Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
Ciro Paoletti
Praeger Security International Advisory Board Board Cochairs Loch K. Johnson, Regents Professor of Public and International Affairs, School of Public and International Affairs, University of Georgia (U.S.A.) Paul Wilkinson, Professor of International Relations and Chairman of the Advisory Board, Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence, University of St. Andrews (U.K.) Members Anthony H. Cordesman, Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy, Center for Strategic and International Studies (U.S.A.) ` Therese Delpech, Director of Strategic Affairs, Atomic Energy Commission, and Senior Research Fellow, CERI (Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques), Paris (France) Sir Michael Howard, former Chichele Professor of the History of War and Regis Professor of Modern History, Oxford University, and Robert A. Lovett Professor of Military and Naval History, Yale University (U.K.) Lieutenant General Claudia J. Kennedy, USA (Ret.), former Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army (U.S.A.) Paul M. Kennedy, J. Richardson Dilworth Professor of History and Director, International Security Studies, Yale University (U.S.A.) Robert J. ONeill, former Chichele Professor of the History of War, All Souls College, Oxford University (Australia) Shibley Telhami, Anwar Sadat Chair for Peace and Development, Department of Government and Politics, University of Maryland (U.S.A.) Fareed Zakaria, Editor, Newsweek International (U.S.A.)
Ciro Paoletti
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Paoletti, Ciro, 1962 A military history of Italy / Ciro Paoletti. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN: 978-0-275-98505-9 (alk. paper) 1. ItalyHistory, Military. I. Title. DG482.P36 2008 355.00945dc22 2007036162 British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data is available. Copyright 2008 by Ciro Paoletti All rights reserved. No portion of this book may be reproduced, by any process or technique, without the express written consent of the publisher. Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 2007036162 ISBN: 978-0-275-98505-9 First published in 2008 Praeger Security International, 88 Post Road West, Westport, CT 06881 An imprint of Greenwood Publishing Group, Inc. www.praeger.com Printed in the United States of America
The paper used in this book complies with the Permanent Paper Standard issued by the National Information Standards Organization (Z39.481984). 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
Contents
Acknowledgments Introduction PART I: THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY 1 Before the Deluge 2 The Italian Wars in the Early Sixteenth Century 3 Between France and the Muslims: 15651601 PART II: THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY 4 The Thirty Years War in Italy 5 The Second Half of the Century 6 The League of Augsburg: 16901696 PART III: THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 7 The Spanish Succession: 17001713 8 The Second Morea War, the Quadruple Alliance, and the Corsican Troubles: 17151733 9 The Polish Succession: 17331739 10 The War of Austrian Succession: 17401748 11 Italy from the Corsican Rebellion to the French Revolution through the First Cold War: 17481792 12 The Revolutionary Hurricane: 17921799 PART IV: THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 13 Napoleon Emperor and King 14 From the Restoration to the First War of Independence: 18161847 15 The First War of Independence: 18481849
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3 8 16
23 30 38
43 48 51 53 57 63
77 85 94
vi Contents
16 17 18 19 From the Peace to the Second War of Independence: 18491859 Garibaldi in Sicily The New State The Kingdom, Royal Policy, and the Colonies, from Rome to Peking: 18711900 102 110 115 122
PART V: THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 20 Before the Great War: 19001912 21 The Great War: 19151918 22 From the Great War to the Ethiopian War 23 24 25 26 Overseas Spain and Overseas Tirana: 19361939 The War with the Germans: 19401943 The War Against the Germans: 19431945 Italian Armed Forces from World War II to the End of the Cold War: 19461988 27 Italy and NATO until the End of the Cold War 28 From the Cold War to the War on Terror: 19892005 Notes Bibliography Military Unit Index Name Index Place Index A photo essay follows page 128. 131 136 151 162 167 183 192 198 205 215 235 247 251 261
Acknowledgments
My first deepest and foremost thanks go to Frederick C. Schneid, whose help was incomparably important. Without his support, work, experience, revisions, and suggestions this work probably would never have been published. My second deepest and foremost thanks go to Heather Staines: It was only thanks to her patience and activity that the whole work, in spite of some strange adventures, was achieved and published.
Introduction
The Historical Service of the Italian Army originally commissioned this work in 1995. The idea was to create a general survey of Italian military history from the beginning of the Modern Age to the present. This meant a book beginning with the discovery of America by Columbusor, as Italian books often say, from the death of Lorenzo the Magnificent to the end of the Cold War. Nothing comparable existed and, after twenty years of studying military history, I needed only two years (and something more than three thousand titles) to write the book. Published by the Italian Army Historical Service in 2002 under the title Gli Italiani in armicinque secoli di storia militare nazionale, 14952000 (The Italians at Arms: Five Centuries of National Military History, 14952000), it was successfully reviewed in the International Bibliography of Military History and in the United States in the Journal of Military History. Then it was chosen as an officially suggested text by the ISSMI, the Italian Joint Staff Interforce Institute, but never republished. Of course, when Praeger asked me to write a military history of Italy, this book found new life, but this is not a pure translation of the old work. This is something quite different. The Italian book was 650 pages in length and had 3,300 titles in its bibliography; this book has 8,500. The original book for the army focused on armies and land warfare, only leaving room for basic information about the Italian navy and air force. While this book is well balanced, it provides a general account of the development of military technology in Italy and how it was implemented by its armed forces. Finally, the original was intended to be read largely by Italian officers and scholars; it did not contain information understood in the context of Italian historical memory or general knowledge, yet this book was written with an understanding that this information is new to a non-Italian audience. I have been careful to include contextual explanations when needed. At the time when I prepared the original work, I realized that the lack of general information concerning Italian military history was commonplace. Entire periods, such as the seventeenth century, had been completely forgotten, because they were no longer studied. The social history, focusing on specific facts, or classes, or people, abandoned an overview any good historian must have to understand events. Moreover, this new history led to the rejection of fields related to military history. There is, of course, a good reason to explain such a lack of knowledge. The
x Introduction
French Revolution caused a deep change in Italian ruling classes. It allowed the bourgeoisie to overthrow the aristocracy and force monarchies to grant constitutions. Half a century after the end of Napoleonic rule, the bourgeoisie and a large reform-minded portion of the aristocracy pursued national unification under the banner of a constitutional Kingdom of Italy founded by the House of Savoy. As a result, after 1861 the histories of preunification Italy were no longer studied. The new histories, beginning in the late nineteenth century, focused on the history of the House of Savoy, and of course on its own state, the Duchy of Savoy, later the Kingdom of Piedmont-Sardinia. This would have been enough to create problems for any historian. The ruling groups in the new kingdom were direct descendants of those who cooperated with Napoleon; this meant the government held an official position on the Napoleonic era. In 1845, Charles Albert of Sardiniathat is to say the House of Savoyaccepted the mantle of revolution, whose heritage was traced to the French Revolution. Between 184860, in order to justify their current situation, the French and their collaborators in Italy (17971814) were considered heroes and their enemies villains. Moreover, this game was easier when discrediting other Italian states. The Risorgimento had been against Austriaa Napoleonic foe, the papacysubordinated to Napoleon, and the king of Naples, whose dynasty, according to the Risorgimento propaganda, opposed the Italian unification as far back as 1799. When in 1876, fifteen years after unification, the political coalition known as the Historical Left gained power, the process accelerated. The Historical Left was composed of nationalists belonging to former revolutionary groups, who needed to demonstrate that they were on the right side of revolution. They focused their energy on magnifying the recent Risorgimento and used the Napoleonic period as the source for everything good and a demonstration of their own correctness. There was a problem, however, when applying this methodology to the armed forces. How does one establish a historical heritage for the newly created Italian army? The seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, with all their victories against the French, Austrians, Turks, and Spanish, were forgotten, especially because the new ruling class had taken no part in them. As well, these centuries lacked political relevance. In fact, it was considered unpatriotic to study the old states, which later opposed national unification, and it could be a symptom of a weak patriotic spirit to study those stateslike Venicewhich disappeared before the Risorgimento. Ignoring these states and their history meant forgetting their military history, and the abandonment of military history made it impossible to speak of the Italians as a military people. The new nationalist spirit, however, wanted to demonstrate that the Third Rome, the Rome of united Italy, the capital of the new kingdom, commanded a European power. Attention turned to Napoleons Italian Army, and it became difficult to find any history addressing military campaigns prior to 1796. Indeed, polemics and propaganda distorted the histories written thereafter. For instance, the two 1866 battles of Custoza and Lissa were used to attack the contemporary government.
Introduction
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The same happened after the colonial defeat of Adowa in 1896, when the press transformed it into a strategic disaster and a national shame, forcing Prime Minister Crispi to disappear. This process continued in the following years and distorted political interpretations, affected the histories of the Great War, Fascism and its wars, and, of course, the Second World War. All of this complicated the panorama of Italian military history. As a result, after the end of World War II, military history was out of favor. The Partisans who fought against Fascism in 194345 were, in a certain sense, the same ruling class the Fascists had defeated when taking power in 1922. In fact, many members of the Resistance had been members of Parliament or of the government until 1925, when Mussolinis dictatorship began. The year 1946 inaugurated a new era in writing military history. The Italian left, notably the Communists, struggled to gain political power, and they heavily influenced intellectuals. Their perception of military history meant to speak a priori of Fascism as the evil and of the Resistance as the good. And when, after consultation with archival sources, someoneas did Renzo De Felicewrote that Fascism was not the absolute evil and Mussolini had not been the worst man in the whole of history, he was attacked and accused of being a Fascist, that is to say a sort of intellectual leper. The political climate and context of postwar Italy and the prevailing negative view of military history led to a tragic lack of research. For these reasons Italy saw few military historians. Piero Pieri, generally regarded as the best Italian military historian of the twentieth century, left a large number of general studies, but only one pupil: Giorgio Rochat, who, belonging to the left, spent his life studying the Italian military history of 18701945, as did Lucio Ceva. Raimondo Luraghi, who studied under Italys expert on the seventeenth centuryGuido Quazzasoon abandoned his old and much-loved studies and found new interest in the Confederate navy in the American Civil War. Ennio Concina moved away from studying the Venetian armed forces to medieval and early Renaissance maritime affairs. There were truly few good historians who dealt with the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Ferdinando Pedriali wrote many books on the Italian Air Force, as Riccardo Nassigh wrote on naval power in the Adriatic. Rear Admiral Pier Paolo Ramoino educated an entire generation of naval officers by looking at the lessons of the past, often a very far past, to divine the future. Mariano Gabriele, Alberto Santoni, and Giuliano Colliva wrote some good works about the Italian Royal Navy produced after many years of research. Ugo Barlozzetti and Nicola Pignato definitively studied Italian military motorization. Virgilio Ilari prepared the only existing work about the military service in Italy, Storia del servizio militare in Italia, 5 volumes (Roma: Ce.Mi.S.S.Rivista Militare, 1991), but began writing books about Italian military history prior to the twentieth century after he collaborated with me. All the other military historians dealt only with the Second World War and the Resistance. The same can be said for the generation of historians born in the sixties: Enrico Cernigoi wrote many very good books about the Great War, Italian submarines,
xii Introduction
and about World War II and national identity; Filippo Cappellano is the best expert on firearms; and Flavio Carbone produced new studies about the police services and Carabineers from their origins, giving a new and clearer perspective of their role. No general overview of Italian military history, however, existed before my book (and until now no other came after it). No one seemed attracted to the idea. Furthermore, when someone studied the pre-Napoleonic past, it was very narrow and disassociated from its relationship to the economic, political, and social situation of Italy at that time. The best authors focused only on the last century, and that is why it is so difficult to find recent works (within the last seventy years) about Italian wars prior to the twentieth century. The few Italian authors who studied the old states were mostly in their thirties and, being as they were preparing their works at the same time I was preparing my book, they were completely unknown to the public. This ` is why I discovered so late, after having published my first book in 1995, Niccolo Capponis studies on seventeenth-century Tuscany, Paolo Giacomone-Pianas work about Genoas military resources, Andrea De Consolis book on Savoys seventeenthcentury military administration, Bruno Mugnais works on seventeenth-century Turkish and Imperial armies; and, of course, none of them were accepted into the Academy, despite the high quality of their work. This is why, when preparing this original manuscript for the Italian Army, I was forced to consult the original sources. It was great luck. I could research the entire period without prejudice or influence from this or that historiographical school or scholar. Conversely, this was both quite difficult and quite good, and generated a good result. Italian military history has been misunderstood. For instance, few associated Italian conflicts with the Thirty Years War; not from books, but from the situation depicted by contemporary documents. I remember the harsh and nasty attack made by a Finnish historian against me in Prague, in summer 1997, when for the first time I presented a paper about Italy and the Thirty Years War. It was based upon facts and figures, but he told me it was useless as it spoke of unknown Italian places and little towns. I simply answered that I was very sorry: Figures and facts came out of archives. I did not pretend to give them more importance than that they had; I only presented them. And, for what concerned the unknown little cities, well, I was sorry again, but I assumed that Venice, Milan, Naples, Florence, and Rome to be generally well known and not so little to be ignored by the public. Another new issue was Italys strategic relevance during the War of Spanish Succession. Italian historians were unaware of the critical role of Italy as a theater of war because nobody studied it anymore. Then the Napoleonic era changed my perspective on the Risorgimento and, when dealing with the twentieth century, I had some surprises concerning the Great War and topics that followed. This was enough about Italian historiography and Italian scholars, but the situation was obviously worse when looking at Italian affairs in foreign literature. Italian is the language of the cultured, the deeply cultured, but the deeply cultured people are few. It was therefore very hard to find a non-Italian historian who had the time and the knowledge (and often the funding) to study Italian documents in order to
Introduction
xiii
prepare a book. But, also if a non-Italian historian would have time and means, the other problem was a dearth of books on Italian military history before 1900, other than ones on general colonial issues. It must be regarded as a miracle if some scholars in France, Great Britain, and the United States spent time studying Italian issues, but they are so few that it is quite hard to find their works and, of course, the most important topics arefor them, toothose related to the twentieth century. Here, however, emerged another problem; the current and most common opinion about Italy and Italian military history is negative. I discuss the origins of this in the book, but this current opinion heavily affected many people who wrote about Italian topics. Even histories that were supposed to be objective were in one way or in another affected by this notion. How did it happen and why? Readers who look at Anglo-Saxon and French literature before the Second World War can easily discern contemporary opinions about Italy. For instance, British historians admired the Risorgimento and spoke and wrote well of Italy. They read reports about the Piedmontese army in the Crimea in 185556 and, in 1915, British propaganda had to support the idea of a heroic and good Italian army joining the Allied cause. Of course, national pride rendered implicitly clear that the Italians were notand could not beas good as the British, but, in a sense, the Italians were not so bad. The same occurred with the French; and no American really took care to discuss Italy at that time. Then, all changed during and after the Second World War. Why? I got the answer from one of the world authorities in military history, when I met him for the only time in my life, in High Point, North Carolina, in February 2004, a few months before his death. Professor Gunther Rothenberg was very kind and talked a lot with me. When he told me he had been in the British Eighth Army during World War II and, after the Italian armistice in 1943, had been a British liaison officer to our troops fighting on the Allied side in 194345, I asked him for his sincere opinion about them. He was ever a sincere man. He was very kind, but this simply meant that he could say the more severe things in the kindest, gentlest, clearest, and best way. It was quite a surprise for me to listen to his answer that, for what he had personally seen in Africa and in Italy, the Italian troops had been as good as any other, on both sides. This was astonishing for me, because in my experience it was the first time a non-Italian did not pronounce a negative opinion about Italian troops and, of course, because of the authority who pronounced it. So, I asked, why this largely expressed crude opinion about them? Oh, he said, just propaganda. As he told me, the British had needed, as all nations need in such a case, to ridicule the enemy, to denigrate him for propaganda purposes. This was the main reason for the very poor opinion expressed by many Britons. Moreover, as it is well known, with little exception, historians copy each from the other. When someone writes, all others report his errors in their work, and when the error is also supported by prejudice, as in this case, the game is over. Apart what Professor Rothenberg told me, there is also another reason heavily affecting and complicating the work of a foreign historian dealing with Italian
xiv Introduction
affairs; the existing Italian literature. Having described the current situation, it should be clear why and how it is possible for a foreign scholar to have problems understanding what happened in Italy. If we take into consideration the problem of the missing recent printed sources about the pre-twentieth century; the reduced comprehension of the Italian language, especially among Anglo-Saxon scholars; the politically affectedand misleadingItalian literature and the existingoften old and affected by prejudiceliterature in English, we must conclude that only a miracle or a very strong will can produce a non-Italian historian dealing with Italian military affairs who produces good and reliable work. It is also the case that the less the Italian language is known, the more nonItalian scholars are discouraged to study Italian military history. The more they are discouraged, the less they publish about it in their own languages. The less they publish in their own languages, especially in English, the more the readers look for information from non-Italian sources. The final result is poor informationthat is to say, no information at all. All of this explains why there are so few real experts on Italian military history, and thats why they can be considered a phenomena. Historians such as Jeremy Black, John Gooch, Sir John Hale, Gregory Hanlon, MacGregor Knox, James J. Sadcovich, Frederick C. Schneid, Christopher Storrs, Brian R. Sullivan, Geoffrey Symcox, and Bruce C. Vandervort spent a long time studying Italian documents and searching Italian archives with very good results. The best Mussolini biography out of Italy and, I suspect, also in Italy (also officially a biography of Mussolinis mistress Margherita Sarfatti) is by Brian Sullivan. John Goochs book about the Italian armed forces from unification until the end of the Great War has been adopted as official text in at least two Italian universities. Bruce Vandervorts remarks about the Italian colonial army in 18801912 are the best Ive ever seen, Italian literature included. Frederick Schneids books on Napoleons Italian army may be considered of fundamental importance and Sir John Hales work on the Venetian army in the Renaissance is a masterpiece. Jeremy Black reached interesting conclusions about the strategic role of Italy in the Early Modern Era and especially in the early eighteenth century, as well as Christopher Storrs and Geoffrey Symcox, who recently wrote about the Duchy of Savoys development in the last days of the seventeenth and the early eighteenth century. James Sadcovichs book about the Italian Navy is quite good. Finally, Gregory Hanlon provides a good general account concerning Italian military history from the Renaissance until the Napoleonic age, even if the title, Twilight of a Military Tradition, could generate some discussion about the twilight itself. It is now up to the reader of this book to decide if, and how much, Italy was in the twilight of its military traditions.
PART
CHAPTER
and Muslims was complex. For centuries Italians and Muslims were trading partners. So the wars between the Turks and Venetians therefore consisted of a combination of bloody campaigns, privateering, commerce, and maritime war lasting more than 350 years. Despite a common enemy, common commercial and financial interests, a common language, and a common culture, Italian politics remained disparate and divisive. For much of the fifteenth century the states spent their time fighting each other over disputed territorial rights. Although they referred to themselves as Florentines, Lombards, Venetians, Genoese, or Neapolitans, when relating themselves to outsiders, such as Muslims, French, Germans, and other Europeans, they selfidentified as Italians.
Galereliterally being the Italian the word squadrone used only for cavalry, the squad of galleysand the Squadra dei Vascellithe squad of vesselsor, as the Venetians referred to them: the Light Squadron and the Heavy, or the Big, Squadron, also called the Big Army, and the the Light Army. The Heavy Squadron included all the square-sailed vessels; the Light one included rowing shipsgalleys, galleasses, half galleys, and galliotsas well as the lateen-sailed vessels like schooners, tartans, and ketches. In all the Italian states, except Venice, the Light Squadron comprised the entire fleet and usually had no more than six galleys. If we consider Italys long coasts, it was impossible to patrol blue waters to protect merchant traffic and the coast with so few ships. The Adriatic was generally safe. The Republic of Venice protected the northern Adriatic, her fleet was strong and, moreover, the Most Serene Republic had an agreement with Istanbul: No man-of-war under sultans formal authoritywhich included Barbary pirateswas allowed to sail in the Adriatic. This agreement remained in effect until the fall of the republic in 1797. Venice maintained permanent naval squadrons protecting her commercial routes. The Guardia in Candia, based in the capital of Crete, controlled eastern Mediterranean waters. The Guardia in Golfoguard in the ` Gulfat Corfu, protected the entrance to the Adriatic Sea, at that time proudly called the Gulf of Venice. Beyond the protection of Venice, the southernIonian and western Tyrrhenianseas were open to piracy. Maltese, Neapolitan, Sicilian, Sardinian, Tuscan, Genoese, and papal fleets hardly totaled more than forty-five galleys. They had no centralized command, no coordination, and they had to protect 2,600 miles of coastline. This meant that in the best possible situation, using all the galleys at the same time, there could be no more than one galley every fifty-seven miles. In fact, when considering that normally a six-galley fleet had two galleys on patrol, two galleys just back or coming back to the port, and two galleys preparing to go out, every galley had to patrol 173 miles coastline, and none in blue waters. It was clearly impossible to stop pirates. The only way to reduce the threat consisted of land-based standing forces. Thats why the Italian coast, from Nice in the northern Tyrrhenian Sea to the Gargano promontory in the southern Adriatic Seajust out of Venetian waterswas filled with watchtowers. Every tower had cannons to fire against pirates and wood for a signal fire, to warn the towns and the villages of the approaching menace and to call infantry and cavalry from the castles in the interior. All of this, however, remained insufficient to stem the threat, and Italian coastal populations concentrated in the well-fortified port cities or escaped to the interior. Towns were built on the top of hills or mountains. Coastal routes were abandoned as well as the country near the sea. Marshes became larger and larger, especially from south of Pisa down to north of Naples, because no one drained the country as the Etruscans and Romans had. Mosquitoes increased and carried malarialiterally naughty air or evil airand this disease, which was supposed to come from the country air, forced the people to concentrate in the cities, were malaria was not so terrible or did not exist at all.
CHAPTER
of the Italic League with 40,000 men intercepted and attacked Charles VIII at Fornovo on July 8, 1495. Charless army escaped complete destruction, but he lost money and materials in excess of 300,000 ducats and more than 1,000 men. His great invasion ended with a rapid retreat to France. Both sides claimed Fornovo as a victory, but it was a hollow one for the French. Their route was blocked by the League army, however, in the end they were able to force their way through. Indeed, Fornovo is significant in Italian history because it was the first time an Italian army fought for Italys honor, or Italys liberty as said in that time. The national idea was essentially a cultural one, but at Fornovo cultural unity appeared in political and military form. As often happens in alliances, after the conclusion of the war, the allies divergent interests manifested themselves and the members of the League returned to their petty rivalries. Italy now became a battlefield for dynastic competition for the next three hundred years. After the first French attempt in 1494, it was evident that the Republic of Venice was the only real contender for dominance in the peninsula. Venices strong position, however, was complicated by papal resistance to accept such an alteration to Italian geopolitics.
11
French this strategic perspective provided a great opportunity because as the sultan, Suleiman the Magnificent, moved west or north, Habsburg pressure on France was reduced. This worked quite well for France, but became a complete disaster for Venice, because the republic found itself wedged between an Austrian-Spanish dynasty and a Franco-Turkish alliance. Venices previous four enemies now became only two, but they were linked in such a way that it seemed impossible for Venice to survive. Only the desperate energy and ability of its Senate allowed Venice to resist for the next two and a half centuries.
13
The pentagonal style was further developed by Vauban and soon reached America, too, where many fortresses and military buildings were built on a pentagonal scheme. This evolution in military architecturegenerally known as the Military Revolutionmeant order and uniformity. A revolution also occurred in uniforms and weapons. Venetian infantrymen shipping on galleys for the 1571 naval campaign were all dressed in the same way;5 and papal troops shown in two 1583 frescoes are dressed in yellow and red, or in white and red, depending on the company to which they belonged.6 Likewise, papal admiral Marcantonio Colonna, in 1571, ordered his captains to provide all their soldiers with merion in the modern style, great velveted flasks for the powder, as fine as possible, and all with well ammunitioned match arquebuses . . . 7 Of course, uniformity remained a dream, especially when compared with eighteenth- or nineteenth-century styles, but it was a first step. Although a revolution in artillery and fortifications remained a significant aspect of the military revolution, captains faced the problem of increasing firepower. The Swiss went to battle in squared formations, but it proved to be unsatisfactory against artillery. Similarly, portable weapons could not fire and be reloaded fast enough, and it soon became apparent that armies needed a mixture of pike and firearms. The increasing range and effectiveness of firearms made speed on the field more important. It was clear that the more a captain could have a fast firearmed maneuvering mass, the better the result in battle. Machiavelli examined this issue; he was as bad a military theorist as he was a formidable political theorist. He suggested the use of two men on horseback: a rider and a scoppiettierea handgunneron the same horse. It was the first kind of mounted infantry in the modern era. Giovanni deMedici, the brave Florentine captain known as Giovanni of the Black Band, adopted this system. Another contemporary Florentine captain, Pietro Strozzi, who reduced the men on horseback to only one, developed the same system. He fought against Florence and Spain, then he passed to the French flag at the end of the Italian Wars. When in France, he organized a unit based upon his previous experience. It was composed of firearmed riders, considered mounted infantrymen, referred to as dragoons.
Thirty More Years of Wars in Italy, and the Beginning of a Unifying Policy of the House of Savoy: 15301560
After 1530, Italy was practically under Spanish rule. Spanish viceroys were in Naples, Palermo, and Cagliari, and a Spanish governor was resident in Milan. The Republic of Genoa and Duchy of Florence were allied to Spain. The duchies of Parma, Modena, and Mantua completely submitted. The Duchy of Savoy practically disappeared after a war between France and Spain from 1541 to 1544, and a
15
best were ordered to arm and equip themselves, according to instructions delivered from their superiors to them.8 At the same time, the duke organized a small navy, composed of a galley squadron, and began construction of a defensive ring of fortified cities, having at its center the fortified capital, the city of Turin. Emmanuel Philiberts program was successfully pursued by his heirs. Gradually, because the opposition of Spain and France, the House of Savoy increased its territory, obtained the royal crown in the eighteenth century, and in the nineteenth century achieved the goal of unifying Italy.
CHAPTER
17
Genoa, and the papacy sent reinforcements to the island. The duke of Savoy provided supplies and dispatched his galleys. King Philip II of Spain ordered the Neapolitan, Sicilian, Sardinian, and Spanish galley squadrons to assemble at the Sicilian city of Messina to aid Malta. The king of France, Francis II, did nothing, as he maintained a secret agreement with the Turks. ` On May 20, 1565, the Turkish fleet under Pial Pasha reached Malta. Grand Master Jean de La Valette had only 541 knights169 of them Italians6,000 Maltese, and 2,600 Spanish soldiers garrisoning the three forts, Saint Elmo, San Michele, and Saint Angelo. The Turks failed to take SantElmo by storm for a price of 3,000 dead compared to only 120 knights. In the following days the Turks isolated and repeatedly attacked the fort, finally prevailing on June 17. No quarter was given, and the few prisoners were flayed alive. They were then fixed on planks, and the planks were launched into the sea under the horrified eyes of the knights in the two other forts. The Turks subsequently attacked San Michele. Their first ` assault cost 2,000 dead and failed. Pial Pasha then employed alternate bombardment and infantry attacks. The fort held and, on September 7, a Christian fleet reached Malta. Composed of sixty galleys from Tuscany, Naples, Sicily, Savoy, Genoa, Sardinia, and Rome, they landed an expeditionary force of infantry and cavalry. Divided into three columns, 8,000 Italian and Spanish soldiers attacked the Turks. Their attempt to deploy their army for battle failed due to a charge by ` Tuscan cavalry, which threw the Turks into disarray, cutting them in pieces. Pial Pashas army was destroyed, only 3,000 remained on the field. The routed army fled to the ships and abandoned the invasion. After a 110-day siege, Turkish casualties amounted to 20,000 men. The Christians lost 214 knights and some 5,000 soldiers. Malta was saved, and Suleimans plans for the invasion of the western Mediterranean failed.
19
On the morning of October 7, 1571, in the Greek gulf of Lepanto, the Christian fleet engaged the Turkish fleet of 282 ships. By five oclock in the evening Don Juans victory was complete. Only 43 Turkish ships fled, while 80 Ottoman galleys were sunk and 160 captured. The Turks lost 30,000 men and 5,000 prisoners, and the Holy League lost 15 galleys and 8,500 men. More than 15,000 Christian slaves were freed from Turkish ships. The Battle of Lepanto was the greatest triumph of the Italian navies. According to tradition, on the same day in the Vatican, Pope Pius V was conducting business, then suddenly stood up and went to the window. He looked eastward for a long time, then turned and said to the cardinals: Let attend to this business no more. Let us go to thank the Lord: the Christian fleet just gained the victory.1 The cardinals were surprised and took note of the time and the day: It was five oclock in the evening. They were astonished when, after many days, messengers came from Venice announcing the victory and confirming the day and the time. Unfortunately, the Spaniards did not want to exploit the victory. They had no strategic interest in the eastern Mediterranean and their major task was to avoid a Venetian success. The Venetian Senate quickly realized they could not expect further help from Spain and its Italian dependencies or Italian states allied to Spain. The Venetian fleet was strong, but not strong enough to sustain a war against the Ottomans. This dilemma was resolved when the Venetian Senate made peace with the Turks, at the expense of the Spanish and despite papal protestations.
PART
II
CHAPTER
Causes
The European conflict known as the Thirty Years War originated in 1618 as a result of an internal conflict between the king of Bohemia, Ferdinand IIHoly Roman Emperor and head of the Austrian Habsburgsand the Protestant lords in Bohemia. They threw Ferdinands envoy and his assistants out of the castle window in Praguethe Defenestration of Pragueand then requested military support from the Evangelical Union in the Holy Roman Empire. Bohemia, a kingdom of the Austrian Habsburg realm, was one of the seven electoral territories in the Holy Roman Empire. The defiant Bohemian lords looked to the German Protestant princes in their rebellion against Ferdinand II, and offered Frederick, elector of the Palatinate, the crown of Bohemia. The Holy Roman Emperor of the German Nation was elected by prince electors. If the House of Habsburg lost the crown of Bohemia, it lost the electoral capability as well as the possibility of maintaining the imperial crown in its hands. At the onset of this struggle for Bohemia, the House of Habsburg moved quickly to deal with this crisis, although it found itself overwhelmed with additional rebellions in Austria, too. All of this provided an opportunity for Frederick, as the Protestant Evangelical Union had no standing army and no diplomatic support abroad. Venice gave diplomatic support, because an enemy of Austria was a friend of the republic. Sweden and Denmark did the same, but Venice was richer and closer to Austria and Bohemia than Denmark and Sweden, therefore its support was of major importance to Frederick.
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The problem remained building an army. It is here that Charles Emmanuel of Savoy became a central player. In 1617 he raised in Germany and paid in advance for an army of five thousand professional soldiers under General Ernst von Mansfeld. Initially, he wanted to employ it against Spain in northern Italy. With the war in Italy interrupted and the Evangelical Union needing an army, he left his forces in Germany. The Unions ambassadors agreed that in exchange for his army, they support his interest in the imperial crown. As a prince of the empire they could vote for him. Charles Emmanuel accepted the proposition and his army went to Prague. Frederick had now diplomatic support and an army. He refused any possible accommodation with the Habsburgs, and the Thirty Years War began. The Evangelical Union did not keep its word; nonetheless, both Savoy and Venice had successfully diverted the Habsburg menace from Italy. The emperor, Ferdinand II, was strongly funded by the Catholic world. His Spanish cousin, Philip III, gave him 1 million florins una tantum, but this was a trifle compared to the funds raised in Italy. Pope Paul V pledged 20,000 florins per month for the duration of the conflict. Then he permitted the emperor to levy a war tax in Italy, which brought in 250,000 scudi per year. The twelve congregations of the Catholic Church sent a 100,000-scudi gift, and this meant that, after 1623, the pope gave the emperor more money than Spain did. Moreover, the duke of Tuscany gave financial support and maintained a cavalry regiment in Germany throughout the war. Thousands of Italians took part in the war, many of whom served as highranking officers in the imperial army. Famed soldiers such as Collalto, Galasso, Piccolomini, and Raimondo Montecuccoli fought under imperial and Spanish colors. Italian troops formed a significant part of the army that defeated Frederick and the Evangelical army at White Mountain in 1618; 14,000 were later led by the duke of Feria from Italy to Bavaria, as well as 16,000 led by the Habsburg Archduke Ferdinand (later Ferdinand III), who fought and won at Nordlingen in 1634.1 The greater part of Habsburg forces and finances were drawn from Italy.
The Spanish Road and the Struggle for Its Control: 16191640
Soon after the war began, Spain moved its troops north along the Spanish Road. It was impossible to prevent their movement in Italy, but it was possible to cut the Spanish Road in Switzerland, in the Valtelline. The Grisons were the masters of that Catholic and Italian-speaking valley, and they were Protestant. The advent of the Thirty Years War in Bohemia therefore affected Switzerland, too. A long and complicated war, the First Valtelline War began in 1620, when the local Catholics massacred all the Protestants living in the valley and, supported by the Spaniards, destroyed Protestant Swiss reinforcements coming from the north. The French, directed by Cardinal Richelieu, tried to cut the Spanish Road but repeatedly failed. Richelieus objective was to weaken the Habsburgs in Italy and Germany by sup-
27
in front of Mantua, to prevent the introduction of imperial troops any farther south. Cardinal de Richelieu saw Mantua as a new opportunity. A French-born duke in Mantua could cut the Habsburgs strategic nerve. Mantua was far from the French frontier, and Richelieus army needed a secure passage through the Alps and a supply base in northern Italy. Lombardy was Spanish, but Mantua owned Monferrat, which was in Piedmont. If France could obtain free passage across the Alps with permission of Savoy, it could establish a horizontal strategic line running from the Alps through Casalethe capital of Monferratto Mantua, cutting both the Spanish Road, very close to Casale, and the Mantua route. The objective was so vital to French grand strategy that Richelieu personally led the French army into the Piedmont. Charles Emmanuel I of Savoy was allied to Spain at this time, having been betrayed by the Evangelical Union and courted by Madrid. Richelieu tried to bargain, but the duke was clever. He negotiated with the cardinal while assembling his army. At the same time the new duke of Mantua raised an army; and both Venetian and imperial troops marched to Mantua. Gradually, more than 100,000 men from Savoy, Venice, Spain, the Papal States, Mantua, France, Naples, and the empire concentrated on the Padana Plain. It was the biggest concentration of troops ever seen during the Thirty Years War; and it occurred in Italy instead of in Germany. In 1629, after the Danish phase of the Thirty Years War and prior to Swedish intervention, the turning point was reached in Italy. As C. V. Wedgwood remarked: Insignificant in itself, the Mantuan crisis was the turning point of the Thirty Years War, for it precipitated the final division of the Catholic Church against itself, alienated the pope from the Habsburg dynasty, and made morally possible the calling of Protestant allies by Catholic powers to redress the balance.2 Habsburg generals Ambrogio Spinola and Rambaldo di Collaltoboth Italians coordinated their efforts and, on July 18, 1630, Mantua fell and was pillaged by the imperials. Richelieu had captured Pinerolo, at the foot of the Piedmontese Alps, by this time, and the French and Mantuan garrison of Casale successfully kept the Spanish at bay. When this short and bloody war ended in 1630, the Treaty of Regensburg recognized the French presence in Italy and their possession of a passage across the Alps. The Spanish Road could now be cut from Casale; and the city-fortress could be supported by the French garrison at Pinerolo; and Pinerolo could be supplied from France thanks to the passage across the Alps. Richelieu had achieved a remarkable strategic success. All was quiet on the Italian front for the following five years. Germany became the major operational theater once more; and Spain focused its attention and troops there. Long columns of soldiers under Spanish colors marched along the Spanish Road from Italy to Germany to fight and die on Dutch and German battlefields. The Spanish raised an enormous amount of money in Italy. Their troops sailed from Italy to South America after 1624, when the Dutch
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fell to the rebellion. The Royal Neapolitan Republicas the revolutionary government named itselfrequested assistance from France. A French fleet arrived before the city on December 24, 1647, and fought a naval battle against the Spanish while the French duke of Guiche was proclaimed chief of the Royal Neapolitan Republic. Spain increased troops and ships in the area. At the same time the Spanish promised money and honors to all who would help them, as well as a general pardon to the city and its inhabitants. In spring 1648 the money succeeded where the weapons had failed; and the duke of Guiche was captured by Spanish forces. The Peace of Westphalia ended the war in Europe, but the Thirty Years War left unresolved problems and new animosities. France attained its strategic goals. Germany and Italy remained divided into small weak states. According to the treaty, France could intervene in German affairs to defend Protestant rights. German princes could seek French protection when in conflict with the emperor. France used this power for diplomatic and military purposes into the eighteenth century. The situation in Italy differed because the Treaties of Westphalia did not address the situation in the peninsula. France, however, retained control of the Alpine passes and the fortress of Pinerolo. This gave them a direct control over the Piedmont and the effective means to cut the Spanish Road and the Spanish logistical system.
CHAPTER
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coast. The Senate concentrated all its resources on the maritime war while reinforcing the coastal towns. Venice was hard-pressed. A city, albeit a rich one, with little territory, was standing against the Ottoman Empire. Less than 1 million Italians were resisting some 50 million Muslims under Ottoman rule. It was probably the first attrition war ever fought in the Western world. Venice could not win, but she continued to resist. Historians agree that more than 2,700 clashes occurred around the city of Candia during the twenty-three-year-long siege from 1646 to 1669; averaging one every three days.1 Nevertheless, the major engagements occurred at sea. The Venetian fleet was smaller, but Venetian sailors were more experienced and veteran. Normally, Venetian galleys of the Light Squadron held post around Candia, while the Heavy Squadron was stationed at the egress of the Dardanelles. Unfortunately, they were not strong enough to intercept all outbound Turkish convoys from Istanbul. They disrupted one or two regularly, but the numbers of enemy vessels were too great to institute an effective blockade. The Venetian fleet was able to close the Dardanelles on occasion, but when the fleet was called to support operations in Candia, as happened in 1648, the Turkish straits were abandoned and the enemy sailed into the Aegean without disruption. In 1649 an Ottoman fleet of 93 galleys and vessels left the Dardanelles en route to Candia. Venetian admiral Da Riva, commanding the Heavy Squadron, could not intercept due to contrary winds. Once the winds changed, he pursued the Turks to the Bay of Focea. Da Riva attacked and destroyed the Ottoman fleet, although outnumbered five to one. Despite the Venetian victory, the Turks sent another fleet of 83 galleys, 63 vessels, and many smaller ships to Candia the following month. They landed 7,000 men and detached 40 galleys for operations against the small Venetian-held Cretan town of Suda. General Pietro Diedo repelled the attack and the Turkish admiral was killed, but this did not alter the situation. The convoy reached Crete and supplies were landed. The next year, Venetian admiral Mocenigo, whose fleet was outnumbered two to one, attacked an Ottoman fleet of 114 ships. He destroyed 17 Turkish vessels without loss. The Turks retreated to Rhodes and then, as soon as possible, sent another convoy of 46 galleys to Crete with money to pay the besieging army. In 1654, Venetian ships twice intercepted the 164-ship Turkish convoy. They won both the times, but, being outnumbered four to one, they could not stop the entire fleet; and the Turkish army in Crete received its supplies. The next year Venice put to sea 55 ships and galleys. It was considered a great achievement because its fleet was only outnumbered 2.8 to 1. The result was the same: a great clash, a partial Venetian victory; and a 12-galley Turkish convoy reaching Crete with supplies. In 1656 the Venetian Sea Captain Generalthe supreme commander of the fleetLorenzo Marcello, attacked the Dardanelles with 63 ships. On June 26, 1656, at noon, Turkish admiral Sinan Pasha with 96 vessels and galleys engaged Marcello. It was the worst Turkish defeat since Lepanto. At the end of the afternoon, only 14 Ottoman galleys escaped to Constantinople. Marcello lost only three vessels and 300 men. He killed 10,000 Turks and liberated 500 Christian slaves.
33
the Dalmatian cities and towns captured during the war. On September 26, 1669, the last Venetian ships left Candia. All the clergy and all of the holy relics and the contents of the churches, monasteries, and private houses were taken to Venice. On October 4 the grand vizier entered Candia. Despite his promise in the capitulation, all the churches were destroyed, excluding four, which were transformed into mosques. So began 230 years of Ottoman rule in Crete. The war for Crete (Candia) had been a terrible and costly conflict. No precise figure is available for casualties. It is particularly difficult to calculate because of the great variations in size and scope of the operations each year. If 1667 is taken as an example, there were 20,000 Turkish dead compared to 400 officers and 2,600 Venetian soldiers. Yet, in the first half of 1668, the Venetian garrison lost 600 officers and 6,500 men. The period 166769 was the hardest, with 29,088 Christians and an estimated 70,000 Turks dying, and no fewer than 38,000 slaves and Cretan peasants forced by the Turks to dig trenches. According to Venetian reports, losses from the war only in Candia totaled 30,985 Venetian soldiers and 118,754 Turkish soldiers. This figure excludes casualties on the Dalmatian front, at sea, and during the first operations in Crete. It is possible that if these figures are included, casualties for both sides should be doubled. The financial costs had been terrible. Venice spent 126 million ducats, more than 5 million per year. One million was used annually for military expenditure; the remainder covered all other war-related expenses. At wars end the republic had a deficit of 64 million ducats. To compare, the contemporary purchasing value of one Venetian ducat is approximately $2,000, that is to say more than $250 billion was spent on the war. The immediate cost was nothing compared to the commercial devastation suffered by the Venetian republic. Venice lost its last and biggest commercial center in the eastern Mediterranean. During the course of the war Venetian commercial traffic from the Mediterranean to northern Europe decreased. This reduction in the availability of Mediterranean goods led to increased prices in Britain and the Low Countries. After a few years, English and Dutch merchants saw opportunity. As England and the Netherlands were neutral powers, their ships could trade in the Mediterranean with little concern. The price of their Mediterranean goods was less than the Venetians or other Italian states. Their business increased, especially because they traded with the Turks, too. When the war ended, Venice had lost a lot of men, a lot of money, a vital colony, and, above all, its monopoly on East-West trade in Mediterranean. The Candia War was a complete disaster.
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Louis XIV reviewed the situation in Sicily as operations in the Low Countries and western Germany were concluding. The French controlled only Messina and Augusta after two years of fighting. The remainder of Sicily was firmly in Spanish hands. The French expedition did not realize its strategic objective; and Louis withdrew his troops. Messina was abandoned. Fearing the return and retribution of the Spanish, 7,000 people fled with the French. When the Spanish finally recaptured the city, it was deprived of all its benefits and privileges; and those involved in the revolt were arrested and hanged.
Venice, the Holy League, and the First Morea War: 16841699
It was the summer of 1683 when the Turks besieged Vienna. Previously in 1664, they were stopped thanks to God and to Count Montecuccoli, as the Emperor Leopold I had said. Less than twenty years later the Turks returned. Pope Innocent XI proclaimed a Crusade; and again princes raised thousands of volunteers across Europe to fight against the Ottomans. He also negotiated a military agreement between the emperor and King Jan Sobieski of Poland. Venice closed the Saint Marks evangel on her flags, because in wartime no banner could have Pax tibi MarcePeace to thou, Markwritten on it. A coalition of imperial forces and the Polish army under Sobieski destroyed the Turks outside the gates of Vienna and, on January 19, 1684, another Holy League was forged. Venice, the pope, the king of Poland, the emperor, andthir-
37
teen years later, in 1696Czar Peter I the Great of Russia, marched against the Ottomans in Hungary and the Balkans. Malta and Tuscany joined the League, too, and the duke of Parma sent an infantry regiment. The Most Serene Republic of Venice was given charge of the maritime campaign and of operations in Dalmatia and Bosnia. Francesco Morosini was elected Sea Captain General. The Senate accorded him liberty of action and provided him with a fleet of 48 ships. The pope, the Knights of Malta, and the grand duke of Tuscany provided him with an additional 17 ships. Morosini left Venice on June 10. Three months later he swept the Turks from the Greek coast, conquering Vonitsa, Xeronero, Missolonghi, and Prevesa. The following year the Turkish fleet practically disappeared while Venetian troops conquered the entire Peloponnesian peninsula, or, as it was called at that time, the Morea. In 1687, while campaigning in Dalmatia, General Cornaro extended Venetian possessions. The Venetian troops under Morosini besieged Athens. They shelled the Turkish powder magazine. It was in the Parthenon and, when a well-directed Venetian shell exploded there, the Parthenon exploded, too, and remained as it is now. Without ammunition and powder the Turks surrendered within six days. The Venetian Senateaccording to ancient Roman traditiongave Morosini the title of Peloponnesiacus and, an honor not previously accorded in Venice, ordered that a statue of him be put in the Ducal Palace, although he was still alive. On March 27, 1688, Doge Giustiniani died; and the Senate elected Francesco Morosini to succeed him. The Senate accompanied his elevation by naming him supreme commander of military forces. Sultan Suleiman III ascended the throne in the midst of a devastating war. His position improved marginally when, in 1688, France suddenly attacked the Holy Roman Empire and Austrian and imperial troops were deployed to the Rhine. Venetian operations, however, continued. A Turkish army of 100,000 men, dedicated to reconquering the Peloponnesus, was destroyed; and the Turkish fleet survived by avoiding battle. Although Morosini died in January 1694, Venice continued its string of successes. After five more years of fighting, and the end of the War of the League of Augsburg, or Nine Years War, 168998 in western Europe, imperial troops returned to the Balkans. Their commander, Prince Eugene of Savoy, completely destroyed the Ottoman army at Zenta in 1697, and the next year he captured Belgrade. Defeated by the imperials in the Balkans and by the Venetians in Greece, the Turks accepted the peace in 1699. The Treaty of Carlowitz ended the war and gave the Most Serene Republic possession of Greece.
