R 202334Z NOV 90 FM AMEMBASSY BOGOTA TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0576 UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 BOGOTA 18530 SUBJECT: COLOMBIA: 1990 ANNUAL

TERRORISM REPORT

REF: (A) STATE 355397; (B) BOGOTA 5568; (C) BOGOTA 14054; ---------BACKGROUND ---------1. COLOMBIA'S DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT IS CONFRONTED BY THREE LEFTIST GUERRILLA ORGANIZATIONS AS WELL AS VIOLENT, WELL-FINANCED NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING ORGANIZATIONS. BOTH THE INSURGENTS AND THE TRAFFICKERS USE TERRORISM, ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY AGAINST DOMESTIC TARGETS. GUERRILLA VIOLENCE CAN ONLY BE CONSIDERED INTERNATIONAL TO THE EXTENT THAT ONE GROUP'S ACTIVITIES HAVE AT TIMES CROSSED COLOMBIA'S BORDER INTO VENEZUELA AND ECUADOR. -----------PROSECUTIONS -----------2. THERE WERE NO PROSECUTIONS INVOLVING INTER-

NATIONAL TERRORISM IN COLOMBIA IN 1990. -------------------------SIGNIFICANT TERRORIST ACTS -------------------------3. NUMEROUS ACTS OF DOMESTIC TERRORISM OCCURED IN 1990, SOME THE RESULT OF GUERRILLA INTIMIDATION CAMPAIGNS AGAINST RURAL POPULATIONS. GUERRILLAS REGULARLY TORTURE AND MURDER PEASANTS AND OTHERS SUSPECTED OF ASSISTING GOVERNMENT SECURITY FORCES. THE MOST SIGNIFICANT TERRORIST ATTACKS, HOWEVER, WERE COMMITTED BY THE LOOSE CONGLOMERATE OF NARCOTICS TRAFFICKERS KNOWN AS THE MEDELLIN CARTEL. IN AUGUST 1989 THE GOVERNMENT LAUNCHED A CRACKDOWN AGAINST THE MEDELLIN CARTEL FOLLOWING A STRING OF POLITICAL ASSASSINATIONS ATTRIBUTED TO THE CARTEL. THE NARCOTICS TRAFFICKERS RESPONDED WITH A VIOLENT CAMPAIGN OF BOMBINGS AND ASSASSINATIONS OF POLITICAL FIGURES AND POLICEMEN THAT CONTINUED INTO 1990. THE BOMBINGS WERE INTENDED TO INDUCE THE PUBLIC INTO PRESSURING THE GOVERNMENT INTO MAKING CONCESSIONS TO THE NARCOTICS TRAFFICKERS. THE ASSASSINATIONS WERE MEANT TO INTIMIDATE POLITICAL FIGURES OPPOSED TO THE TRAFFICKER'S INTERESTS AND DISRUPT COLOMBIA'S DEMOCRATIC ELECTIONS. 4. IN MARCH AND APRIL SUSPECTED NARCO-TERRORISTS ASSASSINATED THE TWO LEADING LEFTIST PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES. IN MAY NARCOTICS TRAFFICKERS BEGAN A COP-KILLING CAMPAIGN IN MEDELLIN, CONTRIBUTING TO A RECORD HIGH 521 POLICEMEN KILLED IN ALL OF COLOMBIA AS OF OCTOBER 16. RANDOM STREETCORNER MASSACRES IN MEDELLIN SOON FOLLOWED THE ATTACKS ON POLICEMEN,

CONTRIBUTING TO THE HIGH-LEVEL OF TERRORISM IN MEDELLIN. SPECIFIC TERRORIST ACTS MAY HAVE BEEN COMMITTED BY THE NARCOTICS TRAFFICKERS IN RETALIATION FOR GOVERNMENT ACTIONS. FOR EXAMPLE, THE POLICE KILLING OF ONE OF ESCOBAR'S TOP AIDES IN JUNE WAS FOLLOWED HOURS LATER BY THE EXPLOSION OF A CAR BOMB WHICH KILLED THREE PEOPLE. 5. FOLLOWING THE INAUGURATION OF THE NEW PRESIDENT AUGUST 7, THE NARCOTICS TRAFFICKERS CHANGED THEIR TACTICS. DURING SEPTEMBER AND OCTOBER, THE GROUP OF TRAFFICKERS KNOWN AS "THE EXTRADITABLES" KIDNAPPED NINE PROMINENT COLOMBIANS, MOSTLY JOURNALISTS. IT IS WIDELY BELIEVED THAT THE KIDNAPPERS' AIM IS TO INFLUENCE THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY, SCHEDULED TO MEET IN FEBRUARY TO REFORM THE CONSTITUTION. AMONG OTHER THINGS, THE TRAFFICKERS WANT THE ASSEMBLY TO PROHIBIT CONSTITUTIONALLY THE EXTRADITION OF COLOMBIAN CITIZENS. -------------------EXTRADITION REQUESTS -------------------6. THE GOVERNMENT OF COLOMBIA MADE NO REQUESTS FOR EXTRADITION OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISTS IN 1990. -----------------------------------------IMPEDIMENTS TO PROSECUTION AND EXTRADITION ------------------------------------------

