The

Rise of China: Challenges to Development Orthodoxy

by James Porter Campbell

A Dissertation Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements of the Degree of BA (Hons) Politics at Manchester Metropolitan University Academic Year 2011/2012

 For Kyasha

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Table of Contents
Dedication............................................................................................................ Table of Contents............................................................................................... List of Abbreviations Used.............................................................................. Acknowledgements........................................................................................... Abstract................................................................................................................. Introduction........................................................................................................ . Part 1: Development Orthodoxy................................................................... 1: Introduction..................................................................................................... 2: Bretton Woods is Dead, Long Live the IFI!......................................... 3: The IFI Approach to Third World Development............................ 4: What the Washington Consensus Omits........................................... 5: Twenty Years On Failures of the Pure Market Approach......... Part 2: The Rise of China................................................................................. 1: Introduction.................................................................................................... 2: Chinas Domestic Growth Strategy........................................................ 3: Chinas Foreign Aid, Trade and Development Strategy................ 4: Conclusion........................................................................................................ Part 3: Development in an Age of Uncertainty......................................... 1: Introduction..................................................................................................... 2: Implications of Chinas Rise...................................................................... 3: The China Effect and the World Bank................................................... 4: The China Effect and the G20................................................................... 5: Conclusion........................................................................................................ Conclusion............................................................................................................ Appendices........................................................................................................... Appendix I.............................................................................................................. Appendix II............................................................................................................ Appendix III........................................................................................................... Appendix IV........................................................................................................... Bibliography........................................................................................................ ii iii iv v vi 1 4 4 5 8 10 13 15 15 16 20 24 26 26 27 29 32 34 35 37 37 37 38 39 40

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List of Abbreviations Used

CAS: Country Assistant Strategies DFI: Direct Foreign Investment GDP: Gross Domestic Product IFI: International Financial Institutions

IMF: International Monetary Fund MDG: Millennium Development Goals PRSP: Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers SAP: Structural Adjustment Policies SEZ: Special Economic Zones UN: United Nations UNDP: United Nations Development Program WTO: World Trade Organisation

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 I would like to acknowledge the help I have received in writing this Dissertation from the Politics Department, past and present, at Manchester Metropolitan University, particularly Paul Cammack and Janet Mather for their continuing patience and support. My special thanks go to my Grandfather, James Porter, who has been a constant inspiration and without whom the writing of this would not have been possible.

Acknowledgements

Abstract
This study examines the Chinese approach to development and compares this with the development orthodoxy promoted by the World Bank and IMF, highlighting the challenges posed. With close reference to the successive reforms at the IFI, it examines the way in which the two global strategies are beginning to coalesce around the emergence of a concert of leading and emergent economies and the reinvigoration of the concept of nationalism.

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In the space of just twenty years, China has propelled itself from economic lightweight to global superpower, overtaking the U.K, France and Germany for its current position as the worlds second largest economy. In getting there, China has grown at an annual rate of 10.4 percent, a figure that belies the belief of what economists thought possible. At the same time, the economies of western nations have been rocked by repeated crises of increasing severity that are destabilising the current financial order created at Bretton Woods in the shadows of war. Understandably, much attention is being paid to the Rise of China and what it means for the contemporary preconceptions of development orthodoxy. It is posited that China has undertaken a unique process of economic development that stands in sharp contrast to the policies promoted by the World Bank and IMF. As such it is hoped that the model pursued by China can be adopted for other developing nations who may then emulate such success. This has given rise to a search amongst scholars, economists and politicians for a Beijing Consensus that is hoped can replace the widely discredited Washington Consensus. However, within the literature there is no widely accepted definition of either concept. For the Washington Consensus, at least two distinct definitions are offered,1 while some scholars reject the notion as an accurate description of the contemporary development strategy altogether.2 Further the
1 See Williamson, J., (2004), The Washington Consensus as Policy Prescription for

Introduction

Development, Practitioners of Development, delivered at the World Bank, Washington D.C, and Rodrik, D., (2002), After Neoliberalism, What?, New Paths of Development, delivered at the Brazilian Development Bank, Rio de Janeiro 2 See Cammack, P., (2009), All Power to Global Capital, Papers in the Politics of Global Competitiveness, No. 10, Manchester Metropolitan University, Manchester

concept of a Beijing Consensus draws just as much controversy, with opinion divided between whether the Chinese approach diverges enough from the Washington Model to justify the epithet, or whether by its nature it commands a consensus at all.3 Thus in approaching the question to what extent does China challenge development orthodoxy?, a number of areas of contention have to be addressed. To gauge the nature of development orthodoxy, it is important to critically re- examine the policies recommended by the IFI for developing nations with regard to the second generation reforms during the 1990s. This is conducted with close reference to the World Development Reports of 1990 and 1991, which reveal the new approach taken by the IFI to development under the restated commitment of eradicating poverty.4 Assessing the nature of Chinas development strategy is made difficult as little policy documentation is made public, and what is has not been translated from Mandarin to English. This is overcome by reviewing the broad analysis available in Journals and in the books The Beijing Consensus: How Chinas Authoritarian Model will Dominate the Twenty-First Century,5 and China Into Africa: Trade, Aid,

3 See Ramo, J. C., (2004), The Beijing Consensus, The Foreign Policy Centre, London, and

Huang, Y., (2010), Debating Chinas Economic Growth: The Beijing Consensus or The Washington Consensus, Academy of Management Perspectives 2010 4 World Bank, (1990), World Development Report 1990: Poverty, (Washington: World Bank), and World Bank, (1991), World Development Report 1991: The Challenge of Development, (Washington: World Bank) 5 Halper, S., (2010), The Beijing Consensus: How Chinas Authoritarian Model will Dominate the Twenty-First Century, Basic Books, New York

and Influence,6 which illustrate the nature of Chinese development policy both domestically and internationally. This Dissertation is separated into three parts; Part One begins with a brief description of the initial meeting at Bretton Woods in 1944 which led to the establishment of the strategy for financial control and development. The approach of the two institutions founded at this meeting is considered, and it is argued that the conventional understanding of the Washington Consensus cannot be used as a functional account of this approach. In Part Two there is a major focus on the Beijing consensus and the rise of China to a dominant position in both its own economic growth and the associated engagement with other nations. The latter has emerged as a direct threat to the Bretton Woods orthodoxy. Part Three indicates the way in which the two global strategies are beginning to coalesce around the emergence of a concert of leading and emergent economies in the G20 group and the reinvigoration of the concept of nationalism.

