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41431
Vulnerability of Aircraft to 75MM Air-Burst Shell, Project TB3-0238A
Weiss, Herbert K.; Stein, Arthur (Efone)
£ Aberdeen Proving Ground, Ballistic Research Lab., Aberdeen, Md M.R.-482
ywame) Md.
(Same)
Sept» 48 Confd'l U.S. English 66 photos, tables, diagrs, graphs

Conditional probabilities are developed from the results of air-burst firings of the 75mm HE,
M48 against the B-25 bomber. These are used to prepare contours of constant probabilities
about the. aircraft. From these contours the conditional probability that a 75mm shell burst
causes a kill on the aircraft may be obtained. The pilots represent the most vulnerable
component of the B-25 in regards to the air-burst 75mm shell. Average zonal vulnerable
areas are obtained for the various major components as a result of field trials. These may
then be combined to give the over-all vulnerability of any aircraft with similar components.

Copies of this veport obtainable from Central Air Documents Office; Atta: MCIDXD
Ordnance and Ar• w» *•»**•» £5*** /0*>\ Shells*^ Fragmentation (85806);
Ballistics (12) Airplanes - Vulnerability "töT

Air Documents Division, T-2


mcr Wright Field
Microfilm No.

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CONFIDENTIAL

ORDNANCE DEPARTMENT

BALLISTIC RESEARCH LABORATORIES


ABERDEEN PROVING GROUND, MD.

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Joint Army-Navy Mailing
List for Guided Missiles
Dated I ':ove"fter 134(j
OS APG 4-9-47 OOOO

MEMORANDUM
REPORT NO. 482

Vulnerability of Aircraft to

75mm Air-Burst Shell

Herbert K. Weiss
Arthur Stein

CONFIDENTIAL

V
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CON FI DENTIAL

Vulnerability of Aircraft to

75mm Air-Burst Shell

MEMORANDUM
REPORT NO. 482

Herbert K. Weiss
Arthur Stein

PROJECT NO. TB3-0238A OF THE RESEARCH AND


DEVELOPMENT DIVISION. ORDNANCE DEPARTMENT

20 SEPTEMBER 1948

ORDNANCE DEPARTMENT

BALLISTIC RESEARCH LABORATORIES


ABERDEEN PROVING GROUND, MD.

CONFIDENTIAL

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MEMORANDUM REPORT NO. 482
TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

ABSTRACT - 3
1
Weiss/Stein/mjs
Aberdeen Proving Ground, Md.
INTRODUCTION - 4 8 April 1948
PROGRAM - 5

RESULTS 8
VULNERABILITY OF AIRCRAFT TO 75MM AIR-BURST SHELL
EVALUATION OF CONDITIONAL PROBABILITIES 16
IL
LETHAL AREAS — - - —- 53 ABSTRACT
m
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS - 62 Conditional probabilities are developed from the results of air-
burst firings, of the 75mm HE, M48 against the B-25 bomber. These are
APPENDK — - 63 used to prepare contours of constant probabilities about the aircraft.

BIBLIOGRAPHY - - 66 From these contours the conditional probability that a 75mm


shell burst causes a kill on the aircraft may be obtained. The pilots
DISTRIBUTION LIST - - - - - 67 represent the most vulnerable component of the B-25 to the air-burst
75mm.

Average zonal vulnerable areas are obtained for the various


major components as a result of field trials. These may then be com-
bined to give the overall vulnerability of any aircraft with similar com-
ponents. Here they were combined for the same type of aircraft as used
in the field trials for illustrative purposes.

DUPLICATING BRANCH
THE ORDNANCE SCHOOL
ABERDEEN PROVING GROUND
MARYLAND»

CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL
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INTRODUCTION weapon types. The first thorough vulnerability program during World War II was carried out in the United
States at the New Mexico Proving Ground by the Applied Physics Laboratory of Johns Hopkins University.
This report contains a preliminary description and analysis of firings to determine the vulnerability
The present program at Aberdeen Proving Ground has been strongly influenced by the methods used, and
of aircraft targets to fragmenting 75mm shell, bursting outside the aircraft. The experimental firings were
the results obtained in that pioneering study, particularly with regard to the air burst shell phases, with
carried out at Aberdeen Proving Ground as a part of an extensive program to determine the vulnerability
which the New Mexico program was entirely concerned.
of aircraft and their components to attacks by missiles, HE charges, fragments, jets, and other weapons.
A continuing program is now being carried out at Albuquerque by the New Mexico School of Mines,
In these experiments only two types of standard fragmentation shell were employed. They are the
under Navy contract. A comparison of some of the results of the present New Mexico program, which is
75mm HE, M48 and the 105mm, HE, Ml. The present report deals with the 75mm shell only.
also concerned primarily with fragment damage, with the Aberdeen results is contained in an appendix to
In planning the overall vulnerability program originally, it was realized that the variation in fragment
the present report.
mass distribution and velocity among the many types of service ammunition would limit the value of results
Mention must also be made of the extensive vulnerability experiments of the British references,
obtained by firing any particular standard shell, such as the M48. It was apparent that it would be practically
which are contained in an attached bibliography.
impossible to predict from the results obtained with one shell, the effectiveness of a shell of widely different
characteristics. Since at least 20 aircraft are expended in firings of a single ammunition type, another and
PROGRAM
more basic method of determining aircraft vulnerability to fragmenting projectiles was sought.
A solution was found in the firing of special shell constructed to emit fragments all of closely the Description of Firings. The 75mm HE, M48 shell weighs 14.70 lbs. and has a TNT loading of
same mass and initial velocity. Development work on these controlled fragmentation shell was started in 1.47 lbs. The shell was fired against a 3" thick wooden bursting screen with a muzzle velocity of approxi-
February 1946. Nine shell types representing three fragment masses and three velocities have been de- mately 1876 ft/sec, at a range of 170 ft. and elevation of about 7°. The striking velocity on the screen was
signed, produced and fired to date. It is anticipated that a report on these controlled fragmentation firings about 1870 ft/sec. The projectile lost about 200 ft/sec in passing through the screen; hence, the velocity
will be prepared in the near future. at the time of burst was about 1670 ft/sec. The striking velocity at the screen and the exit velocity were
In spite of the firings of controlled fragmentation shell, it was considered desirable to fire standard obtained by ultra-high speed motion pictures. Figure 1 shows such pictures for the 105mm HE, Ml shell.
shell in order to provide check points for the analysis involved in use of the controlled fragmentation results. Similar pictures were also used in a few representative firings to determine the average distance behind
Knowing, from results of the controlled fragmentation experiments, the probability that a single fragment of the screen at which the shell would detonate.
known mass and velocity will cause specified amounts of damage to aircraft components, and knowing, from The shell contained the Fuze, PD, M51A4, modified by removal of the black powder delay pellet.
pit tests of standard ammunition or design estimates the fragment density, mass range, and velocity range As a result, when the fuze was set for delay action the shell functioned 2' ± 6" behind the screen. The point
of artillery shell, rocket or guided missile warheads, it should be possible to predict the effectiveness of of burst was always considered to be 2 feet behind the screen.
such weapons without the necessity for expending additional aircraft. Firings were conducted from the front and rear of the target B-25 aircraft with the plane of the
The feasibility of such a method may be determined by comparing its results with the vulnerability trajectory parallel to the longitudinal axis of the fuselage. Initial burst points were chosen to lie on the
figures presented in the present report. It is expected that this comparison will be carried out when more surface of a cylinder with radius of 40 ft. The axis of the cylinder was the axis of the fuselage. The po-
results are available from the controlled fragmentation phase. sitions of burst were later modified somewhat for further study of particular components.
Description of Target. The B-25 medium bomber (see Figure 2) is a mid-wing land monoplane
The present report is, however, concerned solely with the presentation of the program and analyses
powered by two radial air-cooled Wright engines (series R 2600-13 or -29) which drive the three-bladed,
that have been carried out with the 75mm shell. B-25 bombers were used as a target aircraft and the re-
full-feathering, Hamilton Standard Hydromatic propellers. Each engine has 14 cylinders (attached to the
sults are interpreted in terms of vulnerability of the B-25. Since component vulnerabilities are obtained,
crankcase in 2 rows of 7 cylinders each) and is supplied by individual fuel and oil systems. Two com-
however, the basic figures may be applied to the determination of the vulnerability to 75mm air-burst shell
pensated Scintilla SF-14LN-3 magnetos are used for ignition and are attached to the supercharger rear
of any aircraft of similar structure, engine type, and fuel system.
housing cover. In each cylinder, the "right hand" magneto fires the front spark plug while the "left hand"
Although sporadic attempts to determine the vulnerability of aircraft to weapons of various sorts
magneto fires the rear.
have been made by the various services since World War I, most of these studies involved the expenditure
of not more than one aircraft. This single aircraft was frequently fired upon by a half dozen different

BRL Report 637, "Development of Controlled Fragmentation Shell Using Grooved Rings", J. E. Shaw, Technical Monograph No. 113, Applied Physics Laboratories, Johns Hopkins University. Part I, Experi-
8 April 1947. ments on the Vulnerability of Military Aircraft to High Explosive Shell Fragments, etc., April 1945.

