The State in Bangladesh under Zia (1975-81) Author(s): Syed Serajul Islam Reviewed work(s): Source: Asian Survey,

Vol. 24, No. 5 (May, 1984), pp. 556-573 Published by: University of California Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2644413 . Accessed: 26/11/2011 05:52
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THE STATE IN BANGLADESHUNDER ZIA (1975-81)

Syed Serajul Islam
The year 1975 saw dramatic changes in the political environment of Bangladesh. In January, through a "constitutional coup," a presidential system of government replaced the parliamentary form. In June, all political parties were banned and were asked to join the newly formed national party, Bangladesh Krishak Shramik Awami League. In August, a bloody military coup took place in which President Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and his whole family, except two daughters, were killed. On November 3, there was another abortive countercoup and, on November 7, there was a "sepoy mutiny" in which Dacca's strong man, General Ziaur Rahman, consolidated his power in Bangladesh. The fall of Mujib in August and the "sepoy mutiny" of November 7, from which General Ziaur Rahman (Zia) emerged as the de facto military ruler, profoundly altered the state system in Bangladesh. A "new state" emerged, which seemed to follow a pattern that had been set in preliberation Bangladesh; a marriage of convenience between civil and military bureaucrats, similar to that existing in Pakistan before its collapse in 1971, evolved in Bangladesh after the November 7 coup. In a postcolonial society like Bangladesh, it would seem that after an army take-over of the state apparatus, the military bureaucracy forms an alliance with the civil bureaucracy in order to consolidate power at both the national and local levels. The civil and military bureaucrats share one commonality, that is, they maintain a corporate administrative group identity. Perhaps it is this administrative elite identity that leads the bureaucracy to build an "administrative state." In the administrative state, the civil-military bureaucracy adopts, on the one hand, various measures for its increasing dominance in the state apparatus, and seeks, on the other, legitimacy for the regime through various means. Despite the attempts toward obtaining legitimacy, the state may subsequently
Syed Serajul Islam is Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science, University of Dhaka, Dhaka, Bangladesh.
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face serious opposition from alienated classes and groups. However, the state may persist for a certain period of time by using the methods of coercion and/or persuasion but is likely to collapse if contradictions and crises emerge in the dominant coalition controlling the state apparatus. Focusing on the new state in Bangladesh under Zia, the analysis in this article takes up the following questions. What was the nature of the new state? How did it maintain its legitimacy? Did it face any opposition? Was there any crisis within the state itself? Why did the new state under Zia finally fall in 1981? In other words, what were the factors that led to the "fall" of Zia in 1981?

The Installation and Nature of the New State

The "sepoy revolt" in 1975 reinstated Major-General Ziaur Rahman as the Chief of Staff of the Bangladesh Army.' Justice A. S. M. Sayem, who had been appointed earlier by Khaled Mosharaf, continued as both President and Chief Martial Law Administrator. During the first few months, without taking formal leadership of the state, Zia ruled the country while remaining in the background as the Deputy Chief Martial Law Administrator. On November 30, 1976, however, he decided to assume responsibility as Chief Martial Law Administrator. Then on April 21, 1977, Zia took over the presidency, forcing Sayem to resign on grounds of ill health, and retaining his position as Chief Martial Law Administrator and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces.2 After his assumption of the presidency, Zia slowly and steadily consolidated his power. The first step in this direction was the restoration of the position of the civil-military bureaucracy.

1. Ziaur Rahman, a Major in the East Bengal Regiment, made the announcement of the independence of Bangladesh over Radio Chittagong on March 27, 1971. Zia joined the Pakistan Army in 1953 and was commissioned in 1955. During the liberation war, Zia formed the "Z" forces. After independence he expected to be the army Chief of Staff, but Mujib appointed Major General K. Shafiullah, junior to Zia, to the position. The main reason for by-passing Zia, Marcus Franda points out, was that on March 27, 1971, Zia declared himself the President of Bangladesh over Radio Chittagong. Mujib did not like Zia's ambitious nature. After the August 1975 coup, Shafiullah was removed from office and Zia was made the Army Chief of Staff. See Marcus F. Franda,"The Bangladesh Coup," American UniversitiesField Staff Reports,South Asia Series XIX, No. 15 (1975), p. 8; see also his "Ziaur Rahman and Bangladesh Nationalism," Economic and Political Weekly,Vol. 16, Annual Number (March 1981). 2. In this period Zia considered his main task as putting down unrest in the army in different cantonments of Bangladesh. On the other hand, Sayem was kept as President because he was considered neutral and nonpolitical.

