Governmental powers/ functions: Municipality of San Fernando v.

Firme (1991)Facts: Petitioner is a municipal corporation existing under and in accordance with the laws of theRepublic of the Philippines. At about 7 am of December 16, 1965, a collision occurred involving apassenger jeepney driven by Bernardo Balagot and owned by the Estate of Macario Nieveras, agravel and sand truck driven by Jose Manandeg and owned by Tanquilino Velasquez and a dumptruck of the petitioner and driven by Alfredo Bislig. Several passengers of the jeepney includingLaureano Bania Sr. died as a result of the injuries they sustained and 4 others suffered physicalinjuries.P r i v a t e r e s p o n d e n t s i n s t i t u t e d a n a c t i o n a g a i n s t N i e v e r a s a n d B a l a g o t b e f o r e t h e C F I . T h e defendants filed a third party complaint against petitioner and Bislig. The complaint was then amended to implead petitioner and Bislig. Petitioner raised as defense lack of cause of action, nonsuability of the State, prescription and negligence of the owner and driver of the jeepney.The trial court rendered a decision ordering the petitioner and Bislig to pay the plaintiffs. Theowner and driver of the jeepney were absolved from liability. Petitioner filed an MR which wasdismissed for having been filed out of time. Issue: WON the court committed grave abuse of discretion when it deferred and failed to resolvethe defense of non-suability of the State amounting to lack of jurisdiction in a motion to dismiss. Held: Yes Ratio: In the case at bar, the judge deferred the resolution of the defense of non-suability ofthe State until trial. However, the judge failed to resolve such defense, proceeded with the trialand then rendered a decision against the municipality and its driver. The judge did not commitGAD when it arbitrarily failed to resolve the issue of non-suability of the State in the guise of themunicipality. However, the judge acted in excess of his jurisdiction when in his decision he heldthe municipality liable for the quasi-delict committed by its regular employee.The doctrine of non-suability of the State is expressly provided for in Article XVI, Section 3 of theConsti, to wit: "the State may not be sued without its consent." Express consent may be embodied in a general law or a special law. The standing consent of the Stat e to be sued in case of moneyclaims involving liability arising from contracts is found in Act No. 3083. A special law may bepassed to enable a person to sue the government for an alleged quasi-delict. Consent is impliedwhen the government enters into business contracts, thereby descending to the level of the othercontracting party, and also when the State files a complaint, thus opening itself to a counterclaim.Municipal corporations are agencies of the State when they are engaged in governmental functionsand therefore should enjoy the sovereign immunity from suit. Nevertheless, they are subject to suiteven in the performance of such functions because their charter provided that they can sue and besued.A distinction should first be made between suability and liability. "Suability depends on the consentof the state to be sued, liability on the applicable law and the established facts. The circumstancethat a state is suable does not necessarily mean that it is liable; on the other hand, it can never beheld liable if it does not first consent to be sued. Liability is not conceded by the mere fact thatthe state has allowed itself to be sued. When the state does waive its sovereign immunity, it is onlygiving the plaintiff the chance to prove, if it can, that the defendant is liable."A n e n t t h e i s s u e o f w h e t h e r o r n o t t h e m u n i c i p a l i t y i s l i a b l e f o r t h e t o r t s c o m m i t t e d b y i t s employee, the test of liability of the municipality depends on whether or not the driver, acting