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Figure 1. Test of Shell, 105mm, HE, Ml. Impacting a 3" wood target. Reproduced from Ultra High-Speed
Motion Pictures, (8000 pictures per second).
7
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BALLISTIC RESEARCH LABORATORIES BALLISTIC RESEARCH LABORATORIES

The primary fuel supply for each engine is composed bf two large self-sealing tanks located within
the wing between the fuselage and the engine nacelle. These are called the main tanks and are placed one
behind the other interconnected by a booster line and pump. In addition, three interconnected auxiliary
cells located outboard of the nacelle feed each engine. The B-25 S is sometimes equipped with a self-
sealing fixed bomb bay tank, located in the upper portion of the bomb bay. A supplementary droppable
aluminum tank can also be attached to the support of the fixed tank; however, it is assumed that the bomber ;'/
considered throughout this report carried neither of these two tanks. The front main tanks each have a
capacity of 189 gallons; the rear contain 151 gallons each; and the auxiliaries have a combined capacity
of 152 gallons. The fuel system is illustrated in Figure 3. Figure 4 illustrates the armor for the B-25. FUEL TANK CAPACITIES
US GAL. 1M R GAL.
The target airplane was usually completely combat equipped. The fuel tanks were loaded with 100 184 LEFT FRONT TANK 153
184 RIGHT FRONT TANK 153
octane gasoline. The engines were running at 2000 rpm and usually six 500 Ib., M64, GP bombs as well 151 LEFT REAR TANK 126
151 RIGHT REAR TANK 126
as 4800 rounds of Cal. 0.50 ammunition were stowed aboard. In some firings twelve 100 lb. bombs replaced 152 LEFT WING AUX. TANKS 126.5 •it. '
152 RIGHT WING AUX. TANKS 126.5
the 500 lb. bomb. Twelve caliber 0.50 machine guns were installed as were six low pressure oxygen bottles, 215 FUSELAGE TANK 179
335 BOMB BAY DROPPABLE TANK 279
each filled to 50 psi. Personnel were simulated by six wooden dummies equipped with flak suits and helmets. 1524 TOTAL 1269
The dummies were three-dimensional and constructed of 7/8" pine.
Figures 5-7 illustrate the firing position and details of construction of the dummies.
Firings were conducted against the B-25 in both the upright and inverted positions. For fuel cell
damage to the plane from bursts occurring below the wings, shell were statically detonated in positions such
that the angle of spray would be essentially the same with respect to the target as for the shell which were
fired from a gun.
In all, 24 aircraft were expended in the 75mm air-burst tests. This report, however, presents an
analysis of only those burst positions occurring above the plane of the wings. In these positions 12 planes
were expended.
A left-handed coordinate system was used to identify the points of burst and impact. This system
is illustrated in Figure 8. The left-handed system was selected in order to avoid the negative sign for the
Y-coordinate characterizing an impact on the plane. A right-handed system is simply obtained by reversing
the sign of the Y-coordinate.

RESULTS

Definitions of Assessments. Damage is assessed in the following four categories: H.


"A" DAMAGE is the probability that the aircraft will start to fall or go out of control within a period CARBURETOR
of five minutes from the time it is hit. The letter "K" in this category has been used to denote an immediate
crash without reasonable doubt; whereas, a notation of "Ktf' has indicated an immediate crash as well as
defeat of the mission.
"B" DAMAGE is the probability that the plane fails to return to base as a result of assessed damage.
This category includes the five minutes after the burst as well as the time to return to base; therefore, "B"
damage is always larger than or equal to "A" damage but never exceeds 100%. The sum of "A" and "B" may FIGURE 3
exceed 100%, and an assessment of "100 A" implies an assessment of "100 B" as well.

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The primary fuel supply for each engine is composed bf two large self-sealing tanks located within
the wing between the fuselage and the engine nacelle. These are called the main tanks and are placed one
behind the other interconnected by a booster line and pump. In addition, three interconnected auxiliary w
F?3S

cells located outboard of the nacelle feed each engine. The B-25 S is sometimes equipped with a self-
sealing fixed bomb bay tank, located in the upper portion of the bomb bay. A supplementary droppable
aluminum tank can also be attached to the support of the fixed tank; however, it is assumed that the bomber
considered throughout this report carried neither of these two tanks. The front main tanks each have a
capacity of 189 gallons; the rear contain 151 gallons each; and the auxiliaries have a combined capacity
FUEL TANK CAPACITIES
of 152 gallons. The fuel system is illustrated in Figure 3. Figure 4 illustrates the armor for the B-25. U.S GAL. IMP GAL.
184 LEFT FRONT TANK 153
The target airplane was usually completely combat equipped. The fuel tanks were loaded with 100 184 RIGHT FRONT TANK 153
octane gasoline. The engines were running at 2000 rpm and usually six 500 Ib., M64, GP bombs as well 151 LEFT REAR TANK 126
151 RIGHT REAR TANK 126
as 4800 rounds of Cal. 0.50 ammunition were stowed aboard. In some firings twelve 100 lb. bombs replaced 152 LEFT WING AUX. TANKS 126.5
152 RIGHT WING AUX. TANKS 126.5
the 500 lb. bomb. Twelve caliber 0.50 machine guns were installed as were six low pressure oxygen bottles, 215 FUSELAGE TANK 179
335 BOMB BAY DROPPABLE TANK 279
1524 TOTAL 1269
each filled to 50 psi. Personnel were simulated by six wooden dummies equipped with flak suits and helmets.
The dummies were three-dimensional and constructed of 7/8" pine.
Figures 5-7 illustrate the firing position and details of construction of the dummies.
Firings were conducted against the B-25 in both the upright and inverted positions. For fuel cell
damage to the plane from bursts occurring below the wings, shell were statically detonated in positions such
that the angle of spray would be essentially the same with respect to the target as for the shell which were Hit '-'I
fired from a gun.
In all, 24 aircraft were expended in the 75mm air-burst tests. This report, however, presents an
analysis of only those burst positions occurring above the plane of the wings. In these positions 12 planes
were expended. ''•4 •'.
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A left-handed coordinate system was used to identify the points of burst and impact. This system
is illustrated in Figure 8. The left-handed system was selected in order to avoid the negative sign for the
Hi
Y-coordinate characterizing an impact on the plane. A right-handed system is simply obtained by reversing
the sign of the Y-coordinate.

i%- -
RESULTS

Definitions of Assessments. Damage is assessed in the following four categories:


"A" DAMAGE is the probability that the aircraft will start to fall or go out of control within a period CARBURETOR

of five minutes from the time it is hit. The letter "K" in this category has been used to denote an immediate
crash without reasonable doubt; whereas, a notation of "KK" has indicated an immediate crash as well as
(oo-4t-eoi
defeat of the mission.
"B" DAMAGE is the probability that the plane fails to return to base as a result of assessed damage.
This category includes the five minutes after the burst as well as the time to return to base; therefore, "B"
damage is always larger than or equal to "A" damage but never exceeds 100%. The sum of "A" and "B" may FIGURE 3

