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Ballistic Missile Defense: Overview and Implications for Naval Planners


Naval War College Non-Resident Seminar: Joint Maritime Operations 30-31 Jan 2012

CAPT Will Dossel, USN-ret.

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THIS PRESENTATION IS

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Please Keep the Discussion At That Level

All Material is drawn from public/open sources Program Information is Drawn From MDAs Public Website (www.mda.mil)

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OVERVIEW
Ballistic Missile Basics Essential Lexicon Threat BMD Fundamentals History/Background Doctrine & Three Pillars BMD Phases of Intercept BMD Elements BMD Planning and Execution BMDR Homeland Defense and PAA BMD Planning Lexicon BMD Ops in the Joint/Maritime Environment Break Discussion

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Part I Ballistic Missile Basics

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Essential Ballistic Missile Lexicon


Ballistic Missile Class Short Range Ballistic Missile Medium Range Ballistic Missile Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile Intercontinental Ballistic Missile Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile SRBM MRBM IRBM ICBM SLBM Max. Range (km) <1000 1,000 3,000 3,000 5,500 >5,500 Varies
MTCR (Multi-lateral) INF Treaty (Bi-lateral; US-RU)

Relevant International Conventions

START Treaty (Bi-lateral; US-RU)

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Ballistic Missile Composition


SIMPLE DESIGN: SCUD variant COMPLEX DESIGNS:
MaRV MIRV PBV Warhead/RV Tankage: Oxidizer & Propellant Airframe Guidance Multiple Stages with Separating Warhead

Motor

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Ballistic Missiles: Propellant Types


Propellant = Fuel + Oxidizer which produces Thrust

Solid Propellant
Basically combustion chamber tubes packed with a propellant that contains both fuel and oxidizer blended together uniformly. For example Shuttle SRBs: Oxidizer -- ammonium perchlorate (69.93%)

Liquid Propellant
Combines separately stored liquid chemicals, a fuel and an oxidizer, to produce thrust. May be either cryogenic or hypergolic: Cryogenic Propellant : very cold, liquefied gases as fuel and oxidizer; Typical uses: SLV Hypergolic Propellant: fuel and oxidizer ignite on contact with each other. No spark is needed. SCUD B/Shahab/No Dong: Inhibited Red Fuming Nitric Acid (IRFNA) (oxidizer) + Unsymmetrical Dimethylhydrazine (UDMH)(fuel)

Fuel Powdered aluminum (16%)


Catalyzer -- Iron oxidizer powder (0.07%) Remainder is an epoxy binder that also burns Shape of chamber controls burn via exposed propellant surface

Advantages: Stable, storable; simple enables mobility;


Disadvantages: Low tolerance for error in manufacture, cannot shut down & restart

Advantages: highest energy per unit of fuel mass, variable thrust, and a restart capability
Disadvantages: Complex storage/plumbing; Precise injection metering; High capacity pumps; Limited mobility and long term storage; HIGHLY TOXIC (hypergolics)

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Ballistic Missiles: Basing Mode - Fixed


Ballistic missiles are deployed from either fixed or mobile bases Silo: Hardened, underground shelter for security and protection from elements Not immune to attack, difficult for liquid propellant missiles for long term storage Elevate to Launch: Semi-buried, better access to service missile, useful when terrain does not permit deeply buried facilities More vulnerable to attack Roll-out to Launch: Missiles stored in hard/deeply buried facility, rolled out to pre-surveyed launch pad for launch Missiles vulnerable until launch or returned to facility; gives away intentions (aids opponent I&W) and may lead to preemptive strike.