inb e h a l f o f t h e m u n i c i p a l i t y , i s p e r f o r m i n g g o v e r n m e n t a l o r p r o p r i e t a r y f u n c t i o n s ( T o r i o v s . Fontanilla). According to City of Kokomo vs Loy(Indiana SC), municipal corporations exist in a dualcapacity, and their functions are twofold. In one they exercise the right springing from sovereignty,a n d w h i l e i n t h e p e r f o r m a n c e o f t h e d u t i e s p e r t a i n i n g t h e r e t o , t h e i r a c t s a r e p o l i t i c a l a n d governmental. Their officers and agents in such capacity, though elected or appointed by them,are nevertheless public functionaries performing a public service, and as such they are officers,a g e n t s , and servants of the state. In the other capacity the municipalities exercise a private,proprietary or corporate right, arising from their existence as legal persons and not as publicagencies. Their officers and agents in the performance of such functions act in behalf of t h e municipalities in their corporate or individual capacity, and not for the state or sovereign power."It has already been remarked that municipal corporations are suable because their charters grantthem the competence to sue and be sued. Nevertheless, they are generally not liable for tortscommitted by them in the discharge of governmental functions and can be held answerable only ifit can be shown that they were acting in a proprietary capacity.In the case at bar, the driver of the dump truck of the municipality insists that "he was on his wayto the Naguilian river to get a load of sand and gravel for the repair of San Fernando's municipalstreets." In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, the regularity of the performance ofo f f i c i a l d u t y i s p r e s u m e d p u r s u a n t t o S e c t i o n 3 ( m ) o f R u l e 1 3 1 o f t h e R e v i s e d R u l e s o f C o u r t . Hence, We rule that the driver of the dump truck was performing duties or tasks pertaining to hisoffice.We already stressed in the case of Palafox, et. al. vs. Province of Ilocos Norte, the DistrictEngineer, and the Provincial Treasurer that "the construction or maintenance of roads in which thetruck and the driver worked at the time of the accident are admittedly governmental activities."After a careful examination of existing laws and jurisprudence, We arrive at the conclusion thatthe municipality cannot be held liable for the torts committed by its regular employee, who wasthen engaged in the discharge of governmental functions. Hence, the death of the passenger tragica n d d e p l o r a b l e t h o u g h i t m a y b e i m p o s e d o n t h e m u n i c i p a l i t y n o d u t y t o p a y m o n e t a r y compensation.

Proprietary powers/ functions : City of Manila v. Intermediate Appellate Court (1989)Facts: Vivencio Sto. Domingo, Sr. died and was buried in North Cemetery which lot was leased bythe city to Irene Sto. Domingo for the period from June 6, 1971 to June 6, 2021. The wife paid thefull amount of the lease. Apart, however from the receipt, no other document embodied such leaseover the lot. Believing that the lease was only for five years, the city certified the lot as ready forexhumation.On the basis of the certification, Joseph Helmuth authorized the exhumation and removal of theremains of Vicencio. His bones were placed in a bag and kept in the bodega of the cemetery. Thelot was also leased to another lessee. During the next all souls day, the private respondents were shocked to find out that Vicencios remains were removed. The cemetery told Irene to look for thebones of the husband in the bodega.Aggrieved, the widow and the children brought an action for damages against the City of Manila; Evangeline Suva of the City Health Office; Sergio Mallari, officer-in-charge of the North Cemetery; and Joseph Helmuth, the latter's predecessor as officer-in-charge of the said burial grounds ownedand operated by the City Government