exceed 100%, and an assessment of "100 A" implies an assessment of "100 B" as well.
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.051 and .025 Aluminum Alloy plates after test of Type 2 Shell, No. 4, on aircraft No. 31151.
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-t-z Some slight modifications of the definitions of numerical assessments must be made in some cases.
+x Thus, if assessments of damage to a single engine of a multi-engined aircraft were made as defined above,
one would not have a true measure of damage to the aircraft as a whole, since even an immediate kill on
one engine would not necessarily result in an immediate kill on the aircraft. Hence, for twin-engine and
multi-engine aircraft, "A" and "B" assessments for engine damage refer to that engine only, and not to the
aircraft. The "C" and "E" assessments in these cases will still refer to the aircraft as a whole.
The "engine" in the B-25 is defined as that part of the power plant forward of the firewall, the engine
controls and the oil system.
The "fuel system" includes all fuel tanks or cells, selector valves, transfer and booster pumps,
strainers, and fuel hoses, lines and fittings.
-Y
"Structures" are defined as any part of the plane except the engine and engine controls and include
the aircraft structure, surface controls, dummy personnel, armor, armament, landing gear, etc. The
"Structures" assessment is also given exclusive of damage to personnel, and pilot damage is separately
listed.
A code is used to describe the physical components and functional systems that are damaged or •M
impaired during the firings, so for each part hit and identified by the code there is an estimate of the
relative contribution of damage by that part. Also a non-function code is used to denote component parts
1
that have been rendered ineffective. However, this report dealing with the fragment damage from the
75mm will not present a tabulation of damage to individual components, since such a tabulation is under
COORDINATE SYSTEM preparation for controlled fragments. It is much more meaningful to have the component damage resulting
from strikes by fragments whose mass and velocity are known.
"C" DAMAGE is the probability that the particular attack will not be completed. It is possible to Assumption of the Mission. Assessments of aircraft damage will vary according to tactical situations.
have "C" damage although no "A" or "B" damage exists. Thus, damage to guns, bomb release mechanism, For this reason some basic assumptions are made to which the assessments apply. The following assump-
controls whose loss would interfere with the prosecution of the attack, and incapacitation of personnel in-
tions are made with regard to the B-25.
volved in the attack, would be classed as "C" damage. An immediate kill, KK, implies 100 "C" damage. In a. The aircraft is in level flight, on a solo mission, at an altitude of 10,000 feet.
assessing "C" damage, or in fact any category of damage, it is assumed that the pilot will remain with the b. It is on its bomb run and is hit 2-1/2 minutes (at 200 IAS) from point of release of bombs. Bomb
plane and try to prosecute the attack, even though "bailing out" is feasible. The assumption that the attack
doors are opened two minutes before "bombs away."
is 2-1/2 minutes away is also an important one in evaluating "C" damage.
c. The bombsight is pre-set for 200 mph IAS, and the bombs are armed by the bomb-shackle arming
"E" DAMAGE is the probability that the plane will be structurally damaged while landing. ("D" damage,
hooks.
which pertained to manhours required for repair of damage, has been omitted and is not assessed.)
d. No evasive action is necessary, and the target area is 500 feet square.
This report analyzes the "A" and "B" categories of damage caused by the 75mm HE, M48 to the B-25.
e. The mission is to drop twelve 100 lb. or six 500.1b. bombs on the target.
Compound Damage. Any fragment impacting on an undamaged area or component may be given a
f. Each engine has a spring loaded throttle on the carburetor that will maintain 30" Hg manifold
single fragment assessment. A fragment impacting on a previously damaged area or component will result pressure in the event that the throttle cables are severed,
in compound damage, and a "compound assessment" is given to the combination of hits in the area. The
g. The aircraft flies to the target on fuel in the auxiliary cells and has all four main cells full for
compound assessments are used to evaluate the conditional probability for obtaining such damage in actual
the return to base.
combat. The same definition holds for the "single burst" assessment as compared to a "compound burst"
(1) On twin-engine operation 100 gallons per hour are consumed.
assessment.
(2) On single-engine operation 125 gallons per hour are consumed,
Cumulative Damage. Cumulative damage assessments are given for damage to the entire plane.
h. The base landing area is a steel mat 100 feet wide and 6000 feet long.
Thus, whereas two hits on the same fuel cell may cause both compound and cumulative damage, two hits on
i. Both pilots are as competent as possible, know all emergency procedures, and each member of
tanks on opposite sides of the plane may be assessed singly and also cumulatively where the resulting damage
the crew has a working knowledge of every other man's assignment.
to the plane is greater than would be expected from the single fragment assessments alone.

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Firing Results. Results of the 75mm air-burst firings against the upright B-25 are presented in
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Table I. The radial distance referred to in the table is defined as the distance along the shortest line from
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the longitudinal axis of the fuselage (extended if necessary) to the point of burst. The radial angle is the
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angle of this line with theXY-plane. The number of assessable fragments for each burst is indicated. A
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number of columns are devoted to a description of the target aircraft at the time of burst. Thus, the table o o jj o © u
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line, the ammunition that was stowed, the armament that was installed, whether the wooden dummies were & & & &
installed equipped with flak suits and helmets and also whether oxygen bottles were installed. The final
columns of the table give the sums of the individual fragment assessments.
It will be noted that the structural damage occurred chiefly in the "C" and "E" categories of damage.
The few instances of "A" or "B" structural damage were due to personnel injuries and hydraulic fire. The
three immediate structural kills were caused by hydraulic fires. In one instance hydraulic fire resulted OOO oo oooo oooo o oo O OOOOO«)

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An immediate kill was obtained on an engine in one instance having been caused by ruptured fuel lines and o oooo oo o oooo oooo oo O OOOOO©

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OO O OOOO©»"'

tn»Ooooo©ov)ooo o MOOO oo] oiAoooooooonnnooo «oooooo ion © <A


common category for engine damage) was caused in a large majority of cases by damage to the lubrication
oooooNoooNNgu) oooo! oooo ooooomooooinoooooooo o&oooom ooo o

system. In this respect, the results are similar to those obtained in bullet firings against air-cooled re- ooooooooooooo OOOO 00©OlOO©000©0©©OOOOOOC>00 OOOOOOO ooo Ö

ciprocating engines, for which results are presented in BRLM Report No. 462. OOOOOOOOOOOOO OOOOXOOOO OOMOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO OOOOOOO

There were 10 fires observed which were due to the fuel system. Of these, six were caused by int »-
£S
many fragment impacts into undamaged cells; one fire was caused by fragments cutting fuel lines; three
others resulted from fragment impacts on leaking or damaged cells.
The damage to engine and structure sub-components has been assessed and coded in a similar
manner as for bullet impacts (see BRLM Report No. 462). However, due to limitation in time, this damage
to sub-components has not been tabulated. The tabulation would be of limited use, in any event, since the K8. s s8 8
3
»H ftj
o"

mass and velocity of the individual fragments causing the damage are not determinable in most cases. The 8
1 ?! •s
AS
tabulation of sub-component damage resulting from controlled fragments will be of much greater use. This
OOOOOOOOOOOOO o©©oooooo ooononoingoooooe "?« °?°.
latter tabulation is being greatly facilitated by the use of IBM cards for all controlled fragmentation data.

naaxijom
«ooooooooo «•«uwuoOOO* o« «oooocOOOOOO-
«KKBKsar-na t> oooo «a a as u o «ua^a«aaaaa»j
EVALUATION OF CONDITIONAL PROBABILITIES
t> r--> •* ON *rtn oat* ifcoot «oowc-o^rtii , o>inoi©Qjinc>(OV>oi
« rtHHnwin«NW»)«rtf) innon «ov>rt-*
Vulnerable Areas of Components.
Fragmentation Pattern. Experience with the results of bullet impact firings against aircraft com -
•* S5NNnn«ounn<)in t^Atooonv^inininininviinirmviioiOioriiointomoc^c;

ponents and observation of the results of both the standard shell and controlled fragmentation air-burst
firings indicated the zones in space around each major component to which the component presents a cnoof,M-n NF)F)nr)r)ionn not >o <-«© «o>

physically similar target. That is to say, a particular fragment coming from any point in a chosen zone
has the same probability of killing the component (engine, pilot, etc.) as from any other point in the zone.1 O, XK fcKKH.ru tub.t-ti.tr.ee XKtutu>.l-luf,>4tut^»ut-.tutuKKKKK

o> o>o*o- >o>•>o* *» o>P">•> "O «a«o<ov>o<ooo<ooo»o*t>oo>o>o>o>«*ooto>o>co>o* o>°:J* »»»»o-o» oo oo*

• OHpioooHynrto« CDtooo\oto^jf©<j-H<Hc*t»fH^io«onOonot7'*ortOrtttio «io © co « «•* o« c-c-


.—.•••- -• '•• f- > MO nA<fnn« IOH i •-»-« i i HriHNUMrinwoii' IIII •"*-* HR

Provided striking velocity is the same. OHrt©o©(c o>it> ii)0ie«««o«oaotaao>o>o>«koicka>oo0oooo^<'' ^niAiooifti') »in v*ir>

OOt.(OClHM> i<Ov«MOt-a>e.^r.^»olft>? T o> — «meH ma. g;«


t-oec r>c*occ
OOC-0-Otl>^0«OK> r>a)(AoiiI<ci>oOHHUiH(\)<vi'. n c^ -r •+ •* -f ifJ *"no *> o -*
c-
gt . w w v* SJ w »v w »"•»••" »v r* " " T-< T v-< -. -r-j--v-j--. -. -«-V ^ «f *-T «T V IT» tf> U> «IV rfl »S <HO »I «JOO-OiOlD» O (Ö «10«
T
7 A-

>

16 BALLISTIC RESEARCH LABORATORIES

Firing Results. Results of the 75mm air-burst firings against the upright B-25 are presented in
Table I. The radial distance referred to in the table is defined as the distance along the shortest line from
the longitudinal axis of the fuselage (extended if necessary) to the point of burst. The radial angle is the
angle of this line with the XY-plane. The number of assessable fragments for each burst is indicated. A
< o © © > o o io ooco oooooo
number of columns are devoted to a description of the target aircraft at the time of burst. Thus, the table & .->!. DO
jj. . °S° "Ofiooo coooof
"o"" HI 1 1 •
©©OCOHO
fj &©t- lfciC>0 COotjOC-B O t (r U& Ut-OO&C-C'jnC'O J CO oco«
&&0«j^O CO O *©t-© COCf OO.Ot/OC'C-C'C OOC- »OOOvC
describes which engines were running, the percent of capacity to which the fuel tanks were filled with gaso- ooo o«t< oo (i c>o o<_-e- o oooooo oc ooooo

line, the ammunition that was stowed, the armament that was installed, whether the wooden dummies were i* 4.
installed equipped with flak suits and helmets and also whether oxygen bottles were installed. The final
columns of the table give the sums of the individual fragment assessments.
It will be noted that the structural damage occurred chiefly in the "C" and "E" categories of damage. A.. •.UJLJf. *~B.
The few instances of "A" or "B" structural damage were due to personnel injuries and hydraulic fire. The
three immediate structural kills were caused by hydraulic fires. In one instance hydraulic fire resulted
in the loss of the aircraft before assessment of individual fragments could be made. a ä ii.
Only one burst, at position (X = 5, Y * 2, 7 = 29>, caused appreciable "A" damage to both engines.
An immediate kill was obtained on an engine in one instance having been caused by ruptured fuel lines and
8
fire. In general, the "A" damage to engines resulted from damage to the fuel system (main feeder line), " • » ?HOH5HI -.».. si?. , ofiiii8(>s8j . „JE. „„^„fi .. gss£. ., £...., 8,J?j!ooo.>°.>8& . «J
the carburetor, control cables, or magneto switch junction box and leads; whereas, "B" damage (the most £ o & it Ko£ K v. & o£ y.

