Executive Post-Vietnam Formula Under Siege Iran Contra; 1981 Restricted in offensive war; pitch wars as Defensive What

t makes one defensive? pg 550 Shift post WWII; National Security Council, peacetime, 1947. Bypassed Congressional authority on treaties by using executive secretive agreements; pg 551 CIA, president, pentagon, NSC, State Dept left congress out of the loop. Gulf of Tonkin Force Congress hands pg. 554 Congressional Acquiescence 1946 James Polk: put troops in land contested by Mexico; attacked predictably. 1907 Teddy R. sent fleet around; congress had to appropriate the funds to bring it back. Grew in frequency in cold war. Truman / Korea and Kennedy / Johnson in Vietnam secrete executive agreements Congressional Post-Vietnam Formula Under Siege Lacked will to assert itself. Gave executive requests post WWII-Vietnam / Watergate Watergate shook up congress 552, 1. Get access to information 2. Restore congressional authority in foreign policy and strengthen congressional checks 3. limit political repression and violations of civil liberties and civil rights Access to infoHistorical Benjamin Franklin Bache published secret dispatch between France and Secretary of State. French wanted peace, J. Adams wanted war. Congress spurred to pass Sedition Act. 1798. Governments right to secracy; Federalist #64. Question was the information necessary for the citizenry to make its own decisions and protect the government from public opposition. Espionage Act, 1917 Supreme Court decision, 1927- congress needs information. WWII fear of communism deepened imbalance between executive and congress lack of will in congress Watergate / Vietnam:: pg. 553 1973 War Powers resolution : congress be informed of troop movements 48 hours prior 1974 Hughes-Ryan Amendment (again 1980) CIA covert, non-intelligence gathering, must be reported to congress in a 'timely manner' 1976 / 1977 House and Senate Select Intelligence Committees created Case-Zablocki Act of 1972 executive agreements must be reported to congress 1974 Arms sales must be reported to congress 1974 Freedom of Information Act Judicial Review of secret, etc, classification of documents General will for congress to use its checks. Wanted increased participation in FP, CHECKS authority to declare war, advise and consent on treaties and appointments, and power of the purse. Oversight Committees pg. 555 dissuade CIA authorizations of activities, revealing operations, or pass specifically legislation in the full body prohibiting the action War Powers Pres. has 60 days to use troops without affirmative action by congress wanted participation from the start on FP decisions. Decline and Resurgence of Congress. POWER OF THE PURSE pg200; power of the purse re-organization act of 1946 EXECUTIVE veto of budget; split party on executive and congress spending is slit; Pres. gives budget; broken u and assigned to various committees. EXECUTIVE impounding of appropriated funds pg201 impounding Nixon; not first. Used a lot. form of veto. stronger than line item veto negates ability for congress to override the veto. Two kinds -pg202 stretch out and defer nonmilitary expenses during times of war National Security Act of 1947 pres / secretary of defense and disbursement of armed forces funds. weapons projects pg 203 foreign policy, especially see loans Truman did not make to Spain (congress wanted). pg 204 8.2 billion in impoundments; 1968-69.