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RESTORING THE STEEL FRAME: REVIVAL OF THE BUREAUCRACY In order to restore the power and position of the civil-military bureaucracy, the new state first abolished Presidential Order No. 9 of 1972, which had provided for the dismissal of officials without showing cause. Furthermore, those bureaucrats who had lost their jobs under this order after liberation were allowed to appeal their cases. And, in fact, many such civil servants were placed in key positions by Zia, while some pro-Mujib officers were either dismissed or demoted.3 Of particular importance were certain measures adopted by the new state to strengthen the position of the armed forces. Many army officers and soldiers deeply resented the loss of status and influence during the Mujib period; indeed, the survival of the new state under Zia depended primarily on the loyalty of the armed forces. The defense budget left over from the Mujib regime for 1975-76 was immediately revised upwards, with the original allocation raised from Tk. 750 million (7% of the national budget) to Tk. 1109.34 million (20% of the national budget).4 In subsequent years, the defense budget was increased further (see Table 1). Apart from the tremendous increases in the defense budget, the members of the armed forces were provided with many facilities they had enjoyed in preliberation days, such as payment of travel and dearness allowances to army personnel deployed in the aid of civil administration, and accommodation in new residences built exclusively for army officers. In the two years of strict military rule following Zia's take-over, defense and civil administration expenditures increased more than Tk. 2 billion while all other budget categories combined increased by less than Tk. 1 billion.5 Along with the increase in defense expenditures, the number of army personnel increased. The armed forces, including the Rakkhi Bahini (which was integrated into the army after November 1975), expanded

3. For example, Shafiul Azam, former Chief Secretary of East Pakistan, who was dismissed by the state under Mujib, was reinstated after the August coup. On the other hand, A. T. M. Syed Hossain, Mujib's brother-in-law and Additional Secretary of the Establishment Division, was removed from office. In the Army, Major General M. Khalilur Rahman, Brigadier H. M. Ershad (Chief Martial Law Administrator in 1983), and Brigadier Quazi Golam Dastgir were elevated in the army hierarchy. See Franda, "The Bangladesh Coup," p. 8. 4. Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh, Bureau of Statistics, 1980 Statistical Yearbook Bangladesh (Dacca, 1981), p. 363. of 5. Mosharaf Hossain, "Nature of State Power in Bangladesh,"Journal of Social Studies, No. 5 (October 1979), p. 34.

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TABLE

Military Expenditureand Its Share in National Wealth, Bangladesh,

1975-78

Year
1975 1976 1977 1978

Expenditure (millions of U.S. dollars)

34 64 98 130

Percentage GNP of
0.7 1.1 1.6 1.8

and SOURCE: U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, WorldMilitary Expenditures Arms Transfers, 1980 (Washington, D.C., 1980), p. 40.

from about 60,000 men in 1974-75 to about 90,000 in 1976-77;6 Zia also created a new army division, the 9th division. Defense Forces Intelligence and National Security Intelligence were strengthened under the respective directorships of Air Vice-Marshal K. M. A. Islam and A. B. S. Safdar, both men with long training and experience in the Pakistan Intelligence Services. The strength of the police force was increased from about 40,000 men to about 70,000;7 a special Reserved Armed Police Battalion and a metropolitan police force for Dacca were also created. DOMINANCE OF THE CIVIL-MILITARY BUREAUCRATS IN THE STATE APPARATUS The civil-military bureaucrats had come to occupy important portfolios in the state apparatus with the overthrow of Mujib. In the national state apparatus, the main structures of decision-making were the office of the President and his secretariat, the Council of Ministers, and the secretariat. All the subordinate structures of the state were brought under the direct control of the President. Initially, the core of the new state consisted of a Council of Advisers, which included, apart from seven civilians, the three chiefs of the armed forces: General Ziaur Rahman, Chief of Staff of the Army; the Naval Chief, M. H. Khan, who had served in the Pakistan Navy for 20 years; and the Air Force Chief, M. G. Tawab, who had also served in the
6. Ibid., p. 33. However, according to the estimate of WorldMilitary Expenditures,the total number of the armed forces was increased from 100,000 in 1974 to 129,000 in 1978. U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1980 (Washington, D. C., 1980), p. 82. 7. Talukder Maniruzzaman, The BangladeshRevolutionand Its Aftermath (Dacca: World Book International, 1980), p. 203.