CHAPTER
The War of Devolution in 166768 and the Dutch War of 167278 made Louis XIV the most powerful king in Europe. He sought the imperial crown of Germany, and his aggressive policies became bolder each year. Subsequently, in 1686 the German princes, encouraged by Emperor Leopold I, formed a defensive alliance to protect the empire, named after the city of Augsburg where they signed the pact. The Turkish defeat at the gates of Vienna in 1683 and Venetian victories in the Morea War weakened a significant French ally. In 1688 the House of Habsburg expanded its territory with the conquest of Hungary. The emperor was widening his borders in the Balkans. Moreover, Venice enlarged its possessions in the eastern Mediterranean. A weak Ottoman Empire was not a threat to the Holy Roman Emperor; but a more powerful emperor was a problem for France. In 1688, French troops passed the Rhine, invading the empire and pillaging the Palatinate. The League of Augsburg organized the defense of the empire in the midst of this unprovoked French invasion. Indeed, in that same year the Glorious Revolution in Britain removed James II from the throne. Britain had been a close ally of France. Charles IIa cousin of Louis XIVhad been strictly linked to France, and British troops had fought in the Low Countries with the French. All of this changed because the new king of Englandthe Dutch William III of Orangewas an enemy of Louis XIV. Britain joined the League of Augsburg, now called the Great Alliance. It was composed of the German princes, the Austrian and Spanish Habsburgs, and the kings of Denmark and Sweden. The French were forced from the right bank of the Rhine, but the Allies were unable to invade France. The war widened overseas and reached America, too, where it was remembered as the King Williams War, but with little result. This equilibrium forced France and the Great Alliance to look for new allies, particularly the House of Savoy. The young Duke Victor Amadeus II reigned in Turin. He pursued the traditional Savoyard policy of enlarging the state, making it the premier power in Italy. The greatest obstacle was the French garrison in Pinerolo, there since the time of
39
Richelieu. Moreover, the duke of Mantua rented the fortress of Casale to Louis XIV in 1683, and Savoy was still a French satellite. The League offered Victor Amadeus Pinerolo and freedom from French influence. He joined the League in the spring of 1690 and prepared to attack the French. He had merely 10,000 men when he went to war. Spain and the empire sent him an additional 20,000, while Britain and Netherland gave him 30,000 scudi per month: two-thirds from London and one-third from Amsterdam.1 Victor Amadeus was appointed supreme commander of allied troops in Italy. His cousin, Prince Eugene of Savoy, commanded the imperial troops. In 1683, Prince Eugene had offered his services as a young man to Louis XIV, who curtly refused. The prince then turned to Leopold in Vienna, who gladly accepted his fealty. The war in Italy was rather peculiar. Savoys army resisted very well and maintained control of the country, but the French consistently defeated the Allies in battle, at Staffarda in 1690 and Marsaglia in 1693. Fortunately, logistical difficulties prevented the French from capitalizing on their victories, but soon Victor Amadeus realized that Austria and Spain had only limited commitments in Italy. Both Madrid and Vienna feared a strong Piedmont as much as a French presence in Italy. However, William III did not see the situation similarly as his allies did. He perceived the Italian front to be the most critical. He wanted allied troops to enter southern France, carrying the war to the enemys territory as never happened under Louis XIV. Williams letters, especially in 1691 and 1692, are very clear about it.2 Despite defeats in field, Victor Amadeus conducted a successful expedition with Prince Eugene in southern France in 1692. In 1695, rumors about secret negotiations between the Maritime Powersas Britain and the Netherlands were called at that timeand France reached him. Not trusting his allies, and fearing Austria and Spain would make an agreement without him, Victor Amadeus concluded a separate peace with Louis XIV in 1696. France gave him Pinerolo. The fortifications at Casale were dismantled; and the city was returned to the duke of Mantua instead of to Spain or the empire. Furthermore, France gave Savoy all the territories it possessed in Piedmont and accepted an alliance to secure Italys neutrality. The Maritime Powers and the emperor were furious and considered Victor Amadeus a traitor. The Franco-Piedmontese peace allowed the French to send their troops from Italy to Flanders; and this forced the Allies to accept a general peace in 1698. Savoys position was secure. The duchy had no foreign garrisons within its borders, and it was lodged between Spainmaster of Milanand France. In case of war, one or the other could support it. It was the first time that an Italian state, other than Venice, had conducted an independent policy since the death of Lorenzo the Magnificent in 1492. The situation was stable and the duke was pleased, but soon catastrophe struck when Charles II, king of Spain, died.
PART
III
CHAPTER
Charles II, the Spanish Habsburg king of Spain, of Naples, of Sicily, of Sardinia, and duke of Milan, died on November 1, 1700. He had no direct heirs; and the monarchs of Europe had spent many years discussing what to do after his death. Nevertheless, all existing treaties were voided when the late kings will clearly proclaimed the duke of Anjou, grandson of Louis XIV, heir to his realms. The Holy Roman Emperor, and Austrian Habsburg, Leopold, contested the will, claiming all the crowns of Spain for his second son, Charles, and organized an army to support him. In the spring 1701 an imperial army commanded by Prince Eugene of Savoy moved into northern Italy, while a second army formed in Germany. The historical presence of the Spanish in Italy, and the relationship of that dynasty to the Austrians, counterbalanced by French power created a complicated dilemma for Italian princes. The Spanish viceroys in Cagliari, Palermo, and Naples, and the governor in Milan, formally accepted Philip V Bourbon as the king of Spain. Their attitude determined Savoys posture. Victor Amadeus benefited from having opposing powers as neighbors, but as Spain was now allied to France, he was trapped by this alliance and could only hope for rapid and decisive Austrian intervention. The emperor, however, lacked money and men; and a calculating Victor Amadeus subsequently joined the Spanish-French Bourbon alliance. He had few options. Any attempt to avoid a French alliance meant the destruction of his states by both French and Spanish armies. He dedicated 10,000 menhalf of his armyto the Bourbons. At the same time, he maintained secret contacts with the emperor. Victor Amadeus desperately needed an enemy of France in Milan, and looked for every opportunity to change allegiances. William III of England and Emperor Leopold I understood his position perfectly. Louis XIV suspected the accession of his grandson to the Spanish throne would lead to hostilities, but believed the emperor too weak to challenge the Bourbon succession. Leopold possessed merely 42,000 men, while Louis had 200,000 and could deploy no less than 75,000 men in northern Italy, including Spanish and Piedmontese forces. The imperial army in Italy led by Prince Eugene faced another
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army passed the Rhine, moving through the Bavarian Plateau to Austria. The second crossed the Alps, marching through Padana Plainthe large northern Italy plain extending from Turin to Veniceto the Trentino and across the Brenner Pass, where it would join the other French army in Austria. Thereafter the two armies would advance upon Vienna. The campaign in Germany presented practically no problems and, in the summer 1703, French troops, along with their Bavarian allies, were poised along the Austro-Bavarian border. Eugenes army in Italy offered significant resistance in 1701 and 1702, but in 1703 the prince was recalled to Vienna. His success in Italy led to his appointment to reorganize the entire Habsburg military system, which had proved so weak in the previous two years of war. Deprived of its genial commander, the imperial army in Italy found itself pressed by the Franco-Spanish army. In September 1703 the French approached Trente close to the Brenner Pass. The threat to Austria abated only when Victor Amadeus changed sides. This cut French supply and communications to France; and the army was immediately withdrawn to Piedmont. Victor Amadeus threw in his lot with the Allies because he believed a Bourbon victory would ruin the independence of his kingdom. Initially he wanted to wait until his triennial alliance with France and Spain ended in 1703. Then, he intended to reorganize his army during the winter, and sign an official pact with the Great Alliance. Louis XIV, however, had many spies, who informed him of the Savoyard plans. In September 1703 the Sun King ordered his generals in Italy to seize the Piedmontese expeditionary Corps and destroy the Duchy of Savoy. On September 28 they succeeded in arresting Piedmontese troopswhose forces the duke previously reduced to three thousand menbut that was only a portion of Savoys army. In fact, Victor Amadeus rapidly fielded a new one by calling the militia to arms. As we know, in the late sixteenth century, Duke Emmanuel Philibert of Savoy constructed a fortified defense system. It was an oval ring with its center at the citadel of Turin. Victor Amadeus simply concentrated his troops in those fortresses and resisted. The French took all of 1704 and 1705 to reduce the fortresses before reaching Turin. Although the French threatened the Piedmontese capital, it required an enormous expenditure of men and material to occupy the duchy and its fortifications. The Austrian army, however, did not remain inactive throughout, and the French and Spanish had to dedicate substantial forces to wage war in Lombardy, too. The general strategic situation for the Bourbons deteriorated. During the summer of 1704, Eugene of Savoy and the duke of Marlborough, the Anglo-Dutch commander, decisively defeated the Franco-Bavarian army between Hochstadt and Blenheim. In a terrible battle, they eliminated the threat through Germany to Austria. In the following months, French troops retreated to the Rhine while British forces captured Gibraltar and, together with Portuguese and Austrian troops, invaded Spain, too. In 1705 a first imperial attempt to relieve Victor Amadeus failed. In 1706 the decisive campaign began.
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Victor Amadeus also managed to expand his possessions, as all French enclaves on the Alpine frontier were returned to Piedmont.2 He further obtained the royal crown of Sicily with British backing. London wanted to secure the central Mediterranean. Sicilys geographic position made it a perfect checkpoint and a crucial commercial crossroads. It would have been far too expensive for Britain to occupy the island, and they could not accept having it go to a great power such as Spain, France, or Austria. It was better to give it to a weak state. Victor Amadeus was a friend of Britain, his army was good, but not too powerful, and he had no fleet, so Savoy could not compete as a maritime power. Furthermore, his wife was a cousin of Queen Anne, being the daughter of a sister of Charles II of England. Thanks to London, the House of Savoy became the Royal House of Savoy and, in 1713, Victor Amadeus was crowned king of Sicily. He was now one of only ten kings in Europe and the only one in Italy. His prestige was great, and his House was considered the most important referee in Italian affairs. After Emmanuel Philiberts restoration in 1560, this was the first step on the road to Italian unity under the House of Savoy.
CHAPTER
The Second Morea War, the Quadruple Alliance, and the Corsican Troubles: 17151733
After the First Morea War, or the War of the Holy League, in 1699, the Ottomans decided to deal with their enemies piecemeal. The Russians were defeated on the river Pruth and forced to accept a peace. The Sultan, Mustafa II, then moved against Venice. The Senate received worried reports by the Bailiff to the Ottoman Porte, as its ambassador in Istanbul was called, but did not act. Venice expected assistance, in case of war, from the Emperor Charles VI. They naively believed an imperial diplomatic threat would be sufficient to dissuade Turkish action. Charles, however, was perfectly aware of the situation, but did nothing. The Habsburgs wanted a weak Venice. When in the summer 1715 the Ottomans finally declared war on Venice, Austria did not move. The Senate reminded the emperor of their association in the Holy League, but Charles VI found all possible pretexts not to intervene. In this tragic situation, Venice did what it could. Venice disposed a paltry 7,000 men garrisoned in six fortresses in Greece. What could they do when 100,000 Turks attacked? During the summer 1715, all Greek and Cretan fortresses fell into Ottoman hands. The Senate raised 18,000 men, but they were too late to save the situation in Greece. Instead these troops were deployed to the Ionian Islands, to hold Corfu, gateway of the Adriatic. Likewise, the Venetians protected the islands by sea. The Ottomans dispatched 58 sails, 30 galleys, 60 galliots, 5 fire ships, and an enormous number of transports to the Ionian Islands. In autumn, Andrea Pisani, the Venetian sea captain general, with reinforcements from Tuscany, Malta, and the papacy, had a mere 26 sails, 2 fire ships, 18 galleys, 12 galliots, and 2 galeasses at his disposal. He was outnumbered 2.55 to 1 and decided not to chance a naval engagement, but instead save the fleet for the defense of Corfu.
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The Ottomans landed an army of 30,000 men in Corfu supported by two naval squadrons. The garrison of Corfu repelled Turkish assaults and the Venetian fleet conducted operations around the island. On August 24, 1716, the Ottomans lifted the siege and withdrew their fleet, having lost 15,000 men. Venetian casualties were comparatively light, 3,000 men: God remembered on which side his men were, recalled one chronicler. The years following the Peace of Utrecht saw extensive Austrian intervention in the Balkans. No plans against the Turks had been prepared in 1714 and, when they attacked Greece, it troubled Vienna. When the Venetians asked for help, Prince Eugene wrote to the emperor that they could not expect too much from Austria, as Austria needed a lot of time to gather the army still in the west. A year and a half passed from the Turkish declaration of war, whose news arrived in Vienna on December 14, 1714, against Venice to the Austrian offensive in late June 1716. Although Austria had no money and no troops at that moment, the following year, in late June 1716, the imperial army had 65,980 infantrymen in 31 regiments and 32,944 cavalrymen (34 regiments), with 90 field artillery cannons and some 100 siege guns. Garrisons included 53,380 more men and some 15,000 borderers. With this army, Prince Eugene of Savoy routed the Turks at Peterwaradin in 1716 and captured Belgrade in 1717, while the Venetian fleet attacked the Ottomans in the Mediterranean. Despite these victories, when the Peace of Passarowitz was signed in 1718, Venice did not regain Greece. Vienna negotiated in its own interest and left the Venetians to their own devices. Venice could not combat the Turkish empire without imperial help and was forced to accept a bad peace that was clearly not to their advantage. This Second Morea War was the last conflict fought by the Most Serene Republic. Concomitant with this war in the Balkans, Spain moved against its rivals in Italy. Philip Vs counselor, Abbot Giulio Alberoni and Philips wife Elizabeth Farnese, came both from the Duchy of Parma. In 1702, Alberoni served as ducal ambassador to the duke de Vendome, the French supreme commander in Italy during the War of Spanish Succession. Ven dome valued Alberonis counsel and subsequently took him to Flanders and then to Spain. When Vendome died, Alberoni remained at the Spanish court, becoming one of its most important figures. When the first queen of Spain died, Alberoni suggested that Philip V marry Elizabeth Farnese, niece of the duke of Parma. The king agreed: Elizabeth became the new queen and Alberoni the most important minister. Alberoni proceeded to reorganize the Spanish royal administration, but, before he finished his work, the Austrian military buildup in the Padana Plain endangered the autonomy of the duke of Parma, Alberonis former master, who requested Spanish intervention. Alberoni, now a cardinal, had little desire to pursue war with Austria. Spain was recovering from the Succession War and did not need another draining conflict. Although Alberonis position allowed him to put off the duke of Parma, his new queen, Elizabeth Farnese, ordered him to act.1 In July 1717 a
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In February 1733, Augustus of Saxony, king of Poland, died. Poland was an elective monarchy and both Louis XV of France and Charles VI, Holy Roman Emperor, proposed their own candidates. Vienna supported Augustus III, the elector of Saxony; Versailles wanted a former king of Poland, Stanislas Leszczynski, fatherin-law to Louis XV. Neither could compromise on a candidate and war erupted. France prepared two armies and a separate expeditionary corps dispatched by sea to Poland, while the armies marched against Austria using the same routes as previous wars: the Bavarian Plateau and northern Italy. Spain allied itself to France through a Bourbon family compact. The Spanish crown wanted to reclaim southern Italy and, if possible, Milan. Both had been part of the Spanish empire prior to 1715, but the Peace of Utrecht removed them from the Spanish Bourbon realm. Queen Elizabeth Farnese had two sons by Philip V. As the king had two sons through his first marriage, she wanted to secure their future by giving each a crown. The eldest, Charles, received the Duchy of Parma, after last dukes death in 1730, but with the new war her plans changed. Philip, at the queens behest, appointed Charles commander of the Spanish army in Italy. His objective was the reconquest of the Kingdom of Naples. France, however, needed the support of the Piedmontese to cross the Alps and invade Milan. Charles Emmanuel III of Savoy, who ascended to the Piedmontese throne after his father Victor Amadeus left him the crown in 1730, waited for an opportunity to resume his familys traditional policy of expansion in northern Italy. France promised him the Duchy of Milan in return for his aid. He accepted the French proposal and in a few days Piedmontese troops occupied western Lombardy, entered Milan, and besieged its citadel. Concomitant with Franco-Piedmontese operations, the Spanish army passed through the Papal States and entered Naples. Having assessed the situation and observed no significant alterations to global European policy, Venice chose neutrality rather than take sides. The republic re-
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In October 1740, Emperor Charles VI died. In his youth he had held title as the Archduke Charles, claimant to the Spanish crown and for whom the Habsburgs waged the War for the Spanish Succession. He left a single heir, his daughter the Archduchess Maria Theresa. The Holy Roman Empire was an elective monarchy. Charles VI, however, negotiated with the ruling houses of Europe and the magnates of his monarchy to accept Maria Theresa as his legitimate and rightful heir and the next empress. Having secured domestic recognition of his daughters right to succeed him, he also acquired international recognition embodied in the document, the Pragmatic Sanction. It did not work. As soon as he died, the Bavarian and Saxon electors competed for the crown; and King Frederick II of Prussia, newly ascended to the throne, rejected Maria Theresas legitimacy and invaded Silesia, wealthiest of the Habsburg territories. France did not enter the war, but a French auxiliary corps was dispatched to central Germany in accordance with the Treaty of Westphalia, to defend German liberties. The Spanish royal family decided the war offered an opportunity to reclaim Milan. Prince Philip of Bourbon, the youngest son of Philip V and Elizabeth Farnese, needed a crown; and Milan, along with Parma, suited him. A Spanish army landed in Tuscanya neutraland marched north to the Padana Plain. Then, Philip V asked his son Charles VII of Naples to return the army he lent him in 1733 to the Neapolitan and Sicilian thrones. Neapolitan troops marched north to join the Spanish army. France too required allies. They requested Piedmontese permission to cross the Alps and march on Milan, but Charles Emmanuel III did not want to involve his state in this conflict. He realized that, in case of a French and Spanish victory, Piedmont would be caught between the Bourbons. It meant the end of any autonomous policy and of any possible dream of expanding his power in Italy. Moreover, he threatened the approaching Spanish army that if it entered the Padana Plain, his army would its his route to Milan.
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resistance, and besieged Cuneo. Charles Emmanuel tried to relieve the city, but failed. He then directed the militia against the enemys ordnance and supply lines and, thanks to these guerrilla tactics and to Cuneos resistance, the Bourbon armies raised the siege and withdrew to France to take winter quarters. In the early days of 1745, Genoa entered the conflict. The Most Serene Republic sought neutrality, just as Venice had done for the third time in forty-five years. Unfortunately, while Venice could defend its neutrality with 40,000 men, Genoa could not; and, moreover, Britain and Austria promised to give Charles Emmanuel the Marquisate of Finale, a little imperial fief in Liguria owned by the republic as a feudatory of the empire. Charles Emmanuel desired it as a port, an additional window to the Mediterranean. In order to protect its territory, Genoa signed a treaty in Aranjuez and joined the Bourbon alliance. It was a disaster for Charles Emmanuel. The Genoese accession to the League provided the Spanish-French army with an opened route from France through Genoese territory, and now they could mass the army from France with the army from Naples via Velletri, adding to it 10,000 Genoese troops. This was the real disaster as it increased the powerful Bourbon army to 90,000 men. As the war in Flanders continued, Charles Emmanuel received no support from Austria. He had a mere 43,000 men. Maneuvering them well to avoid battle, he lost many fortresses but preserved his army. Despite this, he was compelled to accept an armistice in December 1745. Fortunately, Prussia accepted peace terms offered by Austria, allowing Vienna to send 12,000 men to Italy. It was not an impressive army, but enough to permit Charles Emmanuel to take the field upon the expiration of the armistice. In the spring 1746 he attacked and the Bourbons were defeated. Milan was reconquered, Piedmont liberated, and Genoa overrun by the Austrians. The Piedmontese army occupied western Liguria and the French and Spanish fled, abandoning the republic. While Charles Emmanuel prepared an invasion of southern France, he sent a regiment to support the Corsican revolution against Genoese rule. Genoa found itself under occupation and threatened with destruction if it did not pay 3 million scudi to Austria. Subsequently the city revolted, and the Austrian garrison was ejected. Charles Emmanuel halted his operations against France and marched to support Austrian operations against the city. The Genoese fleet, supported by coastal defenses, prevented the British fleet from shelling Genoa, but the Austrian and Piedmontese armies cut the city off from the outside world by land, while the French supplied its ally with men and material by sea. In the spring of 1747, a new French army marched along the Mediterranean coast. Charles Emmanuel ordered his troops to hold Nice, but soon he knew that another French expeditionary force was approaching the Alps from the west. If they crossed the Alps, they could effectively threaten Turin. Charles Emmanuel had no troops to stem the invasion. He scraped together what troops he could find. On July 19, 1747, at Assietta Hill, 30,000 French with artillery attacked 5,400 Piedmontese and 2,000 Austrians. At sunset, the French
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11
Italy from the Corsican Rebellion to the French Revolution through the First Cold War: 17481792
The Italian Situation
In 1740 the Corsican rebellion against Genoa had begun; and France looked at the island as an opportunity to gain a foothold in the Mediterranean: a potential strategic naval base to protect her southern coast and further menace Italy. The French Foreign Ministry adopted the Chauvelin Plan, after its originator. France would aid Genoa by dispatching troops to the island and in turn they would establish a French presence in Corsica. As time passed, French influence would grow and eventually surpass the Genoese. The Republic of Genoa managed the whole affair poorly. It denied the Corsicans any representation and regularly broke their agreements after earlier revolts. Despite military successes in 1755 and 1756, the republics troops controlled only the coast and major coastal cities. After the War of Austrian Succession, the Genoese had little trust in the Habsburgs, they feared Spain and Naples, and saw Piedmont as their primary enemy. For these reasons they turned to France for support in Corsica, and an alliance against its enemies. Genoa allowed the French to retain garrisons on the island after 1764; and in 1768 officially transferred Corsica to France. The Chauvelin Plan succeeded, primarily because of the republics arrogance and inability to govern the island. Genoa preferred to give Corsicaan Italianspeaking countryto France instead of to the papacy or to another Italian prince; thus world history changed. The year after France received Corsica, Napoleon Buonaparte was born a subject of France, in Ajaccio, the Corsican capital. If Genoa had maintained a good administration, or at least accepted political autonomy for Corsica, Napoleon would probably have been an unknown lawyer, or an abbot; and Europe would have been spared war and tragedy.
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to send detailed reports to London regarding the Italian states respective economies, trade, navies, and armies.3 When the American Revolution began, Britain turned its attention from Mediterranean to the Atlantic. Italian intellectuals and aristocrats found the American Revolution facinating, but no Italian states supported it or dispatched troops to America. It was far away and did not concern Italian affairs. Although the French supplanted the British in the peninsula, there was no reason to act with hostility toward an important commercial partner; and the Italian sovereigns kept to the European Continent, and their perennial problems. Italian navies continued to fight piracy as they had in the previous centuries. The situation had changed very little. Fleets were still mainly composed of galleys, and only Venice and Naples had effective sailing ships, not considering the two frigates composing the entire Piedmontese bluewater fleet. The Venetian fleet had previously experienced problems during the first Morea War. Sea Captain General Alessandro Molin found the operational cooperation between galleys and sailing ships problematic due to their difference in speed and maneuverability. In his final report, he recommended that the Most Serene Republic abandon galleys and reorganize its fleet, employing only sailing vessels. Although galleasses were struck from the fleet in 1746, galleys remained on duty in the Venetian fleet until the end of the republic in 1797, while the Piedmontese fleet used them after the 1814 Restoration, too. Venetian and Neapolitan fleets acted promptly against the Barbary pirates. The Neapolitan fleet conducted numerous raids and participated in the joint SpanishPortuguese-Neapolitan-Maltese expedition against Algiers in the summer of 1784. Venice directed several expeditions against pirates from Tripoli and Tunis. Raids against Tunis in 1784, 1785, and 1786 were brilliantly commanded by Extraordinary Admiral Angelo Emo. He employed floating mortar batteries, then normally used by Italian navies. Piedmont, under new king Victor Amadeus III, focused its resources on its army. The first son of Charles Emmanuel III, he ascended the throne after his fathers death in 1773. He reformed the army, abandoning the old eighteenthcentury organic order and using a new one. Previously his army had had no unit organizations larger than regiments. Brigades existed, but were ad hoc formations established only in time of war. In 1786, Victor Amadeus divided his regiments into two lines, or wings. Each line was divided in two departments. Each department was composed of two divisions, and a division consisted of two brigades, comprising two regiments respectively. Two battalions formed a regiment, and a battalion had two centuries. The century consisted of two companies of two platoons each. Platoons were divided into two dormitories, which were divided in two maniples. A company had 60 men in wartime and 40 in peace. This resulted in weak regiments and proved unsatisfactory in war, but the idea was good, if it came twenty-five years too soon. Artillery too, was rather advanced for such a minor power. Savoys troops had
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military unit was the Compagnia deCarabini rinforzati, o de cacciabanditi a cavalloa Company of Reinforced Carabineers, or of Mounted Bandit-Chasers which remained active until the Napoleonic era. It patrolled the route from Bologna, across the Apennines, to Florence. The general situation in Italy was not so bad according to eighteenth-century European standardsand thats why the French encyclopaedists considered contemporary Italian culture remarkable for the Enlightment. It is clear that prior to the French Revolution, Italy presented a panorama in light and shade, depending upon the particular Italian state. In general, however, Italy presented more light and Enlightment than many European states, if not the Continent.
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spent long periods guarding trenches and field fortifications. They lived in small and smokey bunkers, which they could enter only on their knees. Cold, rain, snow, and mud were considered normal weather. Patrols as well as artillery duels were commonplace. On occasion, raids were conducted. The mountain battlefield prevented the French from fully utilizing their new tactics. The French minister of war, Lazare Carnot, had organized a new army. He decreed that it had to agir toujours en masse3 to act ever in massbecause winning needed only fire, steel and patriotism.4 Inspired by this new doctrine, supported by new, light, and easy-to-repair Gribeauval cannons and by general conscription established on August 23, 1793, the army of 750,000 overwhelmed the allied armies. Outnumbered by the French, disoriented by their speed and by their scattered battle order, Coalition troops were defeated everywhere; everywhere except in the Alps. But all of this changed in 1796 when a relatively unknown artillery general was appointed commander in chief of the French Army of Italy.
1796
Napoleon Buonapartewho changed his family name to Bonaparte to ease the French pronunciationwas a former Jacobin. After Robespierres death, he was briefly jailed, but then went to Paris. One of the most important and influential members of the French Directory the new government after 1794was Paul Barras. A corrupt man, ever looking for pretty women and bags of money, Barras faced the critical situation that France was exhausted from war and revolution. Barras had been appointed commander of the Interior Army with the task of maintaining public order. He needed a good professional soldier as an assistant, and he chose that young and hungry Corsican general who often, if not every evening, was around him at Madame Talliens soirees. He had seen Napoleon in action at Toulon. Barras was a representative en mission at the city along with Augustin Robespierrebrother of the revolutionary leaderand Christophe Saliceti, the Corsican revolutionary. Thats why Barras appointed Napoleon vice commander of the Interior Army. Shortly thereafter, a Royalist coup provided Napoleon with the opportunity to show his mettle. He acted promptly, and firmly, crushing the revolt with a whiff of grapeshot. Seeing how reliable he was, Barras gave him as a wife one of his former lovers, Josephine de Beauharnais, and then command of the Army of Italy. The Directors sought to settle affairs abroad in order to calm the domestic front. They successfully pursued negotiations with Prussia and Spain. The former kingdom was far more concerned about Russian designs on the rump of Poland and wanted the freedom to focus their efforts in the east. Spain had suffered terribly from French invasion and wanted to withdraw from the Coalition before the French marched on Madrid. All of this was settled at the Peace of Basel in 1795, concluding war with Prussia, and later Spain. Austria and Britain remained Frances
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revealing words: Vendemiaire and Montenotte too did not lead me to believe that I was a superior man. Only after Lodi I realized I could, in conclusion, be an important feature on the political scene. Then the first spark set off my great ambition.9 Now, Montenotte was a fine battle and the only possible explanation for such words is that he knew he won because the battle had been prearranged, its result beeing previously negotiated between Paris and Turin. Only after he won a real engagement, such as Lodi, did he realize what a genius general he was. On March 6, 1796, Napoleon received very detailed operational instructions prepared by Carnot. He had to pass rapidly through Piedmont, not caring to take Turin or destroy Piedmont. He had to seize Mantua and Trente and invade Austria as soon as possible. The 1796 campaign is so well known that is definitely irrelevant to describe it here in detail. Piedmontese troops fought well, but they could not change something previously decided at the top levels; and within a few weeks the campaign was over. On April 26, 1796, Victor Amadeus III signed an armistice. Now Napoleon could concentrate on the Austrian army, supported by a Neapolitan cavalry brigade.
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and the population revolted against the French in Padua and other towns. Then Napoleon threatened the Senate and, in the end, after he reached the final agreement with Austria in 1797, he simply declared the republic disbanded. At that moment the French had garrisons in all Venetian towns and cities, except Venice. Venetian rule in Dalmatia and Corfu remained strong, and troops and ships were still there, but unfortunately, some selfprofessed patriots supported a transition of the aristocratic republic into a democratic one, and this divided the Senate, too. Moreover, Venice could not afford a war when all the other states had signed treaties with France. The republic stood alone and, reluctantly, accepted its transformation into the Venetian Republic, as occurred to Genoa when it became the Ligurian Republic.
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manded by Austrian general Karl Leiberich von Mack, later defeated by Napoleon in 1805. Neapolitan troops liberated the Holy City and marched northward, but within a few weeks, thanks to Macks over confidence, they were defeated near Civita Castellana by French, Cisalpine, and Roman troops. Their retreat was a disaster. The French reached the steps of Naples; and the king and his court sailed to Sicily. Ferdinand left a regency, which promptly surrendered to the French general Championnet. The French established another puppet republic in Naples and compelled them to provide money and men to the cause. They were also expected to bear the burden of French occupation. But the situation in southern Italy was quite different, however, from that in the rest of the peninsula. All the other states had been occupied and their rulers forced into agreements; only later did the French establish puppet states. This did not happen in Naples. The king still ruled a large portion of his territorySicilyand it was impossible to reach him. In fact, the remaining Neapolitan fleet and the British navy mastered the sea, while the French had no ships.11 Ferdinand IV reorganized an army in Sicily while consenting to a plan presented by Cardinal Fabrizio Ruffo. A former secretary of the papal navy, Ruffo belonged to a noble family from Calabria. When Ferdinand IV fled to Palermo, he followed. He asked the king for permission to organize a counterrevolution. The king accepted; and Ruffo landed in Calabria with few men and a little money. Within a few weeks, however, Ruffo succeeded in raising much of the kingdom in rebellion. According to the generally accepted history, the French enlightened Italy. Napoleon was a sort of marvelous and incredible hero, and the coming of the French was an absolute benefit for Italy, the dawn of a new era, an era of modernity and the start of the Risorgimento. The French coming meant no more torture, equal civil rights for Jews and Protestants, the end of the supremacy of the Catholic Church on civil affairs, and the birth of democracy. This is a fallacy. As stated in previous chapters, in 1789, Italy was more enlightened than France; and the arrival of the French was anything but fortunate for Italy. In 1796, a country composed of small, pacific states was brutally occupied by an army that was not at war with the Italian states, apart from Piedmont and Naples. This foreign armythe Frenchdestroyed ancient, venerated, and sometimes wise institutions and killed thousands of civilians. Its cruelty was evident. As an example, in 1799 the French killed more than seven thousand civilians in only one day in the southern town of San Severo, which resisted the revolution, and this was not an exception. No one is able to compute all the casualties, but one may suggest, in a population of perhaps 15 million and a half, a figure of half a million dead from 1798 to 1799, that is to say 3.2 percent of the population of the Italian peninsula. By comparison, the percentage of U.S. soldiers killed in World War II amounted to around 0.27% of the population, distributed over forty-five months. A 3.2 percent figure translates to 6.8 million American dead in only two years, that is to say in 179899, Italy had ten times the amount of U.S. dead in World War II and,
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fleet from supplying the Allies; a second under Mounier fought against the irregular bands from Arezzo and Romagna and forced them to retreat to the Apennines; and the last marched to Florence. Dupont defeated Tuscan general Spannocchi at Barberino on October 15, 1800, and entered Florence. Then on January 14, 10,000 Neapolitans under General Roger Damas left Rome and marched north along the Via Cassia. They took Siena and the bands from Arezzo as well as Spannocchi, and a few men joined them. But they were all discouraged by the bad news coming from Germany and were defeated in Monteriggioni, not far from Siena. The Peace of Luneville ended the war in 1801. The Cisalpine Republic, destroyed by the Austrians, was reestablished as the Italian Republic. France absorbed Piedmont and later Parma. Tuscany became the Kingdom of Etruria under the former duke of Parma by 1803. Ferdinand IV and the new Pope Pius VII were restored to their thrones, while the House of Savoy remained confined on the island of Sardinia.
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IV
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at Castalla on April 13, and landed near Tarragona in June. Later they served in General Clintons division in Catalonia. In February 1814, Neapolitan troops were involved in the siege of Barcelona. In March they were again at Tarragona, and in April they sailed back to Italy, to Leghorn and then to Genoa, to fight against the Italian kingdom.
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the situation did change a little: 25 percent of conscripts could legally avoid military service; and a further 17 percent purposely avoided conscription. Moreover, after the Gendarmerie captured and brought them to their regiments, as many as one-third immediately deserted. For instance, in February 1804, 16,687 recruits reached their regiments, but 4,199 deserted soon after. According to many experts, a recruit in these times needed two years drilling before being considered combat-ready.5 Napoleons armies were generally involved in war every year. The Italians were no exception. They were involved in a war in the autumn of 1803, when only numbering 10,000 menthose belonging to the Italian army since the very beginningbut over 22,000 could be considered ready by 1805. One can also suppose that the Italian army in its early days had simply no time to drill. Its effectiveness improved with its combat experience. If it did not perform well in 1805, its participation in Germany, Poland, and Spain was better. Italian troops were at their best during the tragic Russian and German campaigns in 1812 and 1813.
CHAPTER
14
Apart from love and sympathy, the old kings experienced problemsa lot of problems. Most important, they wanted to secure their crowns. The Austrians garrisoned all of northern Italy. They organized an urban Guarda sort of police and constabulary forcethroughout, waiting for the return of the former sovereigns or the arrival of new ones. It was equally necessary to reorganize the armies. Money was desperately needed for this, but there was little available. Italy was practically destroyed by the years of war. If the French had stolen and robbed during the 179699 period, their pillaging had been legally sanctioned after 1800. No one can fully compute what Italy lost under Napoleonic rule. Calabria was devastated, its villages burned by the French. Malta was gone. More than
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independence and passed to the king of Piedmont-Sardinia. The duke of Parma lost his throne, and Austria gave it to Maria Louise, Napoleons second wife and daughter of the emperor of Austria. The Bourbon-Parma family received the Duchy of Lucca as compensation. Parma would remain under Maria Louise until her death and then revert back to Bourbon-Parma while Lucca had to go to Tuscany. The pope was restored to Rome, but the king of Sardinia did not receive Nice and Savoy until after the summer 1815. Similarly, Ferdinand IV was not restored to Naples, but left to Napoleons sister Caroline and King Joachim Murat. They had defected to the Allies in return for their thrones. This was not a satisfying situation. Politics and power dictated the settlement. The sovereigns faced another difficult problem in reorganizing the state administration. Illiteracy was prevalent; and literate persons who opposed the revolutionary and Napoleonic administration were hard to find. Even the French-backed administrations experienced similar problems: insufficient literacy for proper governance. Now, in the spring 1814, only the pope had no trouble employing bureaucrats, because he had many literate peoplethe priestsin his administration. All the old and new governments, however, had no choice but maintain the former administration, regardless of their political past. Certainly, the most culpable collaborators lost their positions, but the majority remained entrenched in the bureaucracy. A similar situation occurred concerning the reorganization of Italian armies. Here, however, compromising the military could be fatal to monarchs. Each state then solved the problem in a different way. The duke of Modena simply swept away all who had served Napoleon. Ferdinand III, grand duke of Tuscany, established a small army composed of former Napoleonic soldiers, but they remained faithful in the following forty-five years. The same happened in Parma as well in Lombardy and Venice. Austria united these two regions into the kingdom of Lombardy-Venetia and accepted all the former Napoleonic soldiers. They received the Austrian rank corresponding to their Italian or French ones; and few problems emerged in the following years. Piedmont had a terribly difficult time. The king had only 2,500 men in Sardinia. He needed at least ten times more in Piedmont and, unfortunately, all the Piedmontese who had served under Napoleon had been in the French army. The former emperor was so hated that no one at court accepted the idea of employing in anyone who served him. It was, however, necessary to have an army as well as a state administration. The solution was quite strange. The court asked all who had served the king up to the last year of his reign1798to take their old places in the administration. The positions and ranks available because the previous administrators were dead, or too old, now were taken over by their sons or grandsons. Former Napoleonic soldiers were admitted, but at a reduced rank; a general became a colonel, a captain became a lieutenant, a sergeant became a corporal. Moreover, police control was required; and on July 13, 1814, Royal Patents established the new corps of Royal Carabineers. Carabineers are traditionally considered an Italian legacy of the French gendarmerie. This is not really true and they should be more properly considered an
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afterward the Austro-Italian army, including Piedmontese, Parmesan, and Modenese, totaled 102,000 men. They invaded France and besieged Grenoble. The final French sortie was repulsed by a charge of the Royal Carabineers: it was their baptism of fire. Lyon, Gap, and many other French cities fell to the army before Napoleons second abdication. At the conclusion of the 1815 Alpine campaign, Victor Emmanuel I signed a separate peace with France. He received Savoy and Nice, but the kingdoms political and diplomatic relevance was now reduced. When the Congress of Vienna reconvened, heated arguments broke out. Talleyrand proposed legitimism as the best course for Europe. This meant going back to the political system prior to 1789, butas we have seenit did not happen. The Allies wanted a chain of buffer states surrounding France. It had to be composed of medium-sized states strong enough to contain France. The Netherlands received former imperial Flanders, later Belgium; Piedmont acquired Genoa; and Prussia appeared on the Rhine. Austria wanted to place a member of the Habsburg family on the throne in Turin. This would have given control of the Alps to Austria and eliminated any possibility of an Italian-born political power, but France could not accept it. Talleyrand and Joseph De Maistre influenced Czar Alexander I; and Victor Emmanuel remained on his throne. Murats foolhardy adventure allowed the Allies to remove the Bonapartists in Naples and restore the Bourbon king Ferdinand. The old king faced reality that his army was composed of Murats former soldiers. To address this, he melded soldiers from Sicily and Naples in his new army. This seemed successful. When in October 1815, Murat landed in Calabria, trying to regain his kingdom, the troops arrested him. A military court judged him guilty and he was shot. With Murats death, the Napoleonic period in Italy was at an end, but left a significant mark on the army and society. The Congress of Vienna also addressed questions of compensation. All the European states demanded that France pay war reparations. Italys damages could be assessed at 1.862 billion livres, with a contemporary value at $560 million. The Italian states asked the Congress of Vienna for only 120 million francs. It was ridiculous, but nobody at that time could compute the real damages. France objected to the sum total of amount, which came to 775,500,000 million francs. A compromise required France to pay all European states a portion of what they were asking for. The Italian states received only 40.5 million francs. Piedmont asked for 70 million: It received 30. The pope demanded 30 million: he was accorded 5. Parma, which paid its first tribute to the French in the summer of 1796, received only 1 million. Tuscany, may be because the grand duke was the brother of the emperor of Austria, wanted 4 million and received 4.5. Naples received nothing.
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their transition. The very young Giuseppe Mazzini in Genoa saw many of them depart for the Americas. Peace and order returned to Italy after this revolutionary interlude; and the Italian states attended to less urgent affairs, such as the perennial threat of the Barbary pirates of North Africa. These pirates preyed on European shipping throughout the Napoleonic Wars. They continued their attacks into the Restoration, causing substantial losses to maritime commerce. Charles Felix expanded his navy to meet this threat. Ferdinand I did the same, and his merchant fleet in 1819 possessed the first steamboat in Italy. In 1825 the Royal Sardinian Navy raided Tripoli harbor. The Neapolitan navy did the same three years later. Then in 1830 the French intervened by invading Algeria, and piracy disappeared. As the Mediterranean was now calm, the Royal Sardinian Navy crossed the ocean and established a naval station in South America in Uruguay and at Rio de la Plata, to protect the commerce, properties, and activities of Piedmontese subjects. In 1831 a new revolutionary wave reached Italy, inspired by the 1830 revolution in France. Giuseppe Mazzininow a mandisseminated his ideas of a national union throughout the peninsula. Mazzini also advocated installing a republican government devoid of monarchy. His revolutionary movement, Giovane ItaliaYoung Italytook the place of the carbonari. Furthermore, most revolutionaries accepted the notion of national unification and looked for historical and modern examples of Italian unity and independence to rally the people. The Napoleonic Kingdom of Italy fit the bill. The green, white, and red tricolor was now considered the national flag instead of the carbonari banner used in 1821. Italian sovereigns were worried, as 1831 demonstrated that the previous 1821 revolts were merely a test. Former Napoleonic generals in 1821 had largely been neutral or supported their king. In 1831 the generals supported the revolutions. General Carlo Zucchi, for example, commanded a revolutionary army against the pope. This was a dramatic change from the past. The most important feature of carbonari or Liberal revolutionaries in 1821 hoped that their sovereigns would accept a democratic or constitutional evolution of their states. The sovereign had answered negatively, so no wonder if in 1831 revolutionaries were clearly against the sovereigns and clearly wanted national unification, which meant the end of the Italian dynasties. Reaction was harsh and strong. Austrian troops entered the Papal States and disbanded Zucchis army. A French expeditionary force landed in Ancona. In theory it was there to protect papal rule; in practice, it was there to establish a stepping-stone to the Middle and Far East, according to French imperialistic policy.3 Although the Austrians withdrew their troops in 1831, the French corps remained in Ancona until 1838. In the same year, 1831, Charles Felix I died and Charles Albert I came to the throne of Piedmont-Sardinia. He was not particularly supportive of the revolutionaries. The police repressed them, especially when, in 1834, Mazzini organized a plot against the monarchy. A great many revolutionaries were arrested or fled. One
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be the same tactic later used in 1849 against the French in Rome and in 1859 against the Austrians. ` On May 20, 1846, on the Dayman river, Garibaldi used infantry to disorder enemy cavalry and protect and reorganize his own cavalry. When in Europe, Garibaldi preferred to use cavalry as a long-range reconnaissance force. All his battles were won with infantry, with the aid of artillery, but never using cavalry. Considering Latin American warfare was at the base of Garibaldis victories and, looking at the fundamental role played by Garibaldi in Italian unification, we can affirm that Latin American warfare made Italian independence possible. In the early days of 1848, Garibaldi received news about the Italian revolutions and decided to return to Europe: He had great expectations, and his great adventure was only beginning.
