USA vs. Ruiz G.R. No.

L-35645, May 22, 1985 Sunday, January 25, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts:

The US had a naval base in Subic, Zambales which was one of those provided in the Military Bases Agreement between the Phils. and the US. The US made an invitation for the submission of bids for the repair of wharves in said base. Private respondent Eligio de Guzman & Co., Inc. responded to the invitation and submitted bids. Subsequent thereto, the private respondent received from the US 2 telegrams requesting it to confirm its price proposals and for the name of its bonding company. The private respondent complied with the requests. Thereafter, private respondent received a letter which said that the company did not qualify to receive an award for the projects because of its previous unsatisfactory performance rating. The private respondent sued the US and the members of the Engineering Command of the US Navy.

Issue:

Whether or not the complaint may prosper

Held: The traditional rule of State immunity exempts a

State from being sued in the courts of another State without its consent or waiver. This rule is a necessary consequence of the principles of independence and equality of States. However, the rules of International Law are not petrified; they are constantly developing and evolving. And because the activities of states have multiplied, it has been

necessary to distinguish thembetween sovereign and governmental acts (jure imperii) and private, commercial and proprietary acts (jure gestionis). The result is that State immunity now extends only to acts jure imperii. A State may be said to have descended to the level of an individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued only when it enters into business contracts. It does not apply where the contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions. In the present case, the projects are an integral part of the naval base which is devoted to the defense of both the US and the Phils., indisputably a function of the government of the highest order. They are not utilized for nor dedicated to commercial or business purposes.

Department of Agriculture vs. NLRC G.R. No. 104269, November 11, 1993 Sunday, January 25, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts:

Petitioner Department of Agriculture (DA) and

Sultan Security Agency entered into a contract for security services to be provided by the latter to the said governmental entity. Pursuant to their arrangements, guards were deployed by Sultan Security Agency in the various premises of the DA. Thereafter, several guards filed

a complaint for underpayment of wages, nonpayment of 13th month pay, uniform allowances, night shift differential pay, holiday pay, and overtime pay, as well as for damages against the DA and the security agency. The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision finding the DA jointly and severally liable with the security agency for the payment of money claims of the complainant security guards. The DA and the security agency did not appeal the decision. Thus, the decision became final and executory. The Labor Arbiter issued a writ of execution to enforce and execute the judgment against the property of the DA and the security agency. Thereafter, the City Sheriff levied on execution the motor vehicles of the DA.

Issue:
the

Whether or not the doctrine of non-suability of State applies in the case

Held: The

basic postulate enshrined in the Constitution

that the State may not be sued without its consent reflects nothing less than a recognition of the sovereign character of the State and an express affirmation of the unwritten rule effectively insulating it from the jurisdiction of courts. It is based on the very essence of sovereignty. A sovereign is exempt from suit based on the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right

depends. The rule is not really absolute for it does not say that the State may not be sued under any circumstances. The State may at times be sued. The States consent may be given expressly or impliedly. Express consent may be made through a general law or a special law. Implied consent, on the other hand, is conceded when the State itself commences litigation, thus opening itself to a counterclaim, or when it enters into a contract. In this situation, the government is deemed to have descended to the level of the other contracting party and to have divested itself of its sovereign immunity. But not all contracts entered into by the government operate as a waiver of its non-suability; distinction must still be made between one which is executed in the exercise of its sovereign function and another which is done in its proprietary capacity. A State may be said to have descended to the level of an individual and can this be deemed to have actually given its consent to be sued only when it enters into business contracts. It does not apply where the contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions. In the case, the DA has not pretended to have assumed a capacity apart from its being a governmental entity when it entered into the questioned contract; nor that it could have, in fact, performed any act proprietary in character. But, be that as it may, the claims of the complainant

security guards clearly constitute money claims. Act No. 3083 gives the consent of the State to be sued upon any moneyed claim involving liability arising from contract, express or implied. Pursuant, however, to Commonwealth Act 327, as amended by PD 1145, the money claim must first be brought to the Commission on Audit.

Republic vs. Sandoval 220 SCRA 124 Sunday, January 25, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts:

Farmer-rallyists marched to Malacanang calling for a genuine land reform program. There was a marcherspolice confrontation which resulted in the death of 12 rallyists and scores were wounded. As a result, then Pres. Aquino issued AO 11 creating the Citizens Mendiola Commission for the purpose of conducting an investigation. The most significant recommendation of the Commission was for the heirs of the deceased and wounded victims to be compensated by the government. Based on such recommendation, the victims of Mendiola massacre filed an action for damages against the Republic and the military/police officers involved in the incident.

Issues:
(1) Whether or not there is a valid waiver of immunity (2) Whether or not the State is liable for damages

Held: The Court held that there was no valid waiver of

immunity as claimed by the petitioners. The recommendation made by the Commission to indemnify the heirs of the deceased and the victims does not in any way mean that liability attaches to the State. AO 11 merely states the purpose of the creation of the Commission and, therefore, whatever is the finding of the Commission only serves as the basis for a cause of action in the event any party decides to litigate the same. Thus, the recommendation of the Commission does not in any way bind the State. The State cannot be made liable because the military/police officers who allegedly were responsible for the death and injuries suffered by the marchers acted beyond the scope of their authority. It is a settled rule that the State as a person can commit no wrong. The military and police officers who were responsible for the atrocities can be held personally liable for damages as they exceeded their authority, hence, the acts cannot be considered official.
Case Digest: Sanders and Moreau, Jr. vs. Veridiano II
10 June 1988 FACTS: Rossi and Wyer were advised that their employment had been converted from permanent full-time to permanent part-time. Their reaction was to protest this conversion and to institute grievance proceedings conformably to the pertinent rules and regulations of the US DoD. Moreau sent to the Chief of Naval Personnel explaining the change of employment status of the two from which Rossi and Wyer filed in the Court of First Instance of Olongapo City a complaint for damages against the herein G.R. No. L-56930