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Ballistic Missiles: Basing Mode - Mobile


Ballistic missiles are deployed from either fixed or mobile bases
Rail: Permits dispersal across broad area; organic support; deployment of heavy missiles Unique identifiers of train set, maintenance shelters a weak point, costly infrastructure to build/maintain TEL/MEL: Most mobile of land-based modes, self-sufficient for solid propellant missiles; easier for CCDD Limitations on size/weight of missile and supporting road infrastructure/terrain SHIP-BASED: Asymmetric threat concept but on the margins Vessel size/stability vs. sea state directly impacts ability to successfully elevate, service, launch missile SLBM: Most survivable, assured 2nd strike. Employed by US, Russia, with China and India in development Very expensive to develop, build and operate ALBM: Allows launch closer to threat territory decreasing flight and warning times Limited by carrier aircraft size

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Ballistic Missiles Defined


Guided only during boost phase of flight

Once powered flight is complete, only gravity affects remainder of trajectory


Plus a little drag on reentry

Guided has historically implied a relatively gentle means of controlling the state vector at thrust termination (Vbo)
To a static target

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Ballistic Missiles Defined: Reality


In reality, ballistic missiles are not ballistic . . . there are many ways to change trajectory during and after boost Endo-atmospheric maneuvers Maneuvers in the atmosphere using aerodynamic surfaces on the booster or RV Used during boost, after boost or both Exo-atmospheric maneuvers Maneuvers outside the atmosphere using small liquid propellant thrusters or solid propellant motors Used after boost Generalized energy management system maneuvers Used on boosters that allow all stages to burn to depletion (i.e., solid fuel); missile pitches and yaws during boost phase to waste energy to control range Can result in a much less gentle guidance during boost phase

Complicates Missile Warning And BMD Missions

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Endo-Atmospheric Maneuvers
Booster Mounted Uses aerodynamic surfaces for lift Takes advantage of atmosphere and missiles velocity to fly further down range Can increase range by 100s of km over basic ballistic missile

Booster

RV Mounted (MaRV) Ballistic missile performance and accuracy decrease as ranges >500 km if payload remains attached to booster Booster needs to be strengthened for re-entry Easier to separate payload after boost To make a MaRV, add moveable fins to separating payload Then maneuver in atmosphere during re-entry to: Avoid defenses; aero range extensions; add terminal guidance maneuvers All at large ranges
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MaRV

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Boost-Phase Maneuvering
Generalized Energy Management Steering (GEMS) Many solid propellant missiles dont shut down to control range, instead their motors burn to depletion Since thrust is constant, boosters pitch/yaw during powered flight to waste energy as required to make planned range. Examples: Trident I C4 SLBM and THAAD May be as simple as corkscrews or more complex maneuvers
This is an example of GEMS (THAAD launch) and this is not (failed BULAVA SLBM launch)

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Exo-Atmospheric Maneuvers
Post-Boost Vehicles (PBVs) Use a small (typically restartable liquid propellant) upper stage motor Deploy MIRVs from a single booster Targets may be 100s of kms apart

Deploy BMD countermeasures


Correct boost phase errors during midcourse flight

Inflatable decoy for Minuteman III

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Ballistic Missile Threat


Ballistic missile threat will continue to proliferate and grow in capacity and capability Increasingly seen as both an asymmetric threat and economical log-range/deep strike alternative to manned aircraft Threat countries are pursuing WMD warheads despite international sanctions and counter-proliferation efforts Future systems will incorporate active and passive countermeasures and a reduced logistical footprint Mobility and underground facilities will protect deployed missiles Growing mobile force using deception and denial Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures which complicate I&W and counter-targeting

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Worldwide Ballistic Missile Proliferation: 1990

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Worldwide Ballistic Missile Proliferation: 2009

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Ballistic Missile Threat: North Korea


Nation of the greatest concern according to 2010 BMDR Nuclear ambitions + long-range missiles Nuclear tests Oct 2006 and May 2009

Three attempted space launches, none successful


1998, 2006, 2009 2006: Simultaneous with 6 x SRBM & MRBM launches 2009: Closest to success; demonstrated potential ICBM capabilities in 3-stage variant to reach CONUS Mobile IRBM under development and may be operational Extensive hardened/deeply buried supporting infrastructure and garrisons complicate I&W Serial proliferator of nuclear and ballistic missile technology and whole systems
Toksa
120140 km

SCUD B/C
300500 km

No Dong Musudan Musudan Taepo ER Dong 2


1300 km 3000 4000 km (est) 15000 km (3-stage)

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Ballistic Missile Threat: Iran