6 Rotberg,

R., ed., (2008), China Into Africa: Trade, Aid, and Influence, Brookings Institution Press, Washington D.C

Part One Development Orthodoxy: Bretton Woods, and the Approach of the IFI
1. Introduction During 1944 Bretton Woods in New Hampshire hosted a meeting of 44 countries that endorsed what came to be known as the Bretton Woods System. Forged at the end of the war for democracy, its aim was to establish rules for the commercial and financial relations between nations through an international exchange rate tied to the U.S dollar. However, the U.S departure from the gold standard in 1971 and the adoption of floating rates effectively ended the role of the Bretton Woods global financial control mechanism. However, the Bretton Woods meeting also created two key institutions, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Bank For Reconstruction and Development (World Bank). These have proved to be essential and flexible world institutions that, even if judged by longevity alone, have been of critical importance in world markets and the global economy. It is now important to critically re-examine the Bretton Woods institutions with close reference to the second generation reforms of the International Financial Institutions (IFI) during the 1990s. Such an account highlights the continuing significance of the market approach and the assumptions on which it is based. 4

2. Bretton Woods is Dead, Long Live the IFI! For at least the past twenty years the IMF and World Bank (IFI), and their partner agencies at the United Nations, collectively referred to as the Bretton Woods Institutions, have been the predominant actors in influencing global economic development. The approach they have taken, often misleadingly simplified as the Washington Consensus, has been to compel nations to adopt the specific set of policies that are considered necessary to enable them to benefit from competitive participation in the global market. Essentially, it is the promotion of capitalism on a global scale.7 The way in which the IFI achieve influence over state government is a complex and sophisticated system of conditionality and surveillance. The system has proven to be effective, as both the IMF and World Bank are now central actors in determining the economic discourse of both developed and developing nations. This has happened despite recurrent economic crises and an apparent absence of legitimate authority. Furthermore the IFI have continuously endeavoured to remain relevant in the constantly changing global economic climate through successions of pre-emptive structural, procedural and systematic adaptations that reflect the shifting geopolitical and economic dynamics. Article IV, as ratified by its member states, makes clear that the IMF shall set specific principles for guidance of all members.8 The arrangement is an exchange of state sovereignty for access to lines of credit, fiscal expertise and a
7 Cammack, P., (2009), All Power to Global Capital, Papers in the Politics of Global

Competitiveness, No. 10, Manchester Metropolitan University, Manchester, p. 15

8 IMF, (2011), Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, Article IV

Obligations Regarding Exchange Arrangements, Section 1: General Obligations of Members, (Washington: IMF), p. 5

perceived safety net that will intervene should a nations finances falter. 9 However, the exchange is, between the parties, often deeply imbalanced and conceivably involuntary. The IFI and their fellow agencies have held until recently the monopoly on development finance and expertise, many nations have had no choice but to approach them for assistance, thus requiring them to adopt the strategies prescribed. This imbalance challenges the authority vested within the IMF, as it bestows overriding power within the central organisation of the fund. To enforce commitment of nations to the IFI adjustment policies, the IMF employs a sophisticated process of surveillance. They regularly publish economic assessment reports under article IV protocol that outline nation- specific recommendations and set the tone for policy adjustment. Surveillance is now the most critical priority of the fund,10 as the vast wealth of financial data amassed by the IFI gives them another dimension of legitimacy beyond the authority invested by states. It is proclaimed that the IMF take a structured, model based approach that is weighted in macroeconomic expertise derived from decades of economic competence.11 This approach portrays the IMF as a meritocratic authority on economic development, and accordingly governments are heavily influenced to consider the recommendations in pursuit of economic success. Crucially, however, the authority with which the IMF is regarded is not
9 Arts, B., Noortmann, M., & Reinalda, B., (2001), Non State Actors in International

Relations, Ashgate, Aldershot, p. 129

10 IMF, (2006-a), Review of the 1977 Decision on Surveillance over Exchange Rate Policies

Preliminary Considerations, Background Information, and Summing Up of the Board Meeting, (Washington: IMF), p. 34 11 IMF, (2006-b), A Practical Model-Based Approach to Monetary Policy Analysis, (Washington: IMF)

based in a history of empirical evidence from outside of the IFI community showing that such approaches are in fact mutually equitable or beneficial. On the contrary, the IFI lead initiatives throughout the world correspond with profound inequalities and declining environmental, humanitarian and societal conditions. What will perhaps be seen as a defining moment for the IFI came with the financial crisis of 2008. The crisis was something of a rare moment of opportunity for the IFI to utilize their coveted position at the center of the financial system. 12 Greater powers and a central planning position were proposed for the fund by governments across Europe. The response of the IMF has been a renewed impetus for the role of credit as a short-term solution to financial difficulty, with the expansion of flexible credit lines, and an ambition to use the crisis as an opportunity to become central actors within the recovery. However there is no scope within this response for questioning the validity of the economic conditions which caused the crisis, rather a continuation of the total faith in market logic, and a renewed commitment to the initial principles conceived over half a century ago. As the IFI have been principally committed to the most relevant nations during the 20h century, in the rapidly shifting 21st they have had to alter their composition and objectives to reflect the emerging and future relevant nations in order to remain at the center of the world economy.
12 World Bank, (2009), Global Monitoring Report 2009: A Development Emergency,

(Washington: World Bank)

3. The IFI Approach to Third World Development During the 1990s the World Bank initiated a shift of focus towards the third world, which, under the banner of poverty eradication, put the worlds poorest nations at the center of the IFIs operations a shift that has become the zeitgeist of 21st century international development.13 It was proposed in the 1990 World Development Report that the key to eradicating poverty is to promote the effective use of the poors most abundant asset labour, with policies aimed at boosting social services in theses nations to promote a productive labour force, as observed in the developed world.14 These initiatives throughout the 1990s signified a reformation of its mission. The World Bank, increasingly in partnership with the IMF, inaugurated a move away from the prevailing U.S- British focus, towards a multilateral financial order that has wider legitimacy.15 The introduction of Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP) and Country Assistance Strategies (CAS) resulted from a general consensus that the strategies pursued by the IFI were isolating emerging nations and called for a greater sense of developing world ownership of the strategy.16 Furthermore they set the tone for the future development goals the IFI were to pursue: Poverty, Education, Health, Gender and Environment. 17 PRSP became the principle Structural Adjustment Policy (SAP) regime of conditionality on third world debt relief and assistance. Although they enable greater participation by including national
13 World Bank, (1990), World Development Report 1990: Poverty, (Washington: World

