International Phenomenological Society

Analytic A Posteriori Truth? Author(s): D. Goldstick Reviewed work(s): Source: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 32, No. 4 (Jun., 1972), pp. 531-534 Published by: International Phenomenological Society Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2106289 . Accessed: 21/02/2012 09:20
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ANALYTIC A POSTERIORITRUTH? A 'synthetic a priori' truth is frequently defined as a nonanalytic, nonempirical truth, and it is frequentlyclaimed that the question is still open whetheror not there can actually be any such propositions.However that may be, I think it can convincinglybe shown that it is reasonable to say that there probably are some analytic a posteriori truths, that is, analyticallytrue propositionswhich can be known to be true only empirically.I am not speakinghere of any propositionswhich, as has been alleged, may be regardedas somehow being midway between analytic status and empirical status, but rather of propositionswhich are to be regarded as being fully both analytic and empirical. (Note that the concept of 'a posteriori truth' or 'empirical truth,' as those phrases are used here, concerns the way in which a truth can become known and is not concernedwith a proposition's"status"in any other sense whatsoever.) It is possible to imagine at once a line of reasoningwhich might be truth invokedagainstthe conclusionI am arguingfor here. If an 'analytic' is to be understoodas a propositionwhose truth can be establishedby means of unaidedlogical deduction,and an 'a posteriori'truth is to be understoodas a truth which can be establishedonly empirically,it will clearly then be logically impossible for any 'analytic' truths, as thus understood,to be 'a posteriori.'So that if the argumentof this article is cogent, it will follow that the terms 'analytic'and 'a posteriori'ought not in fact to be understoodthus. In particular,I shall want to make out that the term 'analytic' ought not be understood'as equivalent to 'provableby unaided logical deduction' even in the broadest possible sense of 'logical deduction.'In this sense, we should count as examples of unaided 'logical deduction'all inferenceswhich are based on purely such as 'Charlie is a bachelor; therefore semantical transformations, or Charlie is unmarried,' 'This card is a Jack of Hearts [or '. . .a red card']; therefose this card is not a Queen of Spades [or '. ..a black card']'.' As a degeneratecase of proof by means of such a 'semantical' inference,the propositionassertedby a sententialformulacorresponding to the inferencerule in question - viz., 'All bachelors are unmarried,'
1

Cf. J. L. Austin, Sense and Sensabilia, 1962, p. 123, footnote.

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'No Jack of Hearts is a Queen of Spades,' 'Nothing red all over is black all over,' ... - in each case that proposition will count, in this broad sense, as a proposition establishable by 'unaided logical deduction' without the need of any premises. And, of course, any proposition that is validly inferable from any such 'semantical' or 'logical' axiom by means of 'unaided logical deduction,' in this sense of the phrase, will naturally count as a proposition that is 'establishable by unaided logical deduction' in the present sense of 'logical deduction.' What my argument in this article will require to justify before it can make out its conclusion is that the term 'analytic' ought to be understood in a wider sense still than that of 'provable by unaided logical deduction,' wide though the meaning of that phrase is, as expounded for present purposes. Here is a list of four candidates for the status of analytic a posteriori truth: (1) 'It is logically possible that all crows are black.' (2) 'It is logically possible that not all crows are black.' (3) 'It is logically possible for causation to occur over a spatiotemporal distance.' (4) 'It is logically possible for there to exist an animal which has the same plural number of teeth on both its jaws and which is such that the set of all its teeth is not exhaustively divisible into two unequal classes neither of which can be subdivided into aliquot proper subsets containing more than one tooth each.' Concerning the truth of propositions (1) and (2) there would probably be little debate. This has not been the case historically as regards proposition (3). However, it is noteworthy that not all the debate over the truth-value of this proposition has revolved around semantical considerations: that is, deniers of (3) have sometimes claimed that in the ordinary meanings of the words and constructions used above in formulating it the sentence so constructed expressed a falsehood, without, however, imputing to their opponents in the debate any error regarding these meanings or any conscious departure from them; this has been the case, it might be pointed out, whenever deniers of (3) have relied, in whole or in part, upon nonsemantical reasoning to prove their point. Proposition (4) is, of course, one which will be true if and only if Goldbach's conjecture in the field of arithmetic (that every even number greater than two is the sum of two primes) is false. No mathematician, apparently, has so far succeeded in either proving or disproving Goldbach's conjecture, and it is psychologically conceivable that no proof