used to be seen as inflation fighter and reducer of budget pg 206 - take care that the laws be faithfully executed used as constitutional basis. pg 207 CONGRESIONAL RESPONSE: Fail to appropriate funds to president's pet projects. axing of supersonic transport in 1971 tie other appropriations to the releasing of impounded funds pg212 - Congressional power... has been not so much usurped by the Presidency as given up to the Presidency by Congress. Impoundment Control Congressional Budget Office; two independent budget committees. Allows Congress to overturn an impoundment. Pg 216 Congress new budget process mimics executive budget process. This allows congress to proceed independently from the President. Pg 217 this allowed Congress to exert a greater check on the power of the executive to formulate budgetary policy. Pg 218 lack of bi-partisanship can halt the ability for the congress to act against the congress; instead strife turns inward. Pg 220 further infighting, between committees, reduced the ability for Congress to act as a whole and thus appropriately check the executive branch. Pg 225 - as the party of the presidency and the congress was unified, the cow-toeing to the demands of the executive, even while claiming to be neutral, increased once again. Pg 229 overall, the new budget process fought for by Congress gave it the tools necessary to exert influence on the budgetary process, avoiding the former haphazard means of dissecting the executive proposals. Pg 231 further use of the new budgetary process gave time for Congress to get a Feel for it. It overcame its inability to plan This did, however, increase intra-house and intra-party divisions and tensions always remaining a threat to Congress ability to exert balance to the executive. Pg 233 overall, the new planning facilities given to Congress enabled it to quickly and efficiently, if not winning always, exert influence on spending matters an all important check the Congress has the power of the purse. Pg 236 That a new orderliness has been achieved is the important thing. The congress has established its own decisionmaking capacity, in the budget committees and the budget resolutions, and its own source of analysis and information independent of the executive branch, in the Congressional Budget Office. When it opposes the fiscal policy of the president, as it did when Gerald Ford was in the White House, it is able to fashion a coherent and well-considered alternative. When it agrees with the president, it has the meansto make even a stringent policy effective Decline and Resurgence of Congress -WAR POWER 238 how much power does a president have to lead the country into war without the participation of the Congress? War Powers Resolution of 1973 symbol of congressional resurgence. Does not Restore to the Congress the whole of the decision making power like the Budget and Impoundment Control Act. 239 LBJ intervention in the Dominican Republic in April 1965 that touched off the ultimately successful challenge to the presidents war-making authority Dissent lead by J. William Fulbright of Arkansas Should align with progressive movements; not authoritarian sides. LBJ was on the wrong side. LBJ mislead the Congress about the threat to American lives in the Dominican Republic and the true purpose of the intervention 240 spurred dissent over Vietnam policy Debate, within Congress (Senate) ensued over whether or not the President should have the final say on Foreign Policy. Madisonian / Hamiltonian split 241 the episode that lead to the Gulf of Tonkin resolution had been misrepresented to the legislators, as a pretext for winning the resolution 242 questions if whether LBJ miss-interpreted the resolution itself; specifically, whether it allowed

landing of troops in Vietnam. Fulbright does not restrict the President; but, was not the intent. There had been an amendment to specifically state the intentions of congress, but Fulbright did not wish to delay the legislation and he felt that LBJ stated the policy was to limit American intervention to aid, training assistance, and military advice 244 Fulbright When the security of the country is endangered, or thought to be endangered, there is a powerful premium on prompt action, and that means executive action Congress is involved in briefings after the fact and the other are resolutions arranged in haste, always under the spur of some real or putative emergency, these resolutions and the White House briefings serve to hti the Congress when it is down, getting it to sign on the dotted line at exactly the moment when, for reasons of politics or patriotism, it feels it can hardly refuse 244-245: Congress has lost the power to declare war as it was written into the Constitution. It has not been so much usurped as given away, and it is by no means certain that it will soon be recovered 245 Executive claims that even without resolutions, the President could land ground troops. Limits of Presidential power have never been defiened, nor has any president ever exercised his power to its limits limits should not be defined; they should be left flexible, to be worked out by the Congress and the president through practical interaction between the two branches. Declaration of war was not needed; American aims were limited and the notion of Declaration was outmoded 246 Committee responded to the above why did it lose its war powers? it Lacked guidelines of experience in meeting the demands of the countrys new role as a world power Air of contrived urgency GoT Resolution was not the equivalent of a declaration of war. National Commitments Resolution passed 1969. No legal force 247 it was a measure of the extent of congressional abdication that the legislators had never even insisted on being informed by the executive what it was doing. Involvements in Laos and Thailand was never taken up with the Congress 248 within congress, cries of Trust the President; the best thing to do today would be to stand behind our President and show unity Spirit of the National Commitments Resolution carried the day Congress would have to be a party to any new commitment; the day of blank checks for presidents was over. 249 -- Cooper Amendment to limit involvement in Laos and Thailand, 1970, first time since WWII that the Congress had asserted control over military operations on foreign soil. 250 invasion of Cambodia diverted attention from Laos and Thailand; huge public out cry. 252 dissent in the congress did not want to see congress become a 535 member War Council Those who wished to recapture the war power had to satisfy these worries. Issues of a nuclear age; the President would have to act quickly without a declaration 254 War Powers Resolution 1973 Nixon bombed north Vietnam capital of Hanoi and it sport of Haiphong did not explain actions to Congress A bill, introduced earlier by Senator Javits (which was tabled), now had 57 co-sponsors. 