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General Staff only coordinated the institution. Unfortunately, the generals commanding corps or divisions tended to act autonomously and therefore did not coordinate their respective operations. This lack of coordination was at the root of defeat in 184849, and in 1866 and 1896. General Cadorna resolved it during the First World War only by consolidating the command function into the General Staff system based on the Prusso-German model. No one in the 1840s could divine the future, and Charles Albert was waiting for an opportunity to strike at Austria. He instituted political reforms, succeeding in gaining the support of the Liberals and national patriots. In autumn 1844, Marquis Massimo dAzeglio made a trip through Italy. When he returned to Turin: I asked for an audience and I had it soon.2 Charles Albert received him alone, on a dark and cold morning in January 1845, around six oclock. DAzeglio relayed to him all he had heard when talking to Liberals and patriots: Now your Majesty will tell me if he approves or disapproves of what I did and what I said. Then I remained silent and I waited for the answer, that the Kings face promised to be not harsh; but, about the main issue, I supposed it to be a ibis redibis,3 wrote DAzeglio. On the contrary, without hesitation and not avoiding my look, but looking right to my eyes the King said to me calmly and resolutely: Let those gentlemen know they must remain calm and they must not move, because by now there is nothing to do. But they must be sure that, when the opportunity arises, my life, the lives of my sons, my weapons, my treasures, my army will all be used for the Italian cause.4 These were revealing words. The Italian bourgeoisie made their first attempt to take power in 1821, and failed. The events of 183031 revealed that a successful revolution was impossible as long as Austria remained in Lombardy-Venetia. The Habsburgs possessed overwhelming force and used it to maintain order in Italy. Each time, Austrian intervention was swift and overturned the Italian revolutions. The Italian bourgeoisie decided it was necessary to seek assistance from a liberalminded monarch with a powerful army. This is preceisely what happened on a January morning in the Royal Palace in Turin in 1845. Charles Albert accepted a pact with the revolutionaries; his army for a constitution and a crown for a unified Italy. At that time, most nationalists advocated an Italian confederation, composed of all the Italian sovereigns with the pope as president. Charles Albert wanted to be the most powerful Italian sovereign, depriving Austria of Lombardy-Venetia as its Italian possessions. It was simply the traditional and historical policy of the House of Savoy. If by chance the entire peninsula could be gained, all the better, but the initial idea was of a confederation. In fact, when in late spring 1848 all appeared well, Charles Albert was acclaimed king of Northern Italy, nothing more. Republicans and Socialists rejected this agreement. Only a republic would be acceptable; but they were not the majority. The opportunity Charles Albert had waited earnestly for came in 1848. In February, Parisians overthrew their king. Louis-Philippe escaped abroad, and the Second French Republic was established. Louis Napoleon Bonaparte became president in December. He was the son of Louis, brother of Napoleon and Hortense de
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saved in his home since 1814. It was a changing of the Guard, the Italian leader committing to the the king of Piedmont the symbols and burden of the Italian revolutionary traditions. In the early days of April 1848, Austria was racked by revolutions. There were no more than 90,000 men in Italy, including garrisons. Most of the navy had rebelled, as most of the sailors were Italians who joined the insurgents in Venice. The Piedmontese and Neapolitan navies were in the upper Adriatic, cutting any possible maritime line from Dalmatia to Venetia. On land, Charles Albert had commanded 100,000 men from all parts of Italy. Some 20,000 Italians volunteered, but their training and effectiveness was minimal. Moreover, the Italians were divided, because a portionincluding papal troopswere camped near Venice, while the remaining forces were in Lombardy. The Austrian army was caught in the middle. Radetzsky could only receive reinforcements from Austria as long as he held Verona. The city guarded the entrance to the Trentino, the quickest route from Austria to Italy: it was the same route used by Prince Eugene in 1701. Charles Albert swept away all the Austrian outposts. The strongest, in Pastrengo, was defeated on April 30. The king then marched to Verona but failed to seize the city. He decided then to besiege Peschiera. Strategically, this failure to take Verona decided the campaign. Radetzky maintained his lifeline to Austria. While Charles Albert methodically invested Peschiera, Radetzky assumed the initiative. He attacked and defeated the papal army, then on May 30 he attacked the Piedmontese at Goito, but was defeated. General Bava, however, did not take advantage of the victory and failed to pursue Radetsky to Mantua. The same day, Peschiera surrendered. Charles Alberts officers hailed his victories, but the tide soon turned. The Austrian emperor and court fled to the Tyrol, where emperor Ferdinand was convinced to abdicate the throne. The court kept in close contact with the generals, and in any case a number of them acted without royal authority against the revolutionaries. It was clear by the end of August that Ferdinand would abdicate in favor of the eighteen-year-old Francis Joseph I. The young emperor was present when Vienna was besieged and seized by loyal troops at the end of October. At the same time, Austria warned the pope that he was the chief of Christendom, not a simple Italian sovereign. If he did not remain neutral, Austria would separate the Catholic Church of the empire from Rome. The menace was considered; and the pope recalled his troops. The British, American, and French consuls in Trieste demanded the Piedmontese and Neapolitan fleets, that they lift the blockade against Austria. Austrian diplomatic pressure, Neapolitan troubles in Sicily, and King Ferdinands desire to restore absolute power created a bevy of internal crises. He withdrew his forces. The remaining 77,000 Italians in Lombardy held a long line from Peschiera to Mantua. A larger portion of the army was deployed around Mantua, preventing Charles Albert from taking the offensive. During the third week of July, Radtezky advanced from Verona with 56,000 men and attacked the Piedmontese army of 20,000 around the village of Custoza. After two days of hard fighting, he dislocated Charles Alberts army. Italian troops were too scattered to resist. Furthermore,
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Italian freedom could be reached through a popular revolt. The people could fight and win a popular war to liberate their country. When receiving news of Piedmonts defeat, Carlo Cattaneo, one of the most important political thinkers of that period wrote: Good news: the Sardinians [Piedmontese] have been defeated. Now we shall be masters of ourselves. It will be us who will make a popular war. It will be us to drive the Austrians from Italy, and then we shall make the Federal republic.7 In the best case, this could be considered total ignorance, political shortsightedness, and complete incomprehension of the nature of war. In the worst case, one could ask himself if this man was as smart as he supposed himself to be. Unfortunately, his words were taken to heart by the most consummate Republicans. For instance, Goffredo Mameli, a young patriot and author of a very popular song, which later became the Italian republics national anthem, shared Cattaneos revolutionary optimism.
The result was simple. The French kept their word, respecting the truce by launching a surprise attack twenty-four hours before it expired. Their assault overwhelmed the defenses. Garibaldi did all he could to delay the inevitable, but the French reached the height of Gianicolo hill. They sent an ultimatum to the triumvirate: if the Republic did not surrender, they would shell the city until it was destroyed. Mazzini and the triumvirate had little choice but to accept. Garibaldi left the city with his wife Anita and 4,000 men. He wanted to reach Venice, but the Spanish, French, and Neapolitans were on his heels, and the Austrians were coming from north. He escaped to San Marino along with 250 men and tried to reach Venice by sea. The Austrian fleet pursued, and he was forced to land near Ravenna. His wife died there. Garibaldi then escaped to Genoa. The Piedmontese government asked him to leave in order to avoid trouble with Austria and France. Having lost his wife, Rome, and revolution, Garibaldi sailed for America. He
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stayed in New York, where he worked as a candle maker in the factory of Antonio Meucci, the Italian who invented the telephone.13 After some time he went to South America as a sea captain and returned to Italy only in 1854. At the same time as Garibaldis defense of Rome, Venice resisted an Austrian siege. Daniel Manin, chief of the Republic, made a determined stand against the Austrians. They attempted to bomb the city from the air, using balloons, but this proved unsuccessful and the siege continued. In late summer the city ran out of food. Manin had no choice but surrender, on August 24, 1849. Radetzky did not take revenge on the rebellious city. He requested that they hand over their ordnance and weapons, and sent Manin and thirty-nine others into exile. The first war for Italian independence was over.
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had been threatened by an Austrian schism in 1848, and this was a lesson he could not forget. He disliked Austria, because of its oppression in Italy and, according to traditional papal foreign policy, he sought external support. He found French president Louis Napoleon Bonaparte receptive, although he was not a good Catholic. Louis Napoleon, however, needed the political support of the conservative Catholics in France. Backed by a conservative France in theory, and by a conservative Austria, Pius IX did not have much room to maneuver. Piedmont was the only Italian state that had been able to escape Austrian pressure. Victor Emmanuel II experienced difficulties in his first year as king. The defeat led to rioting, especially in Genoa. Shortly after the Battle of Novara, in Parliament the extreme left cried for war, revolution, and a republic, against the king and the Church. The leftists were either former Jacobins who had cooperated with the French in 17981814, or their sons. It was a class composed of lawyers, notaries, attorneys, physicians, and merchants from small towns in the provinces. They had no experience in politics. They were certain that if France were now a republic, it would be similar to the republic that had preceded Napoleon. Surely it was the republic that had given the middle class political power. They were confident that France would intervene against Austria. They understood nothing. France was as conservative as Austria. In case of a local revolution, both nations could invade Piedmont as a peace enforcing operation. Victor Emmanuel had few options. If he wanted to preserve the constitution, he had to act against political opposition and rioting. First, he gained the support of the Savoyard party, the most conservative in Parliament. Then he used the army to smash the riots and secure the state against internal disorders. This had two effects; France and Austria considered him a good, reliable, conservative king; and the ghost of intervention disappeared. Militarily the war had been an unmitigated disaster. Piedmontese generals had proved terribly poor compared to their Austrian counterparts in the 1848 and 1849 campaigns. The narrow-minded cadets of 1815 made grave mistakes as generals. The battle at Verona had been lost because they did not to realize how strategically vital the city was to Radetzsky, and they showed incompetence at maneuvering the army in battle. Victor Emmanuel was keenly aware of these problems. He had commanded a division during both campaigns. The victory of Goito on May 30 was due to his successful attack against the Austrian position. He fought well in the two-day battle of Custoza, and in the short campaign of 1849. He was not a great general, but he was clever and had good tactical sense. Although he wanted to shake up the General Staff, he could not. His generals were faithful and loyal, and he simply could not do that among the high command. Some of them were former Napoleonic sheep back in the kings foldBava, who commanded in Goito, was one and that was a key reason not to cause disaffection among the senior officers. They could be as dangerous as the revolutionaries. Others belonged to families that had served the House of Savoy for many centuries: De Sonnaz, Della Rocca, La Marmora; and their families filled the highest ranks of the army, the navy, the diplo-
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heat more than the Russians became biggest obstacle for Piedmontese. Cholera, too, killed thousands of allied soldiers, and Piedmontese dead exceeded one thousand. Among them was General Alessandro La Marmora, brother of the commander in chief and founder of the Bersaglieri, who commanded a division. Reinforcements reached the Crimea, replacing the casualties; and the total Piedmontese force employed by the end of the war totaled 24,082 men, including naval personnel. Losses due to combat were not as severe. The Piedmontese were involved in only one battle, on August 16, 1855, when 60,000 Russians sortied from Sebastapol against the French. The Piedmontese outpost, called Zig-Zag, stalled the Russian attack as its crooked line fortifications designed by Major Cadorna provided greater crossfire for the Italian soldiers. The 350 Bersaglieri and infantry in Zig-Zag resisted for an hour before withdrawing. The Russians then moved against the French, but the Piedmontese resistance had already warned them, and they pounded the Russians with a massive artillery barrage. Shortly thereafter, the entire Piedmontese expeditionary force attacked the Russian flank. By 8:00 a.m. the fighting was over. The Russians lost 2,273 dead and 1,742 missing in action. French casualties amounted to some 1,500 men, and Piedmontese losses totaled a mere 14 dead and 15 wounded, including General Roberto Gabrielli di Montevecchio, who died some two months later. The Times war correspondent W. H. Russell wrote an account praising the Piedmontese action. It was the first Piedmontese victory since Goito, and a demonstration of the effectiveness of the new army. Having their baptism of fire, Piedmont could now be considered an ally in all aspects. After the conquest of Malakov Fort, Sebastopol surrendered. Russia agreed to negotiate and signed an armistice on September 8, 1855. A peace conference was called in Paris; and Louis Napoleon, now Emperor Napoleon III, and Lord Clarendon strongly supported Piedmonts seat at the table. Cavour fully participated, and this meant the kingdom was admitted to the restricted circle of major powers. It was the first step toward Italian unification.
Preparing a War
When in Paris, Cavour realized the extent to which Austria was diplomatically isolated. The Habsburg Empire remained neutral in the conflict. Both Russia and the Allies asked Francis Joseph to intervene. Helping Russia meant the destruction of the Ottoman Empire. This would create a political vacuum in the Balkans and provide the Russians with an opportunity to strengthen their cultural bonds with the Balkan Slavs. Austria could therefore not support Russia. But, unfortunately, it was impossible to join the Allies. In fact, the Austro-Russian frontier was in the large Hungarian, Polish, and Moravian plains. What could the imperial army do against a massive Russian attack? Austria took the middle course. Francis Joseph, however, made a terrible mistake. He organized a large Observation Army and sent it to his eastern border, as
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soon as he saw the emperor, he shouted: In heavens name: No ultimatum to Piedmont.4 It was sent yesterday,5 the emperor sadly replied. Austrias role in Italy was nearing its end.
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the French emperor. In the early days of the war, Vienna had sought military assistance from Berlin, but Prussia demanded the supreme command of all German troops, including Austrians. This meant that Austria would have to give up its political influence in Germany, which the Habsburgs had jealously guarded for three centuries. Austria refused. But Austrian influence in northern Italy was waning with the retreat of the imperial army. Conversely, Napoleon feared Prussia. In fact, as soon as news of the first French-Piedmontese victories spread, the German states mobilized a 400,000-man army,10 deployed on the right bank of the Rhine. Napoleon had only 180,000 men between Paris and the frontier. Domestic crises also emerged in the midst of the war. Napoleons plans for Italy unraveled at the moment of victory. Revolutionaries throughout the peninsula forced the Italian princes to flee. Commissioners then ruled these states in the name of Victor Emmanuel. No one, however, liked the idea of a Central Italian Kingdom under Prince Napoleon Jerome. The French public was asking why then had so many French lost their lives in Lombardy? And what about the pope? He had lost a remarkable portion of his states because of French intervention. A large part of the French public, including the empress Eugenie, questioned the logic of French involvement. Under these circumstances both emperors came to an agreement. Piedmont would have Lombardy, but Austria could maintain Peschiera and Mantua, and the whole of Venetia. All the dethroned rulers could return to their thrones. Italy, however, had to be reorganized as a confederation, including Austria as the sovereign power of Venetia and Trentino. The pope would preside over the confederation as president. Victor Emmanuel realized when all was concluded that he had to be pragmatic. He could not continue the war against Austria without the French. He halfheartedly accepted the armistice. Cavour resigned; but he quickly moved the National Society when the kings commissioners left Modena, Parma, Bologna, and Florence. They established local governments without monarchy. Tuscany, the duchies, and all the legations joined each other, forming a Central Italy League with an army of 60,000 men. They rejected the Austro-French treaty. This forced Austria and France to either accept the new situation or get involved in a new war against the League. London, however, stepped in and proposed a compromise. British policy did not appreciate the increasing French power in Italy, that is to say, in the middle of Mediterranean and linked to India through the Suez Isthmus. Britain suggested that France consent to the union of the Central Italy League in Piedmont in exchange for Savoy and the county of Nice. Napoleon III accepted, and on January 16, 1860, Cavour was reappointed premier. On March 11 and 12, after a plebiscite, a new state was born. It was clear that the next step was south toward Naples and Sicily.
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Garibaldi in Sicily
From Sicily to Naples
On April 4, 1860, rioting broke out in Palermo. The Neapolitan police swiftly crushed it. Some revolutionaries, however, escaped to the mountains around Palermo. Sicilian liberals exiled to Piedmont realized that their plans had no prospects if it was left to the monarchy to alter the political institutions. Francesco Crispi, one of the revolutionaries, urged Garibaldi to intervene. The Republican general called to arms the generous, that is to say, all the willing patriots. They concentrated in Quarto, near Genoa. On May 5, 1860, Garibaldi left Liguria with 1,089 men on two steamboats, the Piemonte and the Lombardo. News of his trip soon arrived in Naples. The Bourbon fleet was dispatched but unable to locate Garibaldi. On May 11, in the early afternoon, the Garibaldini landed in Marsala, on the western coast of Sicily. The closest Bourbon man-of-war was ten miles away. Garibaldi and his thousand had only three cannon, some old rifles, and a few rounds. On May 15 they had their first victory, over 1,800 Sicilian troops and two guns commanded by Major Sforza at Calatafimi. They then marched on Palermo. Garibaldi attacked the city on May 27. After a three-day fight, the Bourbon garrison asked for a truce. Garibaldi agreed just in time to prevent his rearguard from being attacked by Major Beneventano del Boscos column. The new king of Naples, Francis II, had ordered the garrison and the fleet to shell the city. Luckily, he feared an interposition by U.S., French, and British vessels in Palermo harbor. So, no concrete orders for subsequent action came from Naples and, on June 7, the Bourbonian commander, General Lanza, evacuated the city. This was the signal for a general insurrection in southern and eastern Sicily. Neapolitan troops concentrated around Milazzo and Messina. After receiving reinforcements from northern Italy, Garibaldi attacked and seized Milazzo with 4,500 men on July 20. A week later the citadel capitulated. Then, Garibaldis general Medici blockaded Messina, preparing the way for Garibaldi to land in Calabria. Sliding between the Bourbon ships patrolling the Straits of Messina, Garibaldis boats transported the army to the Calabrian shore. The Bourbons collapsed so quickly after the landing that there was little fighting en route to Naples. The Neapolitan generals surrendered, along with their 18,000 men, and Garibaldis march continued unmolested.
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The question about why the sudden collapse of Bourbon authority has been examined by historians. Some proposed the subtle and secret activity of Masonry. Some believe the Neapolitan generals and admirals were corrupted by the Piedmontese government. There is insufficient evidence to definitively support one or the other. It is highly probable that the senior Neapolitan officers acted in this manner because of the kings indecision. When they realized that Francis II was not strong enough to save his crown, they simply thought of themselves. The kingdom was at an end, and a new king was on the horizon; so why resist against the new state instead of looking to save their positions? This may explain why the Neapolitan army did not fight Garibaldi before Naples, but fought with determination in the following months, when only the true Bourbon supporters remained. On September 6, King Francis II retired from Naples to Capua and Caserta with his remaining troops. He ordered his navy to sail to Gaeta, but only one ship obeyed. The other Neapolitan officers and crews secretly agreed with Admiral Persanos Piedmontese ships into Naples harbor, prior to Garibaldis arrivalbecause Piedmont was formally neutraland as soon as Garibaldi entered the city two days later, they hoisted the Piedmontese tricolor. Garibaldi arrived in Naples by train with six companions and was received with great fanfare. The Garibaldininow 20,000 men of the Southern Armymarched to the left bank of the Volturno River. The Bourbon army stood on the opposite bank with 25,000 men, preparing to recapture Naples. Francis II still commanded 40,000 loyal men and looked for immediate assistance. This was not too difficult as Garibaldi, in a speech in Naples, announced his intentions to march on Rome, sweeping the French garrison out. This created a significant problem for Cavour. The French would intervene in such an event, and indeed, Austria could do the same. Franco-Austrian intervention would mean the end of the Italian Risorgimento. Cavour knew it and decided to prevent Garibaldi from fulfilling his pledge. As Cavour feared France more than he did Austria, he warned Napoleon III about a possible Mazzini initiative against the popeMazzini was in Naplesand told the French emperor that Piedmontese involvement was the best way to save the Papal States from the Republican menace. Napoleon was not stupid and did not believe this story, but an extended and friendly Italian state would be better than nothing. Moreover, he was a former carbonaro who had spent his youth in Italy, and surely this played a role in his decision. He grumbled to the Piedmontese ambassador, Faites, mais faites vite! (Do, but do quickly!), and so the Piedmontese army intervened.
Brigands
As all central and southern Italian states, the kingdom of Naples had brigands. Its poor roads, rough geography, steep mountains, and large and wild woods ren-
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dered brigands hard to find. After the defeat of the Bourbons, many soldiers joined the brigands and began a guerrilla war. The first skirmishes occurred in late 1860 and quickly increased in quality and quantity. It was at the same time that the new Kingdom of Italy faced social, political, and military problems. The Neapolitans perceived the Garibaldini as foreigners from other parts of Italy. It was analogous to the experience their grandparents had seen in the early days of that century. The majority of the southern population was illiterate and had never seen Garibaldini. In fact, because of their rapid advance, Garibaldis troops had been seen in only a few towns and cities, mostly on the Tyrrhenian coast. People in the interior only received rumors about the coming soldiers of the honest manking. As an Italian officer later remarked, this nickname created a terrible misunderstanding.1 In fact, the worst social enemy of the southern commoners was not the aristocracyusually referred to as the lords, to which the gentlemen belongedit was the middle class. This rural bourgeoisie, mostly composed of landowners, merchants, attorneys, physicians, land agents, low-ranking police officers, and judges, was normally referred to as the galantuominithe honest menjust as was Victor Emmanuels popular nickname. The officer wrote that the common people, who regarded the galantuomini as its worst enemies, simply thought of King Galantuomo as sovereign of the whole honest men class. As a consequence, they believed he would be the worst king. The countryside revolted, fearing a future of oppression and deeper poverty under the unlimited will and power of the galantuomini and their king. As in all ancien regime societies, in the Two Sicilies the king was the only ally of the poor in the face of the aristocracy and bourgeoisie. Moreover, the common people had seen, or at least heard about, what happened in the past. In 1798 some of the lords and the most of the honest men revolted against the king, joining the French. Blood and violence spread, and less than a year later the dynasty returned. It happened once more in 1806. That time the dynasty was restored in 1815. And what about 182021, when the king disbanded the honest men at the head of the Austrian army? After every invasion or revolution occurred, the dynasty returned. If it had happened three times in the previous sixty years, why not this time, too? Obviously, common brigands profited from the situation, mixing their actions with those of the common people, killing and stealing. Many brigands were supported by the former king, now exiled in Rome. He sent them money and recruited volunteers to increase their strength. Victor Emmanuels army was involved in real counterinsurgency operations. Light columns, mostly composed of cavalry, Royal Carabineers and Bersaglieri, supported by the National Guard, fought throughout the south. Fighting was harsh and bloody. Ambushes, attacks, and raids followed by retaliations were immediate and merciless. Some 90,000 men of the Royal Army, including the Royal Carabineers, were employed on campaign during those four years. Military courts worked hard. Summary executions were commonplace. Suspicion was enough to charge anyone with being a brigand. The worst period of violence ran from late 1860 until early 1864. Once Royal Carabineers were posted in every town and village and made regular patrols, brig-
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had only to wait for an opportunity to seize the city. And Venice? Events in Germany would provide the solution to that problem
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to defeat the Germans in that campaign. In Dijon, on December 1, 1870, he applied his Latin American tactics and repelled German attacks. On January 21, 1871, he fought Prussian general von Kettlers troops. After three days of fighting, the Germans were repulsed again. They lost one of their colors, the only one lost by the Prussians in that war. In the meantime, the pope refused to leave Rome to the king. Thus, on September 20, 1870, General Raffaele Cadorna attacked the citys defenses. A breach was opened on the left side of Porta Pia, the monumental gate by Michelangelo on the Nomentana route, the same one the Garibaldini had used three years earlier. Then, Italian troops entered the city. The papal garrison, including also Belgian, Irish, French, and Canadian volunteers, surrendered upon the popes order, and the kingdom finally found its capital. The Italian Army had forced the Roman Catholic Church to abandon the temporal, by seizing it, and focus instead on the spiritual.
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day; often this was more than he normally had at home. At last the army established compulsory education for recruits and taught reading and writing. In fact, soon after the establishment of general conscription, figures show a significant increase in literacy among the young male population.8 So, the army became the symbolic embodiment of the country, cementing unity, the guardian and soul of the national spirit andas the last phrase of the military oath saidof the Kings and Fatherlands inseparable Good.
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19
The Kingdom, Royal Policy, and the Colonies, from Rome to Peking: 18711900
The Royal Army in Italy and the Royal Navy Abroad
Soon after the conquest of Rome, Italy reorganized its army. General Cesare Ricotti-Magnani looked to the structure of the recently established and unified German army as an example. The Italian Armynow the Regio Esercito, the Royal Armywas rebuilt on an active army, or Esercito di Campagna, Campaign Army; a provincial, later mobile, militia, or Milizia Mobile; and a territorial militia, the Milizia Territoriale, which respectively formed the second and third line armies. All soldiers were dressed with the standard blue uniform, and different corps were distinguished only by their caps and colored collar patches. After ten years of tests, according to the law issued on March 22, 1877, the Campaign Army had ten (twelve after July 8, 1883) corps, formed from twentyfour divisions. Each division was comprised of two infantry brigades, a cavalry regiment, Bersaglieri, artillery, an Engineering Corps unit, and services. Each infantry regiment in peacetime consisted of 61 officers and 1,280 men (to be doubled in war), divided into three battalions on four companies. Infantry had a grenadier brigade, 47 line brigades, 12 Bersaglieri regiments, and, after October 15, 1872, Alpine troops, which in 1883 consisted of six regiments. Artillery had ten regiments and, after 1877, a mountain artillery regiment. The Engineer Corps consisted of different specialized regiments: telegraphers, radiotelegraphers, pontooneers, miners, railwaymen, lagoonnaires (to be used only in marshes, deltas, and lagoons, as a sort of marines), and aerostatic, that is to say, the units using balloons, established in 1885. Including Carabineers and services, the Royal Army had approximately 250,000 men in its peacetime complement. The Mobile Militia was organized into companies. The line infantry had 960 companies, the Bersaglieri 60, Engineers Corps
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sappers 10, and artillery 60. Territorial Militia had companies, too: line infantry 1,440, and fortress artillery had 100. This organization did not change until 1923. The countryand the army, toohad a desperate need to expand track. At the end of 1861 the kingdom had 1,590 miles of line. Five years later railroads covered 3,100 miles and in 1876, 4,834 miles. It was not a great net, especially considering that Germany in the same year had 17,943 miles, France 13,700, and Austria-Hungary 10,759. Italy now ranked fourth in western and central Continental Europe, with Sweden fifth at 2,330 miles. The real obstacle to surpass was not the poverty of the nation or its lack of money; it was its lack of industry. Italians possessed good technical know-how as inventors and technicians: the 7.96-mile-long Moncenisio railway tunnel inaugurated in September 1871 was a good demonstration of it. Unfortunately, they had a limited and weak industrial base and no raw materials. Native iron, copper, lead, and tin were all consumed during the Etruscan and Roman periods. Coal was far from the higher British quality. Moreover, no heavy industry existed. In fact, the first Italian battleships had been built in the United States, France, and the United Kingdom. Now, in December 1873, the minister of the navy, Admiral Simon Pacoret de Saint Bon, a native of Savoy, warned the Parliament that the fleetmostly woodenwas not too old, but the newly invented torpedo boat had introduced a revolution. A torpedo boat needed only half a million liras to be built and could easily sink a bigger and more expensive cruiser or battleship. So, de Saint Bon told the deputies, it was necessary to build a new fleet of iron ships. The 1873 navy budget had a little more than 33 million liras allocated to it. De Saint Bon proposed an extraordinary 12 million annual expenditure for the next four years. But, he warned: If we would like to expend much more than this 12 million, we would not be able unless expending it abroad. The force of our national industry, the production capability of our arsenals and of the metallurgical factories existing in the country is not so wide to allow us to expend more than 12 million per year. I think, by the way, that if we shall not use great energy, we shall not be able to expend them.1 He was right. The lack of heavy industries was the first problem to solve. It was addressed by his successor, the next minister of the navy, Benedetto Brin, general of the Naval Engineer Corps.2 Brin was a strong supporter of national heavy industry, and his support pushed the government toward protectionism. Italy needed weapons and ships to remain independent and a world power. Weapons and ships could only be produced by heavy industry. No country could leave its liberty in the hands of a foreign state or a foreign company. What if outside support and products were unavailable at the beginning or in the middle of a war? Italy needed its own heavy metallurgical industrial system, too, and, if money was lacking, the government could provide it; and, if the price of foreign products was lower, the government could protect Italian production by enforcing import duties. If coal was in short supply, well, waterpower and, later, electricity could be an answer. Brin concentrated much of his energy into putting heavy metallurgical factories
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coming from northern and central Italy as in 1821 and 1831. They were a massive movement of illiterates from poor little southern villages. It was not the best of Italy, and this poor, desperate, and ignorant people was what the Americans, the Germans, and the French saw coming to their countries, and what they saw became the Italians by definition. Despite massive emigration and economic problems, from a military perspective Italy seemed to be growing stronger. This is one reason why in 1882, German chancellor Bismarck accepted Italy into the German-Austrian Dual Alliance. Bismarck wanted to keep France isolated after the Franco-Prussian War. His opinion about Italian military effectiveness did not matter. For what it was worth, it was suficient. In fact, as Bismarck said, he needed only an Italian drummer on the Alps to attract a whole French Army Corps from the Rhine. Moreover, the Regia Marina was a real threat to the French Mediterranean fleet and empire. Brin had, in fact, optimized scarce Italian resources to have first-class battleships equivalent to the French. The 1866 Italian-Prussian alliance was still active in a certain sense. Prussia had supported Italian interests in Rome during the 1870 papal-Italian crisis. Italy had done the same for Prussia and Germany in some South American riots, and it had also officially ignoredthat is to say, refusedappeals to support France in 1870. Italy was isolated and had feared a French intervention since 1870 under the pretext of helping the pope. Furthermore, it was known in Rome that the French General Staff was studying the feasibility of an invasion of Italy andas admiral de Sain Bon had remarked in 1873it was impossible to defend the long Tyrrhenian coast. By 1882 the unnamed enemy was France, as Austria had ceased to be a threat. Italy initially looked to Britain rather than Germany. There had been a long and positive historical relationship between Britain and the House of Savoy. The second half of nineteenth century, however, was a period of golden isolation, and Britain simply did not care very much for alliances. Italy therefore accepted the German overtures, even if this meant making an alliance with the hereditary enemy, Austria. Such an alliance made it impossible for Italy to dream of taking Trente and Trieste, with their predominantly Italian populations. The Left, composed of former Garibaldini, continued to look for an opportunity to seize those lands, regardless of the complications that could emerge from such a policy. When Bismarck organized two conferences in Berlin to discuss and organize the European order and the colonial exploitation of the world, Italian prime minister Benedetto Cairolia former Garibaldinoremained out of the discussion. The situation was complex. Several years prior to the German alliance, Bismarck had gathered the leaders of the major powers in Berlin to avoid a general European war stemming from the harsh Russian settlement of San Stefano, which was imposed on the Ottoman Empire after the war of 1877. The Vienna principle of territorial compensation was successfully applied. Austria wanted a protectorate over Bosnia-Herzegovina. Britain, Germany, and Russia supported this idea. The Austrian-German suggestion to Italy was not to ask for Italian territories still owned
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implications. The first colonial war broke out in 1887 against Ethiopia. Italian troops enlarged the colony and built the first railway from Massawa to Keren. In 1890, Dervishes appeared from Sudan and attacked Italian possessions. Captain Faras six officers and 230 colonial troopers defeated them at Agordat on June 27, 1890. After three years, 10,000 Dervishes raided from Cassala to Eritrea. Colonel Arimondi had 2,181 men, including officers, and was outnumbered 4.5 to one, but he defeated the raiding force and killed their chief. When back in Cassala, Dervishes tallied their casualties to more than 3,200 men. Arimondi had lost only 107 dead and 123 wounded. He was immediately reinforced by General Baratieri, the colonial governor. With more than 2,500 men, Arimondi seized Cassala on July 17, 1894. Another war against Ethiopia broke out in 1895. After many successful skirmishes and engagements, Italian prime minister Crispithe same who persuaded Garibaldi to go to Sicily in 1860determined to end the war with an invasion and conquest of Ethiopia in 1896. Historian Bruce Vandervort wisely remarked in his book that telegraph links between Rome and the campaigning troops deprived Baratieri of the full decisional autonomy he had successfully used in previous operations.4 The result was a defeat. On March 1, 1896, Baratieri ordered his 17,696 men and 56 cannons to attack no less than 80,000 Ethiopians and 46 cannons that Emperor Menelik had in the Adowa valley. All the Ethiopians had firearms. The Italians had no cavalry, and the Ethiopians fielded 8,600 on horseback. Italian troops came down from their positions at dawn and, according to their orders, moved through the canyons to reach the valley. They had a poor knowledge of the terrain and lacked good maps. Instead of advancing like a fist, they advanced as the fingers of a fully open hand. The battle developed as three distinct clashes at the egress of three different canyons. The Italian troops were outnumbered 5 to 1 and, when considering only the infantry, it was 6 to 1. Moreover, the Italian columns could not support each other, so when ammunition ran low, Italian troops were overwhelmed. Casualties on both sides were quite high. The Italians lost some 5,700 men and 3,000 prisoners. Ethiopian casualties totaled 7,000 dead and no less than 10,000 wounded.5 Then Italian press reacted as it had after Custoza thirty years earlier. It was a national tragedy: Crispi should disappear; it was the worst disaster Italy had ever seen: Crispi should disappear; it was a shame: Crispi should disappear; and Crispi disappeared. Really, it was not the disaster often portrayed. From a strategic perspective, Adowa had been not too different from what the British had suffered at Ishandlwana.6 Moreover, 25,000 reinforcements were en route to Eritrea. In fact, within two weeks Italian troops reacted, repelling a new Dervish incursion in the north, against Cassala, and an Ethiopian attack around Adigrat. Regardless, in May 1896, Rome ordered a stop to all operations. Political propaganda successfully destroyed Crispis premiership. Adowa thus remained in the national mind as a shame and a terrible disaster. And moreover in 1897 the Italian government gave Cassala to Britain, which had not asked for it. There was no public opposition, it happened because the government wanted no more involvement in African issues.
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under King Humbert, who appointed him premier for the first time in 1892. Minister of the interior from February 1901 until June 1903, Giolitti ruled Italy as prime ministerapart from a short interregnumuntil March 1914. He was a smart, quiet, and reflective man, just what Victor Emmanuel III and Italy needed. Giolitti was able to listen to both the workers and the industrialists and pursue compromises and agreements. He did not fear socialism or revolutions, and balanced well between extreme political positions, using Catholics to limit socialists, so he permitted general strikes as a valve for social unrest and as an indicator of the political weight of socialists. Under his leadership Italy had a quiet period and could celebrate its first fifty years as a united nation.
Giolittis Foreign and Colonial Policy, and the Italian-Turkish War: 19111912
In 1902, Italian foreign minister Prinetti told the French ambassador that Italy considered the Triple Alliance a defensive pact, so in the event of German aggression, France should not fear Italian intervention. Reactions in Vienna and in Berlin were strident. It was an important turning point. Inspired by the king, Italian foreign policy was slowly turning from the Central Powers and looking for new alliances and better diplomatic space. The British saw an opportunity in the growing rift between Italy and Austria. They too were concerned about Wilhelms aggressive colonial policies. King Edward VII courted Victor Emmanuel, trying to facilitate the dismemberment of the Triple Alliance. Italys relationship with Austria declined after the turn of the century. This was particularly the case since the crown prince, the Archduke Francis Ferdinand, placed Franz Conrad von Hotzendorff as chief of the General Staff of the Austro Hungarian army. The general saw a bleak future for Austria. He foresaw a war against Russia, Italy, Montenegro, and Serbia. These powers had strict links between them. Helen, queen of Italy, was the daughter of King Nicholas of Montenegro. She had been educated at the Russian court, and Italian Balkan policy was not too friendly toward Austria. The clash over the Balkans was similar to those of Venice and the Habsburg court centuries earlier. Conrad planned preventive wars to meet these perceived future crises. When a terrible earthquake destroyed Messina in 1908, Conrad asked the emperor for permission to attack Italy. It was a wonderful opportunity, he said, because practically the entire Italian armed forces were digging out the ruined city, where more than 100,000 people lost their lives. A horrified Francis Joseph rejected the proposal.3 That same year, Austria ended its protectorate of Bosnia-Herzegovina and annexed both provinces. Italy protested. Rome claimed that Austria had broken existing mutual pacts in the Balkan political order, but Vienna rejected the charge. The Regia Marina prepared its first plan for a naval war against Austria. In 1911 the Italian government wanted to expand in the Mediterranean to compensate for the changing situation in the Balkans. Italy had interests in Libya
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to avoid; being the first pilot captured by the enemy. In fact, in the last days of the war, because of an engine breakdown, his plane landed near El Maya and he was taken prisoner. The Turks had their own records for the first antiaircraft artillery fire, on December 15, 1911, and on January 31, 1912, the first enemy pilot ` Captain Carlo Montu was wounded by antiaircraft fire. But, it was far too early in the century to see airpower providing troops with decisive tactical support. In the summer of 1912 the Italian government decided to carry the war closer to Turkish territory. Libyan operations were not decisive. The Regia Marina had swept the Turkish navy from Mediterranean and the Red Sea, and Italian troops could easily move by sea. The Royal Army landed on Stampalia Island and then conquered the remaining Dodecanese Islands. The next step had to be against the Turkish fleet, which remained inactive in the Dardanelles. The last time Italian ships tried to enter the Dardanelles in pursuit of the Turkish fleet had been in 1657. Now the situation was a bit different. On the night of July 1819, Vessel Captain Enrico Millo led his five-torpedo-boat squadron into the Dardanelles. He arrived in sight of Nagara, where the enemy fleet was located, but underwater iron chains, sea mines, and a strong artillery response did not allow him to go forward. He came out of the straits with no damage to his ships or crews. The Italian press acclaimed him as a hero. The French press announced that the Turks had sunk four Macaroni battleships.6 The extension and duration of the war led to complications in both Italy and the Ottoman Empire. Italy was spending a lot of money and, moreover, Conrad von Hotzendorff had asked Francis Joseph again for permission to launch a preven tive attack on Italy.7 The emperor rejected this proposal, too, but the discussion was known in Rome. No German diplomatic support had been given to the Libyan war, and strange rumors emerged in Eastern Europe. The same rumors worried Austria, Britain, and the Ottoman Empire. Russia was quite happy with the Italian attacks on the Ottomans. Russia hoped for a great Turkish defeat, opening the route to the Mediterranean. This was Britains nightmare, but how could Britain intervene against Italy if they were trying to cut Italy from the German alliance? Indeed, even the small Balkan states were preparing to raise arms against Turkey. Bulgaria, Greece, Serbia, and Montenegro attacked European Turkey in the socalled First Balkan War. Both Italy and the Ottomans needed to end their war as soon as possible. On October 18, 1912, Turkey signed the Lausanne Treaty and gave Italy Libya, consenting to a provisional Italian occupation of the Dodecanese Islands, too.
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except for a very small political minority. Socialists disliked the idea, Giolitti did not consider war a good opportunity, and most of the members of Parliament had similar opinions. Most Italian assessments prefigured a quick German victory.2 There were two very active political groups, however, that wanted Italy to enter the war, particularly when it became clear later that Germany would not achieve a rapid victory, if victory at all. The political group was not a party, but a sort of association composed of many Italians who were born as Austrian subjects in Trentino or Venezia Giulia and Dalmatia. These irredentists wanted their birthplaces united with Italy. They played a major role in lobbying the government to enter the conflict and were fully supported by another group of the same mind. As all the Western countries, Italy has a long tradition of connections between culture and war, but the Risorgimento created a change in that correlation. Nationalist culture made policy and pushed for war. Italian Risorgimento authors depicted the sad situation of Italian history under foreign powers. Simply describing his prison experience in Spielberg Castle, Silvio Pellico savaged Austria in the public mind with his famous book Le mie prigioni (My Prisons). Count Alessandro Manzonis romance, I promessi sposithe only one of that periodshowed what foreign rule, in that case the Spaniards in Milan, meant. National poet Giosue Carducci, a former carbonaro and a sort of Italian Tennyson, sang about war and the glory of the Piedmontese army and the Savoyard dynasty. The best-known and loved composer, Giuseppe Verdi, had his own troubles with Austrian censors concerning his operas. Thanks to his Forza del destino (The Force of Destiny), nobody could forget how the Austrians had been defeated in 1744 at Velletri by the Italiansno matter if they were Bourbon Neapolitans. On the walls of Italian cities and towns was scrawled Viva Verdi (Long live Verdi!). In appearance, it acclaimed the composer; in reality, it was an acronym meaning Long Life toVivaVittorio Emanuele Re DItaliaVictor Emmanuel, king of Italy. This was the past, but now something new appeared. The last quarter of the nineteenth century was the age of Decadence. One of its major features was Gabriele DAnnunzio, whose main interest was to taste everything just to experience new sensations. Decadence, however, produced a reaction. A not too brilliant poet, Filippo Tommaso Marinetti, wrote the Manifesto dei Futuristi, inspiring a new cultural movement. Futurism stated that the old-fashioned, elegant, sophisticated Decadent world was over; and that humanity had to live in a new era: an era of progress, of activity, of real life. Technology was the best expression of this new life, and war was the purification that humanity had to experience in order to eliminate its worst members and ideas. Activity and technology became the theme for futurist paintings and poems. Ardengo Soffici, Ottone Rosai, Giacomo Balla, and Umberto Boccioni filled their masterpieces with colors and movement. And what was faster than a car, a train, a plane? So cars, trains, and planes emerged in paintings on canvas and on walls. Futurism acclaimed the Libyan War as the dawn of a new era, an era when Venice had to be a naval base instead of a romantic city for lovers; an era when Rome had to be the capital of a strong and powerful nation. And the coming of the glorious Third Rome arrived after the first, the ancient Imperial Rome; and
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Unfortunately, the Italian government played the negotiations poorly. Although the Pact of London included the annexation of the Trentino, Venezia Giulia, and Trieste, it did not take into consideration the city of Fiume. It made no clear mention of acquisitions in the Middle East. Moreover, it failed to include discussions on German colonies in Africa or the Far East. It only spoke of border adjustments and equal compensation in Africa: no more. In nuce, Italys troubles for the next twenty-five years were all prepared in London on April 26, 1915. The government simply did not inform the Parliament, the people, nor the armed forces. In fact, Cadorna was informed only in the early days of May 1915 of the governments formal promise to enter the war before May 26. Mobilization occurred in a hurry. Beginning on May 4, 2,500 trains carried mobilized troops and 4,500 more trains moved the army to the border through June 15. On May 24, 1915, the Royal Army moved across the border. One and a half million men and 150 ships were the sword of the House of Savoy in its fourth and final mortal duel in seventy years against the House of Habsburg. The Regio Esercito entered the war with four armies and a reserve. They were composed of 14 corps divided into four cavalry divisions, 35 infantry divisions, one Bersaglieri division, and two Alpine groups. Dressed in gray-green uniforms5 and using model 1891 rifles, Italians went to war with remarkable enthusiasm. Many of them hoped the war would be over quickly, despite what was happening in France. Furthermore, Austria was the hereditary enemy. It was the same empire their grandfathers had fought, that their fathers had called the menace, and the sons now were going to fight in what was being definedand it was truly considered by the soldiersas the Fourth War of Independence.6 Not a single Italian intellectual stayed home. All answered the call, mostly as volunteers, and they all went to the trenches. Writers such as Soffici, Gadda, and Slataper; painters such as Boccioni, Balla, and Rosai; the poets DAnnunzio, Montale, Ungaretti, and Marinetti; politicians such as Mussolini, Bissolati, Corridoni, and Battisti; and millions of commoners came from Italy and from abroad. Millions of Italians, and hundreds of thousands of Italian immigrants returned, went to fight for the Kings and Fatherlands inseparable Good. Cadorna took the offensive but faced serious difficulties. He had to organize the army and quickly transform it from a peacetime institution to wartime. Soldiers and reserve officers lacked adequate preparation and training. Italian generals moved slowly, and the Austrians had time to improve their defenses and transfer troops to the frontier. In Cadornas mind the Italian army had to act fast, crossing the Carnatic Alps to reach the Lubjiana Valley. According to Franz Conrad von Hotzendorff, the Austrian chief of staff, the Lubjiana Valley was the perfect place for a battle of annihilation against the Italian army. Regardless of Conrads predications and plans, the problem was that he lacked troops because of intensive Austrian involvement in the Balkans and on the Russian front. He requested German aid, but the Germans refused, having already dispatched an army to the Serbian border in 1915. Conrad therefore had to arrange his defense as best he could, by exploiting natural obstacles.