petitioners claiming that the letters contained libellous imputations against the two. Due to the failure to appear in the court, Moreau and Sanders were declared in default. ISSUE: Whether the petitioners were performing their official duties when they did the acts for which they have been sued for damages. RULING: It is abundantly clear in the present case that the acts for which the petitioners are being called to account were performed by them in the discharge of their official duties. Sanders, as director of the special services department of NAVSTA, undoubtedly had supervision over its personnel and had a hand in their employment, work assignments, discipline, dismissal and other related matters. The same can be said for Moreau. Given the official character of the above-described letters, it can be concluded that the petitioners were being sued as officers of the United States government. There should be no question by now that such complaint cannot prosper unless the government sought to be held ultimately liable has given its consent to be sued.

Loida Shauf & Jacob Shauf v. Court of Appeals, Don Detwiler & Anthony Persi
Posted in Uncategorized by admin on 27 Feb 2010

G. R. No. 90314 (November 27, 1990)

This case illustrates another violation of Article 11(1)(b). The decision enunciates that employment should not be denied on the ground of sex, color, or origin. The protection to labor espoused by the Constitution is used hand-in-hand in upholding non-discrimination. Facts: The Education Branch of the Third Combat Support Group in the Clark Air Base opened a position for a guidance counselor. Loida Shauf, a Filipino by origin and married to an American who is a member of the U.S. Air Force, applied for the position. As per records, she possessed all the qualifications for the job at that time. According to applicable regulations, where there are qualified dependents of military or civilian personnel, who are locally available, appointments to positions shall be limited to the dependents. Instead of hiring Loida, however, one Mr. Isakson was selected for the position. The latter was not a dependent of a military or civilian personnel. In addition, Mr. Isakson, apparently, lacked certain qualifications. Loida filed a complaint for damages grounded on the acts of discrimination committed by the respondents.

Held: The Court affirmed the decision of the trial court awarding damages in favor of Loida. The Constitution provides that the State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all. This is a carry-over from the 1973 Constitution ensuring equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race, or creed.

REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA vs. JAMES VINZON

Posted on March 6, 2009 by raquel

THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA, HIS EXCELLENCY AMBASSADOR SOERATMIN, and MINISTER COUNSELLOR AZHARI KASIM, petitioners, vs. JAMES VINZON

FACTS: Petitioner, Republic of Indonesia, represented by its Counsellor, Siti Partinah, entered into a Maintenance Agreement in August 1995 with respondent James Vinzon, sole proprietor of Vinzon Trade and Services. The equipment covered by the Maintenance Agreement are air conditioning units and was to take effect in a period of four years. When Indonesian Minister Counsellor Kasim assumed the position of Chief of Administration in March 2000, he allegedly found respondents work and services unsatisfactory and not in compliance with the standards set in the Maintenance Agreement. Hence, the Indonesian Embassy terminated the agreement in a letter dated August 31, 2000. Respondent filed a complaint claiming that the aforesaid termination was arbitrary and unlawful. Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss assailing that Republic of Indonesia, as a foreign sovereign State, has sovereign immunity from suit and cannot be sued as a party-defendant in the Philippines.

ISSUE: whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in sustaining the trial courts decision that petitioners have waived their immunity from suit by using as its basis the abovementioned provision in the Maintenance Agreement.

RULING: The SC GRANTED the petition. The rule that a State may not be sued without its consent is a necessary consequence of the principles of independence and equality of States. The mere entering into a contract by a foreign

State with a private party cannot be construed as the ultimate test of whether or not it is an act jure imperii or jure gestionis. Such act is only the start of the inquiry. A sovereign State does not merely establish a diplomatic mission and leave it at that; the establishment of a diplomatic mission encompasses its maintenance and upkeep. Hence, the State may enter into contracts with private entities to maintain the premises, furnishings and equipment of the embassy and the living quarters of its agents and officials. It is therefore clear that petitioner Republic of Indonesia was acting in pursuit of a sovereign activity when it entered into a contract with respondent for the upkeep or maintenance of the air conditioning units, generator sets, electrical facilities, water heaters, and water motor pumps of the Indonesian Embassy and the official residence of the Indonesian ambassador.

KHOSROW MINUCHER vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ARTHUR SCALZO

Posted on March 6, 2009 by raquel

KHOSROW MINUCHER, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ARTHUR SCALZO, respondents

FACTS: Khosrow Minucher, an Iranian national and a Labor Attach for the Iranian Embassies in Tokyo, Japan and Manila came to the country to study in 1974 and continued to stay as head of the Iranian National Resistance Movement. In May 1986, Minucher was charged with an Information for violation of Republic Act No. 6425, Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. The criminal charge followed a buy-bust operation conducted by the Philippine police narcotic agents in his house where a quantity of heroin was said to have been seized. The narcotic agents were accompanied by private respondent Arthur Scalzo who became one of the principal witnesses for the prosecution. In August 1988, Minucher filed Civil Case before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for damages on the trumped-up charges of drug trafficking made by Arthur Scalzo.

ISSUE: WON private respondent Arthur Scalzo can be sued provided his alleged diplomatic immunity conformably with the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations

RULING:

The SC DENIED the petition.