255 the bill would be a first step in ending the trend ever since WWII toward more and more White House monopolization of our foreign affairs 256 - Bombing continued in Cambodia, even after withdrawal from Vietnam. The House removed funding for the Cambodian bombing through amending an appropriations bill 257 The senate passed the Javits bill in the same form as in 1972, and the House approved the Zablocki resolution essentially as it came from the committee, and a conference committee compromised the differences. In its final form, the resolution required a president in every possible instance to consult with Congress before introducing armed forces into hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances and regularly thereafter as long as hostilities continued. He would be required to report in writing within forty-eight hours to the speaker of the House and the president pro tem of the Senate any such movement of armed forces stating the circumstances, the authority for the action, and the expected scope and duration of hostilities. If Congress did not grant specific authorization for the operation through a declaration of war or otherwise within sixty days, he would have to remove the troops, and the Congress could terminate the action at any time within the sixty days by concurrent resolution.

259 after passage of the War Powers Resolution Nixon vetoed. 260 the veto was overrode 284to135 in the house; 75to18 in the Senate. Action was fueled by the feud between Nixon and Congress. It was thus a symbolic issue a timely triumph of Congress over president and the personal antipathy to an aggressive president that had played a part in precipitating the whole resurgence contributed to its first tangible product. 261 the first seven years of the resolution, presidents made five reports to the congress in accordance with the provisions of the act. Debate over whether congress was consulted or just informed, as the transmittal of report happened after the action commenced. 263 EXECUTIVE RESPONSE - Ford during the Easter recess of Congress, not one of the key bipartisan leaders of Congress was in Washington. It must be remembered that critical world events, especially military operations, seldom wait for the Congress to meet. In fact, most of what goes on in the world happens in the middle of the night, Washington time. 267 Senator Church I cannot imagine a situation where the President would take us into a foreign war of major proportions under circumstances that would not cause both the public and the Congress to rally around the flag, at least for 60 days. It is only when a war is pursued for a period of time and the public begins to question whether it is a war in the national interest, or whether it is a winnable war, or a foolish one, that you will ever get a majority in the Congress to exercise the authority that we finally did exercise by pulling up the purse strings on the broadening theatre of war in Southeast Asia, and finally in forcing an end to the bombing in Cambodia. But, in both those cases it was done with Presidential acquiescence. It was not done by concurrent resolution. It was done by law, and the President joined and made it law by signing the legislation 268 Ford: Congress, by institutional design, is not as capable of handling fast-breaking developments as the President, the National Security Council, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 270 Unity from 1930-1960 allowed congress to concede power to the executive. 272 Secrete wars would not be held, even if Congress is only reported too instead of consulted. the War Powers Resolution compels joint decision making on issues of war and peace. The Congress can still support automatically, without deliberation, the presidents course of action, but it will be more difficult than before to evade the exercise of considered judgment and a full share of responsibility. The president is therefore restrained from rash, unilateral action; he will enter into commitments more cautiously. The War Powers resolution is symbol of the congressional resurgence, and substance also RIVALS FOR POWER - INTRODUCTION Unified and Divided Party Control of Government, 1901-1996 page 8-9; REPRINT TABLE FOR PAPER. CORRELATE TO WARS? Pg 3 history: Presidency and Congress constitutionally designed to create a rivalry. Presidential vetoes are usually sustained as it is hard for Congress to marshal the votes needed to overturn. Veto, EXECUTIVE POWER, is used as a bargaining tool (especially pocket veto, un-susceptible to an overturn). Pg 4 veto is a key power of the executive the power to say no CONGRESS POWERS authority to pass laws binding upon all citizens. Power of the purse appropriation of funds Power to levy and collect taxes, borrow and coin money, and regulate foreign and interstate commerce ALSO power to declare war, provide for a milita, adopt laws concerning bankruptcy, naturalization, patents, and copyrights BATTLES center around tax and trade policy Battle over interpretation of war power has changed and is a new source for battle between congress and executive. Senate must approve cabinet nominees, ambassadors, and Supreme Court and Federal judicial appointees president cannot enter into a binding treaty with a foreign governemtn without 2/3 vote of the Senate.