Active indigenous program 2nd only to China in size/scope; nuclear program strongly condemned in 2011 IAEA report Majority of inventory liquid propellant SRBMs Mobile force supported by growing hardened/deeply buried infrastructure Aggressive solid propellant effort Fateh-110 SRBM and Ashura MRBM Two ASBM development programs Recently demonstrated as part of naval exercise Safir SLV 2 successful on-orbit deliveries in three attempts Knowledge and technology developed would aid IR/ICBM program Serial proliferator to other state and non-state actors
Fateh-110 200 km UNCLASSIFIED SCUD A/B/C 300600 km Shahab-3 1300 km Shahab-3 ER 2000 km BM-25 2500 km Ashura/ Sejil 2000 km Safir (SLV)

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Ballistic Missile Threat: China


Largest, most active and diverse ballistic missile program in the world

Ballistic missile force developed and deployed for range of missions from nuclear deterrence to conventional precision strike
Key part of A2/AD capabilities ICW large ASCM/LACM force
Taiwan Strait SAM & SRBM Coverage. This map depicts notional coverage based on the range of land and sea based missile systems, including advanced SAMs that China would likely employ in a Taiwan conflict.

2010 BMDR notes an imbalance of forces across Taiwan Straits primarily because of numbers of SRBM/MRBM deployed
Est. 1,000 1200

ASBM in development or early deployment specifically to counter US CVBGs Non-signatory to MTCR but verbal pledge to some provisions

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Ballistic Missile Threat: Other Notables


India: Ballistic missiles & nuclear weapons
Active, indigenous program to build/deploy a range of ballistic missiles Ranges cover all of Pakistan and eventually all of China

Pakistan: Ballistic missiles & nuclear weapons


Not nearly as extensive as India requires significant outside help Focused primarily on India Israel: Ballistic missiles & nuclear weapons (undeclared) SRBM to IRBM (Jericho II/III) Focused on Iran but able to range other regional threats

Syria: Ballistic missiles & WMD program


Primarily SRBM from Russia, North Korea and/or Iran Reports of sharing weapons and training with Hezbollah

Russia: Treaty limited (INF) to weapons of 500km or less; party to MTCR which limits transfer of technology, materials, systems and knowledge
Broad hints and statements since 2002 over possibly breaking with INF Treaty Extensive use of SRBMs in Georgian conflict (2008)

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Part II BMD Fundamentals

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BMD Timeline

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BMD Doctrine
UNDER RE-WRITE

Guiding Pub: Countering Air and Missile Threats (JP 3-01, 5 Feb 2007)

BMD included under Counterair Mission:


The counterair mission integrates both offensive and defensive operations, by all capable joint force components, to counter the air and missile threat by attaining and maintaining air superiority (Chp 1) Counterair mission consists of Offensive Counterair (OCA) and Defensive Counterair (DCA) missions. Offensive Counterair: The goal of OCA operations is to prevent the launch of enemy aircraft and missiles by destroying them and their overall supporting infrastructure prior to employment. This could mean preemptive action against an adversary As applied to BMD Attack Operations to include attacks on missile sites,,command and control (and) infrastructure Defensive Counterair: (A)ll defensive measures designed to detect, identify, intercept, and destroy or negate enemy forces attempting to penetrate or attack through friendly airspace Includes active and passive measures As applied to BMD: Active Defense: direct defensive action taken to destroy, nullify, or reduce the effectiveness of air and missile threats against friendly forces and assets. It includes the use of aircraft, air defense weapons, missile defense weapons, electronic warfare (EW), sensors, and other available weapons/capabilities. Passive Defense: all measures, other than active AMD, taken to minimize the effectiveness of hostile air and missile threats against friendly forces and assets. These measures include detection, warning, camouflage, concealment, deception, dispersion, and the use of protective construction.