Conformably with the Vienna Convention, the functions of the diplomatic mission involve, the representation of the interests of the sending state and promoting friendly relations with the receiving state. Only diplomatic agents, are vested with blanket diplomatic immunity from civil and criminal suits. Indeed, the main yardstick in ascertaining whether a person is a diplomat entitled to immunity is the determination of whether or not he performs duties of diplomatic nature. Being an Attache, Scalzos main function is to observe, analyze and interpret trends and developments in their respective fields in the host country and submit reports to their own ministries or departments in the home government. He is not generally regarded as a member of the diplomatic mission. On the basis of an erroneous assumption that simply because of the diplomatic note, divesting the trial court of jurisdiction over his person, his diplomatic immunity is contentious.

Under the related doctrine of State Immunity from Suit, the precept that a State cannot be sued in the courts of a foreign state is a long-standing rule of customary international law. If the acts giving rise to a suit are those of a foreign government done by its foreign agent, although not necessarily a diplomatic personage, but acting in his official capacity, the complaint could be barred by the immunity of the foreign sovereign from suit without its consent. Suing a representative of a state is believed to be, in effect, suing the state itself. The proscription is not accorded for the benefit of an individual but for the State, in whose service he is, under the maxim par in parem, non habet imperium that all states are sovereign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over one another. The implication is that if the judgment against an official would require the state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the award, such as the appropriation of the amount needed to pay the damages decreed against him, the suit must be regarded as being against the state itself, although it has not been formally impleaded A foreign agent, operating within a territory, can be cloaked with immunity from suit but only as long as it can be established that he is acting within the directives of the sending state. The consent of the host state is an indispensable requirement of basic courtesy between the two sovereigns. The buy-bust operation and other such acts are indication that the Philippine government has given its imprimatur, if not consent, to the activities within Philippine territory of agent Scalzo of the United States Drug Enforcement Agency. In conducting surveillance activities on Minucher, later acting as the poseur-buyer during the buy-bust operation, and then becoming a principal witness in the criminal case against Minucher, Scalzo hardly can be said to have acted beyond the scope of his official function or duties.

wylie v. rarang 209 SCRA 357 (1992)

WYLIE v. RARANG (28 May 1992) Petitioners: M.H. Wylie and Capt. James Williams Respondents: Aurora I. Rarang and the IAC Nature: Petition for review Ponente: Gutierrez, Jr. AT THE NAVAL BASE. In Feb. 1978, M.H. Wylie was the assistant administrative officer and Capt. James Williams was the commanding officer of the US Naval Base in Subic Bay, Olongapo City. Aurora I. Rarang was employed as a merchandise control guard in the Office of the Provost Marshal. THE POD. Wylie, in his capacity as asst. admin. officer, supervised the publication of the Naval Base stations Plan of the Day (POD), which featured important announcements, necessary precautions, and general matters of interest to military personnel. One of its regular features was the action line inquiry. THE CAUSE OF THIS MESS. On Feb. 3, 1978, the POD published, under the NAVSTA Action Line Inquiry, the ff: Question: I have observed that Merchandise Control inspector/ inspectress are (sic) consuming for their own benefit things they have confiscated from Base Personnel. The observation is even more aggravated by consuming such confiscated items as cigarettes and food stuffs PUBLICLY. This is not to mention Auring who is in herself, a disgrace to her division and to the Office of the Provost Marshal. In lieu of this observation, may I therefore, ask if the head of the Merchandise Control Division is aware of this malpractice? Answer: Merchandise Control Guards and all other personnel are prohibited from appropriating confiscated items for their own consumption or use. Two locked containers are installed at the Main Gate area for deposit of confiscated items and the OPM evidence custodian controls access to these containers. Merchandise Control Guards are permitted to eat their meals at their worksite due to heavy workload. Complaints regarding merchandise control guards procedure or actions may be made directly at the Office of the Provost Marshal for immediate and necessary action. Rarang was the Auring referred to here, as she was the only one with that name in the Office of the Provost Marshall, and Wylies letter of apology for the inadvertent publication was also conclusive proof of this. AN ACTION FOR DAMAGES was instituted by Rarang against Wylie, Williams, and the US Naval Base. She prayed for P300K moral damages, exemplary damages, and P50K attorneys fees. RARANGS ALLEGATIONS: the article constituted false, injurious, and malicious defamation and libel tending to impeach her honesty, virtue and reputation exposing her to public hatred, contempt and ridicule; and that the libel was published and circulated in the English language and read by almost all the U.S. Naval Base personnel. WYLIE, WILLIAMS, THE NAVAL BASE FILED A MOTION TO DISMISS, BASED ON

THESE GROUNDS: 1. Wylie and Williams acted in the performance of their official functions as officers of the US Navy and are immune from suit; 2. The US Naval Base is an instrumentality of the US government which cannot be sued without its consent; and 3. lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties. MOTION DENIED. THE TCS DECISION: the acts of Wylie and Williams werent official acts of the US government in the operation and control of the Base but personal and tortious acts which are exceptions to the general rule that a sovereign country cant be sued in the court of another country without its consent. Thus their acts werent imputable against the US government but were done in their individual and personal capacities. They were ordered to pay Rarang P100K moral and exemplary damages, and P30K attorneys fees. However, the suit against the US Naval Base was dismissed. BOTH PARTIES APPEALED. Wylie and Williams asserted that they are immune from suit since the publication was made in their official capacities as officers of the U. S. Navy, and that they did not intentionally and maliciously cause the publication. Rarang appealed as she wasnt satisfied with the award. THE IAC MODIFIED THE TCS DECISION: Rarang was awarded P175K moral damages and P60K exemplary damages. WYLIE AND WILLIAMS ARGUMENT in this Petition for Review: they made the publication in the performance of their official functions as administrative assistant (Wylie) and commanding officer (Williams) of the US Navy and were, therefore, immune from suit for their official actions. ISSUE: WON Wylie and Williams are liable for the published article in the POD. Does the grant of rights, power, and authority to the US under the RP-US Bases Treaty cover immunity of its officers from crimes and torts? HELD: YES and NO respectively. THE PRINCIPLE OF STATE IMMUNITY FROM SUIT, QUOTING US v. GUINTO: The rule that a state may not be sued without its consent, now expressed in Article XVI, Section 3, of the 1987 Constitution, is one of the generally accepted principles of international law that we have adopted as part of the law of our land under Article II, Section 2Even without such affirmation, we would still be bound by the generally accepted principles of international law under the doctrine of incorporation As applied to the local state, the doctrine of state immunity is based on the justification given by Justice Holmes that there can be no legal right against the authority which makes the law on which the right depends! (Kawanakoa v. Polybank) There are other practical reasons for the enforcement of the doctrine. In the case of the foreign state sought to be impleaded in the local jurisdiction, the added inhibition is expressed in the maxim par in parem, non habet imperium . All states are sovereign equals and cannot assert