Finally, the ability to impeach is reserved for the congress. Pg 5 congress is divided, naturally, into two houses furthering rivalry and checks. Pg 6 state based parties reduces influence of President on Congress Pg -8 unified party control does not mean that the two branches will work together; divided government does not mean they will fight. Pg 10 balance of power is dynamic Pg 11 War Powers Resolution of 1973 and Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 were key acts in Congress regaining power from the executive. However, this came with decentralization of congress which made it less efficient. Balance of Power is NOT NECCESSARLY ZERO-SUM. Expansion post WWII has given both branches new and expansive powers. Newt Gingrich re- / further centralized the power of leadership in the House Pg 12 conflict, naturally created between congress and the executive, may produce incentivesto centralize decision-making power Pg 13 conflict is not bad; it can lead to better plans and action by the federal government. RIVALS FOR POWER Congressional Support for Presidential Action Pg 140. Congressional Support of the President is key support means less checks; less supports means more exertion of congressional control over the executive. Pg 141 Aggregate; as a whole. Then, as individual members. Political Party Party line voting those in the Presidents party are more likely to support him. The party is used as a cue, representing loyalty to the party. This is particularly important for those seeking re-election part lines are used as a representation of a certain electoral constituency Pg 142 some evidence this may be on decline, however, it still plays a significant role. Ideology - members with similar ideological viewpoints as the president are more likely to support his programs. There is a correlation between ideology and party, but it is not absolute. There are conservative democrats and liberal republicans this allows Presidents to look across party lines for support. EG Republican support of NAFTA and Democrat support of Reagan. Interestingly, ideology may play less of a role for those members who are moderate and less extreme. Pg 143 Party / Ideology interaction Difference between northern and southern democrats. Pg 144 Congressional leadership loyalty to leadership institutions may sway support towards or away from the president. Position in leadership dictates willingness to support the president. Public presidential support Popular presidents have greater leeway than those who are unpopular. Pg 148 party and ideology are the most important factors in determining congressional support of the president. The President, Congress, and Legislation 43 Congress subject to party politics Personality of the executive effects the ability of Congress to assert itself. 44 An active executive does not mean that Congress is failing to check the executive 45 One should not confuse the influence of special interest groups with expansion of the executive. 46 the influence of one branch over the other is dynamic 47 the topic will influence the willingness of Congress to assert itself 49 Congress generally sets time frames while the President works to speed up or slow down legislative agendas. 51 congress typically will hold a bill (Specific topic) until the action has fermented; this can be seen with the development of the War Powers Resolution. 52 the President is most active in Defense and War related legislation When Congress and the President Collide: Why Presidents Veto Legislation 696 the weapons that each institution possesses to infringe on the primary domain of the other are

not many, but they tend to be potent. Congress can bend the chief executive through its power to confirm certain presidential appointments, through its control over appropriations, and through legislative oversight. Congress can break a president with its impeachment power. The power of the president in the legislative realm is, if not dominant, sufficient to have earned him the title of chief legislator. The primary sources of the formal legislative power possessed by the president stem from his ability to propose legislation and to veto legislation that Congress has passed the power of the vetohas substantially influenced the development of the American presidency. 697 merely the threat of a veto is often enough to force Congress to tailor a bill to conform to administration wishes 2.7 percent of bills sent to the president have been vetoed; of those, 3.9 percent have been overridden. Not including pocket vetoes, the number is 6.7 percent. Use of the veto varies by individual presidents. 698 early vetoes were based on constitutional grounds or were a direct response to poorly drafted legislation. 699 overall growth in the scope of the government influences the growth in the use of veto. Increase in legislative activity is nearly certain to bring with it more controversy, more disagreements, and ultimately more vetoes. 