l

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
June 27, 2012

Read until page 66 - "D. Issuances, Rules and Ordinances" Please read the following cases: a. Pesigan vs. Angeles, GRN 64279, April 30, 1984 b. David vs. Arroyo, GRN 171396, May 3, 2006 c. Victorias Milling Co. vs. Social Security Commission, 114 Phil 555 (1962) d. Director of Forestry vs. Munoz, GRN L- 24796, June 28, 1968 e. People vs. Lim, 108 Phil. 1091 (1960) e. China Banking Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 265 SCRA 327 (1996) f. United BF Homeowners Association vs. BF Homes, Inc., 310 SCRA 304, 315-316 (1999). g. Executive Secretary vs. Southwing Heavy Industries, Inc., GRN 164171, February 20, 2006 i. DAR vs. Sutton, GRN 162070, October 19, 2005 j. Maxima Realty Management and Devt Corporation vs. Parkway Real Estate Dev. Corp., GRN 136492, February 13, 2004 k. Peralta vs. Civil Service Commission, 212 SCRA 425 (1992) NOTE: The remaining cases that we failed to discuss are still included as your assignment.

CASE DIGESTS A. Pesigan vs. angeles Nature: Petition to review the order of the Caloocan City RTC

Facts: Anselmo and Marcelo Pesigan transported in the evening of April 2, 1982 twenty-six carabaos and a calf from Camarines Sur with Batangas as their destination. They were provided with three certificates: 1) a health certificate from the provincial veterinarian, 2) permit to transfer/transport from the provincial commander; and 3) three certificates of inspections. In spite of the papers, the carabaos were confiscated by the provincial veterinarian and the towns police station commander while passing through Camarines Norte. Confiscation was based on EO No. 626-A which prohibits transportation of carabaos & carabeef from one province to another.

Issue: WON EO No. 626-A, providing for the confiscation and forfeiture by the government of carabaos transported from one province to another, dated October 25, 1980 is enforceable before publication in the Official Gazette on June 14, 1982 Held: No. The said order isnt enforceable against the Pesigans on April 2, 1982 because its a penal regulation published more than 2 mos. later in the OG. It became effective only fifteen days thereafter as provided in A2 of the CC & 11 of the Revised Administrative Code. The word laws in article 2 includes circulars & regulations which prescribe penalties. Publication is necessary to apprise the public of the contents of the regulations & make the said penalties binding on the persons affected thereby. Commonwealth Act No. 638 requires that all Presidential EOs having general applicability should be published in the OG. It provides that every order or document which shall prescribe a penalty shall be deemed to have general applicability and legal effect. This applies to a violation of EO No. 626-A because its confiscation & forfeiture provision or sanction makes it a penal statute. It results that they have cause of action for the recovery of the carabaos. The summary confiscation wasnt in order. The recipients of the carabaos should return them to the Pesigans. However, they cannot transport the carabaos to Batangas because they are now bound by the said executive order. Neither can they recover damages. Doctor Miranda & Zenerosa acted in good faith in ordering the forfeiture and dispersal of the carabaos. JUDGEMENT: Order of dismissal and confiscation and dispersal of the carabaos, reversed and set aside. Respondents to restore carabaos, with the requisite documents, to petitioners for their own disposal in Basud or Sipocot, Camarines Sur. No costs. Important point: Publication is necessary to apprise the public of the contents of the regulations & make the said penalties binding on the persons affected hereby. Justice & fairness dictate that the public must be informed of that provision by means of the publication on the Gazette.