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Pakistan Air Force. Of the seven civilians, one was a former professor of Economics at Dacca University and former Minister of Finance in the government of East Pakistan (1965-69), and the other six had a bureaucratic background. The number of advisers was subsequently raised to 24, of whom ten were from the Civil Service of Pakistan (CSP), three were military officers, and the rest technocrats.8 After the parliamentary elections in February 1979, President Ziaur Rahman formed a Council of Ministers, whose members were appointed by the President and held office at his pleasure. The Parliament itself had been elected under terms and conditions set by the President, and could be summoned, prorogued, and dissolved by him at will. Earlier, in December 1978, Zia had decreed an amendment to the constitution, providing that (1) the President could appoint one-fifth of the membership of the Council of Ministers from among people who were not members of Parliament; (2) the President had the right to withhold assent from any bill passed by parliament, which could be overridden only in a national referendum; and (3) the President could enter into any treaties with foreign nations in the "national interest" without informing Parliament. During the five and a half years of Zia's rule, the civil-military bureaucrats were continuously dominant in the Council of Ministers and its predecessor body, the Council of Advisers. In 1981 there were 24 full ministers in the cabinet of whom six were military bureaucrats, five civil servants, six technocrats, four businessmen, one landlord, and two lawyers. In addition to the Council of Ministers, the President had his own secretariat consisting of three divisions-Personal, General and Economic, and Information-all headed by civil bureaucrats.9 Apart from the national level, the state made an effort to strengthen the position of civil bureaucrats at the local level. With the subsequent "civilianization" of the regime, former CSP officers were posted to different districts and divisions. In 12 of the 19 districts, the Deputy Commissioners were CSP officers.10 In all four divisions, Zia appointed former CSP officers as Divisional Commissioners.
8. The bio-data on the members of the 1977 Council of Advisers is available in Bichitra Barashapatra, 1977 (Dacca: Dainik Bangla Prakashani, 1977), pp. 42-48; Holiday (Dacca), March 18, 1979; also see A Yearbook the Commonwealth,1978 (London: His Majesty's of Stationery Office, 1979), p. 127. 9. Mahbub Alam Chasi (CSP) and A. H. K. Sadique (CSP), respectively, were the Personal and Information secretaries to the President. S. A. Khair (CSP) was the secretary of the Economic Affairs Division. 10. Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh, Establishment Division, Erstwhile Civil Serviceof Pakistan (Dacca, n.d.); also see Government of the People's

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The civil-military bureaucrats became dominant again not only in the cabinet, secretariat, divisions, and districts, but also in the chief policymaking and policy-implementing institutions such as the National Economic Council (NEC) and the Planning Commission, and in the public corporations. The NEC (an earlier Pakistani institution) was revived and made responsible for development planning in Bangladesh; headed by the President, it was made the highest policy-making and decisionmaking body in the field of development planning. Its main body, the five-member NEC Executive Committee, consisted of civil-military bureaucrats," as did the eight-member Planning Commission, which was entrusted with the responsibility of implementing the programs of the NEC; both the chairman and deputy chairman were civilian bureaucrats.'2 In 1975 there were 38 public corporations, which were also dominated by the bureaucratic elites: 11 had chairmen or managing directors who were former CSP officers, 2 were headed by police officers, 5 by military officers, and 6 by former East Pakistan Civil Service members, while the rest were headed by members of the other services of the central government. This contrasted with the Mujib regime, when a majority of the corporations were headed by political elites. Rehman Sobhan and Mujaffer Ahmad comment: It was not the case that only those sectorswhichperformedpoorly had their sector for which chief executivesreplaced.If we merelylook at the industrial fuller performancerecords are available,we find that by the end of 1975 a 100% takeoverof chief executives had been made. This includedthe chairmen of such corporationsas Sugar,Textiles, Engineeringand Shipbuilding, Forest industries, Steel, and Food and Allied products, which had shown profitsand a rising trend in profitability duringthis [Mujib]period.13 It is thus evident that during the Zia period the state apparatus in Bangladesh was dominated by civil-military bureaucrats. The Zia regime was fundamentally a resurrection of the "administrative state" under Ayub Khan in Pakistan; as Anderson points out, "there was a striking resemblance between Bangladesh after the 1975 coups and East Pakistan before its collapse in 1971. A similar marriage of convenience existed
Republic of Bangladesh, President's Secretariat, Actual Distribution List of Officers(Dacca, 1976). 11. Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh, Bureau of Statistics, 1979 of Statistical Yearbook Bangladesh (Dacca, 1980), p. 8. 12. In 1981 the Chairman of the Planning Commission was M. Abdul Momen Khan, a Bengal civil servant, recruited in British India. The Deputy Chairman of the Commission was S. D. Chowdhury (CSP), while the Deputy Chairman under Mujib was an economist. A Regime: in 13. Rehman Sobhan and Mujaffer Ahmad, Public Enterprise an Intermediate of Study in the Political Economy Bangladesh (Dacca: Bangladesh Institute of Development Studies, 1980), p. 534.

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between the military and the civil service."14 And like their forebears in the administrative state of Pakistan, the civil-military bureaucrats in Bangladesh as an exclusive administrative group have been deeply imbued with a 'guardianship" orientation. The broad administrative framework in which they worked did not undergo any fundamental change in Bangladesh. Like Bhutto's regime in Pakistan, Mujib's regime in Bangladesh was a short interlude in the persisting pattern of the administrative state.