Bank)
14 Ibid 15 Helleiner, E., (2006), Reinventing Bretton Woods: International Development and the

neglected origins of embedded liberalism, Development and Change, 37:5, pp. 943-967
16 World Bank & IMF, (2000), A New Approach to Country-Owned Poverty Reduction

Strategies, (Washington: World Bank), pp. 224-278

17 Ibid

government and agencies in policy creation, the PRSP retain the pro-capitalist character of previous SAP, and they do not offer a forum for agencies to propose alternative programs of development. It would appear that the PRSP represent an attempt to legitimise the continuation of global capitalist development through the transfer of perceived leadership of the project from the native global north origins to the emerging global south. Following the Millennium Declaration the IFI officially stepped in line with the UN and myriad partner organisations in adopting the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The Monterrey Consensus expresses the central role of the IMF and World Bank in enhancing participation of developing nations in the global development project.18 The IMF further defines the role of the IFI in pursuit of the MDGs within the capacity building framework as outlined by the UNDP.19 The framework is a program of increasing the capability of developing nations to take control of their own development through building skills, knowledge and experience. The roles the IFI serve in this capacity are: To finance at organisational or systemic levels, guide domestic policy in pursuit of economic goals, encourage the adoption and preservation of systemic standards and codes, and to collaborate with regional training and research agencies to build capacity at the individual level.20 There are many similarities between the PRSP and the UNDP approaches. The MDGs and subsequent Monterrey Consensus have brought together all partner agencies in singing from the same sheet. Under the banner of
18 U.N, (2003), Monterrey Consensus on Financing for Development, (The Monterrey

Consenus), (New York: U.N), p. 20

19 IMF, (2003), The Millennium Development Goals, the Emerging Framework for Capacity

Building and the Role of the IMF, (Washington: IMF)

20 Ibid, pp. 6-7

poverty eradication and third world ownership, the objectives of the development program retain the inherent commitment to capitalism on a global scale. Throughout their development, the IFI have endeavoured to remain in the driving seat of global capitalist expansion. They have achieved great influence over nations through an effective system of conditionality and surveillance that has bestowed greater power within the organisations that goes well beyond their official mandate. In response to changing global circumstances the IFI have gone about a process of reform that has aimed to place the developing world at the center of their program, though the program itself retains the commitment to market lead competitiveness. Despite perceived flaws in the logic of the program, and a lack of legitimate authority, since the financial crisis the IFI have been re- propelled to the center of the global economic system, and are being looked towards to provide guidance on recovery programs. It has not been a democratic or equitable process that has seen the IFI come to such significance, rather it has been a sophisticated and calculated progression of the organisational structure that has given them the global monopoly on providing development finance and expertise. 4. What the Washington Consensus Omits The problem with the widely accepted notion of the Washington Consensus as a functional account of this approach is that its usage can infer two distinct meanings, neither of which adequately encapsulates the true significance of the Bretton Woods project. First is Williamsons original definition, which lists ten

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specific macro-economic reforms that he claims were widely agreed in Washington to be desirable in just about all the countries of Latin America as of 1989 [see appendix I].21 Though this definition reduced to a formula of fiscal discipline, liberalisation, privatisation and deregulation is succinct in establishing the historically specific ideologically liberal context from which the Bretton Woods approach emerged, as Willamson acknowledges, it was never intended as a definitive policy prescription for development, and thus does not accurately describe the nature of contemporary Bretton Woods policy.22 Second is Rodriks ameliorated definition, which augments Williamsons with an additional ten policies that Rodrik observed as being advocated by the Bretton Woods Institutions as of 1999 [see appendix II].23 While this definition goes further to incorporate the structural and social policies inherently neglected by Williamsons definition, its limited perspective overlooks the principles of fiscal policy that relate to the agenda of the Bretton Woods approach, and moreover ignores entirely the underlying assumptions on which they are based.24 As indicated earlier, the restated objective of the IFI, made clear in the 1990 World Development Report, is to abolish poverty by promoting the productive use of the poors most abundant asset labor.25 What is significant at this juncture, aside from its seemingly progressive aim, is that it reveals a renewed commitment to the competitive forces of capital, specifically the engagement of
21 Williamson, J., (2004), The Washington Consensus as Policy Prescription for

Development, Practitioners of Development, delivered at the World Bank, Washington D.C, p. 1 22 Ibid, p. 1 23 Rodrik, D., (2002), After Neoliberalism, What?, New Paths of Development, delivered at the Brazilian Development Bank, Rio de Janeiro, p. 1 24 Ibid, p 9 25 World Bank, (1990)

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labour, as the predominant restructuring principle for developing nations. It assumes that global corporations will be attracted to pro-capitalist domestic policy and invest in the developing nations that adopt them, unlocking abundant labour capital and in turn raising living standards. The nature of these policies, as defined in the 1991 World Development Report, can be expressed as: providing a stable macroeconomic framework to win the confidence of the private sector; creating a competitive environment in which enterprise can flourish; integrating economies into the global market; and investing in the areas of education, health, nutrition and family planning to better mobilise the workforce.26 The defining feature that runs through these policies is not liberalisation, deregulation or privatisation; it is the promotion of competitiveness.27 Thus while the macro-economic discipline and market liberalisation traditionally espoused by the IMF forms the foundational basis of this policy, by insisting on the need for reforms to labour and product markets, and reforms of taxation and welfare policies to better facilitate a productive workforce, the scope goes beyond that offered in the traditional account given of the Washington Consensus. Indeed the aim of the project is more about facilitating the structural and behavioural changes that are judged as necessary to enable market participation than it is about ensuring macro-economic and financial stability in a rules-based architecture, though these are still important. 28

26 World Bank, (1991), World Development Report 1991: The Challenge of Development,

(Washington: World Bank), pp. 256-312

27 Cammack, (2009), p. 3

28 Cammack, (2009), p. 15

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The approach of the IFI, therefore, is one of hegemonic regime change, a prescriptive, paternalist set of demands outlining the conditions through which nations can enable competitive global market participation the primary restructuring principle they advocate. Rather than offering a considered, individualist approach to development that accounts for the needs of individual states, the economic mandates of the IFI merely describe what advanced economies look like, and assumes that these conditions are both universally admirable and reproducible.29 5. Twenty Years On Failures of the Pure Market Approach For more than two decades of the application of market policies in the developing world, despite anomalous successes in some cases, the results, by the World Banks own admission, fall well short of expectations.30 In terms of pure economic growth, data for much of the developing world indicates levels below or equal to pre-1990 levels.31 In Latin America and the former soviet Eastern- Bloc, the shock therapy rapid marketisation approach, while resulting in immediate big bang growth, has resulted in devastating economic, social and political crises. 32 Far from the assumption that removing state control of industry would allow for the market to provide jobs and raise living standards, unemployment remain an endemic problem for the former socialist states. The institutional restructuring of the IFI has not resulted in lasting economic growth. Further, an alarming trend of raising income inequality accompanies the
29 Rodrik, D., (2002), p. 1 30 World Bank, (2005), Economic Growth in the 1990s Learning from a Decade of