On the Carso Plateau the situation was the same. The Austrians possessed the heights of the hills separating the Italians from Gorizia and Trieste. In its complex, the Carso was far easier to defend instead of attack. It stood perpendicular to the
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Isonzo, the Vipacco river and Friuli plain, like a balcony from which one could shoot the attacking forces as if from ten-meter-high building. It was a natural fortress: a great bastion with a great moat: the Isonzo and the Dottori channel.9 Italian infantry had to move from the bottom to the top; Austrian positions were well protected by lines of barbed wire swept by machine gun crossfire. As soon as Italian infantry came out of its trenches, Austrian artillery conducted interdiction bombardment along with infantry fire. It was quite normal to see the first Italian wave completely killed within a couple of minutes before reaching the first line of wire. Italian artillery threw its preparatory fire onto Austrian positions, just as the Allies did on the Western Front, but it could shell as much as it wanted without really creating any exploitable holes in the Austrian defenses. Shelled barbed wire became just a more inextricable jungle of death. It was impossible to cut it with the special wire cutters provided by the army. During the summer of 1915, Italian infantry sent out special patrols during the night. They had to creep toward enemy positions, carrying twenty- to twenty-sixfoot-long metal pipes filled with high explosive. When they reached the enemy barbed wire, they lit the fuse using a cigar. The explosion generally opened good holes in the wire, but sometimes it did not reach the enemy trenches. Due to the relative positions of the armies, Italian trenches were at lower elevations compared to the Austrians. Soldiers therefore had to remain under cover the entire day. As soon as one of them stretched out a portion of his body, he was immediately shot. The standard Austrian sharpshooter, called CecchinoLittle Francis, after Emperor Francis Josephhad a seven-round rifle whose characteristic noiserendered as Tah poom in a military songallowed Italian soldiers to determine if the magazine was empty or not and if was it possible to safely rush out of a hole. For this reason all movements were conducted by night, and the Austrians responded by illuminating Italian positions with searchlights. The trenches were terribly uncomfortable. They were muddy and enveloped in a loud atmosphere, with a terrible mix of smells, including feces and putrefication from dead bodies left on the field or lying under the earth and pushed up by the artillery fire. It was common to see bodies sticking out of the walls or out of the ground of the trenches and bunkers. Cold and rain were constant in the mountains, and in winter the snow added avalanches to all the other risks. The lack of grass and trees due to artillery fire rendered the plains a squalid sight of naked stone. In this situation, it is no wonder the Great War on the Italian front was anything but fast. Cadornas tactics were the same as all his colleagues on other fronts, from the Channel to Gallipoli; massive frontal attacks preceded by a sustained artillery barrage. The First Battle of the Isonzo ended on July 7, 1915. The Second Battle began immediately afterward and ended within a few days; 56,813 Italians and 57,038 Austrians died, for nothing. On October 13 the Allies urged Cadorna to attack and relieve pressure on the Russians. The French had tried on September 20 with the bloody Artois and Champagne offensives. The Russians, however, were defeated in the Tarnow-Gorlice offensive. Further, Bulgaria joined the Central Powers and
19161917
In 1916 the Italian military effort became increasingly effective. Logistics improved. More roads were built and railways were constantly active. The 372-milelong front was now served by 4,000 miles of roads. Kipling remarked: There was curiously little traffic by our standards, but all there was moved very swiftly. The perfectly made and tended roads do most of the motors work. Where there are no bumps, there can be no strain, even under the maximum loads. The lorries glide from railhead to their destination, return and are off again without overhaul or delay.10 Railway systems were as decisive as trucks. During the whole war, Italian rail moved 15 million men, 1.3 million horses, mules, and oxen, 350,000 vehicles and guns, 1,830,000 wounded and sick and 22 million metric tons of ordnance and supplies. It required 50,000 trainsthat is to say 2 million carswhose activities amounted to covering 18,641,000 miles in forty-one months.11 1916 also saw the first Italian air victories. Strangely, the Supreme Command had not learned any lessons from Libya or from the Western Fronts skies. When
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the war began, Italys aircraftone hundred in allwere used only for reconnaissance. Slowly, the Italian air force improved. A first bombing run was made on August 20, 1915, by a 300-horsepower Caproni trimotor bomber against the Austrian airfield at Aidussina, near Gorizia. On April 6 the first Austrian plane was shot down by an Italian interceptor, Cavalry Captain Francesco Baracca, who later became the best Italian ace, with thirty-four kills. Italian aircraft factories improved production. During 1916 they produced 1,300 planes and 2,300 engines.12 By the end of the year the Italian air force had forty-nine air squadrons and, after June 1917, it achieved air superiority through the end of the war.13 The year 1916 was also the most difficult in terms of land operations. The Austrians and Germans planned direct strong offensives to destroy enemy resistance. Luckily for the Allies, both Conrad and General Erich von Falkenhayn, chief of the German General Staff, demanded support for their own respective offensives but refused to help each other. As a result, the Austrians and Germans did not coordinate their operations. Falkenhayn attacked at Verdun in February. Soon the French high command was calling for an Italian diversion on the Isonzo. On March 11, 1916, the Fifth Battle of the Isonzo began, lasting through the month for the first time. The Austrians used flamethrowers and iron-hammers to kill the Italian soldiers wounded or poisoned by gas and still lying on the ground. They lost practically no land, apart from Mount Adamello. Then, on May 15, Conrad launched his offensive: the so called Strafe Expedition, the punitive expedition. Forty Austrian divisions189 battalions and 18 Standschutzen unitssupported by 1,193 guns, came down from the Trentino to attack General Pecori Giraldis First Army. Pecori Giraldi had 155 battalions and 775 guns. The Italian line was forced back in the center but resisted on the wings. Within five days the Austrian offensive looked like an inflating balloon, with a little mouth. Cadorna had been taken by surprise. Despite clear warnings, he was confident that no Austrian attack would come from the Trentino. The desperate resistance of the reinforced First Army gave Cadorna time to organize an army in fifteen days. After only twelve days he concentrated 179,000 men and 35,600 horses in the triangle of Vicenza-Padova-Cittadella, creating the Fifth Army of four corps on eight divisions. The Austrians now found their strategic situation deteriorating rapidly. After Victor Emmanuel wrote a personal letter to Czar Nicholas II, Russian general Brusilov directed a massive offensive against the Austrians on June 4. The Fourth and Seventh Austrian Armies lost 186,000 dead and 80,000 prisoners within five days. Conrad, however, insisted on maintaining the impetus of his offensive in Italy until June 15. The Italian counterattack began the following day; by the end of that month the fighting ended. Austrian casualties amounted to 5,000 dead, 23,000 wounded, and 2,000 prisoners. Italy lost 6,187 dead, 28,544 wounded, and 41,401 prisoners and missing in action; too much for a defensive battle. Likewise, in the following counteroffensive, the Italians lost 72,000 more men; the Austrians some 50,000. Conrad was confident he had so heavily damaged the Italians that they could
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18, the Second Army victoriously crossed the Isonzo and took 20,000 prisoners, 125 guns, and more than 200 machine guns. When the battle ended, Cadorna had lost 18,794 dead, 89,193 wounded, and 35,087 missing in action. The Austrians lost 110,000 men and the Bainsizza.14
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Six days later they renewed the offensive, gaining a further eight miles. Urged on by the situation, on June 12, Foch sent a third request to Diaz, while the president of the French republic summoned the kings ambassador, demanding help. Foch wrote, As the Austrian offensive had not taken place, one could exclude it as a possibility. Therefore, the Italian offensive had to be launched as soon as possible.19 Diaz simply did not respond. On that same June 12, at dawn, Austrian artillery opened fire, inaugurating Operation Avalanche, the offensive Foch had ruled out. Italian artillery reacted quickly and effectively, silencing the Austrians with counterbattery fire within two hours. The day after, at 3:30 a.m., the Austrians bombarded the Italian front again, but when their infantry went over the top, it was massacred by Italian artillery. This was the last charge of the Habsburg Empire. Colonels in full uniform were seen leading their regiments out of the trenches, only to be killed after a few steps. The fire was so terrible that routed Austrian troops fled as far as Trente, and some even farther. More than eight thousand deserters were found on the other side of the Alps, at Innsbruck. Having failed to cross the Piave, too, the Austrian attack halted on July 6. The battle was over, and the empire with it. The Italian armed forces improved their performance in battle. Motor torpedo boats filled the sea. Italian planes, after their greatest victory in the dogfight above Istrana in January, flew over Vienna. It was DAnnunzios idea. He had made his first flight as a passenger in 1909, with Glenn Curtiss as the pilot. He loved flying, and planned a raid on the enemy capital. Nine Italian planes reached the city and dropped thousands of leaflets, declaring that they were too civilized to drop bombs. They said they were just demonstrating what the Italians could do if desired. Summer passed slowly. One million American soldiers were fighting in France, but only a regiment and a few good pilots were sent to Italy.20 The Western Front was as active as the Italian front was calm. The Germans launched numerous offensives, pressing the front to the breaking point. Foch urged Diaz again to intervene against the Austrians, but Diaz refused. Cadornas actions through 1917 had so weakened the army that when Diaz was ready to move, in October, he had 200,000 men fewer than in June, because of the lack of available recruits. On September 29, Diaz finally decided to attack. Bulgaria just surrendered; and Italian troops from Salonika joined the Italian XVI Corps in Albania. The Austrian army in the Balkans was on the verge of collapse, particularly because the Germans had recently withdrawn their forces to continue their own operations on the Western Front. Austrian forces in Italy consisted now of fifty-seven divisions with 6,030 guns and 564 aircraft. Diaz disposed of fifty-seven divisions, with 4,150 guns and more than 600 bombards. The Italian air force had 1,683 aircraft. Diaz planned to throw the Austrians out of Venetia. It centered on a battle across the Piave around a little village called Vittorio Veneto. The offensive was delayed until October 24, the first anniversary of Caporetto. The Austrian army buckled under the weight of the Italian attacks. On the fifth day an Austrian delegation including a German officer requested an armistice negotiation. Austrians
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in London in 1915, but since October 1918, Italians in Fiume had voted to join Italy. According to Wilsons Fourteen Points, this should be satisfied. France and Britain, however, did not consider Wilsons policy useful in this case. Frequent clashes between Italian and Yugoslavian troopers in Fiume were followed by a clash between citizens and a French outpost. In the end, French troops fired on the Italians; and personnel from the Regia Marina were sent to keep the two apart. They were fired by the French. Italian seamen responded and destroyed the French outpost, and a diplomatic storm broke in Paris. The Italians were ordered to change their garrison and reduce their presence in Fiume. Britain offered to send police units. The Italian population in Fiume planned an uprising. A grenadier battalion joined the plot and had contacts with DAnnunzio, who accepted the invitation to be leader of the uprising. On September 12, 1919, he led a military column into Fiume. The Fiume question was critical for the Italians, and DAnnunzios popularity was so great that the troops ordered to stop him not only disobeyed, most joined him. DAnnunzio entered Fiume under a rain of flowers. The Italian government had to deal with this enormous crisis. The Allies did not want Italian sovereignty over the city. DAnnunzio declared, however, he would not accept any solution other than full annexation to Italy. In June 1920, Giolitti began his last premiership. He signed an agreement with Yugoslavia making Fiume a free city. Then he tried to negotiate with DAnnunzio. When talks failed in December, Giolitti ordered the navy and loyal troops to eject DAnnunzio and his supporters from the city. They shelled Fiume by land and sea and, on the last day of the year, the city surrendered. The crisis was over, but it was a portent of things to come. The government looked weak. It had taken no real action during the nine months prior to Giolittis premiership, and many people were concerned about the possibility of a nationalist revolution led by DAnnunzio. Giolitti too seemed unable to act promptly. The message was clear: an armed group could act against government policy without a quick and strong government reaction.
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their families. Revolutionaries promised them a better future, if they joined the revolution. Conversely, the bourgeoisie had seen most of its sons die as reserve officers during the war. How could one admit they died for nothing? Despising victory meant despising and insulting their memory. Moreover, strikes damaged the middle classno services, no mail, no trolleys, no trains workedand worker uprisings frightened them. The government did not react. Public order disappeared. What could one do? Into this disorder came the Fascists. To the eyes of bourgeoisie, they were former combatants. In case of strike, they drove trains and trolleys, they swept dirty streets, they secured public order, they respected officers and the armed forces, and above all they fought against the Socialist and Communist armed groups. They raided the occupied countryside; they reacted against the so-called Red violence. This was important, especially for the big landowners of the Padana Plain. They supported and cultivated Fascism in Emilia to protect themselves and their properties. The result was that by April 1921, Fascism appeared well organized and powerful. It had money, it had people, it had supporters and it could fight against the Reds.4 Clashes using firearms generally occurred between Socialists and Fascists, and criminals and killers were on both sides. A standard Fascist group, a Fascio, was composed of a Squadra dAzioneAction Squadalso defined as Squadraccia, the Naughty Squad, and the remaining members. The Squadra was composed of former combatants and employed in punitive expeditions, that is to say, raids against their opponents. The remainder of the Fascio was composed of young men, mostly high school and university students, used only for booing in front of the Prefecture.5 Clearly the situation was far different and changed depending on the part of Italy. Industrial cities did not suffer from the same problems as agricultural towns, and the countryside was not the same as the coastal towns. For the working class, Fascism was clearly allied to the owners, or to the masters, and therefore they placed it on the other side of the barricade. The middle-class vision of Fascism appears as too simplistic, naive and definitely insincereand often it wasbut nobody, Mussolini included, had an idea of Fascisms future plans. The bourgeoisie sought order and, possibly, business. The Fascists were looking for immediate results. Mussolini had no long-term political programs, as Hitler and the Nazis had. He wanted power, no more. His comrades had no more ideas about future than he did.6 They were a mixed group, including Republicans and monarchists, former Socialists and Conservatives, nationalists and time-wasters. Their liturgy came directly from the Risorgimento. The Fasciothe bunchwas an ancient Etruscan and Roman symbol of justice and public authority. In the eighteenth century, the Enlightenment discovered Roman Republican virtues, and the Fascio became the symbol of unity and the peoples strength. In this sense it was used in the United States, in this sense it was adopted as the Republican coat of arms in France, and
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and Carlo del Prete made the longest nonstop flight, from Rome to Touros, in Brazil. In 1926, the airship Norgedesigned and built in Italy as N. 1 by General Umberto Nobileflew from Europe to Alaska, passing above the North Pole. The next airship flight made by Nobile ended with the Italia airship crashing as it returned from the Pole in 1928. This was the end of airships. Previous military exercises demonstrated that they had an increasingly scarce military relevance; and they were abandoned. The real organization of the Regia Aeronautica began after 1926, when Italo Balboone of the quadrumviri, the four highest-ranked Fascistswas appointed undersecretary of state for the air force.8 The Regia Aeronautica, however, established its first operational doctrines in 1929.9 General Giulio Dohuets air warfare theories on the strategic importance of massive air bombing surely influenced these doctrines, but a further examination shows an influence by General Amedeo Mecozzi, who had unquestionably been influenced by American general Mitchells theories, too.10 Italian operational doctrine sought to employ a small number of aircraft. Anyway, the first combined exercise, made in the summer of 1929 with the army and navy, demonstrated it was impossible to act without an air force in a modern war. De Pinedo and Balbo experimented with various flying formations. The results were the transoceanic flights. After a first flight to Brazil, in 1933, Italo Balbos twenty-four amphibious planes flew from Orbetello through Chicago to New York City. It was considered one of the greatest aviation successes of that period. Balbo paraded triumphally in New York, and a street in Chicago was named after him. This kind of response helped bolster the Fascist regimethe Regimemaking it appear modern and technologically advanced. Technology, however, required money for research and development. The country was still poor, and the Regime preferred to concentrate its resources on results everyone could understand. Research on radar was put aside, as well as radio-piloted remote-controlled aircraft and jet propulsion. Other achievements came quickly. For the first time, an Italian transatlantic shipthe Rexwon the blue ribbon, in 1934. That same year electric locomotives in Italy ran at 93 miles per hour, and in 1939 they established the world record 126.138 miles per hourduring a trip from Florence to Milan, with an average speed of 102.526 miles per hour. Railroads in Italy consisted of ten thousand miles of track, of which 25 percent was electrified. Few lessons, though, were learned from all of this technological hype. For instance, Italy participated in the Schneider Cup, a prize to the fastest seaplane flight. In 1934 military pilot Francesco Agello reached 440.678 miles per hour.11 This is still the world record for a seaplane. It was achieved using an inline engine, but in the following years and until 1942, the Regia Aeronautica asked only for radial engined aircraft. Protectionism played a major role, but industrialists preferred to exploit their old production chains instead of invest money in new systems for better products, and decision makers at the top seemed unaware of technological improvements. The next war is normally prepared for by studying the previous one. This hap-
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In 1934, Italy stopped the German attempt to seize Austria. Hitler had become Reich chancellor the previous year. He declared himself to be a pupil of Mussolini, but Mussolini did not have a great opinion of him, or of Nazism. Moreover, Italian policy protected Austria, and Austrian chancellor Dollfuss was Mussolinis close friend. When Dollfuss was killed by Nazis and Hitler prepared an invasion of Austria, Mussolini ordered three divisions to the Brenner Pass for a counterinvasion. Hitler abandoned his plans. France and Britain appreciated it, especially because Italy allowed them to avoid war. Hitler perceived Italy as the only reactive power among the European Allies of the Great War. He believed it would be a good idea to neutralize Italy by making it an ally.15 A good opportunity appeared in 1934. After Adowa in 1896, the Ethiopians remained quiet until 1912. During the Italo-Turkish War and the Great War, they attempted to invade Italian colonies on six separate occasions, using up to fifty thousand men. For this reason, on June 4, 1930, the War Ministry prepared a plan for a war against Ethiopia.16 When another border skirmish occurred in 1934, and after a British topographical expedition supported Ethiopians attacking an Italian outpost at Ual-Ual, Mussolini decided to act by October 1935. The governor-general of Eritrea, Emilio De Bono, was placed in charge of organizing the next campaign. While Graziani stood in Somalia waiting for an opportunity, De Bonos troops crossed the Eritrean border on October 3, 1935. It was the worst possible terrain for a modern campaign; a dry, rough landscape, with rigid mountains and no roads. No less than 100,000 soldiers and workers had to build roads for the advancing army of 197,000 men with 700 guns and 200 tanks and armored cars. No fewer than 10,000 trucks shuttled supplies along hundreds of miles between the advancing army and the port of Massawa. According to all observers, the Italians were going to be defeated because of terrain and logistical problems. The greatest problem was not the terrain, but a clash between policy and military-technical exigencies; and policy won. The sixty-nine-year-old marshal De Bono knew Eritrea and northern Ethiopia quite well. A former Bersaglieri officer, he had fought there beginning in 1887. He advanced slowly, securing his supply lines. Mussolini needed victories and ordered him to move faster. De Bono refused. He was forced to resign, and Marshal Pietro Badoglio replaced him. Badoglio was an artillery officer from Piedmont. During the Great War he had commanded the XVII Corps, which was smashed at Caporetto because he had directed his artillery not to fire without his personal orders. Then he disappeared, and no artillery fired on the German first wave. After Diazs appointment as the new chief of staff, Badoglio was appointed deputy chief of staff to the surprise of many. He did not like Mussoliniin fact, as the army chief of staff in October 1922, he planned a military resistance against the March on Rome, but he made his career under his rule. As a governor in Libya, he oversaw final combat operations. Now he told Mussolini that the war in Ethiopia was progressing too slowly, and Mussolini appointed him governor of Eritrea. Badoglio obeyed Mussolini and sped up the campaign. He did what De Bono
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new viceroy. Amadeuseldest son of the commander of the Third Army in the Great Warruled well. He improved the military situation, but as a Regia Aeronautica general, he was not in charge of land warfare. General Ugo Cavallero was given that responsibility. Cavallero began operations in January 1938. He had no light hand, but his large-scale operations succeeded. As the British Foreign Office remarked in 1939, there was no doubt that Ethiopia was now fully controlled by Italian forces.19
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the Italian empire, including its possession of Ethiopia. Unfortunately, Mussolini assumed this was a sign of weakness. Shortly after sanctions were imposed, Mussolini left the League of Nations and moved closer and closer to Germany. He gave his assent for Hitler to seize Austria. By a diplomatic and commercial perspective, leaving the League did not result in isolation. The United States, Germany, and Japan were not members of the League; and trade with them was possible. Unfortunately, thanks to traditional Italian provincial shortsightedness, Mussolini looked to Europe instead of the world. He did not pursue President Roosevelts formal and informal offers for talks, and slowly he fell into Hitlers trap.1
Overseas Spain
In the summer of 1936, many Spanish generals revolted against the countrys Republican government. They asked Italy and Germany for military support. Mussolini did not like the idea very much, but he saw it as an opportunity to outmaneuver France. From the Italian point of view, France appeared to have a peculiar ability to act in a way that drew the ire of other countries. In those years, not only did Italians view French attitudes as hostile toward Italy, but also premier Leon Blum made two policy errors, which further alienated Italy. The first was a FrancoSpanish pact. Spain allowed French troops transit through Spanish territory to reach North Africa in case of war against Italy. The second was his announcement of sending weapons, ordnance, and men to support the Spanish Republic. Mussolini did not care about Spanish affairs, but if French intervention rendered Spain a sort of French protectorate, or strategic ally, Italy could find both the exits from Mediterranean closed to Italian shipping. Suez was owned by a French-British company. The Straits of Gibraltar were passable because Spain owned the African side, despite British possession of Gibraltar. What if France indirectly controlled that side as Britain controlled the European one? This could pose a threat to Mussolinis strategic interests. Italian foreign minister Galeazzo Ciano convinced Mussolini to commit the Regio Esercito for the OMSOltre Mare Spagna (Overseas Spain)operation. The Italian Military Mission arrived first in Spain to coordinate with General Francisco Franco. Then the Regia Aeronautica sent him a squadron of twelve bombers. On August 4, 1936, Italian aircraft attacked and swept the loyal Republican Spanish fleet out of the Straits of Gibraltar. Then Italian and recently arrived German aircraft transported Spanish colonial troops from Africa to Spain.2 Italian military support gradually increased. Technicians, tanks, and specialists were sent to Franco as volunteers. He lacked modern weapons and used them not for training his troops, but directly in combat. Italian light tanks played a basic role in smashing the enemy front at Navalcarnero, on October 21. Three days later, Italian military advisers had to fight in Borox. Italian light tanks met Russian-made tanks for the first time and won. Just as the Spanish nationalists and Falange (the Spanish
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On March 8, 1937, Italian troops attacked along the Carretera de Francia, the route from the south to Madrid, Saragossa, and France. Snow and ice pelted the advancing troops, and bad weather over Nationalist airfields prevented any air support for the Italian offensive. On the Republican side, good weather did not restrict Republican aircraft from providing air cover. Moreover, when the Republicans counterattacked, the Nationalists gave no support to the Italians. Despite these circumstances the CTV initially advanced 22 miles, lost 12, and then held the remaining 10 miles. But they failed to reach their objectives, and the battle had to be considered a loss. After this, Franco did not accept Italian strategic advice. ` Republican propaganda exploited this victory: No pasaranThey will not pass! Mussolini was so angered by this propaganda that he determined to commit greater forces to the war. Italian troops increased in quality and quantity and Mussolini finally admitted official involvement on October 20, 1937. His admission also ended the grotesque piracy in the Mediterranean. Since the early days of the civil war, merchant ships en route to Spain had been sunk by mysterious submarines. The Regia Marina, did not admit responsibility, but it was well known. After a League of Nations initiative, the Regia Marina together with German Kriegsmarine, the British Royal Navy, and French Marine Nationale participated in antipiracy control in the Mediterranean and along Spanish coasts. The Italian and German secret services in the Black Sea and Dardanelles observed Soviet ships carrying supplies and ordnance to Spain. Italian submarines acted accordingly and pirates sank the ships. But it was thanks to the operations against piracy that the Royal Navy was able to decipher the Regia Marinas secret codes. This would become a problem for the Italian navy in a few years.6 On land, Italian forces fought on all Spanish fronts. The Legionnaire Air Force, as the Regia Aeronautica was called in Spain, lost 175 pilots in combat. Troops were used in the north; and Legionnaire Artillery support played a fundamental role in the campaign in the north. Italian troops took part in seizing Bilbao, and the following battle of Brunete was won with the decisive role of the Aviazione Legionaria: It destroyed 100 enemy aircraft, and its close air support halted enemy counterattacks. Italian troops later attacked and, on August 26, seized Santander. When Italian tanks reached the center of the city, Nationalist supporters acclaimed them, crying, Han pasado! Han pasado!they passed! After that battle, General Ettore Bastico was recalled to Rome. In fact, Franco protested because Bastico allowed many military and local civilian Republican officers to seek refuge on British ships. It was not the first time Italians acted differently from Spaniards. Italian troops considered Republicans as prisoners of war. The Nationalists did not. In the early days of the war their military courts sentenced prisoners to death. A first Italian formal protest made little impact. When Italian headquarters protested again, the Nationalists replied that they were being more careful about who was sentenced to death: they acquitted up to 30 percent of the total! Further operations proved decisive for the war in northern Spain. Francos troops were hard-pressed near Huesca in December and were saved by the Legionnaire Artillery and Air Force. In March, Italian troops fought in Catalonia. They
Overseas Tirana
Hitler was slowly moving Europe to the brink of war. French and British appeasement and Italian diplomatic support allowed Hitler in 1938 to acquire part of Czechoslovakia. He pursued a closer friendship with Italy in order to achieve an alliance. Mussolini did not like Germans very much, but Germany seemed powerful and impossible to stop, while Britain and France appeared weak and uncertain and the United States was far away and not interested in European affairs. Mussolini believed the young peoplesItaly, Germany, and Japanwere ready to seize world leadership through a war against Britain and France. The last diplomatic conflict over Ethiopia and the Spanish Civil War had demonstrated how far Italy was from Britain and France. Moreover, French attitudes were all but friendly. Mussolini then moved Italy toward a military alliance with Japan and Germany. Mussolini decided to secure Italys strategic position first in the Adriatic. He wanted to close the Channel of Otranto, and the easiest thing to do was seize the Albanian harbor of Valona, key to the eastern side of the Adriatic. Albania had been essentially an Italian protectorate since the 1926 Treaty of Tirana, which established Italian-Albanian friendship. Nobody, however, could divine the future, and Mussolini decided that Albania had to be conquered. On April 4, 1939, the Regia Aeronautica deployed on the airfields of Grottaglie, Brindisi, and Lecce its Squadron A, while the Regia Marina concentrated its ships for transporting the Regio Esercito expeditionary force: 22,000 men, 125 tanks, 860 vehicles, 1,200 motorcycles, and 64 cannons for operation Overseas Tirana. Convoys left Italy on April 6, and troops landed the next morning. The Italian advance guard entered Tirana on April 9 at 10:10 a.m. Soon after, Italian S. 81 aircraft landed in Tirana carrying a grenadier regiment. By April 10, Overseas Tirana was over. Italy had lost 12 dead and 81 wounded to conquer what the king defined as a land containing four stones. On April 12, Albania offered its crown to Victor Emmanuel III, who now was king of Italy and of Albania and emperor of Ethiopia.
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cia. The Italian Army was interested in producing the German designed Maybach engine for tanks. It did not happen, because it preferred to introduce the Ansaldo engine for the Italian P 40 heavy tank. The P 40 was available in the autumn of 1943 and was used by the Germans after the Italian armistice.5 It was the same during the Russian campaign. The Regio Esercito staff realized the valenki, the winter boots used by the Soviets, were very good for Russias winter weather. It called for bids from national companies to produce them. One company proposed production. The others did not try to compete for the contract through a competitive offer; they simply did what they could to prevent the first company from obtaining the contract. No company prevailed. The result was simple, Italian soldiers kept their old shoes.6 This industrial mentality explains why the Regio Esercito began the war with useless tanks. The L3 light tanks were equipped with a couple of machine guns and thin armor. The L6 were not much more effective. The M 11/39 had two machine guns in its 360-degree rotating turret and a gun fixed in the front; contrary to what was needed. The M 13/40 was better, but its speed was slow, its armor thinin fact, crews improved it with sandbagsand its cannon was a simple 1.8-inch gun. During the war Ansaldo made the 3-inch self-propelled howitzer using the M 13 body. It was sent to Northern Africa and was a surprise for British tanks. As a tank officer later wrote, nobody ever understood why the army and Ansaldo respectively continued ask for and to produce the M 13 tanks and its improvement M 15/42.7 It would have been better to produce the more powerful 3-inch self-propelled howitzer. In fact, it was more effective, faster, and cheaper to build, because it was an M 13 deprived of the turret. According to General Carlo Favagrossa, who on May 23, 1940, read in a newspaper that he had been appointed undersecretary of state for war production, the situation was poor for the army and air force, but good for the navy. In autumn 1939 the Regia Aeronautica had 2,856 aircraft, but only 1,190 were combat-ready. Flight schools had 218 additional planes. No heavy bombers existed and no Italian aircraft had as powerful engines and weapons as the foreign equivalents. In 1918 the Italian air force had 1,683 modern aircraft. The Regia Marina had no aircraft carriers, but the capital ships were quite good and modern, other than submarines. Ammunition and ordnance were good, too, as well as sufficient fuel supplies. The Regio Esercito experienced the worst situation. According to the report presented by Graziani on May 25, 1940, its divisions were too lightly armed. It had 23,000 vehicles, 8,700 special vehicles, 4,400 cars, and 12,500 motorcycles. Tanks numbered some 1,500 useless light tanks and merely 70 medium battle tanks. The Regio Esercito possessed only half the number of vehicles it needed to manage something similar to the German Blitzkrieg. It was impossibleas Graziani saidto fill the gap, because the country simply did not have enough cars and trucks. Artillery was old and had little ammunition. Fuel was sufficient for only a few months. Italy produced 15,000 metric tons of crude oil annually. Albania
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Mussolini concluded that the best choice was to join the Germans in their war against France and Britain, in order to seize territory in the Mediterranean. Malta, Corsica, Savoy, and Nicethe Italian territories possessed by foreign powersand Tunis along with other African lands were meant to compensate Italy for the disloyal behavior London and Paris had exhibited in 1919. Mussolini imagined that peace talks would begin shortly, after only a few weeks of war and a few casualties. The few casualties, however, had their own political and military impact. Mussolini distrusted the Germans. He feared a German-Italian conflict after the war. Hitler could be magnetically fascinating, but he was an unreliable ally and his men were corrupt criminals.10 Moreover, as Marshal Enrico Caviglia wrote in his journal, Italy had practically no money, as the competent minister admitted in front of the Chamber of the Fasci and Corporations, the new name of the Chamber of Deputies. The situation remained critical; and Mussolini decided to preserve Italian military power in case of a German-Italian clash in the postwar era. In the best case, the current war would weaken Germany so much that Hitler would prefer not to attack Italy. In the worst case, Italy would at least have the power to resist.11 Conversely, the Germans looked with suspicion and derision at Italy.12 Marshal Caviglia wrote that under these circumstances, Italy decided on a very strange strategy. Declare war on France and Britain, but only move forces when the end of the war was near. Mussolini could then demonstrate his troops were fighting; and this would be sufficient to claim territory as compensation for participation. This was not a strategy, but a shortsighted political trick, and it ultimately led to the collapse of Italy. Italy declared war on France and Britain on June 10, 1940. Army Group West, composed of the First and the Fourth Armies, attacked France on June 21, the day after the French requested an armistice with Italy. The attack was a failure; and Mussolini asked for only a thirty-one-mile-deep occupation zone on the French side of the Alps. Then, an air expeditionary force was sent to Belgium to support German air operations against England. A submarine base was established in Bordeaux for transoceanic operations in the Atlantic against Britain and, later, the United States. After the armistice with France, then, the only active Italian front remained in eastern Africa.
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Greece
While British troops seized Keren and Massawa in East Africa, in the spring of 1941 the bloody Grecian campaign ended in Europe. Mussolini attacked Greece on the eighteenth anniversary of the March on Rome, October 28, 1940. He authorized the war because Greece, in spite of its neutrality, allowed the Royal Navy to refuel in its national waters. Second, after the Nazi-Soviet Pact in 1939, Stalin was free to move against Romania by occupying Bessarabia (Moldova). In late summer 1940, Moscow presented Bucharest with an ultimatum. Romania had little choice but to accept it. Although this was not perceived as a problem when Hitler agreed to the pact in 1939, the speed of conquest pushed up his war schedule and it became apparent that with the invasion of the Soviet Union on the horizon, the Soviet air force could now reach the Ploesti oil fields within thirty minutes from their bases in Bessarabia and Germany acquired practically all of its oil from Romania. In order to secure Romania, Hitler sent a German military mission to Bucharest. Mussolini was informed of this on October 12, 1940. He reacted badly. According to existing Italian-German agreements, after the war, Romania and the Balkans were to be in the Italian zone. If the Germans entered Romania, Italy needed to consolidate its position, and the best way was to secure control of the Black Sea egress by seizing Greece. Greece could be easily attacked from Albania; and Mussolini ordered his chiefs of staff to plan accordingly. Meeting on October 17, 1940, the Regio Esercito told Badoglio, chief of the general staff, that the lack of railways and the poor road system in Albania required 500 trucks to keep materials moving from the ports and 1,250 more trucks to supply the army in the interior. Moreover, Italian troops in Albania were outnumbered in case they had to act against the whole Greek army. Badoglio asked the Regia Marina for support. Despite optimistic reports coming from Albania about the enthusiastic Greek welcome to the Italian invaders, Admiral Cavagnari said that the lack of good ports on Greek and Albanian shores in the Adriatic created a logistical nightmare. Badoglio asked the Regia Aeronautica to provide air transport. General Pricolo declared that he had sufficient aircraft to fight, but none capable of transporting supplies. Badoglio cut off the discussion and arguments, stating, The Duce has judged and declared that for him the occupation of Greece is of major importance. So no more discussion.14 On October 28, 1940, 105,000 Italians of the XXV and XXVI Corps and the Littoral Group crossed the Greek frontier. Within two weeks their advance was stopped by a lack of supplies; and the Greeks counterattacked. The Italian front collapsed. Italy had the Eleventh and Ninth Armies in Albania. They had nine divisions and could receive no more than two additional divisions per month because of the poor capacity of the Albanian ports. These reinforcements could do no more than replace the casualties taken, but not increase overall Italian strength. The Greek army, however, deployed no fewer than thirteen divisions, three bri-
Yugoslavia: 19411943
After March 27, 1941, Belgrade had an anti-Axis government. The Germans reacted quickly. The Italians were not as fast as the Germans, but they too prepared an offensive against Yugoslavia. On April 6, 1941, operations against the 1.4 mil-
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lion men of the Yugoslavian army began. The Germans entered Yugoslavia from Austria, Bulgaria, and Hungary, together with Hungarian troops. The Italian Second Army crossed the border and divided in two. The first group moved east, seized Ljubiana, and met German forces in Karlovac. The main part of the army the king presentmarched south, along the Dalmatian coast, to meet Italian units coming north from Albania. The small garrison of Zara sortied from the city and swept away the local Yugoslav units. Then General Giglioli marched south and east, reaching Knin before the Germans. The Second Armys divisions Torino and Littorio respectively captured Ragusa (Dubrovnik) on the coast, and Mostar and Trebinje in the interior, where they met Infantry Divison Marche coming from Albania. On the Yugoslav-Albanian border operations had been incredible. The Regio Esercito had only the 31st Tank Regiment and some Blackshirt units facing 130,000 Yugoslav soldiers. The SIMServizio Informazioni MilitariItalian Military Intelligence, knew the Yugoslavian code and broadcast false orders to Yugoslav units. As a result, the Yugoslavs delayed their offensive against Albania. When they made a first attempt, Italian tanks successfully repulsed it and, when they realized the trick and tried to react, Italian divisions Centauro and Messina defeated and destroyed them. On April 17, 1941, the Yugoslav campaign was over, with a complete Axis victory; 6,028 officers and 337,684 men surrendered to Axis forces. Unfortunately, operations went so fast that some 300,000 men had been cut off. They escaped and quickly formed partisan units. Yugoslavia was divided between Italy, Germany, Hungary, and Bulgaria. The rump formed a kingdom of Croatia, whose crown was offered to Aimone of Savoy, the youngest brother of the duke of Aosta. Italy held the coastal region and Germany the interior. A demilitarized zone from 31 to 62 miles in length remained between them. As in Ethiopia in 1936, the real war was only beginning. The newly born partisan units, organized by Colonel Mihailovic, attacked the Axis-allied Croatian government, whose chief was Ante Pavelic. CroatiansRoman Catholics hated SerbiansOrthodoxJews, and Muslims, mostly living in the south. The Serbians living in the Lika zone reacted against the Croats. Germans supported the Croats and attacked the Jews. The Italians protected the Jews against the Germans, disliked Croats, and disapproved of their persecution of the Serbians.15 Until the fall of 1941, Mihailovics partisans fought against the Germans; Serbs fought against Croats; Italians stood by and observed the whole situation. Of course, things changed when Tito appeared. Italians scattered their garrisons throughout their occupied zone; and General Roatta conducted numerous and successful counterinsurgency operations, but the situation did not change very much. Partisan activity continued until the end of Italian occupation on September 8, 1943.
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The Soviets stretched the Italian line on the Don like a rubber balloon, but they could not break it. At the end of August they withdrew, having lost 50 percent of their troops. On September 10, the Soviets made a further attempt. They crossed the river near Dubowikof, but the Ravenna Infantry Division threw them back. All these operations were tied to Soviet efforts to stop the German Fourth and Sixth Panzer Armies drive on Stalingrad. When the Soviets launched their great Operation Uranus to relieve Stalingrad, on November 19, 1942, Italians were marginally involved. Stalingradtoday Volgagradis on the Volga river. The Don flows perpendicular to the Volga from north. It turns east a bit and south of Rossosh, making a loop to the Sea of Azov. ARMIR was in the great Don Bend. It had the Second Hungarian Army on its left and the Third Romanian Army on its right. The first phase of Uranus smashed the Third and the Fourth Romanian Armies and enveloped the 250,000 Germans fighting in Stalingrad. On December 16, 1942, the Soviets began Operation Saturn, with Rostov as its objective. They had to overrun Hungarian and Italian troops. It was not too hard. From the Soviet bridgehead at Mamon, fifteen divisions supported by no less than one hundred tanks attacked Italian Infantry Divisions Cosseria and Ravenna and advanced against Sforzesca, too. Outnumbered 9 to 1, the Italian line resisted for two days. On December 19, ARMIR headquarters ordered the remaining troops to withdraw. Italian soldiers moved west on foot, trying to escape the Soviet tanks. Their casualties were terribly high. Italian Divisions Torino, Cosseria, Pasubio, and Ravenna marched one hundred miles in the harsh Russian winter. Temperatures dipped from 10 to 35 degrees Centigrade below zero. They escaped encirclement on December 25, 1942, while the Sforzesca and Celere Divisions together with remaining Romanians retreated under the protection of the Alpine Army Corps, composed of three Alpine divisions and Infantry Division Vicenza. When Italian retreat ended, on January 17, 1943, the Alpine troops withdrew. The corps had few trucks and cars, and a mad crowd of half-disbanded Romanians, Hungarians, Germans, and Spaniards with them for the 140-mile march to the new Axis line. Temperatures reached 45 below zero. In spite of cold, snow, ice, and a lack of food and ammunition, Alpine troops continued their retreat. It was an epic tragedy, worse and greater than in 1812. Soviet tanks appeared here and there. They attacked and shelled, but all their attempts to encircle the Italians failed. On January 26 the Alpine Corps reached Nikolayewka, but the Soviets were already there. Alpine Division Tridentina threw its last three battalions and its last mountain artillery group with only a few rounds against the Soviet positions. Under the eyes of the unarmed and disordered column, they attacked Nikolayewka throughout the day. At sunset, their attacks had failed. Then, Tridentina commander General Reverberi jumped on the last still movable German halftrack. Tridentina forward, he shouted. The entire desperate column followed him and crashed through the Soviet positions. Soviet Official Bulletin Number 630, announcing the total defeat of Axis forces, admitted, Only the Italian Alpine Army Corps must be considered undefeated on Russian soil.19
Alexandria 68 Miles: North African Campaigns and the Mediterranean Maritime War
In June 1940, Libyan governor General Air Marshal Balbo prepared for an attack in Egypt. After his plane was shot down on June 26, 1940, Graziani was appointed his successor. Badoglio ordered him to commence operations before July 15. Graziani did not like the idea; although he had a lot of men and guns, he lacked adequate trucks and vehicles. He did not move. Badoglio ordered him again to attack before September 10. On the twelfth, Graziani moved. He commanded three corps, a Libyan Division Group and a Motorized Group. In spite of the lack of vehicles, the minefields, and the extremely hot temperature56 degrees Centigradehe advanced twelve miles per day in the desert. On September 18 his vanguard reached sixty-two miles into Egyptian territory, when the need for water and gasoline dictated a halt to operations. British general Richard OConnor was waiting for him in Marsa Matruh, eighty miles east. He had prepared an armor counteroffensive. Graziani held his positions through December 9, when OConnor attacked. The Italians were completely surprised. According to British historian Correlli Barnett, the Regio Esercito in general fought well, but its old light tanks could not stand up to British ones, and their hand grenades and antitank guns proved ineffective against British armored vehicles. Italian artillerymen fired all they had until they were either killed or wounded.21 OConnor moved rapidly due to his superiority in vehicles and armor, and completely defeated Graziani. In a few days he advanced 620 miles, conquering half of Libya. It was the first British victory of the Second World War. By February 1941, when Gariboldi took command, Graziani had lost 134,000 men killed, wounded, and prisoner, and 360 light and medium tanks captured or destroyed. On February 12 the German Afrika Korps arrived. General Erwin Rom-
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mel took operational command under Gariboldis supervision and launched an unexpected and incredibly successful offensive, but was stopped due to fuel and supply shortages. The continuation of the Libyan war depended entirely on supplying Axis forces from Italy through the Mediterranean. Poor preparation and planning and North African ports little capacity affected operations terribly. Italy did not seize the British base of Malta in the early days of the conflict, when the island contained few troops and merely three aircraft. The Regia Marina was in charge of maintaining communications between Libya and Italy. It had to escort convoys and contend with the Royal Navy. The first days of the war had been not too good to the Regia Marina. Italian submarines in the Red Sea concerned the British. They feared an Italian naval blockade of the Suez Canal, in case Italians would sink a ship into the canal. The Regia Marina Red Sea Squadron was, however, light, composed of seven submarines and a few destroyers. The strategic situation in the Mediterranean was quite different. The Regia Marina maintained the preponderance of its strength there and was very effective. But Naval headquarters in Rome was disinclined to commit its battle fleet to achieve naval superiority in the Mediterranean. Instead, it was largely employed to protect convoys and maritime supply routes. This was not a good idea. Frederick the Great once said the best strategy consisted of three principles: attack, attack, and always attack. This was precisely what was required. Admiral Luigi Rizzo, the famous Great War sinker, suggested many offensive operations, but they were not approved. Defense and, above all, ship preservation was the order of the day. Submarines operated successfully on both sides, but the first naval engagement occurred on July 9 near Punta Stilo, off Calabrian shores, with no real result. Regia Aeronautica conducted thirty-one air attacks against British ships that day, also with no result. So, British admiral Andrew Cunningham concluded that the Italian navy was incapable of preventing the Royal Navy from entering the Mediterranean from Gibraltar. A second engagement ten days later confirmed Cunninghams conclusion. Several months passed with no action until the night of November 1112, when twelve Royal Navy torpedo bombers attacked the Italian naval base at Taranto and sank three battleships. Luckily the ships were not in deep water, and in a few weeks they were repaired. The Taranto raid was the first demonstration of the utility of using aircraft against ships; and the Japanese navy was said to have carefully studied it, learned the lesson, and used it when planning Pearl Harbor. Mediterranean maritime warfare thereafter consisted of attempts to deny the enemy the ability to supply their armies in North Africa. The Royal Navy escorted convoys to Egypt and Malta. At the same time the Regia Marina had the same responsibilities to supply North Africa, passing just off Malta. Both routes crossed between Italy and Libya, and both navies tried to destroy the other and failed; and sea-lanes remained open on both sides. If the Royal Navy had damaged the Regia Marina in battles such as Capo Matapan, off Greek shores, the Regia Marina responded with equal effectiveness raiding British ports. The X MAS Flotilla grouped all the Italian special forces.