B. DAVID VS. ARROYO

Randolf David et al vs Gloria Arroyo

Proclamation 1017

-Freedom of Speech Overbreadth

In February 2006, due to the escape of some Magdalo members and the discovery of a plan (Oplan Hackle I) to assassinate GMA she declared PP 1017 and is to be implemented by GO 5. The said law was aimed to suppress lawlessness and the connivance of extremists to bring down the government. Pursuant to such PP, GMA cancelled all plans to celebrate EDSA I and at the same time revoked all permits issued for rallies and other public organization/meeting. Notwithstanding the cancellation of their rally permit, KMU head Randolf David proceeded to rally which led to his arrest. Later that day, the Daily Tribune, which Cacho-Olivares is the editor, was raided by the CIDG and they seized and confiscated anti-GMA articles and write ups. Later still, another known anti-GMA news agency (Malaya) was raided and seized. On the same day, Beltran of Anakpawis, was also arrested. His arrest was however grounded on a warrant of arrest issued way back in 1985 for his actions against Marcos. His supporters cannot visit him in jail because of the current imposition of PP 1017 and GO 5. In March, GMA issued PP 1021 w/c declared that the state of national emergency ceased to exist. David and some opposition Congressmen averred that PP1017 is unconstitutional for it has no factual basis and it cannot be validly declared by the president for such power is reposed in Congress. Also such declaration is actually a declaration of martial law. Olivares-Cacho also averred that the emergency contemplated in the Constitution are those of natural calamities and that such is an overbreadth. Petitioners claim that PP 1017 is an overbreadth because it encroaches upon protected and unprotected rights. The Sol-Gen argued that the issue has become moot and academic by reason of the lifting of PP 1017 by virtue of the declaration of PP 1021. The Sol-Gen averred that PP 1017 is within the presidents calling out power, take care power and take over power.

ISSUE: Whether or not PP 1017 and GO 5 is constitutional.

HELD: The issue cannot be considered as moot and academic by reason of the lifting of the questioned PP. It is still in fact operative because there are parties still affected due to the alleged violation of the said PP. Hence, the SC can take cognition of the case at bar. The SC ruled that PP 1017 is constitutional in part and at the same time some provisions of which are unconstitutional. The SC ruled in the following way; Resolution by the SC on the Factual Basis of its declaration The petitioners were not able to prove that GMA has factual basis in issuing PP 1017 and GO 5. A reading of the Solicitor Generals Consolidated Comment and Memorandum shows

a detailed narration of the events leading to the issuance of PP 1017, with supporting reports forming part of the records. Mentioned are the escape of the Magdalo Group, their audacious threat of the Magdalo D-Day, the defections in the military, particularly in the Philippine Marines, and the reproving statements from the communist leaders. There was also the Minutes of the Intelligence Report and Security Group of the Philippine Army showing the growing alliance between the NPA and the military. Petitioners presented nothing to refute such events. Thus, absent any contrary allegations, the Court is convinced that the President was justified in issuing PP 1017 calling for military aid. Indeed, judging the seriousness of the incidents, GMA was not expected to simply fold her arms and do nothing to prevent or suppress what she believed was lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. However, the exercise of such power or duty must not stifle liberty.

Resolution by the SC on the Over breadth Theory First and foremost, the over breadth doctrine is an analytical tool developed for testing on their faces statutes in free speech cases. The 7 consolidated cases at bar are not primarily freedom of speech cases. Also, a plain reading of PP 1017 shows that it is not primarily directed to speech or even speech-related conduct. It is actually a call upon the AFP to prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence. Moreover, the over breadth doctrine is not intended for testing the validity of a law that reflects legitimate state interest in maintaining comprehensive control over harmful, constitutionally unprotected conduct. Undoubtedly, lawless violence, insurrection and rebellion are considered harmful and constitutionally unprotected conduct. Thus, claims of facial over breadth are entertained in cases involving statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate only spoken words and again, that over breadth claims, if entertained at all, have been curtailed when invoked against ordinary criminal laws that are sought to be applied to protected conduct. Here, the incontrovertible fact remains that PP 1017 pertains to a spectrum of conduct, not free speech, which is manifestly subject to state regulation. Resolution by the SC on the Calling Out Power Doctrine On the basis of Sec 17, Art 7 of the Constitution, GMA declared PP 1017. The SC considered the Presidents calling-out power as a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom, it stressed that this does not prevent an examination of whether such power was exercised within permissible constitutional limits or whether it was exercised in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion. The SC ruled that GMA has validly declared PP 1017 for the Constitution grants the President, as Commander-in-Chief, a sequence of graduated