Reform, (Washington: World Bank), p. xii

31 World Bank, (2011), World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security and

Development, (Washington: World Bank), pp. 335-354

32 Rodrik, D., (2002), p. 1

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adoption of IFI policies, with the GINI coefficient index indicating rising levels for much of the developing and developed world through the period 1999-2010, with only modest reductions where they heave been observed. Against another key indicator, poverty, results are equally disappointing. Despite concerted strategies to prioritise the needs of the least developed countries, for much of the African Continent, Latin America and the Caribbean, such efforts have failed to make an impact. The approach of the IFI towards development over at least the past twenty years has been to compel nations to adopt the policies that are regarded as allowing them to benefit from competitive participation in the global market. This has taken the form of paternalist mandating, often enforcing an abidance to policy through conditions placed on loans or loan assistance. Throughout this period the results of this approach have been poor, with little economic benefits demonstrated. Much of the economic and humanitarian successes that have occurred during this period have been in China and its peripheries a region widely regarded as having not adhered to the Washington Consensus principles. The next part of this dissertation examines Chinas approach to development, ascertaining how it differs from the approach as laid out in this section.

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Part Two The Rise of China: An Alternative Mode of Development?

1. Introduction The previous chapter has argued that the approach of the IFI to development has been a largely ineffective model for the nations on which it is imposed. In contrast, Chinas own growth strategy has demonstrated continued and exponential success, not just in that it has consistently enabled unparalleled GDP growth rates, or that its economy has proven resilient through repeated global and regional crises, but that Chinas growth is equated with humanitarian advances unheard of beyond the East Asian region. Naturally, this has led to considerable interest in understanding what China has done that is different, and to what extent others can emulate it.33 In addition, Chinas reliance on externally sourced raw materials has resulted in increasing interaction with the poor nations that supply them, which in itself is challenging contemporary economic relations. Thus when scholars speak of a China Model or a Beijing Consensus, they typically invoke two things: Chinas successful domestic growth strategy which is regarded as having, to varying extents, diverged from the principles of the Bretton Woods model; and Chinas assertive foreign trade and investment strategy whereby it operates as an alternative to the Bretton Woods Institutions in offering investment and loans to developing nations.
33 Breslin, S., (2011), The China Model and the global crisis: from Friedrich List to a

Chinese mode of governance?, International Affairs, 87:6, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, Blackwell, Oxford, p. 1327

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2. Chinas Domestic Growth Strategy For over twenty years of Washington Consensus pursuit, and despite concerted and specifically targeted efforts, much of the economic growth and humanitarian advances observed in the developing world during this period have occurred in China34 a region in which the principles of the Washington Consensus are regarded as having not been widely adopted.35 Further, the resilience of the Chinese economy during and after the recent global financial crisis not only accentuated its remarkable success (for a short period at the height of the crisis the Chinese economy accounted for half of all global growth), 36 but also escalated interest in understanding what China has done that is different and how others may emulate it. For Chinas surge back to double-digit growth after only a brief slow-down is the culmination of a trend over at least two decades for Chinas economy to consistently out-perform not only those nations at comparable stages of development, but also those most developed and advanced.37 Moreover, in contrast to the developing nations targeted by the Washington model, Chinas GDP growth has translated into substantial humanitarian advances, with over 400 million lifted from poverty and significant and sustained increases in rural access to education and healthcare.38 That is not to say that Chinas growth is without its faults, however, it is the comparative
34 World Bank, (2011), Conflict, Security, and Development, World Development Report

2011, (Washington: World Bank), pp. 336-354

35 Gu, J., Humphrey, J., & Messner, D., (2008),Global Governance and Developing

Countries: The Implications of the Rise of China, World Development, 36:2, Elsevier, Brighton, p. 285 36 OECD, (2011), Perspectives on Global Development 2010: Shifting Wealth, (Paris: OECD) p. 45 37 Chinas extraordinary growth is well documented, and its headline-grabbing GDP statistics should by now be so familiar that they need not be reproduced here. 38 World Bank, (2011), pp. 336-354

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lack of damning social indicators and repeated crises commonly associated with the rapidly growing early-stage capitalist economies that distinguish Chinas development model. In charting the nature of Chinas economic growth, the conclusions drawn by observers differ in the extent to which they proclaim it has conformed to, or diverged from, the orthodox prescription of development. On the one hand, Ramo, writing in 2004, argues China is pioneering a new route towards development that is fundamentally distinct from what came before, offering an account of a Beijing Consensus which he claims replaces the widely-discredited Washington Consensus.39 On the other, Huang considers Chinas growth as more befitting the Washington Consensus model than justifying its own, arguing that while Chinese reforms were experimental those experiments resulted in financial liberalisation and private entrepreneurship.40 Both of these accounts, whilst drawing opposing conclusions, share as their basis the same basic assumption of the Washington Consensus that overlooks the true significance of the Bretton Woods agenda that it is competitiveness; not privatisation, liberalisation or deregulation, that fundamentally characterises the approach.41 With that being said, what follows is a critical re-examination of the Chinese experience, arguing that while the distinct manner with which it has been implemented signifies a departure from the traditional approach, it shares as its basis the same rationale of the Bretton Woods mandate.
39 Ramo, J. C., (2004), The Beijing Consensus, The Foreign Policy Centre, London, p. 55 40 Huang, Y., (2010), Debating Chinas Economic Growth: The Beijing Consensus or The

Washington Consensus, Academy of Management Perspectives 2010, pp. 31-47

41 Cammack, (2009)

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In search of a Beijing Model or Consensus, when academics look at what has characterised the Chinese approach, it is the distinct lack of having followed any specific model that makes it unique. 42 Indeed as Ramo posits, the Beijing approach is flexible enough that it is barely classifiable as a doctrine.43 So thus while finding a definition of exactly what is meant by the Beijing Consensus is no easy task,44 the attention tends to be focused on understanding what China has not done that others have. 45 This negative definition of the Sino experience is important in creating what Breslin calls a form of Occidentalism whereby an image of what the West is and stands for is constructed to emphasize how China is Different.46 Along these lines, Beijing Consensus scholars tend to refer to the illiberal nature, or incomplete liberalisation, of the Chinese approach that is contrasted against the perceived Liberality of the Bretton Woods approach. 47 They point to the managed exchange rate, state control over key industries including the banking system, preference for diktat rather than democratic debate, heavy state investment in infrastructure and strong support for the export sector as the differentiating marks of the Chinese alternative. 48 However, with the exception of the first point, none of these features necessarily conflict with the account of the Washington model as argued in chapter one, indeed they may even implicitly reflect it.
42 Bresin, (2011), p. 1338 43 Ramo, (2004), p. 4 44 Williamson, J., (2012), Is the Beijing Consensus Now Dominant?, Asia Policy, No.