Q «>«1©0O0OO
common category for engine damage) was caused in a large majority of cases by damage to the lubrication
3 °""58" ocjo^oc t *> t oe

system. In this respect, the results are similar to those obtained in bullet firings against air-cooled re-
ciprocating engines, for which results are presented in BRLM Report No. 462.
There were 10 fires observed which were due to the fuel system. Of these, six were caused by
many fragment impacts into undamaged cells; one fire was caused by fragments cutting fuel lines; three
others resulted from fragment impacts on leaking or damaged cells.
The damage to engine and structure sub-components has been assessed and coded in a similar
manner as for bullet impacts (see BRLM Report No. 462). However, due to limitation in time, this damage
to sub-oomponents has not beer, tabulated. The tabulation would be of limited use, in any event, since the
mass and velocity of the individual fragments causing the damage are not determinable in most cases. The
tabulation of sub-component damage resulting from controlled fragments will be of much greater use. This ZZKtZZu
8 8888888888888 8888888888888888 . 8SSSSSSSSS8 SggS8SSSSSS£Sg£S||| 2SSSS£|oS£S|gS8
latter tabulation is being greatly facilitated by the use of IBM cards for all controlled fragmentation data.

EVALUATION OF CONDITIONAL PROBABILITIES


« nr)*nNAäNutinrii7 inrm«)
Vulnerable Areas of Components.
Fragmentation Pattern. Experience with the results of bullet impact firings against aircraft com-
ponents and observation of the results of both the standard shell and controlled fragmentation air-burst
firings indicated the zones in space around each major component to which the component presents a
physically similar target. That is tc say, a particular fragment coming from any point in a chosen zone
has the same probability of killing the component (engine, pilot, etc.) as from any other point in the zone.1
[>••>* t> » > >«&•>•>•>«<*•><* O. » •> £» » <> •> O^ ««» ««9Mt(>i>«ft««Ad.BAAl)lAAI1 1ft K, lA^linninn

Provided striking velocity is the same. us


SI"

i "__A.k —_..
BALLISTIC RESEARCH LABORATORIES 19

If now the vulnerable area of a component to a given type of fragment is defined as the presented area of the
component times the probability that the fragment will kill the component if it hits the presented area, the
assumption is made that the vulnerable area of a component is the same for all bursts within a zone.

The zones employed in this study are shown in Figures 9 and 10 for the engines and pilots respectively.
The zones for fuel and structures are the hemispheres above and below the XY-plane.
The vulnerable areas of the individual major components which constitute the B-25 were determined
for each of the zones associated with those components. The calculation of the vulnerable areas was based
on the fact that the density of fragments, (fragments per square foot) multiplied by the vulnerable area in
square feet, yields the expected number of kills. This may be written as p (A ) = K where K is expected
number of kills, p is density and A is vulnerable area. Because not all of the rounds fired burst at the
same distance from each vulnerable'component, a correction must be applied for the variation in effective-
ness of the fragments with distance from burst point to impact. The dependence of damage on fragment
mass and velocity will be determined for aircraft components in the controlled fragmentation firings
Since the controlled fragmentation results are not yet available, a fall-off lav; for damage was used which
was based on the number of perforations obtained per unit solid angle through 1" spruce panels placed at
four different distances from the bursting shell.

(TOP)
VULNERABILITY ZONES
(ENGINES)

Figure 9
r ^
u m-ffTMffmlnimr- - —-- -.—--

20 BALLISTIC RESEARCH LABORATORIES BALLISTIC RESEARCH LABORATORIES 21

(TOP)

(REA

VULNERABILITY ZONES
(PILOTS)

>

>«•> A**- Sss %*»**& \ -' o

•w» *->"-:*•

"«fei«. -"> v-««—«• '"^ ""•*««*


*v V«- «* yv"">-» »"»A--* *•*'' • *—-**»»* • 3,00*
Tiwr^S-

a*. •?>•"• ^-'


D
Ü

FIGURE 10

Figure 11 shows the fragments to be expected from one 75mm HE, M48 shell. In a series of panel
tests conducted with this shell, the perforations of 1" spruce per unit solid angle were obtained as a function
of the angle with the axis of the shell . The tests were conducted for shell fired statically and also for shell
with remaining velocities of 700 and 1085 ft/sec. Perforations were obtained through spruce panels, with
approximate thickness of 1", placed 15, 36, 75 and 120 feet from the bursting shell. Figure 12 reproduced
from BRL Report No. 126, shows the distribution of perforating fragments for a shell with a remaining
velocity of 1085 ft/sec. At this remaining velocity, the side spray is found to lie between angles of 56° to
91° from the nose of the shell. At a remaining velocity of 1670 ft/sec, such as obtained in the air-burst
firings against the B-25 aircraft, the side spray moves forward so that it lies between 45° and 80° from the
nose of the shell. For computational purposes, this 35° spray was broken up into a main side spray with
2 fringe sprays on either side, as in Figure 13.

L
BRL Report No. 126, "Fragmentation Effects of the 75mm HE Shell T3 (M48) as Determined by Panel and
Pit Fragmentation Tests", by N. A. Tolch, contains a detailed descriotion of the tests and analysis of the
fragmentation patterns for this shell.

IT" !
i !
i
i
!'-- J
y >
if .'
7 "' -rt

BALLISTIC RESEARCH LABORATORIES BALLISTIC RESEARCH LABORATORIES 23

DIRECTION OF FIRE (VEL. = 1670 F/S)

o
CD
O CM
— CJ
ec —
*- *
o 2
IO u.
=• a.

a.

UJ
_>
o
z
<
o
_l
o >•
to -1 ANGLE OF SIDESPRAY - 75MM, HE M48
1
»- UJ o
z X o FIGURE 13
=> _l _J
u. _J UJ o
Ul o UJ > The fragment density was converted from perforations per unit solid angle to perforations per
X
a. tf)
X z square foot (normal to the trajectories of the fragments) by the equation:
V)
< UJ
z
2i- > X X
1- to <
< y- 3E ff(d)
P(d)
a: * UJ
o «E
U- UJ
CC _J in
ÜJ o (•- u. where d is the distance in feet, p(d) is the density of fragments per square foot at distance d and <r(d) is
Q. z in
Q
<t oo UJ the number of perforations per unit solid angle at distance d, as obtained from BRL Report No. 126. The
O o
UJ z graphs of this equation for the main and fringe side sprays as given in Figure 13 are shown in Figure 14.
t-
V) ' " • •
=> 10 The <r(d) used to obtain these graphs was the average ordinate in Figure 12 of the side spray. Whenever a
-3 a
Q component was hit by the fringe of the side spray the average density for that fringe was used. When the
<
15 FT

120'
36 •

component was hit by the entire side spray the average density of the main spray was employed.

o <J n
Reduction of Field Test Observations.
Zonal vulnerable areas. For each burst recorded in Table I a tabulation was made of the distance
to any of 14 component areas which fall within the side spray. These included: the near engine, far engine,
near pilot, far pilot, near fuel cells, far fuel cells, near outboard wing, far outboard wing, near inboard
wing, far inboard wing, forward fuselage, mid-fuselage, aft fuselage and empennage. By means of Figure 14,
o the density per square foot of fragments capable of perforating 1" spruce was then tabulated for each com-
a'
318NV 01108 ilNfl H3d 8N0I1VUOJHad ponent area as a function of the distance from the burst. The observed sum of "A" and "B" damage on the
Y- ^

T FW. ,.,, 1L

BALLISTIC RESEARCH LABORATORIES BALLISTIC RESEARCH LABORATORIES 25

component area was then recorded. Dividing the observed number of "A" (or "B") kills on the component
FRAGMENT DENSfTY VS. DISTANCE
by the density of fragments then yielded the observed vulnerable area for "A" (or "B") damage for the com-
ponent.

