Francisco Tatad et al vs Secretary of Energy

Equal Protection Oil Deregulation Law Considering that oil is not endemic to this country, history shows that the government has always been finding ways to alleviate the oil industry. The government created laws accommodate these innovations in the oil industry. One such law is the Downstream Oil Deregulation Act of 1996 or RA 8180. This law allows that any person or entity may import or purchase any quantity of crude oil and petroleum products from a foreign or domestic source, lease or own and operate refineries and other downstream oil facilities and market such crude oil or use the same for his own requirement, subject only to monitoring by the Department of Energy. Tatad assails the constitutionality of the law. He claims, among others, that the imposition of different tariff rates on imported crude oil and imported refined petroleum products violates the equal protection clause. Tatad contends that the 3%-7% tariff differential unduly favors the three existing oil refineries and discriminates against prospective investors in the downstream oil industry who do not have their own refineries and will have to source refined petroleum products from abroad.3% is to be taxed on unrefined crude products and 7% on refined crude products. ISSUE: Whether or not RA 8180 is constitutional. HELD: The SC declared the unconstitutionality of RA 8180 because it violated Sec 19 of Art 12 of the Constitution. It violated that provision because it only strengthens oligopoly which is contrary to free competition. It cannot be denied that our downstream oil industry is operated and controlled by an oligopoly, a foreign oligopoly at that. Petron, Shell and Caltex stand as the only major league players in the oil market. All

other players belong to the lilliputian league. As the dominant players, Petron, Shell and Caltex boast of existing refineries of various capacities. The tariff differential of 4% therefore works to their immense benefit. Yet, this is only one edge of the tariff differential. The other edge cuts and cuts deep in the heart of their competitors. It erects a high barrier to the entry of new players. New players that intend to equalize the market power of Petron, Shell and Caltex by building refineries of their own will have to spend billions of pesos. Those who will not build refineries but compete with them will suffer the huge disadvantage of increasing their product cost by 4%. They will be competing on an uneven field. The argument that the 4% tariff differential is desirable because it will induce prospective players to invest in refineries puts the cart before the horse. The first need is to attract new players and they cannot be attracted by burdening them with heavy disincentives. Without new players belonging to the league of Petron, Shell and Caltex, competition in our downstream oil industry is an idle dream. RA 8180 is unconstitutional on the ground inter alia that it discriminated against the new players insofar as it placed them at a competitive disadvantage vis--vis the established oil companies by requiring them to meet certain conditions already being observed by the latter.

CASE DIGEST ON TAADA v. TUVERA [136 SCRA 27 (1985)]

November 10, 2010 Nature: Petition to review the decision of the Executive Assistant to the President. Facts: Invoking the peoples right to be informed on matters of public concern, a right recognized in Section 6, Article IV of the 1973 constitution, petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials

to publish, and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette, of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders. The respondents would have this case dismissed on the ground that petitioners have no legal personality to bring this petition. Petitioners maintain that since the subject of the petition concerns a public right and its object is to compel public duty, they need not show any specific interest. Respondents further contend that publication in the OG is not a sine qua non requirement for the effectivity of laws where the laws themselves provide for their own effectivity dates. Issue: WON publication in the Official Gazatte is an indispensable requirement for the effectivity of the PDs, LOIs, general orders, EOs, etc. where laws themselves provide for their own effectivity dates. Held: Yes. It is the peoples right to be informed on matters of public concern & corollarily access to official records, & to documents & papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, shall be afforded the citizens subject to such limitation as may be provided by law (6 AIV, 1973 Constitution). Laws, to be valid & enforceable, must be published in the OG or otherwise effectively promulgated. The fact that a PD or LOI states its date of effectivity does not preclude their publication in the OG as they constitute important legislative acts. The publication of presidential issuances of public nature or of general applicability is a requirement of due process. Before a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially informed of its contents. Judgment: Respondents ordered to publish in Official Gazette all unpublished presidential issuances of general application, and unless so published shall have no binding force and effect.

Impt Point: It illustrates how decrees & issuances issued by one manMarcosare in fact laws of genl application & provide for penalties. The constitution afforded Marcos both executive & legislative powers. The generality of law (CC A14) will never work w/o constructive notice. The ruling of this case provides the publication constitutes the necessary constructive notice & is thus the cure for ignorance as an excuse. Ignorance will not even mitigate the crime.

People of the Phils v Que Po Lay

TITLE: People of the Phils v Que Po Lay CITATION: 94 Phil 640 | GR No. 6791, March 29, 1954 FACTS: The appellant was in possession of foreign exchange consisting of US dollars, US checks and US money orders amounting to about $7000 but failed to sell the same to the Central Bank as required under Circular No. 20.Circular No. 20 was issued in the year 1949 but was published in the Official Gazette only on Nov. 1951 after the act or omission imputed to Que Po Lay. Que Po Lay appealed from the decision of the lower court finding him guilty of violating Central Bank Circular No. 20 in connection with Sec 34 of RA 265sentencing him to suffer 6 months imprisonment, pay fine of P1,000 with subsidiaryimprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.ISSUE:1. Whether or not publication of Circular 20 in the Official Gazette is

needed for it to become effective and subject violators to corresponding penalties. HELD: It was held by the Supreme Court, in an en banc decision, that as a rule, circular and regulations of the Central Bank in question prescribing a penalty for its violation should be published before becoming effective. This is based on the theory that before the public is bound by its contents especially its penal provisions, a law, regulation or circular must first be published for the people to be officially and specifically informed of such contents including its penalties. Thus, the Supreme Court reversed the decision appealed from and acquit the appellant, with costs de oficio.