13, 1-16, p. 5
45 Breslin, (2011). p. 1329 46 Ibid, p. 1324 47 Ernst, D., & Naughton, B., (2008), Chinas Emerging Industrialist Economy: Insights

from the IT Industry, in: Chinas Emergent Political Economy: Capitalism in the Dragons Lair, Mcnally, C. A., ed., 39-59, Routledge, London 48 The Economist, (2012), China Model, [Online], Available: http://economist.com/debate/overview/179, [Accessed 01 March 2012]

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The approach of China to development has perhaps been best summed up by Yao Yang as pragmatism pursued by a neutral government that is simply concerned with doing whatever works in the long term and is not driven by any plan, blueprint, ideological commitment or societal basis.49 This is enshrined in the policies of Deng Xiaoping paramount leader of the Chinese Communist Party during the reformative period of 1978-1992 as Mozhe Shitou Guohe - Crossing the river by feeling the stones. Though the policies introduced were undeniably liberal in that they opened China up to foreign trade and investment, this approach was taken gradually and experimentally, with pilots undertaken in Special Economic Zones (SEZs) specifically chosen in regions with the least political or social resistance.50 The policies adopted in the SEZs adhere entirely to those advocated by the IFI but for one critical distinction; whereas the policies of the IFI extend nationally to an entire nation, those in China were adopted for specifically chosen pilot regions within an internal-competition model designed to highlight the successes, which can then be extrapolated more broadly, and weed out the failures.51 In so doing China adopted a marketisation strategy tailored specifically to its own needs, maximising the benefits whist simultaneously limiting damage. Perhaps the most significant feature of Chinese development has been the lifting of 400 million people from poverty. The magnitude of this is so great that it heavily distorts global poverty reduction statistics to the extent that much
49 Yang, Y., (2008), Shifou Cunzai Yige Zhonggun Moshi [Is there a China model?], Tianyi

Network, Beijing, p. 267

50 Halper, S., (2010), The Beijing Consensus: How Chinas Authoritarian Model will

Dominate the Twenty-First Century, Basic Books, New York

51 Ibid

19

analyses often needs to ignore China to present a more accurate picture (see appendix III). Though the means by which this was achieved adds weight to the assumptions of the IFI engagement in labour has been the predominant means again the unique manner in which China approached it demonstrates a critical distinction from the IFI model. While the IFI assumed job creation would necessarily result from national pro-market policies, China focused their efforts on the specific regions and industries that would result in the most benefit. This took the form of early stage agricultural advancements, introducing new technologies to farmers that enabled them with great success to move from subsistence to profitable farming. A similar approach was adopted in the transferal of jobs from state enterprise to private enterprise. Rather than adopting the shock therapy approach of almost instant state withdrawal, Chinas leaders identified the industries where the market could most successfully replace the state, invested heavily in the surrounding infrastructure and withdrew gradually, ensuring adequate job creation and consequential political stability. By mainstreaming priority industries with knowledge of the appropriate factor endowments, China has demonstrated the important role of the state that had been overlooked by the neoliberal policies of the IFI, which assumed a lesser role for the state as the market developed. 3. Chinas Foreign Aid, Trade and Development Strategy In maintaining the remarkable levels of growth observed over the past twenty years, China has become increasingly reliant on externally sourced raw materials. To ensure preferential access in a renownedly volatile market, China is beginning to invest for the long term in the poor countries that supply them,

20

offering an alternate source of development finance and loans than the IFI.52 What the IFI offer is a purely speculative proposal of what neo-classical economists would like to see.53 Thus it has taken the form of top-down, highly politicised conditional aid that has demonstrated very small net results. On the contrary, the Beijing Consensus is informed by what has actually worked and proven successful for China, demonstrating that development has never been something that the rich bestowed on the poor, but rather something the poor achieved for themselves.54 Though ultimately motivated by the pursuit of their own self-interest, Chinas involvement with other developing nations can offer them an alternative development strategy based on the lessons learned from their own development experience. Though other nations may not have the same conditions, factor endowments and social and historical backgrounds to be able to emulate what China has done,55 by adopting the guiding principles of the Chinese strategy gradualism, pragmatism and flexibility nations can follow their own path to development that suits their individual needs and resources. The primary element of Chinas foreign development strategy is the payment in raw materials for investment in the infrastructure needed to procure them. The level of investment given to developing nations, which is indistinguishable from Chinese aid, is beginning to challenge in pure numbers the amount offered by
52 Rotberg, R. I., ed., (2008), China Into Africa: Trade, Aid, and Influence, Brookings

Institution Press, Washington D.C., p. 1

53 Keun & Matthews (2010), From Washington Consensus to BeST Consensus for World

Development, APEL Journal Compilation, pp.86-103, p. 101

54 Birdsall, N., & Fukuyama, F., (2011), The Post-Washington Consensus: Development

after the Crisis Working Paper 244, Centre for Global Development, Washington D.C, p. 1 55 Noughton, B., (2010), Chinas Distinctive System: Can it be a model for others?, Journal of Contemporary China, 19:67, pp. 437-60