Sometimes Referred To As The Three Pillars of Missile Defense


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BMD: Attack Operations


to prevent the launch of enemy . . . missiles by destroying them and their overall supporting infrastructure prior to employment. This could mean preemptive action against an adversary
In Theory: Preferred method of countering missile threats by reducing level of threat defensive forces face; AO range throughout enemy territory, are conducted at initiative of friendly forces, and normally are a high priority. In Practice: Not very successful where ballistic missile forces are concerned: Operation CROSSBOW (Dec 43 Jun 44): Allied bombing campaign against V-1 and V-2 >25,000 sorties with > 36,000 tons of bombs dropped against production and support facilities including fixed launch pads Net result V-1 strikes continued and V-2 strikes began against London summer 44 Operation DESERT STORM (1991): Dedicated A-10 & SOF assigned to seek/destroy SCUD MEL/TEL 1/3 of the 2,000 daily sorties dedicated to SCUD hunting Net result SOF team captured, 0 MEL/TEL struck, launches continued against Israel and single largest US casualty event of DS was via SCUD strike Major challenges to AO: ROE and real-time, actionable intelligence.

Peenemunde V-2 test site

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BMD: Passive Defense


all measures, other than active AMD, taken to minimize the effectiveness of hostile missile threats against friendly forces and assets.

Passive BMD improves survivability by reducing the likelihood of detection and targeting of friendly assets and thereby minimizing the potential effects of adversary reconnaissance, surveillance, and attack. Passive measures include detection, warning, camouflage, concealment, deception, dispersion, and the use of protective construction. Treaties and export control regimes may also be considered a form of passive defense

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BMD: Active Defense


direct defensive action taken to destroy, nullify, or reduce the effectiveness of hostile missile threats against friendly forces and assets.

Active BMD includes the use of aircraft, air defense weapons, missile defense weapons, electronic warfare sensors, and other available weapons/capabilities.

Missile defense is defined as defensive measures designed to destroy attacking enemy missiles, or to nullify or reduce the effectiveness of such an attack.
Integration of systems enables defense in depth, with the potential for multiple engagements that increase the probability for success. AMD assets normally provide overlapping coverage, however, not all anti-air DCA assets have organic capability against BM; likewise, not all anti-BM DCA have anti-air and CM defense capabilities. Offensive counterair and defensive counterair operations use many of the same sensors, weapons, and command and control systems.

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BMD: Intercept Phases


Apogee

Vbo

Mid-Course Phase Terminal Phase

Boost Phase

(times for ICBM flight ( >10,000 km from launch site)

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BMD By Flight Phase: Boost


In theory most vulnerable part of flight

Missile thrusting to gain acceleration


Highly visible exhaust plume aids detection/tracking 3-5 minutes travel in Earths Atmosphere Damage to aerodynamic surfaces or airframe breach may induce fatal aerodynamic loads Challenges Compressed launch notification to intercept timeline/sensor challenges
Note: As of Dec 2011, ALTB to be mothballed

BMOA may be geographically too far to successfully complete endo-atmospheric intercept


Countermeasures (hardening, counterintercept platform defenses, GSM, TTP)
All Active Boost Phase Intercept Programs are Proof of Concept Only
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BMD By Flight Phase: Ascent


ASCENT PHASE: begins right after the missiles powered flight and ends just prior to apogee. Benefits include: Earlier intercept in the battle space Optimizes a shoot-look-shoot tactic to defeat threat before countermeasure deployment Enables debris mitigation Reduces number of interceptors required to defeat a raid of threat missiles Reduces loading on remainder of BMDS architecture by not eliminating need to track and kill a threat reentry vehicle and associated objects, Reduces costs of maintaining significant number of expensive interceptors to destroy advanced countermeasures in a later phase of a threat missiles flight Places a premium on early launch detection and tracking, emphasis on launch/engage on remote and need for longer-range interceptors Mostly PPT and paper CONOPS if funded, capability wont be fielded until late this decade/early 2020s Significant technical, engineering, C2 and fiscal challenges

Boost Phase + Ascent Phase = Early Intercept


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BMD By Flight Phase: Midcourse


Offers longest decision space over course of flight up to 20 to 30 min for ICBMs Missile coasting to apogee Exoatmospheric intercept Debris mitigation for WMD

Challenges
Detection/tracking: Non-thrusting cold body presents IR detection/tracking challenges; Radar affected by horizon and position relative to flight path Discrimination: warhead(s) obscured by debris cloud and/or deployed PENAIDS PBV maneuvering, MiRV Salvage fusing effects Nuclear weapons effects from an offensive warhead fuzed to detonate when attacked Majority Of Current BMD Effort Focused In This Area
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BMD By Flight Phase: Terminal