The Quest for Political Legitimacy

Every military regime usually claims that it will restore democracy and hand power to the civilians as soon as law and order is restored. But what often happens afterwards is that it tries to remain in power through a continuous process of civilianization and legitimization. The military regime of General Ziaur Rahman was no exception to this pattern. In his first broadcast to the nation on November 11, 1975, Zia claimed that he was a "soldier," not a politician. But once General Zia formally assumed the presidency on April 21, 1977, he took a number of steps to legitimize his regime.15 These included a presidential referendum, presidential election, the formation of a political party, parliamentary elections, and the creation of new village institutions. THE PRESIDENTIAL REFERENDUM In an address to the nation over the Bangladesh Radio and Television on April 22, 1977, Zia proclaimed that general elections on the basis of universal adult franchise would be held in December 1978 to elect the members of Parliament. He stressed: "I and my government believe in full democracy and are determined to restore the government of the elected representatives of the people in due time."'16But for the time being, Zia announced, he would remain President and seek people's consent to continuing as President through a referendum. Meanwhile, Zia issued a broad election manifesto, the 19-point program, which promised, in part, the promotion of the private sector, self-sufficiency in food production, population control, and agricultural development. In the national referendum held on May 30, 1977, Zia won a massive vote of confidence with an affirmative vote of 99.5% from among the 85%
14. Robert S. Anderson, "Impressions of Bangladesh: The Rule of Arms and the Politics of Exhortation," Pacific Affairs, 49:3 (Fall 1976), p. 445. 15. From a newspaper interview by President Ziaur Rahman. See Rodney Tasker and S. Kamaluddin, "Martial Law, Democracy and the Future," Far Eastern EconomicReview (FEER), 106:41 (October 12, 1979), p. 30. 16. The Bangladesh Observer, April 23, 1977.

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voter turnout. The referendum gave Zia a strong sense of confidence about his authority in Bangladesh. THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION Having taken a measure of the public support for him and seeking to enhance his legitimacy, Zia announced eleven months after the referendum that there would be an election for the presidency. New rules and regulations were promulgated for the presidential election, and restrictions on political parties were lifted as of May 1978.17 Prior to the election, various political parties and groups aligned themselves into two distinct fronts-the Jatlyotabadi Front (JF, Nationalist Front) and Gonotantrik OikyoJote (GOJ, Democratic United Front). The JF nominated Ziaur Rahman and GOJ nominated General M. A. G. Osmani (who had been Commander-in-Chief of the Mukti Bahini in 1971 and a minister in Mujib's cabinet) as the presidential candidates. When the presidential election was held, as scheduled, on June 3, 1978, Zia won a landslide victory, securing 76% of the more than 53% voter turnout. General Osmani, on the other hand, received 21% of the votes cast. Through his election for a five-year term, Zia had transformed himself from a "soldier" into a "politician." FORMATION OF A POLITICAL PLATFORM Although General Ziaur Rahman had been elected President, he still did not have a mass political organization of his own, and he moved steadily forward to build a political base for his regime. However, he was still undecided about a possible political front-whether to join an existing political party or to organize his own political party. In order to ensure support by all groups, Zia initially adopted the tactic of not being identified with any political party.18However, in September 1978-just before the 1979 parliamentary elections-General Zia himself launched a new political party, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP). The Jatiyotabadi Gonotantrik Dal (JAGODAL), NAP(B), United People's Party (UPP), and the Muslim League joined the BNP. As expected, the BNP manifesto advocated a presidential form of government. It set out 17 goals and objectives, including establishment of "people's democracy," "greater concentration on the private sector," "productivity
17. Before May 1978 all political parties were banned. However, in July 1978 the state promulgated the Political Parties Regulation which legalized parties on registration with the state. See The Bangladesh Times, July 29, August 5, and October 25, 1976. 18. From an interview (April 1981) with Enayatullah Khan, a prominent pro-Chinese leftist, editor of weekly Holiday (Dacca), and a former minister for Land Reforms in Zia's cabinet.

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2 OccupationalBackgroundof the Members the BNP Central Executive of

Committee,1981 Numbers 57 Percentage 33.5

Occupation

Businessmen Professionals Agriculturists Teachers Bureaucrats Trade unionists Others

Total

53 28 20 11 2 7
170

31.2 11.8 11.7 6.5 1.1 4.2

100.00

SOURCE: Information from S. M. Fakhruddin, Member,CentralExecutiveCommitteeof BNP, August 1981, and interviews.

oriented politics," "soical and economic justice," and "multiple political

parties."19

The BNP included a variety of social groups on its Central Executive Committee. Businessmen constituted the largest contingent with 33.5% of the committee's membership in 1981, followed by professionals with 31.2%; agriculturists, by contrast, had only 11.8% and teachers had nearly the same share as agriculturists (Table 2). In one respect, the BNP represented a significant departure from other political parties in that the BNP included 1 1 bureaucrats (6.5%) on the Central Executive Committee. Furthermore, it should be noted that even though Zia had formed the BNP to serve as his political base, the political elites had very little influence on decision making in the party since the major decisions were made by Zia himself in his capacity as party chairman, usually in consultation with the bureaucrat members of the party.20 THE PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION Once formal legitimacy for the regime had been won and a mass political front had been formed, the President proceeded to redeem his pledge
Adarsha [Proc19. Bangladesh Jatiyotabadi Dal, Ghosonapatra, Gothontantra-O-Partyr lamation, Composition and Ideology of the Party], (Dacca: Press Secretary of BNP, n.d.). 20. It is difficult to provide any definitive empirical,evidence on this point. However, the statement is based on information provided by several members of the Central Executive Committee of the BNP.