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advanced nations and the IFI.56 Though while the investment from traditional donors is highly conditional on the adherence to political, economic and social principles, China maintain respect for autonomy in the nations with which they invest by the conspicuous absence of any such conditionality, mindful of the considerable political advantage that this bestows them. 57 Any political or economic changes that result will be as a natural result of the investment, not a precondition to it. Such an approach follows from Chinas own domestic growth strategy, which demonstrated the merits of development as an internally administered, gradual process above adherence to a specific model. Aside from the very self serving nature of the Chinese foreign trade strategy, China is also keen to share, particularly in Africa, the specific lessons it has learnt that it feels are applicable to the region. This is beginning to take shape in the form of projects, both domestic and international, aimed at building partnerships with Africa to tackle the issues of poverty, the environment and trade. In Beijing, an official International Poverty Alleviation Centre has been established to train African officials and introduce them to the poverty reduction projects that have proven successful in Chinas poorest provinces. 58 Further afield, China is championing the establishment of SEZs in Africa, directly linked to the infrastructure projects it is pursuing. In creating investment corridors, almost identical in their composition to those of the Chinese SEZs, it is envisioned that by attracting FDI aimed at specific industries, the internal competition model
56 Rotberg, R., (2008) 57 Ibid 58 Huang, C. H., (2008), Chinas Renewed Partnership with Africa: Implications for the

United States, in: Rotberg, R., ed., China Into Africa: Trade, Aid and Influence, Brookings Institution Press, Washington D.C., p. 300

22

pursued in China can be replicated, highlighting what works for Africa and offering a means by which this can be advanced.59 Along similar lines, China is expanding partnerships in Africa with the aim of addressing climate change, financing the creation of 100 clean energy projects. While it is too early to gauge the material success of such projects, what is evident is the positive reception from the African people of Chinas involvement, contrasting to the negative perception of previous actors [see appendix IV]. What clearly distinguishes Chinas foreign development strategy from those pursued by the IFI, besides the absence of conditionality and the negative perceptions that go with it, is that China is prepared to deal with nations on a case-by-case basis. By learning from its own growth experience, China understands that different factors determine the applicability of certain growth mechanisms, and the flexibility of their approach allows for greater dispensation for the limiting factors that have made development in Africa a typically allusive affair. Though Chinas strategy shares in principle the same commitment to the forces of capital of the IFI, the added dimension of the state as a determining factor means investment strategies are more likely to suit the needs of the nations in which they are undertaken.
59 Davies, M. J., (2008), Special Economic Zones: Chinas Developmental Model Comes to

Africa, in: Rotberg, R., ed., China Into Africa: Trade, Aid and Influence, Brookings Institution Press, Washington D.C., pp. 137-154

23

4. Conclusion Though Chinas growth experience does not by its nature command a particular model or consensus that can be replicated, it has been guided by a set of concurrent principles that stand in contrast to what has previously been endorsed by the IFI. While orthodoxy would have it that economic success results from replicating the conditions observed in so-called advanced countries, by forging its own developmental path free from such dogma, China has demonstrated that economic development can be a natural process native to the developing country that is pursuing it. This has proven very successful for China, who has enjoyed consistent economic growth un-paralleled anywhere else on Earth. While Chinas principles of development - gradualism, pragmatism and flexibility have resulted in the adaptation of policies consistent with those prescribed by the IFI, by not assuming a predetermined model, the developmental process has accounted more sensitively for Chinas specific factor endowments that would have been overlooked had the orthodox model been assumed. A specific factor overlooked by the neoliberal polices of the IFI that has been legitimised by China is the merits of the state as a determining factor that has proven more successful than the market in identifying new industries and mobilising the resources and labour necessary to exploit them. As a consequence of such rapid growth, China is adopting an increasingly assertive foreign trade and development strategy with the objective of securing long-term preferential access to resources that avoids the volatility of the open commodities market. The level of investment offered to poor nations endowed with abundant resources is beginning to rival the amount offered from the

24

traditional sources. Though while traditional investment has been highly conditional on the adherence to specific economic and political principles, China is mindful of the political advantage in not doing so. By proclaiming respect for autonomy, China positions itself as a mutual trade partner, avoiding the criticisms of imperialism that the IFI have been vulnerable to. Though Chinese self-interest is the main motivation of such activity, there are a number of development lessons that China wish to extend to their trade partners. In so doing, the ascendency of the Washington Model is being brought into question. The extent to which this challenges development orthodoxy is considered in the next chapter.

25

Part Three Development in an Age of Uncertainty: Rethinking Orthodoxies

1. Introduction Part one outlined the historical significance, subsequent dominance and current difficulties relating to the Bretton Woods orthodoxy. It showed how the Washington Consensus sharpened the implications of ongoing aid and development activity and has given rise to negative responses from recipient countries and low levels of achievement of the global development targets. In Part two, the Beijing Consensus is shown to offer a different and more dynamic framework for action through national self-interest and an approach linking trade and sustained investment to trading partners. In this final part it is seen as timely to reflect on the global financial and economic crisis and the decisions that need to be made in order to create a sustained response that will be successful. The history of the performance of the Bretton Woods institutions emphasises the vulnerability of the Washington Consensus. However, as described in Part two, such an outcome cant be delivered solely by the Beijing Consensus in circumstances that rest simply upon the economic and trading activity of only one major nation, even one as immense as China. Fortunately, the context of economic engagement between countries has fundamentally changed. Following the Asian crisis and the international upheaval caused by 9/11, there has been an accelerated interest or

26

even a desperate striving to discover a more effective means of dealing with world problems that remain stubbornly resistant to the old methodologies. 2. Implications of Chinas Rise China has demonstrated more effectively than any other nation how the typical shortcomings of the market approach may be overcome. It has relegitimised state developmentalism, which at the face of it stands in opposition to the neoliberal assumptions of the Washington Model.60 Its state-led approach has proven more effective than the market in identifying new industries and mobilising the resources and labour necessary to exploit them undermining the invisible hand doctrine that the capitalist system assumes. Its gradualism has proven a better means for market transition than the shock therapy typically recommended by the IFI for post-communist states. The planned, methodic and considered transition from state to private enterprise has ensured adequate job creation and the broader political stability this enables, which stands in sharp contrast to the collapse of former socialist states during the 1990s. In so doing, China undermines the implicit assumption of the Washington Model that, as Fukuyama claims, liberal democracy remains the only coherent political ambition.61 Until recently, emerging economies had no option other than to accept the liberal preconditions mandated of them if they were to participate in the global economy. For post-Communist or authoritarian states, the choice was either liberalisation and participation, or exclusion. China offers a third way for developing nations, a means to participate in the global economy
60Paus., E., Prime., P., & Western, J., (2009), China Rising: A Global Transformation, in:

Paus., E., Prime., P., & Western, J., eds., Global Giant: Is China Changing the Rules of the Game?, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke 61 Fukuyama, F., (1992), The End of History and the Last Man, Penguin, London, p. xiii

