Babala vs. Abao, et al.

No. L4600. February 28, 1952 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; SUSPENSION OF CIVIL ACTION DURING PENDENCY OF CRIMINAL ACTION; PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION IN CIVIL ACTION.Although a civil action is suspended until final judgment in the criminal proceeding based on the same facts, the trial court is not thereby deprived of .its authority to issue in the civil action preliminary and auxiliary writs, such as preliminary injunction, attachment, appointment of receiver, fixing amounts of bonds, and other processes of similar nature which do not go into the merits of the case. PARAS, C. J.: Consequent upon a dispute over a market stall, an information for grave coercion was filed on January 26, 1951, in the Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte, against the herein petitioner Pedro Babala, at the instance of the herein respondent Patricio Canela. On the same date, respondent Canela filed in said court a civil action against petitioner Babala, for damages based on the same facts alleged in the information for grave coercion, in which action respondent Canela prayed for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction. In the civil case, the petitioner insisted that the criminal case should have precedence. The Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte, however, issued an order dated February 6, 1951, providing that the trial of the civil case upon the merits was suspended until after the criminal case shall have been decided and terminated, but that the hearing on the petition for preliminary injunction might be proceeded with. The present petition for certiorari and prohibition was instituted by the petitioner to set aside this order, it being argued that the criminal case suspended the trial of the civil case, including the matter of the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction. Petitioner's contention is unfounded. In the case of Ramcar, Inc., vs. De Leon (44 Off. Gaz., p. 3795; 78 PhiL, 449) we have already ruled that, although the civil action is suspended until final judgment in the criminal case, the court is not thereby deprived of its authority to issue preliminary and auxiliary writs, such as preliminary injunction, attachment, appointment of receiver, fixing amounts of bonds, and other processes of similar nature which do not go into the merits of the case. It was reasoned out that "if those ancillary processes cannot be resorted to during the suspension, there is no sense in the rule providing only for suspension, when its effect is to kill the action." It becomes unnecessary to touch upon the contention of the respondents that the petition for certiorari and prohibition is defective for lack of verification. Wherefore, the petition is dismissed with costs against the petitioner. So ordered. Feria, Bengzon, Padilla, Tuason, Montemayor, Reyes, Jugo, and Bautista Angelo, JJ., concur. PABLO, M., dissidente:

Disiento por las mismas razones expuestas en mi disidencia en Ramcar, Inc., contra De Leon, 44 O. G., 3795; 78 Phil., 449. Petition dismissed.

o0o

offenses is a public function. Indeed, the sole purpose of the civil action is the resolution, reparation or indemnification of the private offended party for the damage or injury he sustained by reason of the delictual or felonious act of the accused. Same; Same; The public prosecutor may turn over the actual prosecution of the criminal case, in the exercise of his discretion, but he may, at any time, take over the actual conduct of the trial.The public prosecutor may turn over the actual prosecution of the criminal case, in the exercise of his discretion, but he may, at any time, take over the actual conduct of the trial. However, it is necessary that the public prosecutor be present at the trial until the final termination of the case; otherwise, if he is absent, it cannot be gainsaid that the trial is under his supervision and control. Same; Same; The private complainant or offended party may not undertake such motion for reconsideration or appeal on the criminal aspect of the case; The offended party or private complainant may file a motion for reconsideration of such dismissal or acquittal or appeal therefrom but only insofar as the civil aspect thereof is concerned; The private complainant or offended party need not secure the conformity of the public prosecutor.In a criminal case in which the offended party is the State, the interest of the private complainant or the offended party is limited to the civil liability arising therefrom. Hence, if a criminal case is dismissed by the trial court or if there is an acquittal, a reconsideration of the order of dismissal or acquittal may be undertaken, whenever legally feasible, insofar as the criminal aspect thereof is concerned and may be made only by the public prosecutor; or in the case of an appeal, by the State only, through the OSG. The private complainant or offended party may not undertake such motion for reconsideration or appeal on the criminal aspect of the case. However, the offended party or private complainant may file a motion for reconsideration of such dismissal or acquittal or appeal therefrom but only insofar as the civil aspect thereof is concerned. In so doing, the private complainant or offended party need not secure the conformity of the public prosecutor. If the court denies his motion for reconsideration, the private complainant or offended party may appeal or file a petition for certiorari or mandamus, if grave abuse amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction is shown and the aggrieved party has no right of appeal or given an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Same; Same; Public and private prosecutors are not precluded, whenever feasible, from filing a joint motion for the reconsideration of the dismissal of the case or the acquittal of the accused, on the criminal and civil aspects of the cases.The public and private prosecutors are not precluded, whenever feasible, from filing a joint motion for the reconsideration of the dismissal of the case or the acquittal of the accused, on the criminal and civil aspects of the cases. Same; Jurisdictions; It is settled that the jurisdiction of the court in criminal cases is determined by the allegations of the complaint or Information and not by the findings based on the evidence of the court after trial.Case law has it that in order to determine the jurisdiction of the court in criminal cases, the complaint or Information must be examined for the purpose of ascertaining whether or not the facts set out therein and the prescribed period provided for by law are within the jurisdiction of the court, and where the said Information or complaint is filed. It is

Mobilia Products, Inc. vs. Umezawa

G.R. No. 149357. March 4, 2005.*SECOND DIVISION. MOBILIA PRODUCTS, INC., petitioner, vs. HAJIME UMEZAWA, respondent. G.R. No. 149403. March 4, 2005.*SECOND DIVISION. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. JUDGE RUMOLDO R. FERNANDEZ and HAJIME UMEZAWA, respondents. Criminal Procedure; Actions; Institution of Criminal and Civil Actions; All criminal actions commenced by complaint or information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the public prosecutor; The offended party may intervene in the criminal action personally or by counsel, who will then act as private prosecutor for the protection of his interests and in the interest of the speedy and inexpensive administration of justice.All criminal actions commenced by complaint or information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the public prosecutor. When the civil action for civil liability is instituted in the criminal action pursuant to Rule 111 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, the offended party may intervene, by counsel, in the prosecution of the offense. In Ramiscal, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, we held that under Section 16, Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, the offended party may intervene in the criminal action personally or by counsel, who will then act as private prosecutor for the protection of his interests and in the interest of the speedy and inexpensive administration of justice. A separate action for the purpose would only prove to be costly, burdensome and time-consuming for both parties and further delay the final disposition of the case. The multiplicity of suits must be avoided. With the implied institution of the civil action in the criminal action, the two actions are merged into one composite proceeding, with the criminal action predominating the civil. The prime purpose of the criminal action is to punish the offender in order to deter him and others from committing the same or similar offense, to isolate him from society, reform and rehabilitate him or, in general, to maintain social order. Same; Same; The intervention of the private offended party, through counsel, and his prosecution of the case shall be under the control and supervision of the public prosecutor until the final termination of the case.The intervention of the private offended party, through counsel, and his prosecution of the case shall be under the control and supervision of the public prosecutor until the final termination of the case. A public prosecutor who has been entrusted by law with the prosecution of criminal cases is duty-bound to take charge thereof until its final termination, for under the law, he assumes full responsibility for his failure or success since he is the one more adequately prepared to pursue it to its termination. The prosecution of

settled that the jurisdiction of the court in criminal cases is determined by the allegations of the complaint or Information and not by the findings based on the evidence of the court after trial. Jurisdiction is conferred only by the Constitution or by the law in force at the time of the filing of the Information or complaint. Once jurisdiction is vested in the court, it is retained up to the end of the litigation. Corporation Law; Bare fact that the respondent was the president and general manager of the petitioner corporation when the crimes charged were allegedly committed and was then a stockholder thereof does not in itself deprive the court a quo of its exclusive jurisdiction over the crimes charged.The bare fact that the respondent was the president and general manager of the petitioner corporation when the crimes charged were allegedly committed and was then a stockholder thereof does not in itself deprive the court a quo of its exclusive jurisdiction over the crimes charged. The property of the corporation is not the property of the stockholders or members or of its officers who are stockholders. Same; Distinction between the title of a corporation, and the interest of its members or stockholders in the property of the corporation, is familiar and well-settled.As early as the case of Fisher v. Trinidad, the Court already declared that [t]he distinction between the title of a corporation, and the interest of its members or stockholders in the property of the corporation, is familiar and well-settled. The ownership of that property is in the corporation, and not in the holders of shares of its stock. The interest of each stockholder consists in the right to a proportionate part of the profits whenever dividends are declared by the corporation, during its existence, under its charter, and to a like proportion of the property remaining, upon the termination or dissolution of the corporation, after payment of its debts. Same; Filing of a petition in the SEC for the nullification of the Resolution of May 2, 1995 which authorized the filing of criminal cases against respondent Umezawa, was not a bar to his prosecution for estafa and qualified theft for his alleged fraudulent and delictual acts.The filing of a petition in the SEC for the nullification of the Resolution of May 2, 1995 issued by the Chairman and two members of the Board of Directors of petitioner MPI, which authorized the filing of criminal cases against respondent Umezawa, was not a bar to his prosecution for estafa and qualified theft for his alleged fraudulent and delictual acts. The relationship of the party-litigants with each other or the position held by petitioner as a corporate officer in respondent MPI during the time he committed the crime becomes merely incidental and holds no bearing on jurisdiction. What is essential is that the fraudulent acts are likewise of a criminal nature and hence cognizable by the regular courts. Thus, notwithstanding the fact that respondent Umezawa was the president and general manager of petitioner MPI and a stockholder thereof, the latter may still be prosecuted for the crimes charged. The alleged fraudulent acts of respondent Umezawa in this case constitute the element of abuse of confidence, deceit or fraudulent means, and damage under Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code on estafa. PETITIONS for review on certiorari of the resolutions of the Court of Appeals. CALLEJO, SR., J.:

Before the Court are two consolidated petitions: a petition for review on certiorari filed by the People of the Philippines, docketed as G.R. No. 149403 of the Resolution1Penned by Associate Justice Bernardo P. Abesamis (retired), with Associate Justices Teodoro P. Regino (retired) and Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. (now Court Administrator), concurring. of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 52440 which reversed its decision and granted the petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus filed by respondent Hajime Umezawa; and the petition for review on certiorari docketed as G.R. No. 149357 filed by petitioner Mobilia Products, Inc. (MPI), the intervenor in the CA, assailing the same Resolution of the appellate court. The Antecedents The antecedents were amply summarized by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) in the petition at bar, to wit: Mobilia Products, Inc. is a corporation engaged in the manufacture and export of quality furniture which caters only to the purchase orders booked and placed through Mobilia Products Japan, the mother company which does all the marketing and booking. After orders from customers are booked at the mother company in Japan, the same are coursed through Mobilia Philippines for implementation and production, after which, the ordered items are shipped to Japan through the mother company. Mobilia Products Japan sent Hajime Umezawa to the Philippines in order to head Mobilia Products, Inc. as President and General Manager. To qualify him as such and as a Board Director, he was entrusted with one nominal share of stock. Sometime in the last week of January 1995, Umezawa, then the President and General Manager of Mobilia Products, Inc., organized another company with his wife Kimiko, and his sister, Mitsuyo Yaguchi, to be known as Astem Philippines Corporation, without the knowledge of the Chairman and Chief Executive Officer Susumo Kodaira and the other members of the Board of Directors of Mobilia. The said company would be engaged in the same business as Mobilia. Spouses Umezawa recruited Justin Legaspi, former Production Manager of Mobilia, to act as Manager and one Yoshikazu Hayano of Phoenix Marble Corporation to serve as investors [sic]. Pending formal organization, Spouses Umezawa, Justin Legaspi and Yoshikazu Hayano wanted to accelerate the market potentials of Astem by participating in the International Furniture Fair 1995 held at the Word Trade Centre of Singapore on March 6 to 10, 1995. One of the requirements of such Fair was that the furniture exhibits must arrive and be received at Singapore not later than February 23, 1995. Pressed for time, with less than one month to prepare and while Astem had yet no equipment and machinery, no staff and no ready personnel, Umezawa, with grave abuse of the confidence reposed on him as President and General Manager of Mobilia Products, Inc., and in conspiracy with his wife, his sister Mitsuyo Yaguchi, Yoshikazu Hayano and Justin Legaspi, all with intent to gain for themselves and for their company Astem Philippines Corporation, stole prototype furniture from petitioner Mobilia so

that the said pieces of furniture would be presented and exhibited as belonging to Astem in the International Furniture Fair 95 in Singapore. In order to avoid detection, Umezawa contacted Henry Chua, the owner of Dew Foam, one of the suppliers of Mobilia, for that the latter to load several pieces of prototype furniture into a Dew Foam truck and store them at the Dew Foam warehouse. The first batch of furniture was stolen on February 8, 1995, when Mr. Henry Chua, upon the request of respondent Umezawa, caused to be loaded into his Dew Foam truck two prototype sofa models worth P500,000.00, after which, the same were spirited from the Mobilia compound, then transported and stored in Henry Chuas warehouse. Again, on February 18, 1995, Umezawa, with grave abuse of confidence and taking advantage of his position as President and General Manager, unlawfully stole expensive furniture from Mobilias factory worth P2,964,875.00. In order to avoid detection, the said furniture were loaded in the truck belonging to Dew Foam, with respondent Umezawa personally supervising the loading, the carting and spiriting away of the said furniture. Thus, taking advantage of his position as General Manager, he managed to have the said furniture taken out of the company premises and passed the company guard without any problem and difficulty. Further, on February 19, 1995, around 1 oclock in the afternoon, respondent Umezawa again loaded into his motor vehicle, and took away from company premises under the same irregular and unlawful circumstances, an expensive threeseater sofa worth P255,000.00. The taking out of the said furniture was effected in violation of the standard procedures established by petitioner corporation which requires that every shipment or taking out of the furniture be checked and reviewed by Mobilias Production, Planning, Inventory Costing and Control (PPICC) Division. All the foregoing furniture were transported to and stored at Henry Chuas warehouse. After sometime, the foregoing furniture were photographed for slide photos at Photo Folio at the Reclamation Area, Cebu City and then finally catalogued for use in the Singapore Fair for the use of Astem and its supposed owners, namely: spouses Umezawa, Hayano and Legaspi. The foregoing furniture models were finally shipped for exhibition at the International Furniture Fair 95 in Singapore as furniture belonging to Astem Philippines Corporation. Sometime in March 1995, based on orders booked for Astem, Umezawa, with unfaithfulness and abuse of confidence reposed on him as the President and General Manager of petitioner Mobilia, ordered and caused the manufacture of eighty-nine (89) pieces of furniture with a total value of P17,108,500.00. The said pieces of furniture were made with Mobilia supplies, materials and machineries, as well as with Mobilia time and personnel, all of which were under the administration and control of Umezawa as President and General Manager. The said materials and supplies, the time and labor, were supposed to be used for the manufacture and production of quality furniture for the EXCLUSIVE USE of Mobilia. However, Umezawa, in violation of his duty to apply the same for the use of Mobilia and the duty to account for the same, converted their use for the benefit of Astem or for the use and benefit of Umezawa, his wife and sister, Yoshikazu Hayano and Legaspi, much to the damage and prejudice of Mobilia Products.