7. REF B, PLUS PREVIOUS EMBASSY REPORTING, DESCRIBES THE PROFOUND PROBLEMS OF THE COLOMBIAN JUDICIAL SYSTEM, WHICH IS OUTDATED, INEFFECTIVE, AND VULNERABLE TO CORRUPTION AND INTIMIDATION. GOVERNMENT POLICY IS TO ARREST AND PROSECUTE THOSE WHO COMMIT TERRORIST ACTS, BUT IN REALITY THOSE WHO COMMIT THESE CRIMES ARE RARELY CAUGHT. THE CURRENT ADMINISTRATION IS IMPLEMENTING A JUDICIAL REFORM PROGRAM IT HOPES WILL STRENGTHEN THE GOVERNMENT'S ABILITY TO ARREST AND PROSECUTE TERRORISTS. 8. THE GOC CURRENTLY HAS NO LEGAL MECHANISM FOR EXTRADITING A COLOMBIAN TO THE U.S. FOR CRIMES OTHER THAN NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING. IN AUGUST 1989 COLOMBIA RESUMED EXTRADITIONS BY EXECUTIVE DECREE, FOLLOWING SEVERAL YEARS DURING WHICH EXTRADITIONS WERE PROHIBITED BY A 1987 SUPREME COURT RULING. THE 1989 DECREE ONLY PROVIDES FOR THE EXTRADITION OF THOSE ACCUSED OF NARCOTICS-RELATED CRIMES. INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM CRIMES ARE NOT INCLUDED. IN SEPTEMBER THE GOVERNMENT PROMULGATED A DECREE (REF C) GRANTING IMMUNITY FROM EXTRADITION TO THOSE WHO CONFESS NARCOTICS OR TERRORIST-RELATED CRIMES. ONLY ONE TRAFFICKER HAS TAKEN ADVANTAGE OF THIS DECREE, HOWEVER, AND COLOMBIA CONTINUES TO EXTRADITE DRUG TRAFFICKERS TO THE U.S. 9. IN JUNE 1990 THE GOC ISSUED ARREST WARRANTS FOR FIVE BRITISH MERCENARIES ACCUSED OF TRAINING PARA-MILITARY GROUPS FOR COLOMBIA'S NARCOTICS TRAFFICKERS. COLOMBIA HAS A VALID EXTRADITION TREATY WITH THE UNITED KINGDOM, BUT APPARENTLY HAS MADE NO REQUEST FOR THEIR EXTRADITION.

-------------------------------RESPONSES OTHER THAN PROSECUTION -------------------------------10. COLOMBIAN GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS REGULARLY CONDEMN TERRORIST ACTS, BOTH DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL. THE GOC WAS THE PRIMARY INSTIGATOR OF AN INVESTIGATION INTO AN ANTIGUA-BROKERED ISRAELI ARMS SALE TO COLOMBIAN NARCOTICS TRAFFICKERS. IN JULY THE JUSTICE MINISTRY CONDUCTED A MAJOR SHAKEUP OF COLOMBIA'S PUBLIC ORDER COURTS, RESPONSIBLE FOR HANDLING TERRORISM CASES, IN AN EFFORT TO IMPROVE THE COURTS' PERFORMANCE. -----------------------------MAJOR COUNTERTERRORISM EFFORTS -----------------------------11. IN NOVEMBER THE GOVERNMENT CONDUCTED A MAJOR ATTACK ON THE SECOND MOST IMPORTANT BASE OF COLOMBIA'S LARGEST GUERRILLA GROUP, DEALING A BLOW TO THAT GROUP'S ABILITY TO CONDUCT TERRORIST ACTS. COLOMBIA AGGRESSIVELY CAMPAIGNS IN THE UN AND THE OAS FOR ADOPTION OF RESOLUTIONS CONDEMNING THE ILLICIT CONVENTIONAL ARMS TRADE. COLOMBIA HAS ALSO CALLED FOR TIGHTER RESTRICTIONS IN LEGITIMATE ARMS TRANSFERS. ----------------------------------SUPPORT FOR INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM -----------------------------------

12. COLOMBIA PROVIDES NO SUPPORT TO INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM OR TERRORIST GROUPS, NOR HAS THE GOVERNMENT MADE ANY STATEMENTS IN FAVOR OF A TERRORIST-SUPPORTING COUNTRY ON A TERRORISM ISSUE. IN 1980 COLOMBIA BROKE RELATIONS WITH CUBA BECAUSE OF THE LATTER'S SUPPORT FOR COLOMBIAN GUERRILLAS. -----------------------------SIGNIFICANT CHANGES SINCE 1989 -----------------------------13. THERE HAS BEEN NO SIGNIFICANT CHANGE IN COLOMBIA'S ATTITUDE TOWARDS TERRORISM. THE GOC CONTINUES TO CONDEMN TERRORISM AND PROSECUTE TERRORISTS TO THE BEST OF ITS VERY LIMITED ABILITY. HOBBS (Edited and reformatted by Andres for ease of reading.)