27

without major changes to governance. Though this may have the effect of supporting repressive and autocratic regimes is beyond the point it is the de- ideologised commitment to doing whatever it takes to promote growth while maintaining political stability that is the defining hallmark of the Chinese mode of governance not de facto autocracy or despotism.62 Necessitated by Chinas exponential economic growth, and reflecting the unique manner in which it was achieved, China is adopting a foreign trade and development strategy that is free from the political mandates traditionally promoted by the IFI. In so doing, Beijing has achieved traction in engaging developing countries that the Washington approach has failed to materialise. Particularly in the case of Sub-Saharan Africa, the political acceptability of a perceived benign trade partner as opposed to the diktats at the IMF has allowed China considerable leverage within a region typically suspicious of external intervention. Whereas the political, social and economic preconditions mandated by the IFI have lead to accusations of imperialism, China consciously aligns itself as a defender of national autonomy against them. 63 By offering loans and investment to developing nations in return for access to resources, crucially without any attached conditionality, the role of China within these regions is beginning to challenge the ascendency of the traditional development agencies. Though while the activity pursued does not necessarily contradict the assumptions of the Washington Consensus, by demonstrating that development has never been something that the rich bestowed on the poor, but
62 Breslin, S., (2010), p. 1329 63 Gu, J., Humphrey, J., & Messner, D., (2008), p. 285

28

rather something the poor achieved for themselves,64 the already questionable authority and legitimacy of the IFI is further undermined. Further, China also demonstrates how a nation is able to successfully pursue a national agenda within a system designed to promote inter-dependence and economic cooperation. Contrary to the implied assertions of the Beijing Consensus scholars, Chinas rise has happened entirely within the Bretton Woods system of economic relations. With the exception of a manipulated currency exchange rate, a practice that draws repeated, yet unsuccessful, criticisms from global leaders, China is willing for the most part to abide by the norms and conventions of the international system. Bretton Woods assumed economic cooperation within a rules-based architecture would result in the homogenisation of development norms and political practices. This assertion is compromised as China has pioneered an alternate yet parallel development strategy, not defined by the terms and conditions set in Washington, that engages fully in the system yet is driven by unconventional political principles. 3. The China Effect and the World Bank The recommendations made by Justin Yifu Lin, the first Chinese Chief Economist of the World Bank, as informed by his thesis on New Structural Economics, reveals that the lessons learned from Chinas development are informing the new Washington approach to development. In a speech given in Mozambique as part of the annual WIDER lecture, the first to be held in Africa, Lin outlined a new

64 Birdsall, N., & Fukuyama, F.,(2011), p. 1 29

approach for the Bank, which signifies a decisive move from that taken before.65 Guiding the overall tenure of the recommendations, as expanded in the publication Multipolarity: the New Global Economy, is a conviction that the leading emerging economies, amongst them China, are the examples for other developing nations to follow. 66 As such the approach recommended in the document endorses planned state-led growth, recognising how a government of a low-income country may accelerate structural change and income growth by facilitating the development of new industries which reflect their latent comparative advantage, and take advantage of new opportunity.67 Further, the Washington Consensus model is rejected on the basis that it focused on the government failures without fully taking into consideration the crucial market failure issues of coordination and externalities inherent to the process of industrial upgrading and diversification.68 While the prescriptive model traditionally endorsed by the IFI was a static and non-accommodating assumption of development, Chinas flexible and non- ideological process has lead to an endorsement at the Bank of Akamatsus Wild- Geese-Flying-Pattern model. That is that China has demonstrated development as a catch-up process, not a one-size-fits-all, all or nothing approach. Chinas successful role as the worlds factory is significant in demonstrating that as the advanced economies moved from labour-intensive goods manufacturing to the
65 Cammack, P, (2011), Southeast Asia in the New Global Economy: Emerging

Challenges from Africa and Latin America, Southeast Asia Research Centre Working Paper Series, No. 109, City University, Hong Kong, p. 2 66 World Bank (2011-b), Multipolarity: The New Global Economy, Global Development Horizons 2011, World Bank, Washington D.C, p. 4 67 Ibid, p. 4 68 Ibid, p. 40

30

high-tech, low-labour service industries during the 20th century, China has filled the deficit by its mobilisation into industry of the population previously engaged in subsistence agriculture. 69 Similarly, as Chinas labour surplus begins to disappear, and as wages increase, its necessary progression into more productive high-tech industries presents a unique window of opportunity for Africa, as low-income countries can now take on the millions of low-wage, labour intensive jobs China will leave behind.70 Crucially, as the Bank identifies this process of development, it recognises the previously undervalued role of state actors, both domestically and intra-nationally, in facilitating this transition, a process ill-suited to the blunt and non-sensitive workings of the market.71 Overall, the new approach recommended for the Bank by Lin assumes that China is the leading example for other nations to follow, and that what is good for China, by merit of Akamatsus development model, is thus good for the rest of the developing world. Previous rearrangements at IFI, as part one has conveyed, have responded to crises and failures with renewed commitments to the flawed logic of pure capitalism in some evangelist belief that failures were the result of not having followed the model extensively enough. This current change is more momentous than any that have come before as it for the first time reveals a reconsideration of the rationale behind the approach. As asserted earlier, China has undermined the invisible hand doctrine that the IFI had until now accepted. The implications of Chinas rise cannot be overstated; it challenges the very assumptions on which
69 Cammack, (2011), p. 4 70 World Bank, (2011-b), p. 25 71 Ibid, p. 5

31

the pure Capitalist agenda is based. Though neither China, the IMF or the World Bank are departing entirely from a market approach to development, by committing to a more planned and managed state-capitalism, a new future of a market based on competing national interests is being realised, endorsed most comprehensively by China and its remarkable success. 4. The China Effect and the G20 The growing disillusion with the G8 network of global governance climaxed in Genoa at the first summit of the new Millennium. There, previously unprecedented violence and fury was heaped upon the cabal of eight powerful nations dictating to the rest of the world.72 The result was a greatly increased body of support for an organisation that could encompass both the contribution of the major trading nations and acknowledge the increasing importance of the emerging market economies. This has led to the great strengthening of the G20, a group mooted in 1999 and now holding center stage. It is seen as a body that could combine the continuing concerns about the vast differences in wealth between individual countries and the realism and drive to engage in sustained economic development. [The development] of the G20 [has been] a direct response to the global repercussions of the financial crisis in Asia, [and a] tangible recognition of the marked changes to the international economic landscape that has occurred over the preceding decades. Emerging countries had become important economic powers. Moreover, owing to the increasing integration of economies and markets through globalisation, domestic developments in these countries could have significant repercussions far beyond their borders. The effective functioning of the international financial and economic system
72 Porter, J., (2002), Book Review of Globalization and Governance, The Round Table, No.