The same furniture could also have been taken out of the company premises by Umezawa and cohorts for shipment and delivery to Astem customers had it not been for the timely discovery of the previous theft. . . .2Rollo, pp. 12-17 (G.R. No. 149403). The Board of Directors of MPI, consisting of its Chairman Susumo Kodaira and members Yasushi Kato and Rolando Nonato, approved a Resolution on May 2, 1995 authorizing the filing of a complaint against Umezawa for two counts of qualified theft allegedly committed on February 18 and 19, 1995. Attached to the complaint was the Joint Affidavit of Danilo Lallaban, George del Rio and Yasushi Kato. The case was docketed as I.S. No. 95-275. On May 15, 1995, the public prosecutor filed an Information for qualified theft against Umezawa with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lapu-Lapu City. The accusatory portion of the Information, docketed as Criminal Case No. 013231-L, reads: That during or about the period comprised between the 18th and 19th day of February 1995, in the City of Lapu-Lapu, Philippines, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused, while being then the President and General Manager of Mobilia Products, Inc., a corporation engaged in the manufacture and export of furniture, holding office and doing business in the Mactan Export Processing Zone, Lapu-Lapu City, with grave abuse of the confidence reposed upon him by his employer, with intent to gain, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away from the corporations factory in Mactan Export Processing Zone, Lapu-Lapu City, expensive pieces of furniture, to wit: 1) 1 set, Model No. 3, 2-seater German leather sofa, worth .................... P 208,125.00 2) 1 set, Model No. 8, 2-seater German leather sofa, worth .................... P 315,000.00 3) 1 set, Model No. 5, 2-seater German leather sofa, worth .................... P 108,000.00 4) 1 set, Model No. 4, 2-seater German leather sofa, worth .................... P 277,500.00 5) 1 set, Model No. 6, 1-seater German leather sofa, worth .................... P 146,250.00 6) 1 set, Model No. 2, 2-seater German leather sofa, worth .................... P 225,000.00 7) 1 set, Model No. 1, 2-seater German leather sofa, worth .................... P 275,000.00 8) 1 piece, Model Table No. 2, Italian marble table, worth ............................. P 93,750.00

9) 1 piece, Model Table No. 4, Italian marble table, worth ........................... P 105,000.00 10) 2 pieces, Model Pedestal No. 6, Italian marble pedestal, worth ............... P 150,000.00 11) 1 piece, Model Column Standard No. 11, Italian marble worth ............................. P 93,750.00 12) 1 piece, Model Table No. 1, Italian marble table, worth ........................... P 105,000.00 13) 1 piece, Model High Table No. 10, Italian marble, worth ........................ P 187,500.00 14) 1 piece, Model Table No. 8, Italian marble table, worth ........................... P 187,500.00 15) 1 piece, Model Table No. 7 Italian marble table, worth ........................... P 187,500.00 16) 1 piece, Model Table No. 5 Italian marble table, worth ........................... P 112,500.00 17) 1 piece, Model Table No. 9, Italian marble table, worth ........................... P 187,500.00 18) 3-seater sofa, worth .................................. P 255,000.00 with an aggregate value of P3,219,875.00, Philippine currency, without the consent of his employer, to the damage and prejudice of Mobilia Products, Inc., in the said amount of P3,219,875.00. Contrary to law.3Id., at pp. 83-85. On motion of the prosecution, the trial court issued a writ of preliminary attachment covering the properties of Umezawa. Umezawa then filed an Omnibus Motion to quash the information filed against him, the discharge of the writ of attachment issued by the trial court, and to set the case for preliminary investigation. MPI, the private complainant therein, opposed the motion. In the meantime on July 21, 1995, MPI filed another criminal complaint for qualified theft against Umezawa, his wife Kimiko Umezawa, Mitsuyo Yaguchi, Justin Legaspi, Yoshikazu Hayano and Henry Chua allegedly committed in March 1995, with the Office of the City Prosecutor. The case was docketed as I.S. No. 95-442. On July 25, 1995, the trial court issued an Order in Criminal Case No. 013231-L denying the omnibus motion. On joint motion of Umezawa and the public prosecutor, the trial court ordered a reinvestigation of the case. Conformably, the

public prosecutor conducted a reinvestigation of Criminal Case No. 013231-L jointly with I.S. No. 95-442. On September 25, 1995, Umezawa filed a petition with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), docketed as SEC Case No. 002919, for the nullification of the Resolution issued by the three alleged members of MPI Board of Directors, authorizing the filing of criminal complaints against him in behalf of the corporation. On January 3, 1996, the public prosecutor issued a Joint Resolution finding probable cause for qualified theft and one count of estafa against Umezawa, and dismissing the case against the other accused. The Prosecutor maintained his finding of probable cause against Umezawa in Criminal Case No. 013231-L. On February 20, 1996, the public prosecutor filed an Information for qualified theft with the RTC of Lapu-Lapu City against Umezawa, docketed as Criminal Case No. 013423-L. The accusatory portion reads: That on the 8th day of February 1995, in the City of Lapu-Lapu, Philippines, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, while being the President and General Manager of Mobilia Products, Inc., a corporation engaged in the manufacture and export of quality furniture, whose principal place of business is at the Mactan Export Processing Zone, Lapu-Lapu City, with intent to gain, without the consent of his employer, and with grave abuse of confidence, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away from the corporations factory the following expensive pieces of furniture, to wit: 1) 1 set, Model No. 2, 2-seater at ............................... P 225,000.00 2) 1 set, Model No. 1, 2-seater at ............................... P 275,000.00 German leather sofa, all valued

German

leather

sofa,

all

valued

with an aggregate value of P500,000.00 Philippine Currency, to the damage and prejudice of Mobilia Products, Inc. CONTRARY TO LAW.4Id., at pp. 87-88. Another Information for estafa was thereafter filed against the same accused, docketed as Criminal Case No. 013424-L. The accusatory portion reads: That sometime in March 1995, in the City of Lapu-Lapu, Philippines, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, by means of unfaithfulness and abuse of confidence reposed upon him as the President and General Manager of Mobilia Products, Inc., did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate and convert to his own personal use and benefit the amount of Seventeen Million One Hundred Eight Thousand Five Hundred (P17,108,500.00) Pesos, Philippine Currency, which was the total value of the furnitures ordered and manufactured by the accused or at his instance using Mobilia supplies, materials and machineries, as well as time and personnel which were supposed to be for the exclusive use of Mobilia Products, Inc. but were converted for the use and benefit of the accused and Astem Philippines Corporation, a company or

firm engaged in the same business as that of Mobilia Products, Inc., which is, [in] the manufacture and production of quality furniture for export, owned by the accused, to the damage and prejudice of Mobilia Products, Inc. CONTRARY TO LAW.5Id., at pp. 90-91. On April 25, 1996, Umezawa filed a motion for the suspension of the proceedings on the ground of the pendency of his petition with the SEC in Case No. 002919. The trial court, however, issued an Order on May 21, 1996, denying the said motion. It held that the filing and the pendency of a petition before the SEC did not warrant a suspension of the criminal cases. On September 25, 1998, Umezawa was arraigned and pleaded not guilty. On September 30, 1998, Umezawa filed anew a Joint Motion to Quash the Informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 013231-L and 013423-L, on the ground that the facts alleged therein did not constitute the felony of qualified theft. Umezawa claimed that based on the Joint Affidavit of the witnesses for the prosecution submitted during the preliminary investigation, Yasushi Kato and George del Rio, MPI Vice-President and the head of the Upholstery Department, respectively, the appropriate charge should be estafa and not qualified theft. Umezawa further claimed that for their failure to object to and resist his alleged delictual acts, the said witnesses were as guilty as he was and should have been included in the Information. He also asserted that there was, likewise, no allegation in the Informations as to who was the owner of the articles stolen; hence, there was no offended party. He noted that the Informations merely alleged that MPI was his employer. He further posited that there was no valid charge against him because the resolution authorizing the filing of the cases against him was approved by a mere minority of the members of the MPI Board of Directors.6Id., at pp. 93-104. Umezawa, likewise, filed a Motion to Quash7Id., at pp. 105-115. the Information in Criminal Case No. 013424-L on the ground that the facts alleged in the Information did not constitute the felony of estafa. He posited that the Information did not contain any allegation that any demand was made for him to return the goods. Furthermore, the owner of the said articles was not specified. He noted that as gleaned from the Joint Affidavit of the witnesses for the prosecution, there was no lawful private complainant. He reiterated that the MPI board resolution authorizing the filing of the charge against him was not approved by the majority of the members of its board of directors. Umezawa also alleged that the charge for estafa with abuse of confidence was already included in the charge for qualified theft, where it was alleged that he committed theft with abuse of confidence; hence, the charge for estafa should be quashed, otherwise, he would be placed in double jeopardy. The motion was duly opposed by the prosecution. On January 29, 1999, the trial court issued a Joint Order8Id., at pp. 116-120. dismissing the cases for lack of jurisdiction. It held that the dispute between the private complainant and the accused over the ownership of the properties subject of the charges is intra-corporate in nature, and was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the SEC. It ruled that Umezawa, as a member of the board of directors and president of MPI, was also a stockholder thereof. While Umezawa claimed to be the bona fide owner of the properties subject of the Informations which he appropriated for

himself, the private complainant disputes the same; hence, according to the trial court, the conflicting claims of the parties should be resolved by the SEC. The private and public prosecutors received their respective copies of the Joint Order on February 2, 1999. The MPI, through the private prosecutor, filed a motion for reconsideration of the joint order of the court and for the reinstatement of the cases on February 15, 1999. The MPI relied on the following grounds: 1. a. The Honorable Court has jurisdiction and must exercise it over these cases; 2. b. The above-entitled case is not an intra-corporate controversy; and 3. c. The accused could not claim ownership nor co-ownership of the properties of private complainant corporation.9Id., at pp. 121-122. The MPI maintained that the trial court had jurisdiction over the cases and cited Section 5 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 902-A, which provides the rules on cases over which the SEC has original and exclusive jurisdiction. A copy of the motion was served on the public prosecutor for his approval. However, the public prosecutor did not affix his conformity to the motion, and instead opted to appear before the trial court during the hearing of the same. During the hearing, both the public and private prosecutors appeared. In support of his motion, the private prosecutor argued that the trial of the case must be done in the presence of and under the control and supervision of the public prosecutor.10Id., at pp. 128. The trial court denied the motion in an Order dated April 19, 1999. It held that the SEC, not the trial court, had jurisdiction over intra-corporate controversies. It also ruled that the motion of the private complainant was pro forma, it appearing that the public prosecutor had not approved the same. The public prosecutor received a copy of the Order on April 20, 1999. On April 26, 1999, the People of the Philippines, through the OSG, filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with the CA against Presiding Judge Rumoldo R. Fernandez and Umezawa, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 52440. The CA allowed the MPI to intervene as petitioner, and admitted its petition-in-intervention. The People of the Philippines, as the petitioner therein, raised the following issues: I WHETHER OR NOT IT IS THE LEGAL AND MINISTERIAL DUTY OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT TO TAKE COGNIZANCE AND JURISDICTION OF THESE SUBJECT CRIMINAL CASES; II WHETHER OR NOT THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE CRIMINAL CASES AGAINST RESPONDENT HAJIME UMEZAWA; III

WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT JUDGE COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN DISMISSING THE CRIMINAL CASES AND DENYING PETITIONERS MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION.11Id., at pp. 149. The People asserted that the controversy involving the criminal cases was not between Umezawa and the other stockholders of MPI, but one between him as the accused therein and the People of the Philippines. It averred that under Section 20(b) of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 129, the RTC has exclusive jurisdiction over the cases against Umezawa. It also alleged that in dismissing the criminal cases against Umezawa on the ground that it had no jurisdiction over the crimes charged, the RTC committed grave abuse of its discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction. On September 2, 1999, the CA rendered judgment granting the petition and nullifying the assailed Orders of the RTC. It ruled that the issue of ownership of the properties subject of the Informations was not an intra-corporate dispute. It held that Umezawa, although president and general manager of the MPI and a stockholder thereof, was not a joint owner or co-owner of the personal properties subject of the charges. It also held that the dispute between a private corporation and any of its stockholders relative to the ownership of properties does not ipso facto negate the jurisdiction of the RTC over the criminal cases under B.P. Blg. 129, as amended. It also declared that the material averments of the Informations sufficiently charged qualified theft and estafa. Umezawa filed a motion for the reconsideration of the decision of the CA. In a complete volte face, the appellate court issued a Resolution on August 8, 2001, granting the motion and reversing its decision. It affirmed the ruling of the RTC that the dispute between Umezawa and the other stockholders and officers over the implementation of the MPIs standard procedure is intra-corporate in nature; hence, within the exclusive jurisdiction of the SEC. Citing Section 5(a)(b) of P.D. No. 902-A, and the ruling of this Court in Alleje v. Court of Appeals,12204 SCRA 495 (1995). the appellate court ruled that based on the material allegations of the Solicitor General in the petition before the CA, the SEC had exclusive jurisdiction over the conflicting claims of the parties. It likewise affirmed the ruling of the RTC that the absence of any allegation in the Information that the MPI was the owner of the properties subject of the Information is fatal. The petitioner MPI filed the instant petition for review on certiorari, raising the following issues: I WHETHER OR NOT THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE CRIMINAL CASES AGAINST UMEZAWA.