700 when the President faces a hostile Congress, he needs to resort to the veto more frequently. 701 Presidential mandate, by popular vote, increases the propensity to use the veto. 705 strongest indicators are opposition control of the congress and the number of overrides. A president that has been overridden is less likely to use the veto in the future. Veto overrides are a major factor in limiting a presidents future use of the veto power. Usually, the veto is biased in favor of the president until this happens. 708 the state of the economy as a slight effect on the use of the veto; change in party structure may lead to a decline in the influence of opposition control of the congress in the influence of the frequency of the veto. 709 notions of the veto have changed since the 1840s; its use has become more common. Grover Cleveland and FDR are exceptional for their use of the veto When congress is controlled by the opposition party, when the president feels that he has a mandate to enact his platform, or when the president lacks congressional experience he has a greater proneness to use the veto. Congress, though, can temper that bias by occasionally overriding the president when he does return legislation to them. Casework as a Technique of U.S Congressional Oversight of the Executive. Essentially, constituent service can bring issues to light and thus spur Congressional investigation into Executive action. 325 In recent years, oversight of administration has been high on the congressional agenda. Oversight hearings have increased; new laws encouraging and mandating oversight have been enacted; House and Senate rules have been altered; and various congressional study committees and commissions have included oversight among their concerns. PRESIDENTIAL VETOES AND CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE 401 the frequency with which the president chooses to veto will be a function of the frequency with which the Congress produces legislation which is radically different from that which the president desires to produce. exercise of executive power is based on the relationship with congress whether congress is in sync with executive.

402 the proportion of seats in Congress held by the presidents party is perhaps the most basic resource for generating outcomes favorable to the administration.

403 the use of the veto will vary inversely with the level of public support. An election year constitutes a situation which increases presidential attention to legislative matters and enhances the likelihood of executive-legislative conflict. 405 the chance of an attempt [of an override] being successful or that failure may produce more political gain than not trying increase the chance of an of an override. The probability of override attempts and the success of those attempts will be greater in election than nonelection years. 424 involvement in an international conflict influences the frequency of overrides. Public support is a significant influence on both the probability of an override attempt and the probability that the attempt will be successful. 425 often, congressional overrides are in defense of the institution of congress rather than truly being against a measure. Congressional Checks on Military Initiatives 739 Increasingly, presidents solicit authority from the UN security council and not from Congress. Presidents now regularly claim that the Commander in Chief Clause empowers them to send American troops anywhere in the world, including into hostilities, without first seeking legislative approval. 740 Bush 1 claimed he could act in Iraq; Congress passed legislation authorizing military action in the Gulf. These actions were repeated by Clinton (As well as Bush 2) In February 1994, while contemplating air strikes in Bosnia, President Clinton looked not to Congress for authority but solely to the UN Security Council and to NATO. He focused on his need to carry out the will of the United Nations. 741 The trend of presidential war power since World War II the last congressionally-declared war collides with the constitutional framework adopted by the Founding Fathers. The period after 1945 created a climate in which presidents regularly breached constitutional principles and democratic values. The scope of presidential war powers climbed to such heights that Congress felt compelled to pass the War Powers Resolution in 1973; refined later in 1980 and 1991. President Truman set a precedent in 1950 when he sent troops in Korea, using UN Security Council resolutions to justify their actions. 742 Presidents claim that the climate after World War II is far more dangerous and much more in need of decisive presidential action. In effect, the legislature is incapable of being prompt. Author argues that Contemporary presidential judgments need more, not less, scrutiny as the risk of presidential miscalculation and aggrandizement are greater. 