jurisdiction over one another. A contrary disposition would, in the language of a celebrated case, unduly vex the peace of nations. (Da Haber v. Queen of Portugal) While the doctrine appears to prohibit only suits against the state without its consent, it is also applicable to complaints filed against officials of the state for acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their duties. The rule is that if the judgment against such officials will require the state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the same, such as the appropriation of the amount needed to pay the damages awarded against them, the suit must be regarded as against the state itself although it has not been formally impleaded (Garcia v. Chief of Staff). In such a situation, the state may move to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it has been filed without its consent. The doctrine is sometimes derisively called the royal prerogative of dishonesty because of the privilege it grants the state to defeat any legitimate claim against it by simply invoking its nonsuability. That is hardly fair, at least in democratic societies, for the state is not an unfeeling tyrant unmoved by the valid claims of its citizens. In fact, the doctrine is not absolute and does not say the state may not be sued under any circumstance. On the contrary, the rule says that the state may not be sued without its consent, which clearly imports that it may be sued if it consents. The consent of the state to be sued may be manifested expressly or impliedly. Express consent may be embodied in a general law or a special law. Consent is implied when the state enters into a contract it itself commences litigationThe above rules are subject to qualification. Express consent is effected only by the will of the legislature through the medium of a duly enacted statute. (Rep. v. Purisima) not all contracts entered into by the government will operate as a waiver of its non-suability; distinction must be made between its sovereign and proprietary acts (US v. Ruiz). As for the filing of a complaint by the government, suability will result only where the government is claiming affirmative relief from the defendant. (Lim v. Brownell) THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF IMMUNITY FROM SUIT, ALSO UNDER US v. GUINTO: In the case of the US, the customary rule of international law on state immunity is expressed with more specificity in the RP-US Bases Treaty The petitioners also rely heavily on Baer v. Tizon to support their position that they are not suable, the US not having waived its sovereign immunity from suit. It is emphasized that in Baer, the Court held: The invocation of the doctrine of immunity from suit of a foreign state without its consent is appropriate insofar as alien armed forces are concerned, the starting point is Raquiza v. Bradford, a 1945 decision. In dismissing a habeas corpus petition for the release of petitioners confined by American army authorities, Justice Hilado cited Coleman v. Tennessee, where it was explicitly declared: It is well settled that a foreign army, permitted to march through a friendly country or to be stationed in it, by permission of its government or sovereign, is exempt from the civil and criminal jurisdiction of the place. Two years later, in Tubb and Tedrow v. Griess, this Court relied on Raquiza v. Bradford and cited in support excerpts from the works of the authoritative writers Accuracy demands the clarification that after the conclusion of the Philippine-American Military Bases Agreement, the treaty provision should control on such

matter, the assumption being that there was a manifestation of the submission to jurisdiction on the part of the foreign power whenever appropriate. More to the point is Syquia v. Almeda Lopez It was the ruling that respondent Judge acted correctly considering that the action must be considered as one against the U.S. Government. The opinion of Justice Montemayor continued: It is clear that the courts of the Philippines including the Municipal Court of Manila have no jurisdiction over the present case for unlawful detainer. The question of lack of jurisdiction was raised and interposed at the very beginning of the action. The U.S. Government has not given its consent to the filing of this suit which is essentially against her, though not in name. Moreover, this is not only a case of a citizen filing a suit against his own Government without the latters consent but it is of a citizen filing an action against a foreign government without said governments consent, which renders more obvious the lack of jurisdiction of the courts of his country. The principles of law behind this rule are so elementary and of such general acceptance that we deem it unnecessary to cite authorities in support thereof. The above observations do not confer on the US a blanket immunity for all acts done by it or its agents in the Philippines. Neither may the other petitioners claim that they are also insulated from suit in this country merely because they have acted as agents of the US in the discharge of their official functions. There is no question that the US, like any other state, will be deemed to have impliedly waived its non-suability if it has entered into a contract in its proprietary or private capacity. It is only when the contract involves its sovereign or governmental capacity that no such waiver may be implied In the words of Justice Vicente Abad Santos: The traditional rule of immunity excepts a State from being sued in the courts of another State without its consent or waiver. This rule is a necessary consequence of the principles of independence and equality of States. However, the rules of International Law are not petrified; they are constantly developing and evolving. And because the activities of states have multiplied, it has been necessary to distinguish them-between sovereign and governmental acts (jure imperii) and private, commercial and proprietary acts (jure gestionis). The result is that State immunity now extends only to acts jure imperii... The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or economic affairs. Stated differently, a State may be said to have descended to the level of an individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued only when it enters into business contracts. It does not apply where the contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions. The other petitioners in the cases before us all aver they have acted in the discharge of their official functions as officers or agents of the US. However, this is a matter of evidence. The charges against them may not be summarily dismissed on their mere assertion that their acts are imputable to the US, which has not given its consent to be sued. In fact, the defendants are sought to be held answerable for personal torts in which the US itself is not involved. If found liable, they and they alone must satisfy the judgment. SUMMARY OF THE EVENTS. The POD was published under the direction and authority of the commanding officer. The administrative assistant, among his other duties, is tasked to prepare and distribute the POD. The NAVSTA Action Line Inquiry is a regular feature of the POD , which was to provide personnel access to the Commanding Officer on matters they feel