powers. From the most to the least benign, these are: the calling-out power, the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and the power to declare Martial Law. The only criterion for the exercise of the calling-out power is that whenever it becomes necessary, the President may call the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. And such criterion has been met. Resolution by the SC on the Take Care Doctrine Pursuant to the 2nd sentence of Sec 17, Art 7 of the Constitution (He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.) the president declared PP 1017. David et al averred that PP 1017 however violated Sec 1, Art 6 of the Constitution for it arrogated legislative power to the President. Such power is vested in Congress. They assail the clause to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction. The SC noted that such provision is similar to the power that granted former President Marcos legislative powers (as provided in PP 1081). The SC ruled that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants GMA the authority to promulgate decrees. Legislative power is peculiarly within the province of the Legislature. Sec 1, Article 6 categorically states that [t]he legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives. To be sure, neither Martial Law nor a state of rebellion nor a state of emergency can justify GMA[s exercise of legislative power by issuing decrees. The president can only take care of the carrying out of laws but cannot create or enact laws.

Resolution by the SC on the Take Over Power Doctrine The president cannot validly order the taking over of private corporations or institutions such as the Daily Tribune without any authority from Congress. On the other hand, the word emergency contemplated in the constitution is not limited to natural calamities but rather it also includes rebellion. The SC made a distinction; the president can declare the state of national emergency but her exercise of emergency powers does not come automatically after it for such exercise needs authority from Congress. The authority from Congress must be based on the following: (1) There must be a war or other emergency. (2) The delegation must be for a limited period only. (3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may prescribe.

(4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy declared by Congress. Resolution by the SC on the Issue that PP 1017 is a Martial Law Declaration The SC ruled that PP 1017 is not a Martial Law declaration and is not tantamount to it. It is a valid exercise of the calling out power of the president by the president.

SAME CASE DIGEST FOR DAVID V. ARROYO

a.
Facts:

David v Arroyo GR No. 171396, May 3, 2006

As the nation celebrated EDSAs 20th anniversary, President Arroyo issued PP 1017 declaring a state of national emergency and thereby commanded the AFP and PNP to immediately carryout necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of terrorism and lawless violence. This declaration led to cancellation of all programs and activities related to the EDSA People Power I celebration. Rally permits were revoked and warrantless arrests and take-over of facilities, including the media, were implemented. Assemblies and rallyists were dispersed. Along with the dispersal, petitioner was arrested without warrant. A week after PP 1017, PP1021 was issued lifting the state of emergency. Issue: Whether or not there is an actual controversy or case subject for judicial review. Whether or not there petition is with legal standing particularly on his qualification to sue. Ratio Decidendi: The Solicitor Generals refute that the case has been moot and academic was not upheld by the Court. According to the Supreme Court, courts will decide cases otherwise found moot and academic if: there is grave Constitutional violation, the situation Is exceptional character and paramount public interest involved, issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, bar and public, and lastly it is capable of repetition yet evading review. Petitioner was found to be of legal standing on the grounds that his personal rights were involved. The petitioner qualifies under the direct injury test. The personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury qualifies him to impugn the validity of the statute. To wit some of these direct injuries he sustained are the illegal arrest and unlawful search he experienced. Given this fact, the court entertained his petition as he has adequately shown that he entitled to judicial protection. However, the court does not liberally declare statutes as invalid although they may be abused and misabused and may afford an opportunity for abuse in the manner of application. The validity of a statute or ordinance is to be determined from its general purpose and its efficiency to accomplish the end desired, not from its effects in a particular case. The Court ruled that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants President Arroyo the authority to promulgate decrees, taking into

consideration that legislative power is vested only in congress. The Court partly grants the petitions. PP 1017 is constitutional insofar as it allows the President to call the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence. However, commanding the AFP to enforce laws not related to lawless violence are declared unconstitutional. Such proclamation does not also authorize the President to take over privately-owned public utilities or business affected with public interest without prior legislation. General Order No. 5 is constitutional as it is a standard on how the AFP and PNP would implement PP1017, but portion where acts of terrorism has not been defined and punishable by congress is held unconstitutional. Furthermore, the following acts of the government were held unconstitutional: warrantless arrest of the petitioner, dispersal and warrantless arrests of rallyists in the absence of proof that said petitioners were committing acts constituting lawless violence, invasion or rebellion, or violating BP 800; imposition of media standards and any form of prior restraint on the press, as well as warrantless search of the Tribune Offices and whimsical seizure of its articles for publication and other materials.