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Germans, with 560 tanks and 704 planes, began their last offensive. British general Neil Ritchie now commanded the Eighth Army. On May 26 he had 100,000 men, 849 tanks, and 320 aircraft. He was utterly defeated. On June 19, Tobruk was surrounded. Two days later, after a hard shelling, South African general Klopper surrendered with 33,000 British, Indian, and South African troops to General Navarrini, commanding the Italian XXI Corps. Ritchie had lost some 45,000 men and 400 guns. He had only 100 tanks remaining. On that same June 21, 1942, Rommel engaged and defeated Ritchie once more around Marsa Matruh. The British escaped to the east and halted in Egypt. They chose a vertical defensive line from Mediterranean to the El Qattara depression. Australian and Indian reinforcements arrived in time to reinforce the line. In fact, on July 1, the Axis vanguard reached Heavens doors, a place whose Arabic name was going to remain in history: El Alamein. By this time the Italo-German vanguard had only 4,400 men, with 41 tanks and 71 guns. They attacked and were repulsed. On July 7, Rommel had no more than 5,000 men in front of the British army. Ten days later, when the whole ACITArmata Corazzata Italo-Tedesca (Italian-German Armored Army)was on line, his four tank divisions totaled exactly 58 tanks. Alexandria and the delta of the Nile were only sixty-eight miles away. Axis troops had poor quality food and lacked gasoline and water. Supply was difficult because the depots were 250 miles away. Heat, dysentery, fevers, and clouds of flies tortured the troops. Moreover, they all knew that the longer they waited, the more the enemy was reinforcing its position. In August, Rommel was informed by SIM, the Italian intelligence, that the next British attack was foreseen coming after October 20. The new British commander, General Montgomery, was perfectly aware of the forthcoming American-British landing in Morocco in November. Under these circumstances Axis forces had clearly to retreat. It was not necessary to lose lives and materiel in a battle. It was worth the wait, but Montgomery decided Britain had to demonstrate its ability to defeat the Germans and, on October 23, 1942, he launched Operation Lightfoot. The first British action was against the southern flank of the Axis forces. The Italians repelled the attack. The British lost 600 men and 120 tanks. Montgomery did not stop. He slowly increased pressure and widened the front. On November 1, however, he launched Operation Supercharge. It practically destroyed the Littorio and German 15th Tank Divisions. The Ariete and German 21st Tank Divisions arrived, halting the British advance, but in the evening the Axis possessed only 187 tanks; and 155 of them were the little ineffective Italian ones. On November 3, Rommel ordered the retreat. Germans troops withdrew, using all the former British vehicles taken at Tobruk. The four German divisions were near the coast road, enabling them to escape. The Italian divisions moved through the desert, with British tanks on their heels. They were destroyed. The Brescia, Bologna, Pavia, and Trento Infantry Divisions and the Littorio Tank Division simply disappeared in a hail of fire and shelling. The Ariete had to protect them. It still had 111 tanks and 12 self-propelled howitzers. On November 3, Eighth Army continued the attack. Ariete counterattacked; and the fight was scattered
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August 4, the Aosta Infantry Division and German 15th Panzer Division made twenty-four counterattacks, but Patton eventually reached Messina. Axis units abandoned Sicily and withdrew to Calabria across the Straits of Messina. In seven days, despite Allied air superiority, 39,956 Germans with 9,605 vehicles, 47 tanks, and 94 guns, and 62,000 Italians with 227 vehicles and 41 guns, were ferried to Calabria. The Sicilian campaign was over. Axis losses totaled 8,603 dead, 260 tanks, 500 guns, and 132,000 prisoners. Allied casualties consisted of 4,299 dead and 3,242 missing in action. The Allies moved on to the Italian mainland with a landing in Calabria. British troops first arrived on September 3, while Allied headquarters prepared the next landing, for Salerno on September 9. The loss of Sicily and the invasion of Italy made the end inevitable; and the Fascist and military plot to overthrow Mussolini developed with great speed. The Fascist and military hierarchy turned to the king, but he seemed reluctant. Victor Emmanuel did not like the idea of losing the crown because of a false step. In 1925 he did not intervene during Matteotti crisis, which ended the constitutional government. He decided to wait. He knew Fascist leadership was disappointed with Mussolini, and in theory the king could ask Mussolini to resign; but what if Mussolini refused? What if he resisted and caused a civil war while a war was still in progress? The problem here is one often forgotten. At that time everyone in Italy feared Fascism, because they did not know it was weak. Twenty years of uncontested propaganda had succeeded in creating a submissive society. Later, the joyous reaction after Mussolinis resignation was something no one anticipated and a complete surprise. From the kings point of view there was a large and apparently strong party. Millions of Italians belonged to it. The armed forces were filled with Fascists. Although professional officers considered that their loyalty to the king came first, the crown prince Humbert second, and the Duce a distant third, what about reserve officers and the rank and file? Furthermore, the party had its own armythe Militiadispersed throughout the state and society. It appeared well organized and faithful; nobody realized that this was largely propaganda, too. The only force the king had to could counter the Fascists was the Regio Esercito, which was scattered across Europe. It was a risk. Victor Emmanuel understood that in case of an Axis victory, Mussolini would have transformed Italy into a personal dictatorship, eventually abolishing the monarchy.4 All of the kings concerns changed when a number of important Fascist leaders maintained separate contacts with the crown. They prepared to force Mussolini to leave the premiership. According to them, it was the only possible way to abandon the German alliance and negotiate with the Allies. On Saturday, July 24, 1943, at 5:00 p.m., the Grand Council of Fascism met in Rome. It concluded the following morning at 2:00 a.m.; of 28 members, 19 voted against Mussolini, one did not vote; and only eight supported him. At 6:00 a.m. the king was informed. At 5:00 p.m. the Duce met the king at Villa Savoia and, surprised, was told he must resign. Twenty minutes later, when leaving the meeting, he was arrested by the Royal Carabineers. At 10:45 p.m. the radio announced Mussolinis resignation and Mar-
September 8, 1943
Italian-Allied talks quickly reached a conclusion. General Giuseppe Castellano signed the armistice in Cassibile. But the army and civilian population were not informed immediately. This part of Italian history has been widely described. There are probably more accounts, memoirs, diaries, books, and articles concerning the Italian armistice and the following days than about any other period of Italian history. This does not mean that there is a clear understanding of the events that transpired. In a certain way we know how it happened, but we do not exactly know why and, moreover, why in that way. Italian headquarters in France, Italy, the Balkans, and Eastern Europe appear not to have been informed by the Supreme Headquarters in Rome of the armistice and subsequent events. It is unclear, because while some units were aware, others were not. A complete assessment of the situation is difficult, if not impossible. According to evidence, one can only say that, in the late afternoon of September 8, 1943, Allied headquarters announced Italys surrender. Two hours later, at 7:45 p.m., Marshal Badoglios message was broadcast on EIAR, the Italian broadcasting system. Badoglio simply stated that Italy had signed an armistice, but he did not mention what to do with the Germans. He only spoke of reacting to unspecified attacks. At the same time, the Germans broadcast the code word for their operation in reaction to the Italian armisticeit was ironically Achse, Axis. Marshal Kesselring assumed that all German troops south of Rome would be lost, but when the next morning he received initial reports, he realized that the Italians were not moving to neutralize German forces. He moved quickly, before they or the Allies had time to realize their grave strategic error. From their perspective, Italian troops remained inactive because they had not received orders. The armistice meant no more fighting against the Allies, but did not imply joining the Allies against the Germans. No contingency plans existed to contend with a German attack. There was no declaration of war on Germany. That is to say: Italy could be at the same time not completely at peace with Allies but at war with the Germans. It is no wonder that armed forces headquarters began calling the General Staff in Rome from France, from the Balkans, from Corsica, from Russia and Greece, from Italy, and from the city itself. General headquarters had no answer, because Badoglio had left Rome with the king, the court, and most of the General Staff without informing anyone. They went by car to the port of
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Pescara, on the Adriatic and, during the night, sailed to Brindisi in Apulia, which was under Allied control.5 Badoglio left no orders, just as he had done at Caporetto twent-six years earlier. Catastrophe struck on the night of September 8. The responses of the Italian troops differed, depending on their circumstances. The little Regia Marina squadron in China scuttled all its ships, and its men were imprisoned by the Japanese.6 The Italian Eleventh Army in Greece was scattered in small coastal garrisons, while the Germans were grouped as the Axis operational maneuvering group, and no resistance was possible. Its headquarters agreed to the German offer to be sent to Italy by train in exchange for leaving their heavy weapons. But as soon as they left Greece, they were completely disarmed and sent to prison camps in Poland and Germany. Many other units in Greece and the Balkans immediately reacted to the Germans. Infantry Division Pinerolo together with units from other divisions resisted in the Thessalian Mountains and escaped capture. Troops from the Second and the Nineth Army joined the Yugoslav and Albanian partisans. They later formed partisan divisions and fought until the end of the war. Infantry Division Emilia, garrisoning Cattaro, swept away local German units. Then, when they realized after a few days that no reinforcements were forthcoming, its men boarded ships, crossed the Adriatic, and landed in Apulia. The Germans were pushed out of Apulia, Sardinia, and Basilicata. The rest of Italy as well as all other Italian occupied zones, except Corsica, were seized by the Germans. Italian units disbanded, sometimes after a long resistance, sometimes after no resistance. The Germans rounded up all the Italians they could and proposed that they join the Reich to fight, or be sent to prison. A few units chose the Reich, the large majority accepted prison.7 Corsica was a remarkable exception, because its Italian garrison was able to resist until Allied troops landed. Then, Italian units were ordered to leave their heavy weapons and vehicles and were ferried to Sardinia. The Aegean Islands were cleared by Infantry Divisions Cuneo and Regina until the Allied landing, but the German counteroffensive by air, sea, and land destroyed them as well as the British forces landing to help. After a long resistance until November 18, the garrison at Lero was massacred by the Germans, as was the Acqui Infantry Division on Cefalonia. Carabineers and Guardia di Finanza were ordered to remain in place.8 Being both military and civil police, their headquarters had decided that their primary mission was to maintain public order. Most of the Regia Aeronauticas planes flew south to Allied or Italian airfields. The Regia Marina left its ports and reached Malta, according to the terms of the armistice. The German Luftwaffe chased Italian ships and sank several, including the battleship Roma off the Sardinian coast.
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It included former members of the Militia and was simply the militarized version of the Fasci, that is to say, the territorial political organization of the Fascist Party. Their reliability was as poor, as was their military effectiveness. The National Republican Guard included Carabineers and the Italian Africa Police, composed of members of the Colonial Police, whose deployment to Africa had been prevented by the fall of the empire. The X MAS Flotilla had simply remained in place. Its commander, Frigate Captain Junio Valerio Borghese, became a German ally. He looked to the Italian people as the only really reliable and independent entity. He attracted many volunteers and, in spite of later propaganda, it achieved a strength of 6,000 men, divided into six battalions. All of these men chose Fascist Republican units for different reasons. Soon after September 8, many military men had to face a difficult question: was it right to fight against a former ally along with former enemies? Some of them simply obeyed the kings orders, and some did not. Those who obeyed the king remained in the armed forces; many who belonged to a disbanded unit joined the partisans; and those who had been captured, suffered cold, illness, and starvation in German prison camps. There were also a large number of Italians who disobeyed the king. It would be too easy to say they did so because they were Fascists. There was no general rule. For example, Italian prisoners in India, the United States, Canada, and other countries had to choose between considering their guardians as friends or enemies. The situation of a prisoner is quite different from that of a free combatant. A prisoner who did not choose to cooperate with Allied forces was sent generally to a special Criminal Fascist Camp.11 Some decided that the king had betrayed the country; and they did not want to be involved in such an action. Thus, they joined the Germans. Some had no money and needed it, and when the Social Republican officers offered them higher pay, they joined the Republic.12 Finally, some remained in their place through the continually changing situation. In a certain sense, this was what happened to the X MAS Flotilla. Many of Mussolinis new soldiers escaped starvation in German POW camps by joining one of the four Republican divisions being trained in Germany. Some of those people chose this course because it was the only way to return to Italy and, as soon as they arrived, they deserted and joined the partisans, or went home. Many served for a combination of all of these reasons. Social Republic units, mostly from the X MAS, were employed by the Germans against the Allied beachheads at Anzio and Nettuno, south of Rome, through the winter and spring of 1944. At the same time, the National Republican Air Force unitsthree fighters groups, one torpedo bomber group, and two air transport groupsmade several successful raids against Allied positions while the National Republican Navy performed poorly, because of a dearth of ships. Of the 57,498 men belonging to the four divisions, only a few were used against Allied troops, such as in Garfagnana against the Brazilian expeditionary force. In fact, the republic, that is to say the German headquarters, employed most of them in antipartisan warfare. The Social Republic largely succeeded in maintaining control of territory and
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troops quickly resulted in the expansion of the Italian combat groups to four, with a fifth as a training unit. Each combat group had 8,758 men, British equipment, and British inspectors. The Allied headquarters perceived the situation as problematic. The CIL was growing. It had no British inspectors but was fighting very well. Its strength was going to be equivalent to an Allied corps, but this would have meant permitting the Italian Army to act as an ally. This had to remain impossible. Italy was a defeated enemy and only necessity led the Allies to give the Italians the honor of cobelligerent status, a newly invented term, which did not imply alliance. Combat groups meant Italian forces now increased from 25,000 to 50,000 men. But the doubling of combat strength did not translate into the establishment of an Italian army operating on its own front. In fact, each combat group, equal to a division, was scattered among British and American armies. So the Italian General Staff and the group commanders had no role in planning operations, they could merely carry out their orders. Thus they could not ask for being considered real Allies. Combat groups fought in the last campaigns of the war and, in April 1945, took part in the final Allied offensive in Italy. Field Marshal Alexander had twentytwo divisions and seven brigades at his disposal. In the early days of April he engaged Kesselrings Armies Group C with twenty divisions and the National Republican Armed Forces. While the Germans surrendered, Italian Republican units fought to their last round against the Yugoslavs and the French. Italys odd political situation led to significant fighting by partisan together with Fascist units against French troops coming through the Alps to seize the Aosta Valley. On the other side of Italy, Fascist Republican units fought in Friuli, Istria, Dalmatia, and Carniola, against Yugoslav partisans. Italians succeeded in the west thanks to American pressure on the French government. They failed, however, in Friuli, because the Eighth Army moved too slowly and, due to the agreements at Yalta in February 1945, Istria and Dalmatia were lost to Yugoslavia. During the last days of war, on April 25, 1945, partisans captured and killed Mussolini and all the Fascist hierarchs they could find. The Duces body was promptly displayed hanging by his feet in Milan, while his documents disappeared.14 Republican troops disbanded. Most of the soldiers were massacred by partisans. According to reliable figures, of the 25,000 dead belonging to the Republican armed forces, some 15,000 were killed after April 25, 1945, that is to say, after the official conclusion of the war.
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26
Italian Armed Forces from World War II to the End of the Cold War: 19461988
After World War II
The first day of peace began a dramatic period in Italian history. It is true that Italy was in a far better situation than Germany, but it was still quite bad. The kings government had to face all the problems of a defeated country with the few organized institutions it still possessed. In spite of the armistice and of the subsequent difficulties, civil life in 1943 did not change very much. Only the armed forces disappeared, but all the services, including the police, worked as well as before. Then they had been divided by the front. In northern Italy civil service formally passed to the Social Republic, while the south remained under the kings control. Step by step, as each portion of Italy was liberated, the Allied Military Government (AMG) took control. Then, when the situation was stable, the AMG transferred power to the Italian authorities; but Allied supervision continued. At the end of the war the bureaucracy tried to rebuild its component parts. The lack of communications made it extremely difficult, the Allies still controlled movement of resources and, of course there was a severe lack of money and goods. The new government in consultation with the Allies introduced the equivalent of a deNazification program in Italy. Special commissions were sent north to review what each member of the military or civil service had done in the past twenty months, that is to say, from September 12, 1943, until April 25, 1945. Casualties from the war totaled an estimated 470,000, including civilians. It was less than after World War I, but damage at that time affected only a small portion of Italian territory. After the Second World War the entire country experienced substantial material loss. Factories were heavily damaged, even if both partisans and secret services cooperated to save plants and rescue machinery. No less than 60 percent of the railways had been destroyed, and damages amounted to 900 billion lira. Roads were heavily damaged, and bridges had been destroyed by both Allied air forces
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and the retreating Germans. Millions were unemployed and had no money and no food. Hundreds of thousands of refugees escaped to Italy from Istria and Dalmatia, because of the Yugoslavs, who were killing Italians. Hundreds of thousands of prisoners were still far away in Allied prison camps, in India, the Soviet Union, the United States, Africa, Australia, and in Japan, too, waiting for their freedom. All the colonies were gone as well as Albania and the Dodecanese Islands. The Yugoslavs occupied a portion of the northeast, including Istria and Zara in Dalmatia. American and British troops controlled the remainder of the country. The kings government ruled only two-thirds of the territory; and that was under Allied control. A Sicilian separatist movement supported by the Mafia sought British backing. The government could be supported only by armed forces, but the armed forces were in poor shape. On May 8, 1945, the Regia Marina consisted of 64,000 men, five battleshipsit had eight when the war began19 cruisers, 11 destroyers, 39 submarines, 22 escort ships, 19 corvettes, 44 coastal units, 56 minesweepers, 19 landing craft, two training ships, one support ship, and approximately 140 coastal and support units. The Regia Aeronautica came out of the war with three air groups, the three Raggruppamenti Aereiwhich had fifteen groups. The Regio Esercito had still combat groups, auxiliary units, and troops for internal security. The internal security forces consisted of four light infantry divisions deprived of heavy weapons. They acted as a constabulary force, mainly in Sicily, and resolved the separatist crisis there. The situation in the north was equally critical. There were a high number of deaths due to the so called flying red squads, which were intimidating and killing, especially in the so-called death triangle in Emilia Romagna, despite increased control by the Royal Carabineers and police. The Communists comprised the strongest component of the partisan movement. They were backed by the Soviet Union and hoped to achieve political power, changing Italy into a Communist republic during the next plebiscite and following elections. The plebiscite centered on the question of whether to maintain the monarchy or abolish it. The vote was held in June 1946, and women voted for the first time. After the armistice, Victor Emmanuel III appointed his son Humbert as a lieutenant-general of the kingdom. In May 1946 he formally abdicated the throne in favor of his son and went into exile in Egypt, where he died in December 1947. Humbert declared that, in case of an electoral victory with a reduced majority, the plebiscite would be repeated within a year. The plebiscite was held on June 2, 1946, despite the fact that no prisoners of war had yet returned home from Allied camps, preventing a half million voters from voting. For the first and only time in Italian history, results from the south arrived faster than from the north. They indicated a monarchist victory, but when the following day results from the north were tallied, the Republic won by 10 to 12 million votes. Humbert accepted his fate. He released the armed forces from their oath and went into exile in Portugal as his ancestor Charles Albert had done in
19481988
The Italian armed forces were promptly rebuilt after 1948. The growing tensions between the Soviet Union and the United States, as witnessed during the Berlin blockade, made it clear to the United States and Britain that Italy would play a key and strategic role in any future conflict. In the same year that they combined their German zones of occupation into West Germany, the Allies
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changed their attitude toward Italy. The army reorganized the combat groups into normal divisions. Then in 1948, it reestablished other infantry divisions. In 1951 it had ten infantry divisions,1 two tank brigades,2 and two Alpine brigades.3 In the same year it established the Army Light Air Corps, to be used for reconnaissance, while the Lagunari Regiment passed from the Engineers Corps to the infantry, focusing on landing operations and amphibious warfare more than before. Three additional Alpine brigades4 were organized in the subsequent two years, while the tank brigades were increased to divisional strength, and a third division was created. By 1953 the army had thirteen divisions and five Alpine brigades. The navy had 178 ships, equal to 125,000 metric tons of fighting tonnage and 50,000 more of auxiliary tonnage, supported by 48 antisub aircraft and 30 helicopters in the early 1960s. At he end of 1971 the Marina Militare ranked fifth in the world after United States, the Soviet Union, Britain, and France, with 44,000 men and 144 fighting ships divided into four naval divisions, a Minesweeper Command, a Submarine Command, an Undersea Raiders Command, and three Helicopter Centers. In the same year the air force had 70,000 men divided into 35 Flying Groups on 22 airbases, and supported 13 Missile Groups. What did not change after the war, or, if we prefer, since the days of the 1814 Restoration, was the General Staff. A substantial reorganization of the armed forces from top to bottom was carried out between 1962 and 1965. The new NATO views about nuclear weapons foresaw a reduced use of tactical weapons, so the major plan against a possible Soviet invasion was based on conventional weapons. The 1963-issued doctrine Series 700 Employment of the Great Complex Units5 focused on the renovated importance of classical weapons; and this implied a wide change in portable weapons, mortars, and above all tanks, including the M-47, M60, the Leopard 1, and the newly introduced M-113 armored vehicle. The Defense General Staff was established, but it simply coordinated the army, navy, and air force staffs, with no real commanding authority. It needed thirty more years to receive full authority over the entire system. Italy committed its armed forces abroad for much of the postwar era. An Italian Red Cross field unit was sent to Korea, and that same year the United Nations gave Italy a temporary mandate over Somalia, until 1960. Italy organized the AFISAmministrazione Fiduciaria Italianain Somalia, and sent 5,700 men from the armed forces to organize Somali troops. They returned in 1955, leaving only a few advisers until 1959. Italy was admitted to United Nations only in 1955. Italian troops began participating to UN peacekeeping operations beginning in 1960. The first was ONUC in Congothe former Belgian Congowhere, in Kindu, thirteen men of the Italian air force were massacred by Congolese who thought they were Belgians. In the following years Italian military personnel were involved in some United Nations operations, such as in Yemen in 196364, on the Pakistani-Indian border in Kashmir since 1959 for UNMOGIP, in Jordan since 1958 for UNTSO and Lebanon, and, briefly, in 196566, for UNIPOM. Lebanon saw a remarkable Italian involvement. In fact, after their first short six
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disarmament and world peace. The other aspect of their opposition was aimed at weakening NATO Mediterranean forces against the Soviets. The Italian Left supportedand still supportsPalestinians against Israel and Cuba against United States, opposing in all possible ways United States foreign policy. So, for instance, somebody spoke from the left benches of the Parliament against the navy expedition to rescue boat people, because they were abandoning Vietnam after the North Vietnamese victory. Then nobody reacted against the expeditionary force to Lebanon, because it was to rescue Palestinians, especially after the massacres in Sabra and Shatila. But when the ships were sent to the Persian Gulf, Leftist groups reacted. They supported in all the possible ways nonintervention. The mass media were clearly against it, and the government faced a really bad spell. The Left spoke loudly against any intervention abroad. This was due to the desire to weaken NATO, to present strong opposition to any aspect of direct or indirect U.S. policy in the world; in this case, to rescue people from Vietnam implicitly meant that the U.S. had fought on the right side and Vietnamese Communists were wrong. The same happened in Lebabon, because since Palestinians were perceived as enemies of Israel and Israel was perceived as a close ally of the United States, supporting the Palestinians meant weakening Israel and weakening the United States and their world policy. This same attitude based on anti-Americanism gave the ground to oppose the expedition to the Gulf the first time, in the eighties, the first Gulf War, and the operation in Somalia in 199195.
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27
Soon after the signing of the Treaty of Paris, Italy realized it was isolated between two blocs. When in 1948 the Communists lost the first Republican general elections, Italy avoided Soviet influence, but it feared the risk of a Yugoslav attack, or, after the establishment of the Iron Curtain, to be the battlefield between the Soviets and Western Europe. What would happen under those circumstances? The Italian government, led by Alcide De Gasperi, believed the best solution was foreign protection, and looked to the United States. General Efisio Marras was sent to Berlin, where he met with General Lucius Clay. The Italian government dispatched Marras to discuss a military agreement, but Clay responded that the whole issue had to first be decided politically; no military talks before a general political agreement. De Gasperi pursued a bilateral agreement with the United States. Washington was not particularly interested in his proposal. There were more pressing issues and, in any case, they could not sign an agreement with a defeated enemy. When later in 1948, General George C. Marshall came to Italy in his new role as secretary of state, he declared he was in Rome to listen to Italian offers. Unfortunately, Italian politicians presumptuously supposed they could negotiate as if the United States wanted Italy as an ally. This was still not the case. Washington could provide assistance, but surely it was not a priority. According to their old-fashioned mentality, Italian politicians believed they would find France more receptive. This attitude directly stemmed from the historical memory of the 1796 cooperation between the Italian bourgeoisie and their French liberators. It had survived the tumultuous nineteenth century, and it survived the Fascist period because of the great number of antifascist refugees in France. The hope of a friendly France, of the friendly and lovely Latin sister, was dashed when the French coldly invited Italy to join the Council of Europe, a political entity with no military relevance. The international situation deteriorated steadily. The Soviet blockade of Berlin marked the beginning of the Cold War. In Rome, politicians realized that Italy could very well be the next battlefield between East and West. They desperately
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tried to find a way to gain American confidence and subsequent support. The Treaty of Paris truly weakened Italy, but one must also understand that the new Italian government considered defense a secondary issue. Politicians who won in the 1948 elections belonged to the old bourgeoisie. This was the same group that had led Parliament prior to the Great War, but the country now had less money and the strongest Communist Party in Western Europe. The governments biggest concern was, in fact, domestic security. Virtually all state resources were spent maintaining control of the country. Police control and welfare were the equivalent of Roman bread and circuses. Welfare kept the people calm. Police prevented insurrection. The army could be useful as a constabulary force, too, but the country lacked sufficient revenue and therefore could not afford to spend it on a larger army. Before 1948, De Gasperi included the Communists in his coalition government. Communist Party secretary Palmiro Togliatti had been appointed minister of justice, and he granted amnesty to all who had murdered someone after April 1945 for political reasons. This meant that a lot of dangerous Communists were freed. They still possessed weapons and were committed to an armed revolution, as was demonstrated by their reaction when a student wounded Togliatti. This meant above all that an incredible number of former Fascists were free; and nobody could charge them; moreover, many joined the Communists!1 The government had to address this problem, and more money was needed to increase the numbers and effectiveness of police and Carabineers. The government had to find revenue to pay war damages, pay salaries, keep the police and armed Forces, and rebuild the whole country. In order to protect Western Europe against the Soviet threat, the Western countries developed an Atlantic Alliance. It was a political alliance whose military organizationthe North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATOincluded a mutual defense pact for its members. Italy was clearly cut off it, especially after mistakes made by the new politicians. Ironically enough, France came to the rescue. France had been invited to join the Atlantic Alliance. Paris wanted NATO protection to be extended to its North African colonies, particularly Algeria. The United States and Britain disliked this idea. In response, France demanded that Italy be permitted to join the Alliance. This would push the southern border of NATO to the geographical parallel including Sicily. Defense up to the 35th Parallel and north would have included northern Algeriathat is to say, all of Algeriatoo. London definitely rejected this; and President Harry S. Truman was not terribly enthusiastic. The French, however, left him no choice; if Italy was not invited to join NATO, France would veto the admission of Norway. Norway was absolutely vital to protecting the North Atlantic maritime routes from America to Europe. President Truman was a pragmatic man. The Atlantic Alliance absolutely needed Norway, and it needed France as a major beachhead in Continental Europe. He therefore accepted Italys admission. Italian accession to NATO implied large-scale and full military support by the United States. The Italian armed forces were substantially reorganized and, as soon
201
impossibility of direct Soviet involvement. The Communist Partys basic strategy was to conquer the hearts and minds of Italians. It had to be achieved by establishing a deep and complete Communist presence where minds were educated, in the schools and in the universities. It needed time, of course, but at the end of the process, the entire Italian ruling class, orin the worst caseits majority, would be composed of Communists, and power would be achieved. The Communists established a presence at universitiesnormally among nonscientific facultyand in the cultural world, and the result was a fracture between a majority composed of roughly two-thirds of the country and a minority including 100,000 to 200,000 people who spoke through mass media, such as journalists, writers, actors, art directors, painters, and so on. This explains why Italian intellectuals are mainly on the Left. The gap existing between the Left and the majority has often been demonstrated by the vote. The Left won a general election only twice, in 1996 and in 2006. The same gap existed between popular patriotism and national spirit on one side and the Leftist accusations equating patriotism with Fascism. For instance, displaying a national flag something that normally happens in the United Stateswas considered a dangerous nationalist or crypto-Fascist demonstration. The national anthem was sung less because nobody learned it in the schools; and the flag was displayed daily only in the barracks, at the airports, or at the border or on ships. The only place where one could fly his own flag without risk of being labeled a Fascist was the stadium. Things changed only when Carlo Azeglio Ciampi became president in 1999. In the 1950s and 60s the Communists had two more tasks: to weaken the justice system and the police. The police system included police, Carabineers and the Guardia di Finanza. The first step of the Communist program consisted of depriving the police of its military character, in order to control it through unions. The Radical Party, a small progressive Leftist party, was used as the battering ram and, in the 1970s, the police became a civilian body. The Carabineers and the Guardia di Finanza refused to abandon their military status. The Communists suggested a new organization for the security system. The police would remain in the cities and the Carabineers would move to the towns and countryside, but it was not accepted. The Justice Department was very hard to subvert. So, the Communist Party did all it could to support judges and their desire for increased autonomy. In the early1960s the Italian economy grew significantly. The Christian Democrats proposed a welfare program. It was based on a dream, as the funds needed were supposed to come from national economic growth. The Italian growth rate of that time was quite high, but it was hard to predict a similar growth rate in the coming years. Then in 1968, riots and violence occurred throughout Europe, but in Italy they were the origins of terrorism. The situation was quite complex and difficult to explain. It is still unclear if terrorism was organized by a foreign power or if it developed domestically and was later supported by a foreign country. What is clear is that Italy suffered from Leftist terrorism supported by the Soviet Union and a Fascist terrorism supported by unknown forces. The first terrorist actions
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European issues, Italy was often beaten and, when agreements about opening European markets were discussed, Italian industry received a real knock. In fact, it had wasted its time according to its traditional short-term policy. No real reorganization was made. Few invested in research and development; and most industrialists cried for the states help. Italys financial situation grew worse. The republic had to pay for its welfare system, for its security, and for the crude oil needed by industry and daily life. The money supply was insufficient, and the deficit increased. Something had to be cut, and members of Parliament suggested cutting military expenditures. Things in policy did not change so much in the 1980s. The attitude of Italians during the late Cold War was marked by philo-Americanism and anti-Sovietism. Italians normally preferred and supported center and moderate coalitions. It was as conservative as needed and as progressive as required to maintain social progress and welfare. This is why at the end of the 1970s the Italian Socialist Party abandoned its alliance with the Communists and moved to the center, closer to Christian Democrats. They formed a coalition that included the Republican, Social Democratic, and Liberal Parties. It was called the Pentaparty after the five parties composing it. It was during this coalitions tenure that Italian foreign policy became more active. It acted with more energy than in the past and with a remarkable loyalty to NATO. Soon after the beginning of the Cold War, the clash between NATO and the Warsaw Pact was indirect and based mostly on nuclear dissuasion. As the U.S. and USSR increased their nuclear arsenal, the situation eventually stabilized. Soviet strategy during the 1970s centered around the Brezhnev Doctrine, surrounding the West by supporting Marxist revolutions throughout the world. The regions specifically affected were Africa, Asia, and Latin America, where the Soviets and their allies provided military and material aid to the new Marxist regimes. At the same time the Soviets possessed a clear numerical superiority in conventional weapons. In the early 1970s, NATO maintained only naval and nuclear superiority, but appeared unable to repel a conventional Soviet ground attack in Europe. When, after the conference held in Havana in 1979, nonaligned countries basically decided to stand equally distant from both the West and the East, the Soviet Union announced it was going to deploy SS-20 missiles in Europe. People wondered whether, in case of nuclear attack in Europe, the United States would really have reacted using their own nuclear weapons and exposing their metroplitan territory to a Soviet nuclear reappraisal. German chancellor Helmut Schmidt asked for a clear and concrete NATO initiative. Negotiations in Geneva between American delegate Paul Nitze and Soviet Juli Kvjtsinsky began. They aimed to reach a compromise based on so called zero options, that is to say the mutual and contemporary removal of all the Pershing, Cruise, and SS-20 missiles from Europe. Unfortunately they failed. The Soviets stood on their position. The only alternative for NATO was to deploy Cruise missiles. Germany agreed to have Cruise missiles on its own territory only if another great nation in continental Europe agreed, too.3
CHAPTER
28
207
and extensive reorganization. At the end, all units in metropolitan territory were subordinate to a permanent Superior Command, such as the army, air force, and navy commands. These were subordinate to a high command, the Comando Operativo di Vertice InterforzeJoint Service High Operational Commandor COI. All branch Superior Commands were planning staffs and did not directly control military units, but, when ordered to enact their plans, those units earmarked for operations were subordinated to their command. This finally created a system where the planning staff achieved command powers for military operations after 150 years. The army had a Comando Forze TerrestriLand Forces Command, or ComFoTer, which had three branches: schools, logistics, supportand the operational branch. This was divided into four different groups: a Comando Forze di ProiezioneProjection Forces Command; a Comando Truppe AlpineAlpine Troops Command; and two Comandi delle Forze di Difesa1st and 2nd Defense Forces Commands. The Aeronautica Militare developed something similar. Its General Staff was reduced. The previous organization of the three air regions became a single Air Squadron Command. Air bases decreased from 20 to 10, flying groups from 38 to 32, and personnel from 63,747 in 1998 to 55,000 in 2005. The Marina Militare significantly altered its structure. It used peacekeeping operations as tests, just as the other branches did. The navy, however, had a major interest, because of the increasing overseas involvement of the armed forces. It was clear that only a few peacekeeping operations could be conducted without naval support. The Marina Militare, then, developed and expanded its projectability and sustainability. The 1991 Gulf War demonstrated it was time for the navy to establish air protection. The navy sent a squadron: the 20th Naval Group composed of frigates and logistical ships, tasked to protect U.S. carriers and supply the Allied fleet. There was no Italian carrier at that time, so the air force sent Task Group Locusta composed of ten Tornado multi-role aircraft1 and some air cargo planes to cooperate with the UN offensive to free Kuwait and provide air support for Italian ships. But transferring land-based Italian aircraft to the Gulf was quite expensive. Moreover, the land-basingin Abu Dhabi and the United Arab Emirateswas far from the operational theater and proved that air intervention was not as flexible as required. The navy tested its air capability in the operation in Somalia. At that time, in the early nineties the navy built its first aircraft carrier, the Garibaldi. It was originally designed as a helicopter carrier, but could easily be used by VTOL (Vertical Take-Off and Landing) planes. After the Gulf and the first Somali intervention, the Marina Militare decided upon full air capability. Its naval air forcean antisubmarine one, including both planes and helicopterscould not provide such support. In 1995 the On Board Naval Air Squadron was established. It was composed of VTOL Harriers AV-8B and received its eighteenth and last plane in 1997. This gave the Italian armed forces a solid projection and sustainability for peace-
209
In fact, in his article Shaping Americas Global Future,2 he practically said that after the end of the Cold War the United States could build a durable peace based on preserving Americas interests and supremacy. Consequently, Christopher wrote that there were five intervention sectors. America should: strengthen a global and free market commercial system. Europe needed a better security system. The Middle East needed a durable and firmly established peace. Weapons of mass destruction had to be reduced. Finally, terrorists and drugs traders had to be destroyed. It was a quite fine program. Unfortunately, Rome soon realized there was no role foreseen for Italy. In fact, the United States improved its relations with Japan and Germany. On April 17, 1996, Japan signed the Twenty-first Century Treaty. It was a closer alliance between Japan and the United States, and China saw it as a mechanism for their isolation. In Europe, the United States largely supported German foreign policy in the Balkans and Eastern Europe. At the global level the United States suggested a reorganization of the United Nations. According to them, Germany and Japanthe defeated enemies of World War IIcould now enter the Security Council. No mention was made of Italy. At the same time, when preparing the G7 meeting for Denver in June 1996, sources at the United States Department of State asked to reduce the meeting from seven to only the economically most important countries on the three concerned continents. This implicitly meant that only the United States, Japan, and Germany would have met in Denver. Britain, France, Italy, and Canada rejected this idea, but the threat to Italys position was clear. When the civil war in Yugoslavia exploded in 1990, not caring about Italian national interest and supporting a wider Western political plan, Rome recognized the newly established Slovenia and Croatia in spite of Belgrades offer to return the land Italy had lost in 1945. Then, when trouble in Somalia developed the following year and the United Nations decided on intervention, Rome was completely cut off. Washington clearly supported, if not suggested it, and Rome was offended, especially when remembering that Somalia was a former Italian colony with a large diffusion of the Italian language. Furthermore, when an Italian peacekeeping force reached Mogadishu in March 1993, a new problem emerged. The Italian command normally looked to negotiate with Somali warlords; Americans preferred direct military action. The difference between Italians and Americans became so deep that Italian headquarters asked the United Nations command for permission to leave Mogadishu. Italian troops were moved to other Somali towns. The U.S. command insisted in action, and the result was a bloody ambush and an escalation of fighting. The American press then admitted that the Italian way was not wrong and suggested that United States troops to do the same. After the peacekeeping mandate expired in March 1994, Italian forces left Somalia. When the whole UN-Somali operation failed, a complete withdrawal was decided for the end of 1994. The United Nations asked the United States and
211
March 1999, the Italian press asked why Italian airspace needed to be protected by foreign countries against possible Yugoslav intrusion. Two days later the Aeronautica Militare officially announced that Italian aircraft had been in action against the Yugoslavs on the Adriatic and in Yugoslavia since the eve of the war. The parliamentary Leftist majority was astonished. The opposition was quite amused. When officially asked, the government admitted that the armed forces were not fighting a war, they were merely conducting long-range defensive actions. Then, the government admitted forty-two Italian aircraft, that is to say, 10 percent of all Allied forces, were involved in the war, as well as two frigates. Moreover, twelve Italian air bases were used by Allied aircraft, not to mention the ports and infrastructure provided for logistical support. The longer the air campaign lasted, the more the Leftists grumbled against their government. In May, 54 Italian aircraft were involved in a total NATO force of 780. Luckily the war ended before a land attack started. Italian peacekeeping troops in Albania, Macedonia, and Bosnia were ordered to Kosovo along with other NATO troops. The Italian peacekeeping presence in the Balkans was not too unusual. Italian troops had landed in Albania as a peacekeeping force three years after the collapse of the Communist regime, in 1993. After a few years, a larger Italian Force returned to Albania in 1997 to stop clandestine immigration across the Adriatic to Italy. Strict naval control was established in the Otranto Channel. Italian light ships were based at Saseno Island, in the middle of Valona Bay, and Italy took care to assist Albania. The Italian presence in Bosnia and Macedonia had begun earlier. After the collapse of Yugoslavia in the early nineties, a civil war broke out in Bosnia-Herzegovina. People acted just as their grandfathers had fifty years before. They considered those who had a different religion as enemies, and as the population was a mix of Catholic Croats, Orthodox Serbs, and Muslim Bosniacs, terrible massacres began. United Nations forces completely failed. The worst case occurred in Srebrenica. Unable to find a solution, the United Nations committed NATO to garrison Bosnia. Italian units went there as a part of NATOs interposition and constabulary force. They did the same when, later, Macedonia seceded from Yugoslavia. Italian involvement in these operations was not simply a manifestation of strategic interest to maintain peace on their national borders but of their willingness to participate in UN operations and gain relevance in UN affairs. In June 1998, Italy achieved success when a large majority of countries declared that they preferred to take their own time to review the future of the Security Council. The American plan was slowed. Italy had time to prevent German and Japanese admission to the UNs most important committee. This implied, however, a deeper Italian participation in United Nations peacekeeping operations. Rome committed no less than two infantry regiments, a logistical battalion, related supporting units from the Engineers Corps and Army Light Air Corps, two frigates, amphibious ships, six to eight air force cargo planes, and eight to ten helicopters for United Nations operations.
213
international force, mainly composed of 2,500 Italians and a few less French, with a large air and naval contingent, landed in Lebanon. After reviewing the whole situation, in his five years from 2001 to spring 2006, Berlusconi had not acted poorly. It was clear that his main task was linked to the reform of the United Nations Security Council. He acted, looking for a space where Italy could exploit divisions between concerned countries. He fully advocated Russias partnership with NATO in the summer of 2002, at the NATO summit at Pratica di Mare Air Force base, near Rome. These initiated good relations between Italy and Russia; and Berlusconi could act also as a link between the United States and Russia. This gave him leverage to modify the UN reform program, whose original plans foresaw only admitting Germany and Japan. The Italian-proposed plan was quite different and included wide participation from Third World countries. In order to gain a greater support for their initiative, Germany, Japan, and their supporters were forced to suggest additional admissions to the Security Council. At first they looked to India and Brazil, increasing the Council from five to nine instead of the foreseen seven countries. This caused a reaction in South America and Asia, especially in Argentina and Pakistan. Then, a conference hosted by the Italians demonstrated that a majority did not like this plan. The Germans and Japanese then proposed a wider admission, permitting two African countries to join the Security Council as standing members. According to President Clintons original plan, the Security Council should have been composed of seven countries, and four of themUnited States, Britain, Germany, and Japanhad to be strictly linked. The United States would have achieved the majority they did not have in a Security Council composed only of five members and containing Russia, China, and France. But in 2005 the situation completely changed. The Security Council was going to have no less than nine members. The intention was to prevent the U.S. plan from being implemented, if Italy could not have its own seat on the council. The European powers had put Italians in a corner in 161317, and Venetian and Piedmontesethat is to say, Italiansreacted by giving decisive support at the beginning of the Thirty Years War. They tried to do the same in 1696 and failed in the War of the Great Alliance. They did the same in 1719 when not considering Savoys rights to Sicily and the indirect result was the emergence of the Mafia, spreading to America and Oceania, too. They did it in 1796, ignoring Piedmontese issues and resulting in Napoleon and twenty years of war. They did the same at Versailles in 1919, and Mussolini emerged and later Hitler. If history exists to teach lessons, it would be useful to see which ones Italian military history can teach.
Notes
Chapter 2
1. Desjardins, Negociations diplomatiques de la France avec la Toscane (Paris, 1861), II, 119. 2. Ciro Paoletti, Gli Italiani in Armicinque secoli di storia militare nazionale, 14942000 (Rome, 2001), 38. 3. Ibid., 39. 4. Donato Tamble, Michelangelo e il Forte di Civitavecchia : analisi di una tradizione, in Studi Vetrallesi, IV, 8 (luglio-dicembre 2001). 5. Contemporary painting, oil on canvas, Museo Storico Navale (Naval Historical Museum), Venice. 6. Soldiers dressed in yellow and red are shown in a fresco representing a papal ceremony. It lies in San Pietro Church, in the ancient town of Tuscania, some fifty miles north of Rome. Soldiers dressed in white and red are frescoed in the cloister of the former monastery now hosting the Etruscan Museum in the same town. 7. Paoletti, Gli Italiani in Armi, 1819. 8. Quoted in ibid., 74.
Chapter 3
1. Quoted in Georges Grente, Lepanto salva lOccidente, Historia, III, 16 (March 1959): 64.
Chapter 4
1. According to Count Capponis family tradition, it was Cavalier Capponi from Florence who mortally shot Gustavus Adolphus, king of Sweden, with his pistol. 2. C. V. Wedgwood, The Thirty Years War (London, 1944), 247.
216 Notes
Chapter 5
1. Carlo Botta gives in his History of Italybook twenty-seven, year 1669a figure of 69 general assaults, 80 sorties, and 1,364 exploded mines. Kohlhaas in his Candia: Die tragoedie einer abendlandischen Verteidigung und ihr Nachspiel in Morea, 16451714, gives a figure of 2,781 engagements. The best and most up-to-date figures on naval strength for both Venice and the Ottomans from the early seventeenth century to the second Morea ` War are in Luca Lo Basso, Uomini da remogalee e galeotti nel Mediterraneo in eta moderna (Milan, 2004). ` 2. There are few works on Italian militias. The only good recent works include Niccolo Capponi, Le palle di Marte: Military Strategy and Diplomacy in the Grand Duchy of Tuscany under Ferdinand II deMedici (16211670), Journal of Military History 68, 4 (October 2004), which is the only work in English on this subject, and Claudio De Consolis Al soldo del duca: lamministrazione delle armate sabaude (15601630) (Turin, 1999).
Chapter 6
1. The best work in English about this and other aspects of the Maritime Powers support for Savoy in the 16901713 period is Christopher Storrs, War, Diplomacy, and the Rise of Savoy, 16901720 (London: Cambridge University Press, 1999). 2. Ruggero Moscati, Direttive della politica estera sabauda da Vittorio Amedeo II a Carlo Emanuele III (Milano, ISPI, 1941).
Chapter 7
1. Anne Stuart, sister of Mary Stuart and sister-in-law of William III, accessed the British throne after Williams death in 1702. She died in 1714, leaving the throne to the House of Hanover, whose first British king was George I. 2. The Treaty of Utrecht stated that where the water flowed from the top of the Alps westward, was France; and where it went eastward was Savoys. This part of the Treaty of Utrecht was never abolished and it is still active. After the cession of Savoy to France in 1861, the same conditions were applied to the new French-Italian border. This means that the top of Monte Bianco, the White Mountain, the highest mountain of Europe, is half French and half Italian. French mapsand others maps copied from the French onesshow the top as owned by France; and are completely wrong.
Chapter 8
1. This is clearly said in the Dukes letters to Alberoni still existing in Collegio Alberoni Archive in Piacenza. They have been extensively published in Giovan Felice Rossis essay La guerra iniziata in Italia nel 1717 dalla Spagna contro lAustria fu voluta dal Duca di Parma ` che indusse a usare per limpresa la flotta gia allestita dallAlberoni per la crociata contro il Turco, in Cento studi sul Cardinale Alberoni, 4 vols. (Piacenza, Collegio Alberoni, 1978), 1, 242262.
Notes
217
Chapter 10
1. Figures are taken by the Piedmontese official relation, whose text in ItalianRelazione della difesa de Trinceramenti del Colle dellAssietta fatta dalle truppe Piemontesi ed Austriache ` l 19 luglio 1747 (Relation of the Defense of Assietta Hill Entrenchments Made by the Piedmontese and Austrian Troops on July 19, 1747), lies in the Archive of the Historical Office of the Italian Army General Staff (since now AUSSME) Fondo antico (previously in Fondo L 3, lavori svolti, Stati Preunitari, Piemonte), last page. Among the French wounded was Marquis de Montcalm, who later commanded French troops in Canada in the Seven Years War and was killed by the British at Quebec in 1759. 2. In Italy, it is known as the Peace of Aquisgrana, Aix-la-Chapelles Latin and Italian name.