743 specifically does the specter of nuclear war unknown to the Framers require concentrating in the president the sole responsibility for launching missiles? The author argues there is a difference between first use of nuclear weapons and retaliatory second strikes. Time is available within the executive branch to debate and decide the use of nuclear weapons, permitting adequate opportunity for a congressional role in the event of conventional war escalating. 744 Congress should not attempt to provide advance authority for every type of emergency action. Having been burned on the Tonkin Gulf Resolution the Senate Foreign Relations Committee concluded in 1969 Finally, should the president find himself confronted with a situation of such complexity and ambiguity as to leave him without guidelines for constitutional action, it would be far better for him to take the action he saw fit without attempting to justify it in advance and leave it to Congress or the courts to evaluate his action in retrospect. A single unconstitutional act, later explained or pronounced unconstitutional, is preferable to an act dressed up in some spurious, precedent-setting claim of legitimacy,

Further, the concept of defensive war has expanded in recent decades beyond any definition familiar to the Framers. During the nineteenth century, defensive war was confined to protective action along the borders of the United States and on ships at sea. Twentieth-century notions of defensive war are far more ambitious. As a result of World War II, American military bases are no dispersed around the globe. By 1966, Leonard C. Meeker, the legal adviser to the State Department, offered this concept of presidential power: in 1787 the world was a far larger place, and the Framers probably had in mind attacks upon the United States. In the 20th century, the world has grown much smaller. An attack on a country far from our shores can impinge directly on the Nations Security. In the SEATO treaty, for example, it is formally declared that an armed attack against Viet-Nam would endanger the peace and safety of the United States. The Author argues The Senate, in agreeing to those treaties, did not abandon its constitutional responsibilities or attempt to deny to the House of Representatives its constitutional role in authorizing war. A shrinking globe is no reason to shrink congressional power. 745 Truman, Bush, and Clinton have told the American public that mutual defense treaties, like NATO, and resolutions passed by the UN Security Council provide sufficient legal support for presidential military actions. 746 On acts of war, Felix Frankfurter, future Justice, argued that it all depends on the size of the nation. Targets of American military power are typically weak and isolated nations, including Cambodia, Libya, Grenanda, Panama, Iraq, and Haiti. 747 custom helps shape the Constitution. However, they also give some encouragement to presidential raids of power, done with the knowledge that the additional power seized will be successful and permanent unless Congress effectively defends itself. 748 If one branch encroaches, the branch under attack must respond. 749 Congress may further its power by tying the power of the purse more directly to a revised War Powers Resolution in effect, not allowing the president to make any military maneuvers unless specifically appropriated by Congress 756 Instead of relying on unpredictable court decisions, Congress must learn to invoke the powerful weapons at its command. Through its prerogative to authorize programs and appropriate funds, it can define and limit presidential power. In domestic as well as in foreign affairs, Congress can withhold all or part of an appropriation and may attach riders to appropriations measures to proscribe certain actions. 757 Congress can define the scope of military maneuvers by passing legislation, to be signed or vetoed by the president. 758 power of the purse used in Cambodia, Vietnam, Nicaragua, and for a time-frame in Somalia. 758 -- congress used legislation to allow Bush 1 to fight Iraq as only defined by UNSCR 678 to expel from Kuwait only; not occupy. 760 evidence suggest that unbridled executive power reduces the effectiveness of said power in the long term; This can be seen in Nixons sparring with Congress and the eventual outcome Congress marshalling enough troops to pass and override the veto of the War Powers resolution. 761 decentralized nature of Congress takes away its ability to assert itself whereas the executive, being unified, easily asserts its position. While Dangers Gather: Congressional Checks on Presidential War Powers 3 Harry Truman started a change in war action . By declaring the Korean war a police action that did not require a declaration of war, Truman established a precedent for subsequent presidents to strike out on their own, deploying the military on prolonged tours of duty, humanitarian ventures, and targeted strikes without ever securing Congresss formal consent. 3 coincides with emergence of US as superpower. 4- ever president since Nixon has refused to recognize the constitutionality of the War Powers Resolution.