III EVEN ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE FACTS ALLEGED DO NOT CONSTITUTE AN OFFENSE THE CORRECT RULING IS NOT TO DISMISS THE CASE BUT TO ORDER AMENDMENT. IV WHETHER OR NOT THE STATE HAS LOST ITS RIGHT TO APPEAL. V WHETHER OR NOT THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF UMEZAWA IS PRO FORMA.13Rollo, p. 30. (G.R. No. 149357). The People of the Philippines filed a separate petition for review on certiorari, contending that: 1. 1. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERRORS OF LAW AND GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN FINDING THAT THE PETITION FOR MANDAMUS, CERTIORARI AND INJUNCTION WAS FILED OUT OF TIME AND THAT PETITIONER HAS LOST ITS RIGHT TO APPEAL; 2. 2. THE COURT OF APEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERRORS OF LAW IN RULING THAT NOT ALL THE ELEMENTS OF QUALIFIED THEFT AND ESTAFA ARE PRESENT; 3. 3. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED BLATANT AND SERIOUS ERRORS OF LAW IN FINDING THAT THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION (SEC) HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT CRIMINAL CASES; 4. 4. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERRORS OF LAW AND GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN GIVING DUE COURSE TO THE PRO-FORMA MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF UMEZAWA.14Rollo, p. 27. (G.R. No. 149403). The two petitions were consolidated in the Second Division of the Court. The threshold issues for resolution are the following: (a) whether or not the petition for certiorari of the People of the Philippines in the CA assailing the January 29, 1999 Joint Order of the trial court was time-barred; (b) whether the RTC has jurisdiction over the crimes charged in the said Informations; (c) whether the Informations sufficiently charge the felonies of qualified theft and estafa; and (d) if in the affirmative, whether all the elements of qualified theft and estafa are alleged in the Informations. On the first issue, the CA held that the Public Prosecutor failed to file a motion for the reconsideration of the trial courts January 29, 1999 Joint Order dismissing the cases, that is, within fifteen days from receipt of a copy of the said order on February 2, 1999; neither did the People appeal the said Order within the period therefor. Thus, according to the CA, the People filed its petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus assailing the January 29, 1999 Joint Order of the trial court only on April 26, 1999, well beyond the 60-day period therefor. The appellate

II WHETHER OR NOT ALL THE NECESSARY ELEMENTS OF THE CRIMES OF QUALIFIED THEFT AND ESTAFA ARE SUFFICIENTLY ALLEGED IN THE INFORMATIONS.

court, likewise, held that the filing of the motion for reconsideration of the said Joint Order by the private prosecutor without the conformity of the Public Prosecutor did not toll the period for the People to file its motion for reconsideration thereof, or to appeal therefrom, or to file a petition for certiorari, prohibition or mandamus. It ruled that, having lost its right to appeal in due course, the People was proscribed from filing a petition for certiorari, prohibition or mandamus. The CA declared that the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner MPI of the Joint Order of the RTC is pro forma, the public prosecutor not having signified his written conformity thereto. On the other hand, the petitioner People of the Philippines insists that while the public prosecutor did not expressly conform to the motion for reconsideration of the January 29, 1999 Joint Order of the trial court filed by the private prosecutor, through the public prosecutors presence during the hearing of the said motion, his supervision and control over the private prosecutor during the said hearing, he in effect adopted and conformed to the said motion for reconsideration. In his comment on the petitions, respondent Umezawa maintains that the motion for reconsideration of the joint order of the trial court filed by the private prosecutor did not interrupt the period within which the People could appeal, citing the ruling of this Court in Cabral v. Puno.1570 SCRA 606 (1976). The respondent posits that the finding of the trial court, which was affirmed by the CA, that the public prosecutor did not conform to the motion for reconsideration of the private prosecutor, is binding on this Court. The respondent also avers that the petitioner has no personality to file the petition. Moreover, he insists that whether the public prosecutor conformed to the private prosecutors motion for reconsideration is a question of fact which is not proper in a petition for review on certiorari. The Courts Ruling The contention of the petitioner People of the Philippines is not correct. All criminal actions commenced by complaint or information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the public prosecutor.16Section 5, Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure. When the civil action for civil liability is instituted in the criminal action pursuant to Rule 111 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, the offended party may intervene, by counsel, in the prosecution of the offense.17Id., Section 16. In Ramiscal, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan,18G.R. Nos. 140576-99, December 13, 2004, 446 SCRA 166. we held that under Section 16, Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, the offended party may intervene in the criminal action personally or by counsel, who will then act as private prosecutor for the protection of his interests and in the interest of the speedy and inexpensive administration of justice. A separate action for the purpose would only prove to be costly, burdensome and time-consuming for both parties and further delay the final disposition of the case. The multiplicity of suits must be avoided. With the implied institution of the civil action in the criminal action, the two actions are merged into one composite proceeding, with the criminal action predominating the civil. The prime purpose of the criminal action is to punish the offender in order to deter him and others from committing the same or similar offense, to isolate him from society, reform and rehabilitate him or, in general, to maintain social order.19Ibid. The intervention of the private offended party, through counsel, and his prosecution of the case shall be under the control and supervision of the public prosecutor until

the final termination of the case. A public prosecutor who has been entrusted by law with the prosecution of criminal cases is duty-bound to take charge thereof until its final termination, for under the law, he assumes full responsibility for his failure or success since he is the one more adequately prepared to pursue it to its termination.20People v. Beriales, 70 SCRA 361 (1976). The prosecution of offenses is a public function. Indeed, the sole purpose of the civil action is the resolution, reparation or indemnification of the private offended party for the damage or injury he sustained by reason of the delictual or felonious act of the accused.21Ramiscal, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, supra. Under Article 104 of the Revised Penal Code, the following are the civil liabilities of the accused: ART. 104. What is included in civil liability.The civil liability established in Articles 100, 101, 102 and 103 of this Code includes: 1. 1. Restitution; 2. 2. Reparation of the damage caused; 3. 3. Indemnification for consequential damages. Thus, when the offended party, through counsel, has asserted his right to intervene in the proceedings, it is error to consider his appearance merely as a matter of tolerance.22Id. The public prosecutor may turn over the actual prosecution of the criminal case, in the exercise of his discretion, but he may, at any time, take over the actual conduct of the trial. However, it is necessary that the public prosecutor be present at the trial until the final termination of the case; otherwise, if he is absent, it cannot be gainsaid that the trial is under his supervision and control.23Id. In a criminal case in which the offended party is the State, the interest of the private complainant or the offended party is limited to the civil liability arising therefrom. Hence, if a criminal case is dismissed by the trial court or if there is an acquittal, a reconsideration of the order of dismissal or acquittal may be undertaken, whenever legally feasible, insofar as the criminal aspect thereof is concerned and may be made only by the public prosecutor; or in the case of an appeal, by the State only, through the OSG. The private complainant or offended party may not undertake such motion for reconsideration or appeal on the criminal aspect of the case.24Neplum, Inc. v. Orbeso, 384 SCRA 466 (2002). However, the offended party or private complainant may file a motion for reconsideration of such dismissal or acquittal or appeal therefrom but only insofar as the civil aspect thereof is concerned.25Ibid. In so doing, the private complainant or offended party need not secure the conformity of the public prosecutor. If the court denies his motion for reconsideration, the private complainant or offended party may appeal or file a petition for certiorari or mandamus, if grave abuse amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction is shown and the aggrieved party has no right of appeal or given an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The public and private prosecutors are not precluded, whenever feasible, from filing a joint motion for the reconsideration of the dismissal of the case or the acquittal of the accused, on the criminal and civil aspects of the cases.

In the present case, only petitioner MPI, through counsel, filed a motion for the reconsideration of the trial courts Joint Order dated January 29, 1999, praying for the reinstatement of the cases insofar as the civil aspect thereof is concerned. The public prosecutor did not approve nor conform to the said motion. Although petitioner MPI provided ample space for the said conformity of the public prosecutor, the latter did not do so; he merely appeared during the hearing of the said motion with the private prosecutor when the latter presented his oral arguments in support of the said motion. The fact that the public prosecutor did not conform to the said motion, however, does not mean that the same is pro forma. It must be stressed that the propriety and efficacy of the motion, insofar as the civil aspect of the cases is concerned, is not dependent upon the conformity of the public prosecutor. Hence, the filing of the joint motion for reconsideration effectively suspended the running of the period for petitioner MPI to assail the joint order in the CA via an appeal or a special civil action for certiorari or mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. However, since the public prosecutor did not file any motion for the reconsideration of the joint order nor conform to the motion of petitioner MPI, insofar as the criminal aspect of the cases is concerned, the period for the State to assail the said joint order was not suspended. Only the motion for reconsideration filed by the public prosecutor of the joint order of dismissal of the cases could have tolled the period within which the State could appeal, insofar as the criminal aspect of the cases was concerned. The bare fact that the public prosecutor appeared for the State during the hearing of the motion for reconsideration of petitioner MPI does not amount to or constitute his adoption of the said motion as that of the State. As ruled by this Court in Cabral v. Puno:26Supra note 13. While it is true that the offended party, Silvino San Diego, through the private prosecutor, filed a motion for reconsideration within the reglementary fifteen-day period, such move did not stop the running of the period for appeal. He did not have the legal personality to appeal or file the motion for reconsideration on his behalf. The prosecution in a criminal case through the private prosecutor is under the direction and control of the Fiscal, and only the motion for reconsideration or appeal filed by the Fiscal could have interrupted the period for appeal.27Id., at p. 610. We agree with the ruling of the CA that the petition for certiorari filed by the petitioner People of the Philippines with the CA on April 26, 1999 was filed beyond the 60-day period as provided in Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,28The Rule has been amended by the Resolution of the Court in A.M. No. 00-2-03-SC promulgated on August 1, 2000. it appearing that the public prosecutor received a copy of the joint order of the trial court on February 2, 1999, and, thus, had only until April 3, 1999 within which to file the said petition. Even then, the Court still holds that the CA erred in dismissing the petition of the People of the Philippines simply because the public prosecutor erred in not himself filing a motion for reconsideration of the joint order of the trial court, on his perception that by being present during the hearing of the motion for reconsideration of petitioner MPI, he thereby adopted the said motion as that of the States. The settled rule is that the State is not estopped by the mistakes of its

officers and employees. Indeed, in Cruz, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,29194 SCRA 145 (1991). the Court declared: . . . Estoppel does not lie against the government because of the supposedly mistaken acts or omissions of its agents. As we declared in People v. Castaeda , there is the long familiar rule that erroneous application and enforcement of the law by public officers do not block subsequent correct application of the statute and that the government is never estopped by mistake or error on the part of its agents. The Court also held in Chua v. Court of Appeals:30344 SCRA 136 (2000). . . . While ordinarily, certiorari is unavailing where the appeal period has lapsed, there are exceptions. Among them are (a) when public welfare and the advancement of public policy dictates; (b) when the broader interest of justice so requires; (c) when the writs issued are null and void; or (d) when the questioned order amounts to an oppressive exercise of judicial authority. . . .31Id., at pp. 147148. On the second issue, the petitioners assert that the CA erred in holding that the dispute between it and the respondent is intra-corporate in nature; hence, within the exclusive jurisdiction of the SEC. As gleaned from the material allegations of the Informations, the RTC had exclusive jurisdiction over the crimes charged. Petitioner MPI further avers that even if there is no allegation in the Informations identifying it as the owner of the personal properties described in the Informations, its ownership of the properties can be inferred from the other allegations. The petitioners maintain that even if the Informations are deficient, the remedy is the amendment of the Informations and not the dismissal of the cases. For his part, the respondent avers that the assailed Resolution of the CA is correct, and that it is the appellate courts decision which is erroneous. We agree with the petitioners. According to Section 20 of B.P. Blg. 129 SEC. 20. Jurisdiction in criminal cases.Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all criminal cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal or body, except those now falling under the exclusive and concurrent jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan which shall hereafter be exclusively taken cognizance of by the latter. Section 32 thereof was later amended by Section 2 of Republic Act No. 7691, as follows: Sec. 32. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Criminal Cases.Except in cases falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court and of the Sandiganbayan, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:

(1) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all violations of city or municipal ordinances committed within their respective territorial jurisdiction; and (2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the amount of fine, and regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties, including the civil liability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value or amount thereof: Provided, however, That in offenses involving damage to property through criminal negligence, they shall have exclusive original jurisdiction thereof. Case law has it that in order to determine the jurisdiction of the court in criminal cases, the complaint or Information must be examined for the purpose of ascertaining whether or not the facts set out therein and the prescribed period provided for by law are within the jurisdiction of the court, and where the said Information or complaint is filed. It is settled that the jurisdiction of the court in criminal cases is determined by the allegations of the complaint or Information and not by the findings based on the evidence of the court after trial.32Buaya v. Polo, 169 SCRA 471 (1989). Jurisdiction is conferred only by the Constitution or by the law in force at the time of the filing of the Information or complaint. Once jurisdiction is vested in the court, it is retained up to the end of the litigation. Indeed, in People v. Purisima,3369 SCRA 341 (1976). this Court held that: In criminal prosecutions, it is settled that the jurisdiction of the court is not determined by what may be meted out to the offender after trial or even by the result of the evidence that would be presented at the trial, but by the extent of the penalty which the law imposes for the misdemeanor, crime or violation charged in the complaint. If the facts recited in the complaint and the punishment provided for by law are sufficient to show that the court in which the complaint is presented has jurisdiction, that court must assume jurisdiction. In Criminal Case No. 013231-L, the value of the properties subject of qualified theft is P3,219,875.00, while in Criminal Case No. 013423-L, the value of the property was pegged at P255,000.00. Under Article 309 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for theft when the value of the stolen property exceeds P22,000.00 is as follows: 1. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the value of the thing stolen is more than 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 20,000 pesos; but if the value of the thing stolen exceeds the latter amount, the penalty shall be the maximum period of the one prescribed in this paragraph and one year of each additional ten thousand pesos, but the total of the penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be. Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code further provides for the penalty for qualified theft: Art. 310. Qualified theft.The crime of theft shall be punished by the penalties next higher by two degrees than those respectively specified in the next preceding article, if committed by a domestic servant, or with grave abuse of confidence, or if

the property stolen is motor vehicle, mail matter or large cattle or consists of coconuts taken from the premises of a plantation, fish taken from a fishpond or fishery or if property is taken on the occasion of fire, earthquake, typhoon, volcanic eruption, or any other calamity, vehicular accident or civil disturbance. On the other hand, in Criminal Case No. 013424-L for estafa, the amount of the fraud involved is P500,000.00, and under Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for such crime is 1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period, if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos; and if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos; but the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be.

Patently, then, based on the material allegations of the Informations in the three cases, the court a quo had exclusive jurisdiction over the crimes charged. The bare fact that the respondent was the president and general manager of the petitioner corporation when the crimes charged were allegedly committed and was then a stockholder thereof does not in itself deprive the court a quo of its exclusive jurisdiction over the crimes charged. The property of the corporation is not the property of the stock-holders or members or of its officers who are stockholders.34San Juan Structural and Steel Fabricators, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 296 SCRA 631 (1998). As the Court held in an avuncular case:35Boyer-Roxas v. Court of Appeals, 211 SCRA 470 (1992), citing Stockholders of F. Guanzon and Sons, Inc. v. Register of Deeds of Manila, 6 SCRA 373 (1962). . . . Properties registered in the name of the corporation are owned by it as an entity separate and distinct from its members. While shares of stock constitute personal property, they do not represent property of the corporation. The corporation has property of its own which consists chiefly of real estate (Nelson v. Owen, 113 Ala., 372, 21 So. 75; Morrow v. Gould, 145 Iowa, 1, 123 N.W. 743). A share of stock only typifies an aliquot part of the corporations property, or the right to share in its proceeds to that extent when distributed according to law and equity (Hall & Faley v. Alabama Terminal, 173 Ala., 398, 56 So. 235), but its holder is not the owner of any part of the capital of the corporation (Bradley v. Bauder, 36 Ohio St., 28). Nor is he entitled to the possession of any definite portion of its property or assets (Gottfried v. Miller, 104 U.S., 521; Jones v. Davis, 35 Ohio St., 474). The stockholder is not a co-owner or tenant in common of the corporate property (Harton v. Johnston, 166 Ala., 317, 51 So., 992) . . .36Id., at p. 485. As early as the case of Fisher v. Trinidad,3743 Phil. 973 (1922). the Court already declared that [t]he distinction between the title of a corporation, and the interest of its members or stockholders in the property of the corporation, is familiar and well-

settled. The ownership of that property is in the corporation, and not in the holders of shares of its stock. The interest of each stockholder consists in the right to a proportionate part of the profits whenever dividends are declared by the corporation, during its existence, under its charter, and to a like proportion of the property remaining, upon the termination or dissolution of the corporation, after payment of its debts.38Id., at p. 986, citing Mr. Justice Gray in Gibbons v. Mahon, 136 U.S. 549. We also agree with the ruling of the CA in its decision that the SEC (now the Regional Trial Court) had no jurisdiction over the cases filed in the court a quo. The appellate courts reliance in the assailed Resolution issued by the Board of Directors of the petitioner corporation, on Section 5(b) of P.D. No. 902, has no factual and legal basis. Section 5 of P.D. No. 902-A provides that the SEC39P.D. 902-A has been repealed by Republic Act No. 8799, which provides in Sec. 5.2 thereof that the jurisdiction of the SEC under Section 5 of P.D. 902-A has been transferred to the appropriate RTC. shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving the following: (a) devices or schemes employed by, or any acts of, the board of directors, business associates, its officers or partners, amounting to fraud and misrepresentation which may be detrimental to the interest of the public and/or of the stockholders, partners, members of association or organizations registered with the Commission, and (b) controversies arising out of intra-corporate or partnership relations, between and among stockholders, members or associates; between any or all of them and the corporation, partnership or association of which they are stockholders, members or associates, respectively. In Fabia v. Court of Appeals,40388 SCRA 574 (2002). the Court explained that Section 5 of P.D. No. 902-A should be taken in conjunction with Section 6 of the law. It then proceeded to explain: In synthesis, Sec. 5 of PD 902-A mandates that cases involving fraudulent actions and devices which are detrimental to the interest of stockholders, members or associates and directors of the corporation are within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the SEC. Taken in conjunction with Sec. 6 of the same law, it will be gathered that the fraudulent acts/schemes which the SEC shall exclusively investigate and prosecute are those in violation of any law or rules and regulations administered and enforced by the Commission alone. This investigative and prosecutorial powers of the SEC are further without prejudice to any liability for violation of any provision of The Revised Penal Code. From the foregoing, it can thus be concluded that the filing of the civil/intracorporate case before the SEC does not preclude the simultaneous and concomitant filing of a criminal action before the regular courts; such that, a fraudulent act may give rise to liability for violation of the rules and regulations of the SEC cognizable by the SEC itself, as well as criminal liability for violation of the Revised Penal Code cognizable by the regular courts, both charges to be filed and proceeded independently, and may be simultaneously with the other.41Id., at p. 579.