Missile re-enters atmosphere Atmosphere acts as a screen to strip away debris cloud/PENAIDS Challenges: RV free-falling at extremely high speeds (+22,500 KPH for ICBM RVs) High-g maneuvering by MaRVs Limited engagement space owing to speeds, fuzing and warhead altitude detonation or dispersion of submunitions Lower tier engagements must deal with debris mitigation from upper tier intercepts

Most Demanding Environment On BMD Systems And Supporting C2 And C4I Infrastructures

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BMDS: System of Sensors and Shooters


The Ballistic Missile Defense System is an integrated, layered architecture that provides multiple opportunities to destroy missiles and their warheads before they can reach their targets. The systems architecture includes: Networked sensors and ground- and sea-based radars for target detection and tracking; Ground- and sea-based interceptor missiles for destroying a ballistic missile using either the force of a direct collision, called hit-to-kill technology, or an explosive blast fragmentation warhead; A Command, Control, Battle Management, and Communications Network providing the warfighter with the needed links between the sensors and interceptor missiles.

The BMDS Is Designed To Counter Ballistic Missiles Of All Ranges

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Ground-Based: Midcourse Defense


GMD: Engage and destroy limited intermediate- and long-range ballistic missile threats in the midcourse battle space to protect the United States Elements: Ground-Based Interceptor (GBI): Three-stage, solid fuel booster with an EKV (Exo-atmospheric Kill Vehicle) Ground Systems: Includes redundant fire control nodes, interceptor launch facilities, and a complex communications network for planning, directing and controlling GMD element Current Configuration: GBIs: emplaced at Fort Greely, Alaska and Vandenberg Air Force Base, California. A total of 30 interceptors were deployed at the end of 2010. Fire control, battle management, planning, tasking and threat analysis take place via a dual-node, human-incontrol interface located in Fort Greely, Alaska (49th MD Battalion) and Colorado Springs, Colorado (100th MDBE) GND C2 via GMD communications network, a secure data and voice communications system using both SATCOM and fiber optic cabling for long-haul communications.

Cue & track

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Ground-Based: Terminal
Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD): a globally transportable, rapidly deployable capability to intercept and destroy ballistic missiles inside or outside the atmosphere during their final, or terminal, phase of flight. Land-based, capable of shooting down a ballistic missile inside and just outside the atmosphere w/hit-to-kill technology. Procurement: First two Batteries fielded at Fort Bliss, TX. Total hardware for Battery #1 & #2 include: 6 Launchers, 2 Fire Control & Communications components, 2 AN/TPY-2 Radars, and 48 Interceptors. Delivery of first production interceptors began in March 2011. Batteries 3 and 4 on contract March 2011 with delivery and fielding to start in 2013. Dec 2011: Agreement to sell battery to UAE

PATRIOT Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3): Operational and fielded by the U.S. Army.
Procurement: The Army is responsible for production and further development of the PAC-3 and the Medium Extended Air Defense System; the Missile Defense Agency remains responsible for the Ballistic Missile Defense System and PAC-3 interoperability and integration efforts.

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Sea-Based BMD: Aegis BMD


Aegis BMD: Describes the entire program of sea-based BMD but primarily focused on the mid-course intercept of SRBMs, MRBMs some IRBMs and in latter versions, a limited capability against certain ICBMs Modifications and upgrades to the Aegis Weapons System (sensors, hardware and software currently ver. 3.6.1) and the SM-3 BLK 1A interceptor. 24 Deployed/forward-based CG/DDGs currently configured (includes one developmental ship, USS LAKE ERIE) Missions: Aegis LRS&T: Forward deployed Long Range Surveillance & Tracking support to GMD for Homeland Defense Aegis BMD: Exo-atmospheric, mid-course intercept and endo-atmospheric, terminal intercept First Aegis BMD Patrol (EUCOM AOR): 2011 Aegis Ashore: Shore-based program to support PAA derived from the Aegis BMD ship-based program, using the SM-3 BLK IIA and a land-based only version for long-range intercept of ICBMs.
BMD-cap. Ships SM-3 Inventory FY 11 23 FY 12 28 FY 13 32 FY 14 36 FY 15 38 263 +TBD FY 16 41 FY 17 42 FY 18 43 500 +TBD FY 19 43 FY 20 43