Only in Lebanon in 1983 was the War Powers clock even started. 5 Congress is infected by a culture of deference: a distinct set of norms and beliefs, customs and institutions, that confine it to the margins of power Legislative abdication is the reigning modus operandi in foreign affairs 6 Congress has ceded to the president considerable ground so much, in fact, that its members no longer meet even basic standards of responsibility set by the Constitution. 7 When presidents act unilaterally, they stand at the front end of the policy-making process and thereby place on Congress and the courts the burden of revising a new political landscape. If adjoining branches of government choose not to retaliate, either by passing a law or ruling against the president, then the presidents order stands. Only by taking positive action can either adjoining institution limit the presidents unilateral powers. When critical, members of congress may be charged with reducing troop morale and catering to the enemy. 9 executive branch has greater access to information; thus, congress often lacks the information required to offer a substantive objection Congress remains a secondary player in regards to foreign policy. 10 Congress can restrict the scope or duration of a conflict or by establishing firm reporting requirements. Members also oversee the appropriations process this gives Congress tremendous say over the budgets, structures, and duties of the armed forces Historically, congressional influence through using its means of making its position known has cuased presidents to change or alter course. EG pre WWII: Neutrality Acts in 1935 and 1937 that restricted the presidents ability to direct military or financial aid to Allied powers engaged in war. Roosevelt recognized the extent to which congressional views resonated in the public, and he feared that Congress might derail his domestic agenda if he pushed for American involvement. Opposition through legislation / appropriations 11 Roosevelt was forced to appeal to the public to get congress on his side. 12 it took the attacks of pearl harbor to finally get Congress behind Roosevelt. The Korean War ushered in the modern presidential era, one wherein presidents regularly deploy troops abroad without first acquiring any kind of congressional authorization. 13 Congress used its power of the purse to cut the defense budget by more than 20 percent; 1952 It was the Vietnam War that brought congressional opposition to the presidential use of force to a fever pitch 15 War Powers resolution only invoked in Lebanon; 1983 16- public reaction to media images motivated Congress to pressure Clinton; he withdrew from Somalia. Congress used the power of the purse to cut aid to Rwanda to ensure that the Untied States did not become entangled in another African nations domestic troubles. Further, Congress made stipulations such that no moneys could be spent in operations in Rwanda or in concert with the UN mission. 19 Congress reacts to foreign policy agenda set by the president Congress usually acts to restrain, rather than stimulate, military action Not since the Spanish-American War has a congress arisen o publicly advocate on behalf of a major military venture. 21 typically members only punished the president when a military venture subsequently became protracted or costly. 22 all the way back to Thucydides the unpredictable that occurs in war, spurred by the length of time you are engaged, usually is what causes a turn against the President.

Opposition through public appeals//dissent 25 through public discourse, members helped shape public opinion in regards to re-flagging of Kuwaiti ships in Iraq-Iran war. In 1994 media debate with members argued against use of US forces for UN actions; in regards to Haiti. US forces were eventually sent only after civilian leadership returned to Haiti, allowing US forces to be used as a transition buffer rather than front-line fighters. 26 the president can also use the statements congress makes use in the media as a weather gauge for support of possible military engagements. 32 because the president speaks with one voice while Congress chimes in with many, because of the profound informational asymmetries that define executive-legislative relations, and because the ability to act unilaterally yields significant agenda-setting powers, presidents obviously have the advantage in campaigns to mobilize public support for planned military venture. Just because the president dominates these proceedings, however, does not mean that Congress is wholly irrelevant. Quite the contrary, there is considerable cause for believing that Congress can be a major player in the public debates over foreign policy initiatives. And to the extent that congressional views determine the tone and content of media coverage and thereby influence public opinion it gains an important entre into executive decision making on matters involving war. 33 Evidence of opposition, and by extension influence, should mount as (1) the opposing part to the presidents retains larger and more cohesive governing majorities within Congress; (2) military operations grow in size; and (3) operations focus on nations that are less strategically important to the United States. 34 Congress does not check the President; Individuals within Congress do. When divisions run deep within its ranks, members have an exceedingly difficult time enacting laws, holding hearings, and affirming nominations, among other things activities that affect the content of public policy and check the assertion of presidential power. When the membership is relatively unified and strong, however, policy entrepreneurs find it considerably easier to affirm or challenge the president. 35 the probability that members of Congress will take on the president surely depend son the particulars of each individual crisis and the impact members see it having on their constituents, and by extension, the prospects for their reelection. 36 trust of the president has a large influence on members of congress, even members of the same party and thus having the same world view. 37 the impact the president may have on congressional elections will also influence the potentiality for members to act against the president. 39 when Republican presidents exercised military force in Lebanon (82-83), Grenanda (83), and Panama (89), Republican members of Congress came out in support, while many Democrats dissented. When Democratic presidents exercised force in Haiti (93-96) and Bosnia (92-98), allegiances shifted. 41 scope of the engagement will influence the potentiality for Congress to get involved. If a presidential action has little immediate effect on re-election chances, the member will be less likely to act on it in either a positive or negative action. You should do those things that matter most to your constituents, those things for which you ca claim credit, and those things that stand a reasonable chance of success 47 - when presidents use executive orders, proclamations, and other unilateral directives to advance their policy agendas, their initiatives are not fixed in stone. Congress, after all, has subsequent opportunity to amend and overturn them and, more easily still, to restrict their funding. 63 minor use of force does not seem to be effected by domestic politics. However, major use of force is subject to the influence of domestic politics, and thus Congress. 64 partisan composition of Congress appears to play a significant role in shaping the presidents willingness to deploy troops board in any major context.