TABLE II

Observed Average Zonal Vulnerable Areas (ft'


(75mm HE, M48vs. B-25)

A s(ft2) A v(ft2)
V v
Component Zone Nos. of Rds. "A" Damage "B" Damage
Front Rear Front Rear Front Rear

Engine El 11 0 0 0 1.36 0
E2 0 5 0 0 0 7.49
E3 0 5 0 0 0 3.22
E4 96 63 0.34 0.05 1.79 1.11
E5 27 22 1.02 0 1.38 0
Pilot Bl 5 0 1.18 0 1.18 0
B2 50 13 1.77 1.88 1.77 1.88
B3 0 33 0 0.25 0 0.25
B4 18 3 1.41 3.51 1.41 3.51
Forw. Fuselage Z>0 55 41 0.06 0 0.061 0
Z<0 18 11 0 0 0 0
Mid Fuselage Z>0 56 42 0 0 0 0
Z<0 19 14 0 0 0 0
Aft Fuselage Z>0 46 40 0 0 0 0
Z<0 16 13 0 0 0 0
Near Inboard Wing z >0 54 46 0 0 0 0
Z<0 19 13 0 0 0 0
Near Outboard Wing Z>0 54 37 0 0 0 0
Z<0 14 12 0 0 0 0
Far Inboard Wing Z>0 62 49 0 0 0 0
Z<0 20 16 0 0 0 0
Far Outboard Wing Z>0 60 49 0 0 0 0
Z<0 20 15 0 0 0 0
Empennage Z>0 29 22 0 0 0 0
Z<0 14 7 0 0 0 0
\t

Each burst position fell into one of the zones described above for each of the components. It was
then possible to classify by zone, on each of the components, the individual observed vulnerable areas for
each burst. The averages of these zonal vulnerable areas are presented in Table II.
FIGURE 14
Vulnerability of Fuel System. Fuel tank fires usually were caused by the impact of more than one
fragment and required a more careful treatment. Table III lists the observed data for the six fires obtained
with previously undamaged tanks.
J'
y * JLi
if
iyaüt-'JgjJS T ii

BALLISTIC RESEARCH LABORATORIES BALLISTIC RESEARCH LABORATORIES 27

TABLE III mm m m iiil iii •iii iiii iii iii! 'iii HI !!! iii iü iü; ;-::
tt:
iiii iii •Hi •iii HSi •Ht Ü HH HH HH it: j'tt tt\
t!:

m P mm jiii iji titr Hi Hi -•':


•iii
t!.1!
"i-i iiii nii ipi iii .iii iiii ;Hi
,:t!
iH- !!!! !|H v.i s}\ 41!
trt:
I!]! i!fi m m ::*
iiii •I' ':.. !t* It! tit Hi. "li
N N 'iii iii 'H ii. Hi HH Hit it:
*-[*
HT
Density Group Range R F Average Assess- !:•

£:t -..: ;;i '.!'


ft. No. of Rounds No. of NF ment of Fires it" -«}
P :;.-; •i: ; ii- *•; ::ii .'Hi tii
:
'••;':

Producing Frag- Fires N


F
p
A
P
B m m m m Hi I:: ;!: .:-•. .tt: iii; •:H Hi 'H: •H *:r; .I'.l

ment Hits on Ob- •!H


m n in: i!H «tt
::i:
. t :;. iii
•iii :iti "Hi . ; •iii 'Ht Hi '•'/:
.' 1 :i: itt. : ; r: tt::
Fuel Tank Area served percent percent
m mm m tttt
; i; ii.i •iii iii: iii '-' i
!
!
t
..*• 'it .tt.
.Hi tHt iiii .').'. Hi i": iiii
:ttt rrrr
:

0 - .10 oo-40 122 0 0 0 0 ttr: m m iii; ft!! •Hi- '-'•'


ÜÜ "" >? *
iÜ it .iii iiii H' HH iif
öSH
iii t|H !< utt

.11 - .20 39-28 51 2 .039 0 12.5 m HH m ft Iiii ii« ;;;* :.! :i' :.:
:
•iii Iiii iüi Hi!
w
Hi •a. ti .-•;-:
•'ii
tit * 'it. rrrr

3g i P m Ü- Hir
.21 - .30 27-33 37 2 .054 75 100 :!;: :<
iii: :«;
ttli
i ii -!' ;
;>;; HH tii:
Hi! HH !!H ti rSe
.tt:
:;t: .•]. ••:!

1
•-:

iiii liit i Iüi tut


22-17 16 .125 •fif Mh
.31 - .60 2 0 0
h I lit! m iüi iki ii- ill; ;: ti-tt
im
jit; :
iiii iiii it I.:; ;:
ffi
ii: HH :i: * * * +
tt:t
•:it

IK m 88 ft ti m tin ti iiii I'll


.!..
S iiii :;rt
- - iV i:H •;4 ••;; !:H iiii tt»
ig 'Hi .. t r :t1t it!

m m ttnHHtHilitit
m iiii rttt ttl
;:;! r
i: ; i'ti •: ii Iiii iiii iiii Iiii HH ilf,
•ti: 'tt- ; ; l : : : it \1 3TT
iiii,
-ttt ttt
tttt
Tt'I
til m iiii ;i- i.-i
;:;t t;t i :
i:: iiii iiii it. •:
P .1-. til! i;rt ttt; : ;t!l

The points, rz-, were used to fit curves representing the probability of obtaining a fire as a function mm m KH ::•: m i-H'i iiii i::.
ttri
iiii "Ir rnt Iiii iiii it iiii
1
.t4'.
;:tt
t:.'
•p
tttt
Tw-
R '* .
tw •3E •!<r '••'•
T" .;: [tit • iii HH iiii iii! it
' t *;
lit:
:
!H it
";* :s? !:.. iii, tut tr;t
of density and as a function of distance. These curves are illustrated in Figures 15 and 16, respectively. ;j;ti
A
:••: in; .fr ;iii «tt HÜ ii'H Hit :ti: it }•

It was assumed that the severity of a fire, as reflected in the "A" and "B'' assessments of fires,
I'! J
o Mr-
..ii ''.:'
HH :iti !!' '' X
• i\ '; .'•",

]"•'
'• !*!
iiii Hi! iiii nn tut
Hit Üii tits \% 35 J tttt '.it

olnjuld increase with the fragment density. Since only C fires were observed it was decided to use a smooth !•••
.'j
3
<:v .i;:
-'••'.
•if it HH :rt: ÜÜ ti ÜÜ it tO
«4
-tit
is ; h ;, iiii ti iS t^i
function to represent the probability of an "A" (or "B") kill as a function of density or of distance. However, it
^3£
•i'U
t::: ... L
;
;
'•
-,-' iii; tttt
litt
;;H j ;jt
o tU.
iiii lii- ice -a
.itf i'ui ••G .'•'.• .... ..;:
T tut V"V :t.t tit.
tit:
iiil iiii iiii -co
this smooth function was chosen to have the same average assessment of fires as was actually observed. T1'.'
'£•« iiji |Iti
"ill
4:;- r :t
::n iti't "V -i r r
HH Hi' :;;i iiii Hi! ".it -HH
m HH HH if:: ti". i;: >•
•Sf

i!'-, TO : :.:: :'!S t'.ii !!:• ax


The smooth function was made asymptotic to a probability of 90% with increasing density, for both "A" and
to a HU iüi HH iiV. iiii
*fT ..B ...
i:i? H:l :it' üii iii!
I'M iii: tilt . ti
it
Ki-
Ä

'If? jiii fin ii'i jiii HH |iit V' ii - Vfr t: :«t


"E" assessments of fires. Then, for any density or distance, the product of the probability of getting a fire ti J2E
ir' t:.
i: • •!•: üii ti! iii1
. \. t
•a.

times the probability of an "A" (or "E"1 kill when a fire occurs is the overall probability of getting an "A"
ttt! ::<t !;* His it; w,t
tt-tr ii'.! m •:•• :|U it\^ \i iii: t"
.ii'
::^i!i it 1": tt.
ll .

(or "B") kill due to fuel fire.


::i!
-'ir HO ii<
itjjf it:;
;ii; üi- ittt üi; •:-' Hil ••rl '••.,
is:
ti3:-: iiil i't •t i!;. iiii 1" ;M*
•^
Hit iK i:<» :*HH
'**T
tin HH it;t :tr \-ir r.r. Hit iC •r -'i: ;::' Hi! IJ^ t H'; s
Fragment Vulnerability Device.
;:lt
m I5S •Irr •tun'
'. u H;T
• -^ "
i: '. !"•':
oa: B:, ii;: • •!; ji':
Sitj
t-'i ii* ",',*
:

The determination of the expected number of fragment strikes on an aircraft component is a laborious
Hit iäl l'& HwS:i' Tttt •J
"itt A ','•' '•••': « iiii Üii iüi Iiii ::H it K iii'
++-;
H2 ;'«:'.- .i: v;i it.: ttjJil; lltj ttu HH :tt ttt : Ti:
o; *;
/i
;';•'

task if performed mathematically. A mechanical device was therefore developed to reproduce the problem
1
HH ;«•
'w njif
::C'.-
t:j! it iii; •Hi HH 't
•a [tti >
to scale. This device is shown in Figures 17 and 18. The long horizontal bar at the top of the device
represents the shell trajectory in the vicinity of the target. The center uf the dial at the end of this bar
HH
Hü :*r
:-;: .::. :ii. ii.
•;::
k it \
•-;•-
::.'
...: CD
::;<s:;i it
ti -;•• it ;::. l'l Hft
;•;!.'