111

129

155

201

341 428 +TBD +TBD

513

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Sea-Based BMD: Ship Mods

NFIC-CA has critical role in IAMD (cruise- and TBM) mission

The caveat: These plans all depend on outcome of major program cuts and revisions DoD-wide

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Sea-Based BMD: SBT


Sea-based Terminal: Provides a sea-based, endo-atmospheric intercept capability for a limited threat set.
Initially comprised of 72 modified SM2 Blk IV deployed on BMD configured ships with the Aegis BMD 3.6.1 system. Blast frag warhead, not HTK Increasingly capable versions of SBT will be fielded beginning with Increment I SBT (IOC 2014) which uses the SM-6 with BMD 5.0 and Increment II SBT (IOC 2018) which will debut with BMD 5.1
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SBT: Sea-Based Terminal Kill vs. SRBMs

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Part III BMD Planning and Execution

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Navy BMD Pedigree


National guidance and policy:
22 July 1999: National Missile Defense Act of 1999 (Public Law 10638) 16 Dec 2002: NSPD-23 National Policy on Ballistic Missile Defense March 2006: NSS Field BMD to protect US from rogue states June 2008: NDS Missile defenses can defend against attack should deterrence fail 17 Sept 2009: Field more of most capable theater MD systems to protect our forces and those of allies.

DIRECTS
DOD/JCS guidance:
MDA CHARTER

Guide/Influence
15 March 2007 Missile Defense Executive Board (MDEB) Established
15 Dec 2008 NAVY BOD Membership Memo

January 2002 MDA Charter

2012

2010

Navy guidance:
October 2007: A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower Sept 2009: CNO Guidance 2010 Issue NOC that links CS21 to operations and force structure with guidance from QDR 10 and BMDR 10

Guide/Influence
Navy Strategic Guidance
PR-11

Naval Operating Concept (NOC)

Fleet TACPRO

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TACMEMOs

preventing wars is as important as winning wars.

CS-21 Strategic Imperatives

Limit Regional Conflict Deter major Power War Win our nations Wars Homeland defense Cooperative Relationships Prevent or Contain Local Disruptions

CS-21 Core Capabilities

Deterrence Sea Control Power Projection Forward Presence HA/DR Maritime Security

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The Ballistic Missile Defense Review (BMDR)


The BMDR - Congressionally mandated and guided by Presidential directive, released in Feb 2010 for the purpose of conducting a comprehensive review of US BMD policies, strategies, plans and programs. Established Policy Priorities: 1. U.S. will continue to defend the homeland against the threat of limited ballistic missile attack. 2. U.S. will defend against regional missile threats to US forces, while protecting allies and partners and enabling them to defend themselves.

3. Before new capabilities are deployed, they must undergo testing that enables assessment under realistic conditions.
4. The commitment to new capabilities must be fiscally sustainable over the long term. 5. US BMD capabilities must be flexible enough to adapt as threats change.

6. US will seek to lead expanded international efforts for missile defense.


This review. . . will result in an enhanced defense of the United States and its forces, allies, and partners from the danger of ballistic missiles wherever and whenever they threaten us.
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Defense of the Homeland


The United States will Maintain readinessdevelop capabilities at Fort Greely, AK (FGA) and Vandenberg AFB, CA (VAFB) Complete the 2nd field of 14 silos at FGA as a hedge Deploy new sensors in Europe to improve cueing for missiles launched at the US from Iran or elsewhere in Middle East Invest in further development of the SM-3 for future land-based use as ICBM threat matures Increase investments in sensors and earlyintercept kill systems to defeat countermeasures Pursue new enhancementsand other hedging strategies including continued development of a two-staged ground-based interceptor

