African Primary Resistance to Colonialism

African resistance to colonialism was the inevitable outcome of the clash of cultures that arose as European settlers competed for land with indigenous people and began to impose upon them sanctions intended to coerce the native population to colonial administrative systems. As their indigenous social, political and economic structures were undermined, Africans had no choice but to respond in defence of their way of life, often at great personal cost. The colonists most powerful political weapon was their technological superiority but it would be nave to claim that they subjugated the local populations through military force alone. Colonialists were drawn to Africa with the intent of cultivating and mining the land for profit; vast expanses of little used terriotory were to be transformed into colonies that could harness the commercial potential of the continent, augmenting the affluence of the European nations. The methods implemented to realise this are instrumental in affecting African resistance. The acquisition of land was achieved largely by signing treaties with the local Chiefs who often did not understand the implications of what they were agreeing to; King Lobengula of Matabeleland, leader of the Ndebele, was one such Chief. The Ndebele were an influential warrior tribe who presided over a large swathe of land in what was soon to become Southern Rhodesia, dominating the neighbouring Shona tribes in Mashonaland. They

were engaged by British Chartered Company troops in 1893 after a period of contention over the land. The Matabele War itself was a short-lived affair; Stafford Glass concludes that there was a degree of inevitability about the War. Lobengula by no means wanted a war with the whites and in fact wished to accommodate them but could not concede his claim to Mashonaland and its people; this lead him into conflict with the settlers.1 The Matabele were scattered within weeks. However, resistance in Southern Rhodesia was far from quelled. Rebellion against a colonial government is much more erroneous than repelling initial conquest so it would seem that once defeated, the Ndebele would resign themselves to colonial rule. This is not the case. The Rebellion of 1896 was longer and bloodier than The War three years earlier, the fires started in Matabeleland spreading to some Shona tribes who had up to that point been peaceful, if not willing, participants in the colonial administration. The rapid expansion of the colonialism into Matabeleland after the War brought about great hardship for the Ndebele people. Not only were they forced off their ancestral land into sub-prime reservations to make way for settlers but their entire way of life and their traditional institutions were trampled on by the new administration. Virtually the whole of Ndebele land and cattle, both key aspects of their society, were passed into the white hands.2 The removal of their livelihood meant that they too were indirectly forced into labouring for the wage economy through taxation.

1 2

S. Glass, p269 T. Ranger, p90

The implementation of taxing was seen not only as a source of revenue but as an educational measure;
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many Europeans viewed Africans as lazy

and believed that taxation would compel them into labouring for the colonial economy. Taxation is often cited as a catalyst for rebellion and Southern Rhodesia is no different. The Company were not only ignorant or indifferent to important aspects of Ndebele culture but were also harsh in their treatment of native which led to widespread discontent amongst a population who already bitterly resented their conquerors.4 Ranger illustrates how the administration flouted and evaded provisions to protect the natives in regard to both land and cattle; The formerly dominant tribe of this terriotoryare, of all tribes, now in the worst position
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Faced with a grain famine, robbed of their status, land and

remaining cattle due to a rinderpest outbreak, forced into unaccustomed labour and suffering brutalities at the hands of the Police Force6, all of which they blamed on the presence of Europeans, it is not surprising that Ndebele were looking for an opportunity to rebel; the senior induna, Somabulana, describes their pathos, You came, you conquered. The strongest takes the land. We accepted your rule. We lived under you. But not as dogs! If we are to be dogs it is better to be dead.7