Chapter 11
1. Letter of general Walsegg to Marshal Kevenhuller, on July 9, 1741, in V. Ilari, G. Boeri, C. Paoletti, La corona di Lombardiaguerre ed eserciti nellItalia del medio Settecento (17331763) (Ancona: Nuove Ricerche, 1997), 84. 2. The Earl Philip Stanhope, Lord Chesterfield, Letters to His Son, London, November 18, 1748: It is certain that in all the Courts and the Conferences where different foreign ministers are, those of the King of Sardinia are, generally, the ablest, the most courteous, the most delies. 3. All published in English in Vincenzo Giura, Gigliola Pagano de Divitiis, LItalia del secondo Settecento nelle relazioni segrete di William Hamilton, Horace Mann e John Murray (Napoli: Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane, 1997). 4. Jean-Baptiste Labat, Voyage en Espagne et en Italie (Tivoli: Chicca, 1951), 148. 5. Du Paty, Lettres sur lItalie en 1785, 2 vols. (Lausanne: Jean Mourer, 1796), I, 92. 6. Cesare Beccaria, Dei delitti e delle pene (About Crimes and Penalties) (Leghorn, 1764); Pietro Verri, Osservazioni sulla tortura (Observations on Torture) (Milan, 1768). 7. A very good overview of this period in British foreign policy is given by Jeremy Black, Pitt the Elder (Melksham: Cambridge University Press, 1992). 8. For the concept of this ante litteram cold war, see Virgilio Ilari, Piero Crociani, Ciro Paoletti, BellItalia militar (Roma: USSME, 2001), cf. C. Paoletti, Gli Italiani in armi. For the American posture in this struggle, idem., Americas Posture in the French-British Struggle for Supremacy: 16901815, a paper in Proceedings of the XXVIII Conference of the International Commission for Military History, Norfolk, 2003.
Chapter 12
1. They were the future kings of France, Louis XVIII and Charles X. 2. After his marriage to Maria Theresa, Francis of Lorraine stayed in Vienna and left Tuscany to a governor. When his first son Joseph II became emperor, Tuscany was left to his second son: Peter Leopold. When Joseph died without heirs, Peter Leopold became Emperor Leopold II. He went to Vienna along with his oldest son Francis, later Emperor
218 Notes
Francis II, leaving the Tuscan throne to his second male son, who became Grand Duke Ferdinand III. 3. Lazare Carnot, in Michael Howard, War in European History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976), 151. 4. L. Carnot, in M. Howard, vi. 5. There are only two books in Italian literature about this. The first was written by Guglielmo Ferrero. Its first edition appeared in 1936; the second in 1996 in Milan, published by Il Corbaccio. It was entitled Avventura (Adventure). The second and more detailed book is La Guerra delle Alpi (The War of the Alps), by Ciro Paoletti, Virgilio Ilari, and Piero Crociani. It was published in Rome, by USSME, in 2000. 6. For specific sources supporting this argument see ibid., 261 passim; cf. See Alberto Costa de Beauregard, Un uomo daltri tempi (Torino: Tipografia e libreria San Giuseppe degli artigianelli, 1897); Guglielmo Ferrero, Avventura: Bonaparte in Italia (17961797) (Milan: Corbaccio, 1996).; Ilari, Virgilio Crociani, Piero Paoletti, Ciro, La Guerra delle Alpi (17921796), Roma, USSME, 2000; Ilari, Virgilio Crociani, Piero Paoletti, Ciro, Storia militare dellItalia giacobina, (17961802), Roma, USSME, 2001. Ilari, Virgilio, La Guerra delle Alpi: le ragioni di una rimozione storica, in Barberis, ValentinaDel Monte, DarioSconfienza, Roberto (a cura di), Le truppe leggere nella Guerra delle Alpi, Torino, Gioventura Piemonteisa, 2006. Las Cases, Emanuel de, Memoriale di SantElena, Roma, Casini, 1969. Paoletti, Ciro, Gli Italiani in armi cinque secoli di storia militare nazionale 14942000, Roma, USSME, 2001. Segre, Arturo, Vittorio Emanuele I, Torino, Paravia, 1935. 7. All these documents were quoted for the first time by Ferrero. They were in Public Record Office, F.O. 67, 20, and 21. 8. Guglielmo Ferrero, Avventura, Milan, Il Corbaccio, 1996, page 24. 9. Quoted in Las Cases, Memoriale di SantElena, Firenze, Casini, 1987, page 79. 10. Napoleon to the Directory, on October 11th 1796, rip. in Oreste Bovio, Due secoli di tricolore, Roma, USSME, 1996, page 19. 11. The Neapolitan fleet was a very good second-rank one. Unfortunately, to save money, it was only half crewed. The remaining crews were called only in case of need. In 179899 the French advance was so fast that the fleet lacked the time to gather the crews. Nelson promptly ordered the ships uncrewed to be burned instead of being towed to Palermo. Britain preferred Naples, linked to Spain by the Bourbon family pact, to have no fleet at all.
Chapter 13
1. In Spain, Wellington had in his Peninsular Army at least three veterans of Maida, that is to say: Lt. Gen. Sir Lowry Cole, Maj. Gen. Sir James Kempt, and Lt. Col. John Colborne; so also if he had not previously noticed, he surely was perfectly aware of Maida on the eve of the campaign. 2. E.g., when he wrote to Eugene of Beauharnais on August 23, 1810: If I would lose a great battle, one, two million soldiers will rush under the flags of my old France, whilst my Kingdom of Italy would stand me up. 3. In 1812, just before the Russian campaign, the Italian army had 88,935 men, 14,951 horses, and 150 guns divided into 48,560 infantrymen and 815 horse for 11 infantry regi-
Notes
219
ments and two Dalmatian battalions, 5,275 artillerymen with 2,850 horses, 6,576 cavalrymen using 5,976 horses, divided in six regiments. The Royal Guard had 6,192 men and 1,670 horses. The Engineer Corps had 1,400 men and 265 horses. Gendarmerie, of three regiments, had 1,908 men and 1,030 horses. The Royal Navy had some as 9,000 men. The remaining belonged to logistical, administrative, and medical corps, to the military schools, local and general staffs, and so on. 4. Studies are still going on, anyway good figures can be found in Cappello, Girolamo, ` Gli Italiani in Russia nel 1812, Citta di Castello, Comando del Corpo di Stato Maggiore del Regio EsercitoUfficio Storico, Memorie Storiche Militari, Vol. VII, Fascicolo IV del 1912, 1912. Assereto, Giovanni, Coscrizione e politica militare nella Liguria napoleonica, in Allombra dellaquila imperiale, Atti del convegno di Torino del 1518 ottobre 1990, Roma, Ministero per i beni culturali e ambientali, Ufficio centrale per i beni archivistici, saggi, 28, 2 voll., 1994. Carillo, Maria Margherita, La coscrizione nel Mezzogiorno dItalia nel decennio francese, in Studi storico-militari 2002, Roma, Stato Maggiore dellEsercito Ufficio Storico, 2004. Crociani, Piero Ilari, VirgilioPaoletti, Ciro, Storia militare del Regno Italico (1802 1814), Vol 1 tomi I e II, Vol 2, Roma, USSME, 2004. Della Peruta, Franco, Larmata del napoleonico Regno dItalia in Allombra dellaquila imperiale, Atti del convegno di Torino del 1518 ottobre 1990, Roma, Ministero per i beni culturali e ambientali, Ufficio centrale per i beni archivistici, saggi, 28, 2 voll., 1994. Ferrari, G. Giacchi, N., Gli Italiani in Germania ` nel 1813, Citta di Castello, C.do del Corpo di Stato Maggiore del Regio EsercitoUfficio Storico, 1914. 5. Discussion with Professor Greg Urwin, Temple University, May 2003. 6. General Buturlin, quoted in Ambrogio Bollati, Gli Italiani nelle armate napoleoniche (Bologna, 1938), 111. ` 7. Captain Baggi, quoted in Girolamo Cappello, Gli Italiani in Russia nel 1812 (Citta di Castello, SMREUfficio Storico, Memorie Storiche Militari, Vol. VII, Fascicolo IV of 1912, 1912), 209. 8. Eugene de Beauharnais to his wife, quoted in Cappello, Gli Italiani in Russia nel 1812, 316. 9. Italian Engineers Corp captain Belcredi to his relatives, quoted in Ibid., 318.
Chapter 14
1. Massimo DAzeglio, I miei ricordi (My remembrances) (Varese: Feltrinelli, 1963), 110. 2. Ibid., 116. 3. For these aspects of French policy in Italy since 1796 see Giuseppe Brizzolara, La Francia dalla Restaurazione alla fondazione della Terza Repubblica, 18141870 (Milano, Hoepli, 1903). Ciro Paoletti, Gli Italiani in armi cinque secoli di storia militare nazionale 14942000 (Roma, USSME, 2001). Ilari, Virgilio Crociani, Piero Paoletti, Ciro, Storia militare dellItalia giacobina, (17961802), (Roma, USSME, 2001). Crociani, Piero Ilari, VirgilioPaoletti, Ciro, Storia militare del Regno Italico (18021814), Vol. 1 tomi I e II, Vol 2, (Roma, USSME, 2004). Radogna, Lamberto, Storia della Marina Militare delle Due Sicilie 17341860 (Milano, Mursia, 1978). Randaccio, C., Storia delle Marine militari italiane dal 1750 al 1860 (Roma, Forzani & Co., 1886). Pier Paolo Ramoino, La Marina Italica, a paper presented to the conference La Legione Italica e la situazione italiana fra il 1800 e il 1806 (Brescia, Palazzo Bonoris, 6 ottobre 2006). Paoletti, Ciro, La situacion estrategica en el
220 Notes
mar Adriatico y la Marina italiana de 1798 a 1814, in Poder terrestre y poder naval en la poca e de la batalla de Trafalgar, Acts of the International Conference of Military History, Madrid, CEHM, 2005. 4. On April 1, 1843, Garibaldi organized an Italian Legion, about 500 men, in Montevideo to fight for Uruguay against Argentina. The Legionnaires were dressed with the later world-famous red shirts. They were prepared for the butchers of Montevideo (beasts blood spots were supposedly less remarkable on red than on any other color). They could be a cheap and good uniform.
Chapter 15
1. Just that year Giuseppe Gabetti, bandleader of the 1st Infantry Regiment Savoia, composed the Marcia Realethe Royal March. In a short time it became the national anthem instead of the Sardinian anthem. It was officially accepted as the Italian national anthem until the end of the kingdom of Italy in 1946. The only place were it is still officially played in public is New York City. In fact, this is the traditional piece played in Little Italy during the Saint Gennaro Feast and during Columbus Day ceremonies. 2. Massimo DAzeglio, cit. 539. 3. Ibid. 4. Ibid., 540. 5. Charles Albert, quoted in Ciro Paoletti, Gli Italiani in Armi, 402. 6. The Italian word the king used was galantuomo. It may be translated as gentleman as well as honest man. But in Italian the word gentiluomothe perfect translation of the English word gentlemanhas an aristocratic implicit meaning, which galantuomo does not. In this case, Victor Emmanuel, whose house had ruled Savoy since the year 998 and was the oldest ruling house of Europe, explicitly defined himself as a bourgeois would do. 7. Carlo Cattaneo to F. Arrivabene, in Paolo Pinto, Carlo Alberto (Milano: Rizzoli, 1990), 294. 8. The monument still lies in the monumental cemetery of Brescia. The inscription says: Beyond the urn, no enemy anger survives. 9. Garibaldi, Memorie (Torino: Einaudi, 1972), 222. 10. Ibid., 223. 11. Ibid., 234. 12. Ibid., 227. 13. The United States Supreme Court recognized him as the father of the telephone in 1886, but he did not have a patent after 1873; by a legal point of view it was Alexander Graham Bell, who registered it in 1876 and was the owner of all the related rights.
Chapter 16
1. Lord Clarendon to Sir James Hudson, British ambassador in Turin, London, November 29, 1854, quoted in Pier Giusto Jaeger, Le mura di Sebastopoli (Milano, Mondadori, 1991), 125.
Notes
221
` 2. Cavour, quoted in G. Visconti Venosta, Ricordi di gioventu (Memoirs of Youth) (Milan, Rizzoli, 1959), 283. 3. Cavour, quoted in Ibid., 285. 4. Quoted in Franz Herre, Kaiser Franz Joseph von Osterreich (Koln, Verlag Kiepenheuer & Witsch, 1978), 151. 5. Ibid. 6. They composed five ordinary divisions, a cavalry division and the Cacciatori delle AlpiChasseurs of the AlpsBrigade commanded by Garibaldi. ` 7. Cavour to Engineer Carlo Noe, quoted in Amedeo Ademollo, Lallagamento del Vercellese nellaprile 1859, in Studi storico-militari 2002 (Roma, USSME, 2004), 350. 8. Victor Emmanuel fought so bravely that the French Zouaves acclaimed him a corporal in their 1st Regiment. Then, every evening until his death, when calling Caporal Savoye Victor Emmanuel for the roll-call, another corporal answered absent, because he is king in Italy. 9. According to the Piedmontese and later Italian ranks, a Brigadier was a colonel temporarily commanding a Brigade; but a Brigade was normally commanded by a Major General (one star), while a Division was commanded by a Lieutenant General. Army Corps and Armies were commanded by Lieutenant Generals designated of Army Corp and designated of Army. After World War I, Great Units were respectively commanded by Brigade Generals, Division Generals, Army Corp Generals (three stars), and Army Generals, while the ranks of Major General and Lieutenant Generals were used only for Generals of noncombattant Corps, which were not composed of Regiments, like Medical Corp, Supply Corp, Administration, and so on. 10. See Jean Berenger, Storia dellimpero asburgico 17001918 (Bologna, Il Mulino, 2003). Brizzolara, Giuseppe, La Francia dalla Restaurazione alla fondazione della Terza Repubblica, 18141870 (Milano, Hoepli, 1903). Herre, Franz, Francesco Giuseppe (Milano, Rizzoli, 1980). Herre, Franz, Prussia (Milano, Rizzoli, 1985). Mola, Aldo Alessandro, Storia della monarchia in Italia (Milano, Bompiani, 2002). Paoletti, Ciro, Gli Italiani in armi cinque secoli di storia militare nazionale 14942000 (Roma, USSME, 2001). von Naso, Eckahrt, Moltke Mensch und Feldherr (Berlin, Krueger Verlag, 1943). Pieri, Piero, Storia militare del Risorgimento, 2 vol. (Milano, Il Giornale, 2003), 2nd volume. Pinto, Paolo, Vittorio Emanuele II (Milano, Mondadori, 1997). Flaviani, Francesco, Due imperatori a colloquio, su Historia, n. 14, genn.1959.
Chapter 17
1. Report in AUSSME, Fondo Brigantaggio, still reorganizing when this book was written.
Chapter 18
1. Obviously it was the so-called little coat of arms, the white cross in a red field bordered in blue (the border was used just to remember the traditional color of Savoy, in spite of the pure heraldic tradition, which does not use it for reigning houses. By the way, the
222 Notes
great coat of arms of the House of Savoy is so complicated that it would have been really very hard to put it on a flag. 2. As a Catholic, in his last moments Cavour was assisted by a priest, who absolved him and later had a lot of trouble with Church hierarchy. 3. Two of them had been built by Webb in New York. 4. Quoted in Ciro Paoletti, Gli Italiani in armi cit, 438. The exact text was: I have received dispatch number 1073. I obey. 5. Garibaldi, Memoirs, 400. 6. The 1861 Italian Lira was officially equal to 4.5 grams of silver (0.158 oz) or to 0.2903225 grams of gold (0.010 oz). 7. They appeared after the December 13, 1871, Royal Decree, which ordered the army and the fleet to wear, as a characteristic symbol of military, little five pointed white metal stars on the collars of uniforms. Still in use, they are worn by all and only the military personnel on land, air, and sea. So, if one wants to understand if the Italian uniform in front of him is a military one or not, he needs only to look for the little stars on the collar. 8. The issue was discussed in the late seventies, by Lucio Ceva, Le Forze Armate, Torino, ` Utet, 1981 and Piero Del Negro, Esercito, Stato e societa, Bologna, Cappelli, 1979. Whilst marshall Emilio De Bono, in his book Nellesercito nostro prima della guerra, Milano, Mondadori, 1931, told that no real result had been obtained by the army, Ceva and Del Negro agreed that it could be reliable the officially admitted figure of a 1520% reduction of illiteracy. The most recent and probably the best work was the paper presented by the late Alberto Arpino during an Italian-Spanish symposium in 1994. Arpino had compared figures about illitterate people resulting from the 1861, 1871, 1881, 1891, and 1901 census. He took in exam how many people could have passed through the new school system before going in the army, how many of them did not, how many of them went in the army after the introduction of the regimental primary school. Then he compared related ages and the illitteracy average per age. His data basically confirmed the abovesaid 20% figure and increased it to 22 or 25%. Unfortunately, he died two years later, his work was never published and was lost.
Chapter 19
1. Simone Pacoret Di Saint-Bon, Discorso pronunziato alla Camera dei Deputati nella tornata del 6 dicembre 1873(speech pronounced in front of the Chamber of Deputies in the December 6 1873 sitting)reported in Rivista Marittima, VII, 1 (January 1874): 3435. 2. The Royal Navy gave vessel ranks only to the staff officers. All the officers belonging to Engineer, Medical and Administrative Corps had the same ranks as in the army. They could easily be distinguished by chevrons. In fact vessel officers had chevrons as in the British navy, other corps had like in the US Navy. De Saint Bon and Brin had the same rank, but being first a staff officer who commanded large naval units, he was an admiral, whilst the other came from the Naval Engineers Corps and he was a general. Vessel ranks were unified for the Navy Corps only after World War II. 3. As demonstrated by Bruce Vandervort, War of Imperial Conquest in Africa, 18301914 (London: University College London Press, 1998) 4. Ibid. It is probably the best essay I have read about this topic and probably the only real objective analysis on Italian colonial wars. 5. See, Franco Bandini, Gli Italiani in Africa (Milan: Longanesi, 1971); Baratieri,
Notes
223
Oreste, Memorie dAfrica (Trento: F.lli Melita Editori, 1988); Bourelly, G., La battaglia di Abba Garima (Milan: Cogliati, 1901); Ceva, Lucio, Le Forze Armate (Torino: Utet), 1981; Paoletti, Ciro, Gli Italiani in armi cinque secoli di storia militare nazionale 14942000 (Roma: USSME, 2001); Rochat, Giorgio, Adua, analisi di una sconfitta, in Ufficiali e soldati: lEsercito Italiano dalla Prima alla Seconda Guerra Mondiale (Udine, Gaspari, 20000; Di Ferdinando, Roberto, La sconfitta di Adua, on Rivista Italiana Difesa, year XXII, n. 6, giugno 2004; Governale, Giulio, Adua: i perche di una sconfitta, on Rassegna dellArma dei Carabinieri, anno LIII, n. 2, aprile giugno 2005; Montanari, Mario, Adua 1896, on Storia Militare, n. 32, mag. 1996; Rovighi, Alberto, La battaglia di Adua, on Rivista Militare, n. 4, 1996; Zamorani, Massimo, La Battaglia di Adua, on Rivista Italiana Difesa, anno, XV, n. 4, aprile 1997. 6. See the comments by sir Michael Howard about Adowa and Ishandlwana in his War in European History (Oxford, 1976), chapter VII, note 2 and the opinion of Bruce Vandervort, in cit. p. 29, 40, 153164. 7. The International Expeditionary Force was composed of more than 61,000 men. Japan sent two divisions, Britain an Anglo-Indian division, France two brigades, Germany three. Russia sent 4,000 men, United States 6,000, Italy, as said some 2,000. AustriaHungary sent only five small ships.
Chapter 20
1. Still suffering after the crash that occurred in Fort Myers on September 18, 1908. 2. Aldo Alessandro Mola, Giolitti: lo statista della nuova Italia (Cles, Mondadori, 2003); Aldo Alessandro Mola, Storia della monarchia in Italia (Milano, Bompiani, 2002). 3. As clearly explained by Francis Josephs aide de camp Alberto di Margutti, in his, LImperatore Francesco Giuseppe (Milano, Agnelli, 1931). 4. The Italian navy was divided into naval divisions, commanded by a vice-admiral, corresponding to a division general in the army. Two or more naval divisions composed literally a squad, that is to say a squadron, commanded by an admiral. 5. Alderotti, Enrico Lombardo, Alessandro, Ansaldo (Roma: Rivista Marittima, 2005). Ceva, Lucio, Le Forze Armate (Torino: Utet, 1981). Fatutta, Francesco, Cento anni per lOto Melara, on Rivista Marittima, CXXXIX, gennaio 2006. I camions della F.I.A.T. in Tripolitania, on LIllustrazione Italiana XXXIX, n. 4, 28 gennaio 1912, 74. Pignato, Nicola Cappellano, Filippo, Gli autoveicoli da combattimento dellEsercito Italiano, 2 vols. (Roma, USSME, 2002). 6. As it is well known, Macaroni is an ironic nickname normally used in Europe and in the Anglo-Saxon world for the Italians. What is less known is that it is very ancient. One of the oldest uses of this term in English is in a sixteenth-century version of Yankee Doodle. At that time I quote from The World Book Encyclopedia, 1975 edition, volume 21, 458, voice Yankee Doodle, by Raymond Kendall the word macaroni was used to mean the young men of London who dressed in odd Italian styles. Of course, being macaroni equal to Italy, it was soon used by Europeans and Americans to mean the Italian soldiers, too. But this is improper. In fact, Italy has its own version of the standard privates nickname. An American private is Johnny especially when coming back home marching again. A British one is Tommy, or Tommy Atkins, a German is a Fritz after Frederick the Greatsder alte Fritz (the old Freddy)family nickname and an Italian private is Ciccillo Cacace (pronounce Chychylloh Kakacheh. Ciccillo is a southern Italy diminutive for
224 Notes
Ciccio, which on his side is a diminutive for Francis and may also mean fatty. So, the closest translation in English would be Little Fatty Frankie Cacace). In fact, every time an officer (generals included), a noncommissioned officer, or a corporal must give his men an example of right or wrong, he speaks about what Private Ciccillo Cacace must do or not do in that case. 7. Margutti, quoted, 137.
Chapter 21
1. Prince Montenuovo, quoted by Baron Alberto di Margutti in, Limperatore Francesco Giuseppe, (Milan: Agnelli,1931), 221. 2. A family memory: in August 1914, my great-great-grandfather was an 83-year-old retired infantry general. Enrolled as a private in 1848, he fought against the Austrians in 1859 and 1866. The day he found in his newspaper news of the war, he curtly commented: Germany wins. He died in 1921, after having seen his false prediction and his youths dream realized with the definitive destruction of Austria. 3. Rudyard Kipling, The New Italy. This article, as the others here quoted, appeared in Daily Telegraph and New York Tribune in 1917. Quotations here refer to the last Italian edition in English, The War in the MountainsImpressions from Italian Front (Rome: Rivista Militare Europea, 1990), 53. 4. Cadorna, cited in Gianni Rocca, Cadorna (Milano: Mondadori, 1985), 47. 5. The gray-green uniform had been tested in 1905 and adopted in 1908. 6. See for the opinions of contemporaries, written while combatants or written later, when they were veterans: Alessi, Rino, DallIsonzo al Piave (Milano, Longanesi, 1966); Caccia Dominioni, Paolo 19151919 (Treviso, Longanesi, 1979); Comisso, Giovanni, Giorni di guerra (Milano, Mondadori, 1930); de Rossi, Enrico, La vita di un ufficiale italiano fino alla guerra (Milano, Mondadori, 1927); Frescura, Attilio, Diario di un imboscato dallintervento allarmistizio (Bologna, Cappelli, 1934); Milanesi, Guido, Fiamme dellara (Milano,Ceschina, 1942); Monelli, Paolo, Le scarpe al sole (Milano, Mondadori, 1971); Prezzolini, Giuseppe (edited by) Tutta la guerra (Milano, Longanesi, 1968); Salsa, Carlo, Trincee (Milano, Sonzogno, 1934); Sangiorgi, Giorgio Maria, 75 m/m (Milano, Agnelli, 1931); Sillani, Tomaso (edited by), Lettere di Enrico Toti (Firenze, Bemporad & figlio editori, 1924). See also contemporary weekly magazines such as Il diario della nostra guerra bollettini ufficiali dellEsercito e della Marina (Milano, different publishers, 19151918); LIllustrazione Italiana (Milano, F.lli Treves Editori, 19151918); La Domenica del Corriere (Milano, Corriere della Sera, 19151918). Works written by others than veterans include: Bandini, Franco, Il Piave mormorava, (Milano, Longanesi, 1968); Gabriele, MarianoFriz, Giuliano, La politica navale italiana dal 1885 al 1915 (Roma, USSMM, 1982); Cedroni, Lorella, La funzione dell opinione pubblica italiana dal primo dopoguerra allavvento del Fascismo, in, Alberini, Paolo Rainero, Romain H. (editors) Le Forze Armate e la Nazione italiana (19151943), Proceedings of the conference held in Rome 2224 October 2003 (Roma, CISM, 2004); Cuomo, Vincenzo, Il volontariato militare italiano nella storia dItalia, in Studi storico-militari 2001, Roma, Stato Maggiore dellEsercito Ufficio Storico, 2004; Del Negro, Piero, La Grande Guerra, elemento unificatore del popolo italiano ?, in Alberini, PaoloRainero, Romain H., Le Forze Armate e la Nazione italiana (19151943), Proceedings of the conference held in Rome 2224 October 2003 (Roma, CISM, 2004); Del Negro, Piero, La prima Guerra ` Mondiale e lidentita nazionale, in Studi storico-militari 2000, Roma, USSME, 2002;
Notes
225
` PAPA, Catia, Volontari della Terza Italia: i battaglioni studenteschi deta giolittiana, su Rassegna Storica del Risorgimento, anno XCI, fascicolo IV, ottobre-dicembre 2004; Ansaldo, Giovanni, Quel 24 maggio, su Storia Illustrata, anno II, n. 5, maggio 1958; Murialdi, Paolo, La grande stampa ` tutta interventista, su Storia Illustrata, anno XXVII, n. 330, e maggio 1985; Tranfaglia, Nicola, Piazza e Corona condizionano il Parlamento, su Storia Illustrata, anno XXVII, n. 330, maggio 1985. 7. Kipling, A Pass, a King and a Mountain, in The War in the Mountains, cited p. 33. 8. Kipling, Only a Few Steps Higher Up, in The War . . . cited, 4546. 9. Enrico Cernigoi, Le ultime battaglie del Carso e la conquista dellaltopiano di Comeno, su Studi Storico-Militari 2005, Roma, USSME, 2007, 329. 10. Kipling, Only a few . . . cited, 46. 11. A part Italian Official Relation on WW I LEsercito Italiano nella Grande Guerra (19151918), see specifically, Jannattoni, Livio, Il treno in Italia (Roma: Editalia, 1980) and Monti, Enrico, Il problema ferroviario militare in relazione alle operazioni di guerra, su Rivista Militare italiana, anno II, n. 8, agosto 1928, VI E.F. 12. Italian industrial system produced 11,537 planes and some 30,000 engines. By the way, figures show the Italian industrial systems weakness compared to France which in 19141918 produced 41,500 planes, while Germany made 48,000 and Britain a little less than 55,000. 13. Figures too show it. In fact, from May 24th 1915 until November 4th 1918, the Italian Air Force destroyed 643 Austrian aircraft and balloons, while Austrians destroyed only 128 Italian aircraft. 14. For all the figures, see the related tome in the Italian Official Relation on World War I (divided in 37 volumes) LEsercito Italiano nella Grande Guerra (19151918), VII Volume 15. According to the operational doctrine, one wins a battle when he reaches the objective he has previously defined in his plans as his objective. There are strategic victories those allowing a side to win the war, and tactical victories, allowing a side to gain a great success but not necessarily a strategically significant one. This was the case; we know the Austro-German objectives: they were reached only for their original part of the plan but the Austro-Germans failed to destroy the Italian army. So, they gained a great victory, but the real strategic success was lacking. In fact, the Italian army remained active and able to defend the country; as it clearly demonstrated on the Piave, within one month. The problem for the Austro-Germans was that they reached what is defined as the Zone of strategic exhaustion, that is to say: each army may advance as far as it can; but, at a certain distance, it can not receive supplies and reinforcements as it needs to feed the attack; when this happens the Army must go slowly or must stop. This is precisely what happened to the Austrians and to the Germans: they simply could advance anymore. The interruption of the roads and railways in Friuli where the war had been fought in the previous two years forbade any fast movement of needed supplies in the needed quantity. 16. Allied troops sent to Italy were only a French division and two British divisions. This did not prevent some authore.g., British general Fraser in his Rommel biographyof speaking of the following Vittorio Veneto battle as of a victory of British-Italian Army. 17. This verse by DAnnunzio is from the dedication of the Leda senza Cigno to the Grenadiers Brigade. The original Italian text, referring to the long wars against Austria and ` to the then 250 years old brigade, says: Di noi/ tremo/ la nostra vecchia gloria/ tre secoli di fede/ e una/ vi-ttoria Of us/ trembled/ our old glory/ three centuries of faith/ and a/ vic-tory.
226 Notes
18. Il Corpo Automobilistico dellEsercito (Roma, Rivista Militare, 1980), p. 1012. 19. Emilio Faldella, La grande guerra, 2 vol. (Milano, Longanesi, 1978), II, 346. 20. They included Lieutenant Fiorello La Guardia, who later was a very popular mayor of New York City. 21. War Bulletin number 1268, issued on November 4th 1918, at noon. 22. A part Italian Official Relation on WW I LEsercito Italiano nella Grande Guerra (19151918), 37 tomes (Rome, USSME, ended in 1985), Volume V: Operazioni del 1918, tome 2 bis, Luglio-Novembre a detailed account is given by Francesco, Fatutta, La ventilata operazione contro la Baviera del dicembre 1918 (The foreseen operation against Bavaria of December 1918) on Rivista Italiana Difesa, Year XX, no. 3, March 2002, 9297. 23. Quoted in Colonel Mario Caracciolo, Sintesi storico-politica della guerra mondiale 19141918 (Torino, Schioppo, 1930), 187. 24. Quoted in General Emilio Faldella, La grande guerra, 2 vols. (Milano, Longanesi, 1978), II, 376.
Chapter 22
1. Cernigoi, Enrico, Dalla guerra di Libia alla missione militare in Anatolia, su Rivista Italiana Difesa, XXI, n. 9 (September. 2003). Magnani, Enrico, Il mantenimento della pace dal XIX al XXI secolo (Roma, Rivista Marittima, 1998). Osca, Alexander, La politique de la ` ` ` France et de lItalie au sud-est de lEurope pendant les premieres annees apres la Premiere Guerre Mondiale, su Revue internationale dhistoire militaire, n. 83 (Paris, Comission Francaise dHistorie Militaire, 2003). Paoletti, Ciro, La Marina italiana in Estremo Oriente 18662000 (Roma, USSMM, 2000). Salimbeni, Fulvio, Il confine orientale, in Mola, Aldo Alessandro (a cura di), Il marchesato di Saluzzo da Stato di confine a confine di Stato a Europa, atti del convegno per il IV centenario della pace di Lione, Saluzzo, 30 novembre -1 dicembre 2001 (Foggia, Bastogi, 2003). 2. For a general overview Duroselle, Jean Baptiste, Storia diplomatica dal 1919 al 1970, (Roma, Edizione dellAteneo, 1972). On the specific aspects concerning Austria the most recent work is Fiorentino, Waldimaro, Il confine con lAustria, in Mola, Aldo Alessandro (a cura di), Il marchesato di Saluzzo da Stato di confine a confine di Stato a Europa, atti del convegno per il IV centenario della pace di Lione, Saluzzo, 30 novembre -1 dicembre 2001 (Foggia, Bastogi, 2003). Salimbeni, Fulvio, Il confine orientale, in Mola, Aldo Alessandro (a cura di), Il marchesato di Saluzzo da Stato di confine a confine di Stato a Europa, atti del convegno per il IV centenario della pace di Lione, Saluzzo, 30 novembre -1 dicembre 2001, (Foggia, Bastogi, 2003). 3. Local authorities had to decide on their own initiative. An additional family memoir: my great-grandfather was at that time the lieutenant colonel commanding the Royal Carabineers Group in Mantua. He reacted on his own initiative against the riots ordering 20 Carabineers he had in the city to fire. According to the law, the first volley had to be shot in the air; the second against the people. After the first volley, when watching the Carabineers carabines lowering for the second, the people fled: There were no dead. 4. Probably the best book ever written about this period is Longanesi, Leo, In piedi e seduti (Milano, Longanesi, 1968). 5. Interview of Professor Aldo Ademollo, on March 12, 1985. Professor Ademollo was a founding member of the Fascio of Mantua in 1919. He later belonged to that of Florence and marched on Rome in October 1922.
Notes
227
6. Another problem with English translations. In English the word comrade is used to define both Fascist and Socialist/Communist party members. In Italian there is a difference, Camerataliterally comradewas used by Fascists to define their comrades, while Compagnoliterally companionwas, and still is, used by Socialists and Communists to define their own. 7. At this point in the narrative, the Italian Armed Forces will be mentioned using their Italian name, just to prevent the reader from mistaking them for the British ones. 8. The Quadrumvirifrom Latin, literally meaning four menwere Emilio De Bono, a general of the Bersaglieri, later Marshal of Italy; Michele Bianchi, the Fascist party administrator; Italo Balbo, a former Alpini Officer during the war and later Air Marshal; Count Cesare Maria de Vecchi di Val Cismon. They ranked just under Mussolini. By the way, just to give an idea of what Italians now think of Fascism, all their sons, grandsons and nephews live quietly in Italy. Countess de Vecchi lives in Rome, De Bonos nephews in Cassano dAdda near Milan; advocate Balbo works in Rome. Bianchi had no relatives. A granddaughter of Mussolinithe daughter of Mussolinis youngest son Romano and of a sister of the world known actress Sophia Lorenseats in the Italian Parliament as a deputy, thus it is still possible to see vote for Mussolini scrawled on Italian walls before an election. 9. The most important was the Directives for the Coordinated Employment of the Army Air Units. Directives were divided into three main parts. The first contained general issues and orders for actions above the ground. The second was about fighting above the sea; the third concerned antiaircraft defense, reconnaissance, emergency airfields, emergency places and so on. The only known copies are those owned by De Pinedo himself, at that time Deputy Chief of Staff of the Regia Aeronautica. I found it in a very strange way. It now lies in Rome, AUSSME, fondi acquisiti, non catalogato. The other is the Ipotesi Ovest, Ipotesi Est, Ipotesi doppia, considerazioni generali. An incomplete copy of it is in AUSSME, fondi acquisiti, non catalogato; a complete copy has been found by Professor John Gooch in AUSSME too; a third copy is in AUSSMM (Archivio Ufficio Storico Stato Maggiore Marina MilitareArchive of the Navy Historical Office), Documentazione di base, busta 1725, but it is the new and modified version written in 1933. The only study existing about the Directives is Ciro Paoletti, The first air war doctrine of the Italian Royal Air Force, 1929, a paper presented to the 67 annual conference of the American Society for Military HistoryQuantico (Virginia), the U.S. Marines Corp University, April 28th 2000. 10. See, Mecozzi, Amedeo: Scritti scelti sul potere aereo e laviazione dassalto (19201970) (edited by Ferruccio Botti), 2 vols. (Roma, Stato Maggiore dellAeronauticaUfficio Storico, 2007). 11. 709.202 kilometers per hour. 12. As clearly said in Francesco De Pinedo, Promemoria per il Sig. Generale Giuseppe Valle, oggetto: passaggio di consegne della carica di Sottocapo di Stato Maggiore della R. Aeronautica riservatissimo personale(Memorandum for General Giuseppe Valle handing over the office of Assistant Chief of Staff of the R. Air Force; top secret and personal) annexe number 4, Ammonitions. Rome, typewritten, undated, but August 24, 1929, AUSSME, fondi acquisiti, non catalogato. The only published source is Ciro Paoletti, Le risorse materiali della Regia Aeronautica nel 1929, in Rivista Italiana Difesa, XXIII, issue n. 4 (April 2005). 13. Italian Camel Corps was considered very effective, It was officially called Meharists, after the Mehara camel it used. 14. According to General Baron Amedeo Guillet, who knew the story directly from the captain commanding the Spahis squadron, when Italian SpahisLibyan colonial light cavalrytook Omar-el-Muktar, who was considered the chief of the Libyan rebellion, and
228 Notes
presented him to Graziani, Graziani asked him: So, you would be Omar-el-Muktar? I AM Omar-el-Muktar. Yes YOU ARE Omar el Muktar and tomorrow YOU WILL BE dead. The day after Muktar was hanged. 15. Duroselle, Jean Baptiste, Storia diplomatica dal 1919 al 1970, Luciolli, Mario, Palazzo Chigi: anni roventi ricordi di vita diplomatica italiana dal 1933 al 1948, (Milano, Rusconi, 1976). Pelagalli, Sergio, Il generale Efisio Marras addetto militare a Berlino (19361943), Roma, USSME, 1994. Perna, Valerio, Galeazzo Ciano: operazione Polonia (Milano, Luni, ` 1999). Rainero, Romain H., Il nuovo ordine mondiale: ambizioni e realta dellItalia fascista, in, Alberini, PaoloRainero, Romain H., Le Forze Armate e la Nazione italiana (1915 1943), Atti del convegno tenuto a Roma dal 22 al 24 ottobre 2003 (Roma, CISM, 2004). 16. His Excellence the Minister of War general Gazzera to the Chief of the Governe` ment, Predisposizione per leventuale costituzione di grandi unita O.M., on June 4, 1930, in Rome, State Central Archive, Presidenza Consiglio dei Ministri, 192830, Fasc. 1, sottofasc 22, prot. 8717. I found it by chanceas normally happen to historianslooking in a folder when preparing my book about the Italian Navy in China. If I wanted it, I probably would still be looking. 17. The complete and detailed account of air operations over Ethiopia, including which poison gas was used, when and in which quantity is in Ferdinando Pedriali, LAeronautica italiana nelle guerre coloniali Africa Orientale Italiana 193640: dalla proclamazione dellimpero alla Seconda Guerra Mondiale, (Air Force in Colonial warsItalian Eastern Africa 1936 1940 since the Empire proclamation to World War Two) (Rome, Air Force General Staff Historical Service, 2000). 18. Another family memoir: uncle Guidothe brother of my great-grandfather on my mothers sidewas lieutenant colonel Guido Lami. He commanded the Engineers Corps battalion of the Sabauda Infantry Division, composing the Badoglio column. When in front of Termaber, Badoglio called him: how long do you need to repair it? Twenty-four hours. Are you sure? Yes All right; Ill remember it. Then uncle Guido and his men worked hard the whole day and the whole night with no problems, a partas he said later to my grandmotherall the Staff officers and generals coming to see the work and shake their heads. The next morning the Pass was repaired. So, uncle Guido took the heaviest truck he had and drove it, leading the column, to test the route until Addis Ababa. He was promoted colonel because of war merit and this did not render him more popular among his oldest colleagues. 19. Foreign Office Egyptian Department Memorandum to Lord Halifax, on February 9, 1939, cited in Alvin Mockler, The return of Haile Selasse, 270.
Chapter 23
` 1. See also, Carlo de Risio, E Mussolini non incontro Roseevelt, (And Mussolini did not meet Roosevelt) in de Risio, Carlo, Gli Italiani in guerra, Rome, Il Tempo, XLV (November 1989): 5. By the way, this was confirmed by what Mussolinis second son Vittorio personally revealed in a TV interview a bit later. When he visited the United States in 1937, Vittorio ` had to see Hollywood because he was the manager of Cinecitta, the Cinema studios in Rome, He established a production company together with Hal Roach. Then, he was received by F. D. Roosevelt. The president asked him to ask Mussolini for a visit or a meeting, just to see if the United States could balance Italian pretension toward Germany. When back in Rome, Vittorio referred to his father Roosevelts proposal, but Mussolini did not
Notes
229
care for it. In February 1940, Sumner Welles came to Rome. On February 26 he met Mussolini and gave him a letter from Roosevelt for a sort of agreement. Unfortunately Mussolini was angry with France and Britain for the undeclared blockade of Italian Merchant ships847 ships stopped and their goods confiscated since August 1939, for a damage of more than a billion liras of that time. Moreover, Hitler ensured Germany would have provided Italy the needed coal and crude oil. Three months later, the German offensive against France began and there was no more time to talk. 2. Regia Aeronauticas previous experience included similar operations. In 1923 it evacuated civilians from Azizia, in Libya; and in 1936 infantry units had been air transported to Addis Ababa just after the end of the war. So, this Spanish operation was its first troop air transport in wartime. 3. Quoted in Sergio Attanasio, Gli Italiani e la guerra di Spagna (Milano, Mursia, 1974), 107. 4. In F 6, Fondo Oltremare Spagna, 336 folders. From 1 to 82 Comando Corpo Truppe Volontarie, 83189 Intendenza CTV, 119142 Artillery; 143145 Commissariato; 146148 Trasporti e tappe; 149214 Units, 214 Drilling, 215 miscellanea, 216236 Mobilization, 217336 miscellanea. 5. Studies about this aspect are still rare and very rarely published and one is tempted to ask himself how much Fascist propaganda had the late effect to convince people that all worked well. Anyway, one can find something in Cernigoi, Enrico Giovanetti, Massimo, Ricordati degli uomini in mare (Bassano del Grappa, Itinera Progetti, 2005); the book is about the submarine crews and it is a collection of interviews with survivors. When answering the question why did they enroll, most of the answers are more or less because of the lack of work in the thirties. Something similar can be found in personal accounts or memoirs of people who did not have important positions at that time who were interviewed, or it is indirectly admitted in some contemporary document. 6. See the Italian Navy official relation: Bargoni, Franco, Limpegno navale italiano durante la Guerra civile Spagnola (19361939) (Roma, Ufficio Storico della Marina, 1998).
Chapter 24
1. Valguarnera, Giuseppe, Seconda guerra mondiale: la struttura economica italiana alla vigilia del secondo conflitto, su Rivista marittima, CXL (maggio 2007). Alderotti, Enrico Lombardo, Alessandro, Ansaldo (Roma, Rivista Marittima, 2005). Barlozzetti, UgoPirella, Alberto, Mezzi dellesercito italiano 19331945 (Firenze, Editoriale Olimpia, 1986). Botti, Ferruccio, Come non ci si prepara a una guerra, su Storia militare, n. 4 (genn. 1994). Botti, Ferruccio, Il problema logistico italiano nella seconda guerra mondiale, su Informazioni della Difesa, n. 6 (1992). Fatutta, Francesco, Cento anni per lOto Melara, su Rivista Marittima, anno CXXXIX (gennaio 2006). Ferrari, Paolo Massignani, Alessandro, Economia e guerra in Italia 1943/1945 su Storia Militare, n. 73 (ottobre 1999). Ferrari, Paolo Massignani, Alessandro, Economia e guerra in Italia 19431945, su Storia Militare, n. 72 (sett. 1999). Luciani, Luciano, Leconomia e la finanza di un paese in guerra lesperienza italiana del 19401945, su Rivista della Guardia di Finanza, n. 4, (luglio-agosto 2000). 2. Figures officially published by the Italian Air Force in Gentile, Rodolfo, Storia dellAeronautica dalle origini ai giorni nostri (Firenze, Scuola di Guerra Aerea, 1967) and in Lioy, Vincenzo, Cinquantennio dellAviazione italiana, (Roma, Rivista Aeronautica, 1959).