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Phased Adaptive Approach


A key objective (for regional defense) is to leverage recent successes in regional missile defense to further expand that capability at low risk. Near-term capabilities Increase procurement of proven systems (SM-3, THAAD, An/TPY-2) Improve already developed technology Aegis Ashore 2015 epoch: land-based Aegis BMD weapons system including land-based SM-3 variant SM-3 BLK IB, BLK IIA, BLK IIB/NGAM Develop/deploy enhanced C2BMC Long-term Capabilities Develop SM-3 BLK IIA/IIB with higher Vbo and divert, providing greater regional coverage BLK IIB will have some early-intercept capability against long-range missiles Engage on remote enables interceptor engageability at greater ranges using off-board sensors Develop persistent overhead sensors to detect/ track large raid sizes over entire trajectories from space

Ballistic missile defenses help support U.S. security commitments to allies and partners. They provide reassurance that the United States will stand by those commitments despite the growth in the military potential of regional adversaries.

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PAA Implemented: Europe


Sep 2009 decision followed SECDEF/JCS recommendation to revise Sept 2007 deployment plan Phase 1 (2011): Existing missile defense systems deployed to defend against short- and medium-range ballistic missiles. Protection of portions of southern Europe with seabased BMD supported by new TPY-2 site in Turkey Phase 2 (2015): Fielding enhanced capabilities -- SM-3 Block IB and additional sensors. Phase 2 will include land-based SM-3s in southern Europe expanding coverage to additional NATO allies. Phase 3 (2018): Coverage against medium- and intermediate-range threats improved with 2nd landbased SM-3 site, located in northern Europe, and deployment of SM-3 BLK IIA 2009 Concept

Extends coverage to all NATO allies in Europe.


Phase 4 (2020): adds capability against a potential ICBM launched from the Middle East against the United States. Deploys SM-3 BLK IIB/NGAM will be available.

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BMD: International Participation


The U.S. is committed to working intensively with allies and partners

Per the BMDR, international cooperation is focused on: Development and deployment of joint and/or complementary capabilities Technological and industrial cooperation Current Initiatives: Europe: implement PAA in a NATO context East Asia and Middle East: strengthen cooperative relationships in bilateral frameworks Arrow development program w/Israel THAAD sale to UAE Renew cooperation with Russia Conduct a substantive and sustained dialogue with China

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BMD Planning Lexicon


Defended Area (DA): Defended area is the portion of the territory protected against long-range missile attacks; Critical Asset List (CAL): A list compiled by the JFC w/input from components of assets requiring theater level protection Organized by phase of operations and prioritized Defended Asset List (DAL): a list of those assets on the CAL that receive theater level asset protection. Each defended asset on the DAL should be prioritized as requiring active air defense or appropriate passive measures if that is all that is available. Launch Area Denied (LAD): Refers to the collection of threat countries from which the DA is protected; Probability of Engagement Success (Pes): The probability that all attacking warheads are destroyed, derived from the probabilities associated with missile defense functions like detection, discrimination, and hit-to-kill; Raid size breakpoint: The maximum number of warheads the system can realistically defeat in a single engagement. This metric is highly dependent on interceptor inventory.

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BMD Planning Lexicon


Point Defense (PAC 3)

DEFENDED AREA

Area Defense (Aegis BMD/THAAD)

Critical Asset List

Launch Area Denied

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BMD & Joint Doctrine for C2 Architecture


The JFACC / Area Air Defense Commander (AADC) is the supported commander for Counter-Air operations to include BMD The JFMCC has a supporting role (JP 3-01) In mature theaters, the JFC will normally designate the JFACC as the AADC and Airspace Control Authority (JP 3-01) Decentralized execution remains a basic C2 tenet of joint operations. The level of control used will depend on the nature of the operation or task, the risk or priority of its success, and the associated comfort level of the CDR. (JP 1) BMD engagement timelines may dictate that engagement authority be held by the ships CO for optimal employment of BMD-capable ships Strategic considerations may drive engagement authority to be held at the highest level in some situations (JP 1)

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Navy C2 Architecture Planning Factors


JFMCC is the persistent maritime IAMD planning and execution command echelon IAMD ships are multi-mission platforms that are most effectively controlled by a Maritime Commander A Maritime Commander will retain OPCON / TACON of multi-mission ships Provides most effective asset management for AADC Maximizes warfighting capacity and capability across all component commanders Optimizes logistics support