Thus, the filing of a petition in the SEC for the nullification of the Resolution of May 2, 1995 issued by the Chairman and two members of the Board of Directors of petitioner MPI, which authorized the filing of criminal cases against respondent Umezawa, was not a bar to his prosecution for estafa and qualified theft for his alleged fraudulent and delictual acts. The relationship of the party-litigants with each other or the position held by petitioner as a corporate officer in respondent MPI during the time he committed the crime becomes merely incidental and holds no bearing on jurisdiction. What is essential is that the fraudulent acts are likewise of a criminal nature and hence cognizable by the regular courts.42Id., at pp. 580-581. Thus, notwithstanding the fact that respondent Umezawa was the president and general manager of petitioner MPI and a stockholder thereof, the latter may still be prosecuted for the crimes charged. The alleged fraudulent acts of respondent Umezawa in this case constitute the element of abuse of confidence, deceit or fraudulent means, and damage under Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code on estafa.43Id. We agree with the encompassing disquisitions of the CA in its decision, to wit: . . . A dispute involving the corporation and its stockholders is not necessarily an intra-corporate dispute cognizable only by the Securities and Exchange Commission. Nor does it ipso facto negate the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court over the subject cases. The Supreme Court citing the case of Viray v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 92481, 191 SCRA 308 [1990]) in Torio v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 107293, March 2, 1994, 230 SCRA 626) held: It should be obvious that not every conflict between a corporation and its stockholders involves corporate matters that only the SEC can resolve in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers. As the Supreme Court further ruled in the Torio case that a contrary interpretation would distort the meaning and intent of P.D. 902-A, the law re-organizing the Securities and Exchange Commission. The better policy in determining which body has jurisdiction over a case would be to consider not only the relationship of the parties but also the nature of the questions raised in the subject of the controversy.44Rollo, p. 77. (G.R. No. 149357). On the last issue, we find and so hold that the Informations state all the essential elements of estafa and qualified theft. It was adequately alleged that respondent Umezawa, being the President and General Manager of petitioner MPI, stole and misappropriated the properties of his employer, more specifically, petitioner MPI. As expostulated by the CA in its decision: . . . In any event, the allegations in the informations, if hypothetically admitted, are sufficient to bind Umezawa to the charges of qualified theft and estafa. As aptly ruled by the court a quo in its Order of July 25, 1995, all the elements of the offense of qualified theft are present. There is no basis for claiming otherwise. Furthermore, the private offended party, as well as the subject matter of the felonious taking and the ownership thereof, have been adequately indicated or identified leaving no room for any doubt on these matters. Considering that the motions to quash of September 30, 1998 are fundamentally rehash of the motion to quash filed on May 29, 1995

and the culpable acts subject of the new informations are virtually the same as the first information filed against Umezawa, there is no conceivable reason why the court a quo abandoned its previous stand and controverted itself in regard the sufficiency of the informations. In our considered view, and as the court a quo had correctly held in its Order of May 26, 1996, even a SEC ruling voiding the resolution authorizing the filing of criminal charges versus the accused Hajime Umezawa can have no bearing on the validity of the informations filed in these three criminal cases as pointed out by private complainant, the public offenses of qualified theft and estafa can [be] prosecuted de officio. The resolution of the office of the prosecutor on the preliminary investigation as well as the re-investigation conducted on the letter-complaint filed by private complainant company sufficiently established prima facie case against the accused and the legality or illegality of the constitution of the board which authorized the filing of the complaint does not materially affect either the informations filed against Umezawa or the pending criminal proceedings. As petitioners contend, the action is now between the People of the Philippines and herein private respondent.45Id., at pp. 75-77. IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petitions are GRANTED. The Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 52440 dated August 8, 2001 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated September 2, 1999 is AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED. Puno (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Tinga and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur. Petitions granted, resolution reversed and set aside. Note.The offended parties in criminal cases have sufficient interest and personality as persons aggrieved to file the special civil action of prohibition and certiorari. (Narciso vs. Sta. Romana-Cruz, 328 SCRA 505 [2000]) o0o

Palana vs. People

G.R. No. 149995. September 28, 2007.*THIRD DIVISION. Remedial Law; Jurisdictions; It is hornbook doctrine that jurisdiction to try a criminal action is determined by the law in force at the time of the institution of the action and not during the arraignment of the accused.It is hornbook doctrine that jurisdiction to try a criminal action is determined by the law in force at the time of the institution of the action and not during the arraignment of the accused. The Information charging petitioner with violation of B.P. Blg. 22 was filed on August 19, 1991. At that time, the governing law determinative of jurisdiction is B.P. Blg. 129. Same; Same; Where a court has already obtained and is exercising jurisdiction over a controversy, its jurisdiction to proceed to the final determination of the cause is not affected by new legislation placing jurisdiction over such proceedings in another tribunal unless the statute expressly provides, or is construed to the effect that it is intended to operate on actions pending before its enactment.The subsequent amendment of B.P. 129 by R.A. No. 7691, An Act Expanding the Jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Courts, Municipal Circuit Trial Courts and the Metropolitan Trial Court on June 15, 1994 cannot divest the Regional Trial Court of jurisdiction over petitioners case. Where a court has already obtained and is exercising jurisdiction over a controversy, its jurisdiction to proceed to the final determination of the cause is not affected by new legislation placing jurisdiction over such proceedings in another tribunal unless the statute expressly provides, or is construed to the effect that it is intended to operate on actions pending before its enactment. Indeed, R.A. No. 7691 contains retroactive provisions. However, these only apply to civil cases that have not yet reached the pre-trial stage. Neither from an express proviso nor by implication can it be construed that R.A. No. 7691 has retroactive application to criminal cases pending or decided by the Regional Trial Courts prior to its effectivity. The jurisdiction of the RTC over the case attached upon the commencement of the action by the filing of the Information and could not be ousted by the passage of

R.A. No. 7691 reapportioning the jurisdiction of inferior courts, the application of which to criminal cases is prospective in nature. Criminal Law; Violation of B.P. Blg. 22; Elements; The elements of the offense penalized under B.P. Blg. 22 are as follows: (1) the accused makes, draws, or issues any check to apply on account or for value; (2) the accused knows at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment; and (3) the check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment.This Court sustains petitioners conviction for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. The elements of the offense penalized under B.P. Blg. 22 are as follows: (1) the accused makes, draws, or issues any check to apply on account or for value; (2) the accused knows at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment; and (3) the check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment. Same; Same; Gravamen of the Offense; The allegation of petitioner that the checks were merely intended to be shown to prospective investors of her corporation is, to say the least, not a defense; The gravamen of the offense punished under B.P. Blg. 22 is the act of making or issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentment for payment.The allegation of petitioner that the checks were merely intended to be shown to prospective investors of her corporation is, to say the least, not a defense. The gravamen of the offense punished under B.P. Blg. 22 is the act of making or issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentment for payment. The law has made the mere act of issuing a bad check malum prohibitum, an act proscribed by the legislature for being deemed pernicious and inimical to public welfare. Considering the rule in mala prohibita cases, the only inquiry is whether the law has been breached. Criminal intent becomes unnecessary where the acts are prohibited for reasons of public policy, and the defenses of good faith and absence of criminal intent are unavailing. Same; Criminal Procedure; The rule is that a variance between the allegation in the information and proof adduced during trial shall be fatal to the criminal case if it is material and prejudicial to the accused so much that it affects his substantial rights. The rule is that a variance between the allegation in the information and proof adduced during trial shall be fatal to the criminal case if it is material and prejudicial to the accused so much so that it affects his substantial rights. In a prosecution for violation of B.P. 22, the time of the issuance of the subject check is material since it forms part of the second element of the offense that at the time of its issuance, petitioner knew of the insufficiency of funds. However, it cannot be said that petitioner was prejudiced by such variance nor was surprised by it. Records show that petitioner knew at the time he issued the check that he does not have sufficient funds in the bank to cover the amount of the check. Yet, he proceeded to issue the same claiming that the same would only be shown to prospective suppliers, a defense which is not valid. APPEAL from a decision of the Court of Appeals.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: For review is the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 21879 dated September 17, 2001,1Rollo, pp. 22-27. Penned by Associate Justice Bienvenido L. Reyes and concurred in by Associate Justices Eubulo G. Verzola and Marina L. Buzon. affirming the September 23, 1997 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 63, in Criminal Case No. 91-5617 convicting petitioner Isidro Pablito Palana with violation of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 22 otherwise known as the Bouncing Checks Law. On August 19, 1991, petitioner was charged with violation of B.P. Blg. 22 in an Information which reads as follows: That on or about September 1987, in the Municipality of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and knowingly make or draw and issue to Alex B. Carlos to apply on account or for the value the check described below: Check No. :326317PR Branch In the amount of:P590,000.00 Dr. Alex B. Carlos Drawn Against Asian Savings Bank Paseo de Roxas

Postdated: February 15, 1988

Payable to:

said accused well knowing that at the time of issue, he did not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment in full of the face amount of such check when presented for payment within (90) days from the date thereof, was subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for the reason Drawn Against Insufficient Funds and despite receipt of notice of such dishonor, the accused failed to pay said payee the face amount of said check or make arrangement for full payment within five (5) banking days after receiving notice.2Records, p. 1. On January 30, 1992, the case was archived due to petitioners non-apprehension despite the issuance of a warrant for his arrest.3Id., at p. 15. On June 27, 1995, the warrant of arrest was recalled and set aside4Id., at p. 20. after petitioner posted the required bail. He was arraigned on July 25, 1995 when he pleaded not guilty to the offense charged.5Id., at pp. 23-24. Private complainant Alex B. Carlos testified that sometime in September 1987, petitioner and his wife borrowed money from him in the amount of P590,000.00. To secure the payment of the loan, petitioner issued a postdated check for the same amount in favor of the complainant.6TSN, November 21, 1995, pp. 10-11. However, when the check was presented for payment, it was dishonored by the bank for insufficiency of funds. Subsequent demand notwithstanding, petitioner failed to make good the said dishonored check.7Records, pp. 63-64. Petitioner alleged that the amounts given to him by private complainant was an investment by the latter who was his business partner. He argued that the subject

check was not issued in September 1987 to guarantee the payment of a loan since his checking account was opened only on December 1, 1987.8Id., at p. 66; TSN, June 13, 1996, p. 11. He claimed that private complainant cajoled him to issue a check in his favor allegedly to be shown to a textile supplier who would provide the partnership with the necessary raw materials. Petitioner alleged that when the check was issued sometime in February 1988,9TSN, April 29, 1997, p. 17. complainant knew that the same was not funded.10Id., at p. 12; Records, pp. 3-4. After trial on the merits, the Regional Trial Court rendered on September 23, 1997 a Decision11Records, pp. 111-112; penned by Judge Salvador S. Abad Santos. finding petitioner guilty as charged, the dispositive portion of which reads: Wherefore, this court finds the accused Isidro Pablito M. Palana guilty as charged and sentences him to a prison term of Six (6) months and to indemnify the private complainant the sum of P590,000.00 plus legal interest from filing of this case until full payment. SO ORDERED. Petitioner appealed but it was dismissed by the Court of Appeals which affirmed the trial courts decision in toto.12Rollo, p. 27. Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found that the check was issued as a guaranty for the loan, thereby rejecting petitioners investment theory. In ruling against the existence of a partnership between them, the trial court noted that the so-called partnership venture, Palanas General Merchandising, was registered on December 1, 1987 only in the name of petitioner.13TSN, September 9, 1997, p. 17; Records, p. 5. The Court of Appeals also held that the act of lending money does not necessarily amount to an investment of capital. Hence, the instant petition raising the following issues: I. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE FINDING OF THE LOWER COURT DISREGARDING THE DEFENSE OF THE ACCUSED THAT THE ISSUANCE OF THE SUBJECT ASIAN BANK CHECK, WAS NOT FOR A CONSIDERATION OR FOR VALUE, AS THE ACCUSED WAS ONLY TRICKED BY THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT TO ISSUE THE SAID CHECK AS A MEANS OF BINDING THE ACCUSED TO RETURN HIS INVESTMENT IN THE PARTNERSHIP WHICH WAS THEN SUFFERING FROM BUSINESS REVERSALS.

The issues to be resolved are: 1) whether petitioner was guilty of violation of B.P. Blg. 22; and 2) whether the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the case. Petitioners argument that it is the Metropolitan Trial Court and not the Regional Trial Court which has jurisdiction over the case pursuant to R.A. 7691 is without merit. It is hornbook doctrine that jurisdiction to try a criminal action is determined by the law in force at the time of the institution of the action15Yu Oh v. Court of Appeals, 451 Phil. 380, 387; 403 SCRA 300, 308 (2003). and not during the arraignment of the accused. The Information charging petitioner with violation of B.P. Blg. 22 was filed on August 19, 1991. At that time, the governing law determinative of jurisdiction is B.P. Blg. 12916THE JUDICIARY REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1980. which provides: Sec. 20. Jurisdiction in criminal cases.Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all criminal cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal or body, except those now falling under the exclusive and concurrent jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan which shall hereafter be exclusively taken cognizance by the latter. xxxx Sec. 32. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Criminal Cases.Except in cases falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts and the Sandiganbayan, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise: xxxx (2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment of not exceeding four years and two months, or a fine of not more than four thousand pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment, regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties, including the civil liability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value or amount thereof: Provided, however, That in offenses involving damage to property through criminal negligence they shall have exclusive original jurisdiction where the imposable fine does not exceed twenty thousand pesos. Violation of B.P. Blg. 22 is punishable with imprisonment of not less than 30 days but not more than one year or by a fine of not less than but not more than double the amount of the check which fine shall in no case exceed P200,000.00, or both fine and imprisonment17B.P. Blg. 22, Sec. 1. at the discretion of the court. In the present case, the fine imposable is P200,000.00 hence, the Regional Trial Court properly acquired jurisdiction over the case.18See Lee v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 145498, January 17, 2005, 448 SCRA 455, 470. The Metropolitan Trial Court could not acquire jurisdiction over the criminal action because its jurisdiction is only for offenses punishable with a fine of not more than P4,000.00.

II. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE FINDINGS OF THE LOWER COURT THAT THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE, DESPITE THE FACT THAT AT THE TIME THE ACCUSED WAS ARRAIGNED ON JULY 25, 1995 R.A. 7691 EXPANDING THE JURISDICTION OF THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT WAS ALREADY IN EFFECT.14Id., at pp. 11-12.

The subsequent amendment of B.P. 129 by R.A. No. 7691, An Act Expanding the Jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Courts, Municipal Circuit Trial Courts and the Metropolitan Trial Court19The inferior courts were granted jurisdiction to try cases punishable by imprisonment of not more than six (6) years irrespective of the amount of fine. on June 15, 1994 cannot divest the Regional Trial Court of jurisdiction over petitioners case. Where a court has already obtained and is exercising jurisdiction over a controversy, its jurisdiction to proceed to the final determination of the cause is not affected by new legislation placing jurisdiction over such proceedings in another tribunal unless the statute expressly provides, or is construed to the effect that it is intended to operate on actions pending before its enactment. Indeed, R.A. No. 7691 contains retroactive provisions. However, these only apply to civil cases that have not yet reached the pre-trial stage. Neither from an express proviso nor by implication can it be construed that R.A. No. 7691 has retroactive application to criminal cases pending or decided by the Regional Trial Courts prior to its effectivity.20People v. Velasco, 322 Phil. 146, 158-159; 252 SCRA 135, 147-148 (1996). The jurisdiction of the RTC over the case attached upon the commencement of the action by the filing of the Information and could not be ousted by the passage of R.A. No. 7691 reapportioning the jurisdiction of inferior courts, the application of which to criminal cases is prospective in nature.21Id., at p. 160; p. 148. After a careful review of the records, this Court sustains petitioners conviction for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. The elements of the offense penalized under B.P. Blg. 22 are as follows: (1) the accused makes, draws, or issues any check to apply on account or for value; (2) the accused knows at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment; and (3) the check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment. Each element of the offense was duly proven by the prosecution. Petitioner admitted that at the time he issued the subject check, he knew that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for payment of such check. Consequently, when the check was presented for payment, it was dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds. Thereafter, he received demand letters to pay the amount of the check from private complainant but he did not comply with it.22TSN, April 29, 1997, pp. 18-20; TSN, September 9, 1997, p. 16. In ruling that the amount of the check was for consideration or value, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals upheld private complainants claim that the check was issued as a guaranty for the loan and rejected petitioners investment theory. The issue as to whether the amount of the subject check represents the amount of the money loaned by private complainant to petitioner or as an investment in the alleged partnership is a factual question involving the credibility of witnesses. Where the issue is one of credibility, the appellate court will not generally disturb the findings of the lower court considering that it is in a better position to settle that issue since it had the advantage of hearing the witnesses and observing their conduct during the trial, which circumstances carry great weight in assessing their credibility. In the present case, we see no reason to reverse the finding of the trial court as affirmed by the Court of Appeals that the amount of the subject check was

a loan and not an investment.23See Cueme v. People, 390 Phil. 294, 302; 334 SCRA 795, 804 (2000). Upon issuance of a check, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, it is presumed that the same was issued for valuable consideration, which may consist either in some right, interest, profit or benefit accruing to the party who makes the contract, or some forbearance, detriment, loss or some responsibility, to act, or labor, or service given, suffered or undertaken by the other side. Since it was established that petitioner received money from private complainant in various amounts,24TSN, April 29, 1997, p. 7; September 9, 1997, p. 6. petitioner cannot now claim that the checks were not issued for value.25See Ongson v. People, G.R. No. 156169, August 12, 2005, 466 SCRA 656, 671-672. The allegation that the check was intended to be shown to potential suppliers is not a valid defense. In Cueme v. People,26Supra at pp. 303-304; pp. 805-806. the Court held thus: The allegation of petitioner that the checks were merely intended to be shown to prospective investors of her corporation is, to say the least, not a defense. The gravamen of the offense punished under B.P. Blg. 22 is the act of making or issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentment for payment. The law has made the mere act of issuing a bad check malum prohibitum, an act proscribed by the legislature for being deemed pernicious and inimical to public welfare. Considering the rule in mala prohibita cases, the only inquiry is whether the law has been breached. Criminal intent becomes unnecessary where the acts are prohibited for reasons of public policy, and the defenses of good faith and absence of criminal intent are unavailing. The checks issued, even assuming they were not intended to be encashed or deposited in a bank, produce the same effect as ordinary checks. What the law punishes is the issuance of a rubber check itself and not the purpose for which the check was issued nor the terms and conditions relating to its issuance. This is not without good reasons. To determine the purpose as well as the terms and conditions for which checks are issued will greatly erode the faith the public reposes in the stability and commercial value of checks as currency substitutes, and bring about havoc in the trading and banking communities. Besides, the law does not make any distinction as to the kind of checks which are the subject of its provisions, hence, no such distinction can be made by means of interpretation or application. What is important is the fact that petitioner deliberately issued the checks in question and those checks were dishonored upon presentment for payment. Hence, the agreement surrounding the issuance of a check is irrelevant to the prosecution and conviction of the petitioner.27Ruiz v. People, G.R. No. 160893, November 18, 2005, 475 SCRA 476, 491-492. The alleged inconsistency in the date of issuance of the subject check is likewise immaterial. Issuance, as defined under the Negotiable Instruments Law, is the first delivery of the check.28NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW, Sec. 191. In the case at bar, the Information alleged that the check was postdated February 15, 1988 although issued in or about September 1987. During trial, petitioner testified that

the Checking Account was opened only on December 1, 1987 and that the check was issued sometime in February 1988. The rule is that a variance between the allegation in the information and proof adduced during trial shall be fatal to the criminal case if it is material and prejudicial to the accused so much so that it affects his substantial rights.29Andaya v. People, G.R. No. 168486, June 27, 2006, 493 SCRA 539, 558. In a prosecution for violation of B.P. 22, the time of the issuance of the subject check is material since it forms part of the second element of the offense that at the time of its issuance, petitioner knew of the insufficiency of funds. However, it cannot be said that petitioner was prejudiced by such variance nor was surprised by it. Records show that petitioner knew at the time he issued the check that he does not have sufficient funds in the bank to cover the amount of the check. Yet, he proceeded to issue the same claiming that the same would only be shown to prospective suppliers, a defense which is not valid. Moreover, there is no merit in petitioners allegation that private complainant knew that the check is not funded. Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found that the subject check was issued as guaranty for payment of the loan hence, was intended to apply for account or for value. As such, it was incumbent upon petitioner to see to it that the check is duly covered when presented for payment. Pursuant to Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 12-2000, as clarified by Administrative Circular No. 13-2001, the alternative penalty of fine may be imposed in lieu of imprisonment considering that the prosecution failed to prove or allege that petitioner is not a first-time offender.30Young v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 140425, March 10, 2005, 453 SCRA 109, 121. Hence, in lieu of imprisonment, a fine of P200,000.00 shall be imposed upon petitioner.31Violation of B.P. Blg. 22 is punishable with imprisonment of not less than 30 days but not more than one year or a fine of not less than but not more than double the amount of the check which fine shall in no case exceed P200,000.00, or both fine or impris... WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 21879 dated September 17, 2001, finding petitioner ISIDRO PABLITO M. PALANA guilty of violating Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Petitioner is ordered to pay private complainant the amount of P590,000.00, representing the value of the check, with six (6%) percent interest from date of filing of the Information until the finality of the decision, the amount of which, inclusive of the interest, is subject to twelve percent (12%) interest, from finality of the decision until fully paid. In lieu of imprisonment, petitioner is ordered to pay a fine of P200,000.00. SO ORDERED. Note.The purpose for which the check was issued and the terms and conditions relating to its issuance are immaterial. (Yulo vs. People, 452 SCRA 705 [2005]) o0o

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. CARPIO-MORALES,J.: By Decision of August 14, 2006,1 the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction of Willie Rivera (appellant) by the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 154 for violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 (R.A. 9165), the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. The Information against appellant reads: On or about March 13, 2003, in Pasig City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused (appellant), not being authorized by law, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, deliver and give away to PO3 Amilassan M. Salisa, a police poseur-buyer, two (2) heat-sealed transparent sachets each containing four centigrams (0.04 gram) of white crystalline substance, which were found positive to the test of methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug, in violation of the said law. CONTRARY TO LAW.2 From the documentary and testimonial evidence for the prosecution, particularly the testimony of its principal witness PO3 Amilassan Salisa (PO3 Salisa), the following version is culled:

People vs. Rivera

G.R. No. 177741.August 27, 2009.* Criminal Procedure; Arrests; Illegal Arrests; Voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court, as shown by the counsel-assisted plea he entered during the arraignment and his active participation in the trial thereafter, voluntarily waives his constitutional protection against illegal arrests and searches.x x x It is long settled that where the accused, by his voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court, as shown by the counsel-assisted plea he entered during the arraignment and his active participation in the trial thereafter, voluntarily waives his constitutional protection against illegal arrests and searches. We have consistently ruled that any objection concerning the issuance or service of a warrant or a procedure in the acquisition by the court of jurisdiction over the person of the accused must be made before he enters his plea, otherwise, the objection is deemed waived. Same; Same; By submitting himself to the jurisdiction of the court and presenting evidence in his defense, appellant voluntarily waived his constitutional protection against illegal arrest.The records do not show that appellant raised any question on the legality of his arrest before he was arraigned or in his petition for bail. By submitting himself to the jurisdiction of the court and presenting evidence in his defense, appellant voluntarily waived his constitutional protection against illegal arrest. APPEAL from a decision of the Court of Appeals.

On March 13, 2003, upon the request of the Pasig City Mayors Special Action Team which had received information from a civilian agent that a certain Kirat was engaged in open selling of prohibited drugs in Villa Reyes St., Barangay Bambang, Pasig City, P/Insp. Rodrigo E. Villaruel of the Pasig Philippine National Police formed a team to conduct a buy-bust operation in the area. The team which was composed of SPO4 Manuel Buenconsejo as leader, PO2 Arturo San Andres, PO1 Roland Panis, PO1 Janet Sabo, and PO3 Salisa as poseur buyer, was given control number NOC-130303-04 by the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA). P/Insp. Villaruel gave PO3 Salisa two one hundred peso (P100) bills on which the latter wrote his initials AMS above the serial numbers ZK801664 and JT972090 printed on the top right portion of the bills. To signal consummation of the sale, it was agreed that PO3 Salisa would remove his cap. At 12:55 oclock in the afternoon of March 13, 2003, the buy-bust team proceeded to the place where Kirat was reportedly peddling prohibited drugs. Upon arrival at the target area, the buy-bust team parked the van that carried them to the other side of the street. PO3 Salisa and the informant thereupon alighted from the van and, from a distance of about five (5) meters, on seeing appellant who was wearing short pants and a cap, the informant pointed to and identified him as Kirat to PO3 Salisa. As the informant approached appellant, he introduced PO3 Salisa as a buyer of shabu worth P200. PO3 Salisa at once handed the marked bills to appellant who in

turn handed him two heat-sealed plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance. At that instant, PO3 Salisa removed his cap. The members of the buy-bust team thus closed in, and PO3 Salisa held appellants arm and introduced himself as a police officer and informed him of his violation and his constitutional rights. PO3 Salisa then placed the markings EXH-1 AMS and EXH-B AMS 03/13/03 on the two sachets.302 The buy-bust team brought appellant to the Rizal Medical Center for physical checkup, and later to the Pasig City Police Station. In a memorandum, accomplished at 3:00 p.m. also on March 13, 2003, addressed to the Chief of the Physical Science Division of the Eastern Police District-Philippine National Police (EPD-PNP) Laboratory Service, P/Insp. Villaruel requested for the conduct of laboratory examination on the seized items to determine the presence of dangerous drugs and their weight. Still on the same day, March 13, 2003, at 3:55 P.M., the plastic sachets were delivered to Police Inspector Lourdeliza M. Gural, Forensic Chemist at the EPD-PNP Crime Laboratory Office who examined them and recorded at 5:55 p.m. of even date her findings and conclusion in Chemistry Report No. D-455-03-E, viz.: SPECIMEN SUBMITTED: Two (2) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets with markings EXH-1 AMS and EXHB AMS 03/13/03 each containing 0.04 gram of white crystalline substance and marked as A and B respectively. xxxx F I N D I N G S: Qualitative examination conducted on the above-stated specimen gave POSITIVE result to the tests for Methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug. xxxx

presence of kibitzers, for allegedly selling shabu. He was dragged and brought inside a parked van wherein the police officers, under threats, tried to elicit from him information on the whereabouts of a certain Ebot and Beng whom he did not personally know, however. The police officers tried to extort from him P200,000, which was reduced to P20,000, for his release but he did not come across as he could not afford it, hence, they charged him with violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. 9165. Appellant presented Lourdes Sanchez, his mothers neighbor, who declared that at the time of the incident, while she was outside her nipa hut in the field waiting for her son, she saw appellant come out of the alley upon which two police officers approached and handcuffed him, and [w]hen there were many kibitzers around, they dragged him near the van. Finding for the prosecution, the trial court, by Decision of January 23, 2004, convicted appellant, disposing as follows: WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused WILLIE RIVERA GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of violation of Section 5, Article II, R.A. 9165 for selling of shabu as charged in the information, and he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of LIFE IMPRISONMENT and to pay a fine of P500,000.00. Considering the penalty imposed by the Court, his immediate commitment to the National Penitentiary is hereby ordered. SO ORDERED.4 (Emphasis in the original) The case was forwarded to the Court after appellant filed a notice of appeal. Per People v. Mateo,5 however, this Court referred the case to the Court of Appeals by Resolution of August 3, 2005.6 As earlier stated, the Court of Appeals upheld appellants conviction. Hence, the present appeal, appellant faulting the appellate court I.... IN NOT FINDING THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT WAS ILLEGALLY ARRESTED.