should be brought to his attention for correction or investigation . According to Wylie, the action line naming Auring was received about 3 weeks prior to the articles publication. It was forwarded to the Provost Marshal for comment, and the response included a short note stating that if the article was published, to remove the name. This note was forwarded to the executive officer and to the commanding officer for approval. The approval of the commanding officer was forwarded to the office of the Administrative Assistant for inclusion in the POD. A clerk typist in the office of the Administrative Assistant prepared the smooth copy of the POD and Wylie, the administrative assistant signed the smooth copy of the POD but failed to notice the reference to Auring in the action line inquiry. As the article implied that Rarang was consuming and appropriating confiscated items, she was investigated by her supervisor. Before the article came out, she had been the recipient of commendations by her superiors for honesty in the performance of her duties. PART OF OFFICIAL FUNCTIONS. Wylie and Williams actively participated in screening the features and articles in the POD as part of their official functions. Under the rule that US officials in the performance of their official functions are immune from suit, then it should follow that they may not be held liable for the questioned publication. BUT: TAKE NOTE THAT THEY WERE SUED IN THEIR PERSONAL CAPACITIES for their alleged tortious acts in publishing a libelous article. And our laws and, we presume, those of the US dont allow the commission of crimes in the name of official duty, and these arent covered by the immunity agreement. CHAVEZ v. SANDIGANBAYAN on the law on immunity from suit of public officials is applicable here: the general rule is that public officials can be held personally accountable for acts claimed to have been performed in connection with official duties where they have acted ultra vires or where there is showing of bad faith A mere invocation of the immunity clause does not ipso facto result in the charges being automatically dropped. In the case of PCGG v. Pea, Chief Justice Teehankee added a clarification of the immunity accorded PCGG officials under Section 4(a) of Exec. Order No. I as follows: First, the main opinion does not claim absolute immunity for the members of the Commission, The cited section provides the Commissions members immunity from suit thus: No civil action shall lie against the Commission or any member thereof for anything done or omitted in the discharge of the task contemplated by this order. No absolute immunity like that sought by Mr. Marcos in his Constitution for himself and his subordinates is herein involved. It is understood that the immunity granted the members of the Commission by virtue of the unimaginable magnitude of its task to recover the plundered wealth and the States exercise of police power was immunity from liability for damages in the official discharge of the task granted the members of the Commission much in the same manner that judges are immune from suit in the official discharge of the functions of their office. Immunity from suit cannot institutionalize irresponsibility and nonaccountability nor grant a privileged status not claimed by any other official of the Republic. Where the petitioner exceeds his authority as Solicitor General, acts in bad faith, or maliciously conspir(es) with the

PCGG commissioners in persecuting respondent Enrile by filing against him an evidently baseless suit in derogation of the latters constitutional rights and liberties, there can be no question that a complaint for damages does not confer a license to persecute or recklessly injure another. The actions governed by Articles 19, 20, 21, and 32 of the Civil Code on Human Relations may be taken against public officers or private citizens alike. ARGUMENT: that Williams as commanding officer is far removed in the chain of command from the offensive publication and it would be asking too much to hold him responsible for everything which goes wrong on the base. WHILE THIS IS TRUE AS A GEN. RULE, FOR THIS CASE NO. The records show that the offensive publication was sent to the commanding officer for approval and he approved it. Art. 2176 prescribes a civil liability for damages caused by a persons act or omission constituting fault or negligence. Fault or negligence in this Article covers not only acts not punishable by law but also acts criminal in character, whether intentional or voluntary or negligent. Moreover, Art. 2219(7) provides that moral damages may be recovered in case of libel, slander or any other form of defamation. In effect, the offended party in these cases is given the right to receive from the guilty party moral damages for injury to his feelings and reputation in addition to punitive or exemplary damages . ULTRA VIRES ACT CANT BE PART OF OFFICIAL DUTY. Indeed the imputation of theft contained in the POD is a defamation against Rarangs character and reputation. Wylie himself admitted that the Office of the Provost Marshal explicitly recommended the deletion of the name if the article was published, but they were negligent because under their direction they issued the publication without deleting the name. Such act or omission is ultra vires and cannot be part of official duty. It was a tortious act which ridiculed Rarang, and as a result she suffered besmirched reputation, serious anxiety, wounded feelings and social humiliation, specially so, since the article was baseless and false. Wylie and Williams alone, in their personal capacities, are liable for the damages they caused. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. The questioned decision and resolution of the IAC are AFFIRMED.