ECHEGARAY v. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE

FACTS: The DOJ, through the Department of Justice, filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration on the January 4, 1999 issuance of the Supreme Court of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) on the execution of Echegaray. The DOJ, represented by the Solicitor General, argued that the Court no longer has the authority to grant the TRO because: That the Court lost its jurisdiction the moment it rendered its judgment that is already final and executory; That it is encroaching on the powers specifically vested by the Supreme Court to the executive department in granting the TRO; That the purpose sought to be achieved by the TRO is nil due to certain supervening events that transpired.

ISSUE: Whether or not the court abused its discretion in granting a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) on the execution of Echegaray despite the fact that the finality of judgment has already been rendered. RULING: No, the Court was within its authority when it granted the TRO despite the final and executory judgment having been rendered already. 1.The Court did not lose its jurisdiction when it granted the TRO. In its decision, it categorically answered the contention of the plaintiff in such that it is not changing its judgment. The Court is merely suspending its execution temporarily. It was emphasized tht the Court, in rendering the judgment lost its jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the same, but it retained its power to execute and enforce it. It was further stated that the power to control the execution of its decision is an essential aspect of jurisdiction. The 1987 Constitution, according to the Court, strengthened and broadened the power of the Court in matters like these. It gave the Court the power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, i.e. the right to life. On a final note regarding the first contention of the respondent, the DOJ acknowledged this Courts jurisdiction when it filed a Manifestation and Urgent Motion to Compel the trial judge to disclose the Warrant of Execution containing the date of Echegarays execution to the public. The jurisdiction of the Court, it emphasizes, does not depend on the convenience of the litigants. 2.The respondents contention that the issuance of the TRO encroaches on the power of the executive is also rejected. Section 19 Article VII of the Constitution

cannot be interpreted as denying the powers of the Court to Control the enforcement of their decision after their finality. It is not a usurpation of the presidential power of reprieve, although it has he same effect. It must be noted that the powers of the Executive, the Legislative, and the Judiciary to save the life of a death convict does not exclude each other for the simple reason that there is no higher right than the right to life. 3.The Court made it a point to clarify the rationale behind the issuance of the TRO. The Court had to decide on the petitioners Very Urgent Motion for the Issuance of a TRO with a mere (5) hours prior to the execution of Echegaray. They had been placed in a very difficult position because it was such a short period to ascertain the validity and substance of the allegation contained in the Very Urgent Motion. They also had no way of checking and verifying with Congress because it was in recess at that time. The Court took an extremely cautious stance by temporarily restraining the execution of the petitioner because of fear that any error of the Court in not stopping the execution will preclude any further relief for all rights stop at the graveyard. At the end of the day, the TRO had achieved its purpose. It crystallized the issue on whether the Congeress is disposed to review capital punishment or not. Supervening events like the (1) pronouncement of then President Estrada that it will veto any law repealing death penalty; (2) the resolkution of the Congressmen that they are against the repeal of the law; and (3) that current actions undertaken by Senators Roco and Pimentel are futile.

ORTIGAS AND CO, LTD., VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS G.R. NO. 126102; DECEMBER 4,

2000DIGEST NO.1Facts: On August 25, 1976, petitioner Ortigas & Company sold to EmiliaHermoso, a parcel of land known as Lot 1, Block 21, Psd-66759, locatedin Greenhills Subdivision IV, San Juan, Metro Manila. One stipulationo f t h e c o n t r a c t p r o v i d e d t h a t the lot will be used exclusively forr e s i dential purposes only, and not mor e t h a n o n e s i n g l e - f a m i l y residential building will be constructed thereon.I n 1 9 8 1 , t h e M e t r o p o l i t a n M a n i l a C o mmission (now MetropolitanManila Develop ment Authority) enacted MMC Ordinance No . 8 1 - 0 1 , a l s o known as the Comprehensive Zoning Area for the National Capital Region.T h e ordinance reclassified as a commercial area a portion of OrtigasA v e n u e f r o m M a d i s o n t o R o o s e v e l t S t r e e t s o f G r e e n h i l l s S u b d i v i s i o n wh ere the lot is located.On June 8, 1984, private respondent Ismael Mathay III leased thel o t f r o m E m i l i a H e r m o s o a n d J . P . H e r m o s o R e a l t y C o r p . . T h e l e a s e con tract did not specify the purposes of the lease. Thereupon, privater e s p o n d e n t c o n s t r u c t e d a s i ngle story commercial building f o r Greenhills Autohaus, Inc., a car sales company.Thus on January 18, 1995 Ortigas and Co. filed a complaint whichsought to the demolition of the said structure , thus in his defenseMathay denied any knowledge of the