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TABLE

3 ParliamentaryElectionResults (February1979) No. of Seats Contested 298 295 265 240 183 425 419
2125

Party BNP AL (Malek) Muslim League-Islamic Democratic League Alliance JSD AL (Mizan) Independents Other parties
Total

No. of Seats Won 206 40 19 9 2 17 7

300

% of Seats 68.3 13.3 6.3 3.0 0.7 6.1 2.3

100.00

% of Votes 41.2 24.4 10.0 4.9 2.8 12.9 1.7

100.00

SOURCE: Dainik Bangla (Dacca), March 8, 1979.

for parliamentary elections by announcing in November 1978 that such elections would be held two months later on the basis of adult franchise. As decided, the election was held in February 1979, and was contested by 31 political parties. The results of the elections were a virtual endorsement of Zia's regime, with his BNP winning more than two thirds of the seats although the party obtained only 41.2% of the total votes cast (Table 3). The massive victory by the BNP underlined the continued confidence of the public in the leadership of President Zia, the soldier turned politician. Although no systematic study on the occupational background of the members of Parliament of 1979 is available, preliminary data indicate that while no single group was dominant, businessmen were the largest group (28%), followed by lawyers (26%); agriculturists were less than one fifth (19%); technocrats were 7% of the membership; and teachers 6.6% (Table 4). It is interesting that this pattern largely reflects the composition of the BNP's Central Executive Committee, and that it marked a significant departure from the results of the 1973 election. While only one military bureaucrat had been elected in 1973, 19 bureaucrats were elected in 1979; of the 19, 17 were retired military officers and two were civilian bureaucrats.2'

21. See Holiday (Dacca), March 18, 1979.

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4 OccupationalBackgroundof the Members Parliament, 1979 of Numbers 84 78 58 21 20 19 6 14 Percentage 28.0 26.0 19.3 7.0 6.6 6.4 2.0 4.7

Occupation Businessmen Lawyers Agriculturists Technocrats Teachers Bureaucrats Trade unionists Others

from Nur Mohammad SOURCE: Interviewswith MPs and information Khan, an MP and State and Ministerfor Information Broadcasting, 1981.

Even though its members were elected, the parliament was not a sovereign body since it was subordinate and subservient to the President who was a military bureaucrat. The President was above parliament, and he could dissolve the parliament whenever he felt it necessary. However, an elected parliament provided a constitutional facade for what was essentially an "administrative state." BUILDING NEW VILLAGE INSTITUTIONS Having consolidated power in the central state apparatusafter the "sepoy revolt," Zia realized that in order to survive politically over a longer period, it was necessary to build a solid base of support at the grass roots village level. With this end in view, two types of village institutionsSwanirvar Gram Sarkar (Self-sufficient Village Government) and Gram Pratirakkhi Bahini (Village Defense Force-VDF)-were introduced in Bangladesh. In 1976 Zia announced the formation of Gram Parishad, which was later renamed SwanirvarGram Sarkarin 1980. Like Ayub's Basic Democracies, Gram Sarkars could mobilize support for the regime and also give the rural people a sense of participation. However, whereas under the Basic Democracies system there were Union-level governments, Zia's Gram Sarkarsystem was a village-level government. A Gram Sarkar consisted of a Gram Prodhan (chairman) and 11 members, including two female members, who were chosen through a consensus among all eligible voters of the village present at a meeting (Gram Sava) called by the Thana Circle Officer (a bureaucrat). By December 1980, 6800 Gram

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Sarkars had been organized.22 However, they seem to have been more the creations of the bureaucracy than the result of genuine political participation. As Franda observed: Most of the Gram Sarkars have been chosen by a "consensus" evolved at village meetings, with the nature of that consensus being determined by Thana Circle Officers representing the central government.... Observers who have watched the selection process in several villages suggest that members of parliament and District officers frequently play a major role in choosing these "consensual" candidates.23

The Gram Pratirakkhi Bahini (VDF) was another institution created for building support for the regime at the village level. Consisting of about 150 persons in each village, the VDFs were organized by the Home Ministry and were, in fact, modeled after the "Peace Committees" created by the Pakistan army during the liberation war. Officially, their main purpose was described as aiding the Gram Sarkarin maintaining law and order in each village. Initially, the state offered free radios, newspapers, books, and small rewards to those who joined them.24 The foregoing analysis thus indicates that Zia, after consolidating his power, attempted to gain legitimacy through various means at both the national and local levels. The state under Zia, gaining such legitimacy, was able to bring political stability and rule the nation without significant opposition for a certain period of time, but it could not avert the crisis that eventually proved fatal for Zia.