US v. Reyes 219 SCRA 192 (1993)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA vs. REYES Petition for Certiorari to Annul & Set Aside RTC Cavite Branch 22 Resolution, 1993 FACTS:

Respondent Nelia Montoya, an American Citizen, worked as an ID checker at the US Navy Exchange (NEX) at the US Military Assistance Group (JUSMAG) headquarters in Quezon City. Shes married to Edgardo Montoya, a Filipino-American serviceman employed by the US Navy & stationed in San

Francisco. Petitioner Maxine is an American Citizen employed at the JUSMAG headquarters as the activity exchange manager. Jan. 22, 1987 Montoya bought some items from the retail store Bradford managed, where she had purchasing privileges. After shopping & while she was already at the parking lot, Mrs. Yong Kennedy, a fellow ID checker approached her & told her that she needed to search her bags upon Bradfords instruction. Montoya approached Bradford to protest the search but she was told that it was to be made on all JUSMAG employees on that day. Mrs. Kennedy then performed the search on her person, bags & car in front of Bradford & other curious onlookers. Nothing irregular was found thus she was allowed to leave afterwards. Montoya learned that she was the only person subjected to such search that day & she was informed by NEX Security Manager Roynon that NEX JUSMAG employees are not searched outside the store unless there is a strong evidence of a wrong-doing. Montoya cant recall any circumstance that would trigger suspicion of a wrong-doing on her part. She is aware of Bradfords propensity to suspect Filipinos for theft and/or shoplifting. Montoya filed a formal protest w/Mr. Roynon but no action was taken. Montoya filed a suit against Bradford for damages due to the oppressive & discriminatory acts committed by petitioner in excess of her authority as store manager. She claims that she has been exposed to contempt & ridicule causing her undue embarrassment & indignity. She further claims that the act was not motivated by any other reason aside from racial discrimination in our own land w/c is a blow to our national pride & dignity. She seeks for moral damages of P500k and exemplary damages of P100k. May 13, 1987 Summons & complaint were served on Bradford but instead of filing an answer, she along with USA government filed a motion to dismiss on grounds that: (1) this is a suit against US w/c is a foreign sovereign immune from suit w/o its consent and (2) Bradford is immune from suit for acts done in the performance of her official functions under Phil-US Military Assistance Agreement of 1947 & Military Bases Agreement of 1947. They claim that US has rights, power & authority w/in the bases, necessary for the establishment, use & operation & defense thereof. It will also use facilities & areas w/in bases & will have effective command over the facilities, US personnel, employees, equipment & material. They further claim that checking of purchases at NEX is a routine procedure observed at base retail outlets to protect & safeguard merchandise, cash & equipment pursuant to par. 2 & 4(b) of NAVRESALEACT SUBIC INST. 5500.1. July 6, 1987 Montoya filed a motion for preliminary attachment claiming that Bradford was about to leave the country & was removing & disposing her properties w/intent to defraud her creditors. Motion granted by RTC. July 14, 1987 Montoya opposed Bradfords motion to dismiss. She claims that: (1) search was outside NEX JUSMAG store thus its improper, unlawful & highly-discriminatory and beyond Bradfords authority; (2) due to excess in authority and since her liability is personal, Bradford cant rely on sovereign immunity; (3) Bradfords act was committed outside the military base thus under the jurisdiction of Philippine courts; (4) the Court can inquire into the factual circumstances of case to determine WON Bradford acted w/in or outside her authority. RTC granted Montoyas motion for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment and later on

issued writ of attachment opposed by Bradford. Montoya allowed to present evidence & Bradford declared in default for failure to file an answer. RTC ruled in favor of Montoya claiming that search was unreasonable, reckless, oppressive & against Montoyas liberty guaranteed by Consti. She was awarded P300k for moral damages, P100k for exemplary damages & P50k for actual expenses. Bradford filed a Petition for Restraining Order. SC granted TRO enjoining RTC from enforcing decision. Montoya claims that Bradford was acting as a civilian employee thus not performing governmental functions. Even if she were performing governmental acts, she would still not be covered by the immunity since she was acting outside the scope of her authority. She claims that criminal acts of a public officer/employee are his private acts & he alone is liable for such acts. She believes that this case is under RP courts jurisdiction because act was done outside the territorial control of the US Military Bases, it does not fall under offenses where US has been given right to exercise its jurisdiction and Bradford does not possess diplomatic immunity. She further claims that RP courts can inquire into the factual circumstances & determine WON Bradford is immune. ISSUES/RATIO:

1. WON the case is under the RTCs jurisdiction - YES Intervention of a third party is discretionary upon the Court. US did not obtain leave of court (something like asking for Courts permission) to intervene in the present case. Technically, it should not be allowed to intervene but since RTC entertained its motion to dismiss, it is deemed to have allowed US to intervene. By voluntarily appearing, US must be deemed to have subjected itself to RTCs jurisdiction. 2. WON RTC committed a grave abuse of discretion in denying Bradfords motion to dismiss. - NO Petitioners failed to specify any grounds for a motion to dismiss enumerated in Sec. 1, Rule 16, Rules of Court. Thus, it actually lacks cause of action. A cause of action is necessary so that Court would be able to render a valid judgment in accordance with the prayer in the complaint. A motion to dismiss w/c fails to state a cause of action hypothetically admits the truth of the allegations in the complaint. RTC should have deferred the resolution instead of denying it for lack of merit. But this is immaterial at this time since petitioners have already brought this petition to the SC. 3. WON case at bar is a suit against the State. - NO Doctrine of state immunity is expressed in Art. XVI, Sec. 3 of the 1987 Constitution. This immunity also applies to complaints filed against officials of the state for acts allegedly performed by them in discharge of their duties since it will require the state to perform an affirmative act such as appropriation of amount to pay damages. This will be regarded as a case against the state even if it has not be formally impleaded. But this is not all encompassing. Its a different matter where the public official is made to account in his capacity as such for acts contrary to law & injurious to rights of plaintiff. State authorizes only legal acts by its officers. Action against officials by one whose rights have been violated by such acts