C. VICTORIAS MILLING CO. VS SSS

Facts: On October 15, 1958, the Social Security Commission issued its CircularNo. 22 of the following tenor: "Effective November 1, 1958, all Employers in computing the premiums due the System, will take in...to consideration and include in the Employee's remuneration all bonuses and overtime pay, as well as the cash value of other media of remuneration. All these will comprise the Employee's remuneration or earnings, upon which the 3-1/2% and 21/2% contributions will be based, up to a maximum of P500 for any one month."Petitioner Victorias Milling Company, Inc. wrote the Social Security Commission in effect protesting against the circular as contradictory to a previous Circular No. 7, dated October 7, 1957 expressly excluding overtime pay and bonus in the computation of the employers' and employees' respective monthly premium contributions. Moreover, it contended that due notice via publication was not complied with. Issue: (1) Whether or not Circular No. 22 is a rule or regulation, as contemplated in Section 4(a) of Republic Act 1161 empowering the Social Security Commission "to adopt, amend and repeal subject to the approval of the President such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions and purposes of this Act."

Held: It will thus be seen that whereas prior to the amendment, bonuses, allowances, and overtime pay given in addition to the regular or base pay were expressly excluded, or exempted from the definition of the term "compensation", such exemption or exclusion was deleted by the amendatory law. It thus became necessary for the Social Security Commission to interpret the effect of such deletion or elimination. Circular No. 22 was, therefore, issued to apprise those concerned of the interpretation or understanding of the Commission, of the law as

amended, which it was its duty to enforce. It did not add any duty or detail that was not already in the law as amended. It merely stated and circularized the opinion of the Commission as to how the law should be construed.

D. DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY VS. MUNOZ

Note: This case is consolidated with G.R. No. L-24796 DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY vs HON. EMMANUEL M. MUOZ Land Titles and Deeds Systems of Registration Prior to PD 1529 Spanish Titles

FACTS: PINAGCAMALIGAN INDO-AGRO DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, INC (Piadeco) is a company engaged in logging. It was given a Certificate of Private Woodland Registration so that it can operate in a 72000 hectare. It also has a Titulo de Propriedad which it acquired in 1894 under the Spanish regime. In 1964, the NAWASA director ordered the cancellation of Piadecos certificate because it encroached beyond what was allowed in the certificate. It actually cut trees in the Angat and Marikina watershed area which was prohibited. The lower court ruled in favor of Piadeco. Piadeco also had a settlement with Nawasa. Piadeco sought to renew its certificate but it was denied by the Asst. Director of Forestry. The latter ruled that the Spanish title is no longer recognized and should have never been used to apply for a Certificate. ISSUE: Whether or not Piadeco can claim ownership over the property. HELD: No. The Spanish title it acquired cannot be used to register for another Certificate. There should be no question now that Forestry Administrative Order 12-2 has the force and effect of law. It was promulgated pursuant to law. Section 1817, Revised Administrative Code, empowers the Bureau of Forestry, with the approval of the department head, to issue regulations deemed expedient or necessary to secure the protection and conservation of the public forests in such manner as to insure a continued supply of valuable timber and other forest products for the future, and regulating the use and occupancy of the forests and forest reserves, to the same end. Forestry Administrative Order 12-2 was recommended by the Director of Forestry, and approved by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. It is no less a valid law. It is an administrative regulation germane to the objects and purposes of the law. A rule shaped out by jurisprudence is that when Congress authorized the promulgation of administrative rules and regulations to implement a given legislation, [a]ll that is required is that the regulation should be germane to the objects and purposes of the law; that the regulation be not in contradiction with it, but conform to the standards that the law prescribes. E. PEOPLE VS. LIM 8