••;;
hi
:

It" -.a-::-
represents the burst position. The scale model of the target is oriented and located with respect to the .HGLu
tit;
" ! ^ ki i\ ;f it
: • ;;. ;i i it is?
: ii'i
tit!
_;:; •t:: t ...' it" •ia :-i:

i
i^iii: iir :
j:!:
burst position as desired to simulate any experimental or assumed spacial relationship. l \
!•:. i tt :
:;' :;•! ii • •\
i-.i ii'i
-t.'ST7
The thin rod with pointed end and the scale passing through the dial center are then oriented rela- •:" !:', i tv
iii iii' i. ; IÜ '•:;•

:i: .' <, 4^ iii.


tive to the shell trajectory to one of the boundary angles of the main or fringe fragment sprays. This angle Hit HH Hi' ii: IH- ;;: iiii ::' iii. '1 . t;;
> it" ^ X i' '

is read on the dial and the angular setting is locked by a set screw. As the dial plus transverse rod is ro-
•AV w Hi Hi iii 'i: •.:. :r^ : - ET iii •:-

-1 ii: it.
UB ü|i Hi Hi Hi' vi ii.' i'.t i!':: ii' HJ i:
tated about the shell trajectory as axis, the rod traces in space the cone describing the chosen fragment -;.
spray boundary. A Ii! it
-+MJ
'.*.: ":•
:i'' :T^ <r
.,!'
It:
, ,,

ii! tttt
iTt* Sjj i;

'i'. :n Hi •(1 .. ..: .:^ :iii iii :! .^.. l;. :: ,:•

J
t..
.:
Hi 'ii^i" -.. iii ""T "'- !»" <>. . :i: j.'t ö
.
!t: .- 'It <Ml

:'t.; r
4..
;
i'i^ :' :

For an ingenious method of accomplishing the same objective by photographic techniques, See Technical
•V.
•f
:::)•
»?:
" fctr^r rq: f a uc a

:, j-
Report No. 458, of the Research and Development Division, New Mexico School of Mines, page A-40. Hi • | •';
7 y. zU
__ I
i I

BALLISTIC RESEARCH LABORATORIES BALLISTIC RESEARCH LABORATORIES 29

: ;
1
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FIGURE 17

^m:::::..l
4_i .. It IE .
. I. , M :. .".
i rWEIV SO Md .;. ;:::
•1. ..:!• :•!•

-^"">v
r
mBMwmaum

T -\*-;-- -u'^awAms.^LjJi

30 BALLISTIC RESEARCH LABORATORIES BALLISTIC RESEARCH LABORATORIES 31

The pointed rod slides freely through the dial center, and its extension, read against the linear
scale, indicates the distance from the burst point to the pointed end of the rod. If the point is held against
the aircraft surface as the dial assembly is rotated about the trajectory axis, the point traces on the air-
craft the intersection of the boundary of the fragment spray with the aircraft surface. Simultaneously the
distance of each point on the intersection from the burst point may be read on the scale.
For any burst position relative to the target the components of the aircraft struck by each portion
of the fragment spray are thus easily determined, as is the distance from the burst point to each compon-
ent. The density of potentially lethal fragments is then Icnown, and the expected number of lethal hits may
be computed. The probability of at least one lethal hit on each component may then be determined.

Calculation of Conditional Probabilities.


Once the zonal vunlerabilities are obtained for the major components of the aircraft it is not diffi-
cult to obtain the overall probability of obtaining a kill on the composite aircraft. At this point the zonal
vulnerabilities may be used to synthesize the vulnerability of the same type of aircraft used to obtain the
data on component damage (the B-2a in this case), or to synthesize the vulnerability of any other aircraft
with similar components, even if these are differently arranged. Since the 75mm firings are to serve as a
check point for comparison with an independent estimate to be made on the basis of controlled fragmentation
results, the simplest aircraft target to use is the B-25 itself.
The calculation of probability contours requires that the overall probability of a kill on the plane
« be obtainable for any arbitrary point of burst about the B -25.
O
t-H The procedure is as follows: The direction of flight and the position of shell-burst is simulated to
scale on the fragment vulnerability device (Figures 17 and 18). The chosen point of burst will fall into a
zone for each of the major aircraft components. By means of the fragment vulnerability device, the dis-
tance, and hence the density of fragments in the side spray, is obtained for impacts on each of the major
components. Since pA = K, the average zonal vulnerable area of the component may be used to obtain K,
-K"
the expected number of kills on the component due to the shell burst. Then e is the probability that the
component survives and 1 - e~ is the probability of at least one kill on the component.
For any given burst it is thus possible to obtain the probability of at least one kill on each of the
major components. If P 1 - e" A«- is the probability of at least one "A" kill on the near engine and
El

and P„ = 1 - e"-K,A„0 is the probability of an "A" kill on the far engine then (P. ) (P ) is the proba-
A El A
E2 El E2 N
bility that the burst causes an "A" kill to both engines. Similarly, (P ) (P ) is the probability of L*/
A A
P1 P2
causing "A" damage to both pilots. Since usually P •= P. , the probability of "A" damage to both pilots
Apl Ap2

is (1 - e_KApl)2.

The probability of killing each of the singly vulnerable components, fuel and structure, is simply

1 - e^A^ where KA is the expected number of "A" kills on the singly vulnerable component.
SV A
SV
r ..-_ !_
fH i i It t-L

32 BALLISTIC RESEARCH LABORATORIES BALLISTIC RESEARCH LABORATORIES 33

If it is assumed that the plane suffers "A" damage if both engines, or both pilots, or any of the singly
vulnerable components suffer "A" damage, then the probability that the burst resulted in an "A" kill to the
plane is:

-K, -K„ -K. -K,


"SI S2 S3 "S4
P
A = 1 1 - P. 1 - P.
*F1 T2

-K, -K„
*E1 E2N Pl>2
(1 -e )(1 1 -(1

where PA and PA are the probabilities of "A" kills on the plane due to the fuel tank area in the near
X
F1 "F2
and far wing respectively. They are obtained by use of the Figures 15 and 16. K. , K. , K. and K.
A
S1 AS2 AS3 A
S4
are the expected numbers of "A" kills on the plane due to the forward, middle and aft fuselage structure and
empennage, respectively. K. and K.. are expected numbers of "A" kills on the near and far engines,
A A
E1 E2
respectively, and K. is the expected number of "A" kills on one pilot.
A
P1
Contours of constant probability for "B" damage were prepared for firings from the front and rear.
These contours were sketched into various views of the aircraft to relate the three dimensions. For firing
from the front, Figure 19 illustrates shell bursts in the XY plane at Z = 0 (plane of the wings); Figure 20
shows the effect of bursts in the YZ plane at X = 0; and Figures 21 - 28 indicate shell bursting in XZ planes
at Y = -15, -10, -5, 0, 5, 10, 15 and 20 feet respectively. Origin of the coordinate system remained, as
previously, the intersection of the nose of the aircraft with the line passed thru the center of gravity
parallel to the fuselage.
Similar sketches were made to cover firing from the rear. Figure 29 shows the effect of bursts in
the XY plane; Figure 30 indicates shell bursting in the YZ plane; and Figures 31 - 36 show the effect of > z
<
t- _l
—m 0.
bursts in XZ planes at Y = 15, 20, 25, 30, 35, and 40 feet respectively. _J 00 >•
CO * 2S
For purpose of illustration and comparison, contours for "A" damage were prepared for bursts in < Ul
00 <5
5- £o
the plane Y = 0 for firing from the front (Figure 37) and in the plane Y = 25 for firing from the rear (Figure 38). o 2 _J °=
cc 2 _J "-
These were the vertical planes in which the greatest "B" damage was observed. Q. < UJ al
a X X
Ü. CO >-
In general, the contours for any of the planes, Y = constant, were prepared with the aid of auxiliary o=
CO 5§
graphs which were used for interpolation to get even values of the probabilities. For any plane, a graph ^ u.
was prepared with probability of a kill as the ordinate and radial distances as the abscissa. A separate
curve was prepared for each radial angle. For a series of radial angles, points were selected at various
i-
z
"I CC
o \L
Ü
radial distances and a curve fitted to these points for each radial angle. The distances along each radius
were then read which yielded even probabilities of a kill, (.05, .10, .20, . . .). The points thus obtained
were used to obtain the probability contours. These contours were prepared as a "shake-down" problem to
set up computational procedures and familiarize personnel with the methods employed. The "B" damage
contours were computed in detail, although they are of less eventual interest than the "A" contours, because
J
r „•» .,r-WMtf»i^«».wM^-^^.-^-Uia^J.:

r vr

34 BALLISTIC RESEARCH LABORATORIES 35


BALLISTIC RESEARCH LABORATORIES

75 M M V S B 25

FRONT V«-I6

D
O

>-
X
_1 z
m <x> <
-J
< 0.
CO UJ
2
IM
o e> -
ir < I *•*
>•

a. Z _l z
< UJ
u. Q X <E
o - in U.
m UJ
cc 2 It
u> o "« 2E
(> O
i- in IT
7- N U.
o (9
o Z

26 DISTANCE FROM C.6.(FT.)

FIGURE 21
„:'»,:,•,'.