3 4 5 6 7

J. Iliffe, p203 T. Ranger, p98 Ibid., p102 H.M. Hole, p349 T. Ranger, p 121

The degradation of their society was bound to evoke rebellion in a nation which Cobbing assures us was in a much better shape in 1895 than was supposed by the Company; the[false] belief that the Ndebele regimental system had been smashed in 1893 lulled the administration into a false sense of security which left them open to attack. The failure of the infamous Jamesons Raid in the Transvaal drained Matabeleland of police, providing an opportunity to overcome the white man.8 It is clear that the Ndebele had never truly been defeated; the bulk of their fighting force had merely scattered in 1893 and lenient measures of disarmament had allowed them to stockpile weapons for future resistance.9 Wilson claims in his diary that Lobengula sent a message to his people before his flight instructing them, to make peace with the white man but to rise again if opportunity offered.10 The Ndebele were successful at first, taking the colonists by surprise, but failed to take advantage of this and they were quickly supressed. However, the uprising sparked further rebellion in some of the usually peaceful Shona tribes; Ranger places significant weight on the influence of the Mlimo cult in orchestrating this second rebellion but Cobbing refutes this claiming that the affluence of the cult was overplayed by the Company; only the continued loyalty of Ndebele tributary states can explain the distribution of the tribes who rebelled in March 1896.11 It is clear that the First Chimurenga, as the revolt is otherwise known, was brought about by the exacting policies of the Company. The Ndebele
8 9

J. Cobbing, p63-4 L.H. Hole, p353 10 N. Jones, p120 11 J. Cobbing, p68

were unfairly punished for the Matabele War in terms of material loss. The colonialists paid no attention to their hierarchy or customs which

compounded their resentment and confirmed their suspicions that the settlers intended to suppress the traditional institutions that they prided themselves on. The Shona rising can be attributed to an accumulated sense of grievance as well as their loyalty to the Ndebele. Perhaps if the Ndebele had been treated in a similar manner to the Shona, who in some respects were never conquered in the military sense, they would not have felt so compelled to revolt. However, this seems unlikely when considering the manner in which colonialists tended to view the natives. Ten years later, the British colony of Natal attempted to impose a Poll Tax on the male population in order to lift the colony out of debt. The resulting uprising, The Bambatha Rebellion, is one of the most famous instances of African resistance to taxation, but the underlying causes are of course more complex than just the opposition of the tax itself and reflect the plight of Africans in the face of extremely insensitive and inflexible colonial regimes. By 1905, when the Poll Tax was introduced, there was already widespread discontent in Natal as the native population reeled from the cumulative impact of rapid population growth, outbreaks of rinderpest and east coast fever, drought and famine. The expansion of large-scale commercial agriculture and restrictions on land ownership was impoverishing much of the native population and a series of legislation was brought in which included the 1901 Native Servants Identification Act; these were designed to
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sate the demand for labour and effectively placed a labour tenant in the hands of the farmer.12 These were part of a process of exclusion and discrimination which diminished the power of native chiefs and slowly indebted Africans until it was near impossible for them to live in the traditional homestead manner, instead resorting to poorly paid farm work that trapped them in a cycle of debt, Natives for a long number of years remain practically slaves13 It is no surprise then that when the Poll Tax was introduced it was met with verbal dissent and protest, especially from the young male population who seemed to relish the excuse to rebel. Rumours spread amongst the population that the Zulu King Dinuzulu had promised deliverance from white rule14 and there were several cases of the widespread slaughter of white animals and the destruction of European. Of course this spread the fear of an uprising in the white community which undoubtedly helped to shape their decisions when faced with more open defiance. When magistrates attempted to collect the tax in February 1906 they were met with eexceedingly insolent and disrespectful natives who refused to pay.15 Although small compared to some cases, the most significant of these acts of defiance occurred in the Umgeni region. A group of approximately 30 members led by Makanda and Mjongo refused to pay the tax and when asked why they had come armed replied, it is our day today. There will be blood today.16. Police were sent to arrest the men but were not
12 13 14 15 16

J. Lambert, p166 Ibid, p172 S. Marks, p165 S. Redding, p31 S. Marks, p174

successful; in the ensuing scuffle, two white policemen including SubInspector Hunt, who is believed to have fired upon an unarmed member of the group, were stabbed to death.17 This resulted in open hostility towards the natives. Without a powerful independent group within the white community to restrain the Natalian militias many Africans feared the worst as troops marched through their land and armed themselves in self-defence. Of course this would be appear to be an act of rebellion and so troops would be dispatched to deal with it. It is easy to see how the Natalians response to perceived aggression could in turn

become the cause of it, creating a snowball effect driven by fear.18 In the weeks after, the rebellion was quelled by troops led by Col. McKenzie scoured the land for participants, razing African crops and villages until they captured Mjongo and the remaining members and put them to death. The execution of these men may have sparked the next stage in the rebellion. Bambatha assembled an army and fled to the forests of Nkandla after ambushing a police patrol and killing several of the men. Bambatha led his troops under the banner of Dinuzulu but it is highly possible that this was only a means of rousing support. He was finally killed in a battle at Momo Gorge, alongside the majority of his followers. A week later, attacks on white traders in the Mapumulo began the final chapter in the rebellion and Mckenzies troops flooded into the country, sweeping through the land and dealing with the rebels mercilessly. By the end of the revolt over 3000