Ensures asset protection and safety of navigation


When the size and scope of the mission dictates, JFMCC will recommend a RADC to support the AADC for optimum employment of multi-mission ships

Multi-mission Ships Are Most Effectively Controlled By Maritime Commander


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Integrated Air & Missile Defense C2


JFC / JTF
Supporting OPCON / TACON Lines of Coordination Engagement Authority

JFMCC

JFACC AADC
DAADC

JFLCC
TAAMDCOORD

CTF IAMD

RADC

CRC RADC

RADC
ADAFCO

AAMDC

Maritime Sensors and Shooters

Airborne Sensors and Shooters

Land-based Sensors and Shooters

JFMCC is a supporting commander to JFACC/AADC for IAMD Navy retains OPCON and TACON of multi-mission IAMD ships When the size and scope of the mission dictates, JFMCC will recommend a RADC to support the AADC for optimum employment of multi-mission ships
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IAMD C2 Vision: The Reality

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TF Integrated Air & Missile Defense


JFMCC conducts operations at the Operational level from the Maritime Operations Center (MOC) Commander, Task Force Integrated Air and Missile Defense (TF IAMD) is the JFMCCs tactical execution agent for the air and missile defense mission CTF IAMD may serve as the RADC for the maritime BMD fight In most cases, CTF IAMD would reside at the MOC where the supporting integrated planning and C2 resides

CTF IAMD is JFMCCs Tactical Execution Agent for IAMD


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What This Means For The Joint Community


Joint Force Commanders have a consistent path to maritime IAMD capability in every theater Optimized maritime contribution to theaterlevel plans and operations

Supports JP 3-01 for IAMD C2


Identifies maritime node to support JFACC / AADC development and execution of the Area Air Defense Plan CTF IAMD plans for maritime IAMD
Joint Force Commander NORTHCOM SOUTHCOM EUCOM CENTCOM PACOM USFK Theater IAMD C2 Elements ACC 1st AF 12th AF 3rd AF 9th AF 13th AF 7th AF MCC USFF LCC 263rd AAMDC N/A 357th AMDD 32nd AAMDC 94th AAMDC

C4F C6F C5F C7F C7F

CTF IAMD, when designated as RADC plan, coordinate, and execute engagements

94th AAMDC

The Path to Maritime IAMD Capability is Through the JFMCC


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BMD Challenges
Countermeasures PENAIDS: Chaff, decoys Terminal maneuvers Multiple warheads/HGV Salvage fuzing Debris Upper stages, separation debris, chuffing, other intercepts Adversary TTP Attack BMD system Trajectory shaping/depressed trajectories Raids Mass launches/Timed arrival Positional Location of sensors/shooters relative to BMOA Geo-political Host-nation concerns/issues

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BREAK

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Discussion

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BMD Discussion
Situation: Intention to launch scientific research satellite
Declares launch window and booster drop zones/keep out areas Does not reveal configuration/details of payload Intel has determined payload is a RORSAT & weighs 3,800 kg, of which 1,250 kg are made up by a nuclear reactor and the disposal stage. These two components are 5.3 m long. The reactor core consists of 37 cylindrical fuel elements with 31.1 kg of highly enriched (90%) uranium-235 embedded in a beryllium casing and cooled by liquid sodium potassium. Projected orbital insertion track passes just north of Hawaii Two previous attempts have failed one 4 seconds after launch and the most recent when the third stage failed to ignite and missile fell in the broad ocean area.

SLV CONOPS Range Fans And Locations Are For Demonstration Only And Do Not Represent Actual Systems, Capabilities or Plans

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Backups

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BMD: Tracking and Cueing


Vz
Full Covariance: Space track report transmitted by a BMD platform: Area Of Uncertainty (AOU) Aegis Track Covariance

Position: X-Y-Z Cartesian coordinate system w/origin @ Earth center Velocity: Along X, Y & Z axes. Predicts future BM position.

Vy

Vx
Full covariance provides a more reliable AOU around the current and future positions of the space track, enabling construction of a search pattern that efficiently utilizes sensor resources by limiting the search only to the most probable area of the sky
(Earth center)

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