363, pp. 91-104, Carfax, London, p. 92

32

warranted their active participation in the governance structure of the global economy.73 The effects of the change to a much more inclusive and representative body is best illustrated by the new membership. The membership is expressed in five groups: Group 1 Australia, Canada, Saudi Arabia and the US Group 2 India, Russia, South Africa and Turkey Group 3 Argentina, Brazil and Mexico Group 4 France, Germany, Italy and UK Group 5 China, Indonesia, Japan and South Korea (Membership is also given to the Representative of the EU) The growing authority of the G20 was consolidated at the meeting in China in October 2005. The theme of the Meeting fitted well with the initiatives described in Part two and were successfully embedded in the wider consciousness of the membership in Xianghe. By 2005, the world economy continued to face large and increasing imbalances with accelerating economic globalisation. The prolonged global imbalances gave rise to concern because uncertainty existed regarding how far into the future they could continue to be financed, and whether the eventual adjustment would take place in an orderly fashion. To reduce this uncertainty and achieve orderly unwinding of the imbalances, sustained policy actions across major countries were called upon, Against this backdrop, the G-20 members, under the facilitation of China, the Chair of 2005 G-20 meetings, decided the theme of the 2005 meetings: Global Co-operation: Promoting Balanced and Orderly World Economic Development.
73 G-20, (2005), Chair Summary of the Meeting of G-20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank

Governors, (Xianghe: G-20), p. 16

33

Several Troika meetings were held both on the margins of the deputies and ministerial meetings in the form of video conference to discuss the policy and administrative issues in preparation for the deputies and ministerial meetings. Five topics were chosen for discussion at the ministerial meeting: Current Economic and Development Issues; 60 years of Bretton Woods Institutions: Strategic Review and Reform Agenda; Achieving the MDGs: Development Assistance and Innovative Financing Mechanism; Demographic Challenges and Migration; and Innovation of Development Approaches for Sustained Growth74 Increasingly, opinion appears to be crystallizing around the idea of the G20 model as the most suitable for the next period of world economic development. Recently, the Asian Bank heralded a new world order with the G20 as the Global Steering Committee for balanced and sustainable growth. 5. Conclusion By demonstrating the merits of planned, state-led marketisation, Chinas rise undermines the implicit neoliberal assumptions of the Bretton Woods approach to development. For other developing nations, this offers a third way for development that avoids the conditionalities of the IFI system. This is proving to have significant implications for the future development policies advocated by the Bretton Woods Institutions, whom by endorsing the Chinese development model are setting the groundwork for a future of global economic relations based on national self-interest. This is reflected more broadly in the resurgence of the G20 as development practitioners. In a flying dragons pattern of state led development, national and intra-national government relations define agendas as market forces are restrained. 74 Ibid, p. 100 34

Chinas development strategy has proven more successful than the pure market approach recommended by the IFI for the past twenty years. Though the true nature of the challenges posed are overlooked by the simplistic accounts traditionally offered of both the Washington and Beijing Consensuses. By critically re-examining both approaches, it appears that the Chinese approach both endorses and undermines those of development orthodoxy. It endorses it by demonstrating that a commitment to the competitive forces of capital can be successful when mindfully implemented by a state with knowledge of the appropriate factor endowments. However, it undermines the invisible hand doctrine assumed by the orthodox model by demonstrating that a strong state is more effective than the market in identifying new industries and mobilising the resources and labour necessary to exploit them. These lessons are beginning to influence the development policies promoted for the World Bank by Justin Lin as part of his thesis on New Structural Economics, and are reflected in the resurgence of the G20 as central development practitioners. The two global strategies are beginning to coalesce around the emergence of a concert of leading and emergent economies, and with an endorsement of the wild geese flying pattern of state lead development, a new future of a market based on competing national interests is being realised.

Conclusion

As well as the deeply serious economic issues facing the world economy, the images and realities of 9/11 still haunt the world. The war on terror has continuing affect on national economies as well as on the consciousness of the

35

people caught up in the seemingly endless aftermath. Many observers hold that the great inequalities that exist between the nations of the world provide a rich soil for the continuing violence and uncertainty that remain without effective redress. The suggestions in the final part of this study respond to the emerging potential for more effective and co-operative solutions to stubborn economic problems. What is clear is that in the changed dynamic of the globes political economy, solutions will need to go beyond even the most persuasive consensuses emerging from Washington, Beijing or any other of the worlds capitals.

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Appendices
Appendix I: John Williamsons Original Washington Consensus 1 Fiscal discipline 2 Reorientation of public expenditure 3 Tax reform 4 Financial liberatlisation 5 Unified and competitive exchange rates 6 Trade liberalisation 7 Openness to DFI 8 Privatisation 9 Deregulation 10 Secure Property rights Source: Williamson, J., (2004) Appendix II: Dani Rodriks Augmented Washington Consensus The original 10 policies plus: 11 Legal/political reform 12 Regulatory institutions 13 Anti-corruption 14 Labour market flexibility 15 WTO agreements 16 Financial codes and standards 17 Prudent capital-account opening 18 Non-intermediate exchange rate regimes 19 Social safety nets 20 Poverty reduction Source: Rodrik, D., (2002)

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Appendix III:

Note the heavily distorting effect the anomalous rise of Asian economies has on the overall statistical analysis, as shown at the bottom of the graphic. Source: UN, (2010), The Millennium Development Goals Report, (New York: UN)

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Appendix IV:

Africa Kenya +17 Ivory Coast +10 Ghana + 11 Senegal +30 Mali +21 Nigeria +21 Tanzania +42 Uganda +10 Ethiopia +27 South Africa -6 Based on respondents who say China/U.S has at least a fair amount of influence on the way things are going in their countries. Question asked only in Sub- Saharan Africa and Latin America, the latter excluded from this table. Source: Pew Research Centre, (2007), Global Unease with Major World Powers, 47-Nation Pew Global Attitudes Survey, Pew Global Attitudes Project, [Online], Available: http://pewglobal.org/reports/pdf/256.pdf [Accessed 01 March 2012]

Americas Influence good bad good bad thing thing thing thing % % % % 91 6 74 16 90 6 80 12 90 5 79 13 86 6 56 23 84 7 63 25 79 12 58 27 78 13 36 52 75 13 65 24 61 33 34 54 49 32 55 24

Chinas Influence

Good Difference

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