'•- --;'!,,»
r- >
JyBL
1
)t< i t 11: -"sr;?^^T"~

36 BALLISTIC RESEARCH LABORATORIES BALLISTIC RESEARCH LABORATORIES 37

75 MM VS B25 'IPs
FRONT Y*-IO
75MM VS B25

C.G.X

DISTANCE FROM CG. (FT.)

10 IS :fc
2'0 elj DISTANCE FROM O.G.(FT.) FIGURE 23

FIGURE 22
^

38 BALLISTIC RESEARCH LABORATORIES


BALLISTIC RESEARCH LABORATORIES 39

75 MM V S B35
K~KK3
FRONT Y'0

75 MM VSB25

'•••'?. %

DISTANCE FROM C.G.(FT.)

Is" 20~ -^| DISTANCE FROM O.Q

FIGURE 25
FIGURE 24
JL

40 BALLISTIC RESEARCH LABORATORIES BALLISTIC RESEARCH LABORATORIES 41

mm

M VS B 25
VS 825
T Y= 10
T Y « 15

ZD

1 DISTANCE FROM CG (FT.)

DISTANCE FROM C.G. (FT.)

10 15 20 25

FIGURE 27

1 JL»-_;O S^JL
r^f"^

^
>

"M-I^S

42 BALLISTIC RESEARCH LABORATORIES BALLISTIC RESEARCH LABORATORIES 43

75 MM VS B25

FRON T YiJO

C.G.X1

-I- f— DISTANCE FROM CO. (FT.)


10 15 20 25

FIGURE 28

the "B" vulnerable areas were the first available. It is anticipated that a set of "A" contours will be pre-
pared when reduction of data on vulnerability of aircraft to bursts below the aircraft is completed.
It is already apparent that computation will be considerably simplified if contours are plotted on
conical surfaces rather than the vertical planes used in the present report. Such procedure will minimize
the now present complication of components moving in and out of main and fringe sprays as the burst point
is moved in a vertical plane. It will also replace many of the peculiarly shaped contours by contours which
are approximately circular. A redesign of the fragment vulnerability device to handle such conical surfaces
is planned.

fffas,. - .-,.

L;5:l
.' v i RS?
*Y"
A ! • V* V

-fr
r / 1 V 1 '

BALLISTIC RESEARCH LABORATORIES 45


44 BALLISTIC RESEARCH LABORATORIES

rim
DISTANCE FROM
Co. (FT.)

VULNERABILITY OF B25
TO 75MM AIRBURS'; SHELL
(Y-Z PLANE AT X»0)
75 MM VS

REAR Y= 15
B25
It
REAR FIRINGS

CO. X

DISTANCE FROM C.8.

FIGURE 30
ir~"ir

BALLISTIC RESEARCH LABORATORIES


46 BALLISTIC RESEARCH LABORATORIES

75 MM VS B 25 W
REAR Y= 25

75 MM V S 8 25

REAR Y> 20

DISTANCE FROM CG. (FT.)

FIGURE 32
.Mff*"ffl
"scr
/
aa»nwwwiMwfiiiwnfwiiim>iiBi'
r^r- *S;-L^ .'_. jg;
T"~Ti

BALLISTIC RESEARCH LABORATORIES 49


48 BALLISTIC RESEARCH LABORATORIES

79 MM V S B £5

REAR Y= 30
75MM VS B25
1:
m
m

A,

?»; 'Jft

..I' .?•.-

o.o.x

DISTANCE FROM G.G. (FT,)

OISTAN0E PRO« C.t.


15 SO
FIGURE 34

••J',^--
T
MlJinlUlLU«»

BALLISTIC RESEARCH LABORATORIES 51


50 BALLISTIC RESEARCH LABORATORIES

•4'/$»^

75 MM VS 825
"A" DAMAGE FRONT
XZ PLANE Y» 0

75 M M V S B25
REAR Y= 40

CO. X

DISTANCE FROM 0.0.(FT.)


DISTANCE FROM O.G. (FT.)
-'t- —t—
10 is 20 28
FIGURE 36
FIGURE 37

Ul^k.
T *HFflfä*tff?V7TltfKWrX
JV

BALLISTIC RESEARCH LABORATORIES BALLISTIC RESEARCH LABORATORIES 53

The plotted contours were combined in models for the two directions of fire to indicate the three
dimensional probability surfaces. These are illustrated in Figures 39 - 42. To further enhance visuali-
zation of the overall surfaces of probability about the aircraft, a three-dimensional contour model was
constructed, using transparent material. This unit is pictured in Figure 43. Construction of a model in
75 M M V S B25 Plaster of Paris has also been considered.
"A" DAMAGE REAR
XZPLANE Y=Z5
LETHAL AREAS

Suppose that a burst occurs with the center of gravity of the target at the point (X,Y, Z) in a rec-
tangular coordinate system with origin at the point of burst, theZ axis lying along the shell trajectory.
IT 'f\$ ''£.
, >'./<A*\e*-
Then from the contours given in another portion of this report the conditional probability p (X, Y, 2) that
the burst causes a kill on the airplane may be obtained. If this probability is multiplied by the probability
that the target lies at (X, Y, Z) when the burst occurs and the product is summed over all space, the proba-
bility that a round fired at the airplane will destroy it is obtained. This is

oo oo oo

.= j f J Pc(X,Y,Z)Pb(X,Y,Z)dXdYdZ. (1)
- OO -oo-oo *

Now if the probability of a burst atX, Y, 2 is substantially constant in that volume of space where the
conditional probability Pn (X, Y, Z) is not zero," (1) may be written

CO CO CO

P = constant P (X, Y, Z) dX dY dZ
-00-00-co
OO CO CO

and the quantity P (X,Y, Z) dXdYdZ is referred to as the lethal volume of the shell-target combination
-co-oo -oo

If the round always bursts so thatZ is completely defined byX,Y(for example a proximity fuze al-
ways bursting on a particular surface with respect to the target) a lethal area may be similarly defined as

J | pc (X, Y) dX dY (2)

This definition encounters practical difficulties when p (X, Y) does not decrease rapidly with in-
creasing X, Y but for the purposes of the present report is perfectly adequate.
Assuming first, bursts on that vertical plane through the target at which the target is most vulner-
able the following approximate values of lethal area are obtained for bursts on trajectories parallel to the
target's axis. These areas were obtained by very rough summation over the appropriate contours.
Lethal Area for Bursts in Plane -L to Target Long. Axis
DISTANCE FROM CG Attack from Front from Rear

A-damage 900 ft 900 ft"


FIGURE 38 1600 ft2 1100 ft2
B-damage
r A
uT
I ' 11 fci.

54
BALLISTIC RESEARCH LABORATORIES
BALLISTIC RESEARCH LABORATORIES 55

i^l^UJVJM^V-Ml."!!!,*»*!!»

•: -" •">,'-.\i» •> -V, ?tf'K »; 1

FIGURE 39 Figure 40. Three-dimensional Representation of Constant Probability Contours for Category "B" Kill Firing
from the Front (75mm AC vs. E-25).

.<
7- *

jsscsssssL? Tf ' \ li us.

BALLISTIC RESEARCH LABORATORIES BALLISTIC RESEARCH LABORATORIES 57

'- .'••'.'•",' ;V-.'--.'.'*"X^'.*',s'?. •s';T^'.-/'JiV\f ^'•;';-%'::*'OX'fe""^ :


>-'V"4. •%•'•.-''.'.'" v''fJ

Figure 42. Three-dimensional Representation of Constant Probability Contours for Category "B" Kill Firing
Figure 41. Three-dimensional Representation of Constant Probability Contours for Category "B" Kill Firing
from the Rear (75mm AC vs. B-25). from the Rear (75mm AC vs. B-25).
*y^

58 BALLISTIC RESEARCH LABORATORIES BALLISTIC RESEARCH LABORATORIES 59

If, however, the rounds always burst so as to catch the pilot's compartment in the main spray, a
2 2
value of B-lethal area as large as 1700 ft is obtained. However, about 1600 ft may be obtained for the
pilots alone, indicating that most of the vulnerability of the airplane results from pilot vulnerability. The
main effect of vulnerability of engines and fuel systems is to broaden the vulnerability contours somewhat,
along the fuselage axis, without greatly raising their peaks.