230 Notes
3. For all concerning Marshal Cavallero, the best source is Ceva, Lucio, Il maresciallo Cavallero, su Storia Militare, anno III, n. 19 (1995). 4. See Ceva, Lucio, Il maresciallo Cavallero, on Storia Militare, anno III, n 19, 1995, p. 6, and Ceva, Lucio Curami, Andrea, La meccanizzazione dellEsercito Italiano dalle origini al 1943 (2 vols., Roma, USSME, 1989), vol. I, chapters 4, 5, 8 and especially 9, and, in vol. 2, attached documents, especially document n. 23. 5. Barlozzetti, UgoPirella, Alberto, Mezzi dellesercito italiano 19331945 (Firenze, Editoriale Olimpia, 1986). Ceva, Lucio Curami, Andrea, La meccanizzazione dellEsercito Italiano dalle origini al 1943 (2 vols., Roma, USSME, 1989); Pignato, Nicola Cappellano, Filippo, Gli autoveicoli da combattimento dellEsercito Italiano, 2 vols. (Roma, USSME, 2002). Pignato, Nicola Cappellano, Filippo, Gli autoveicoli tattici e logistici del R. Esercito Italiano fino al 1943, 2 vol., (Roma, USSME, 2005). 6. Lualdi, Aldo, Nudi alla meta (Milano, Longanesi, 1970). 7. Raffaele Campini, Nei giardini del diavolo (In the devils gardens) (Milano, Longanesi, 1969). 8. Figures are taken from general Carlo Favagrossas Come abbiamo perduto la guerra (How we lost the war), Milano, Longanesi, 1962. Grazianis official report is completely published in Mario Montanari, LEsercito Italiano alla vigilia della 2a Guerra Mondiale (The Italian Army at the eve of WW II) (Roma, USSME, 1982), 503504. 9. Ciano, Galeazzo, Diario (Milano, Rizzoli, 1990); Pelagalli, Sergio, Il generale Efisio Marras addetto militare a Berlino (19361943), (Roma, USSME, 1994); Perna, Valerio, Galeazzo Ciano: operazione Polonia (Milano, Luni, 1999); Kuby, Erich, Il tradimento tedesco (Milano, BUR, 1990). Plehwe, Friederich Karl von, Il patto dacciaio (Roma, USSME, 1978). 10. According to reserved reports by OVRA to Mussolini, Italian Fascist Hierarchsas they were officially calledadmitted to corruption, because, for instance, as some of them said, they owned the car, that is to say one personal car. This revealed them as poor little chicken-thieves compared to their Nazi counterparts. What was this in comparison of what Goering or Goebbels had stolen? 11. See Enrico Caviglia, Diario (Roma, Casini, 1953). The conclusion reached by Pierpaolo Battistelli, briefly and completely exposed in his Levoluzione del Regio Esercito nella seconda guerra mondiale, su Storia Militare, n. 36 (1996) is the same. 12. See Erich Kuby, Il tradimento tedesco, (Milano, BUR, 1990). 13. See for instance Virgilio Ilari, Storia del servizio militare in Italia, De Biase, Laquila doro, and my Gli Italiani in Armi, cit. 14. Badoglio, quoted in Verbali delle riunioni tenute dal Capo di Stato Maggiore Generale (Minutes of the meetings at the Chief of General Staffs) (Rome, USSME, 1983), Vol. I, years 19391940, meeting on October 17, 1940, 101. 15. A detailed account of Italian Armys actions in favor of Jews is given by Menachem Shelah, un debito di gratitudine: storia dei rapporti fra lEsercito Italiano e gli Ebrei in Dalmazia 19411943 (Roma, USSME, 1991). 16. See Basil Liddel Harts, History of Second World War, London, Pan Books, 1970, chapter 11, 140. 17. Quoted in Benedetto Palmiro Boschesi, LItalia nella II Guerra Mondiale. 10-VI-40, 25-VII-43 (Italy in WW II. June 10th 1940 July 25th 1943) (Milano, Mondadori, 1971), 109. 18. Apart some little tank units, the Italian Cavalry operated mainly on horses during all of World War II. In 1940 in Keru, Erythrea, Lieutenant Amedeo Guillet led his mounted
Notes
231
Gruppo Bande Amhara in a desperate and tactically successfully charge against British troops. Savoia Cavalleria Regiment charged in Isbushensky. The last Italian charge occurred in Poloy, Croatia, in Spring 1943. 19. Quoted in Paoletti, Gli Italiani in armi . . . , 581. 20. Bruno Berini, La 121a compagnia cannoni da 47/32 Granatieri di Sardegna (The 121st 47/32 Grenadiers of Sardinia guns company), (Rome, published by the Grenadiers Historical Museum, 1984), 48. The 47/32 millimetres gun were normally used Italian antitank weapon. 21. See Correlli Barnetts description in his The Desert Generals (London, 1960), chapter 2. 22. Balbo established first Italian paratroopers in 1938 in Libya as a Colonial unit. In spring 1939 the first paratrooper school was established in Tarquinia, some as 50 miles north from Rome. In 1941 Italian paratroopers were launched on Cefalonia, Zante, Itaca and Ionian islands. Then, two Paratrooper Divisions were established: Folgore was the first, Nembo the other. 23. Cited in Paolo Caccia Dominioni, El Alamein 19331962 (Milano, Longanesi,1964), 251. 24. Giuseppe Berto, Guerra in camicia nera, (War in black shirt) (Milano, Longanesi, 1967), 211.
Chapter 25
1. This story has not yet been clearly written and may never be. What is clear is that many officers commanding smaller units were shot by local members of the Mafia because they wanted to resist the Allies. Many American units were guided or informed by Mafiosi. It is hard to determine how effective Mafia aid had been. It is clear that after the Americans captured Palermo, of the newly appointed 82 mayors in the whole province of Palermo, 76 belonged to Mafia. 2. See, Hugh Pounds opinion in his Sicily!, chapter 4, published in 1962. 3. A family name tragically suitable for the situation: Chirieleison in ancient Greek means literally Oh Lord have mercy on us and it is used as an invocation of mercy in the first part of the Catholic Mass in Latin. 4. Mureddu, Matteo, Il Quirinale del Re (Milano, Feltrinelli, 1977). 5. Many authors suspect a secret agreement between the Court and the Germans to leave alone the long column carrying all the state officials. As a matter of fact, the vehicles were stopped many times by German checkpoints, but they were allowed to proceed. How could it happen? Simply, since the early days of the German presence in Italy, there was a password indicating a superior inspection. All the Italian and German patrols knew it, as well as they knew that, in case of that password, they were facing an allied general to be permitted to pass without controls. 6. Apart from the Eritrea, which was able to escaping the Japanese in India. 7. Thats why, for instance, a little Italian coastal artillery unit fought against the Allies ` on D-Day resisting on the Ile de Cezembre, off the Normandy coast, and a small motorized antitank unit serving in Russia later fought on the German side in Arnhem in 1944. 8. The Guardia di Finanza (Finance Guard)Regia Guardia di Finanza at that timeis a military corps (in fact, its men have the little stars on the collar) subordinate to
232 Notes
the Ministry of Finance, instead of the Ministry of Defence. It is in charge of police survey on financial activities. It acts as a Customs guard, and as a Treasury special agency, as a coast guard, and as normal police. It is very proud of its old military traditions. It comes from similar corps existing in the old Italian States, as well as the Light Troops Legion of the Kingdom of Sardinia. Thats why the Guard dates its origin to 1775. It was a nonmilitary corps until July 19, 1906. It received the little stars the following year and it had its colors on June 2, 1911; its baptism of fire as a military unit in Libya in 1911. A Finanziere was the first Italian soldier who fired the first shot in the Great War, preventing an Austrian attempt to destroy a bridge. 9. It is quite funny to note that the Italian Social Republics national anthem was the Inno di Mameli and its national flag the Italian tricolor deprived of the crowned crest of Savoy. The Fascist Republic had the same national symbols of the democratic Italian Republic born in 1946. 10. The unit comprised the 67 Inf. Reg. Legnano on two battalions, LI Battalion Bersaglieri Allievi Ufficiali, V Battaglione Controcarrion one hq platoon and 2 companies Field Artillery Regiment, XII Artillery Group, Howitzer Group, minor units of the Engineers Corps and of Supply Corp, 51a Section of the Medical Corp, total: 5,500 men 11. According to the late Leonida Fazi, a Bersaglieri second lieutenant, he was kept alive by British troops in Libya in 1941 after having lost his entire antitank platoon. He ironically remarked that in India after September 8, 1943, in the Yol Criminal Fascist Camp were he remained (he told me he could not consider the British who killed his platoon as friends) flew the Union Jack while the normal Italian POW Camp flew the Italian tricolor, andhe saidThis was the only difference. So, why cooperate? 12. My grandfather, the one whose name I have, belonged to the 2nd Grenadiers Regiment. He was in the Army since 1913 and this allowed him to not join the Fascist Party. On September 10, 1943, the Grenadier Division was disbanded. He went home. After a few days, a general he knew very well came to visit and offered him a post in the army of the Republic in exchange for a higher pay. My grandfather had a family depending on him, no savings, and no good perspectives for the future: he refused, because he had sworn an oath to the king, not to the Duce. A captain in his regiment, however, who lived on the same block, accepted because of the lack of money. Both were not peculiar cases. 13. CIL at that time was composed of the Paratrooper Division Nembo and a couple of Infantry Brigades including Alpini, Infantry, San Marco (Marines) Regiment, a Cavalry squadron, Artillery, Engineer Corp and supply and supporting units. 14. Mussolini had a lot of documents with him. He took them from his secretariat archive. We have eyewitnesses who looked at them and who partially read some. For instance Silvio Bertoldi reported on two of these witnesses in his, La guerra parallela (Verona, Longanesi, 1966). We know these papers existed, we know partisans seized them and took photos before giving them to authorities; but we do not know if these documents still exist and where they are located.
Chapter 26
1. erolo, 2. 3. Folgore (infantry), Friuli, Cremona, Legnano, Mantova, Aosta, Avellino, Trieste, PinGranatieri di Sardegna. Ariete and Centauro, the former Littorio. Tridentina and Julia.
Notes
233
4. Orobica, Taurinense, and Cadore. 5. According to the classical italian organica, that is to say, military organization, the words great units include units commanded by a general, from brigade up to army (brigade, division, army corps, army). Great units are divided into Elementary Great Units and Complex Great Units. The first units are those whose composition is fixed, that is to say, for instance: two regiments compose a brigade and two brigades compose a division; while the army corps and the army are defined Complex Great Units, because their composition is not rigidly foreseen. An army corps is composed of an undefined number of divisions, depending by the moments, as well as an army may be composed of a number of army corps, varying depending by the case.
Chapter 27
1. There are only a couple of very recent studies about it: Buchignani, Paolo, Fascisti ` rossi: da Salo al PCI, la storia sconosciuta di una migrazione politica 194353Red Fascists: ` from Salo to the Italian Communist Party, the unknown story of a political emigration (Cles, Mondadori, 1998); and Franzinelli, Mimmo, Lamnistia Togliatti 22 giugno 1946: colpo di spugna sui crimini fascistiTogliattis Amnesty 22 June 1946: erasing the fascist crimes, Cles, Mondadori, 2006. 2. During the middle of the war, after El Alamein and the American landing in Northwest Africa it was clear in Italy that the war was lost. There appeared a small political organization, Partito dAzioneAction Party. It grouped many young intellectuals, with a humanistic background. The organizer of the Action Party, Professor Guido Calogero, had a reformist and progressive program. He declared that all the disasters were due to Mussolini. The only solution consisted of going back to that purity of ideas. (I know it, because I personally listened to one of the first members of that party, professor Giuseppe Recuperati, remembering it, in Spring 1997, during a Conference of the Italian Society for the Studies ` about Eighteenth Century held in Rome, at the Faculty of Lingue of the first Universita degli Studi di Roma La Sapienza, villa Torlonia, May 2, 1997, afternoon session.) Recuperati, now one of the most important Italian historians, an internationally well known authority about the second half of the Eighteenth century, told us that Professor Calogero stated the Action Party considered the 1799 Jacobins as its ancestors. So, the Party inspired its action to their ideas and named itself the preserver of their heritage. The Action Party in 1946 sat on the left of the new Italian Republican Parliament. Its members were clever, highly educated and sometimes important. Ferruccio Parri, the chief of the National Liberation Movement belonged to the Action Party. As often it happens, being composed of intellectuals, the Action Party was too small to survive. It soon disappearedin the Fiftiesand its members looked for other parties. They were welcomed everywhere. Even if the Party no longer existed, its influence grew thanks to its old members and, the more they made their careersas an extreme example: one of them became Governor of the Bank of Italy, then was appointed Prime minister and later was elected as the President of the Republic, Carlo Azeglio Ciampithe more their power increased, the more some of the Actionist ideas gained ground. 3. Cit. in Frescobaldi, Dino, Quando LItalia ` stata determinante, su Nuova Antologia, e anno 134, fasc. 2209, ottobre dicembre 1998, p. 36. 4. For a general overview, one can see: Ilari, Virgilio, Storia Militare della Prima Repubblica, 19431993 (Ancona, Nuove Ricerche, 1994); Frescobaldi, Dino, Quando LItalia ` e
234 Notes
stata determinante, su Nuova Antologia, anno 134, fasc. 2209, ottobre dicembre 1998. Incisa di Camerana, Ludovico, La vittoria dellItalia nella terza guerra mondiale (Roma, 1998); Lagorio, Lelio, Problemi militari e internazionali: la posizione dellItalia, su Quadrante, n. 16/17, ott. 1981. Luraghi, Raimondo, La vulnerabile alleanza la NATO dal 1949 a oggi, su Storia Illustrata, anno XXX, n. 352, marzo 1987; Minardi, Salvatore, Il dibattito nazionale sugli Euromissili in Italia, in Le Forze Armate e la nazione italiana (19441989) (Roma, CISM, 2005). The most important works about this issue are by the contemproray Italian Defense minister Lelio Lagorio and they are: Lagorio, Lelio Lultima sfida: gli euromissili (Firenze, Loggia deLanzi editrice, 1998); Lagorio, Lelio, Euromissili e dissuasione: le motivazioni tecnico-operative della scelta di Comiso, su Quadrante, n. 14/15, sett. 1981. Lagorio, Lelio, Lultima sfida: gli euromissili, su Nuova Antologia, n. 2205, genn-marzo 1998.
Chapter 28
1. Locusta lost a plane because of Iraqi antiaircraft fire, but the two pilots saved their lives, and spent the remainder of the war in Iraqi hands as POWs, along with other allied pilots. 2. Robert Dole, Shaping Americas Global Future, in Foreign Policy 98 (Spring 1995).
Bibliography
While preparing this Bibliography, the main problem was what to write here. A reduced space did not allow me to put all the 8,323 titles I used (not to mention archival documents from Rome, Milan, Cagliari, Turin, Florence, Parma, Mantova, Brescia, Genoa, and Naples State Archives as well as the State Central Archive in Rome, and the Army, Navy and Air Force Archives) to prepare this book, after thirty years of dedicated reading. It could be a good idea just mentioning works in English; but, unfortunately, apart from this one, practically nothing exists about Italian military history in the early modern era. The situation is not better about the following periods, that is to say the Risorgimento and colonial operations. Thanks to Frederick C. Schneid, theres good coverage of the Napoleonic era in Italy. The twentieth century also may be considered in a good situation because of the works by John Gooch, even if it is not exaustive due to its focus on the Fascist period. By the way, the situation in Italian literature is quite similar to this. Italian books are useless for an English-speaking reader who does not know Italian. I did not use texts in English, apart from some marginal exceptions, because they normally dont give more information than Italian books. So, what to do ? Thats why I decided to mention only a few Italian books among the thousands I used. The most complete, and the only existing general account is my: PAOLETTI, Ciro, Gli Italiani in armi, cinque secoli di storia militare nazionale 14942000, Roma, Ufficio Storico dello Stato Maggiore Esercito (Historical Service of the Army General Staff, since now USSME), 2001. It must be considered useful for all the topics and all the periods from 1494 up to the end of the twentieth century. Its 652 pages cover the whole five centuries with as much detail as it was possible to put in only one volume. For general accounts about the sixteenth through eighteenth centuries I used: BOTTA, Carlo, Storia dItalia continuata da quella del Guicciardini sino al 1789, 10 voll., Parigi, Baudry, 1832; MURATORI, Lodovico Antonio, Annali dItalia dal principio dellera volgare sino allanno 1750, 13 voll., Napoli, Lombardi, 1870.
236 Bibliography
Good sources about Italian ancient States are: CACIAGLI, Giuseppe, Lo Stato dei Presidi, Pontedera, Arnera, 1992; COLLETTA, Pietro, Storia del reame di Napoli, Milano, Casini, 1989; ACTON, Harold, I Borboni di Napoli, Firenze, Giunti, ` 1985; CONIGLIO, Giuseppe, I Vicere spagnoli di Napoli, Napoli, Fiorentino, 1967; ` COSTANTINI, Claudio, La Repubblica di Genova nelleta moderna, Torino, UTET, 1991; DIAZ, Furio, Il Granducato di Toscana I Medici, Torino, Utet, 1987; ` DUBOIN, Carlo, Raccolta per ordine di materia delle leggi, cioe editti, patenti, manifesti ecc. emanati negli stati Sardi sino all8 dicembre 1798, 23 voll., Torino, 1816 ` 1869; GALASSO, Giuseppe, a cura di Il Piemonte Sabaudo stato e territori in eta moderna, Torino, UTET, 1994; GIANNONE, Pietro, Storia civile del Regno di ` Napoli, 5 Voll., Milano, Borroni e Scotti, 1844; MACHIAVELLI, Niccolo, Le Istorie Fiorentine, Firenze, Barbera, 1899; PASTOR, Ludwig von, Storia dei Papi, 17 Vols., Roma, Desclee, 1961; SELLA, Domenico CAPRA, Carlo, Il Ducato di Milano, Torino, UTET, 1984; SOLARO DELLA MARGARITA (edited by), ` Traites publics de la Royale Maison de Savoie avec les puissances trangeres depuis la e ` paix de Chateau Cambresis jusqua nos jours, 5 vols., Torino, Stamperia Reale, 1836; TABACCO, Giovanni, Lo stato sabaudo nel Sacro Romano Impero, Torino, Paravia, 1939; BULFERETTI, Lugi COSTANTINI, Claudio, Industria e commercio in ` Liguria nelleta del Risorgimento 17001861, Milano, B.C.I., 1961; DAL PANE, Luigi, La finanza toscana dagli inizi del secolo XVIII alla caduta del Granducato, Milano, B.C.I., 1965; MOLA, Aldo Alessandro, Storia della monarchia in Italia, Milano, Bompiani, 2002; about the military in general: PIERI, Piero, Levoluzione dellarte militare nei secoli XV,XVI,XVII e la guerra del secolo XVIII, in Nuove questioni di storia moderna, Milano, Marzorati, 1966; PIERI, Piero, Storia militare del Risorgimento, 2 voll., Milano, Il Giornale, 2003; ILARI, Virgilio, Storia del servizio militare in Italia, Roma, Ce.Mi.S.S.Riv.Mil., 1991. Good accounts about the Italian Corps are: Air Force, LODI, Angelo, Il periodo pionieristico dellAeronautica Militare Italiana: 1884 1915, Roma, Rivista Aeronautica, 1962; GENTILE, Rodolfo, Storia dellAeronautica dalle origini ai giorni nostri, Firenze, Scuola di Guerra Aerea, 1967; LIOY, Vincenzo, Cinquantennio dellAviazione italiana, Roma, Rivista Aeronautica, 1959; VALLE, Giuseppe, Uomini nei cieli storia dellAeronautica italiana, Roma, Centro Editoriale Nazionale, 1958; Armies of the Ancient States, ALES, Stefano, Le regie truppe sarde 17731814, Roma, USSME,1989; ALES, Stefano, LArmata Sarda della Restaurazione 18141831, Roma, USSME, 1987; ALES, Stefano, LArmata Sarda e le riforme albertine 1831 1842, Roma, USSME 1987; BOERI, Giancarlo CROCIANI, Piero, Lesercito borbonico dal 1789 al 1815, Roma, USSME, 1989; BOERI, Giancarlo CROCIANI, Piero, Lesercito borbonico dal 1815 al 1830, Roma, USSME, 1995; BOERI, Giancarlo CROCIANI, Piero, Lesercito borbonico dal 1830 al 1861, 2 tomes, Roma, USSME, 1997; CESARI, Cesare, Milizie estensi (18141859), in Memorie ` Storiche Militari, Citta di Castello, USSMRE, 1914. CONCINA, Ennio, Le trionfanti armate venete, Venezia, Filippi, 1972; DA MOSTO, Andrea, Milizie dello Stato Romano, 16001797, in Memorie Storiche
Bibliography
237
Militari, Roma, Vol. X, 1914; DE CONSOLI, Claudio, Al soldo del duca: lamministrazione delle armate sabaude (15601630), Torino, Paravia, 1999; GIACOMONE PIANA, Paolo DELLEPIANE, Riccardo, Militarium fonti archivistiche e bibliografia per la storia militare della Repubblica di Genova (15281797), della Repubblica Ligure (17971805) e della Liguria napoleonica (18051814), Genova, Brigati, 2004; MUGNAI, Bruno, Soldati e milizie lucchesi dellOttocento (1799 1847), Roma, USSME, 2005; PRELLI, Alberto, Lesercito veneto nel primo 600, Venezia, Filippi, 1993; ZANNONI, Mario FIORENTINO, Massimo, Le Reali Truppe Parmensi. Da Carlo III a Luisa Maria di Borbone: 18491859, Parma, Albertelli, 1984; Italian Army, ALES, Stefano, DallArmata Sarda allEsercito Italiano 18431861, Roma, USSME, 1990; ASCOLI, Massimo, La Guardia alla Frontiera, Roma, USSME, 2003; AUDITORE, Amedeo, Il segno crociato del bene, Roma, Au. De., 1956; BECHI LUSERNA, Alberto CACCIA DOMINIONI, Paolo, I ragazzi della Folgore, Milano, Longanesi, 1970; Carabinieri, C.do Gen.le., I Carabinieri 18141980, Roma, Edizioni del Comando Generale dellArma dei Carabinieri, 1980; CEVA, Lucio, Le Forze Armate, Torino, UTET, 1981; Cronaca e storia del Corpo dei Bersaglieri, Torino, Daniela Piazza, 1986; GenioTrasmissioni, Roma, Rivista Militare, 1980; GUERRINI, Domenico, I Granatieri di Sardegna 1659 1900, Roma, Comando Divisione Granatieri, 1962; Il Corpo di Commissariato dellEsercito, Roma, Rivista Militare, 1990; ILARI, Virgilio CARBONE, Flavio, Elementi storici dellOrdine Militare dItalia, Roma, Gruppo Decorati dellOrdine Militare dItalia, 2003; MECCARIELLO, Pierpaolo, Storia della Guardia di Fi` nanza, Firenze, Le Monnier, 2003; MONTu, Cesare Maria, Storia dellArtiglieria Italiana, Roma, tipografia dArtiglieria e Genio, 1934; TEODORANI, Vanni, Milizia Volontaria Armata di popolo, Roma, Rivista Romana, 1961; VIAZZI, Luciano, Gli Alpini, Roma, Ciarrapico, 1978; Navies, LO BASSO, Luca, Uomini da remo ` galee e galeotti nel Mediterraneo in eta moderna, Milano, Selene Edizioni, 2004; GUARNIERI, Gino, I Cavalieri di Santo Stefano, Pisa, NistriLischi, 1960; NANI MOCENIGO, Mario, Storia della Marina veneziana, da Lepanto alla caduta della Repubblica, Roma, Ufficio Storico della Regia Marina, (Since now USSRM), 1935; CANOSA, Romano, Storia del Mediterraneo nel Seicento, Roma, Sapere, 1997; RADOGNA, Lamberto, Storia della Marina Militare delle Due Sicilie 17341860, Milano, Mursia, 1978; RANDACCIO, C., Storia delle Marine militari italiane dal 1750 al 1860, Forzani & Co., Roma, 1886; Lista di tutti i bastimenti della marina dellex-reame delle Due Sicilie costruiti o acquistati dallanno 1779 , epoca del suo incremento, sino allaprile del 1815, su Rivista Marittima, anno XII, fascicolo I, Roma, Cotta & comp. Tipografi del Senato del Regno, 1878; Italian Navy, GABRIELE, MarianoFRIZ, Giuliano, La flotta come strumento di politica nei primi decenni dello stato unitario italiano 18611881, Roma, USSMM, 1973; FULVI, Luigi MARCON, Tullio MIOZZI, Ottorino, Le fanterie di Marina italiane, Roma, Ufficio Storico Marina Militare (since now USSMM), 1988; Il Corpo di Commissariato Militare Marittimo 18762001, Roma, Rivista Marittima, 2001 Useful texts in English concerning the world global situation I used are: PAR-
238 Bibliography
KER, Geoffrey, The grand strategy of Philip II, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1998 and KENNEDY, Paul, The rise and fall of the great powers economic change and military conflict from 1500 to 2000, New York, Random House, 1988. All the aforesaid texts are useful for the military history of the whole sixteenth and the very early seventeenth century. For what concerns the seventeenth century: about the Thirty Years War, any good biography of Cardinal Richelieu may be useful. I used mostly BURCKARDT, Karl, Richelieu, Torino, Einaudi, 1945; As a general overview of the War, WEDGWOOD, C.V., The Thirty Years War, London 1944, italian translation as La guerra dei TrentAnni, Milano, Mondadori, 1995; As a general overview of Italy in that period, a part my Gli Italiani in Armi there are only: PAOLETTI, Ciro, Il Corpo di spedizione napoletano in Brasile, su Panoplia, year IX, n. 33, 1998; PAOLETTI, Ciro, LItalia e la Guerra dei Trentanni, in Studi Storico-Militari 1997, Roma, USSME, 2000; PAOLETTI, Ciro, La successione di Mantova: 1628 1630, su Panoplia, Anno IX, n. 34, 1998; PAOLETTI, Ciro, Principisti e Madamisti, su Panoplia, Anno VIII, n. 31/32, 1997; PAOLETTI, Ciro, La frontiera padana dello Stato pontificio nel secolo XVII, in Frontiere e fortificazioni di frontiera, Firenze, EDIFIR, 2001; the best text about Italian officers in Imperial service is THIRIET, Jean Michel, Gli ufficiali italiani al servizio degli ` Asburgo durante la guerra dei Trentanni: identita e integrazione di una aristocrazia ` militare, in Quaderni della Societa Italiana di Storia Militare 19961997, Napoli, ` ESI, 2001; CAPPONI, Niccolo, Le palle di Marte: Military Strategy and Diplomacy in the Grand Duchy of Tuscany under Ferdinand II deMedici (16211670), in Journal of Military History, Vol. 68. n. 4, oct. 2004; PAOLETTI, Ciro, La prima guerra di Castro (16401644), su Rivista Marittima, n.4, 1998; Coeval accounts: SIRI, Vittorio, Del Mercurio, overo Historia dei correnti tempi, Cuneo, 1642. Other seventeenth-century wars include: Candia War; The basic work about the Ottoman army is MUGNAI, Bruno, Lesercito ottomano da Candia a Passarowitz (1645 1718), 2 vols., Venezia, Filippi, 1998; the history of the Venitian Navy by NANI MOCENIGO, Mario, Storia della Marina veneziana, da Lepanto alla caduta della Repubblica, Roma, USSMRM, 1935 is still the best printed source. I used many coeval-printed relations about the main battles; Piedmontese-Genoese War, The only existing printed work is Carlo Emanuele II e la guerra del Piemonte contro Genova nellanno 1672, in Ministero della Guerra Comando del Corpo di Stato Maggiore, Bollettino dellUfficio Storico, Roma, CCSM, 1933; Uprising of Messina, Coeval sources as the ANONYMOUS, Relazione di Messina, s. i., but ` July 1674, and SAITTA, Antonio, Messina antispagnola, Messina, Niccolo Giannotta Editore, 1974. The late seventeenth and first half of the eighteenth century: for a general overview, one needs a good biography of Louis XIV in English I used BLUCHE, Francois, Louis XIV, New York, Franklin Watts, 1999 and something about military evolution and increasing British power. I used: WHEELER, James Scott, The making of a world power: war and the military revolution in seventeenth century England, Phoenix Mill, Sutton, 1999; BLACK, Jeremy, Britain as a military power
Bibliography
239
16881815, London, UCL, 1999. About The War of the Holy League or the First Morea War and the Second Morea War, which other unconsidered wars, the most important works are: CACCAMO, Domenico, Venezia e la Lega Santa. Disimpegno in Italia ed espansione nel Levante (16821686), in Atti e memorie ` ` della Societa Dalmata di Storia patria, Vol. XII, N.S. I, Roma, Societa Dalmata di Storia patria, 1987; CASSELS, Lavender, The struggle for the ottoman empire 1717 1740, London, Murray, 1966; NANI MOCENIGO, Mario, Storia della Marina veneziana, da Lepanto alla caduta della Repubblica, Roma, Ufficio Storico della Regia Marina, 1935; PAOLETTI, Ciro, La prima guerra di Morea 16841699, su Rivista Italiana Difesa, Anno XV, n. 12, December 1997; PAOLETTI, Ciro, Il principe Eugenio di Savoia, Roma, USSME, 2001. This last is one of the books concerning the period between 1688 and 1748. It is useful along with some other works for this and the following wars, that is to say: CARUTTI, Domenico, Storia del regno di Vittorio Amedeo II, Firenze, Le Monnier, 1863; STORRS, Christopher, War, diplomacy and the rise of Savoy, 16901720, London, Cambridge University Press, 1999; SYMCOX, Charles, Vittorio Amedeo II e lassolutismo sabaudo 1675 1730, Torino, SEI, 1989; VOLTAIRE, Le siecle de Louis XIV, Paris, Stoupe, 1792; WILLIAMS, Henry Noel, A rose of Savoy, London, Methuen & co., 1910; or this and the Spanish Succession; ANONYMOUS (possibly Guido FERRARI) Vita e campeggiamenti del Serenissimo Principe Francesco Eugenio di Savoja, supremo comandante degli eserciti Cesarei, e dellImpero, Napoli, appresso Domenico Lanciano, 1754, for the Nine Years War or the War of the Greta Alliance (or of the League of Augsburg), the next War of the Spanish Succession, the 1718 Savoy-Spanish war in Sicily and the following Polish Succession. MOSCATI, Ruggero, Direttive della politica estera sabauda da Vittorio Amedeo II a Carlo Emanuele III, Milano, ISPI, 1941 is about diplomatical aspects till 1748, that is to say till the end of the Austrian Succession. BAUDRILLART, Alfred, Philippe V et la cour dEspagne, 5 vols., Paris, 18901901 covers the period of the three Succession wars and the 1718 war in Sicily. Specific works on the Great Alliance or the Nine Years War include: AA.VV., La guerra della Lega di Augusta fino alla battaglia di Orbassano, Torino, Accademia di San Marciano, 1993; DE RIENCOURT, Histoire de Louis XIV, Paris, Barbin, 1695; ROWLANDS, Guy, Louis XIV, Vittorio Amedeo II and French Military Failure in Italy, 168996, su English Historical Review, Oxford University Press, June 2000. Specific works on the Spanish Succession are a problem. In fact, practically nothing exists in English about the Spanish Succession in Italy. For a general overview see: BARNETT, Correlli, The first Churchill: Marlborough soldier and statesman, New York, G. Putnams sons, 1974; BLACK, Jeremy, Britain as a military power 16881815, London, UCL, 1999; CHURCHILL, Winston Spencer, Marlborough,Verona, Mondadori, 1973; KAMEN, Henry, Philip V of Spain, New York London, Yale University Press, 2001. Anyway, a part the previously mentioned ones, the most useful Italian books I used are: ASSUM, Clemente, Lassedio e la battaglia di Torino (1706), Torino, Giani, 1926; ILARI, VirgilioBoeri, Gian CarloPAOLETTI, Ciro, Tra i Borboni e gli Asburgo: le armate terrestri e navali
240 Bibliography
italiane nelle guerre del primo Settecento (17011732), Ancona, Nuove Ricerche, 1996; MANNO, Antonio, (a cura di), Relazione e documenti sullassedio di Torino nel 1706, estratto da Miscellanea di Storia Italiana, Torino, Regia Deputazione di Storia Patria, Tomo XVII, 2 della serie, F.lli Bocca, 1878, pagg. 539548; MUGNAI, Bruno, La guerra di Comacchio: 1708, in Studi Storico-militari 1999, Roma, USSME, 2000; NICOLINI, Fausto, LEuropa durante la guerra di successione di Spagna, 3 Vols, Regia Deputazione Napoletana di Storia Patria, Napoli, 1937 1939; PAOLETTI, Ciro, Errori dimpostazione storiografica e nuova valutazione dellassedio di Tolone e della campagna sabauda in Provenza del 1707, in Studi storicomilitari 2001, Roma, USSME, 2004; PAOLETTI, Ciro, Logistica e assedi delle guerre del settecento, su Panoplia, n. 2728, anno VII, August - December 1996; Regia Deputazione per gli Studi di Storia Patria per le antiche provincie e la Lombardia, Le campagne di guerra in Piemonte (17031708) e lassedio di Torino (1706) studi, documenti, illustrazioni, Torino, F.lli Bocca librai di S.M., 1912; VICO, Giambattista, La congiura dei principi napoletani del 1701, Napoli, IEM, 1971. About the 1718 War in Sicily, see CASTAGNOLI, Pietro, Il cardinale Giulio Alberoni, 3 voll., Roma, Ferrari, 1929; DI VITTORIO, Antonio, Gli Austriaci e il Regno di Napoli, 17071734, Napoli, Giannini, 1969; PAOLETTI, Ciro, La guerra ispano-austrosabauda in Sicilia del 1718, su Rivista Italiana Difesa, anno XXI, n 6, June 2003; ROSSI, Giovanni Felice, Cento studi sul Cardinale Alberoni, 4 Vols, Piacenza, Collegio Alberoni, 1978. About the Polish and Austrian Successions, the best available coeval source is the Anonymous made yearly history, printed in Venice and covering the period from 1730 till the end of the Napoleonic Era. The first volume concerning this period is ANOYNMOUS, La storia dellanno 173233, Amsterdam, (Venice), Pitteri, 1735; following volumes are about the history of the years 17341749, one each year; then one can use ILARI, Virgilio BOERI, Gian CarloPAOLETTI, Ciro, La corona di Lombardia: guerre ed eserciti nellItalia del medio Settecento (17331763), Ancona, Nuove Ricerche, 1997; BONAMICI, Castruccio, De Bello Italico, Augusta Vindelicorum (Augusburg), 1764; BONAMICI, Castruccio, De rebus ad Velitras gestis, Augusta Vindelicorum, 1764; BROGLIE, Jacques Victor Albert duc de, La paix dAix-la-Chapelle, Calmann-Levy, Paris, 1895; La battaglia dellAssietta, dattiloscritto originale in AUSSME, L 3, 11, Lavori svolti, Piemonte; LOGEROT, Ferdinando, Memorie storiche del Regno delle Due Sicilie, Soc. Napoletana di Storia Patria, Ms. XXVI-C 6; MINUTOLI, Daniele, Relation des Campagnes faites par S.M. et par ses Generaux avec des Corps Separes dans les annees 1742 et 1748, 5 manuscript Vols. and 2 topographical atlas, Torino, Biblioteca Reale, M.S. Mil. 111; PAOLETTI, Ciro, La battaglia di Casteldelfino, su Rivista Storica, Anno VIII, n. 7, 1995; PAOLETTI, Ciro, La battaglia di Velletri del 1744, a paper presented to the conference for the 250th of the battle of Velletri, Velletri, Novembre 17th 1994. About the Corsican revolt, the best available coeval source is the aforesaid Anonymous yearly history, printed in Venice and covering the period since 1730 till 1769. The last published work about this issue in miltary history is PAOLETTI, Ciro, La Repub-
Bibliography
241
blica di Genova e linsurrezione corsa (17301769), on Bollettino darchivio dellUfficio Storico della Marina Militare, year XVII, December 2003. Napoleonic Era The minimum needed is: CUOCO, Vincenzo, Saggio Storico sulla Rivoluzione di Napoli del 1799, Napoli, Procaccini, 1995; FERRERO, Guglielmo, Avventura: Bonaparte in Italia (17961797, Milano, Corbaccio, 1996; ILARI, Virgilio CROCIANI, Piero PAOLETTI, Ciro, La Guerra delle Alpi (17921796), Roma, USSME, 2000; ILARI, Virgilio CROCIANI, Piero PAOLETTI, Ciro, Storia militare dellItalia giacobina, (17961802), Roma, USSME, 2001. CROCIANI, Piero ILARI, Virgilio PAOLETTI, Ciro, Storia militare del Regno Italico (1802 1814), Vol 1 tomi I e II, Vol 2, Roma, USSME, 2004; CAPPELLO, Girolamo, ` Gli Italiani in Russia nel 1812, Citta di Castello, Comando del Corpo di Stato Maggiore del Regio EsercitoUfficio Storico, Memorie Storiche Militari, Vol. VII, Fascicolo IV del 1912, 1912; COLLETTA, Pietro, Storia del reame di Napoli, Milano, Casini, 1989; CONTI, Giuseppe, Firenze dopo i Medici, Firenze, Marzocco, 1984; COOPER, Duff, Talleyrand,Verona, Mondadori, 1974; FERRARI, G. ` GIACCHI, N., Gli Italiani in Germania nel 1813, Citta di Castello, C.do del Corpo di Stato Maggiore del Regio EsercitoUfficio Storico, 1914; GATES, David, The napoleonic wars 18031815, New York, Oxford University Press, 1997; SCHNEID, Frederick C., Soldiers of Napoleon Kingdom of Italy, Boulder. Westview Press, 1995; SCHNEID, Frederick, Napoleons Italian campaign 18051815, Westport, Praeger, 2002; SCHNEID, Frederick C., Napoleons conquest of Europe: the War of the Third Coalition, Westport, Praeger, 2005. Risorgimento: 18141870 CAVOUR, Camillo BENSO conte di, Epistolario, 14 Voll., Firenze, Olschki, 19901994; CAVOUR Camillo BENSO conte di, Diari (18331856), 2 Vols., Roma, IPZS, 1991; GARIBALDI, Giuseppe, Memorie, Torino, Einaudi, 1975; PAOLETTI, Ciro, Latin America Warfare and Garibaldis tactics, in Acta of the XXIV Annual Conference of the International Commission for Militry History, Lisbon, 1998; SACERDOTE, Gustavo, La vita di Giuseppe Garibaldi, Milano, Rizzoli, 1933; ALBERINI, Paolo (edited by), Adriatico 1848: ricerca e significato della contrapposizione marittima, Acta of the conference held in Venice on Septem` ber 25th 1998, Roma, CISM, 1999; GIACCHI Nicolo, La campagna del 1849 nellAlta Italia, Roma, USSMRE, 1928; JAEGER, Pier Giusto, Le mura di Sebastopoli, Milano, Mondadori, 1991; MANFREDI, Cristoforo, La spedizione sarda in Crimea nel 185556, Roma, USSME, 1956; ADEMOLLO, Amedeo, Lallagamento del Vercellese nellaprile 1859, in Studi storico-militari 2002, Roma, USSME, 2004; CEVA, Lucio, Ministro e Capo di Stato Maggiore, on Nuova Antologia, year 121, fasc. 2160, October December 1986; CEVA, Lucio, Monarchia e militari dal Risorgimento alla Grande Guerra (18481915), su Nuova Antologia, year 131, fasc. 2197, January March 1996; COGNASSO, Francesco, Vittorio Emanuele II, Torino, UTET, 1942; GALLINO, Crescenzio, La marina sarda durante la guerra dindipendenza italiana del 1859, su Rivista marittima, n. 4, aprile 1877; MAS-
242 Bibliography
SARI, Giuseppe, Vittorio Emanuele II, Milano, Ediz. A. Barion, 1935; PINTO, Paolo, Vittorio Emanuele II, Milano, Mondadori, 1997; VISCONTI-VENOSTA, ` Emilio, Ricordi di gioventu, Milano, BUR, 1959; ABBA, Giuseppe Cesare, Da ` Quarto al Volturno, Firenze, Casini, 1966; BUTTa, Giuseppe, Viaggio da Boccadifalco a Gaeta, Milano, Bompiani, 1985; JAEGER, Pier Giusto, Francesco II di Borbone ultimo re di Napoli, Milano, Mondadori, 1982; CEVA, Lucio, Ministro e Capo di Stato Maggiore, su Nuova Antologia, year 121, fasc. 2160, October December 1986; The Kingdom of Italy On Foreign interventions and Colonial policy 18691914 and 191939, except the Great War, see, apart from the general accounts like my Gli Italiani in armi and Lucio CEVAs Le Forze Armate, BANDINI, Franco, Gli Italiani in Africa, Milano, Longanesi, 1971; BOURELLY, Giuseppe, La battaglia di Abba Garima, Milano, Cogliati, 1901; GABRIELE, Mariano FRIZ, Giuliano, La politica navale italiana dal 1885 al 1915, Roma, USSMM,1982; MAGNANI, Enrico, Il mantenimento della pace dal XIX al XXI secolo, Roma, Rivista Marittima, 1998; MAZZETTI, Massimo, LEsercito Italiano nella Triplice Alleanza aspetti della politica estera 18701914, Napoli, ESI, 1980; DE COURTEN, LudovicaSARGERI, Giovanni, Le Regie Truppe in Estremo Oriente 19001901, Roma, USSME, 2005; PAOLETTI, Ciro, La Marina italiana in Estremo Oriente 18662000, Roma, Ufficio Storico della Marina, 2000; Paoletti, Ciro, La Marina italiana nelle operazioni di pace 18232004, Roma, Ufficio Storico della Marina, 2005 (basically useful also for the interwar period interventions and for peacekeeping operations after Wordl War II); MALTESE, Paolo, La terra promessa, Cles, Mondadori, 1976; RAMOINO, Pierpaolo, Le forze armate italiane alla vigilia della guerra di Libia, su Analisi Difesa, anno IV, n. 35.0, June 2003; LEVA, Fausto, Storia delle campagne oceaniche della Regia Marina, 4 vols., Roma, USSMM, 1992; MOLA, Aldo Alessandro, Giolitti: lo statista della nuova Italia, Cles, Mondadori, 2003; PASQUALINI, Maria Gabriella, Missioni dei Carabinieri allestero 19362001, Roma, Ente Editoriale per lArma dei Carabinieri, 2002. On the Great War and first afterwar period, it is basic MINISTERO DELLA DIFESA STATO MAGGIORE DELLESERCITO, Lesercito italiano nella Grande Guerra (19151918),Roma, USSME, 1983, which is the Italian official relation about the Great War. Then, apart the general accounts like my Gli Italiani in armi and CEVAs Le Forze Armate, see: ALBERTI, Adriano, Limportanza dellazione militare italiana le cause militari di Caporetto. Roma, USSME, 2004; BANDINI, Franco, Il Piave mormorava, Milano, Longanesi, 1968; CACCIA DOMINIONI, Paolo, 19151919, Treviso, Longanesi, 1979; FALDELLA, Emilio, La grande guerra, 2 vols., Milano, Longanesi, 1978; MONTANARI, Mario, Le truppe italiane in Albania 191420, 1939, Roma, USSME, 1978; GERRA, Ferdinando, Limpresa di Fiume, Milano, Longanesi, 1978. On the 19191939 period, a part the general accounts like my Gli Italiani in armi, CEVAs Le Forze Armate and BANDINIs Gli Italiani in Africa, one can see about Libya: GRAZIANI, Rodolfo, Cirenaica pacificata, Mondadori, Milano, 1934 and Verso il Fezzan, Tripoli, Cacopardo, 1930; about Ethiopia 193539: BOTTAI, Giuseppe,
Bibliography
243
Diario 19351944, Milano, Rizzoli, 1982; LONGO, Luigi Emilio, La Campagna Italo-Etiopica (19351936), 2 tomes, Roma, USSME, 2005; PIGNATELLI, Luigi, La guerra dei sette mesi, Milano, Longanesi, 1972; PEDRIALI, Ferdinando, LAeronautica italiana nelle guerre coloniali Africa Orientale Italiana 193640: dalla proclamazione dellimpero alla Seconda Guerra Mondiale, Roma, USSMA, 2000; about the Spanish Civil War: ATTANASIO, Sandro, Gli Italiani e la guerra di Spagna, Milano, Mursia, 1974; CEVA, Lucio, Le Forze Armate, Torino, UTET, 1981; BARGONI, Franco, Limpegno navale italiano durante la Guerra civile Spagnola (19361939), Roma, Ufficio Storico della Marina, 1998; about Albania there is only the aforesaid book by MONTANARI, Le truppe italiane in Albania etc and PAOLETTI, Ciro, Loperazione Oltremare Tirana, on Storia Militare, n.23, agosto 1995, the only recently (!) printed work on this topic. About World War II 193945: apart the general accounts like my Gli Italiani in armi and CEVAs Le Forze Armate, see for: France, AZEAU, Henri, La guerra dimenticata storia dei quattordici giorni di battaglia tra italiani e francesi nel giugno 1940, Verona, Mondadori, 1969; DE LORENZIS, Ugo, Dal primo allultimo giorno, Milano, Longanesi, 1971 (also relevant for Yugoslavia, Russia, Corsica and Italy); GALLINARI, Vincenzo, Le operazioni del giugno 1940 sulle Alpi Occidentali, Roma, USSME 1981; Northern Africa, BARNETT, Correlli, I generali del deserto, Milano, Longanesi, 1964; CACCIA DOMINIONI, Paolo, El Alamein 19331962, Milano, Longanesi,1964; DI GIAMBARTOLOMEI, Aldo, Il Servizio Informazioni Militare italiano dalla sua costituzione alla Seconda Guerra Mondiale, Roma, SMDSIFAR, 1957; MONTANARI, Mario, Le operazioni in Africa Settentrionale, 4 vols, Roma, USSME, 19932000; Eastern Africa: LEONE, U., La guerra in Africa Orientale, Roma, USSME, 1971; LOFFREDO, Renato, Cheren (31 gennaio-27 marzo 1941), Milano, Longanesi, 1973; Yugoslavia, LOI, Salvatore, Le operazioni ` delle unita italiane in Jugoslavia, Roma, USSME, 1978; Greece, CECOVINI, Manlio, Ponte Perati: la Julia in Grecia, Milano, Longanesi, 1973; CERVI, Mario, Storia della Guerra di Grecia, Verona, Mondadori, 1969; MONTANARI, Mario, LEsercito Italiano nella Campagna di Grecia, 3 vols, Roma, USSME, 1980; Museo Storico dei Granatieri, I Granatieri del 3 Reggimento nella guerra contro la Grecia, Roma, s.i.,1943; Russia, CARLONI, Mario, La campagna di Russia, Milano, Longanesi, 1970; CORRADI, Egisto, La ritirata di Russia, Milano, Longanesi, 1968; Italy, BROOKE, Alan Francis, War Diaries 19391945, London, Phoenix Press, 2002; BARTOLI, Domenico, La fine della Monarchia, Milano, Mondadori, 1966; CAPPELLANO, Filippo ORLANDO, Salvatore, LEsercito Italiano dallarmistizio alla Guerra di Liberazione: 8 settembre 1943 25 aprile 1945, Roma, USSME, 2005; Commissione Italiana di Storia Militare, La partecipazione delle Forze Armate alla Guerra di Liberazione e di Resistenza: 8 settembre 1943 8 maggio 1945, Roma, CISM, 2003; LUALDI, Aldo, Nudi alla meta, Milano, Longanesi, 1970; MECCARIELLO, Pierpaolo, In Nome dello Statole forze militari di polizia in Italia 19431945, Roma, USSME, Lazione dello Stato Maggiore Generale per lo sviluppo del movimento di Liberazione, Roma, USSME, 1975; Social Republic, PANSA, Giampaolo, Il gladio e lalloro, Milano, Mondadori, 1991; SAXON, Timo-
244 Bibliography
thy D., Hidden treasure: the Italian war economys contribution to the German War effort (19431945), in Acta of the XXX Conference of the International Commission of Military History, Rabat, Commission Marocaine dHistoire Militaire, 2005. The Italian Republic, 19462006 Apart the general accounts like my Gli Italiani in armi (useful up to 2000) and CEVAs Le Forze Armate, (useful till 1980) one can see only: Commissione Italiana di Storia Militare, LItalia nel dopoguerra LItalia nel nuovo quadro internazionale: la ripresa (19471956), Roma, CISM, 2000; DI CAPUA, Giovanni, Come lItalia ` ader al Patto atlantico, Roma, EBE, 1971. In fact, a part the aforesaid books, there are practically no good histories, or no histories at all, of the Italian armed forces from 1946 to 2006, and one must seek to collect a great number of articles of interviews of top ranks and essays. Most important seem to be: about Policy, PASTORELLI, Pietro, Lammissione dellItalia allONU in, Commissione Italiana di Storia Militare, LItalia nel dopoguerra LItalia nel nuovo quadro internazionale: la ripresa (19471956), Roma, CISM, 2000; SALIMBENI, Fulvio, Il confine orientale, in Mola, Aldo Alessandro (a cura di), Il marchesato di Saluzzo da Stato di confine a confine di Stato a Europa, atti del convegno per il IV centenario della pace di Lione, Saluzzo, 30 novembre -1 dicembre 2001, Foggia, Bastogi, 2003; FRESCOBALDI, Dino, Quando lItalia ` stata determinante, su Nuova Antologia, e year 134, fasc. 2209, October December 1986; LAGORIO Lelio, Euromissili e dissuasione: le motivazioni tecnico-operative della scelta di Comiso, su Quadrante, n. 14/15, sept. 1981; about Armed Forces, their structure and personnel, Cambia il vertice di SME, su Rivista Italiana Difesa, anno XXI, n. 9, sett. 2003; Decreto legislativo 31 gennaio 2000, n. 24 Norme in materia di reclutamento, stato giuridico avanzamento del personale militare femminile; Decreto Ministeriale 4 aprile 2000, n. ` 114 Regolamento recante norme in materia di accertamento dellidoneita al servizio militare; Decreto del Presidente della Repubblica 15 giugno 1965, n. 1431 Documenti caratteristici degli ufficiali, dei sottufficiali e dei militari di truppa dellEsercito, della Marina e dellAeronautica; Decreto del Presidente della Repubblica 29 dicembre 1973, n. 1092 Approvazione del testo unico delle norme sul trattamento di quiescenza dei dipendenti civili e militari dello Stato; Decreto legislativo 30 dicembre 1997, n. 498 Modifiche alla normativa concernente la posizione di ausiliaria del personale militare, a norma dellarticolo 1, commi 97, lettera g), e 99, della legge 23 dicembre 1996, n. 662; Legge 10 aprile 1954, n. 113 Stato degli Ufficiali dellEsercito, della Marina e dellAeronautica; Legge 12 novembre 1955, n. 1137 Avanzamento degli Ufficiali dellEsercito, della Marina e dellAeronautica; Legge 27 dicembre 1990, n. 404 Nuove norme in materia di avanzamento degli ufficiali e sottufficiali delle Forze Armate e del Corpo della Guardia di Finanza; Legge 31 luglio 1954, n. 599 Stato dei sottufficiali dellEsercito, della Marina e dellAeronautica; Legge 5 novembre 1962, n. 1695 Documenti caratteristici degli ufficiali, dei sottufficiali e dei militari di truppa dellEsercito, della Marina, dellAeronautica e della Guardia di Finanza; LEsercito, in AA VV, Elementi di diritto amministrativo militare, Quaderni della Rassegna dellArma dei Carabinieri, Roma, Rassegna dellArma dei Carabinieri, 2001, pag. 65. VAGNONI, Salvatore, Lunificazione e il riordinamento dei ruoli normali, speciali
Bibliography
245
e di complemento degli ufficiali dellesercito, della marina e dellaeronautica, su Quadrante, n. 17/18 e 19/20, ott. e nov. 1980. VAGNONI, Salvatore, Unificazione e riordinamento dei ruoli normali, speciali e di complemento degli ufficiali dellesercito, della marina e dellaeronautica, su Quadrante, n. 21/22, dic. 1982; ILARI, Virgilio, Storia del servizio militare in Italia, Roma, Ce.Mi.S.S. Rivista Militare, 1991; CERVONI, Francesco, Lesercito Italiano alle soglie del XXI secolo, su Rivista militare, n 5, sett/ott. 1999; CAMPAGNA, Luigi, La logistica dei sistemi informativi e di Comando e Controllo, su Rivista Militare, anno CXLVI, n. 1, gennaiofebbraio 2002; CANINO Goffredo, Esercito Italiano ed eserciti europei: i nuovi modelli di difesa a confronto, su UNUCI, n. 10, ott.1993; CORCIONE, Domenico, Il nuovo modello di difesa 1993, su UNUCI, n. 9, sett.1993; VOZZA, Nicola, Nuovi lineamenti dellOrganizzazione Logistica dellEsercito, su Rivista Militare, n.3, 1993; ZUCARO, Domenico, La nuova dottrina dellEsercito, su Rivista Militare, n 5 sett/ott. 1999; about Budget and planning, Esercitoconsuntivo 1985; programmazione 1986, quaderno 1986 della Rivista Militare; Esercitoconsuntivo 1986; programmazione 1987, quaderno 1987 della Rivista Militare; Esercitoconsuntivo 1987; programmazione 1988, quaderno 1988 della Rivista Militare; Esercito duemila, su UNUCI, n. 11/12 nov. dic. 1997; La Difesa: libro bianco 2002 sintesi, su UNUCI, n. 5/6, maggio/giugno 2002; SCAGLIUSI, Pietro, Il libro bianco della Difesa, su Rivista Marittima, agosto-settembre, 2002, pag. 117; La Difesa: libro bianco 2002 sintesi, su UNUCI, n. 5/6, maggio/giugno 2002; NATIVI, Andrea, Bilancio Difesa 98: tra tagli e speranze, su Rivista Italiana Difesa, n. 12, 1997; Obiettivi dellEsercito per il 1988, Roma, Stato Maggiore dellEsercito, 1987; Strategy, geopolitics, and tasks, LURAGHI, Raimondo, The Mediterranean, Italy and NATO, in Military conflicts and 20th century geopolitics Acta of the XXV annual conference of the International Commission for Military History, Bruxelles, 2000; RAMOINO, Pier Paolo, Une vision geopolitique italienne: La Mediterranee elargie, in Military conflicts and 20th century geopolitics Acta of the XXVII annual conference of the International Commission for Military History Athens August 19th-25th 2001, Athens, Greek Commission for Military History, 2002; RA MOINO, Pierpaolo, LOTAN et la Marine Italienne dans la Mediterranee des annees Cinquante, in Acta of the XXV annual conference of the International Commission for Military History, Bruxelles, 2000; ARPINO, Mario, Concetto Strategico del Capo di Stato Maggiore della Difesa, su Informazioni della Difesa, anno XX, n. 12001; CERVONI, Francesco, La trasformazione dellEsercito nel nuovo quadro geostrategico, su UNUCI, n 9/10, sett./ott. 2000.CORCIONE, Domenico, La nuova situazione geostrategica: il modello di difesa italiano, su Informazioni della Difesa, n.2, 1992; OTTOGALLI, Gianfranco, Il ruolo delle forze terrestri nei moderni scenari, su Rivista Militare, anno CXLVII, n. 4, luglio-agosto, 2003; VIESTI, Antonio, Compiti, dottrina e strutture dellEsercito, su Rivista Militare, n.5, 1987. Italian involvement in Peacekeeping There are four main printed sources containing all the needed general information about all the peacekeeping operations that included Italian personnel. They are Enrico MAGNANIs Oltremare Le missioni dellEsercito Italiano allestero,
246 Bibliography
Roma, SME, 1992 and Il mantenimento della pace dal XIX al XXI secolo, Roma, Rivista Marittima, 1998; and my Gli Italiani in armi cinque secoli di storia militare nazionale 14942000, Roma, USSME, 2001 and, about only the Navy-involving operations, my La Marina italiana nelle operazioni di pace 1823 2004, Roma, USSMM, 2005. They include all the basic information about Italian involvement in Afghanistan 19891990 and 200105 (IsafEnduring Freedom Active Endeavour), Albania (all the operations), Bosnia and Kosovo (former Yugoslavia, IFOR-SFOR and JOINT FORGE JOINT GUARDIAN, Eufor-Althea, KFOR); Cambodia; Cashmir; Congo 1960; Congo Kinshasa Eupol; Corea; East Timor; El Salvador; Erithrea; Ethiopia; Hebron Palestine (UNTSO); India-Pakistan (UNMOGIP); lraq; Ivory Coast; Kenia (Mountain NUBA); Kurdistan (Airone I and II and Provide Comfort); Kuwait; Lebanon (UNIFILItalair, Libano e Libano 2, Leonte); Macedonia; Malta (military cooperation agreement); Mozambico (Albatros); Namibia (UNTAG); Persian Gulf; Red Sea minesweeping; Romania; Rwanda; Somalia (AFIS, UNOSOM, Ibis, Ibis 2 and United Shield); South Chinese Sea Boat People rescue; Southwestern Sahara (MINURSO); Sudan (Operation Nilo and AMIS II); Tiran Gulf Sinai Sharm el Sheik; Zambia.
