, so high, perhaps, that a proof of theism is in principle unattainable, his very conclusive objection is made to be, in fact, inconclusive and, therefore,
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H.J. McCloskey, On Being an Atheist, 51. Ibid., 52 Timothy Keller, The Reason for God, (New York, NY: Riverhead Books, 2008), 161. H.J. McCloskey, On Being an Atheist, 52. Ibid.

unreasonable. 8 Still, one example of the teleological argument exists in the analogical form. The analogical versions of the argument, as mentioned, try to confront this problem head-on. For example, we might argue as follows: (1) Objects in nature are analogous to manmade machines, in that their parts work together to achieve some end or purpose. (2) Manmade machines are the result of intelligent design. (3) Analogous effects tend to have analogous causes. (4) Therefore, objects in nature are probably the result of something analogous to intelligent design. 9 While it may not be sufficient to meet with McCloskeys standard of indisputable, it is forcibly convincing for the argument from design. McCloskey implies that evolution has displaced the need for a designer. However, even if this were true, the theist could use this implication as a means of proving his point by arguing that, just as the manmade machine achieves an ultimate purpose (and therefore that ultimate purpose was intelligently designed), according to Evans, the evolutionary process, even if it is a mechanical process, is simply the means whereby God, the intelligent designer, realizes his purposes. 10 It is as if the fact that the evolutionary process is such a sophisticated process as to affirm intelligent design eludes McCloskey. Evil certainly exists in the world. Furthermore, when McCloskey claims that the presence of imperfection and evil in the world argues against the perfection of the divine design or divine purpose in the world, it seems as if this statement holds some merit. 11 However, as Evans explains, the cosmological argument only alludes to the existence of a first cause (and not a personal, all-powerful God). Without this additional knowledge of
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C. Stephen Evans, Philosophy of Religion, 87. Ibid., 81. Ibid., 83. H.J. McCloskey, On Being an Atheist, 52.

God, McCloskey incorrectly assumes that the perfection of the divine design or divine purpose in the world is something that can or will be seen at this time or on this earth. 12 Keller says, In short, the problem of tragedy, suffering, and injustice is a problem for everyone. It is at least as big a problem for nonbelief in God as for belief. It is therefore a mistake, though an understandable one, to think that if you abandon belief in God it somehow makes the problem of evil easier to handle. 13 Furthermore, C.S. Lewis explains, My argument against God was that the universe seemed so cruel and unjust. But how had I got this idea of just and unjust?...What was I comparing this universe with when I called it unjust?...Of course I could have given up my idea of justice by saying it was nothing but a private idea of my own. But if I did that, then my argument against God collapsed toofor the argument depended on saying that the world was really unjust, not simply that it did not happen to please my private fancies. Consequently atheism turns out to be too simple. 14 While this is one of the most common objections to the existence of God, though it certainly seems logical on the surface, it proposes certain assumptions, as previously pointed out by Keller and Lewis. One of these assumptions is that in order for God to exist and be omnipotent, omniscient and omnibenevolent, he must rid the world of every form of evil. Why is this even reasonable to accept? Evans points out, It does not seem to be truethat a good being always eliminates evil as far as it can. What is true, perhaps, is that a good being always eliminates evil as far as it can without the loss of a greater good or the allowance of a worse evil. 15 Another problem that McCloskey faces is this: From what source do we derive the definition of evil? It seems the most appropriate place one would obtain this definition is from the source in which it is
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C. Stephen Evans, Philosophy of Religion, 77. Timothy Keller, The Reason for God, 27. 14 C. S. Lewis, Mere Christianity (Macmillan, 1960), 31; quoted in Timothy Keller, The Reason for God, (New York, NY: Riverhead Books, 2008), 26. 15 C. Stephen Evans, Philosophy of Religion, 160.

primarily discussed, the Bible. Unfortunately for McCloskey, in the Bible, evil ranges from the grand scheme (destructive armies, pestilence and disasters) down to the minutest of details (motives of the heart). This definition, when applied to McCloskeys claim that, No being who was perfect could have created a world in whichhis creatures would engage in morally evil actswhichresult in injury to innocent persons, combined with his allusion that this kind of evil must be eliminated in order for God to exist, would require the elimination of the human race altogether, including McCloskey himself. With regard to free will, McCloskey specifically discusses the free will argument, asking might not God have very easily so have arranged the world and biased man to virtue that men always freely chose what is right? 16 The answer to this question is a resounding no! First, if there is a right, then, by definition, there must, therefore, be a wrong. Second, if there are two options, but we are wired to only choose one of those options, how can freedom exist? What is most intriguing about atheists is that most have a sense of right and wrong, apart from legal definitions. However, without God, what constitutes this sense of morality? In countries other than the United States of America, there are happenings that take place that are illegal in our justice system. For example, some countries permit slavery, sex-trafficking, and genocide. Atheists do have a sense that this is wrong, but this begs the question: why is it wrong? If there is no God, then everything happening on the earth today is a variable of chance, and, therefore, accidental or unplanned. How, then, can you call any of it evil? 17

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H.J. McCloskey, On Being an Atheist, 53. William Lane Craig, Reasonable Faith: Christian Truth and Apologetics, 3rd Ed., (Wheaton, IL: Crossway Books, 2008), 88.

In the end, McCloskey argues against the existence of God purely from an egocentric perspective. With such phrases as, comfort and security, and with such views as the idea that pain is ultimately evil, or that evil has a clear definition, McCloskey assumes that if a god exists, he would exist for us. Atheism is, in essence, a form of theism worship of the idol-god of creation (primarily of self) and not the Creatorand therefore, requires the same amount of, if not more, audacious faith. It is easy to see, then, why McCloskey claims that, Atheism, adopted by a thoughtful and sensitive person, leads to a spirit of self-reliance, to a self-respect, which demands that we comfort and help those who need such support. 18

BIBLIOGRAPHY
18

H.J. McCloskey, On Being an Atheist, 54.

Craig, William Lane. Reasonable Faith: Christian Truth and Apologetics, 3rd Ed., Wheaton, IL: Crossway Books, 2008. Evans, C. Stephen and R. Zachary Manis. Philosophy of Religion, 2nd Ed. Downers Grove, IL: IVP Academic, 2009. Lewis C. S., Mere Christianity Macmillan, 1960, 31. Quoted in Timothy Keller, The Reason for God, (New York, NY: Riverhead Books, 2008), 26. Keller, Timothy. The Reason for God. New York, NY: Riverhead, 2008. McCloskey, H.J. On Being an Atheist, Question 1 (February 1968): 51-54.