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ever can be suppliedfor either that propositionor its negation,although only a mathematicalintuitionistcould say that this would preclude (4) from being truth-valuable.However, no mathematical proof of the of indemonstrability Goldbach'sconjecture has ever been provided, it would seem, and it is psychologicallyconceivablethat none ever could be provided.If that actuallyis the case, and if in fact Goldbach'sconjecture is itself indemonstrable(4) will then state something which is truebut logicallyunprovable, unless mathematical intuitionism justified is in denying truth-valueto any logically undecidablemathematicalsentences, or unless the negationof (4) ought in such a case to count itself as a logically unprovableanalytictruth. Two main reasons will be found in the literaturefor classifying as analytic all truthswhich assert the existence of logical possibilities.(In what follows, I shall for brevity'ssake speak sometimesof the 'logical
possibility' of a proposition instead of speaking of the 'logical possibility,'

in the ordinarysense, of what it assertsbeing actuallythe case.) A. Whateverit is (eg., meanings)that determineswhich propositions are the logicallynecessaryones will also determineipso facto which ones are not logically necessary,and hence, as well, which propositionsare the negations of the latter. Therefore, whatever it is that determines which propositionsare logically necessary determinesalso which ones are logically possible. Accordingly, if the 'logical necessity' of a true propositionis understoodto consist in a particularsource of determination of its truth-value,all true assertionsof logical possibilitywill have to count as being logically necessary,i.e., 'analytic.' B. A proposition may be conceived as being 'logically necessary' ('analytic')if and only if it is (or would be) true in all logically possible worlds (i.e., under all logically possible conditionsor ensemblesof conditions). On this account,a propositionis 'logicallypossible' if and only if it is true in some logically possible world(s). So that if and only if it can be said to be true, i.e., true in the actual world, that a particular propositionp is logically possible, then that propositionmust itself be true either in the actual world or in some other logically possible world(s).Thus, in general,it will count as true in any particular logically possible world w that p is a logically possible proposition,if and only if p itself is true either in w or in some other logically possible world(s) (i.e., even where w is not the actual world, it must be the case that p still wouldbe true eitherin w or in some other logicallypossibleworld(s) if w were the actual world). Accordingly,if it be true, i.e., true in the actual world, that p is logically possible, then it will be true in all logically possible worlds that p is logically possible, and hence the true proposition asserting that p is logically possible will itself be logically

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necessary. Hence it follows on this basis that all truths which assert the logical possibility of anything must be logically necessary.

(For those who like to have things expressed in the symbolism of modal logic: ) (p) Pp :D NPp Primafacie there are at least the followingthree sorts of groundsupon which a belief in the existenceof a logical possibilitymay sometimesbe rationallyfounded: (i) the existenceof a logicallyvalid deductiveproof either of the truth of the propositionthus concludedto be logically possible or at least of of the indemonstrability its negationby logical deductionalone; (ii) the existence of empiricalevidence to the effect that, in spite of
prolonged and diligent search by investigators highly competent in the science and art of deductive reasoning, no logically valid deductive proof has to date been found for the negation of the proposition thus concluded to be logically possible; and (iii) the existence in reality of empirical evidence for the actual truth of the proposition thus concluded to be logically possible. It does not seem as though there ever could be a plausible way to insist, with any degree of reasonableness, on limiting to considerations of type (i) the rationally admissible bases for belief in the existence of a

logical possibility.As far as the admissibilityof reasons of type (ii) is concerned, in all likelihood wide assent could be obtained to the even strongerprinciplethat the mere absense of any known logical disproof of a proposition,whetheror not such disproofhas been searchedfor at all - let alone diligentlyor lengthilyor competently- will in itself constitute prima facie evidence of that proposition'slogical possibility.To reject reasons of type (iii) would be to reject the validity of ab esse ad posse inferencesin general,surely an untenablemove wherever,as here, 'possibility'is being simply understoodas equivalentto the negation of of and the 'impossibility' any propositionis being under'impossibility,' stood as equivalentto the necessityof its logical contradictory. Thus, anyone wishing to deny the thesis of this article will have to reject the premisesof argumentsA and B above. Surely it must appear more reasonableinstead to admit the genuine possibility of analytic a posterioritruths.And if this is so, surely it is reasonableto regardone or more of the four above-listedpropositionsas being, in all probability, actual examplesof analytictruthswhich are only knowablea posteriori. of This should suffice, then, to justify the reasonableness assertingthe of some analytica posterioritruths. probableexisteice
UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO.

D. GOLDSTLCK.