To indicate the comparatively small contribution of fire damage,consider, in firing from the rear, %
the lethal area for a fuel cell alone, assuming it to be always in the main fragment spray. It is
if

/ For fire of any class 480 ft*


2
For fire resulting in B damage 310 ft
2
For fire resulting in A damage 250 ft

Since pilot vulnerability was indicated to be of considerable importance, it was considered important
to estimate this contribution to overall aircraft vulnerability by a computational method distinct from the
experimental observation of number of penetrations of the wooden dummies in the field firings.
Assuming 2 square feet of presented area of each pilot to the fragment spray, assuming both pilots
to be in the main fragment spray, and assuming incapacitation caused by a fragment strike capable of per-
forating .04" dural with 58 ft. lbs. energy remaining after perforation of the plane, the curve of Figure 44 was
obtained, showing the probability of incapacitating both pilots as a function of distance from burst point to
pilots. The corresponding lethal area is about 1200 square feet. The curves of Figure 44 assume an initial
fragment velocity of 2750 f/s, equal to the static fragment velocity, but less than the velocity of 3800 f/s
obtained from the shell detonated in flight.
To determine the extent to which pilots may be protected, the same computation was repeated, as-
suming 3/16" homogeneous armor protection for the pilots. This protection reduces the lethal area of two
pilots to 300 ft.2 .
Rounds will not, of course, always burst to catch the pilot's compartment in the main fragment spray.
The tolerance in permissible burst positions along the fuselage axis of the target is rather small,
since the 50% B-damage contour is only about 15 ft. wide at its maximum extent in this direction. If the
standard deviation of burst positions about the best burst position is 6 ft., a reasonable value for influence
in El fuzing, the B-kill probability will be only about 0.6 as large as for perfect fuzing, and the A-kill probability
may be reduced even more.
VT fuzes usually burst before the shell strikes the target even if the shell is traveling on a trajectory
Figure 43. Probability Contour Model for Category "B" Kill (Firing from the Rear) Constructed of Trans- which would pass through the target if the fuze did not function. It is of some interest to see where these
parent Materials. burst positions iie with respect to the computed damage contours.

1
This computation was carried out by Mr. Kenneth S. Jones. The distribution of fragment mass used in the
computation was that obtained from pit tests.
1 v teHS
ET r >

BALLISTIC RESEARCH LABORATORIES 61


60 BALLISTIC RESEARCH LABORATORIES

FIGURE 45

FIGURE 44
T -JU_..
>

62 BALLISTIC RESEARCH LABORATORIES BALLISTIC RESEARCH LABORATORIES 63

For illustrative purposes, burst points as obtained by the New Mexico School of Mines for shell
approaching a mock-up Nakajima target on impact trajectories have been plotted in Figure 45. These were
actually 90mm shell, so the figure is purely qualitative. Also shown are damage contours for B-damage. APPENDIX
In general, bursts occur on contours representing low probabilities of damage. For burst directly Comparison of Vulnerable Areas of Components
in front of the target there would be damage caused by the nose spray of the shell, which has not been
analysed in the present study. Pilot (A-Damage) Vulnerable Area (ft")
Source Date Shell Aircraft Front Above Rear
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS Aberdeen 1948 75mm M48 B-25 1.18 1.77 0 (front)
0 1.88 0.25 (rear)
Most of the computations required for the preparation of this report were made by Mr. J. Christian
and Mr. H. Kostiak. Mr. K. S. Jones assisted in the estimation of pilot vulnerability. New Mexico 1944 75mm SB2A 1.72
Mr. A. C. Todaro prepared the drawings for the fragment vulnerability device. Improvements on 90mm SB2A 2.01
m
the original design and actual construction of the device were carried out by Mr. Richard W. Myers of the
5"/38 SB2A 3.04
BRL Machine Shop, whose helpful comments and excellent workmanship resulted in a very useful instrument.
The validity of the data obtained from the firings against aircraft depends to a great extent on the 5"/38 RDX SB 2 A 5.46
2 Side Above Below
technical knowledge and experience of the assessors and proof directors assigned to the Terminal Ballistics New Mexico 1947 5"/38 SB2C 1.13 1.34 0.55
Branch, Arms and Ammunition Division, Development and Proof Services. The 75mm firings were conducted 3
British 1943 All frags Junkers 1.31 1.19 0-1.10
under the general supervision of Lt. Col. D. H. Black and Lt. Col. W. M. Tisdale and under the able direction meeting
of Mr. F. E. Watts. Assessments of damage were made under the supervision of Major H. G. Reed, USAF, a thresh-
old cri-
Chief Assessor and Lt. (SG) M. McKinney, U.S. Navy. terion

Comments: From the direction of attack where the pilot is most vulnerable, i.e.,
above, there is good agreement among the above values for vulnerable
area. As the mass and/or striking velocity of a fragment increases,
/^tM^/c^ CLJJUJ*
'JLA^LO however, its ability to incapacitate a man should increase, but the
maximum value of vulnerable area should not exceed the area pre-
sented by the man. The average presented area of the human body is
Herbert K. Weiss about 4 ft2. In view of the fact that so large a portion of the total
vulnerable area of an aircraft is represented by its pilot or pilots,
a more detailed examination of pilot vulnerability along the lines of
British work^ is desirable.

Arthur Stein

1
Experiments on the Vulnerability of Military Aircraft to High Explosive Shell Fragments, etc., Tech.
Monograph No. 113, Applied Physics Laboratory of Johns Hopkins University, April 1945.

Quarterly Report for Quarter Ending 30 September 1947; Technical Report 494-A of the Research &
Development Division, New Mexico School of Mines.
3
"The Vulnerability of Aircraft in Flight to Fragments from Heavy AA Shell, etc." by Brown and Simm,
AC 5420.
Quarterly Report for the Quarter Ending 30 September 1947, Technical Report No. 494, The New Mexico 4
School of Mines. "The Wounding Power of Small Fragments."
*NL
>
_AL

64 BALLISTIC RESEARCH LABORATORIES BALLISTIC RESEARCH LABORATORIES 65

13
ENGINES STRUCTURES
2
Source Date Shell Aircraft Vulnerable area (ft) *. Source Date Shell Aircraft Vulnerable Area (ft) *
Above
Er E Aberdeen 1948 75mm (M48) B-25 0.06
"1 4
Front Above (0.06)

Aberdeen 1948 75mm B-25 0 0 0 0.34 1.02 (Front) New Mexico 1944 75mm (M48) SB 2 A 1.54
M48 (1.36) (0) (0) a.78) (1.38) (1.97)
90mm (M71) SB2A 1.58
0 0 0 0.05 0 (Rear) (3.32)
(0) (7.49) (3.22) (1.11) (0)
5738 (Mk 35) SB2A 2.83
Above (7.23)
New Mexico 1944 75mm SB2A 1.10 5738 RDX SB2A 2.08
M48 (2.21) (4.94)
Side Above Below
90mm SB 2 A 1.75 New Mexico 1947 5738 SB2C 0.09 0.39 0.42
M71 (3.83) (0.13) (0.54) (0.54)
5"/38 SB2A 5.72
(Mk 35) (9.67) •Figures in parentheses refer to "B" damage, others to "A" damage.
5"/38 SB2A 3.87 ' Comments: If the New Mexico 75mm vulnerable areas obtained in 1944 were reduced by the
RDX (7.56) same amount as the 5"/38 figures obtained in 1948 over the 1944 value, the 75mm
Side Above Below value thus estimated would be more than four times as large for the SB2A as
Aberdeen has obtained for the B -25. The difference between the Aberdeen values
New Mexico 1947 5"/38 SB2C 0.52 0.62 0.34 and the estimated 1948 New Mexico values may be accounted for by the difference
Comp A (1.30) (3.07) (2.77) in structure between the SB2A and B-25. The chief sources of structural damage
5738 B-17 1.6 2.6 2.3 by fragments are those associated with the oxygen and hydraulic systems, and
Comp A (3.6) (6.6) (7.8) these have not been serious in the B-25.

•Figures in parentheses refer to "B" damage, others to "A" damage. The 1944 New Mexico structural assessments included estimates of probable
failure to return to base if gun, gunner, or ammunition is hit, etc. At Aberdeen
such damage is not included as a source of "A" or "B" damage but is instead re- &."
Comments: Reduction of the New Mexico 1944 values for the 75mm by the fraction indi-
cated for their 1944-1948 5"/38 values yields estimates of 75mm vulnerable flected as a loss in fire power for the assumed combat. Thus if the bomber were
areas that are about one-third as large as the Aberdeen values for A damage, attacked by a fighter, damage to armament will be considered in the overall evalu-
and one-half as large for B damage. A major cause of difference between the ation of the outcome of the encounter. ;••:*••>'

1944 New Mexico and 1948 Aberdeen figures is lower severity of assessments
for oil loss at Aberdeen. It is believed that the present assessment procedures at both establishments are
essentially in agreement. In addition, each installation describes damage so care-
fully that changes in severity of assessment as more information becomes avail-
able can always be made.

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66 BALLISTIC RESE'ARCH LABORATORIES BALLISTIC RESEARCH LABORATORIES 67

BIBLIOGRAPHY
DISTRIBUTION LIST
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2. OPRS BC-5Y, 3575, "Note on Vulnerability of Various Aircraft Fuel and Oil Systems to Enemy Action
Damage." No. of No. of
Copies Copies
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Damage", November 1944. 12 ORDTB - Ballistic Section with list 1 Glenn L. Martin Co.
of recommended distribution Baltimore 3, Maryland
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10 British Turret Sect. Engr. Depl.
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Missile - Distribution List, I
33d and Dearborn Sts.
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1 Commanding Officer
Picatinny Arsenal
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Dover, New Jersey
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1 A MC Liaison Officer Albuquerque, New Mexico
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5 Dr. W. Bartky
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2 President
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Director, Research & Development Div.
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Air Tactical School
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Office of Naval Research Department of the Nävy
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1 Commanding Officer
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