The Crisis of Zia's AdministrativeState

In the post-1975 period, while Ziaur Rahman was attempting to consolidate the administrative state, serious opposition to his regime emerged. The Awami League (AL) was the largest and only opposition political party having a country-wide organization; it mounted a strong agitational effort against Zia's state.25 The AL blamed Zia's state for distorting the true story of the liberation movement and charged that, while the true patriots had been thrown in jail, the enemies of independence and nationalism had gained ascendancy in the new state. The most serious
in the 22. Azizul Haque, "Bangladesh in 1980: Strains and Stresses-Opposition Doldrums," Asian Survey, 21:2 (February 1981), p. 192. 23. Franda, "Ziaur Rahman and Bangladesh Nationalism," p. 358. 24. In a handout, the Ministry of Home Affairs announced on August 23, 1979, that 294 village defense forces, consisting of 904,410 members, had been formed throughout Bangladesh. See Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh, Ministry of Home Affairs, Village Defense Parties (Dacca, August 23, 1979). 25. See The StatesmanWeekly(Calcutta), May 31, 1980, p. 11; also see S. Kamaluddin, "Revolution and Confusion," FEER, 106:44 (November 2, 1979).

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opposition to Zia's state was organized by the Jatiyo Samajtantrik Dal USD). The JSD and its military front, Biplobi Gono Bahini, made serious efforts to overthrow Zia, alleging that he had betrayed the cause of the sepoy mutiny" of November 7, 1975.Y The leaders of the JSD claimed that the regime could only be overthrown by a popular united movement and that an armed rebellion was therefore necessary for bringing about a socialist revolution in Bangladesh. In addition to such activities by the opposition, the regime was subjected to serious criticism inside Parliament. Opposition and independent members pointed out that pro-Pakistani officers were governing Bangladesh in civilian disguise and that the administration was run like an "operation plan at GHQ." Rashid Khan Menon, the only MarxistLeninist MP, described Parliament as not "sovereign," calling it "a school-debating society with an indulgent president sometimes languidly watching from the gallery."27 Besides opposition inside and outside Parliament, insurgency movements gained momentum in the Chittagong Hill Tracts, seriously threatening Zia's regime. Although insurgency in this area is an old problem, it became worse during the Zia period because many freedom fighters, particularly members of the Kader Bahini, who were pro-Mujib and had taken shelter in the border areas after Mujib's death, allegedly joined the insurgency movement in the Chittagong Hill Tracts, and this gave the insurgents additional strength.28 The state under Zia responded to these threats and the opposition in two ways-by means of repression and manipulation-that is, a policy of "sticks and carrots." Of the various opposition parties, Zia considered the AL and the JSD as his two major opponents, and many of the leaders and workers of both these parties were arrested and thrown in jail. The President also adopted a policy of divide and rule. He secretly assured some JSD leaders of economic and political opportunities if they re26. The Biplobi Gono Bahini was led by Colonel Abu Taher, a freedom fighter who was dismissed by Mujib for his radical views and for forming the Bahini. On November 7, 1975, when Zia was under house arrest, Taher was said to have rescued him. The Bahini released him on the condition that he would meet their twelve demands, which included elimination of differences and discrimination between officers and soldiers, and release of all political prisoners. On November 18, Zia released the main leaders of the JSD. However, because of further JSD agitation on the twelve demands, Zia again arrested them on November 25, 1975. For a detailed discussion of the 12-point demands, see Lawrence Lifschultz, "The Crisis Has Not Passed," FEER, 90:49 (December 5, 1975), p. 33; also see "Bangladesh State and Revolution-II," Frontier, 8:31 (December 13, 1975). 27. For a detailed discussion of the criticisms by the opposition inside Parliament, see The Statesman Weekly (Calcutta), May 31, 1980. 28. Kader Bahini was an organization led by Kader Siddique, a guerrilla leader in the 1971 liberation War of Bangladesh. See Maniruzzaman, Bangladesh Revolution,p. 201.

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mained quiet. A group of JSD workers under the leadership of M. A. Awal responded positively to Zia's assurance, and the result was a split in the JSD and the emergence of a new party, Bangladesh SamajtantrikDal League lead(BSD) under Awal.29 In a similar way, while many Awamni ers, including Abdul Malek Ukil, were put in prison,30 others were inducted into the BNP.31 In the Chittagong Hill Tracts, strong repressive measures were undertaken but the state also adopted various programs for developing the neglected tribal areas and introduced a monthly allowance system for the tribal leaders. However, more importantly, the challenge to the authority of the administrative state came not only from the opposition parties and the tribal areas, but also emerged within the various dominant forces of the state apparatus itself. Three major groups-the BNP, the civil bureaucracy, and the military bureaucracy-were dominant in Zia's administrative state. In the strict sense of the term, the BNP was not a single political party, but was a multidimensional "umbrella" party hastily assembled under the energetic leadership of Zia and consisting of dramatically opposed interests and ideological groups. There was no meeting ground, for example, between the Islamic fundamentalists and the leftist factions within the party. The BNP thus contained the germs of conflict at its very birth. As a "sarkari"(government) party, the BNP attracted those people who expected a share in state patronage and power;32 such people did not join the party because of its ideology or program. Consequently, the success of the BNP depended on the access of its members to the state machinery rather than on the support of the people. In the last two years of Zia's rule, despite his own popular image and his call for unity, the BNP was faced with inner party feuds. It remained divided along various lines-officials vs. politicians, socialists vs. nonsocialists, Islamists vs. secularists, and freedom fighters vs. non-freedom fighters. These divisions led to bitter internal factionalism. The situation had come to such a pass that the New Nation wrote:

29. On the split within the JSD and the growth of the BSD, see Bichitra (Dacca), October 30, 1980. 30. In June 1978 the central office of the AL claimed that about 5,000 AL members and workers had been in jail for more than two years without trial; see Marcus F. Franda,"Ziaur Rahman's Bangladesh, Part I: Political Realignments," American University Field Staff Reports, South Asia Series, No. 25 (1979), p. 3. 31. For example, Mohammadullah, Speaker of the Parliament in 1972 and President of Bangladesh during the Mujib regime, joined Zia's BNP; later, he became Vice-President, under the Sattar regime, just 12 hours before the March 1982 coup. 32. Rounaq Jahan, BangladeshPolitics. Problems Issues (Dacca: University Press Ltd., and 1980), p. 208.

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The system-whatever it is-under whichthis countryis saidto be governed

seems to be on the verge of the collapse.... As things deteriorate, BNP will

not be able to bear the strains.Perhapsit will be destroyedby its own time bomb of greed, corruptionand self-advancement its members.33 of The civil bureaucracy, another major dominant force in Zia's state, was already fragmented between "patriots" and "nonpatriots." Zia revived the disheartened bureaucracy, but he tended to rely heavily on those civil servants who had been thrown out of office during the Mujib regime. On the other hand, the civil servants who were close associates of Mujib were demoted or placed in insignificant positions. Thus, Zia antagonized one section of the civil servants, although he was popular, no doubt, among those bureaucrats who regained power and position after 1975. However, during the last year of his rule, even the latter became disenchanted with Zia because they perceived him to be attaching more and more importance to the political elites. This was a point on which the bureaucracy seemed unwilling to compromise, for its training and ethos allowed for little tolerance of interference by politicians in the administration. The growing importance of the BNP caused concern in the bureaucracy about its role in the system.34 More critically, a crisis emerged within the army, the key force in Zia's state, mainly for two reasons. In the first place, Zia relied heavily on those army officers who had been suppressed by Mujib-i.e., mainly the ones who had been repatriated from Pakistan after liberation. Zia's obvious preference for the repatriated officers is manifest in the fact that in 1981 only two of the 50 major-generals and brigadiers in the Bangladesh Army were men who had fought with the Mukti Bahini in 197 1;35 the other 48 officers were those who had been stranded in West Pakistan during the liberation war. Of the eight sector commanders of the Mukti Bahini, only two, in addition to Zia, retained command in the army by 1980. One was General Shawkat Ali, but he was later stripped of his operational command in 1980 and appointed Principal of Staff College in Dacca; the other was General Manzoor, who was transferred in
33. Cited in Asia Research Bulletin, 3, Monthly Political Supplement (August 31, 1981), p. 837. 34. Regarding the death of Zia, Zillur R. Khan writes, "Perhaps he [Zia] wanted to shift his power base from a military-bureaucratic-industrialcombine to a mass-oriented institutional frame. According to this interpretation, the deaths of Zia and Manzoor can be attributed to a much larger conspiracy. This view suggests that opponents of critical change are determined to maintain the status quo, that is, the domination of political life by the combined military, bureaucratic, and entrepreneurial elites." See Kahn's "Bangladesh in 1981: Change, Stability, and Leadership," Asian Survey, 22:2 (February 1982), p. 165. 35. Franda, "Ziaur Rahman and Bangladesh Nationalism," p. 365.

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1980 from a central position in Dacca to a peripheral one in Chittagong. Zia's preference for repatriated officers alienated him from those military officers and soldiers who had fought for independence. The second reason for the crisis within the army was conflict between officers and the ranks. Colonel Abu Taher, who had led the "sepoy revolt" of November 7, 1975, and had rescued Zia, sought to radicalize the army, emphasizing the elimination of all differences and discrimination between officers and soldiers. He also organized an underground Biplobi Gono Bahini with the idea of launching an armed revolt against the officers. As a result of the crisis within the army, there were nineteen abortive coups between 1977 and 1981.36