FACTS: In the morning of Sunday, April 20, 1969, Santiago Tumaliuan, a 37-yr old businessman, drove his jeep to Tuguegarao. He was accompanied by his daughter Vilma, whom he dropped off at St Paul College, and Fausto Guiyab, Juan Malillin and Patrolman Cesar Binag who was his escort in civilian clothes. They first played mahjong at the house of one Mallabo. Guiyab remained in the jeep to guard it. At noon, they proceeded to the cockpit. Guiyab again watched the jeep. At about 4PM, Santiago and Binag left the cockpit. On their way out, they passed by Antonio Lim and his bodyguard near the exit. Genaro and Alberto, Lims companions, were standing at the gate talking to each other. Upon reaching the jeep, Santiago took the drivers seat. Binag seated himself at the passengers and Guiyab occupied the back seat. They first went to the gas station to fill up. Binag saw Genaro and Alberto on the street 10 meters away to his right. Genaro shouted in Ibanag dialect translated, Fire now. 3 successive gunshots were fired in a few seconds. The 1st show killed Santiago hitting him in the head. The 2nd shot was fired at Guiyab who also shot in the head, killing him instantly. The 3rd shot hit Patrolman Binag in the jaw. He fell on the cement pavement and lost consciousness. But before that, he saw Lim firing the first 2 shots w/ his .38 caliber nickle-plated Smith & Wesson revolver. Being a patrolman himself and having served in the army, he was familiar w/ firearms. Lim was then wearing a yellow polo-jacket. Binag had known him for a long time since they both came from San Pablo and used to drink liquor together. Binag sustained a gunshot wound above the left jaw, near the mouth, injuring his tongue. If not for blood transfusion, he would have died. In the hospital, on the night following the shooting, the chief of police interviewed him and asked him who had fired at him and his companions. As Binag could not talk, he wrote on a piece of paper the name of his assailant: Antonio Lim with his bodyguard. Prior to the shooting, Santiagos brother, Vice-Mayor Carlos Tumaliuan was charged w/ the murder of Antionio Lims mother and sister. Moreover, in another case, the brothers of Lim were charged w/ murder and Binag was a prosecution witness there. Santiago was known to be financier of his brother, the vice-mayor, while Guiyab was a buyer of tobacco for Santiago and was responsible for obtaining bail bonds for the vicemayor.

HELD: The guilt of Lim was proven beyond reasonable doubt. The shooting was indubitably treacherous for Lim employed a form of assault w/c directly and specially insured its execution w/o risk to himself arising from the defense w/c the victims might have made (Art 14 RPC). The surprise assault precluded them from making any defense at all. Premeditation was not proven. The prosecution failed to establish (a) the time when Lim determined to commit the crimes, (b) the act showing that he had clung to his determination, and

(c) a sufficient interval between the determination and the execution that would have afforded him full opportunity for meditation and reflection and allowed his conscience to overcome the resolution of his will. There being no generic aggr/mit circumstances, the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each of the 2 murders was properly imposed (Art 64 & 248 RPC). An indeterminate sentence of 6 yrs of prision correcional, as minimum, to 12 yrs & 1 day of reclusion temporal minimum, as maximum, is imposed for the frustrated murder. Judgment affirmed. F. CHINA BANKING CORP VS. CA China Banking Corp. v. CA Case No. 59G.R. No. 121158 (December 5, 1996) FACTS: Petitioner extended loans to Native West Corp. and its president, So Ching, in return for promissory notes to pay the loans. Two extra mortgages were additionally executed by So Ching and his wife on July and August 1989. The loans matured but So Ching was not able to repay the said loans. This caused Petitioner to file for extrajudicial foreclosures of the two mortgaged properties. The properties were to be sold/auctioned on April 3, 1993. On April 28, 1989 the court ruled on the side of So Ching. The issuance of the preliminary injunction was granted; therefore the sale of the two mortgaged properties was stopped. Petitioner sought for reconsideration and elevated the case to the Court of Appeals. They were appealing that Act No.3135 was the governing rule in their case, instead of Administrative Order No. 3as So Ching was contending. ISSUE:1. W/N Petitioner can extra-judicially foreclose the properties.2. W/N Administrative Order No. 3 should govern the extra judicial foreclosure. HELD: 1. Petitioner can foreclose the properties. 2. Act No. 3135 is the governing law. Administrative Order No. 3 cannot prevail over Act 3135. It is an elementary principle that a stature is superior to an administrative directive. Thus, the statute cannot be repealed or amended by the administrative

10