17 18

Ibid, p176 S. Marks, p188

Africans had been slaughtered including women and children with many more imprisoned and relieved of their property. Despite the large numbers murdered by Natalian soldiers, the uprising was still relatively small and the reasons for this are important. Stuart concludes that those who did rebel did so not because of the Poll Tax itself, but in defiance of the civilisation that was being imposed on them. Marks concludes that it was a culmination of dissent over the poll tax and the prolonged oppression of Africans by the colonialists in the form of forced labour and expropriation of land that caused the upheavals. They were increasingly aware of the attenuation of their social and economic structures and the erosion of their political autonomy and rebelled out of a desperation and a desire to conserve their way of life. The Zulu way of life was being undermined by the growth of large-scale agriculture and industry and this was exacerbated by the grievances that were suffered at the hands of the colonists. As is evident, African resistance was often not a show of solidarity against the a common oppressor and in-fighting between factions was common. This was often aided by the delegation of certain powers to selected chiefs from the colonists. The lack of compelling evidence of a high degree of organisation points again to an air of desperation around the uprisings as natives reacted to the pressure put upon them. There are suggestions that the colonial administrations were fully aware of the effect of their slow decimation of African culture and welcomed rebellion as an opportunity to crush the native problem for good; certainly it seems to be the case in Natal
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that a prolonged period of ever exacerbating sanctions on the natives would result in complete subjugation, with or without resistance. Shuba Marks does indeed encapsulate the nature of the uprisings well with her title of Reluctant Rebellion. In some ways the outcome of these rebellions were a foregone conclusion; the nature of the persecution of Africans over a prolonged period of time put them in a position whereby when the opportunity to rebel arose, they were too divided and powerless to cause a problem to the still vastly superior technology of the Europeans. At first this is not so clear when considering the First Chimurenga but this is because the division had occurred many years before; Cobbings analysis of Shona tributary state in Mashonaland alludes that if the Ndebele had remained dominant over these tribes, then collaboration may well have ensured their freedom from the European civilisation. Primary resistance can be said to have been futile in that it did not arrest the spread and influence of colonialism and in some cases may even have sped up the process but it is evident that Africans had no choice but to resist, in whatever way they could, once they comprehended the extent to which the colonists were going to change their world. The resistance was not even necessarily to the change itself, but to the complete disregard for African culture and the oppressive and debilitating nature of sanctions on the native community that were implemented to achieve it. Their choice was simple; stand up and rebel or sit still and be crushed under the slow wheel of Westernisation.

Bibliography

L.E. Clark, Through African Eyes, Fredrick Praeger, 1970 J. Cobbing, The Absent Priesthood, JAH, Vol.18, No.1 (1977) B. Freund, The Making of Contemporary Africa, Macmillan, 1998 L.H. Gann, A History of Southern Rhodesia, Chatto & Windus, 1965
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S. Glass, The Matabele War, Longmans, Green & Co.,1968 H.M. Hole, The Making of Rhodesia, Macmillan, 1926 J. Iliffe, The Africans, Cambridge University Press, 2007 N. Jones, Rhodesian Genesis, Robert MacLehose & Co., 1953 J. Lambert, Betrayed Trust, University of Natal Press, 1995 S. Marks, Reluctant Rebellion, Clarendon Press, 1970 T.O. Ranger, Revolt in Southern Rhodesia 1896-97, Heinemann, 1967 S. Redding, A Blood-Stained Tax: Poll Tax & the Bambatha Rebellion, JAH, Vol. 20, No .3.

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