The Fall of Zia

The growing strength of the opposition and the internal feuds within and among the dominant forces of the state itself weakened Ziaur Rahman's position. In early 1981, the New Nation wrote: "He [Zia] is a prisoner of his own mixed-up, cross-bed political system [and] of the various vested
interests which have been created during the past few years.... So what

is in store for us in the coming months? Our concern is real."37President Ziaur Rahman, however, was still personally popular among the masses for his honesty. The national press as well as the foreign press eulogized his honesty and sincerity, how he worked 18 hours a day to turn Bangladesh from an "international basket case" to a basketful of hopes, his experiments with village-based development, and his bold strides in restoring democracy and in upholding the country's independence and sovereignty. It was expected, therefore, that it would perhaps take some time for Zia's state to collapse. But the violent assassination of Zia in an abortive coup on May 30; 1981, brought an abrupt end to his rule and led the nation into a state of uncertainty. The death of Ziaur Rahman is shrouded in mystery. It is widely believed that Zia was killed for reasons of personal revenge by General Manzoor, the alleged leader of the May 1981 coup. Manzoor had been a very close friend of Zia's during the liberation war and the critical days of 1975-77 when Zia was consolidating his political power. Because of his close association and friendship with Zia, Manzoor expected Zia, once he became President, to appoint him Chief of Staff of the Bangladesh Armed Forces. However, Zia offered this position to Lt. Colonel General Ershad, a repatriated officer, apparently because Ershad was senior to General Manzoor and also because Zia knew that Manzoor was very
36. This estimate has been given by Maniruzzaman in Bangladesh Revolution, p. 221. Bulletin, 2:3 (August 31, 1981), p. 837. 37. Cited in Asia Research

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ambitious.38Zia's decision to promote Ershad brought about a deterioration in the personal relations between Zia and Manzoor. On the night of May 30, while Zia was on an official tour in Chittagong, Manzoor reportedly decided to make one desperate attempt to remove Ziaur Rahman from power. This "personal revenge" theory has received wide publicity, but it apparently does not tell the whole truth about Zia's assassination.It seems that Zia's death was not an isolated event, but rather part of a larger conspiracy even though there was no involvement of an external power and the conspiracy was homegrown. It is true that Manzoor was disappointed with his job situation, but this merely served as an "accelerator" for the coup attempt, which was perhaps related to intense discontent among a segment of the armed forces. During the last two years of his rule, Zia had relied heavily on the repatriated and newly recruited officers and soldiers. In 1981, it is estimated that only 15% of the members of the armed forces were freedom fighters or had been recruited during the Mujib regime, while 25% had been repatriated from Pakistan and the remaining 60% were new recruits. Zia felt that the repatriated soldiers and new recruits were much better and more disciplined soldiers than the freedom fighters, primarily because their training had been more thorough; moreover, the freedom fighters were proMujib and highly politicized. In order to counter the freedom fighters, Zia had expanded the army from five divisions in 1975 to nine divisions by 1981.39 Zia's policy further alienated him from the freedom fighters both inside and outside the army. Thus, while Manzoor did have a personal grudge against Zia, the freedom fighters and officers recruited during the Mujib regime had sought to seize power long before May 30, 1981, since all the previous coup attempts against Zia had been led by participants in the liberation war. Of all the freedom fighters, only General Manzoor had been able to retain an operational command in the army, and this was in Chittagong. Therefore, it may be that he was persuaded by the freedom fighters to stage a coup in Chittagong, after which the freedom fighters posted in different cantonments would mobilize support both within the army and from pro-Mujib civilians. As planned, on Friday, May 30, 1981, at 3 A.M., some 20 officers led by Colonel Fazle Hassan arrived at the Chittagong Circuit House where President Zia was staying, and within 20 minutes of their arrival the operation to kill President Zia and his security guards
38. Marcus F. Franda, "Bangladesh After Zia: A Retrospect and Prospect," Economic and Political Weekly, 16:34 (1981), p. 1388. 39. Ibid.

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was over. But the coup-makers failed to receive any support from the other cantonments and most of the rebels had surrendered by the next morning. The abortive coup of May 1981, even though unsuccessful, brought an end to Zia's rule, and his stunning exit from the scene sparked off yet another political crisis in the state of Bangladesh.

Conclusion
In sum, the administrative state that had endured for more than two decades in East Pakistan had been replaced after independence by a state dominated by politicians, but this only lasted for about four years. After the August 1975 coup, the civil-military bureaucrats again became dominant in the state apparatusand transformed it into an administrative state. After regaining their previous position and power, the civil-military bureaucracy adopted several measures in order to acquire political ascendancy and legitimacy. However, subsequently, the state faced tremendous opposition from both the regular political parties like the AL and the JSD, and the underground revolutionary parties. It also faced insurgency movements in the tribal areas of the Chittagong Hill Tracts. Through coercion and persuasion, the state managed to check the activities of the opposition, but the crisis emerged within and among the dominant forces of the administrative state itself. The three dominant forces-the BNP, the civil bureaucracy, and the military bureaucracybegan to fight among themselves. It was the internal contradiction and crisis among the dominant forces of the state apparatus that weakened the state under Zia and prepared the ground for its eventual collapse.