67 Congress was slow to wake to the transformation of U.S. defense policy following World War II. Throughout the 1950s and early 1960s, the legislature was content to go along with presidential initiatives, ceding authority and post-dating its approval of military actions from Korea through the Middle-East to the Gulf of Tonkin. It was the Vietnam War, of course, that changes all this. By Order of the President National Security Directives 143 Used in Iran-Contra affair; US Sponsored coup in 1953 that put the Shah in power in Iran. NSDs have been tools of foreign policy implementations 144 NSDs are formal notification to the head of a department or other governmental agency informing him of a presidential decision in the field of national security affairs and generally requiring follow-up action by the department or agency addressed. _ LBJ 145 The experience of pearl harbor pushed the executive to come up with a way to better co-ordinate communications, decision making, implementation, and accountability for foreign and military action. 146 - After WWII, in 1947 the National Security Act created the National Security Council 152 ford, carter, bush1, Clinton, bush2 have had their NSC plans ready on day one; issued in NSD 1. Regan took a year because of internal debate. 1 62 NSDs can be expensive; to avoid limitations in appropriations by Congress, Creative means of funding can be found; extreme example is Iran-Contra 163 NSDs increasingly found their way into Trade issues. Sanctions in particular. 170 NSD 54 launched the Desert Storm attack on Iraq in 1991 NSDD 110 in the fall of 1983 set in motion the invasion of Grenada. 172 NSDs are used to manage nuclear stockpiles. 196 NSDs allow the president to operate far outside the usual checks and balances of the U.S. federal system NSDs avoid transparency and democratic accountability 194 congress is often unaware of NSC actions and NSDs Power Without Persuasion 1 Executive Orders 2 EO to create a new court system; W. Bush 5 Clinton, while publicly may seem lame duck issued frequent EO that dictated policy. All while even in the consideration for impeachment. 6 Roosevelt issued EO to nationalize avation plants, shipbuilding companies, and thousands of coal companies and a shell plant in violation of the 5th amendment; never overturned. EO 9066 Roosevelt ordered the evacuation, relocation, and internment of 110,000 japanese Americans. EO 9981, Truman, desegregated the military. Kennedy created Peace Corps through EO; financed with discretionary funds. Bush 1, EO, federalized the national guard. 16 EO combine the highest levels of substance, discretion, and direct presidential involvement. 20 supreme court decisions have affirmed the legality of EOs; only when Congress issues direct contradictions to an EO has the courts ruled against the president. 101 the president has more information; giving him greater power than congress 103 congress rarely has access to NSDs 104 attempts by congress to control the president, like the Case Act 1972 failed. The War Powers resolution is another attempt to control the President. while heralded at the time, today it seems to have marginal impact. 111 congress rarely has the will as a whole body to seriously challenge the ability for the executive to issue EOs (thus having an informational advantage over Congress) 113 less than 3% of the executive orders issued by presidents received any measure of critical attention. 121 presidents powers of unilateral action are greatest when they do not require Congress to take any subsequent action such as funding. 152 Russell amendment stipulated that EOs lasting more than a year needed congressional appropriation