C O N C L U S I O N: Specimens A and B contain Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.3 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) x x x x Hence, the filing of the Information against appellant. Denying the charge against him, appellant claimed that he was framed up and gave the following version: On March 13, 2003, as he was walking towards his mothers house in SPS Compound, Barangay Bambang, Pasig City, two police officers accosted him, in the II.. . . IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF VIOLATION OF SECTION 5, ARTICLE II OF REPUBLIC ACT 9165.7 (Underscoring supplied) Appellant questions his arrest without warrant, not any of the instances when a warrantless arrestthe person to be arrested must have committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense8having been allegedly present when he was arrested. Buenaventura v. People,9 citing People v. Bagsit,10 teaches, however: x x x It is long settled that where the accused, by his voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court, as shown by the counsel-assisted plea he entered during

the arraignment and his active participation in the trial thereafter, voluntarily waives his constitutional protection against illegal arrests and searches. We have consistently ruled that any objection concerning the issuance or service of a warrant or a procedure in the acquisition by the court of jurisdiction over the person of the accused must be made before he enters his plea, otherwise, the objection is deemed waived. (Citations omitted; underscoring supplied) The records do not show that appellant raised any question on the legality of his arrest before he was arraigned or in his petition for bail. By submitting himself to the jurisdiction of the court and presenting evidence in his defense, appellant voluntarily waived his constitutional protection against illegal arrest. In any event, appellant forgets that from the evidence for the prosecution, he was arrested while committing a crimepeddling of illegal drugs, a circumstance where warrantless arrest is justified under Rule 113, Section 5(a) of the Rules of Court which reads: SEC.5.Arrest without warrant; when lawful.A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (a)When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. x x x x Appellants other assigned error delves on the reliance by the lower courts on the prosecution evidence in finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt. The matter of assigning values to declarations on the witness stand is best and most competently performed by the trial judge who, unlike appellate magistrates, can weigh such testimony in light of the witness demeanor, conduct and position to discriminate between truth and falsehood. That is a time-tested doctrine. Thus, appellate courts will not disturb the credence, or lack of it, accorded by the trial court to the testimonies of witnesses. This is especially true when the trial courts findings have been affirmed by the appellate court as in the present case, because they are generally conclusive and binding upon the Court, unless it be manifestly shown, and appellant has not in the present case, that the lower courts had overlooked or disregarded arbitrarily the facts and circumstances of significance in the case. Given the penalty imposed on appellant, however, the Court just the same assiduously evaluated the evidence for the prosecution but found nothing to warrant a reversal of the lower courts evaluation. Appellant has not even proffered any credible motive why the police officers would falsely charge him. His alleged refusal to divulge the whereabouts of those two persons mentioned above fails to impress. Neither does his claim that the police officers wanted him to pay off his liberty. For, inter alia, if he were just a house painter, as he claimed, and not a drug dealer, the police would not expect him to come up with such amount (P20,000). Besides, since, by his and his witness information, there were kibitzers around, including neighbors, when he was

arrested, why no timely succor to him, or any form of protest by anyone of them against his arrest was lodged, if he were indeed innocent, does not speak well of his defense. In consonance with the hornbook precept that an appeal in a criminal case opens the entire case for review on any question including one not raised by the parties, the Court went on to determine whether the requirements of Section 21.112 of R.A. 9165 was complied with. The buy bust operation in the present case was coordinated with the PDEA. After the sachets of shabu were confiscated from appellant and PO3 Salisa marked them, a spot report was submitted to the PDEA detailing the items seized from appellant and the procedure undertaken.13 P/Sr. Inspector Villaruel14 soon after issued a memorandum transmitting the sachets to, which were received at 3:55 P.M. by, the EPD-PNP Crime Laboratory for examination.15 While PO3 Salisas testimony did not indicate if he made a list of the sachets as well as the buy-bust money in the presence of appellant or if photographs thereof were taken, the defense did not propound questions suggesting doubt as to the integrity of the sachets. People v. Pringas teaches that non-compliance with Section 21 is not necessarily fatal as long as there is justifiable ground therefor, what is important being the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items: Non-compliance by the apprehending/buy-bust team with Section 21 is not fatal as long as there is justifiable ground therefor, and as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the confiscated/seized items, are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team. Its non-compliance will not render an accused's arrest illegal or the items seized/confiscated from him inadmissible. What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused.16 (Citation omitted, emphasis supplied) Appellant, as in Pringas, has not questioned at any stage of the case the custody and disposition of the items taken from him. At all events, the Court appreciates no showing that the integrity of the seized items has been compromised. WHEREFORE, the August 14, 2006 Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED. Judgment affirmed. Note.Requisites for voluntary surrender to be appreciated as a mitigating circumstance; To be considered voluntary, the surrender must be spontaneous in such a manner that it shows the interest of the accused to surrender unconditionally to the authorities either because he acknowledges his guilt or because he wished to

save them the trouble and expenses necessarily incurred in his search and capture. (Mendoza vs. People, 534 SCRA 668 [2007]) o0o

Miranda vs. Tuliao

G.R. No. 158763. March 31, 2006.*FIRST DIVISION. Criminal Law; Bails; Custody of the law is required before the court can act upon the application for bail, but is not required for the adjudication of other reliefs sought by the defendant where the mere application therefor constitutes a waiver of the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused.Our pronouncement in Santiago shows a distinction between custody of the law and jurisdiction over the person. Custody of the law is required before the court can act upon the application for bail, but is not required for the adjudication of other reliefs sought by the defendant where the mere application therefor constitutes a waiver of the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused. Custody of the law is accomplished either by arrest or voluntary surrender, while jurisdiction over the person of the accused is acquired upon his arrest or voluntary appearance. One can be under the custody of the law but not yet subject to the jurisdiction of the court over his person, such as when a person arrested by virtue of a warrant files a motion before arraignment to quash the warrant. On the other hand, one can be subject to the jurisdiction of the court over his person, and yet not be in the custody of the law, such as when an accused escapes custody after his trial has commenced. Being in the custody of the law signifies restraint on the person, who is thereby deprived of his own will and liberty, binding him to become obedient to the will of the law. Custody of the law is literally custody over the body of the accused. It includes, but is not limited to, detention. Same; Same; A person applying for admission to bail must be in the custody of the law or otherwise deprived of his liberty. A person who has not submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court has no right to invoke the processes of that court.The statement in Pico v. Judge Combong, Jr., 215 SCRA 421 (1992), cited by the Court of Appeals should not have been separated from the issue in that case, which is the application for admission to bail of someone not yet in the custody of the law. The entire paragraph of our pronouncement in Pico reads: A person applying for admission to bail must be in the custody of the law or otherwise deprived of his liberty. A person who has not submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court has no right to invoke the processes of that court. Respondent Judge should have diligently ascertained the whereabouts of the applicant and that he indeed had jurisdiction over the body of the accused before considering the application for bail. While we stand by our above pronouncement in Pico insofar as it concerns bail, we clarify that, as a general rule, one who seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the court. As we held in the aforecited case of Santiago, seeking an affirmative relief in court, whether in civil or criminal proceedings, constitutes voluntary appearance.

Same; Courts; Jurisdictions; Filing of pleadings seeking affirmative relief constitutes voluntary appearance and consequent submission of ones person to the jurisdiction of the court, Exceptions.There is, however, an exception to the rule that filing pleadings seeking affirmative relief constitutes voluntary appearance, and the consequent submission of ones person to the jurisdiction of the court. This is in the case of pleadings whose prayer is precisely for the avoidance of the jurisdiction of the court, which only leads to a special appearance. These pleadings are: (1) in civil cases, motions to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, whether or not other grounds for dismissal are included; (2) in criminal cases, motions to quash a complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused; and (3) motions to quash a warrant of arrest. The first two are consequences of the fact that failure to file them would constitute a waiver of the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person. The third is a consequence of the fact that it is the very legality of the court process forcing the submission of the person of the accused that is the very issue in a motion to quash a warrant of arrest. Criminal Procedure; Warrants of Arrest; Even if the petition for review of the resolution of the assistant prosecutor was filed with the Secretary of Justice before the issuance of the warrants of arrest, the fact remains that the pendency of a petition for the review of the prosecutors resolution is not a ground to quash the warrants of arrest.After Judge Tumaliuan issued warrants for the arrest of petitioners, petitioner Miranda appealed the assistant prosecutors resolution before the Secretary of Justice. Judge Anghad, shortly after assuming office, quashed the warrant of arrest on the basis of said appeal. According to Judge Anghad, x x x prudence dictates (that) and because of comity, a deferment of the proceedings is but proper. Quashal on this basis is grave abuse of discretion. It is inconceivable to charge Judge Tumaliuan as lacking in prudence and oblivious to comity when he issued the warrants of arrest against petitioners just because the petitioners might, in the future, appeal the assistant prosecutors resolution to the Secretary of Justice. But even if the petition for review was filed before the issuance of the warrants of arrest, the fact remains that the pendency of a petition for the review of the prosecutors resolution is not a ground to quash the warrants of arrest. Judicial Ethics; Judges; Abuse of Discretion; Records and supporting evidence show that Judge Anghad gravely abused his discretion.After a careful scrutiny of the records of the case, including the supporting evidence to the resolution of the prosecutor in his determination of probable cause, we find that Judge Anghad gravely abused his discretion. Criminal Procedure; Probable Cause; Probable cause need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt and definitely, not on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt.It is important to note that an exhaustive debate on the credibility of a witness is not within the province of the determination of probable cause. As we held in Webb: A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely than not a crime has been committed and was committed by the suspects. Probable cause need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt and definitely, not on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt. As well put in Brinegar v. United States, while probable cause demands more than bare suspicion, it requires less than evidence which would justify x x x conviction. A finding of

probable cause merely binds over the suspect to stand trial. It is not a pronouncement of guilt. x x x Probable cause merely implies probability of guilt and should be determined in a summary manner. Preliminary investigation is not a part of trial x x x. Same; Judgments; A decision acquitting the accused of a crime cannot be the basis of the dismissal of criminal case against different accused for the same crime.A decision, even of this Court, acquitting the accused therein of a crime cannot be the basis of the dismissal of criminal case against different accused for the same crime. The blunder of Judge Anghad is even more pronounced by the fact that our decision in Leao was based on reasonable doubt. We never ruled in Leao that the crime did not happen; we just found that there was reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused therein, since the prosecution in that case relied on circumstantial evidence, which interestingly is not even the situation in the criminal cases of the petitioners in the case at bar as there is here an eyewitness: Rodel Maderal. The accused in Leao furthermore had no motive to kill respondent Tuliaos son, whereas petitioners herein had been implicated in the testimony of respondent Tuliao before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee. Same; Same; The declaration of nullity of proceedings should be deemed to carry with it the reinstatement of the orders set aside by the nullified proceedings. Whether the Court of Appeals ordered the issuance of new warrants of arrest or merely ordered the reinstatement of the warrants of arrest issued by Judge Tumaliuan is merely a matter of scrupulous semantics, the slight inaccuracy whereof should not be allowed to affect the dispositions on the mer-its, especially in this case where the other dispositions of the Court of Appeals point to the other direction. Firstly, the Court of Appeals had reinstated the 25 June 2001 Order of Judge Tumaliuan, which issued the warrants of arrest. Secondly, the Court of Appeals likewise declared the proceedings conducted by Judge Anghad void. Certainly, the declaration of nullity of proceedings should be deemed to carry with it the reinstatement of the orders set aside by the nullified proceedings. Judge Anghads order quashing the warrants of arrest had been nullified; therefore those warrants of arrest are henceforth deemed unquashed. Same; Constitutional Law; Double Jeopardy; Double jeopardy cannot be invoked where the accused has not been arraigned and it was upon his express motion that the case was dismissed.The reinstatement of a criminal case dismissed before arraignment does not constitute double jeopardy. Double jeopardy cannot be invoked where the accused has not been arraigned and it was upon his express motion that the case was dismissed. PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals. The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the 18 December 2002 Decision1Penned by Associate Justice Sergio L. Pestao with Acting Presiding Justice (now Supreme Court Associate Justice) Cancio

C. Garcia and Associate Justice Eloy R. Bello, Jr., concurring. of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 67770 and its 12 June 2003 Resolution denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. The dispositive portion of the assailed decision reads as follows: WHEREFORE, finding public respondent Judge Anastacio D. Anghad to have acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed Orders, the instant petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition is hereby GRANTED and GIVEN DUE COURSE, and it is hereby ordered: 1. 1. The assailed Joint Order dated August 17, 2001, Order dated September 21, 2001, Joint Order dated October 16, 2001 and Joint Order dated November 14, 2001 dismissing the two (2) Informations for Murder, all issued by public respondent Judge Anastacio D. Anghad in Criminal Cases Nos. 36-3523 and 36- 3524 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and another entered UPHOLDING, AFFIRMING[,] and REINSTATING the Order dated June 25, 2001 and Joint Order dated July 6, 2001 issued by the then acting Presiding Judge Wilfredo Tumaliuan; 2. 2. Criminal Cases Nos. 36-3523 and 36-3524 are hereby ordered REINSTATED in the docket of active criminal cases of Branch 36 of the Regional Trial Court of Santiago City, Isabela; and 3. 3. Public respondent Judge Anastacio D. Anghad is DIRECTED to ISSUE forthwith Warrants of Arrest for the apprehension of private respondents Jose Pempe Miranda, SPO3 Alberto P. Dalmacio, PO3 Romeo B. Ocon and accused Rodel T. Maderal in said Criminal Cases Nos. 36-3523 and 36-3524.2Rollo, pp. 109-110. The factual and procedural antecedents of the case are as follows: On 8 March 1996, two burnt cadavers were discovered in Purok Nibulan, Ramon, Isabela, which were later identified as the dead bodies of Vicente Bauzon and Elizer Tuliao, son of private respondent Virgilio Tuliao who is now under the witness protection program. Two informations for murder were filed against SPO1 Wilfredo Leao, SPO1 Ferdinand Marzan, SPO1 Ruben B. Agustin, SPO2 Alexander Micu, SPO2 Rodel Maderal, and SPO4 Emilio Ramirez in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Santiago City. The venue was later transferred to Manila. On 22 April 1999, the RTC of Manila convicted all of the accused and sentenced them to two counts of reclusion perpetua except SPO2 Maderal who was yet to be arraigned at that time, being at large. The case was appealed to this Court on automatic review where we, on 9 October 2001, acquitted the accused therein on the ground of reasonable doubt. Sometime in September 1999, SPO2 Maderal was arrested. On 27 April 2001, he executed a sworn confession and identified petitioners Jose C. Miranda, PO3 Romeo B. Ocon, and SPO3 Alberto P. Dalmacio, a certain Boyet dela Cruz and Amado Doe, as the persons responsible for the deaths of Vicente Bauzon and Elizer Tuliao. Respondent Tuliao filed a criminal complaint for murder against petitioners, Boyet dela Cruz, and Amado Doe, and submitted the sworn confession of SPO2 Maderal.

On 25 June 2001, Acting Presiding Judge Wilfredo Tumaliuan issued warrants of arrest against petitioners and SPO2 Maderal. On 29 June 2001, petitioners filed an urgent motion to complete preliminary investigation, to reinvestigate, and to recall and/or quash the warrants of arrest. In the hearing of the urgent motion on 6 July 2001, Judge Tumaliuan noted the absence of petitioners and issued a Joint Order denying said urgent motion on the ground that, since the court did not acquire jurisdiction over their persons, the motion cannot be properly heard by the court. In the meantime, petitioners appealed the resolution of State Prosecutor Leo T. Reyes to the Department of Justice. On 17 August 2001, the new Presiding Judge Anastacio D. Anghad took over the case and issued a Joint Order reversing the Joint Order of Judge Tumaliuan. Consequently, he ordered the cancellation of the warrant of arrest issued against petitioner Miranda. He likewise applied this Order to petitioners Ocon and Dalmacio in an Order dated 21 September 2001. State Prosecutor Leo S. Reyes and respondent Tuliao moved for the reconsideration of the said Joint Order and prayed for the inhibition of Judge Anghad, but the motion for reconsideration was denied in a Joint Order dated 16 October 2001 and the prayer for inhibition was denied in a Joint Order dated 22 October 2001. On 25 October 2001, respondent Tuliao filed a petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition with this Court, with prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order, seeking to enjoin Judge Anghad from further proceeding with the case, and seeking to nullify the Orders and Joint Orders of Judge Anghad dated 17 August 2001, 21 September 2001, 16 October 2001, and 22 October 2001. On 12 November 2001, this Court issued a Resolution resolving to grant the prayer for a temporary restraining order against Judge Anghad from further proceeding with the criminal cases. Shortly after the aforesaid resolution, Judge Anghad issued a Joint Order dated 14 November 2001 dismissing the two Informations for murder against petitioners. On 19 November 2001, this Court took note of respondents cash bond evidenced by O.R. No. 15924532 dated 15 November 2001, and issued the temporary restraining order while referring the petition to the Court of Appeals for adjudication on the merits. Respondent Tuliao filed with this Court a Motion to Cite Public Respondent in Contempt, alleging that Judge Anghad deliberately and willfully committed contempt of court when he issued on 15 November 2001 the Order dated 14 November 2001 dismissing the informations for murder. On 21 November 2001, we referred said motion to the Court of Appeals in view of the previous referral to it of respondents petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus. On 18 December 2002, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed decision granting the petition and ordering the reinstatement of the criminal cases in the RTC of Santiago City, as well as the issuance of warrants of arrest against petitioners and SPO2 Maderal. Petitioners moved for a reconsideration of this Decision, but the same was denied in a Resolution dated 12 June 2003.