is not a suit against the State w/in the rule of immunity of the State from suit. The doctrine of state immunity cannot be used as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice. It will not apply & may not be invoked where the public official is being sued in his private & personal capacity as an ordinary citizen. This usually arises where the public official acts w/o authority or in excess of the powers vested in him. A public official is liable if he acted w/malice & in bad faith or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction. (Shauf vs. CA) Also, USA vs. Guinto declared that USA is not conferred with blanket immunity for all acts done by it or its agents in the Philippines merely because they have acted as agents of the US in the discharge of their official functions. In this case, Bradford was sued in her private/personal capacity for acts done beyond the scope & place of her official function, thus, it falls w/in the exception to the doctrine of state immunity. 4. WON Bradford enjoys diplomatic immunity. - NO First of all, she is not among those granted diplomatic immunity under Art. 16(b) of the 1953 Military Assistance Agreement creating the JUSMAG. Second, even diplomatic agents who enjoy immunity are liable if they perform acts outside their official functions (Art. 31, Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations). HELD: Petition denied. TRO lifted.

World Health Organization v. Aquino 48 SCRA 243

Facts: Herein petitioner, in behalf of Dr. Verstuyft, was allegedly suspected by the Constabulary Offshore Action Center (COSAC) officers of carrying dutiable goods under the Customs and Tariff Code of the Philippines. Respondent Judge then issued a search warrant at the instance of the COSAC officers for the search and seizure of the personla effects of Dr. Verstuyft notwithstanding his being entitled to diplomatic immunity, as duly recognized by the Executive branch of the government. The Secretary of Foreign Affairs Carlos P. Romulo advised the respondent judge that Dr. Verstuyft is entitled to immunity from search in respect for his personal baggage as accorded to members of diplomatic missions pursuant to the Host Agreement and further requested for the suspension of the search warrant. The Solicitor General accordingly joined the petitioner for the quashal of the search warrant but respondent judge nevertheless summarily denied the quashal.

Issue: Whether or not personal effect of WHO Officer Dr. Verstuyft can be exempted from search and seizure under the diplomatic immunity.

Ruling: The executive branch of the Phils has expressly recognized that Verstuyft is entitled to diplomatic immunity, pursuant to the provisions of the Host Agreement. The DFA formally advised respondent judge of the Philippine Government's official position. The Solicitor General, as principal law officer of the gorvernment, likewise expressly affirmed said petitioner's right to diplomatic immunity and asked for the quashal of the search warrant. It recognized principle of international law and under our system of separation of powers that diplomatic immunity is essentially a political question and courts should refuse to look beyond a determination by the executive branch of government, and where the plea of diplomatic immunity is recognized by the executive branch of the government as in the case at bar, it is then the duty of the courts to accept the claim of immunity upon appropriate suggestion by the principal law officer of the government, the Solicitor General in this case, or other officer acting under his discretion. Courts may not so exercise their jurisdiction by seizure and detention of property, as to embarass the executive arm of the government in conducting foreign relations. The Court, therefore, holds the respondent judge acted without jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion in not ordering the quashal of the search warrant issued by him in disregard of the diplomatic immunity of petitioner Verstuyft.

Case Digest: The Holy See vs. Rosario, Jr.

G.R. No. 101949 FACTS: This petition arose from a controversy over a parcel of land consisting of 6,000 square meters located in the Municipality of Paranaque. Said lot was contiguous with two other lots. These lots were sold to Ramon Licup. In view of the refusal of the squatters to vacate the lots sold, a dispute arose as to who of the parties has the responsibility of evicting and clearing the land of squatters. Complicating the relations of the parties was the sale by petitioner of the lot of concern to Tropicana. ISSUE: 01 December 1994

Whether the Holy See is immune from suit insofar as its business relations regarding selling a lot to a private entity RULING: As expressed in Section 2 of Article II of the 1987 Constitution, we have adopted the generally accepted principles of International Law. Even without this affirmation, such principles of International Law are deemed incorporated as part of the law of the land as a condition and consequence of our admission in the society of nations. In the present case, if petitioner has bought and sold lands in the ordinary course of real estate business, surely the said transaction can be categorized as an act jure gestionis. However, petitioner has denied that the acquisition and subsequent disposal of the lot were made for profit but claimed that it acquired said property for the site of its mission or the Apostolic Nunciature in the Philippines. The Holy See is immune from suit for the act of selling the lot of concern is nonproprietary in nature. The lot was acquired by petitioner as a donation from the Archdiocese of Manila. The donation was made not for commercial purpose, but for the use of petitioner to construct thereon the official place of residence of the Papal Nuncio. The decision to transfer the property and the subsequent disposal thereof are likewise clothed with a governmental character. Petitioner did not sell the lot for profit or gain. It merely wanted to dispose of the same because the squatters living thereon made it almost impossible for petitioner to use it for the purpose of the donation.