restriction on the lot , he furtherc o n t e n d s i n his special civil action to the court of appeals that , the MCC Ordinance classified the area where th e lot was located as acommercial area and said ordinance must be read as a concrete exerciseof Police power.T h e c o n t e n t i o n h o w e v e r o f t h e petitioner Ortigas, is that it isobserved that the contract of sale was entered into in August 1 9 7 6 , while the zoning ordinance was enacted only in March 1981. The trialc o u r t r e a s o n e d t h a t s i n c e private respondent had failed to show t h a t MMC Ordinance No. 81-01 had retroactive effect, said ordinance shouldbe given prospective application only. And the contract of Ortigas Coand Hermosos should not be affected. Issues: Whether or not the ordinance of the MCC nullified the buildingr e s t r i c t i o n i m p o s i n g e x c l u s i v e r e s i d e n t i a l u s e o n t h e p r o p e r t y in quisition. Held: In general, we agree that laws are to be construed as having onlyprospective operation. Lex prospicit, non respicit. Equally settled,o n l y l a w s e x i s t i n g a t t h e time of the execution of a contract area p p l i c a b l e t h e r e t o and not later statutes, unless the l a t t e r a r e specifically intended to have retroactive effect. A later l a w w h i c h enlarges, abridges, or in any manner

changes the intent of the partiesto the contract necessarily impairs the contract itself and cannot beg i v e n r e t r o a c t i v e e f f e c t w i t h o u t v i o l a t i n g t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l pr ohibition against impairment of contracts.But, the foregoing principles do admit of certain exceptions. Oneinvolves police power. A law enacted in the exercise of police powerto regulate or govern certain activities or transactions could be givenr e t r o a c t i v e e f f e c t a n d m a y r easonably impair vested rights o r contracts. Police power legislation is applicable not only to futurecontracts, but equally to those already in existence. Non impairment ofcontracts or vested rights clauses will have to yield to the superiora n d legitimate exercise by the State of police power to promote theh e a l t h , m o r a l s , p e a c e , e d u c a t i o n , g o o d o r d e r , s a f e t y , a n d g e n e r a l welfare of the people. Moreover, statutes in exercise of valid policep o w e r m u s t b e r e a d i n t o e v e r y contract. Noteworthy, in Sangalang vs.Intermediate Appellate Court, we already upheld MMC Ordinance No. 81-01as a legitimate police power measure. Sec. 18. When Laws Take Effect. - Laws shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation, unless it is otherwise provided.

Revised Penal Code Article 22 Retroactive effect of penal laws Penal Laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the persons guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal, as this term is defined in Rule 5 of Article 62 of this Code, although at the time of the publication of such laws a final sentence has been pronounced and the convict is serving the same. Revised Penal Code Article 62 Effect of the attendance of mitigating or aggravating circumstances and of habitual delinquency Mitigating or aggravating circumstances and habitual delinquency shall be taken into account for the purpose of diminishing or increasing the penalty in conformity with the following rules: 1. Aggravating circumstances which in themselves constitute a crime specially punishable by law or which are included by the law in defining a crime and prescribing the penalty therefor shall not be taken into account for the purpose of increasing the penalty. 2. The same rule shall apply with respect to any aggravating circumstance inherent in the crime to such a degree that it must of necessity accompany the commission thereof. 3. Aggravating or mitigating circumstances which arise from the moral attributes of the offender, or from his private relations with the offended party, or from any other personal cause, shall only serve to aggravate or mitigate the liability of the principals, accomplices and accessories as to whom such circumstances are attendant.

4. The circumstances which consist in the material execution of the act, or in the means employed to accomplish it, shall serve to aggravate or mitigate the liability of those persons only who had knowledge of them at the time of the execution of the act or their cooperation therein. 5. Habitual delinquency shall have the following effects: (a) Upon a third conviction the culprit shall be sentenced to the penalty provided by law for the last crime of which he be found guilty and to the additional penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods; (b) Upon a fourth conviction, the culprit shall be sentenced to the penalty provided for the last crime of which he be found guilty and to the additional penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods; and (c) Upon a fifth or additional conviction, the culprit shall be sentenced to the penalty provided for the last crime of which he be found guilty and to the additional penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its minimum period. Notwithstanding the provisions of this article, the total of the two penalties to be imposed upon the offender, in conformity herewith, shall in no case exceed 30 years. For the purpose of this article, a person shall be deemed to be habitual delinquent, is within a period of ten years from the date of his release or last conviction of the crimes of serious or less serious physical injuries, robo, hurto, estafa or falsification, he is found guilty of any of said crimes a third time or oftener.

Sec. 19. Prospectivity. - Laws shall have prospective effect unless the contrary is expressly provided.