Hence, this petition. The facts of the case being undisputed, petitioners bring forth to this Court the following assignments of error: FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR With all due respect, the Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in reversing and setting aside the Joint Order of Judge Anastacio D. Anghad dated August 17, 2001, September 21, 2001, October 16, 2001 and November 14, 2001 issued in criminal cases numbered 36-3523 and 36-3524; and, erred in upholding, affirming and reinstating the Order dated July 6, 2001 issued by then Acting Presiding Judge Wilfredo Tumaliuan, on the alleged rule that an accused cannot seek any judicial relief if he does not submit his person to the jurisdiction of the court. SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR With all due respect, the Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in directing the reinstatement of Criminal Cases No. 36-3523 and 36-3524 in the docket of Active Criminal Cases of Branch 36 of the Regional Trial Court of Santiago City, Philippines, and in ordering the public respondent to re-issue the warrants of arrest against herein petitioners. THIRD ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR With all due respect, the Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in ordering the reinstatement of Criminal Cases No. 36-3523 and No. 36-3524 in the docket of active criminal cases of Branch 36 of the regional trial court of Santiago City, Philippines, and in ordering the public respondent to issue warrants of arrest against herein petitioners, the order of dismissal issued therein having become final and executory. Adjudication of a motion to quash a warrant of arrest requires neither jurisdiction over the person of the accused, nor custody of law over the body of the accused. The first assignment of error brought forth by the petitioner deals with the Court of Appeals ruling that: [A]n accused cannot seek any judicial relief if he does not submit his person to the jurisdiction of the court. Jurisdiction over the person of the accused may be acquired either through compulsory process, such as warrant of arrest, or through his voluntary appearance, such as when he surrenders to the police or to the court. It is only when the court has already acquired jurisdiction over his person that an accused may invoke the processes of the court (Pete M. Pico vs. Alfonso V. Combong, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-91-764, November 6, 1992). Thus, an accused must first be placed in the custody of the law before the court may validly act on his petition for judicial reliefs.3Id., p. 103. Proceeding from this premise, the Court of Appeals ruled that petitioners Miranda, Ocon and Dalmacio cannot seek any judicial relief since they were not yet arrested or otherwise deprived of their liberty at the time they filed their Urgent Motion to

complete preliminary investigation; to reinvestigate; to recall and/or quash warrants of arrest.4Id. Petitioners counter the finding of the Court of Appeals by arguing that jurisdiction over the person of the accused is required only in applications for bail. Furthermore, petitioners argue, assuming that such jurisdiction over their person is required before the court can act on their motion to quash the warrant for their arrest, such jurisdiction over their person was already acquired by the court by their filing of the above Urgent Motion. In arguing that jurisdiction over the person is required only in the adjudication of applications for bail, petitioners quote Retired Court of Appeals Justice Oscar Herrera: Except in applications for bail, it is not necessary for the court to first acquire jurisdiction over the person of the accused to dismiss the case or grant other relief. The outright dismissal of the case even before the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the accused is authorized under Section 6(a), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure and the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure (Sec. 12a). In Allado vs. Diokno (232 SCRA 192), the case was dismissed on motion of the accused for lack of probable cause without the accused having been arrested. In Paul Roberts vs. Court of Appeals (254 SCRA 307), the Court was ordered to hold the issuance of a warrant of arrest in abeyance pending review by the Secretary of Justice. And in Lacson vs. Executive Secretary (301 SCRA 1025This should have been 301 SCRA 298.), the Court ordered the case transferred from the Sandiganbayan to the RTC which eventually ordered the dismissal of the case for lack of probable cause.6Oscar Herrera, REMEDIAL LAW, Vol. IV, pp. 38-39 (2001 ed.). In arguing, on the other hand, that jurisdiction over their person was already acquired by their filing of the above Urgent Motion, petitioners invoke our pronouncement, through Justice Florenz D. Regalado, in Santiago v. Vasquez:7G.R. Nos. 99289-90, 27 January 1993, 217 SCRA 633, 643. The voluntary appearance of the accused, whereby the court acquires jurisdiction over his person, is accomplished either by his pleading to the merits (such as by filing a motion to quash or other pleadings requiring the exercise of the courts jurisdiction thereover, appearing for arraignment, entering trial) or by filing bail. On the matter of bail, since the same is intended to obtain the provisional liberty of the accused, as a rule the same cannot be posted before custody of the accused has been acquired by the judicial authorities either by his arrest or voluntary surrender. Our pronouncement in Santiago shows a distinction between custody of the law and jurisdiction over the person. Custody of the law is required before the court can act upon the application for bail, but is not required for the adjudication of other reliefs sought by the defendant where the mere application therefor constitutes a waiver of the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused.8Id. Custody of the law is accomplished either by arrest or voluntary surrender,9Paderanga v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 115407, 28 August 1995, 247 SCRA 741, 750; Dinapol v. Baldado, A.M. No. RTJ-92-898, 5 August 1993, 225 SCRA 110, 116-117. In some jurisprudence, voluntary surrender is termed as voluntary submission to the jur... while jurisdiction

over the person of the accused is acquired upon his arrest or voluntary appearance.10Layosa v. Rodriguez, G.R. No. L-46080, 10 November 1978, 86 SCRA 300, 303; People v. Umbrero, G.R. No. 93021, 8 May 1991, 196 SCRA 821, 829. One can be under the custody of the law but not yet subject to the jurisdiction of the court over his person, such as when a person arrested by virtue of a warrant files a motion before arraignment to quash the warrant. On the other hand, one can be subject to the jurisdiction of the court over his person, and yet not be in the custody of the law, such as when an accused escapes custody after his trial has commenced.11This is because of the rule that jurisdiction, once acquired, attaches until the final disposition of the case. In such a situation, the escapees right to confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses are deemed waived by his failure to appear du... Being in the custody of the law signifies restraint on the person, who is thereby deprived of his own will and liberty, binding him to become obedient to the will of the law.12See Larranaga v. Court of Appeals, 351 Phil. 75, 88-89; 287 SCRA 581, 589 (1998). Custody of the law is literally custody over the body of the accused. It includes, but is not limited to, detention. The statement in Pico v. Judge Combong, Jr.,13A.M. No. RTJ-91-764, 6 November 1992, 215 SCRA 421. cited by the Court of Appeals should not have been separated from the issue in that case, which is the application for admission to bail of someone not yet in the custody of the law. The entire paragraph of our pronouncement in Pico reads: A person applying for admission to bail must be in the custody of the law or otherwise deprived of his liberty. A person who has not submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court has no right to invoke the processes of that court. Respondent Judge should have diligently ascertained the whereabouts of the applicant and that he indeed had jurisdiction over the body of the accused before considering the application for bail.14Id., at p. 424. While we stand by our above pronouncement in Pico insofar as it concerns bail, we clarify that, as a general rule, one who seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the court.15Sapugay v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 86792, 21 March 1990, 183 SCRA 464, 471. As we held in the aforecited case of Santiago, seeking an affirmative relief in court, whether in civil or criminal proceedings, constitutes voluntary appearance. Pico deals with an application for bail, where there is the special requirement of the applicant being in the custody of the law. In Feliciano v. Pasicolan,16Feliciano v. Pasicolan, 112 Phil. 781, 783; 2 SCRA 888, 890 (1961). we held that [t]he purpose of bail is to secure ones release and it would be incongruous to grant bail to one who is free. Thus, bail is the security required and given for the release of a person who is in the custody of law. The rationale behind this special rule on bail is that it discourages and prevents resort to the former pernicious practice wherein the accused could just send another in his stead to post his bail, without recognizing the jurisdiction of the court by his personal appearance therein and compliance with the requirements therefor.17Paderanga v. Court of Appeals, supra, note 9, p. 749. This is what the Court of Appeals erroneously rephrased just before quoting Pico. Cf. note 1. There is, however, an exception to the rule that filing pleadings seeking affirmative relief constitutes voluntary appearance, and the consequent submission of ones person to the jurisdiction of the court. This is in the case of pleadings whose prayer

is precisely for the avoidance of the jurisdiction of the court, which only leads to a special appearance. These pleadings are: (1) in civil cases, motions to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, whether or not other grounds for dismissal are included;18RULES OF COURT, Rule 15, Section 20. (2) in criminal cases, motions to quash a complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused; and (3) motions to quash a warrant of arrest. The first two are consequences of the fact that failure to file them would constitute a waiver of the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person. The third is a consequence of the fact that it is the very legality of the court process forcing the submission of the person of the accused that is the very issue in a motion to quash a warrant of arrest. To recapitulate what we have discussed so far, in criminal cases, jurisdiction over the person of the accused is deemed waived by the accused when he files any pleading seeking an affirmative relief, except in cases when he invokes the special jurisdiction of the court by impugning such jurisdiction over his person. Therefore, in narrow cases involving special appearances, an accused can invoke the processes of the court even though there is neither jurisdiction over the person nor custody of the law. However, if a person invoking the special jurisdiction of the court applies for bail, he must first submit himself to the custody of the law. In cases not involving the so-called special appearance, the general rule applies, i.e., the accused is deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court upon seeking affirmative relief. Notwithstanding this, there is no requirement for him to be in the custody of the law. The following cases best illustrate this point, where we granted various reliefs to accused who were not in the custody of the law, but were deemed to have placed their persons under the jurisdiction of the court. Note that none of these cases involve the application for bail, nor a motion to quash an information due to lack of jurisdiction over the person, nor a motion to quash a warrant of arrest: 1. 1. In Allado v. Diokno,19G.R. No. 113630, 5 May 1994, 232 SCRA 192, 198. on the prayer of the accused in a petition for certiorari on the ground of lack of probable cause, we issued a temporary restraining order enjoining PACC from enforcing the warrant of arrest and the respondent judge therein from further proceeding with the case and, instead, to elevate the records to us. 2. 2. In Roberts, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,20324 Phil. 568, 590; 254 SCRA 307, 348 (1996). upon the accuseds Motion to Suspend Proceedings and to Hold in Abeyance Issuance of Warrants of Arrest on the ground that they filed a Petition for Review with the Department of Justice, we directed respondent judge therein to cease and desist from further proceeding with the criminal case and to defer the issuance of warrants of arrests against the accused. 3. 3. In Lacson v. Executive Secretary,21361 Phil. 251, 284; 301 SCRA 298, 332 (1999). on the prayer of the accused in a petition for certiorari on the ground of lack of jurisdiction on the part of the Sandiganbayan, we directed the Sandiganbayan to transfer the criminal cases to the Regional Trial Court even before the issuance of the warrants of arrest.

We hold that the circumstances forcing us to require custody of the law in applications for bail are not present in motions to quash the warrant of arrest. If we allow the granting of bail to persons not in the custody of the law, it is foreseeable that many persons who can afford the bail will remain at large, and could elude being held to answer for the commission of the offense if ever he is proven guilty. On the other hand, if we allow the quashal of warrants of arrest to persons not in the custody of the law, it would be very rare that a person not genuinely entitled to liberty would remain scot-free. This is because it is the same judge who issued the warrant of arrest who will decide whether or not he followed the Constitution in his determination of probable cause, and he can easily deny the motion to quash if he really did find probable cause after personally examining the records of the case. Moreover, pursuant to the presumption of regularity of official functions, the warrant continues in force and effect until it is quashed and therefore can still be enforced on any day and at any time of the day and night.22RULES OF COURT, Rule 113, Section 6. Furthermore, the continued absence of the accused can be taken against him in the determination of probable cause, since flight is indicative of guilt. In fine, as much as it is incongruous to grant bail to one who is free, it is likewise incongruous to require one to surrender his freedom before asserting it. Human rights enjoy a higher preference in the hierarchy of rights than property rights,23Phil. Blooming Mills Employees Orga. v. Phil. Blooming Mills, Co., Inc., 151-A Phil. 656, 676; 51 SCRA 189, 202 (1973). demanding that due process in the deprivation of liberty must come before its taking and not after. Quashing a warrant of arrest based on a subsequently filed petition for review with the Secretary of Justice and based on doubts engendered by the political climate constitutes grave abuse of discretion. We nevertheless find grave abuse of discretion in the assailed actions of Judge Anghad. Judge Anghad seemed a little too eager of dismissing the criminal cases against the petitioners. First, he quashed the standing warrant of arrest issued by his predecessor because of a subsequently filed appeal to the Secretary of Justice, and because of his doubts on the existence of probable cause due to the political climate in the city. Second, after the Secretary of Justice affirmed the prosecutors resolution, he dismissed the criminal cases on the basis of a decision of this Court in another case with different accused, doing so two days after this Court resolved to issue a temporary restraining order against further proceeding with the case. After Judge Tumaliuan issued warrants for the arrest of petitioners, petitioner Miranda appealed the assistant prosecutors resolution before the Secretary of Justice. Judge Anghad, shortly after assuming office, quashed the warrant of arrest on the basis of said appeal. According to Judge Anghad, x x x prudence dictates (that) and because of comity, a deferment of the proceedings is but proper.24Joint Order dated 17 August 2001, Rollo, p. 204. Quashal on this basis is grave abuse of discretion. It is inconceivable to charge Judge Tumaliuan as lacking in prudence and oblivious to comity when he issued the warrants of arrest against petitioners just because the petitioners might, in the future, appeal the assistant prosecutors resolution to the Secretary of Justice. But even if the petition for review was filed before the issuance of the warrants of arrest,

the fact remains that the pendency of a petition for the review of the prosecutors resolution is not a ground to quash the warrants of arrest. In Webb v. de Leon,25317 Phil. 758, 796; 247 SCRA 652, 682 (1995). we held that the petitioners therein cannot assail as premature the filing of the information in court against them on the ground that they still have the right to appeal the adverse resolution of the DOJ Panel to the Secretary of Justice. Similarly, the issuance of warrants of arrest against petitioners herein should not have been quashed as premature on the same ground. The other ground invoked by Judge Anghad for the quashal of the warrant of arrest is in order if true: violation of the Constitution. Hence, Judge Anghad asked and resolved the question: In these double murder cases, did this Court comply or adhere to the above-quoted constitutional proscription, which is Sec. 2, Article III Bill of Rights; to Sec. 6(a), Rule 112, Rules of Criminal Procedure and to the above-cited decisional cases? To this query or issue, after a deep perusal of the arguments raised, this Court, through [its] regular Presiding Judge, finds merit in the contention of herein accused-movant, Jose Pempe Miranda.26Joint Order dated 17 October 2001, Rollo, p. 196. Judge Anghad is referring to the following provision of the Constitution as having been violated by Judge Tumaliuan: Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.27CONSTITUTION, Art. III, Sec. 2. However, after a careful scrutiny of the records of the case, including the supporting evidence to the resolution of the prosecutor in his determination of probable cause, we find that Judge Anghad gravely abused his discretion. According to petitioners: In this case, the nullity of the order of Judge Tumaliuan, for the arrest of the petitioners is apparent from the face of the order itself, which clearly stated that the determination of probable cause was based on the certification, under oath, of the fiscal and not on a separate determination personally made by the Judge. No presumption of regularity could be drawn from the order since it expressly and clearly showed that it was based only on the fiscals certification.28Petitioners Memorandum, Rollo, pp. 477-478. Petitioners claim is untrue. Judge Tumaliuans Joint Order contains no such indication that he relied solely on the prosecutors certification. The Joint Order even indicated the contrary:

Upon receipt of the information and resolution of the prosecutor, the Court proceeded to determine the existence of a probable cause by personally evaluating the records x x x.29Judge Tumaliuans Joint Order dated 6 July 2001, Rollo, p. 193. The records of the case show that the prosecutors certification was accompanied by supporting documents, following the requirement under Lim, Sr. v. Felix30G.R. Nos. 94054-57, 19 February 1991, 194 SCRA 292, 300. and People v. Inting.31G.R. No. 88919, 25 July 1990, 187 SCRA 788, 792. The supporting documents are the following: 1. 1. Resolution dated 21 June 2001 of State Prosecutor Leo S. Reyes; 2. 2. Affidavit dated 22 May 2001 of Modesto Gutierrez; 3. 3. Affidavit dated 19 May 2001 of Romeo B. Ocon; 4. 4. Joint Counter Affidavit dated 23 May 2001 of Mayor Jose C. Miranda and Reynaldo de la Cruz; 1. 5. Affidavit dated 19 May 2001 of Alberto Dalmacio; 2. 6. Decision dated 22 April 1999 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 41 in Criminal Case No. 97-160355; 3. 7. Sworn statement dated 27 April 2001 of Rodel Maderal; 4. 8. Information dated 22 June 2001; 5. 9. Affidavit-complaint of Virgilio Tuliao; and 6. 10. Medico-legal Reports of the cadavers of Elezer Tuliao and Vicente Buazon. Hence, procedurally, we can conclude that there was no violation on the part of Judge Tumaliuan of Article III, Section 2, of the Constitution. Judge Anghad, however, focused on the substantive part of said section, i.e., the existence of probable cause. In failing to find probable cause, Judge Anghad ruled that the confession of SPO2 Maderal is incredible for the following reasons: (1) it was given after almost two years in the custody of the National Bureau of Investigation; (2) it was given by someone who rendered himself untrustworthy for being a fugitive for five years; (3) it was given in exchange for an obvious reward of discharge from the information; and (4) it was given during the election period amidst a politically charged scenario where Santiago City voters were pitted against each other along the lines of the Miranda camp on one side and former City Mayor Amelita S. Navarro, and allegedly that of DENR Secretary Heherson Alvarez on the other.32Joint Order dated 17 August 2001, Rollo, pp. 197-201. We painstakingly went through the records of the case and found no reason to disturb the findings of probable cause of Judge Tumaliuan.

It is important to note that an exhaustive debate on the credibility of a witness is not within the province of the determination of probable cause. As we held in Webb:33Webb v. De Leon, supra note 25, pp. 675-676. A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely than not a crime has been committed and was committed by the suspects. Probable cause need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt and definitely, not on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt. As well put in Brinegar v. United States, while probable cause demands more than bare suspicion, it requires less than evidence which would justify x x x conviction. A finding of probable cause merely binds over the suspect to stand trial. It is not a pronouncement of guilt. x x x Probable cause merely implies probability of guilt and should be determined in a summary manner. Preliminary investigation is not a part of trial x x x. Dismissing a criminal case on the basis of a decision of this Court in another case with different accused constitutes grave abuse of discretion. Judge Anghad had quashed the warrant of arrest on the ground, among other things, that there was a petition for review of the assistant prosecutors resolution before the Secretary of Justice. However, after the Secretary of Justice affirmed the prosecutors resolution, Judge Anghad summarily dismissed the two criminal cases against the petitioners on the basis of the following explanation: Rodel Maderal was one of the accused in People vs. Wilfredo Leano, et al., RTC, Branch 41, Manila, and based from his sworn statements, he pinpointed to Mr. Mirandathe mastermind and with him and the other police officers as the direct perpetrators, the October 9, 2001 Decision of the Supreme Court absolving the five cops of murder, certainly makes his sworn Statements a narration of falsehood and lies and that because of the decision acquitting said officers who were likewise falsely linked by said Rodel Maderal in his April 27, 2001 statements, it is now beyond doubt that Rodel Maderal made untruthful, fabricated and perjured statements and therefore the same is without probable value. This Court agrees with the defenses views. Indeed, of what use is Maderals statements when the Supreme Court rejected the prosecutions evidence presented and adduced in Criminal Case No. 97-160355. Rodel Maderal is supposed to turn state witness in these two (2) cases but with the Supreme Court decision adverted to, the probative value of his statements is practically nil. xxxx This Court finds merit to the manifestation of the accused Miranda dated October 18, 2001, praying for the summary dismissal of the two (2) murder charges in view of the latest decision of the Supreme Court in People of the Philippines vs. Wilfredo Leao, et al., G.R. No. 13886, acquitting the accused therein and in effect disregarding all the evidence presented by the prosecution in that case. Accordingly, the two (2) informations [for] murder filed against Jose Miranda are ordered dismissed.34Joint Order dated 14 November 2001, Rollo, pp. 271-272.

This is a clear case of abuse of discretion. Judge Anghad had no right to twist our decision and interpret it to the discredit of SPO2 Maderal, who was still at large when the evidence of the prosecution in the Leao case was presented. A decision, even of this Court, acquitting the accused therein of a crime cannot be the basis of the dismissal of criminal case against different accused for the same crime. The blunder of Judge Anghad is even more pronounced by the fact that our decision in Leao was based on reasonable doubt. We never ruled in Leao that the crime did not happen; we just found that there was reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused therein, since the prosecution in that case relied on circumstantial evidence, which interestingly is not even the situation in the criminal cases of the petitioners in the case at bar as there is here an eyewitness: Rodel Maderal. The accused in Leao furthermore had no motive to kill respondent Tuliaos son, whereas petitioners herein had been implicated in the testimony of respondent Tuliao before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee. It is preposterous to conclude that because of our finding of reasonable doubt in Leao, it is now beyond doubt that Rodel Maderal made untruthful, fabricated and perjured statements and therefore the same is without probable value.35Id. On the contrary, if we are to permit the use of our decision in Leao, an acquittal on the ground of reasonable doubt actually points to the probability of the prosecutions version of the facts therein. Such probability of guilt certainly meets the criteria of probable cause. We cannot let unnoticed, too, Judge Anghads dismissal of the informations two days after we resolved to issue, upon the filing of a bond, a temporary restraining order prohibiting him from further proceeding with the case. The bond was filed the day after the informations were dismissed. While the dismissal of the case was able to beat the effectivity date of the temporary restraining order, such abrupt dismissal of the informations (days after this Courts resolve to issue a TRO against Judge Anghad) creates wild suspicions about the motives of Judge Anghad. Nullification of a proceeding necessarily carries with it the reinstatement of the orders set aside by the nullified proceeding. In their second assignment of error, petitioners claim that the Court of Appeals did not recall or reinstate the warrants of arrest issued by Judge Tumaliuan, but instead directed Judge Anghad to issue apparently new warrants of arrest.36Petitioners Memorandum, Rollo, p. 493. According to the petitioners, it was an error for the Court of Appeals to have done so, without a personal determination of probable cause. We disagree. Whether the Court of Appeals ordered the issuance of new warrants of arrest or merely ordered the reinstatement of the warrants of arrest issued by Judge Tumaliuan is merely a matter of scrupulous semantics, the slight inaccuracy whereof should not be allowed to affect the dispositions on the merits, especially in this case where the other dispositions of the Court of Appeals point to the other direction. Firstly, the Court of Appeals had reinstated the 25 June 2001 Order of Judge Tumaliuan,37Rollo, pp. 150-151. which issued the warrants of arrest. Secondly, the Court of Appeals likewise declared the proceedings conducted by Judge Anghad void. Certainly, the declaration of nullity of proceedings should be deemed to carry with it the reinstatement of the orders set aside by the nullified proceedings. Judge

Anghads order quashing the warrants of arrest had been nullified; therefore those warrants of arrest are henceforth deemed unquashed. Even if, however, the Court of Appeals had directed the issuance of new warrants of arrest based on a determination of probable cause, it would have been legally permissible for them to do so. The records of the preliminary investigation had been available to the Court of Appeals, and are also available to this Court, allowing both the Court of Appeals and this Court to personally examine the records of the case and not merely rely on the certification of the prosecutor. As we have ruled in Allado v. Diokno and Roberts v. Court of Appeals, the determination of probable cause does not rest on a subjective criteria. As we had resolved in those cases to overrule the finding of probable cause of the judges therein on the ground of grave abuse of discretion, in the same vein, we can also overrule the decision of a judge reversing a finding of probable cause, also on the ground of grave abuse of discretion. There is no double jeopardy in the reinstatement of a criminal case dismissed before arraignment In their third assignment of error, petitioners claim that the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in ordering the reinstatement of Criminal Cases No. 363523 and No. 36-3524, alleging that the order of dismissal issued therein had become final and executory. According to petitioners: It is also worthy to point out at this juncture that the Joint Order of Judge Anghad dated November 14, 2001 is NOT ONE of those Orders which were assailed in the private respondent Tuliaos Petition for Certiorari, Mandamus and Prohibition filed by the private respondent before the Court of Appeals. As carefully enumerated in the first page of the assailed Decision, only the following Orders issued by Judge Anghad were questioned by private respondent, to wit: 1. 1.) Joint Order dated August 17, 2001; 2. 2.) Order dated September 21, 2001; 3. 3.) Joint Order dated October 16, 2001; and 4. 4.) Joint Order dated October 22, 2001. Obviously, the Joint Order dated November 14, 2001 of Judge Anghad, which ultimately dismissed Criminal Cases Nos. 36-3523 AND 36-3524 is NOT included in the list of the assailed Order/Joint Orders. Hence, the Court of Appeals should not have passed upon the validity or nullity of the Joint Order of November 14, 2001.38Id., pp. 498-499. Petitioners must have forgotten that respondent Tuliaos Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus was filed not with the Court of Appeals, but with this Court. The Court of Appeals decided the case because we referred the same to them in our 19 November 2001 Resolution. Such petition was filed on 25 October 2001, around three weeks before the 14 November 2001 Order. Upon receipt of the 14 November 2001 Order, however, respondent Tuliao lost no time in filing with this Court a Motion to Cite Public Respondent in Contempt, alleging that Judge Anghad

deliberately and willfully committed contempt of court when he issued on 15 November 2001 the Order dated 14 November 2001 dismissing the informations for murder. On 21 November 2001, we referred said motion to the Court of Appeals, in view of the previous referral of respondent Tuliaos petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus. Our referral to the Court of Appeals of the Motion to Cite Public Repondent in Contempt places the 14 November 2001 Order within the issues of the case decided by the Court of Appeals. In claiming that Judge Anghad committed contempt of this Court in issuing the 14 November 2001 Order, respondent Tuliao had ascribed to Judge Anghad an act much more serious than grave abuse of discretion. Respondent Tuliao claims that Judge Anghad issued the 14 November 2001 Order on 15 November 2001, antedating it so as to avoid the effects of our 12 November 2001 Resolution. In said 12 November 2001 Resolution, we resolved to issue a temporary restraining order enjoining Judge Anghad from further proceeding with the criminal cases upon the respondent Tuliaos filing of a bond in the amount of P20,000.00. Respondent Tuliao had filed the bond on 15 November 2005. While we cannot immediately pronounce Judge Anghad in contempt, seeing as disobedience to lawful orders of a court and abuse of court processes are cases of indirect contempt which require the granting of opportunity to be heard on the part of respondent,39RULES OF COURT, Rule 71, Section 3 (b) and (c). the prayer to cite public respondent in contempt and for other reliefs just and equitable under the premises should be construed to include a prayer for the nullification of said 14 November 2001 Order. In any case, the reinstatement of a criminal case dismissed before arraignment does not constitute double jeopardy. Double jeopardy cannot be invoked where the accused has not been arraigned and it was upon his express motion that the case was dismissed.40People v. Monteiro, G.R. No. 49454, 21 December 1990, 192 SCRA 548, 553. As to respondent Tuliaos prayer (in both the original petition for certiorari as well as in his motion to cite for contempt) to disqualify Judge Anghad from further proceeding with the case, we hold that the number of instances of abuse of discretion in this case are enough to convince us of an apparent bias on the part of Judge Anghad. We further resolve to follow the case of People v. SPO1 Leao,41419 Phil. 241; 366 SCRA 774 (2001). by transferring the venue of Criminal Cases No. 363523 and No. 36-3524 to the City of Manila, pursuant to Article VIII, Section 4, of the Constitution. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated 18 December 2002 and the Resolution dated 12 June 2003 of the Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED, with the modification that Criminal Cases No. 36-3523 and No. 36-3524 be transferred to and raffled in the Regional Trial Court of the City of Manila. In this connection, 1. 1) Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Executive Judge of the RTC of the City of Santiago, Isabela, who is directed to effect the transfer of the cases within ten (10) days after receipt hereof;

2. 2) The Executive Judge of the RTC of the City of Santiago, Isabela, is likewise directed to report to this Court compliance hereto within ten (10) days from transfer of these cases; 3. 3) The Executive Judge of the City of Manila shall proceed to raffle the criminal cases within ten (10) days from the transfer; 4. 4) The Executive Judge of the City of Manila is likewise directed to report to this Court compliance with the order to raffle within ten (10) days from said compliance; and 5. 5) The RTC Judge to whom the criminal cases are raffled is directed to act on said cases with reasonable dispatch. 1. 6) Finally, Judge Anastacio D. Anghad is directed to issue forthwith warrants of arrest for the apprehension of petitioners Jose C. Miranda, Alberto P. Dalmacio, Romeo B. Ocon, and accused Rodel T. Maderal, conformably with the decision of the Court of Appeals dated 18 December 2002. The Temporary Restraining Order issued by this Court dated 4 August 2003 is hereby LIFTED. Costs against Petitioners. SO ORDERED. Notes.A person is considered to be in the custody of the law: (a) when he is arrested either by virtue of a warrant of arrest or by warrantless arrest, or (b) when he has voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court by surrendering to the proper authorities. (Paderanga vs. Court of Appeals, 247 SCRA 741 [1995]) The determination of probable cause to hold a person for trial must be distinguished from the determination of probable cause to issue a warrant of arrest, which is a judicial function. (People vs. Court of Appeals, 301 SCRA 475 [1999]) The discharge of an accused to become state witness has the effect of acquittal, and a recall of that discharge may place the said accused in double jeopardy. The fact that not all the requisites for the discharge of a state witness are present is not a ground to recall the discharge order. (People vs. Larraaga, 421 SCRA 530 [2004])

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