of Manila. The court ordered defendants to give plaintiffs the right to make use of another lot. The CA affirmed and included the award of damages in favorof the private respondents. Issue: WON the operations and functions of a public cemetery are a governmental, or a corporateor proprietary function of the City of Manila. Held: Proprietary Ratio: Petitioners alleged in their petition that the North Cemetery is exclusively devotedfor public use or purpose as stated in Sec. 316 of the Compilation of the Ordinances of the City ofM a n i l a . T h e y c o n c l u d e t h a t s i n c e t h e C i t y i s a p o l i t i c a l s u b d i v i s i o n i n t h e p e r f o r m a n c e o f i t s governmental function, it is immune from tort liability which may be caused by its public officersand subordinate employees. Private respondents maintain that the City of Manila entered into acontract of lease which involve the exercise of proprietary functions with Irene Sto. Domingo. Thecity and its officers therefore can be sued for any-violation of the contract of lease.The City of Manila is a political body corporate and as such endowed with the faculties of municipalcorporations to be exercised by and through its city government in conformity with law, and in itsproper corporate name. It may sue and be sued, and contract and be contracted with. Its powersare twofold in character-public, governmental or political on the one hand, and corporate, privatea n d p r o p r i e t a r y o n t h e o t h e r . G o v e r n m e n t a l p o w e r s a r e t h o s e e x e r c i s e d i n a d m i n i s t e r i n g t h e powers of the state and promoting the public welfare and they include the legislative, judicial,public and political. Municipal powers on the one hand are exercised for the special benefit andadvantage of the community and include those which are ministerial, private and corporate. Inconnection with the powers of a municipal corporation, it may acquire property in its public org o v e r n m e n t a l c a p a c i t y , a n d p r i v a t e o r p r o p r i e t a r y c a p a c i t y . T h e N e w Civil Code divides suchproperties into property for public use and patrimonial properties (Ar t i c l e 4 2 3 ) , a n d f u r t h e r enumerates the properties for public use as provincial roads, city streets, municipal streets, the squares, fountains, public waters, promenades, and public works for public service paid for by saidp r o v i s i o n s , c i t i e s o r m u n i c i p a l i t i e s , a l l o t h e r p r o p e r t y i s p a t r i m o n i a l w i t h o u t p r e j u d i c e t o t h e provisions of special laws. Thus in Torio v. Fontanilla, the Court declared that with respect toproprietary functions the settled rule is that a municipal corporation can be held liable to third persons ex contractu.Under the foregoing considerations and in the absence of a special law, the North Cemetery is apatrimonial property of the City of Manila. The administration and government of the cemetery areunder the City Health Officer, the order and police of the cemetery, the opening of graves, niches,or tombs, the exhuming of remains, and the purification of the same are under the charge andresponsibility of the superintendent of the cemetery. With the acts of dominion, there is no doubtt h a t t h e N o r t h C e m e t e r y i s w i t h i n t h e c l a s s o f p r o p e r t y w h i c h t h e C i t y o f M a n i l a o w n s i n i t s proprietary or private character. Furthermore, there is no dispute that the burial lot was leased infavor of the private respondents. Hence, obligations arising from contracts have the force of lawbetween the contracting parties. Thus a lease contract executed by the lessor and lessee remainsas the law between them. Therefore, a breach of contractual provision entitles the other party todamages even if no penalty for such breach is prescribed in the contract.

Issue: WON the city is liable for damages Held: Yes Ratio: All things considered, even as the Court commiserates with plaintiffs for the unfortunateh a p p e n i n g c o m p l a i n e d o f a n d u n t i m e l y d e s e c r a t i o n o f t h e r e s t i n g p l a c e a n d r e m a i n s o f t h e i r deceased dearly beloved, it finds the reliefs prayed for by them lacking in legal and factual basis.U n d e r t h e a f o r e m e n t i o n e d f a c t s a n d circumstances, the most that plaintiffs ran ask for is ther e p l a c e m e n t o f s u b j e c t l o t w i t h a n o t h e r l o t o f e q u a l s i z e a n d s i m i l a r l o c a t i o n i n t h e N o r t h Cemetery which substitute lot plaintiffs can make use of without paying any rental to the cityg o v e r n m e n t f o r a p e r i o d o f f o r t y t h r e e ( 4 3 ) y e a r s , f o u r ( 4 ) m o n t h s a n d e l e v e n ( 1 1 ) d a y s corresponding to the unexpired portion of the term of the lease sued upon as of January 25, 1978w h e n t h e remains of the late Vivencio Sto. Domingo, Sr. were prematurely removed f r o m t h e disputed lot; and to require the defendants to look in earnest for the bones and skull of the late Vivencio Sto. Domingo Sr. and to bury the same in the substitute lot adjudged in favor of plaintiffshereunder.As regards the issue of the validity of the contract of lease of grave lot No. 159, Block No. 195 ofthe North Cemetery for 50 years beginning from June 6, 1971 to June 6, 2021 as clearly stated in t h e r e c e i p t duly signed by the deputy treasurer of the City of Manila and sealed by t h e c i t y government, there is nothing in the record that justifies the reversal of the conclusion of both thetrial court and the Intermediate Appellate Court to the effect that the receipt is in itself a contractof lease. (Under the doctrine of respondent superior, (Torio v. Fontanilla), petitioner City of Manila is liablefor the tortious act committed by its agents who failed to verify and check the duration of thecontract of lease. The contention of the petitioner-city that the lease is covered by AdministrativeO r d e r N o . 5 , s e r i e s o f 1 9 7 5 d a t e d M a r c h 6 , 1 9 7 5 o f t h e C i t y o f M a n i l a f o r f i v e ( 5 ) y e a r s o n l y beginning from June 6, 1971 is not meritorious for the said administrative order covers new leases.When subject lot was certified on January 25, 1978 as ready for exhumation, the lease contract forfifty (50) years was still in full force and effect.