ARMIES Austria 4th Army, 143 7th Army, 143 Austro-German 14th Army, 145 Germany 4th Army, 177 6th Army, 177 Hungary 2nd Army, 177 Italy 1st Army, 140, 143, 150, 171, 17882 2nd Army, 140, 145, 146, 148, 175, 187 3rd Army, 140, 144, 145, 146, 161 4th Army, 146, 166, 171 5th Army, 143 6th Army, 18385 7th Army, 188 8th Army, 17678 9th Army, 173, 187 11th Army, 173, 187 Romania 3rd Army, 177 4th Army, 177 United States 7th Army, 18385 United Kingdom 3rd Army, 148 5th Army, 14648 8th Army, 18085, 190, 191
ARMY CORPS Austria V Army Corps, 108 VIII Army Corps, 108 France IV Army Corps, 83 Germany LXXVI Army Corps, 190 Italy I Army Corps, 117, 118 II Army Corps, 117, 118, 147 III Army Corps, 117, 118 IV Army Corps, 111, 112, 118 V Army Corps, 111, 112, 118 VI Army Corps, 118, 144 VII Army Corps, 188 VIII Army Corps, 118 IX Army Corps, 188 XIII Army Corps, 188 XVI Army Corps, 147, 149 XVII Army Corps, 159 XX Army Corps, 182 XXI Army Corps, 181, 182 XXV Army Corps, 173 XXVI Army Corps, 173 XXX Army Corps, 188 XXXI Army Corps, 188 XXXV Army Corps, 176, 177 LI Army Corps, 188
BRIGADES Cacciatori Delle Alpi Brigade, 221 n. 6 Mario Gordini Partisan Brigade, 190 Maiella Partisan Brigade, 190 United Kingdom 22nd Tank Brigade, 180
REGIMENTS France 7th Light Infantry Regiment, 78 17th Light Infantry Regiment, 78 26th Light Infantry Regiment, 78 32nd Light Infantry Regiment, 78 103rd Line Infantry Regiment, 78 111th Line Infantry Regiment, 78 113th Line Infantry Regiment, 78 21st Dragoons Regiment, 78 26th Mounted Chasseurs Regiment, 78 Tiralleurs du Corses, 78 Tiralleurs du Po, 78 1st Zouaves Regiment, 221 n. 8 Italy Piedmont, later Italy Catalano Alfieri Infantry Regiment, 35 La Marina Regiment, 36 Monferrato Infantry Regiment, 35 Nizza Infantry Regiment, 35 Piedmont Infantry Regiment, 35 Regiment of the Guards, 35 Savoy Infantry Regiment, 35, 220 n. 1 (ch. 15)
249
8th Alpini Regiment, 156 11th Bersaglieri Regiment, 134 31st Tank Regiment, 175 Dragoons of Sardinia Regiment, 60 His Highness Dragoons Regiment, 35 Royal Madams Regiment of Dragoons, 35 Savoia Cavalleria Regiment, 231 n. 18 Italy, other states than Piedmont Marquis Clericis Infantry Regiment, 58 Regiment of the Corsicans, 60 Tercio de la Mar Oceano, 36 Tercio Viejo de la Mar de Napoles, 36
BATTALIONS Italy Gruppo Bande Amhara, 231 n. 18 XIII Tank Battalion, 182 CDXXIX Coastal Battalion, 184 NAVY X MAS Flotilla, 188, 189 Task Group 620.01, 212 18th Naval Group, 196 20th Naval Group, 207 26th Italian Naval Group, 210 2nd Naval Squadron, 134 6th Fleet, United States, 200
AIR FORCE Germany X Fliegerkorps, 180 Italy Squadron A, 166 LXI Reconnaissance Group, 176 XXII Hunters Group, 176 Task Group Locusta, 207
Name Index
Personal and organization names, including operations, civil and military services, and military units greater than an army or less than a battalion Abdul Hamid II, sultan, 134 ACIT, 181, 182 Action Party, 232 n. 2 Ademollo, Aldo, 226 n. 5 Aerostatic Regiment, 132 AFIS Amministrazione Fiduciaria Italiana in Somalia, 195 Afrika Korps, 17882 Agello, Francesco, Italian pilot, 157 Airplanes Squadron, 134 Airship Number 1 (1908), 132 Alberoni, Giulio, Italian cardinal, 49 Alexander, Sir Harold, British field marshal, 191 Alfa Romeo, 168 Allenby, Sir Edmond Henry Hynman, British general, 147 Alpine Army Corp, 177 Alpine Troops Command, 207 Alviano, Bartolomeo d, Italian captain, 11 Anjou, House of, 34 Ansaldo, 168, 169 Antonelli, Giacomo, Italian cardinal, 111 Aragon, Ferdinand, king of, 8, 10 Aragona, Alfonso of, king of Naples, 8 Arimondi, Giuseppe, Italian colonel, 127 Armee Coloniale, 126 Armies Group C, 191 Armies Group West, 171 Arnim, Hans Jurgen von, German general, 182 Arpino, Alberto, Italian historian, 222 n. 8 Auchinleck, sir Claude, British general, 180 Augerau, Pierre, French general, 70 Austria, don Juan of , 18, 19 Axis, 170 Badoglio, Pietro, Italian Marshal, 159, 160, 168, 173, 178, 186, 187, 228 n. 18 Baistrocchi, count Federico, Italian general, 158 Balbo, Italo, Italian air marshal, 157, 178, 227 n. 8, 231 n. 22 Balla, Giacomo, painter, 137, 139 Banco di San Giorgio, 4 Baracca, Francesco, Italian pilot and ace, 143 Baratieri, Oreste, Italian general, 127 Barnett, Correlli, British historian, 178 Barras, Paul, viscount de, French director, 65, 66 ` Barsanti, Niccolo, Italian physicist, 132 Bastico, Ettore, Italian general, 165 Battenberg, Edward VII, king of England, 133 Battisti, Cesare, Italian politician, 138, 139 Bava, Eusebio, Sardinian general, 97, 103 Beauharnais, Eugene de, 78, 83, 84 Beauharnais, Hortense de, 95 Beauharnais, Josephine de, 65 Bell, Alexander Graham, American inventor, 220 n. 13 Below, Otto von, German general, 145 Beneventano del Bosco, Ferdinando, Neapolitan major, 110 Bennigsen, August, Russian general, 83 Bentinck, Lord William Cavendish, 80 Benz, Gottlieb, German inventor, 132 Berlusconi, Silvio, Italian premier, 208, 210, 212, 213 Bernadotte, Jean Baptiste, French marshal, later king of Sweden, 81 Bersaglieri, 95, 114, 116, 122, 150, 154
Name Index
Christopher, Warren, US Secretary of State, 208, 209 Cialdini, Enrico, Sardinian and Italian general, 112, 117, 118 Ciampi, Carlo Azeglio, Italian President, 201, 233 n. 2 Ciano, Galeazzo, Italian minister, 163 CIL, 190 Cisalpine Republic, 69 Cispadane Legion, 69 Cispadane Republic, 69 Clarendon, Lord George William Frederick Villiers, count of, 104, 105 Clay, Lucius D., American general, 198 Clemenceau, Georges, French premier, 152 Clinton, British general, 81 Clinton, William, US president, 210, 213 CLN, 190 CLNA, 190 COI, Comando Operativo di Vertice Interforze, 207 Colborne, John, 218 n. 1 Cole, Lowry, 218 n. 1 Collalto, Rambaldo di, Italian general in imperial service, 25, 27 Colli, Italian general, 64 Colonna family, 14 Colonna, Marcantonio, Papal general, 13 ComFoTer, 207 Compagnia deCarabini rinforzati, o de cacciabanditi a cavallo, 60 Conrad von Hotzendorff, Franz, Austro-hun garian field marshal, 133, 135, 139, 143, 146, 148, 149 Cordova, Consalvo de, Spanish Great Captain, 8 Cornaro, Andrea, Venetian Sea Captain General, 32 Cornaro, Giacomo, Venetian general (1694), 37 Corpo Reale Equipaggi, 115 Corridoni, Filippo, Italian politician, 139 Cosmo SkyMed, 208 Credito Italiano banking group, 168 Crispi, Francesco, Italian patriot and premier, 110, 127 Crocco, Gaetano Arturo, Italian colonel, 132 CSIR, 176, 177 CTV Corpo Truppe Volontarie, 16466 Cuniberti, Vittorio, Italian Naval Engineers Corps Director, 131 Cunningham, Alan, British general, 180 Cunningham, Andrew, British admiral, 179 Curtiss, Glenn, American pilot, 149
253
DAmboise, French cardinal, 11 DAnnunzio, Gabriele, Italian poet, 13739, 149, 153 dAzeglio, Massimo Taparelli marquis, Sardinian minister, 95 Da Riva, Jacopo, Venetian admiral, 31 Damas, Roger, Neapolitan general, 73 Dandolo, Italian battleship, 124 ` Dandolo, Nicolo, Venetian commander, 18 Davout, Louis, French Marshal, 83 De Bono, Emilio, Marshall of Italy, 159, 227 n. 8 De Courten, Raffaele, Swiss general in papal service, 112 De Gasperi, Alcide, Italian premier, 198, 199 De Giorgi, Gino, Italian admiral, 196 de La Valette Jean, Great Master of the Order of Malta, 17 Delagrange, Leon, French pilot, 132 della Rocca, count Enrico Morozzo, Sardinian, then Italian general, 103 Del Prete, Carlo, Italian pilot, 157 de Maistre, count Joseph, Sardinian ambassador to Russia, 80, 89 deMedici, Cosimo, 14 deMedici, family, 11, 12, 52 deMedici, Giovanni, Black Bands John, 13 deMedici, Lawrence, called the Magnificent, 39 De Nicola, Enrico, Italian president, 194 de Pinedo, Francesco, Italian general, 156, 157 de Ruyter, Michael, Dutch admiral, 34 ` de Sonnaz dHaberes, Giuseppe Gerbaix, Sardinian general, 103 de Vecchi, Cesare Maria, count di Val Cismon, Italian minister, 227 n. 8 de Vins, Joseph, Austrian general, 64 Diaz, Armando, Marshall of Italy, 146, 148 50, 159 Diedo, Pietro, Venetian General, 31 Dini, Lamberto, Italian premier, 210 Doctorov, Russian general, 83 Dohuet, Giulio, Italian general, 157 Dole, Robert, American senator, 208 Dollfuss, Engelbert, Austrian chancellor, 159 Doria, Andrea, Genoese admiral, 34 Duilio, Italian battleship, 124 Dunat, Henry, 108 Dupont, Pierre, comte de lEtang, French general, 72, 73 Duquesne, Abraham, French admiral, 34
Name Index
Habsburg, House of, 4, 6, 10, 11, 14, 20, 2327, 30, 32, 38, 46, 48, 5254, 57, 58, 78, 89, 95, 102, 133, 139 Habsburg, Leopold I, Holy emperor, 36, 38, 39, 43, 44 Habsburg, Leopold II, Holy emperor, 64 Habsburg, Maria Luisa, duchess of Parma, 87 Habsburg, Maria Theresa of, Holy empress, 5254, 56 Habsburg, Marie Antoinette of, queen of France, 63 Habsburg, Maximilian of, Holy emperor, 8 Habsburg, Philip II of, king of Spain, 14, 1720 Habsburg, Philip III of, king of Spain, 24, 25 Habsburg-Lorraine, Ferdinand III, grand duke of Tuscany, 87 Habsburg-Lorraine, Leopold II, grand duke of Tuscany, 96 Hanover, George I of, king of England, 216 n. 1 (ch. 7) Haynau, baron Julius, Austrian general, 99 Hemingway, Ernest, American writer, 164 Hezbollah, 212 Hindenburg, Paul Beckendorf baron von, German field marshal, 145 Hitler, Adolf, 155, 159, 163, 166, 171, 173 76, 186, 188, 213 Hohenstaufen, Frederic I Readbeard, Holy emperor, 4 Hohenzollern, Frederick II of, the Great, king of Prussia, 53, 58, 85, 179 Hohenzollern, William II, emperor of Germany, 131, 133, 150 Holy Empire, 3 Huguenots, 20 Ibrahim, Turkish sultan, 30 Inflexible, British battleship, 124 Invincible Armada, 19 IRA, 202 IRI, 168 Italia, Italian airship, 157 Italian Committee, 172 Italian Communist Party, 199203 Italian Liberal Party, 203 Italian Military Mission to Spain, 163, 164 Italian National Society, 106 Italian Republican Party, 203 Italian Royal Guard, 77 Italian Social Democratic Party, 203
255
Italian Social Movement, party, 208 Italian Social Republic, 18890 Italian Socialist Party, 131, 138, 154, 156, 200, 203, 208 Italic League, 8, 9 Italic Legion, 220 n. 4 (ch. 14) Jesus Christ, 9 Kempt, James, 218 n. 1 Kesselring, Albert, German air marshal, 184, 186, 191 Kettler, Karl Friedrich von, Prussian general, 119 Kipling, Rudyard, British writer, 138, 142 Klopper, South African general, 181 Krafft von Dellmensingen, German general, 145 Kutusov, Mikhail, Russian marshal, 83 Kvjtsinsky, Juli, Soviet diplomat, 203 La Guardia, Fiorello, American politician, 226 n. 20 La Marmora, Alessandro, Sardinian general, 95 La Marmora, Alfonso, Italian general, 1035, 117, 118 La Marmora, family, 103 Lahoz, Giuseppe, Italic general, 69 Lalace, Chief of Brigade, 69 Lami, Guido, Italian general, 228 n. 18 ` Lamoriciere, Christophore, Juchault de, French general in papal service, 112 Lancia, 168 League of Nations, 162, 163, 165, 167 Lechi, count Giuseppe, Italian general in French service, 69, 82 Lechi, count Teodoro, Italic general, 96 Leszczynski, Stanislas, king of Poland, 51, 52 Liddell Hart, Basil, British military author, 176 Light Troops Legion, 232 n. 8 Littoral Group, 173 Locatelli, Antonio, Italian pilot, 156 Lombard: League, 4; Legion, 69 Lombardo, Italian steamhip, 110 Loren, Sophia, Italian actress, 227 n. 8 Lorenzini, Orlando, Italian general, 172 Lorraine, Francis duke of, 58 Ludendorff, Einrich, German marshal, 145, 150 Lyautey, Pierre, French marshal, 158
Name Index
Operation C 3, 180 Operation Enduring Freedom, 212 Operation Crusader, 180 Operation Husky, 18385 Operation Lightfoot, 181 Operation Saturn, 177 Operation Supercharge, 181 Operation United Shield, 210 Operation Uran, 177 Orange, William III, king of England, 38, 39, 43 Order of Saint John of Jerusalem, 4, 16, 18, 32, 37, 194 Orwell, George, British writer, 164 OTO, 168 Oudinot, Nicolas, Charles Victor, French general, 99 Paciotti, Francesco, Italian architect, 12 Pacoret de Saint Bon, count Simon, Italian admiral, 123, 125 Pallavicini, Emilio di Priola, Italian colonel, 116 Paolucci, marquis Filippo, Italian general in Russian and Sardinian service, 80, 95 Parma. See Farnese Parri, Ferruccio, Italian politician, 233 n. 2 Passalacqua, Italian general, 184 Patton, George Smith Jr., American general, 184, 185 Pavelich, Ante, Croatian dictator, 175 Pecori Giraldi, count Guglielmo, Italian marshal, 143 Pellico, Silvio, Italian patriot, 137 Persano, Carlo Pellion count of, Italian admiral, 111, 112, 118 ` Pial Pasha, 17 Piazza, Carlo, Italian pilot, 134 Piccolomini, Ottavio, Italian general in Imperial service, 25 Piemonte, steamship, 110 Pino, Domenico, Italian general, 83 Pirelli, 168 Pisani, Andrea, Venetian sea captain general, 48 Pollio, Alberto, Italian general, 134, 136 Popes: Alexander VI, 8, 9; Alexander VII, 32; Clemens VII, 11; Clemens VIII, 23; Clemens IX, 32; Clement XI, 46; Innocent X, 30, 32; Innocent XI, 36; Paul III, 14; Paul IV, 14; Pius V, 18, 19, 25; Pius VI, 70; Pius VII, 73; Pius IX, 96, 99, 100, 102, 103; Urban VIII, 26 Pricolo, Francesco, Italian general, 173 Prinetti, Giulio, Italian minister, 133 Prodi, Romano, Italian premier, 212 Quadruple Alliance, 49, 50
257
Radetzky, Joseph Wenzeslaus, count von Radetz, Austrian field marshal, 9698, 101, 103, 117 RAF, German Communist terrorists, 202 Rattazzi, Urbano, Italian premier, 116 Red Cross, 108 Redl Alfred, Austro-Hungarian colonel, 136 Reggiane, 168 Regio Corpo Truppe Coloniali, 126 Reverberi, Giulio, Italian general, 177 Rex, Italian liner, 157 Reynier, Jean Louis Ebenezer, French general, 79 Ricaldoni, Ottavio, Italian colonel, 132 Ricasoli, Baron Bettino, Italian premier, 116 Richelieu, Armand Jean du Plessis, cardinal de, French minister, 25, 27, 29, 39 Ricotti-Magnani, count Cesare, Italian general and minister, 122 Ritchie, Neil, British general, 181 Rizzo, Luigi, Italian admiral, 148, 179 Roach, Hal, American producer, 228 n. 1 Roatta, Mario, Italian general, 164, 175 Robespierre, Augustin, 65 Robespierre, Maximilien, 65 Roma, Italian battleship, 187 Romanov, Alexander I, czar of Russia, 78, 89 Romanov, Nicolas I, czar of Russia, 106 Romanov, Nicolas II, czar of Russia, 143 Romanov, Peter I, czar of Russia, 37 Rommel, Erwin, German field marshal, 18082 Roosevelt, Franklin Delano, US President, 163, 228 n. 1 Rosai, Ottone, Italian painter, 137, 139 Roselli, Pietro, Italian general, 100 Royal Carabineers, 8789, 95, 113, 114, 172, 187, 189, 194, 199, 201, 202, 206, 226 n. 3 Rubattino, shipping company, 126 Ruffo, Fabrizio, Italian cardinal, 71, 72 Russel, Odo, British diplomat, 106 Russell, W. H., British journalist, 105
Name Index
Trezzani, Claudio, Italian general, 172 Triple Alliance, 133, 136, 138 Triple Entente, 138 Trotti, Ardingo, Sardinian general, 96 Truman, Harry S., US President, 199 Ungaretti, Giuseppe, Italian poet, 139 UNIFIL, 196 United Nations, 195, 20913; Security Council, 212 UNIPOM, 195 UNMOGIP, 195 UNOGIL, 196 UNTSO, 195 Urban Guard, 85 Urban, baron Karl, Austrian general, 107 Urwin, Gregory, American historian, 219 n. 5 Uscocks, 6, 23 Utili, Umberto, Italian general, 190 Valois, Charles VIII of, king of France, 8, 9 Valois, Francis I of, king of France, 10, 11 Valois, Francis II of, king of France, 17
259
Vandervort, Bruce, American historian, 127 Van Leden, Marquis of, 50 Vauban, Sebastien de la Preste sieur de, French marshal, 13 Vendome, Louis Joseph duke de, French marshal, 49 Verdi, Giuseppe, Italian composer, 137 Wallenstein, Albert von, Imperial general, 23 Wasa, Gustav Adolphus, king of Sweden, 215 n. 1 (ch. 4) Wedgwood, W. G., British historian, 26 Welles, Sumner, American politician, 229 n. 1 (ch. 23) Wellington, Lord, Arthur Wellesley, 1st duke of, British general, 79 Wettin, Augustus II, king of Poland, 51 Wettin, Augustus III, king of Poland, 51, 52 Wilson, Woodrow, US President, 151, 153 Wright, Orville, American inventor, 132 Wright, Wilbur, American inventor, 132 Zucchi, Carlo, Italian general, 84, 91
Place Index
Abruzzo, 112, 190 Abu Dhabi, 207 Adamello, mount, 143 Addis Ababa (Addis Abeba), 160, 172 Adige river, 72, 77 Adigrat, 127 Adowa (Adua), 127, 134, 159 Adriatic, 610, 14, 24, 30, 44, 48, 49, 54, 81, 86, 96, 97, 106, 108, 112, 138, 140, 142, 166, 187, 210, 211 Aegean Islands (Egee), 187 Aegean Sea, 31 Afghanistan, 206, 212 Africa, 16, 19, 54, 91, 12628, 134, 135, 139, 152, 167, 17075, 17882, 193, 203 Agordat, 127 Ahshahngi Lake (Lago Ascianghi), 160 Ajaccio, 57 Aidussina, 143 Ain Zara, oasis, 134 Aisne, 144, 148 AixlaChapelle, 56 Alaska, 157 Albania, 142, 152, 166, 167, 169, 17375, 183, 193, 206, 211 Alexandria (Egypt), 18, 180, 181 Algeria, 91, 199 Algier (Algeri), 5, 16, 59 Alicante, 80 Alps, 12, 14, 19, 24, 29, 45, 46, 51, 5355, 6366, 70, 72, 77, 88, 89, 107, 117, 125, 145, 149, 150, 152, 171, 191, 194 Amalfi, 3 Amba Alagi, 172 Amba Aradam, 160
Amba Uorc, 160 America, 13, 19, 20, 27, 38, 54, 61, 62, 90 93, 100, 101, 124, 125, 131, 199, 203, 209, 213 Amiens, 12, 148 Amsterdam, 39, 62 Anatolia, 151 Ancona, 70, 91, 106, 112 Ande, 156 Anghiera, 56 Angola, 206 Antwerp (Anversa), 12 Anzio, 189 Aosta Valley (Val DAosta), 191 Apennines, mountains, 61, 70, 73 Apulia (Puglia), 16, 187, 188, 190 Aqaba Gulf, 196 Aquisgrana. See Aix-la-Chapelle Aragon, 82 Aranjuez, Treaty of, 55 Ardre, 147 Arezzo, 73 Argentina, 213, 220 n. 4 (ch. 14) Argonnes, 147 Arnhem, 231 n. 7 Artois, 141 Asia, 54, 62, 126, 152, 156, 203, 213 Asiago, plateau, 146 Aspromonte, 116 Assietta Hill, 55, 56 Athens, 37; Parthenon, 37 Atlantic Ocean, 6, 59, 183, 199 Auerstadt, 78 Augsburg (Augusta), League of, 37, 38, 61 Augusta, 34, 35
Place Index
Cefalonia, 187, 231 n. 22 Centocelle military airfield, 132 Cernaya river, 104 Champagne, 141 Channel of Sicily, 16 The Channel, 63, 77, 141 Charleville, 12 Chateau-Cambresis. See Cateau-Cambresis Chebotarewsky, 176 Chemin des Dames, 147 Cherso, 152 Chesapeake, 62 Chicago, 157 China, 126, 128, 138, 167, 187, 209, 213 Cittadella, 143 Civita Castellana, 71 Civitavecchia, 12, 99, 112 Civitella del Tronto, 78, 112 Cognac, 11; League of, 11 Colberg, 78 Confluenti, 79 Congo, 172, 195, 206 Constance (Costanza), peace of, 4 Constantinople, 31. See also Istanbul Corfu, 7, 18, 30, 48, 49, 69 Cornino, 145 Corsica, 4, 50, 57, 80, 171, 183, 18688 Cosenza, 79 Crete, 4, 7, 17, 18, 30, 32, 33, 174 Crimea, 1046 Croatia (Croazia), 10, 96, 175, 209 Croisilles, 14648 Cuba, 197 Cuneo, 55 Custoza, 97, 103, 117, 118, 127 Cyprus (Cipro), 4, 17, 18, 126, 196 Cyrenaica (Cirenaica), 180 Czechoslovakia, 166 Dalmatia (Dalmazia), 4, 6, 10, 30, 37, 44, 69, 78, 81, 84, 97, 117, 137, 152, 191, 193 Danube, 19; Valley, 19 Dardanelles, 30, 31, 135, 138, 165 ` Dayman river, 93 Denmark, 24, 38, 120, 170, 204 Denver, 209 Dijon (Digione), 119 Dnepropetrovsk, 176 Dodecannese (Dodecanneso), 135, 174, 193, 194 Dolomites, 140 Don, river, 176, 177 Dottori Channel, 141 Dresden, 84 Dubowikof, 177 Dunkirk, 170 Durazzo, 142, 174
263
East Timor, 206, 208 Ebro, 166 Egypt, 17, 30, 70, 72, 126, 128, 17882, 196, 210 El Agheila, 180 El Alamein, 181, 182 El Maya, 135 El Qattar (El Qattara) depression, 181 El Salvador, 206 Emilia, 117, 155, 156, 193 Enfidaville, 182 England, 11 Ersekujvar, 12 Erythrea (Eritrea), 126, 127, 159, 160, 206 Ethiopia (Etiopia), 127, 15863, 167, 175, 206 Etruria, kingdom of, 73, 81 Europe, 4, 19, 20, 33, 43, 54, 57, 61, 78, 89, 93, 100, 132, 144, 151, 152, 156, 157, 166, 173, 186, 198, 199, 204, 209 Famagosta, 18 Ferrara, 4, 69 Finale, 55 Fiuggi, 136 Fiume, 139, 152, 153 Flanders, 11, 46, 49, 55, 63, 144 Florence, 4, 8, 1114, 61, 73, 96, 109, 116, 117, 157 Focea, bay of, 31 Fombio, 68 Formia, 112 Fornovo, 9, 11 Fort Myers, 223 n. 1 (ch. 20) France, 1015, 1820, 2729, 3147, 50 92, 100110, 118, 12326, 132, 133, 138, 145, 147, 149, 150, 152, 155, 159, 162, 163, 16567, 170, 171, 183, 186, 190, 194, 195, 198, 199, 202, 209, 212 Frankfurt (Francoforte), 62 Friedland, 78 Friuli, 10, 23, 140, 141, 191 Fuka, 182 Gaeta, 78, 111, 112 Gallabat, 172 Gallipoli, 138, 141 Gap, 89
Place Index
Krasnoy, 83 Kurdistan, 206 Kurmuk, 172 Kuwait, 206, 207 LAquila, 164 La Fere, 14648 La Sforzesca, 98 La Valletta, 12 Lagonegro, 79 Lahn, 84 Lake Rudolph, 172 Lauria, 79 Laurino, 79 Lausanne (Losanna), peace of, 135 Layazzo Gulf, 18 Lazio, 118 Lebanon, 19597, 207, 212, 213 Lecce, 166 Lecco, 77 Leghorn (Livorno), 60, 72, 81 Legnago, 96 Legnano, 4 Leipzig, 84 Lepanto, Gulf of, 19, 31 Lero, 187 Libya (Lybia), 5, 13335, 142, 15860, 167, 172, 179 Licata, 184 Ligury, 26, 55, 64, 104, 110 Lisbon, 184 Lissa, 82, 118 Loano, 64 Lodi, 67, 72 Lombardy, 26, 45, 46, 52, 56, 58, 63, 64, 6669, 97, 1079, 11517 Lombardy-Venetia, kingdom, 86, 95, 106, 107 London, 47, 54, 59, 62, 63, 66, 77, 79, 80, 109, 116, 128, 139, 153, 162, 172, 199 London, Pact of, 138, 139, 152 Loreto, 112 Lorraine, 52 Louisiana, 86 Low Countries (Paesi Bassi), 10, 19, 33, 35 Lubjiana, 90, 139, 175; valley, 139 Luneville, Peace of, 73, 77 Luques (Lucca), 4, 23, 33, 81, 87 Lutzen, 84 Lyon (Lione), 12, 89, 145 Macedonia, 206, 211 Macerone, 112
265
Madrid, 18, 20, 24, 2628, 34, 65, 82, 164, 165 Magenta, 107 Maida, 79 Mainarde, mountains, 190 Malaga, 164 Maloyaroslavezt, 83 Malta, 1618, 37, 70, 77, 85, 171, 179, 180, 187, 196; forte San Michele, 17; forte SantAngelo, 17; forte SantElmo, 17 Mamon, 177 Mantua (Mantova), 4, 13, 24, 2629, 39, 44, 67, 68, 77, 96, 97, 109 Marengo, 72 Marienwerder, 84 Marmara sea, 196 Marmore falls, 124 Marne, river, 138 Marsaglia, 39 Marsa Matruh, 178, 181 Marsala, 110 Martorana, 79 Massa, 4, 69 Massawa (Massaua), 126, 127, 159, 172, 173 Masurian lakes, 138 Mediterranean, 4, 6, 10, 1619, 3038, 49 55, 57, 59, 61, 70, 72, 80, 91, 104, 109, 13335, 152, 163, 165, 167, 170, 171, 179, 181, 200 Melegnano, 107 Mentana, 118 Messina, 17, 34, 35, 99, 110, 112, 133, 184, 185; strait of, 110, 185 Metemma, 172 Meuse (Mosa) river, 147 Middle East (Medio Oriente), 4, 16, 17, 58, 70, 80, 91, 139, 151, 152, 209, 210 Milan, 4, 8, 1113, 23, 24, 39, 43, 44, 46, 5155, 58, 68, 96, 98, 107, 108, 131, 132, 137, 157, 191 Milazzo, 110 Mincio, river, 26, 44, 72, 96, 108 Mississippi, river, 61 Missolonghi, 37 Mockern, 84 Modena, 4, 13, 23, 28, 29, 33, 44, 66, 67, 69, 70, 87, 88, 90, 96, 102, 106, 108, 109 Mogadishu (Mogadiscio), 209, 210 Mola di Gaeta, 112 Moldova. See Bessarabia Monaco, principality of, 4
Place Index
Pola, 118, 142, 148 Poland, 36, 51, 58, 65, 78, 83, 84, 138, 151, 170, 178, 187 Poloy, 231 n. 18 Pontecorvo, 81 Portici, 102 Portugal, 28, 98, 120, 193 Prague, 24, 25 Pratica di Mare, 213 Presidii (the Garrisons), 14, 19, 28 Pressburg, (Presburgo) Peace of, 78 Prevesa, 37, 134 Provence (Provenza), 190 Prussia, 55, 58, 63, 65, 78, 86, 89, 106, 109, 117, 118, 125 Prut, river, 48 Punta Stilo, 179 Pyrenees, peace of, 29 Quadrilateral (Quadrilatero), 96, 117 Quarnarolo, 152 Quarto, 110 Quebec, 61 Ragusa, 4, 175 Ravenna, 12, 100 Red Sea, 126, 135, 179, 196 Regensburg (Ratisbona), treaty of, 27 Rheims, 147 Rhine, 19, 37, 38, 45, 52, 63, 89, 109, 200 Rhine, valley, 19 Rio de la Plata, 91, 126 Rio Grande do Sur, Republic of, 92 Rocca Gloriosa, 79 Rodi, 18, 152 Romagna, 73, 156 Roman Republic, 100, 101 Romenia, 144, 173 Rome, 11, 12, 17, 23, 28, 34, 55, 63, 70, 73, 81, 87, 93, 97102, 111, 113, 116, 118, 122, 125, 127, 128, 132, 133, 13537, 152, 156, 157, 164, 165, 172, 182, 185, 186, 190, 198, 20911, 213; Gianicolo hill, 100; march on, 157, 159; Porta Pia, 119; Vatican, 19, 34, 99; Via Aurelia, 99; Via Cassia, 73; Via Nomentana, 119; Villa Savoia, 185 Rossosh, 177 Rostov, 177 Rwanda, 206 Russia, 37, 55, 63, 77, 83, 86, 102, 1046, 120, 125, 135, 150, 151, 154, 17578, 186, 213
267
sHertogenbosch, 12 Sabotino, mount, 144 Saccarello, 64 Sadowa, 118 Sahara, 180 Saint Helena, 66, 90 Saint Petersburg, 80, 144 Saint Quentin, 14 Salerno, 102, 185 ` Salo, 188 Salonika (Salonicco), 147, 149 Saluzzo, 20 San Antonio, 92 San Basilio, 79 San Fermo, 107 San Germano sul Garigliano, 8 San Marino, 4, 81, 100 San Martino, hill, 108 San Mun bay, 128 San Severo, 71 Santander, 165 Sao Joao da Bahia, 28 Sapri, 79 Saracena, 79 Saragoza, 165 Saraevo, 136 Sardinia (Sardegna), 4, 10, 1719, 34, 43, 46, 50, 60, 69, 70, 73, 81, 85, 87, 184, 187, 200 Saseno, island, 211 Savona, 84 Savoy (Savoia), 4, 13, 14, 17, 18, 2628, 33, 36, 50, 55, 63, 64, 66, 69, 80, 87, 88, 89, 106, 109, 123, 171 Saxony, 51, 150 Scire, 160 Sebastopol, 104, 105 Sebastopol, Malakov Fort, 105 Senafe, 160 Serbia, 133, 138, 142 Shan Hai Kwan, 128 Shanghai, 128 Shara Shat (Sciara Sciat), 134 Sharm el Sheik, 196 Siam, 126 Siberia, 151, 152 Sicily (Sicilia), 3, 4, 10, 1619, 34, 35, 43, 47, 50, 52, 7072, 79, 81, 89, 90, 99, 10914, 116, 126, 127, 18385, 193, 199, 200, 213 Sidi Rezegh, 180 Siena, 4, 14, 73, 77 Silesia, 53
Place Index
Valtellina, 25, 28 Varallo, 77 Varese, 107 Veglia, 152 Velletri, 54, 55, 100, 137 Venetia, 11618, 140, 149 Venezia Giulia, 137, 139 Venice (Venezia), 411, 16, 18, 19, 23, 24, 2633, 36, 37, 45, 48, 49, 58, 59, 62, 6769, 81, 82, 84, 98101, 108, 116, 117, 133, 137, 152; Ducal Palace, 37; Gulf of, 7 Venetian Earthland Domain, 44, 6769, 72 Vercelli, 14, 107 Verdun, 143 Verona, 72, 96, 103, 108, 148 Verrua, 26 Versa, 118 Versailles, 51, 62, 152 Vicenza, 107, 143 Vichy, 182 Vienna, 12, 24, 26, 36, 38, 44, 49, 51, 68, 82, 86, 106, 107, 109, 117, 125, 133, 149; Congress of, 88; flight on, 149 Vietnam, 196, 197 Vigevano, 56 Vigna di Valle, 132 Vignale, 98 Vilnius (Vilna), 84 Vipacco, 141 Vittorio Veneto, 149, 150 Volga, 177 Volgograd, 177 Volosca, 152 Volterra, 12 Volturno, river, 111 Vonitsa, 37 Vosges, 118 Vyazma, 83 Wagram, 82 Warsaw Pact, 200, 204, 205 Washington, 198, 209, 210 Waterloo, 79 Westphalia, peace of, 29; treaties of, 53 White Mountain (Bohemia), 25 Worms, Treaty of, 55 Xeronero, 37
269
Yagodny, 176 Yalta, 191, 194 Yemen, 195, 206 Yol Criminal Fascist Camp, 232 n. 11 Yorktown, 62 Ypres, 144 Yugoslavia, 152, 153, 167, 17476, 183, 191, 194, 206, 20911 Zante, 231 n. 22 Zara, 175, 193, 194 Zenta, 37 Zig-Zag, 105 Zurich, 148