G.R. No. L-22734, September 15, 1967 CIR vs. PINEDA

Estate proceedings were had to settle the estate of Atanasio Pineda. After the estate proceedings were closed, the BIR found out that the income tax liability of the estate during the pendency of the estate proceedings were not paid. The Court of Tax Appeals rendered judgment holding Manuel B. Pineda, the eldest son of the deceased, liable for the payment corresponding to his share of the estate. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue has appealed to SC and has proposed to hold Manuel B. Pineda liable for the payment of all the taxes found by the Tax Court to be due from the estate instead of only for the amount of taxes corresponding to his share in the estate. ISSUE: Can the Government require Pineda to pay the full amount of the taxes assessed? RULING:

Yes. Pineda is liable for the assessment as an heir and as a holder-transferee of property belonging to the estate/taxpayer. As a holder of property belonging to the estate, Pineda is liable for the tax up to the amount of the property in his possession. The reason is that the Government has a lien on what he received from the estate as his share in the inheritance for unpaid income taxes for which said estate is liable. By virtue of such lien, the Government has the right to subject the property in Pineda's possession, i.e., the P2,500.00, to satisfy the income tax assessment in the sum of P760.28. After such payment, Pineda will have a right of contribution from his co-heirs, to achieve an adjustment of the proper share of each heir in the distributable estate. The Government has two ways of collecting the tax in question. One, by going after all the heirs and collecting from each one of them the amount of the tax proportionate to the inheritance received. The reason why a case suit is filed against all the heirs for the tax due from the estate is to achieve thereby two results: first, payment of the tax; and second, adjustment of the shares of each heir in the distributed estate as lessened by the tax. Another remedy is by subjecting said property of the estate which is in the hands of an heir or transferee to the payment of the tax due. This second remedy is the very avenue the Government took in this case to collect the tax. The BIR should be given the necessary discretion to avail itself of the most expeditious way to collect the tax because taxes are the lifeblood of government and their prompt and certain availability is an imperious need. The adjustment of the respective shares due to the heirs from the inheritance, as lessened by the tax, is left to await the suit for contribution by the heir from whom the Government recovered said tax.

Obillos vs. Commission on Internal Revenue

139 SCRA 436 G.R. No. L-68118 October 29, 1985 Aquino, J.

Doctrine:
The sharing of gross returns does not of itself establish a partnership, whether or not the persons sharing them have a joint or common right or interest in any property from which the returns are derived. There must be an unmistakable intention to form a partnership or joint venture.

Facts:
For at least one year after their receipt of two parcels of land from their father, petitioners resold said lots to the Walled City Securities Corporation and Olga Cruz Canda, for which they earned a profit of P134,341.88 or P33,584 for each of them. They treated the profit as a capital gain and paid an income tax on one-half thereof or of P16,792. One day before the expiration of the five-year prescriptive period, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Commissioner acting on the theory that the four petitioners had formed an unregistered partnership or joint venture, required the four petitioners to pay corporate income tax on the total profit of P134,336 in addition to individual income tax on their shares thereof, a 50% fraud surcharge and a 42% accumulated interest. Further, the Commissioner considered the share of the profits of each petitioner in the sum of P33,584 as a " taxable in full (not a mere capital gain of which is taxable) and required them to pay deficiency income taxes aggregating P56,707.20 including the 50% fraud surcharge and the accumulated interest. The petitioners contested the assessments. Two Judges of the Tax Court sustained the same. Judge Roaquin dissented. Hence, the instant appeal.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioners have indeed formed a partnership or joint venture and thus, liable for corporate income tax.

Held:
We hold that it is error to consider the petitioners as having formed a partnership under article 1767 of the Civil Code simply because they allegedly contributed P178,708.12 to buy the two lots, resold the same and divided the profit among themselves. To regard the petitioners as having formed a taxable unregistered partnership would result in oppressive taxation and confirm the dictum that the power to tax involves the power to destroy. That eventuality should be obviated.

As testified by Jose Obillos, Jr., they had no such intention. They were co-owners pure and simple. To consider them as partners would obliterate the distinction between a co-ownership and a partnership. The petitioners were not engaged in any joint venture by reason of that isolated transaction. Article 1769(3) of the Civil Code provides that "the sharing of gross returns does not of itself establish a partnership, whether or not the persons sharing them have a joint or common right or interest in any property from which the returns are derived". There must be an unmistakable intention to form a partnership or joint venture. WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Tax Court is reversed and set aside. The assessments are cancelled. No costs.

Commissioner vs. Algue

GRL-28890, 17 February 1988First Division, Cruz (J); 4 concur Facts: The Philippine Sugar Estate Development Company (PSEDC) appointed Algue Inc. as its agent,authorizing it to sell its land, factories, and oil manufacturing process. The Vegetable Oil InvestmentCorporation (VOICP) purchased PSEDC properties. For the sale, Algue received a commission of P125,000 and it was from this commission that it paid Guevara, et. al. organizers of the VOICP, P75,000in promotional fees. In 1965, Algue received an assessment from the Commissioner of Internal Revenuein the amount of P83,183.85 as delinquency income tax for years 1958 amd 1959. Algue filed a protestor request for reconsideration which was not acted upon by the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR). Thecounsel for Algue had to accept the warrant of distrant and levy. Algue, however, filed a petition forreview with the Coourt of Tax Appeals. .Issue: Whether the assessment was reasonable. Held: Taxes are the lifeblood of the government and so should be collected without unnecessaryhindrance. Every person who is able to pay must contribute his share in the running of the government.The Government, for his part, is expected to respond in the form of tangible and intangible benefitsintended to improve the lives of the people and enhance their moral and material values. This symbioticrelationship is the rationale of taxation and should dispel the erroneous notion that is an arbitrarymethod of exaction by those in the seat of power. Tax collection, however, should be made inaccordance with law as any arbitrariness will negate the very reason for government itself. For all theawesome power of the tax collector, he may still be stopped in his tracks if the taxpayer candemonstrate that the law has not been observed. Herein, the claimed deduction (pursuant to Section 30[a] [1] of the Tax Code and Section 70 [1] of Revenue Regulation 2: as to compensation for personalservices) had been legitimately by Algue Inc. It has further proven that the payment of fees wasreasonable and necessary in light of the efforts exerted by the payees in inducing investors (in VOICP) toinvolve themselves in an experimental enterprise or a business requiring millions of pesos. Theassessment was not reasonable